CICL XXX v.

People

An Information was filed against CICL XXX, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 1st day of January 2010 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused [CICL XXX], a
minor, 17 years old, but acting with discernment conspiring together, confederating with CHRISTOPHER PUYO
AND JAYJAY NARAG and mutually helping one another, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously[,] with intent to kill, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one GLENN
REDOQUERIO by then and there mauling him and hitting him in the head with a piece of stone, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and grave wounds, the offender thus performing all the acts of execution that
would produce the crime of homicide as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason or
cause independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance rendered
to said GLENN REDOQUERIO, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

During the arraignment, CICL XXX pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.

The prosecution presented private complainant Redoquerio de los Santos and Luague as witnesses. The version of
the prosecution is as follows:

At around 12:30 in the morning on January 1, 2010, private complainant Redoquerio was sent by his mother to buy
iced tea powder from a store located in VVV, WWW, Quezon City. While he was at the store, Glenn heard
somebody say "Yan si Glenn anak ni Purok Leader na humuli sa atin nuon." He looked back and saw CICL XXX,
Puyo and Narag. CICL XXX suddenly poked a gun at the face of Redoquerio. The gun was only about six (6) inches
away from Redoquerio's face. CICL XXX pulled the trigger several times but the gun did not fire. CICL XXX then
hit (hinataw) the left temple and top of the head of Redoquerio with the gun. Puyo and Narag held the arms of
Redoquerio while CICL XXX punched him several times. Puyo then hit the head of Redoquerio with a stone
causing the latter to lose consciousness. Redoquerio was in coma for 7 days while he was confined at the East
Avenue Medical Center.

Redoquerio incurred expenses for the treatment of his injuries as shown by various receipts.

The incident was witnessed by Delos Santos who was buying cigarettes from the store at that time.

On the other hand, the version of the defense is as follows:

CICL XXX denied the allegations against him. At around 2:00 in the morning on January 1, 2010, he and his family
were having a celebration for the New Year in their residence in WWW, Quezon City. They heard a commotion
outside and they were told that there was a mauling incident that was happening. His mother YYY went out first and
then he, his siblings and their visitors followed to the corner of Cotabato Street. CICL XXX saw Redoquerio and De
los Santos mauling Narag. Thereafter, De los Santos ran away while Narag boxed Redoquerio who fell on his back.
He did not know what happened next because YYY already called for him and they went home. He and his family
were surprised when they were called by the barangay authorities because he was implicated in the mauling of
Redoquerio. He surmised that the reason why he was implicated in this case is that Redoquerio did not really know
who mauled him.

After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted CICL XXX of the crime of Frustrated Murder. Aggrieved, CICL XXX
appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of CICL XXX.

The CA concluded, based on the evidence presented, that CICL XXX was in conspiracy with Puyo and Narag in
inflicting fatal injuries against Redoquerio. Hence, the instant appeal.

(1) Whether the CA erred in convicting CICL XXXX despite the prosecution's failure to show that he acted with
discernment. – YES.
The appeal is meritorious. The Court acquits CICL XXX for the crime of Frustrated Homicide.

In questioning his conviction, CICL XXX argues that because he was only seventeen (17) years old at the time he
supposedly committed the crime, then he is presumed to have acted without discernment, and that it was the burden
of the prosecution to prove otherwise. CICL XXX then argues that the prosecution was unable to discharge its
burden. The argument is meritorious.

In the case of Dorado v. People, the Court had the occasion to state that "when a minor above 15 but below 18 years
old is charged with a crime, it cannot be presumed that he or she acted with discernment. During the trial, the
prosecution must specifically prove as a separate circumstance that the CICL XXX committed the alleged crime
with discernment." The Court in the same case said:

"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor x
x x who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference
between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances accorded by the records in each case, the very
appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and
during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial."

"The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence of intelligence, freedom of
action of the offender which is an essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is
the power necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act. On the
other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong." As earlier stated, the "prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by
evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission of the
act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor
knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the
crime and the minor's cunning and shrewdness." In an earlier case, it was written:

For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable
doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he
was doing and that it was wrong.

Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor; his overt acts before, during and
after the commission of the crime relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used in the commission of the
crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus delicti.

Discernment cannot be presumed even if Dorado intended to do away with Ronald. Discernment is
different from intent. The distinction was elaborated in Guevarra v. Almodovar. Thus:

On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and intent are two different concepts. We
agree with the Solicitor General's view; the two terms should not be confused.

The word "intent" has been defined as: a design; a determination to do a certain [thing]; an aim; the purpose
of the mind, including such knowledge as is essential to such intent; x x x; the design resolve, or
determination with which a person acts." It is this intent which comprises the third element of [dolo] as a
means of committing a felony, freedom and intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, We have
defined the term "discernment," as used in Article 12(3) of the RPC, “"The discernment that constitutes an
exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who
commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong x x x"
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While both
are products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desire of one's act while the latter relate
to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence, a person may not intend to shoot another but
may be aware of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in negligently
handling an air rifle. It is not correct, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of
age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his
friend, thus, did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his negligence.

