The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: the State, and under the necessary powers

the necessary powers granted to the Court

to perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to practice law
xxx before the courts of this country should be and is a
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be
the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive arbitrary.
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Sec. 5, Art. VIII, the lawyers public responsibilities.
1987 Constitution) As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the
bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, one of which is the
payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants
Payment of IBP Dues, B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005) such drastic move. 

Facts: 
Atty. Arevalo wrote a letter to the SC requesting for exemption Santos, Jr. vs. Atty. Llamas, AC 4749
from payment of his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of
FACTS:
P12,035.00. He contends that after admission to the Bar he
worked at the Civil Service Commission then migrated to the US Atty. Francisco Llamas was complained of not paying his IBP
until his retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his dues. He was also cited in the complaint as not paying his
employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his law professional tax or PTR as it was intermittently indicated in his
profession and he did not practice the same while in the US. The pleadings filed in court. It was also an alleged falsity when he
compulsion that he pays his IBP annual membership is included his “IBP-Rizal 259060” where in fact he was not in good
oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer. His standing. Petitioner cited that Atty. Llamas was dismissed as
removal from the profession because of non-payment of the Pasay City Judge. But later revealed that the decision was
same constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights bereft of reversed and he was subsequently promoted as RTC Judge of
due process of the law. Makati. He also had criminal case involving estafa but was
appealed pending in the Court of Appeals. In the numerous
Issues:
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he
1. Is petitioner entitled to exemption from payment of his dues expressed willingness to settle the IBP dues and plea for a more
during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, temperate application of the law.
when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he
ISSUE:
was working abroad from 1986-2003?
Whether or not Atty. Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of
2.  Does the enforcement of the penalty of removal amount to a
Professional Responsibility.
deprivation of property without due process?
HELD:
Held:
YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for
1. No. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for one (1) year, or until he has paid his IBP dues.
regulation. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar,
it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a RATIO:
membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put Even if he had “limited” practice of law, it does not relieve him of
on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the the duties such as payment of IBP dues. Rule 139-A provides:
expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with
it the power to impose such exaction. Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the
provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of
The payment of dues is a necessary consequence of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment
that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
long as ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged
in. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility:

2. No. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
sense of its being one that entitles the holder of immoral or deceitful conduct.
a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to
be misled by any artifice.

EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007 ]

[ G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007 ]
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, PETITIONER FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER,
VS.
Facts: ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO AND HON.
ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, RESPONDENTS
 Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He
practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to Facts:
seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied
 Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid
Appearance, as private prosecutor, where his father, Mariano
program. His application was approved and he became a
Cruz, is the complaining witness.
Canadian citizen in May 2004.
 The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student,
 On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225
justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the
reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his
Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-
oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to
of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his
the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.
appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor
Issue: and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his
agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
 Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in
the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship  However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied
permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the
Ruling:
ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice
 The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student
the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the
prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the continuation of trial.
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
Issue:
practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The  whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant
 The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of Ruling:
naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
 The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine
an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed
simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34,
[RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
Rule 138 provides:
another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person,
membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
law practice accrues. purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party
may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
 Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
member of the bar.
citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of
the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
 July 23, 2004, which was again received by Atty. Cruz-
Angeles.5 However, to complainant's dismay, no appreciable
progress took place. When complainant inquired about the delay
in the filing of the case, Atty. Cruz-Angeles attempted to ease his
worries by saying that the draft petition was already submitted to
the judge for editing and that the petition will soon be finalized.6
In the last week of September 2004, complainant received a text
message from Atty. Cruz-Angeles informing him that the National
Statistics Office bore no record of his marriage. The latter
A.C. No. 11113, August 09, 2016 explained then that this development was favorable to
complainant's case because, instead of the proposed petition for
CLEO B. DONGGA-AS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROSE BEATRIX
annulment of marriage, they would just need to file a petition for
CRUZ-ANGELES, ATTY. WYLIE M. PALER, AND ATTY.
declaration of nullity of marriage. She also informed complainant
ANGELES GRANDEA, OF THE ANGELES, GRANDEA &
that they would send someone to verify the records of his
PALER LAW OFFICE, Respondent.
marriage at the Local Civil Registrar of La Trinidad, Benguet (Civil
DECISION Registrar) where his marriage was celebrated. However, upon
complainant's independent verification through his friend, he
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: discovered that the records of his marriage in the Civil Registrar
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed on were intact, and that the alleged absence of the records of his
February 11, 2005 by complainant Cleo B. Dongga-as marriage was a mere ruse to cover up the delay in the filing of the
(complainant), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) – petition.7
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), against respondents Atty. Utterly frustrated with the delay in the filing of his petition for
Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles (Atty. Cruz-Angeles), Atty. Wylie M. annulment, complainant went to respondents' law office to
Paler (Atty. Paler), and Atty. Angeles Grandea (Atty. Grandea; terminate their engagement and to demand for a refund of the
collectively, respondents) of the Angeles, Grandea & Paler Law aggregate amount of P350,000.00 he earlier paid them. However,
Office (law firm), charging them of various violations of the Code Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler refused to return the said amount,
of Professional Responsibility (CPR) for, inter alia, refusing to and to complainant's surprise, sent him two (2) billing statements
return the money given by complainant in exchange for legal dated October 5, 20048 and October 10, 20049 in the amounts of
services which respondents failed to perform. P258,000.00 and P324,000.00, respectively. Notably, the October
The Facts 5, 2004 billing statement included a fee for "consultants
(prosecutors)" amounting to P45,000.00.10 In view of the
Complainant alleged that sometime in May 2004, he engaged the foregoing, complainant filed the instant Complaint-Affidavit before
law firm of respondents to handle the annulment of his marriage the IBP-CBD, docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1426.
with his wife, Mutya Filipinas Puno-Dongga-as (Mutya). In his
meeting with Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler, complainant was In her defense,11 Atty. Cruz-Angeles admitted to have received a
told that: (a) the case would cost him P300,000.00, with the first total of P350,000.00 from complainant,12 but denied that she was
P100,000.00 payable immediately and the remaining remiss in her duties, explaining that the delay in the filing of the
P200,000.00 payable after the final hearing of the case; (b) petition for annulment of marriage was due to complainant's
respondents will start working on the case upon receipt of failure to give the current address of Mutya and provide sufficient
PI00,000.00, which will cover the acceptance fee, psychologist evidence to support the petition.13 Further, Atty. Cruz-Angeles
fee, and filing fees; and (c) the time-frame for the resolution of the alleged that it was Atty. Paler who was tasked to draft and finalize
case will be around three (3) to four (4) months from filing. the petition.14 For his part,15 Atty. Paler moved for the dismissal of
Accordingly, complainant paid respondents P100,000.00 which the case for failure to state a cause of action, arguing too that
was duly received by Atty. Cruz-Angeles.2 complainant filed the present administrative complaint only to
avoid payment of attorney's fees.16
From then on, complainant constantly followed-up his case with
Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler. However, despite his constant
prodding, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler could not present any The IBP's Report and Recommendation
petition and instead, offered excuses for the delay, saying that:
In a Report and Recommendation17 dated July 10, 2012, the IBP
(a) they still had to look for a psychologist to examine Mutya; ( b)
Investigating Commissioner found Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler
they were still looking for a "friendly" court and public prosecutor;
administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended that they
and (c) they were still deliberating where to file the case. 3 They
be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
promised that the petition would be filed on or before the end of
four (4) months. However, Atty. Grandea was exonerated of any
June 2004, but such date passed without any petition being filed.
liability as his participation in the charges has not been
As an excuse, they reasoned out that the petition could not be
discussed, much less proven.18
filed since they have yet to talk to the judge who they insinuated
will favorably resolve complainant's petition.4
The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant indeed
engaged the services of Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler in order to
Sometime in the third week of July 2004, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and
annul his marriage with his wife, Mutya. Despite receiving the
Paler asked for an additional payment of P250,000.00 in order for
aggregate amount of P350,000.00 from complainant, Attys. Cruz-
them to continue working on the case. Hoping that his petition
Angeles and Paler neglected the legal matter entrusted to them,
would soon be filed, complainant dutifully paid the said amount on
as evidenced by their failure to just even draft complainant's CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
petition for annulment despite being engaged for already five (5) MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
long months.19 Moreover, as pointed out by the Investigating COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Commissioner, despite their preliminary assessment that
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property
complainant's petition would not likely prosper, Attys. Cruz-
collected or received for or from the client.
Angeles and Paler still proceeded to collect an additional
P250,000.00 from complainant. Worse, they even billed him an Rule 16.03– A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
exorbitant sum of P324,000.00.20 Thus, the Investigating client when due or upon demand, x x x.
