People vs. Tabuelog G.R. No.

178059, January 22, 2008

Elements of Self-Defense/Murder
Facts:
An Information was filed charging appellant with murder.  The accused admits that he stabbed Clinton Badinas on or about that time on said place
and as a consequence of the wound he sustained Clinton Badinas died.  However, he claimed that he acted in self-defense.
The trial court found the version of the prosecution credible thus rejecting appellant’s theory of self-defense. On May 6, 2005, the trial court rendered
a Decision finding appellant guilty of murder. 
Appellant alleges that the justifying circumstance of self-defense was not properly considered in his favor; that assuming the killing was committed
not in self-defense, still the courts below erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.  
Issue: 
 Is appellant’s contention meritorious?  
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
In invoking self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, the onus probandi is shifted to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence all
the elements of justifying circumstance, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) the reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The accused, in cases of self-defense, must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence since
he admits the commission of the alleged criminal act. One who admits the infliction of injuries which caused the death of another has the burden of
proving self-defense with sufficient and convincing evidence, for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak, it could not be disbelieved after
the accused himself had admitted the killing. Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense which can easily be concocted. If the accused’s evidence is of
doubtful veracity, and it is not clear and convincing, the defense must necessarily fail.
We agree with the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the defense miserably
In the instant case, appellant failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; moreover, his narration of the events was unbelievable.
As correctly observed by the trial court, considering the alleged disadvantageous position of the appellant and the relentless assault from the victim,
it is surprising that appellant remained unscathed. The presence of a pitcher and a knife conveniently within the reach of appellant was highly
suspect and coincidental. As noted by the trial court, "the presence of a pitcher of water which the accused picked up to repel the attack of the
deceased and the knife which the accused was able to grasp and swung it to the (victim) hitting him near the left armpit seems to suggest that
pitchers and knives are scattered around Fort Ilocandia."11 Moreover, if it were true that the victim was pursuing Roger Domingo with a broken
bottle, then it is preposterous for the appellant to shout at and order Domingo, instead of the victim, to stop, thus putting Domingo’s life at risk.
Further, if Domingo stopped as narrated by appellant, then it is inconceivable that he was not harmed by his alleged pursuer.
In fine, the trial court correctly held that the defense failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. There being no
unlawful aggression, there is no need to discuss whether the means employed to repel the attack was reasonable or whether appellant sufficiently
provoked the victim into attacking him.
However, we cannot agree with the findings of the trial court that treachery attended the commission of the crime. The trial court appreciated the
qualifying circumstance of treachery because "the attack by the accused upon the victim was sudden and coming from behind, thus, precluding any
possible way for the victim to defend himself." Nevertheless, mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery.
It bears stressing that treachery cannot be presumed. It must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. The fact that the
victim might have been unaware or helpless when he was stabbed does not constitute proof of treachery. The prosecution has the burden to prove
that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, method and forms of attack employed by him. In the instant case, there was no proof that appellant consciously adopted the mode
of attack, hence he may only be held liable for homicide, not murder.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals finding appellant guilty of murder is MODIFIED. The Court finds appellant guilty of Homicide.
 
Baxinela vs. People
G.R. No.149652, March 24, 2006
Facts:
SPO2 Baxinela was already in the pub drinking with Regimen and Legarda for more than a couple of hours prior to the shooting incident. After
witnessing an altercation between Lajo and another customer, Baxinela decided to confront Lajo on why he had a gun with him. Baxinela
approached Lajo from behind and held the latter on the left shoulder with one hand while holding on to his .45 caliber service firearm with the other.
As Lajo was turning around, to see who was confronting him, Baxinela shot him.
The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that Baxinela was already in the pub drinking with Regimen and Legarda for more than a couple of
hours prior to the shooting incident. After witnessing an altercation between Lajo and another customer, Baxinela decided to confront Lajo on why he
had a gun with him. Baxinela approached Lajo from behind and held the latter on the left shoulder with one hand while holding on to his .45 caliber
service firearm with the other. As Lajo was turning around, to see who was confronting him, Baxinela shot him. Baxinela then got Lajo’s wallet and
fled the scene with Regimen. 
The RTC and CA accepted the prosecution’s version. Hence, this petition.  
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the justifying circumstances of self- defense of in the alternative the lawful performance of
official duty under Article 11 paragraphs 1 and 5, respectively, of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
No. In order to avail justifying circumstance of lawful performance of an official duty under Article 11, Paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, it must
be shown that: 1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense
committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office. While the first condition is present,
the second is clearly lacking. Baxinela’s duty was to investigate the reason why Lajo had a gun tucked behind his waist in a public place. This was
what Baxinela was doing when he confronted Lajo at the entrance, but perhaps through anxiety, edginess or the desire to take no chances, Baxinela
exceeded his duty by firing upon Lajo who was not at all resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannot be considered due performance of a duty if at that
time Lajo posed no serious threat or harm to Baxinela or to the civilians in the pub.