The Court in Dorado acquitted the 16-year-old accused therein, because: (1) the prosecution did not make an effort
to prove that the accused acted with discernment at the time of the commission of the crime, and (2) the decision of
the RTC convicting the accused therein simply stated that a privileged mitigating circumstance of minority must be
appreciated in favor of the accused. The Court therein noted that there was no discussion at all on whether the
accused therein acted with discernment when he committed the crime imputed against him.

The foregoing ruling is applicable to CICL XXX's case.

In the present case, neither the RTC nor the CA discussed whether CICL XXX acted with discernment. The CA, for
instance, only noted CICL XXX's age in its discussion of the penalty to be imposed on him. Thus:

It was established that appellant was merely 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime on
January 1, 2010, having been born on August 15, 1992. He is therefore entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. It provides that when the
offender is a minor over 15 and under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed on the accused but always in the proper period.

Both the RTC and the CA erred in convicting CICL XXX, as they both equated "intent to kill" — which was
admittedly established through the evidence presented by the prosecution — with acting with discernment,
which, on the contrary, was not proved.

The prosecution, in fact, never endeavored to prove that CICL XXX acted with discernment. This is highlighted by
the prosecution's cross-examination of CICL XXX, which focused only on whether Redoquerio had the motive to
falsely accuse CICL XXX of committing a crime, and whether CICL XXX's father owned a gun. (See notes)

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, on the other hand, established only CICL XXX's supposed
participation in the mauling of Redoquerio. To reiterate, these pieces of evidence only establish CICL XXX's
intent, instead of his having acted with discernment. Furthermore, even if he was a co-conspirator, he would still
be exempt from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non- discernment on his part
by virtue of his age. It is well to emphasize that:

[f]or a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, theprosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable
doubt,by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he was
doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor; his overt acts
before, during and after the commission of the crime relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used in the
commission of the crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus delicti.”

Again, there are no such pieces of evidence in the case at bar. As the presumption that CICL XXX acted without
discernment was not successfully controverted, he must perforce be acquitted of the charge.

(2) Whether the CA erred in convicting CICL XXX for Frustrated

Even assuming that CICL XXX had acted with discernment, the RTC and the CA still erred in convicting him for
Frustrated Homicide.
To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt:
(1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the
accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have
performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the
victim without medical intervention or attendance.

On the other hand, the essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows: (1) the offender performs all the acts
of execution; (2) all the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence; (3) but the felony is not
produced; and (4) by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

In affirming the conviction of CICL XXX for Frustrated Homicide, the CA noted — without citing its basis — that
"the injuries sustained by private complainant would have caused his death, if not for the timely medical attention he
received." A perusal of the records, however, reveals that the extent of the injuries sustained by Redoquerio was not
fully established. The medical records of Redoquerio were admitted into evidence only through the testimony of
Luague, the Administrative Officer 1 of East Avenue Medical Center who had custody of the medical records.
However, as he was not a medical doctor, both parties stipulated that Luague could not: (1) "testify as to the nature
and gravity of the wound sustained by the private complainant"; and (2) "testify whether or not the alleged wound
sustained by the private complainant is fatal in nature."

There is no testimonial evidence on record explaining to the Court the medical findings which would have
established the nature and extent of the injuries that Redoquerio sustained.

As the nature and extent of the injuries were not sufficiently established, it was error for the lower courts to conclude
that the injuries were fatal and that Redoquerio would have died if not for the timely medical assistance he received.

Damages

While CICL XXX is not criminally liable for his acts because the presumption that he acted without discernment
was not overcome, he is still civilly liable for the injuries sustained by Redoquerio. It is well-settled that "[e]very
person criminally liable is also civilly liable x x x. However, it does not follow that a person who is not
criminally liable is also free from civil liability. Exemption from criminal liability does not always include
exemption from civil liability."

The foregoing liability is imposed upon CICL XXX's parents because Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that:

ARTICLE 101. Rules Regarding Civil Liability in Certain Cases. — The exemption from criminal liability
established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:

First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane
person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted
without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it
appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or control,
or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting
property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.

In Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court en banc interpreted the above provision to mean that the civil
liability of parents for criminal offenses committed by their minor children is direct and primary. The Court said:
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing provision the civil liability of
the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the
defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.

Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents are and should be held primarily liable
for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or
control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under
15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age
who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Article 101 of the RPC, however, provides that the foregoing liability of CICL XXX's parents is subject to the
defense that they acted without fault or negligence. Thus, the civil aspect of this case is remanded to the trial
court, and it is ordered to implead CICL XXX's parents for reception of evidence on their fault or negligence.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, accused-appellant CICL
XXX is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The civil aspect of this case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court
for reception of evidence on the issue of fault or negligence on the part of CICL XXX's parents. IDSEAH

SO ORDERED.