Commissioner opined that the amounts respondents had already
collected and would still want to further collect from complainant It bears stressing that "the relationship between a lawyer and his
can hardly be spent for research in connection with the client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity
annulment case that was not filed at all. Neither can they cover and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship
just fees for Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler who did nothing to imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or
serve complainant's cause.21 property collected or received for or from his client. Thus, a
lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on
In a Resolution22 dated September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption
Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid Report and that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of
Recommendation, with modification increasing the recommended the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation
penalty to two (2) years suspension from the practice of law. Atty. of general morality, as well as of professional ethics."26
Cruz-Angeles moved for reconsideration,23 which was, however, Furthermore, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler misrepresented to
denied in a Resolution24 dated June 7, 2015. complainant that the delay in the filing of his petition for
annulment was due to the fact that they were still looking for a
The Issue Before the Court "friendly" court, judge, and public prosecutor who will not be too
much of a hindrance in achieving success in the annulment case.
In fact, in the two (2) billing statements dated October 5,
The essential issue in this case is whether or not Attys. Cruz-
200427 and October 10, 2004,28 Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler
Angeles and Paler should be held administratively liable for
made it appear that they went to various locations to look for a
violating the CPR.
suitable venue in filing the said petition, and even paid various
The Court's Ruling amounts to prosecutors and members of the National Bureau of
Investigation to act as their "consultants." Such
A judicious perusal of the records reveals that sometime in May
misrepresentations and deceits on the part of Attys. Cruz-Angeles
2004, complainant secured the services of Attys. Cruz-Angeles
and Paler are violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, viz.:
and Paler for the purpose of annulling his marriage with Mutya,
and in connection therewith, paid Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws
the aggregate sum of P350,000.00 representing legal fees. of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
However, despite the passage of more than five (5) months from
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
the engagement, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler failed to file the
immoral or deceitful conduct.
appropriate pleading to initiate the case before the proper court;
and worse, could not even show a finished draft of such pleading. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR instructs that "[a]s officers of the
Such neglect of the legal matter entrusted to them by their client court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of
constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair
CPR, to wit: dealing."29 Clearly, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler fell short of
such standard when they committed the afore-described acts of
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
misrepresentation and deception against complainant. Their acts
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
are not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the
legal profession; they also reveal basic moral flaws that make
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler unfit to practice law.30
to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable. As members of the Bar, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler should not
perform acts that would tend to undermine and/or denigrate the
Case law exhorts that, "once a lawyer takes up the cause of his
integrity of the courts, such as insinuating that they can find a
client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and
"friendly" court and judge that will ensure a favorable ruling in
to attend to such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion
complainant's annulment case. It is their sworn duty as lawyers
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such
and officers of the court to uphold the dignity and authority of the
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the
reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer's neglect of a legal matter
judicial institution. Without this guarantee, the institution would be
entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence
resting on very shaky foundations.31 This is the very thrust of
for which he must be held administratively liable,"25 as in this
Canon 11 of the CPR, which provides that "[a] lawyer shall
case.
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." Hence,
In this relation, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler also violated Rules
lawyers who are remiss in performing such sworn duty violate the
16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when they failed to return
aforesaid Canon 11, and as such, should be held administratively
to complainant the amount of P350,000.00 representing their
liable and penalized accordingly, as in this case.[32]
legal fees, viz.  :
 by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct
Moreover, Canon 7 of the CPR commands every lawyer to "at all and not intrinsically linked to his professional
times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession" for engagement."37 Hence, since Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler
the strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity received the aforesaid amount as part of their legal fees, the
of its members. It is every lawyer's duty to maintain the high Court finds the return thereof to be in order.
regard to the profession by staying true to his oath and keeping
WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles and
his actions beyond reproach. It must be reiterated that as an
Atty. Wylie M. Paler are found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01,
officer of the court, it is a lawyer's sworn and moral duty to help
Canon 1, Canon 7, Canon 11, Rule 18.03, Canon 18, and Rules
build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard
16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of
Responsibility. Accordingly, each of them is
justice; as acts and/or omissions emanating from lawyers which
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
tend to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the
three (3) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with
continuity of the government and to the attainment of the liberties
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
of the people. Thus, all lawyers should be bound not only to
will be dealt with more severely.
safeguard the good name of the legal profession, but also to keep
inviolable the honor, prestige, and reputation of the judiciary.33 In
Likewise, respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles and Atty.
this case, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler compromised the
Wylie M. Paler are ORDERED to return to complainant Cleo B.
integrity not only of the judiciary, but also of the national
Dongga-as the legal fees they received from the latter in the
prosecutorial service, by insinuating that they can influence a
aggregate amount of P350,000.00 within ninety (90) days from
court, judge, and prosecutor to cooperate with them to ensure the
the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing
annulment of complainant's marriage. Indubitably, Attys. Cruz-
directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Angeles and Paler also violated Canon 7 of the CPR, and hence,
they should be held administratively liable therefor. Meanwhile, the complaint as against Atty. Angeles Grandea
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Anent the proper penalty for Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler,
jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers
Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar
neglected their client's affairs, failed to return the latter's money
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in
and/or property despite demand, and at the same time committed
the country for their information and guidance and be attached to
acts of misrepresentation and deceit against their clients, the
respondents' personal records as attorney.
Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years. In Jinon v. Jiz 34 the
SO ORDERED.
Court suspended the lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his
failure to return the amount his client gave him for his legal
services which he never performed. Also, in Agot v. Rivera,  35 the
Court suspended the lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his
(a) failure to handle the legal matter entrusted to him and to
return the legal fees in connection therewith; and (b)
misrepresentation that he was an immigration lawyer, when in
truth, he was not. Finally, in Spouses Lopez v. Limos, 36 the Court
suspended the erring lawyer for three (3) years for her failure to
file a petition for adoption on behalf of complainants, return the
money she received as legal fees, and for her commission of
deceitful acts in misrepresenting that she had already filed such
petition when nothing was actually filed, resulting in undue
prejudice to therein complainants. In this case, not only did Attys.
Cruz-Angeles and Paler fail to file complainant's petition for
annulment of marriage and return what the latter paid them as
legal fees, they likewise misrepresented that they can find a
court, judge, and prosecutor who they can easily influence to
ensure a favorable resolution of such petition, to the detriment of
the judiciary and the national prosecutorial service. Under these
circumstances, the Court individually imposes upon Attys. Cruz-
Angeles and Paler the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) years.
Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering
Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler to return the amount of
P350,000.00 they received from complainant as legal fees. It is
well to note that "while the Court has previously held that
disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the
determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative and not
his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains
applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in
nature – for instance, when the claim involves moneys received
 of P.D. 1829 which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the
apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenses.
Atty. Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the IBP with
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically
Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03; Canon 6, Rules 6.01 and
6.02; and Canon 8, Rule 8.01, docketed as CBD Case No. 373.
The administrative cases were, on motion of Atty. Lambino,
consolidated. Before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), the issues were defined as follows:
1. Whether the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the
suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon constitutes
violation of Code of Professional Responsibility.
A.C. No. 6968             August 9, 2006 2. Whether the act of Atty. Dizon in trying to arrest the student-
ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON, Complainant, suspects constitutes violation of the Code of Professional
vs. Responsibility.
ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO, Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------x By Report and Recommendation submitted to the Board of
ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO, Complainant, Governors of the IBP on June 20, 2005, CBD Investigating
vs. Commissioner Siegfrid B. Mison recommended the dismissal of
ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON, Respondent. the complaint against Atty. Lambino in light of a finding that she
DECISION "acted within her official duties as she safeguarded the rights of
CARPIO MORALES, J.: the students in accordance with the school’s substitute parental
authority" and "within the bounds of the law as the NBI agents
The killing during a rumble on December 8, 1994 of University of had no warrants of arrest."
the Philippines (UP) graduating student Dennis Venturina, the
chairperson of the UP College of Public Administration Student With respect to the complaint against Atty. Dizon, the
Council, drew the then Chancellor of UP Diliman Roger Posadas Commissioner recommended to reprimand him for violating the
to seek the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation Code of Professional Responsibility in "recklessly tr[ying] to
(NBI). arrest" the suspects without warrant.

Acting on the request of Chancellor Posadas, Atty. Orlando The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution of October 22, 2005,
Dizon, then Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the adopted and approved the Commissioner’s Report. The IBP
NBI, together with his men, repaired to the Office of Col. Eduardo thereupon transferred to this Court its Notice of Resolution,
Bentain, head of the UP Security Force on December 12, 1994. together with the records of the cases which this Court noted by
Resolution of February 1, 2006.
As two student-suspects in the killing, Francis Carlo Taparan and
Raymundo Narag, were at the time in the office of Col. Bentain, As earlier stated, the issue against Atty. Lambino is whether she
Atty. Dizon requested to take them into his custody. Atty. Marichu violated the Canons of Professional Ethics in "refusing to turn
Lambino, Legal Counsel of UP Diliman, who repaired to the over the suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon."
Office of Col. Bentain, advised against Atty. Dizon’s move, When the complaint of Atty. Dizon before the Ombudsman
however, he not being armed with a warrant for their arrest. against Chancellor Posadas, Vice Chancellor Torres-Yu and Atty.
Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor for students Rosario Lambino was elevated on Certiorari and Prohibition, this Court
Torres-Yu, who also repaired to the office of the colonel, joined addressing in the negative the two issues raised therein, to wit:
Atty. Lambino in opposing the turn-over of the suspects to Atty. (1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the
Dizon, despite the latter’s claim that under its Charter the NBI NBI could be validly made without a warrant; and (2) Whether
was authorized to make warrantless arrests. there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioner for violation
The suspects’ lawyer, one Atty. Villamor, later also showed up at of P.D. No. 1829. x x x,1
the office of Col. Bentain and after what appeared to be a heated held that the objection of the said UP officials to the arrest of the
discussion between Atty. Dizon and the UP officials, the students students "cannot be construed as a violation of P.D. No. 1829,
were allowed to go back to their dormitories, with Atty. Villamor Sec. 1 (c) without rendering it unconstitutional,"2 they having
undertaking to accompany them to the NBI the following morning. "a right to prevent the arrest [of the students] at the time because
The two student-suspects were eventually indicted in court. their attempted arrest was illegal."3

Hence, spawned the filing of a complaint by Atty. Dizon against Indeed, Atty. Lambino was legally justified in advising against the
Atty. Lambino before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), turn over of the suspects to Atty. Dizon, there being no basis for
for violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.1 to 1.3 of the Code of him to effect a warrantless arrest. Atty. Dizon’s administrative
Professional Responsibility, docketed as CBD Case No. 346. complaint against her must then be dismissed.

Atty. Dizon had earlier filed a criminal complaint also against Atty. Respecting the complaint against Atty. Dizon, this Court, also in
Lambino, together with Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor Posadas v. Ombudsman, held that "[f]or the failure of the NBI
Torres-Yu and Col. Bentain, before the Ombudsman, for violation agents to comply with the constitutional and procedural
requirements, . . . their attempt to arrest [the two student-
suspects] without a warrant was illegal."4
In the main, Atty. Dizon invoked Section 1 (a) of Republic Act 157
(The NBI Charter) which empowers the NBI "to undertake
investigations of crimes and other offenses against the laws of
the Philippines, upon its own initiative and as public interest may
require"5 and to make arrests. The invocation does not impress.
Said section does not grant the NBI the power to make
warrantless arrests. The NBI Charter clearly qualifies the power
to make arrests to be "in accordance with existing laws and
rules."
Members of the investigation staff of the Bureau of Investigation
shall be peace officers, and as such have the following powers:
(a) To make arrests, searches and seizures in accordance with
existing laws and rules.6
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected students
without a warrant, Atty. Dizon violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
xxxx
Rule 1.02 – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
(Emphasis supplied).
WHEREFORE, CBD Case No. 346 against Atty. Marichu C.
Lambino is DISMISSED.
Atty. Orlando V. Dizon is, in CBD Case No. 373, found guilty of
violation of Canon 1 of Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the National Bureau of Investigation, and the
Department of Justice.
SO ORDERED.
 wife's possession of the property until after the expiration of
twenty years; and (5) the Spouses Frias would entrust the original
owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-14354 that covers the
subject property to Rodrigo Arbiz and his wife. These
agreements, however, were not put into writing as it was the
usual practice those days.
On January 16, 1995, the Spouses Frias left for South Cotabato,
leaving whatever they owned in Capiz. Despite all medical
treatments they could afford with their savings, Susana died in
2000 in South Cotabato.
Sometime in 2000, the Spouses Frias learned that Rodrigo Arbiz
died. Later, in 2005, they also learned that Rodrigo Arbiz's wife,
Maria, also died. They discovered that the heirs of the Spouses
April 10, 2019 Arbiz, Jermehilda Escutin and Danilo Escutin, took possession of
A.C. No. 12467 [Formerly CBD Case No. 16-5072] the subject property.
SPOUSES PEPITO AND PRESCILA FRIAS, Complainants
The Spouses Frias alleged that even after the death of the
vs.
Spouses Arbiz, they could not return to Dao, Capiz because they
ATTY. NELLY E. ABAO, Respondent
respected the alleged lease agreement. After the expiration of the
DECISION
lease contract, they decided to return to Capiz, and claim the
PERALTA, J.:
subject property as they believed to be entitled thereto. However,
Before us is a Complaint1 for Disciplinary Action dated September the Spouses Escutin refused to turnover the possession of the
1, 2016 filed by the spouses Pepito Frias and Prescila Chavez subject property. Thus, the Spouses Frias filed a complaint for
Frias (Spouses Frias) against respondent Atty. Nelly E. Abao ejectment against the Spouses Escutin.
(Atty. Abao) for violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 10.01 of the Code
In their Answer, the Spouses Escutin argued that the subject
of Professional Responsibility and of the Notarial Law.
property was sold to their parents by the Spouses Frias. They
The facts are as follows: attached a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 11, 1995
purportedly executed by complainants in favor of the parents of
Complainant Pepito Frias, married to Prescila Chavez, is the the Spouses Escutin.2
registered owner of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 3270-A,
Psd-06-000781, situated at Barangay Malonoy, Dao, Capiz, The Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized by herein respondent
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-14354 Atty. Abao on July 11, 1995, as document no. 106, found on page
(subject property). 23, Book No. LVIX.3 However, the Spouses Frias insisted that
they did not execute any document of conveyance of the said
The Spouses Frias narrated that in early 1900s, Susana Frias, parcel of land to anybody. They claimed that it was impossible for
their daughter, was enduring a heart disease. Because of them to execute the said Deed of Absolute Sale on July 11, 1995
financial difficulties, they accepted the offer of one of their because at that time they already left for Mindanao and never
daughters who was then residing in Mindanao, to bring Susana to came back to Dao, Capiz, until April 4, 2015.
Davao for treatment. Before they left, the Spouses Frias asked
Rodrigo Arbiz, and his wife, Maria, the parents of Jermehilda The Spouses Frias then searched for an original copy of the deed
Escutin, if they could lend them money to cover for their of absolute sale with the Clerk of Court of Roxas City. The Clerk
transportation to Mindanao and the medical expenses of Susana. of Court of Roxas City, Atty. Jelou F. Almalbis-Laguna, issued a
Although the Spouses Arbiz agreed to lend them some money, Certification4 dated November 3, 2015 stating that the deed of
they demanded that the Spouses Frias secure the loan with the absolute sale executed by Pepito Frias and Prescila Frias in favor
subject property, for twenty years. of Rodrigo Arbiz and Maria L. Arbiz under Doc. No. 106, Page 23,
Book No. LVIX dated July 11, 1995 and notarized by Atty. Abao
Because the Spouses Frias were unsure of their capacity to pay does not exist. It further certified that respondent Atty. Abao was
back the loan in time, and were afraid they might lose the subject never commissioned as Notary Public in the City of Roxas,
property if they failed to settle the loan, they allegedly offered Province of Capiz for the year 1995 and had no notarial files on
instead to lease the property to the Spouses Arbiz, instead of record for the same year.5
mortgaging it to them.
The Spouses Frias, likewise, lamented that while Atty. Abao
Rodrigo Arbis allegedly accepted the offer to lease the subject admitted that she notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale
property, and gave them the amount of ₱340,000,00. Both purportedly executed by them, she, however, made false
parties agreed that: (1) the Spouses Frias would not have any statements in her Judicial Affidavit6 dated July 28, 2016 wherein
obligation to give back the amount of ₱340,000.00 to Rodrigo she alleged that: (1) Pepito Frias was present when she notarized
Arbiz; (2) Rodrigo Arbiz and his wife would possess the subject the said document; (2) Prescila Frias was present when she
property for twenty years, that is from January 16, 1995 to notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale; and (3) Pepito Frias and
January 16, 2015, and enjoy the use and produce of the land; (3) Prescila Frias affixed their signatures in the said Deed of
Rodrigo Arbiz and his wife would be responsible to pay for the Absolute Sale.7
real estate taxes due on the property because it would be difficult
for the Spouses Frias to pay them while they were in Mindanao; Thus, the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Abao for
(4) the Spouses Frias would not disturb Rodrigo Arbiz and his violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). of the year in which the commissioning is made. Commission
either means the grant of authority to perform notarial or the
On October 3, 2016, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
written evidence of authority.15 Without a commission, a lawyer is
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) ordered Atty. Abao to
unauthorized to perform any of the notarial acts.
submit her answer to the complaint against her.8
Clearly, for misrepresenting in the subject Deed of Absolute Sale
In her Answer9 dated November 14, 2016, Atty. Abao admitted
that she was a notary public for and in Dao, Capiz, when in fact
that she notarized the subject Deed of Absolute Sale without the
she was not, Atty. Abao further committed a form of falsehood
necessary notarial commission to do so. She offered no valid
which is undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer's oath. Atty. Abao's
excuse for her unauthorized notarial act. She denied having
misdeeds run afoul of her duties and responsibilities, both as a
notarized a fictitious deed of absolute sale, and maintained that
lawyer and a notary public.
complainants personally appeared and signed the subject Deed
of Absolute Sale before her. By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission
from the court, Atty. Abao violated not only her oath to obey the
Meanwhile, on November 29, 2016, the complaint for unlawful
laws, particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice, but also Canons
detainer filed by the Spouses Frias against the Spouses Escutin,
1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
docketed as Civil Case No. V-376, was dismissed.10
proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
In its Report and Recommendation11 dated September 19, 2017, immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the
the IBP-CBD found Atty. Abao liable for notarizing documents integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times.16
without a notarial commission and for executing an untruthful
In the case of Nunga v. Atty. Viray,17 the Court appropriately held
judicial affidavit. For notarizing a document without commission,
that where the notarization of a document is done by a member of
the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Abao be suspended from
the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or
the practice of law for six (6) months, and that if she is presently
commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to
commissioned as notary public, she be disqualified from being
disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without
commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years.