Nacnac vs. People

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GR No. 191913, March 21, 2012
FACTS:
February 20, 2003, in Dingras, Ilocos Norte, accused SPO2 Lolito I. Nacnac shoot one SPO1 Doddie Espejo with a gun resulting into the
latter’s death. Accused claims the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
On that fateful night of February 20, 2003, 10:00 in the evening, the victim, together with then SPO1 Eduardo Basilio, took the patrol
tricycle from the station grounds. When accused-appellant saw this, he stopped the victim and his colleague from using the tricycle. The victim told
accused-appellant that he (the victim) needed it to go to Laoag City to settle a previous disagreement with a security of a local bar. Accused-
appellant still refused. He told the victim that he is needed at the station and, at any rate, he should stay at the station because he was drunk. This
was not received well by the victim. He told accused-appellant in Ilocano: "Iyot ni inam kapi" (Coitus of your mother, cousin!). The victim took a few
steps and drew his .45 caliber gun which was tucked in a holster. Accused-appellant then fired his M-16 armalite upward as a warning shot.
Undaunted, the victim still drew his gun. Accused-appellant then shot the victim on the head, which caused the latter’s instantaneous death.
The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged. The RTC held that the claim of self-defense by the accused was unavailing due to the
absence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. CA affirmed the findings of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON there is unlawful aggression to avail the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
RULING:
Ordinarily, the act of the [deceased] of allegedly drawing a gun from his waist cannot be categorized as unlawful aggression. Such act did
not put in real peril the life or personal safety of appellant." However, The victim here was a trained police officer. He was inebriated and had
disobeyed a lawful order in order to settle a score with someone using a police vehicle. A warning shot fired by a fellow police officer, his superior,
was left unheeded as he reached for his own firearm and pointed it at petitioner. Petitioner was, therefore, justified in defending himself from an
inebriated and disobedient colleague. Even if We were to disbelieve the claim that the victim pointed his firearm at petitioner, there would still be a
finding of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. A police officer is trained to shoot quickly and accurately. Given this factual backdrop, there is
reasonable basis to presume that the appellant indeed felt his life was actually threatened.

nacario vs. pp gr 173106 case digest N/A

Pp vs. Comillio, jr. GR 186538, November 25, 2009 N/A

PEOPLE v. EULOGIO IGNACIO
G.R. No. 134568. February 10, 2000
The RTC convicted Eulogio Ignacio of murder.The trial court ruled that appellant failed to prove by credible, clear and convincing evidence that he
had acted in lawful defense of the landowner’s property. There was no legal reason for him to shoot the victim, an unarmed minor at the time of the
incident. The said court qualified the killing to murder because of the presence of treachery.
HELD:
In the present case, we find ample evidence that appellant did shoot the victim. It should be stressed that appellant’s conduct cannot be justified as a
lawful defense of property rights. For this justifying circumstance to be appreciated, the accused has the burden of proving unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim and reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it. In this case, the first requisite was not proven, because
he was not attacked by the victim. In fact, he did not even see the victim steal the crabs; he merely  suspected him of doing so. Furthermore,
assuming that unlawful aggression was proven, there was no necessity to shoot because, according to him, the victim was already running away
when hit.
There is treachery when the accused unexpectedly and deliberately shoots an unarmed minor who is thus not in a position to put up a defense or to
inflict harm on the former. Voluntary surrender is not appreciated even if the accused submits himself to the members of the barangay  tanod who, by
their presence in his house, precluded his escape.
In order that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be appreciated, the defense must clearly satisfy three requisites: (a) the
offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and (c) the surrender is
voluntary. The defense must show an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, because of an acknowledgement of guilt or because of a
wish to spare them the trouble and the expense concomitant to the search and the capture of the accused.

Pp vs. Alfonso Fontanilla GR 177743 January 25, 2012

FACTS:
Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood called bellang. Olais
fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only
because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their
father-in- law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival. Consequently, Fontanilla was charged with murder.
At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. Prosecution presented the physician who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Olais. She attested
that her post-mortem examination showed that Olais had suffered a fracture on the left temporal area of the skull, causing his death. She opined that
a hard object or a severe force had hit the skull of the victim more than once, considering that the skull had been already fragmented and the
fractures on the skull had been radiating.
The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense by observing that he had "no necessity to employ a big stone, inflicting upon the victim a mortal
wound causing his death" due to the victim attacking him only with bare hands. It noted that Fontanilla did not suffer any injury despite his claim that
the victim had mauled him; that Fontanilla did not receive any treatment, and no medical certificate attested to any injury he might have suffered,
having been immediately released from the hospital.
ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of accused alleging self-defense may be given credence amidst gravity of the injury sustained by the victim.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self- defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-
defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel.