such commission is a violation of the lawyer's oath to obey the
Further, for executing an untruthful judicial affidavit and testifying
laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it
thereon, the IBP-CBD, likewise, recommended a penalty of
appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all
suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood,
In a Resolution12 dated June 29, 2018, the IBP-Board of which the lawyer's oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall
Governors adopted and approved the Report and squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD on the recommended penalty. Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
RULING conduct."18
We agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD, except as to use In a number of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers to
recommended penalty. disciplinary action for notarizing documents outside their territorial
Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an jurisdiction or with an expired commission. In Zoreta v. Atty.
empty, meaningless and routine act.1âшphi1 It is invested with Simpliciano,19 the respondent was, likewise, suspended from the
substantive public interest that only those who are qualified or practice of law for a period of two (2) years and was permanently
authorized may act as notaries public.13 It must be emphasized barred from being commissioned as a notary public for notarizing
that the act of notarization by a notary public converts a private several documents after the expiration of his commission. In the
document into a public document making that document case of Judge Laquindanum v. Atty. Quintana,20 the Court
admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A suspended a lawyer for six (6) months and was disqualified from
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2)
face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe with years, because he notarized documents outside the area of his
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their commission, and with an expired commission. In the more recent
duties. case of Japitana v. Atty. Parado,21 following the Court's
pronouncements in Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial
In the present case, it is undisputable that Atty. Abao performed Practice,22 the lawyer was suspended for two (2) years from the
notarial acts on the subject deed of absolute sale knowing fully practice of law and forever barred from becoming a notary public
well that; she was without a valid notarial commission. Her lack of when he notarized documents with no existing notarial
notarial commission at the time of the unauthorized notarization commission.
was likewise sufficiently established by the Certification issued by
Atty. Jelou F. Almalbis-Laguna, Clerk of Court VI of the Office of Considering that Atty. Abao has been proven to nave performed
the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, notarial work in Dao, Capiz, without the requisite commission, the
Roxas City in the territory where Atty. Abao performed the Court finds the recommended penalty insufficient. Likewise, Atty.
unauthorized notarial act.14 Clearly, Atty. Abao could not perform Abao's assertion of old age and sickness fails to convince,
notarial functions in Dao, Capiz, since she was not commissioned considering that at the time of the commission of the
in the places to perform such act in the year 1995. unauthorized act of notarizing, she was only fifty-four (54) years
old. Instead, Atty. Abao must be barred from being commissioned
Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, a person as notary public permanently and suspended from the practice of
commissioned as a notary public may perform notarial acts in any law for a period of two (2) years.23
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court
for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nelly E. Abao is
found GUILTY of malpractice as a notary public, and violating the Report was not tried in Court yet but that the Information did not
lawyer's oath as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of include said Atty. Jose A. Grageda, hence this report.
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she
(p. 2, Vol. I, Record.)
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years
and BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Respondent filed his counter-affidavit dated March 29, 1989,
Notary Public, effective upon her receipt of a copy of this pertinently alleging:
Decision.
6. That they showed me a copy of the title which I examined and
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land found out the title was clear and there was no annotation or entry
through the Office of the Court Administrator, the Integrated Bar so I told them that as far as the title was concern there was no
of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and be encumbrances or annotation and can be the subject of the Pacto
recorded in the personal files of Atty. Abao. de Retro;
SO ORDERED. 7. That they insisted that I notarized the document so I proceeded
to translate the document in Cebu, Visayan dialect to make sure
that the parties understood the deed and they replied that they
understood this and I asked then further if they have any more to
add or delete; they answered that there was no more and they
will sign the same;
8. That I told them to sign the document above their typewritten
name which they did and witnessed by the other person with
them who were present, so after their signature in good faith
A.C. No. 3232 September 27, 1994 based upon their documents I notarized the same.
ROSITA C. NADAYAG, complainant,
vs. (p. 10, Vol. II, Record.)
ATTY JOSE A. GRAGEDA, respondent.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the resolution
MELO, J.:
of the Court En Banc of April 12, 1988, the case was referred to
In a letter-complaint dated April 15, 1988, Rosita C. Nadayag the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
charged respondent Atty. A. Grageda, a practicing attorney and Philippine (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
notary public in Iligan City, with conduct unbecoming of a lawyer
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline scheduled hearings for
in connection with a "Pacto de Retro" transaction wherein
reception of evidence but complainant manifested that she cannot
complainant was the vendee. Complainant's affidavit, which
proceed to Manila and attend to her case due to financial
accompanied her letter-complaint, alleged that respondent:
constraints. Upon the other hand, respondent could no longer be
. . . prepared and notarized a PACTO DE RETRO  sale with me located, having moved without leaving any forwarding address.
as the Vendee-a-Retro last January 21, 1987 in this City using
Nonetheless, said Commission, on the basis of the complaint and
Original Certificate of Land Title stolen from the Office of the
the supporting affidavit, as well as the counter-affidavit of
Register of Deeds herein in Iligan as a result of which I was
respondent, found that "there is reason for disciplining the
swindled in One hundred eight thousand pesos (P108,000.00)
respondent" premised upon the following observations:
because the said land sold to me by Pacto de Retro  was already
sold ahead of time to another party, using the owner's duplicate Respondent first admits that he was consulted by the vendor-a-
copy of the title. That during our pacto de retro sale, as I was retro and the complainant (vendee-a-retro) on the matter of the
suspicious already of the appearance of the Original Certificate of title when he was asked to notarize the Deed of Sale a Retro. He
Title, having many annotations and old patches thereof, when I admits that he rendered an opinion based on the title that was
brought the matter to the attention of Atty. Jose A. Grageda, presented to him. It turns out that the title presented to him is the
notarizing the same, he simply answered me that the title was all Original Certificate of Title which only the Register of Deeds has
right and that he told me further not to worry as he is an attorney custody of and he should have sensed foul-play or irregularity. As
and besides he knew very well the Vendor-a- Retro  whose a lawyer and officer of the court, he should have been alerted and
business transactions especially notarial matter has been and in should have reported the irregularity of an Original Certificate of
fact always handled by him (Attorney Jose A. Grageda). Title, which should be in the exclusive safekeeping of the
Register of Deeds, in the possession of unauthorized persons.
That said stolen Original Certificate of Land Title was confiscated
Even if it were the photostat copy of said Original Certificate of
by Iligan City Register of Deeds, Attorney Reynaldo Baguio on
Title that was presented to him, the same did not bear any
the occasion when I applied for registration of my Pacto de Retro.
certification by the Register of Deeds which could have alerted
Findings showed that many other cased of stolen original
him of the irregularity. The testimony that the Original was shown
certificates of land titles have taken place in the said office but the
to him has not been controverted. The Vendee was in fact in
said Attorney as the Register of Deeds did not prosecute the
possession of the Original because it was testified that when the
thieves thereof.
Register of Deeds found that respondent was in possession, the
I filed Estafa case against the Vendor-a-Retro  together with her original certificate was confiscated by the Register of Deeds.
accomplices to include said Attorney Jose A. Grageda, coursing it
The Commission takes special note of a notary public acting
through the local Barangay Captain last May 1987 yet, then
more than a notary public and goes beyond mere certification of
forwarded to the City Fiscal through the Police Station
the presence of the signatories, their having signed, and having
Commander in June 1987 but that and until the time of this
contracted. By transcending these bounds, such notary public
has entered the realm of giving "legal advice" — thus "acting also
as counsel aside from notary public" to the parties to the contract.
Treated as counsels for the vendee, he had the legal duty to
advice him properly of the irregularities and the dangers of
holding the Original Certificate which should have been in the
custody of the Register of Deeds. Respondent had acted
recklessly at the least, in his advise of the vendee. He rendered
an opinion that was irresponsible that his client relied upon —
which recklessness is censurable.
(pp. 3-4, Commissioner's Report; ff. p. 22, Vol. Record.)
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by
clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of
his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public.
The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as
well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer
can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to his clients. To
this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal
fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence
of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the
profession. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA 1 [1992]).
Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity,
and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., supra).
In the case at bar, respondent should have been conscientious in
seeing to it that justice permeated every aspect of a transaction
for which his services had been engaged, in conformity with the
avowed duties of a worthy member of the Bar. He should have
fully explained the legal intricacies and consequences of the
subject transaction as would aid the parties in making an
informed decision. Such responsibility was plainly incumbent
upon him, and failing therein, he must now face the
commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion.
After all, notarization is not an empty routine. Notarization of a
private document converts such document into a public one and
renders it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity.
ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the IBP Board of
Governors, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Atty.
Jose A. Grageda from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
months commencing from receipt of this Resolution, with the
warning that a repetition of the same or any other misconduct will
be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be
spread on the records of said respondent, with copies thereof
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and duly
circularized to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
 Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social
card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which card when
unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000,
the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking
down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find
meaning in what you're about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find
fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to
find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a
bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have
done everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you
make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time
I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final
moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you
until the life in me is gone and until we are together again.
A.C. No. 7136             August 1, 2007 Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough
JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant, memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always remember though
vs. that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.
DECISION . . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
PER CURIAM:
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
Complaint for Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar of the
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG
Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty.
AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2
Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly
immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."
Eternally yours,
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account: NOLI

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene
then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as
her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already
"Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children. residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene
on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant
concert, she was pregnant.
noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had been
receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE
some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at YOU card on which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.
Megamall."
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very
late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and 14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR
sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social
whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of
Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work. September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the "Wine All
You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was
respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24
he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were
house. photographed together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as
Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION
celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with
of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship" supplied),
her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and
humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household 4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an
appliances. adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of
the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule
was low profile and known only to the immediate members of 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11 (Emphasis and
their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the underscoring supplied)
general public was concerned, was still known to be legally
To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging
married to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring
that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the
supplied)
Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading: to the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live
Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the
15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's
father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born
wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family,
on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.
demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit
to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION
institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally TO DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which
reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live
on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for Birth attached to the complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved
her "until we are together again," as now they are.6 (Underscoring to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed
supplied), by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a
criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's
of the Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his
Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer were adopted as his
acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit
testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not
to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being
cross-examine complainant.17
that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not under
scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner
his own family: Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful
charge against respondent sufficiently proven.
relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still
occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be
of Respondent's special friendship with Irene. disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility reading:
xxxx
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),
the institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a
mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage
and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the
in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
supplied)
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading: (Underscoring supplied)
18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside
Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution
the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9 dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading: RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the CBD Case No. 02-936
Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
complainant's wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, a.k.a. Noli Eala
betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage,
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby
commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal
profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated: the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of
merit.20  (Italics and emphasis in the original)
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19
of the Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court,
the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 13922 of the Rules of Court.
low profile special relationship with Irene is neither under
The petition is impressed with merit.
scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as modified are literally denied, it has been held that the  qualifying
its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows. circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring
Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition
supplied)
of complainant, that there is no evidence against him. 24 The
contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having
observed: "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene
Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000
respondent – a "lawyer," 38 years old – as the child's father. And
(Exh. "C") and the news item published in the Manila
the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired
Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove
information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A
that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with
comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the
complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record
certificate28 with her signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows
which support the accusation of complainant against respondent.
that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner
respondent through counsel made the following statements to wit: noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.
"Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical
adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of
Center, in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit30 which he identified at
the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship
the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the
was low profile and known only to immediate members of their
Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel
respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the
Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31
allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being
that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent
respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship with and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more than
Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount clearly preponderant evidence – that evidence adduced by one
to grossly immoral conduct . . ." party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other
party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 – which
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission
is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case
that there is indeed a "special" relationship between him and
against a lawyer.
complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the
Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
"H-1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently
relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the of civil and criminal cases.
birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case,
Samantha it should be noted that complainant's wife Irene
proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative
supplied the information that respondent was the father of the
case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant
child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special
evidence" is all that is required.33 (Emphasis supplied)
relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene
would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie
of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has not because his relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of
categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on Court, grounds therefor. ─ A member of the bar may be
an adulterous relationship with Irene, "adultery" being defined disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What respondent to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney
denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
was "low profile and known only to the immediate members of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
their respective families." through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant, The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar
by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such
in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated
action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression
which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or
some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground
with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of
supplied), law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the
supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support
under scandalous circumstances.34
its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
disbarment or suspension uses the phrase "grossly immoral consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly
conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice,
334 of the Revised Penal Code reading: and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)
is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall
be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The
periods. Family) of the Constitution reading:

x x x x, Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the

foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has
sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere. In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209),
which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as fidelity, and render mutual help and support."40
'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding
circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a relationship between Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer
immaterial whether the affair was carried out from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which
in Vitug v. Rongcal:36 proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law."
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he
had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the
discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to investigation of the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that
to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to
disagree. Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery
xxxx complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on the
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending
sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of
warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.
with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004
all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review
law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful reads:
and immoral as it manifests  deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final
affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant the
same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38 July 3, 2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time
respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution
that the records of this administrative case substantiate the shall stand as though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis
findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP supplied by complainant)
Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has That the marriage between complainant and Irene was
been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly subsequently declared void ab initio  is immaterial.  The acts
immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the complained of took place before the marriage was declared null
fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man
behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are
treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful
him.39 (Underscoring supplied) contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with
admission to practice law which goes: complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself
being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge
by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer. is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards
of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely
As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before
enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal
the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state that before
law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in
complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his
an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in
Petition for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a
trying criminal case47 (Italics in the original),
Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the
Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty.
adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Naldoza,48 held:
Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently
would, in the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently of civil and criminal cases.
establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-
both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded
2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors
to complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET
Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her about
ASIDE.
Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages to her.
Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for
rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and
fact that he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the
(Eala) himself was married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's Code of Professional Responsibility.
eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant
had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be
the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes made part of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar
all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71- Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the
B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
away from the church where she had exchange marital vows with circulated to all courts.
complainant. This Decision takes effect immediately.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. SO ORDERED.
Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's were always
seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said
address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office.
The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and
Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed
smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address
appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje
stayed all throughout after her separation from complainant. It
was both respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that
was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje
gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical
Center. What finally militates against the respondents is
the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje
furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all
too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the
adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed
illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside
the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in
any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child
Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot
be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to
grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But
even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery
after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the
same would not have been a bar to the present administrative
complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:
 TCT No. 12794 – Andes Estoy
TCT No. 12791 – Leonor Petronio
TCT No. 12792 – Wilfredo Gomez
TCT No. 12793 – Elizabeth Dungan
TCT No. 12476 – Wilfredo Ondoy
TCT No. 12475 – Amelia Andes
Respondent knows this fact. Later on, Lilia and Concepcion
decided to sell the subject parcels of land because they needed
money for their medication and other necessary expenses. On
the pretext that he is going to help them sell the subject property
to prospective buyers, respondent borrowed the seven land titles
from complainants. However, despite the lapse of one year from
the time he borrowed the titles, respondent still failed to negotiate
the sale of the property. He informed herein complainants that he
lost all the seven land titles. Respondent then advised
complainants to file a petition in court for re-issuance of title.
Following respondent’s advice, Lilia Tabang, in the guise of acting
as the "authorized agent-representative" of the fictitious owners,
filed a case for the re-issuance of title to the seven parcels of
land. However, in the course of the proceedings, the public
prosecutor noticed that the signatures of the alleged owners in
the seven individual Special Power of Attorney executed in favor
of Lilia Tabang appear to have been signed by the same person
because of the similarities in their strokes. The public prosecutor
informed the trial court of this fact prompting the latter to summon
the alleged principals. To avoid embarrassment and possible
sanctions from the court because the alleged principals are in fact
fictitious, Lilia withdrew the case without prejudice to the re-filing
Adm. Case No. 6490             September 29, 2004 of the same. Subsequently, Lilia filed a new set of cases for re-
(CBD 03-1054) issuance of title, changing the signatures of the fictitious owners.
LILIA TABANG and CONCEPCION TABANG, complainants, Upon knowledge that a new set of cases was filed, respondent
vs. executed or caused to be executed several documents, among
ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, respondent. which were Revocation of Special Power of Attorney and
RESOLUTION Affidavits of Recovery purportedly signed by the principals of Lilia
Tabang. Respondent caused the annotation of these documents
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: in the land titles covering the subject properties. Thereafter,
On February 3, 2003, complainants Lilia Tabang and her mother, respondent caused the publication of a notice representing
Concepcion Tabang, filed before the Integrated Bar of the himself as the owner of the subject parcels of land and indicating
Philippines (IBP) a verified complaint for disbarment or therein his desire to sell the said properties. Eventually,
suspension against respondent Atty. Glenn C. Gacott for gross respondent was able to sell the seven parcels of land to seven
misconduct, deceit and gross dishonesty. individuals. However, only three of these buyers were legitimate,
while the remaining four are dummies of respondent. As a result
Complainants allege as follows: of selling the three parcels of land, respondent was able to
receive ₱3,773,675.00. None of the proceeds of the sale was
Sometime between the years 1984 and 1985, Lilia sought the
remitted to complainants.