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The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed
his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from Olais. We consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested
the determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not just to defend himself.

Pomoy vs. People (439 SCRA 439) Fulfillment of Duty Art. 11 Justifying Circumstances
Facts:
Tomas Balboa was a teacher in Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries in Iloilo. On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning, some
policemen arrived at and arrested Balboa, allegedly in connection with a robbery which took place in the municipality in December 1989. Balboa was
taken to the Headquarters of the already defunct 321 st Philippine Constabulary Company at Camp Jalandoni,
Sara, Iloilo. He was detained along with another suspect, Edgar Samudio. At about 2 o’clock in the afternoon, petitioner, a police sergeant, directed
Balboa to come out from the jail where he is detained, purportedly for tactical interrogation at the investigation room. At that time, petitioner had a
gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a holster which was hanging by the side of his belt. When petitioner and Balboa were near the investigation room,
two (2) gunshots were heard. When the source of the shots was verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol, facing Balboa, who was
lying in a pool of blood, about two (2) feet away. Certain Dr. Palma, who happened to be at the crime scene as he was visiting his brother
in the Philippine Constabulary, examined Balboa, he (Dr. Palma) said that it was unnecessary to bring Balboa to the hospital for he was dead.
Issue: Whether or not the act of the accused was committed in the course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law.
Held:
Yes. The act of the petitioner to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person in his custody, is a lawful
performance of his duty as a law enforcer.
Aside from the fact that all the elements of accident as an Exempting Circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code were present in this
case, which exonerate the accused from criminal liability, the accused was also in the lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer at that
time of the incident. He was a member, specifically one of the investigators of the PNP stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company, and
that under the instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latter’s cell for a routine interrogation.
It was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly
tried to remove it from his holster. He was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person in
his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim’s death was limited only to acts committed in the course of the lawful performance of his duties as
an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its holster, the release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots -- all of which
led to the death of the victim -- were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of circumstances beyond the control of petitioner.

Pp vs. SP01 Ulep GR 132547 September 20, 2000

Facts:
- On Dec 22 1995, Buenaventura Wapili appeared to have gone crazy and kept on running without any particular direction.
- SPO1 Ulep, together with Espadera and Pillo, arrived at the scene armed with M-16 rifles and saw the naked Wapili approaching them.
- The police claimed that Wapili was armed with a bolo and a rattan stool, while Wapili’s relatives and neighbours said he had no bolo, but only a
rattan stool.
- SPO1 Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and told Wapili to put down his weapons ar they would shoot him.
- When Wapili was only about 2-3 meters away from them, SPO1 Ulep shot the victim with his M-16 rifle, hitting him in various parts of his body.  As
the victim slumped to the ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and pumped another bullet into his head and literally blew his brains out.
Issue: w/n accussed should be acquitted on the basis of his claim that the killing of the victim was in the course of the performance of his official duty
as a police officer, and in self-defense
Held: It cannot be said that the fatal wound in the head of the victim was a necessary consequence of accused-appellant’s due performance of a
duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office.
The evidence does not favour his claim of self-defense.
Accused-appelant SPO1 ERNESTO ULEP is found guilty of Homicide, instead of murder.
RD:
-The accused must prove the presence of 2 requisites: (1) that he acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or an office,
and (2) the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of the duty or the lawful exercise of such
right or office.
There were two stages of the incident:
1. The victim threatened the safety of the police officers by menacingly advancing towards them. Up to that point, his decision to respond with a
barrage of gunfire to halt the victim’s further advance was justified under the circumstances.
2.When he fatally shot the victim in the head, perhaps in his desire to take no chances, even after the latter slumped to the ground due t multiple
gunshot wounds sustained while charging at the police officers. He cannot be exonerated from overdoing his duty.
- The aggression that was initially begun by the victim already ceased when accused-appellant attacked him. From that moment, there was no longer
any danger to his life.
- No treachery, thus the offense is only murder. Victim was given more than sufficient warning before he was shot.
– Art. 69 of RPC is applicable. (tignan nyo na lang) :)
Incomplete justification is a special or privileged mitigating circumstance, which, not only cannot be offset by aggravating circumstances but also
reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law.
The instant case would have fallen under Art. 11, par 5 had the two conditions therefore concurred.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v . MARCELO ALETA et al. 584 SCRA 578 (2009)
A witness’ testimony deserves full faith and credit where there exists no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive against the
accused, or why he should implicate the accused in a serious offense. While the deceased Acob‘s mother Marina was at the community center of
Barangay Nagsurot, Burgos, Ilocos Norte, she heard a commotion at the yard of Marcelo Aleta, et al. (the Aletas). Soon after returning home, she
told Acob that there was a quarrel at the Aletas‘ compound. Against his mother‘s pleas, Acob repaired to the Aletas‘ compound. Marina followed and
upon reaching appellants‘ compound, she saw her nephew appellant Rogelio striking her son Acob twice at the left cheek and at the back of his
head with a piece of wood, causing Acob to fall on the ground. She thereafter saw Rogelio striking Acob‘s father-in-law Duldulao twice on the face