legal advice of then incumbent Judge Eustaquio Gacott, father of
herein respondent, regarding her desire to buy a 30-hectare Complainants contend that in executing the various Revocation of
agricultural land in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto Princesa, Special Power of Attorney and Affidavit of Recovery, affixing
Palawan, which consists of several parcels of land belonging to thereon the signatures of the fictitious registered owners of the
different owners. Judge Gacott informed Lilia that under the disputed parcels of land, and in arrogating the ownership over the
agrarian reform program of the government, she is prohibited said lands upon himself, respondent committed gross
from acquiring vast tracks of agricultural land, as she already misconduct, dishonesty and deceit. Complainants likewise allege
owns other parcels of land. Judge Gacott then advised her to put that this is not the only case wherein respondent sold properties
the title of the lands in the names of fictitious persons and to keep of his clients to third persons without his clients’ knowledge and
the titles with her for easy disposition. Following the advice of consent.1
Judge Gacott, Lilia bought the parcels of land using fictitious
names. Eventually, Lilia was able to secure individual titles over Respondent filed his Answer to the Complaint denying the
these parcels of land in the names of 7 fictitious persons to wit: material allegations of the complainants. He claims that the seven
land titles covering the subject properties are valid and duly
TCT No. 12790 – Agnes Camilla executed; and denies complainants’ allegations that the alleged
owners are fictitious. Respondent further claims that the evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
registered owners voluntarily sold the seven parcels of land to administrative penalty.7
different individuals and his only participation in the said sale is
Moreover, in complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation is a
that he was authorized by the registered owners to collect from
mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with except
the buyers the full payment of the lands sold. He further denies
for valid and compelling reasons.8 Rule 139-B provides for the
that complainant Lilia Tabang is the real owner and that she
procedure of investigation in disbarment and disciplinary
merely acted as a broker who was trying to promote the sale of
proceedings against attorneys before the IBP, thus:
the properties; that when she came to know that the properties
were sold by their registered owners, she called up the law office Sec. 8. Investigation. – Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of
of respondent and demanded that she be given her share or the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate
"balato" in the sale of the properties equivalent to 20% of the gross speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have
sales because of her alleged efforts exerted in promoting the sale the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The
of the subject parcels of land; that when respondent turned her respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to
down, Lilia threatened to put him in bad light and seek his present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and
disbarment. Respondent further denies complainants’ allegation counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails
that he sold real properties of some of his clients to third persons to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.
claiming that in all these cases his role was merely to notarize the
documents of sale executed voluntarily by his clients and the The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3)
buyers of their properties.2 months from the date of its commencement, unless extended for
good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application.
The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1054, was assigned by
the IBP to Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro for report and Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful
recommendation. Commissioner Navarro conducted a mandatory order issued by the Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect
conference on November 25, 2003 after which she required the contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall be filed by the
parties to submit their respective position papers, together with all Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which shall
the necessary documents and duly verified affidavits of their require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days
witnesses, if any. In a report dated March 4, 2004, Commissioner from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter conduct
Navarro found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for violating hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the procedure set forth
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional in this Rule for hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing
Responsibility.3 Accordingly she recommended that respondent shall as far as practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days
be suspended from the practice of law for six months.4 from its commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors
shall within a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution
On April 16, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a setting forth its findings and recommendations, which shall
resolution adopting the report of Commissioner Navarro. forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and
However, the Board modified the recommended penalty and if warranted, the imposition of penalty. (Emphasis ours)
imposed the supreme punishment of disbarment.5
In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner initiated the
We do not agree with the IBP Resolution. The case should be formal investigation by conducting a mandatory conference
remanded for further proceedings. between the complainants and the respondent after both parties
have filed their complaint and answer, respectively. The
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his
mandatory conference was supposedly held for the purpose of
oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment
defining the issues and enabling the parties to stipulate facts.
unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in
However, no definitive result was reached during the conference
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit,
as respondent continued to deny all the allegations of the
malpractice, gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct,
complainants. After the mandatory conference was held, no
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, any violation of the
further hearings were conducted. Instead, the Investigating
oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice
Commissioner merely required the parties to submit their
of law, willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
respective position papers, including all the necessary documents
corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case
and duly verified affidavits of witnesses, if any. On the sole basis
without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in
of the pleadings filed by both parties and of the documents
nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any
attached thereto, the Investigating Commissioner submitted her
kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his
Report and Recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.
professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time
be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only Considering the gravity of the charges imputed against the
conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are likewise respondent and the imposition of the penalty of disbarment being
essential demands for his continued membership therein.6 prayed for by complainants, the Investigating Commissioner
should not have simply relied on the parties’ position papers and
Nonetheless, the power to disbar must be exercised with great
the pieces of documentary evidence submitted by them. She
caution.
should have proceeded with the investigation by conducting
For the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against formal hearings and calling upon the parties to present additional
the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and evidence to support their respective contentions. In the case of
satisfactory proof. Indeed, considering the serious consequences the complainants, the Investigating Commissioner should have
of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the required the presentation of the persons who allegedly executed
Supreme Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant the affidavits presented in evidence to prove the veracity of the
allegations contained in said affidavits, at the same time affording When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that
respondent the opportunity to cross- examine the supposed the latter would not return until around 2:30 P.M. So complainant
affiants. The failure of the complainants to move for the and the NBI agents went back at around 2:30 P.M. As there were
presentation of the persons alleged to have executed the subject other persons doing business with respondent, complainant had
affidavits does not render the IBP powerless to conduct further to wait for thirty minutes. When finally complainant was able to
investigation, considering its power to issue subpoena under the see respondent, the latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba ang sa
Rule. iyo?" Complainant answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang
umaga." To which respondent replied "Oo, kanina pa kita
In the same manner, the Investigating Commissioner should have
hinihintay." Complainant then handed to respondent the marked
compelled the persons named by the respondent as the original
money which he placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents
owners as well as the buyers of the subject properties to appear
then apprehended respondent and brought him to the NBI
before her. The appearance of these witnesses could have easily
Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. Respondent's
been facilitated considering that the residence and office
hands were found positive of the yellow florescent powder applied
addresses of the three of the supposed buyers are all located in
earlier to the marked money. Respondent was thereafter taken to
Makati while the residence of three of the original owners are
the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI where
located within Manila and the remaining four are residing in the
he was photographed, fingerprinted and record checked.
province of Cavite which is very near Metro Manila. To repeat,
Respondent declined to give a sworn statement to explain his
under the above-quoted Rule, the Investigating Commissioner is
side of the case, invoking his right against self-incrimination.
authorized to issue subpoena to compel the appearance of
persons and witnesses before it. On the same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of
respondent for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.
It bears to point out that majority of the pieces of evidence
presented by complainants and respondent consists of affidavits On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of
and photocopies of documents. Not one of the persons who Justice the filing of administrative charges and the institution of
executed these affidavits and instruments was presented or disbarment proceedings against him.
subpoenaed by the Commissioner to identify their affidavits and
On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from
give the adverse party opportunity to confront the witnesses in a
office pending investigation and disposition of his administrative
formal hearing.
case (Case No. 74).
Consequently, no judgment could be rendered fairly and squarely
Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No.
on the issues raised in the subject administrative matter.
74, two other cases were earlier filed against respondent: namely,
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave Misconduct filed by one
hereby REMANDED to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for Angel Alora on October 13, 1969, wherein respondent was found
further proceedings. guilty as charged and was recommended for suspension; and
Administrative Case No. 10-A. for partiality filed by Fabiola
SO ORDERED.
Fajardo on April 26, 1970, which was pending resolution.
A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995
In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent
WELLINGTON REYES, complainant,
asserted that complainant surreptitiously planted the marked
vs.
money in his pocket without his knowledge and consent.
ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.
He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed
against him by the NBI at the instance of complainant was still
PER CURIAM:
pending preliminary investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila. In
This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, connection with the incident of March 30, 1971, he said that he
a former Assistant City Fiscal of manila, with malpractice and had filed a criminal complaint for incriminatory machination,
willful violation of his oath as an attorney. perjury and attempted corruption of a public official against
complainant with the City Fiscal of Manila.
I
In reply to the answer, complainant denied that the several cases
On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to against respondent were motivated by revenge, malice or
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the personal ill will. He said that the investigating fiscal had
victim of extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal of recommended the dismissal of the charges filed by respondent
Manila, who was investigating a complaint for estafa filed by against him.
complainant's business rival. According to complainant, he had
given respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to
P500.00 on three other occasions. He said that another "payoff" refer the disbarment case to the Solicitor General for
was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in respondent's office at investigation, report and recommendation. However, upon the
the City Hall. adoption of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court., the case
was transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation
An entrapment was set up by the NBI. and disposition.
Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the
P150.00 for marking. The paper bills were sent to the Forensic Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
and Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to Philippines (IBP) recommended that respondent be disbarred.
complainant for the use in the entrapment.
Said recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of
Governors in its resolution dated March 26, 1994.
II
We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors.
In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante
delicto  in the act of receiving the marked money from
complainant during the entrapment conducted by the NBI agents,
which resulted in his arrest and the subsequent filing of
administrative and criminal cases against him. In his defense,
respondent merely denied the charge of extortion and retorted
that the marked money was planted by complainant.
It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than
negative testimony (Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653
[1989]). When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged,
it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must
meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him (Malcolm,
Legal and Judicial Ethics 93 [1949]). He must show proof that he
still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all
times is expected of him (Bayasen v. Court of Appeals, 103
SCRA 197 [1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA
393 [1978]).
Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of
such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to
show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a
member of the bar on such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya,
176 SCRA 634 [1989]).
The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as
a public official, which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer. The lawyer's oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138,
Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]), imposes
upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice.
The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is
a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary
action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67 [1983]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is
ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of
this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
 In our resolution dated May 5, 1980, issued consequent to the
Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor
General submitted to this Court on April 21, 1980, we ordered the
suspension of respondent Navarro from the practice of law during
the pendency of these cases. 3
The investigative phase was conducted by said office pursuant to
our resolutions of February 14, 1975 and September 13, 1976 in
G.R. Nos.
L- 39386 and L-39620-29, entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al." With commendable
thoroughness and attention to detail, two reports were submitted
which, in order to vividly portray the scope and magnitude of
respondent's operations and how he was able to perpetrate the
anomalous transactions complained of, we quote extensively
from said reports which are sustained by the evidence of record.
I. The antecedent facts on which Administrative Case No. 2148 is
premised are reported by then Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, as follows:
PREPATORY STATEMENT
This unnumbered administrative case against respondent Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro (hereinafter called respondent NAVARRO, for
short) originally stemmed from the letter of a certain Angelito B.
Cayanan to the Honorable Supreme Court dated January 25,
1975 which reads as follows:
x x x           x x x          x x x
I wish to respectfully inform your good office that I bought a few
lots on installment basis from Atty. Felipe C. Navarro of Ruby
Hills Subdivision as evidenced by the attached OR Nos. 0512 and
0519 and a "Contract of Sale".
Atty. Navarro, some officials and representative of the said
company claim that although there is a pending case No. L-39386
under Decree No. 1425 on the property being sold, the case is
almost won in their favor and are just waiting for your final
decision within a couple of months or even less.
In this connection, I am respectfully writing you this letter in order
to bring to your attention this transaction and to protect my rights
in the event that any unfavorable circumstances may arise in the
A.C. No. 2033 May 9, 1990
future.
E. CONRAD and VIRGINIA BEWLEY GEESLIN, complainants,
vs. xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.
A.C. No. 2148 May 9, 1990 Acting on the aforesaid letter, the Supreme Court, per Resolution
ATTY. FRANCISCO ORTIGAS, JR. and ATTY. EULOGIO R. dated February 14, 1975, referred the copy of Mr. Cayanan's
RODRIGUEZ, complainants, letter to the Solicitor General for "investigation of the existence of
vs. sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent. C. Navarro (whose address of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Peña & Marcos for District, Quezon City) for suspension or removal from the office of
complainants in AC No. 2033. attorney and for appropriate action." The resolution reads as
follows:
Felipe C. Navarro for and in his own behalf.
L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs.
PER CURIAM: Court of Appeals, et al.) The court NOTED the letter dated
January 25, 1975 of Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan with its attachments
We write this finale to the dispiriting charges filed by complainants
(copy thereof has been furnished Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, counsel
Francisco Ortigas, Jr. and Eulogio R. Rodriguez in Administrative
for respondents) and RESOLVED to instruct the Clerk of Court to
Case No. 2148 1 and by spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Bewley
inform him of the status of the cases at bar.
Geeslin in Administrative Case No. 2033 2 seeking the
disbarment of respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for malpractice It appearing from said letter that Atty. Felipe C. Navarro has been
and gross misconduct. selling the lots in litigation herein on installment basis to the public
(among them, Mr. Cayanan) as "absolute owner by virtue of this
contract of legal services in Civil Case No. 8321, etc. of the Court delos Santos Avenue, White Plains Road and R. Rodriguez
of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig" (see Ruby Hills Subdivision Avenue, comprising approximately of 260 hectares.
Contract of Sale), which lots are titled in the name of herein
As reported in our previous letters to the Court, Navarro claims to
petitioner and not in Atty. Navarro's name and that the
be the owner of some 4,000 hectares of land in the Greater
unwarranted claim is made on his behalf that 'the case is almost
Manila Area in virtue of his handling the case of some squatters
won in their favor' (see Mr. Cayanan's letter), the Court
on a 1.2-hectare lot in Mandaluyong, Rizal owned by Dona
RESOLVED FURTHER to refer copy of Mr. Cayanan's said letter
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. He contends that whereas
with its attachments to the Solicitor General under Rule 139,
his squatters-clients occupy only about a hectare, he has
Sections 1, 3, 4 and 5 for investigation of the existence of
become, in virtue of his contract of legal services' with them, the
sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe
owner of thousands of hectares of land as these are allegedly0
C. Navarro (whose address of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas
covered by void titles. Navarro thus started to openly sell these
District, Quezon City) for suspension or removal from the office of
properties.
attorney and for appropriate action.
Navarro's Ruby Hills and Bluehills Subdivisions, for instance,
Aside from Mr. Cayanan, the Solicitor General is directed to
cover properties already with buildings and other improvements.
communicate in the premises with Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez of
He has nevertheless been quite successful in selling portions
the law firm of Ortigas & Ortigas (with address at 10th Floor,
thereof, as when he sold lots within the De La Salle College,
Ortigas Bldg. Ortigas Ave., Pasig, Rizal), who under letter of June
Wack-Wack Golf & Country Club, ABM Sison Hospital, etc.
10, 1974 on file in Administrative Case No. 1154 has offered to
His modus operandi  is described in this Company's letter
make available documents in their possession showing other
complaint dated April 8, 1974 to Gen. Prospero Olivas, copy of
sales made by Atty. Navarro of properties titled in the name of
which is attached hereto for ready reference.
other persons, involving a total selling price of P75 million and
down payments of almost P 0.6 million. Navarro continues to defy the authorities, for only after a brief lull
he is now again openly selling titled properties of other persons.
On April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General (now Justice of the
We have provided more than sufficient documentary evidence to
Court of Appeals) Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. wrote Mr. Angelito B.
the Court and the Solicitor General and we hope that formal
Cayanan asking him to submit his affidavit embodying the
administrative charges can now be filed against Navarro to
circumstances surrounding the matters contained in his letter
prevent him from further perpetrating a large scale fraud upon the
dated January 25, 1975, especially the second paragraph thereof.
public.
The letter was sent to Mr. Cayanan by registered mail but the
same was returned unserved for the reason that the addressee xxx xxx xxx
had moved to another address.
Thereafter, hearings were conducted on various dates.
On the same date, April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General
Gutierrez, Jr. also wrote to Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez requesting COMPLAINANTS' EVIDENCE
him for copies of the documents evidencing the sales made by The evidence for the complainants consist mainly of documents,
respondent Navarro. most of which were presented in Criminal Cases Nos. 3158 and
On February 13, 1976, this Honorable Court issued a Resolution 3159 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and in the various civil
in L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer cases before the said court involving Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) referring the letter of Atty. Francisco Haberer. Complainants' sole witness, Reynaldo Morallos, merely
Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13, 1976 "for investigation of the identified the various documentary exhibits presented by the
existence of sufficient grounds for the prosecution of Atty. Felipe complainants.
C. Navarro for suspension or removal from office and for From the evidence adduced by the complainants, it appears that
appropriate action" and directing "Mr. Ortigas, Jr., to furnish the a certain Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer (hereinafter called
Office of the Solicitor General for the purpose with a copy of said HABERER, for short) filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
letter and all its pertinent attachments." twenty-two (22) cases for recovery of possession of her 1.2
The aforementioned letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated hectare property in Mandaluyong, Rizal titled in her name, and to
January 13, 1976 reads as follows: eject the twenty-two (22) families squatting thereat. Eleven (11) of
these cases were raffled to Judge Emilio Salas, while the other
x x x           x x x          x x x eleven (11) cases were assigned to Judge Pedro Navarro. All the
twenty-two (22) defendants-squatters were represented by
Dear Justice Teehankee,
respondent NAVARRO. On behalf of his clients, respondent
This is to apprise your Office of the latest activities of Atty. Felipe NAVARRO interposed as principal defense, the alleged nullity of
C. Navarro who has previously been reported to the Supreme the HABERER'S title, claiming that the mother title from which it
Court as selling properties titled in the name of this Company. emanated actually originated from Decree No. 1425 issued in
G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which he claims to be non-existent.
We have just secured a new "subdivision plan" of Atty. Navarro
showing that the lots he is now selling to the public include those The two sets of cases were decided differently. In the first set of
titled in the names of the heirs of the late Don Vicente Madrigal eleven (11) cases, Judge Salas rendered a decision on August
and this Company in Quezon City. Atty. Navarro has thus 31, 1970 sustaining the validity of the HABERER'S title and
expanded his activities despite recent detention by the Military. ordering the eviction of the defendants-squatters clients of
As could be seen from the attached "plan", Navarro claims to be respondent NAVARRO (Exhibit W). In finding for the plaintiff,
the owner of that huge property (actually titled in the name of the Judge Salas stated as follows:
Madrigals and this Company) bounded by Ortigas Avenue, E.
After due consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, be direct and not by collateral proceeding. The title which may be
this Court finds that most of the documentary evidence submitted issued in pursuance of said decree cannot be changed, altered,
by defendants are irrelevant to the case since they pertain to modified, enlarged or diminished in a collateral proceeding
defendants claim of ownership over 10,000 hectares of land when (Legarda, et al. vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590). In the case of Director
the area of the property subject matter of the complaint is only of Land vs. Gan Tan, G.R. No. L-2664, May 30, 1951, our
12,700 square meters. This Court also believes that the above- Supreme Court, in reversing the decision of the trial court where
mentioned claims of defendants are untenable. the registered owner was considered disqualified to acquire land
under the Constitution and consequently was denied the right to
Plaintiffs ownership over the property in question is evidenced by
constitute his title, said: "That the disqualification raised by the
the issuance in her name, since 1929, of Transfer Certificate of
Court is untenable in the light of the theory that a Torrens title
Title No. 15043. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a
cannot be collateraly attacked. That issue can only be raised in
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the
an action instituted expressly for that purpose". (See also Ramon
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.