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drawing his eyes to pop up, and again on the head causing him to fall on the ground. Rogelio then ran towards the family house whereupon Marina
heard gunshots. Rogelio‘s brothers-co-appellants Jovito, Marlo and Ferdinand and their father Marcelo at once began clubbing Acob and Duldulao
with pieces of wood, mainly on the face and head, as well as on different parts of their bodies. Even while the victims were already lying prostrate on
the ground, Marcelo, Jovito, Marlo, and Ferdinand continued to hit them. And when Rogelio emerged from the house, he got another piece of wood
and again clubbed the victims. As found by Dr. Arturo G. Llabore, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation-Regional Office, San
Fernando, La Union who supervised the exhumation and autopsy of the bodies of Acob and Duldulao on June 3, 1994, the two victims suffered
multiple abrasions, lacerations, open wounds, contusions and fractures on their face, head, scalp, arms, legs and thighs; that Acob‘s death was due
to ―hemorrhage, intercranial, severe, secondary to traumatic injuries, head‖ while Duldulao‘s was due to ―hemorrhage, intercranial, severe,
secondary to traumatic injuries, head, multiple;‖ that both victims could have died within one (1) hour after the infliction of the injuries; and that
because of the severity and multiplicity of the injuries sustained, the same could not have been inflicted by only one person. Ferdinand and Marlo
interposed self-defense and defense of relative, respectively. Additionally, Marlo invoked voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. Marcelo,
Rogelio and Jovito invoked alibi. Crediting the prosecution version, the trial court found the Aletas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in both
cases. The trial court held that although what triggered the incidents was never explained, Acob and Duldulao died as a result of the attacks on
them, qualified by abuse of superior strength and cruelty. The Aletas moved for a reconsideration of the trial court‘s decision which was denied.
Hence, the present appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial and the appellate courts erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
HELD:
As in most criminal cases, the present appeal hinges primarily on the issue of credibility of witness and of testimony. As held in a number of cases,
the trial court is best equipped to make the assessment on said issue and, therefore, its factual findings are generally not disturbed on appeal,
unless: (1) the testimony is found to be clearly arbitrary or unfounded; (2) some substantial fact or circumstance that could materially affect the
disposition of the case was overlooked, misunderstood, or misinterpreted; or (3) the trial judge gravely abused his or her discretion. As held in a
catena of cases and correctly applied by both lower courts, Marina‘s positive identification of the Aletas as the assailants and her accounts of what
transpired during the incidents, which were corroborated on all material points by prosecution witnesses Loreta Duldulao (Loreta) and Willie Duldulao
(Willie), as well as the findings of the medico-legal officer, carry greater weight than the Aletas‘ claims of self-defense, defense of relative and alibi.
More particularly, that Marina‘s narration was so detailed all the more acquires greater weight and credibility against all defenses, especially because
it jibed with the autopsy findings. Respecting the defense‘s questioning of Loreta‘s testimony that Willie had told her that Duldulao was already dead,
but was later to claim that on reaching the scene of the crime, Duldulao was still alive, lying on the ground and being clubbed by Aleta, et al., the
same deserves scant consideration. Far from being inconsistent, the same is in sync with the other witnesses‘ claim and Marlo‘s own admission that
Aleta, et al. continued to club the two victims even as they lay motionless and helpless on the ground. At any rate, inconsistencies in the testimonies
of witnesses which refer to minor and insignificant details, such as whether Duldulao was still alive or not, cannot destroy Loreta‘s testimony. Minor
inconsistencies in fact even guarantee truthfulness and candor. A witness‘ testimony deserves full faith and credit where there exists no evidence to
show any dubious reason or improper motive why he should testify falsely against the accused, or why he should implicate the accused in a serious
offense. That the prosecution witnesses are all related by blood to the Aletas should a fortiori be credited, absent a showing that they had motive to
falsely accuse the Aletas.