Chua Yu Sun vs. The Hon. Ceferino de los Santos, et al., G.R.
After the expiration of the one-year period from the issuance of
No. 4347, November 23,1951; James (sic) G.R. No. L-4013, Dec.
the decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes
29,1951; Samonte, et al. vs. Descallar et al., No. L-12964, Feb.
incontrovertible (see case of Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil.
29,1960).
558; Reyes & Nadres vs. Borbon & Director of Lands, 50 Phil.
791; Manuel Sy Juco, et al. vs. Luis Francisco, 53 O.G., p. 2186, In view of the above-mentioned ruling of the Supreme Court, it is
April 15,1957; Brizuela et al. vs. Ciriaco Vda. de Vargas, 53 O.G., our opinion that there is no need to discuss the merits of the
p. 2822, May 15, 1957). reasons claimed by defendants why Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 15043 in the name of plaintiff is null and void. (Exh. W)
Defendants' claim that they became owners of the land in
Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 8322, 8323, 8327, 8370, 8375,
question by adverse possession is without merit considering that
8374, 8382, 8691, 8693, 8696 & 8699, at pages 6-7; 9-10).
title to land becomes non-prescriptible Sec. 42 of Act No. 496
provides that no title to registered land in derogation to that of the In the second set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Pedro Navarro
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse decided in favor of the defendants-squatters clients of respondent
possession (Corporation de Pp. Agustines vs. Crisostomo, 42 NAVARRO. In his decision dated May 26, 1971, dismissing the
Phil. 427). A title once registered cannot be defeated even by complaints, Judge Navarro stated as follows:
adverse, open and notorious possession. Registered title under
Plaintiff claims to be the registered owner of a parcel of land
the Torrens System cannot be defeated by prescription. The title,
containing an area of 12,000 square meters situated at the corner
once registered, is notice to the World. All persons must take
of A. Luna, Harapin Ang Bukas and J.C. Zuluete Streets,
notice. No one can plead ignorance of registration (Legarda vs.
Mandaluyong, Rizal, which is covered by, and more particularly
Saleeby, 3 Phil. 590, 595).
described in, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the
Further, defendants recognized plaintiffs ownership over the Register of Deeds of Rizal and indicated in the sketch plan
property in question when they filed a petition with the People's attached to the complaint as Annex A.
Homesite & Housing Corporation wherein they sought the latter's
x x x           x x x          x x x
intervention for the acquisition of the property and for the
subdividing thereof into small lots to be sold to them at nominal It likewise appears that ejectment proceedings have been filed in
cost. In said petition defendants not only named the plaintiff as the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, and in the City Court of
the owner of the property in question but they also indicated Quezon City against several persons occupying other parcels by
therein her title to the land as Transfer Certificate of Title No. Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, where decisions have
15043 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. We quote been rendered in favor of said Partnership. In order to forestall
hereunder the pertinent facts and data concerning the property in executions of these decisions defendants in said ejectment cases
question in defendants' petition submitted to the General filed class suit before this Court by the occupants of the land
Manager of the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, as which was heard and tried before Branch XV in which the Director
follows: of Lands was impleaded as a party-defendant. The decision of
Branch XV in said class suit is made part of the evidence of these
x x x           x x x          x x x
defendants in the herein eleven cases for whatever the same
1) Location of land: Barrio Burol, Mandaluyong, Rizal may be worth as aid in the determination of the merits of the
issues raised herein.
2) Name of registered owner: Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer
As may be gleaned from said decision of Branch XV plaintiff
3) Address of owner: 1288 Burgos St., Paco, Manila, or c/o
therein assailed the validity of Decree No. 1425 as null and void
Bausa, Ampil, & Suarez Law Offices, Madrigal Bldg., Manila
and or fictitious and the proceedings in GLRO Rec. No. 917 upon
4) Certificate of Title No. (attach photostatic copy): 15043 which the decree was based as also null and void. The Court
sustained the herein plaintiffs claim and rendered judgment
5) Area of land, Lot & Block & Survey Nos. 12,700 square declaring (1) the proceedings in GLRO Rec. No. 917 null and
meters(Exh G). void; (2) the Decree No. 1425 null and void; (3) all original
As regards defendants' claim that Transfer Certificate of Title No. certificates of title issued by virtue of and pursuant to the
15043 issued since 1929 in the name of plaintiff is null and void, judgment in GLRO Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 utter
this Court is of the opinion that defendants cannot assail the nullities; (4) all transfer certificates of title derived from the original
validity of said title in this proceeding, which is for recovery of certificates of title declared void under No. 3 above, particularly
possession. Any attack on the decree of registration of title must but not exclusively, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 77652 and
77653 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and 126575 and land occupied by the herein eleven defendants is a derivative
its derivative Transfer Certificate of 'title No. 135879 of the from such decree, it is the considered opinion of this Court that
Register of Deeds of Rizal, null and void; (5) that the rightful until and unless the decision of Branch XV of this Court is
owners of the litigated lands covered by Transfer Certificates of reversed or set aside by final judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order
Title Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or 135879) are the herein the herein eleven defendants in these eleven cases to vacate the
plaintiffs . . . and so forth. parcels which they occupy and on which their respective houses
are built has become premature. It goes without saying that if said
The Court has read copy of this decision of our Branch XV and
decision of Branch XV will be finally affirmed, or that the same
observed findings of facts too ponderous to be ignored.
becomes final and executory, all the claims of rights to ownership
That case before Branch XV directly assails the nullity of the and possession of properties embraced in the decision in GLRO
proceedings leading to the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 shall become absolute
and, as an inevitable corollary, the nullity of Decree No. 1425 nullities. Possessions by actual occupants of all these properties
issue by virtue of such void proceedings as well as the original had better be maintained until after final decision in Civil Case
certificates of title issued as consequence thereof. No. 7-M(10339) shall have been rendered. (Exh. R, Decision in
Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8369, 8379, 8383, 8385,
In said proceeding before Branch XV the Court, among other 8386, 8387 and 8700, at pp. 2, 5-9).
things, found that while the decision in GLRO 917 was
supposedly rendered on April 25, 1905, the survey of the property On June 21, 1971, Judge Navarro, acting on the motion filed by
subject matter of therein application was not made until June 16 respondent NAVARRO, issued an order cancelling HABERER's
to August 16, 1906, or some one year after the decision. It found title over her property in question and directing the issuance of a
no proof of initial hearing of the application for registration being new title in lieu thereof in favor of respondent's clients Thus —
published as required by law without which the Land Registration
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
Court could not have acquired jurisdiction over the case. Said
rendered dismissing the complaints in the above-entitled cases
decision also made inference that since the survey of the property
(Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8329, 8376, 8379, 8383, 8386, 8685,
was not made until a year after the rendition of the judgment the
8687 and 8700) all with costs against the plaintiff and hereby
technical descriptions appearing in the original certificates of title
ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel Transfer
issued under GLRO Rec. No. 917 Decree No. 1425, could not
Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal
have been those appearing in the notice of initial hearing, if any.
issued in favor of the plaintiff Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer
Publication of accurate technical description being an essential
and in view thereof issue new certificates of title in favor of the
jurisdictional requirement which cannot be dispensed with and
defendants subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of
non-compliance with this requirement renders the proceedings
Attorney Felipe Navarro in accordance with the terms of the
and the decision and decree and titles issued arising therefrom
"Kasunduan Hinggil sa Serbisyo ng Abogado" which is quoted in
null and void.
his ex-parte  motion for clarification and/or modification of the
The same decision of Branch XV also made its findings that decision.
James Ross who was said to have penned the decision in GLRO
As so modified the decision stands in all other respects.
Rec. No. 917, never was a judge of the Court of Land
Registration at the time the decision was supposedly rendered SO ORDERED.
because the Gaceta Official for the year 1905 does not show that
(Exhibit S, pp. 4-5).
James Ross was listed as Judge of the Land Registration Court
or that he was ever appointed in that capacity. Furthermore, the On July 23, 1971, HABERER filed a motion for reconsideration of
Court found that while J.C. Welson was the Clerk of Court on the aforesaid order, and on September 15, 1972, Judge Navarro
April 26, 1905, one A.K. Jones issued the decree and he signed it issued the following order:
as Clerk of Court. The Court even found the supposed decision in
that proceedings missing and made its conclusion that since the In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to
decree which was supposedly issued by a person who was not reiterate that its decision in this case was mainly predicated on
the Clerk of Court at the time and which decree did not contain the decision of Branch XV of this Court that the certificate of title
the description of the property ordered in the decision to be emanating from the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were
rendered because the survey of the property was only made null and void and plaintiffs title happened to be one of them. The
some one year later and that said decree cannot now even be Court opined that until said decision is reversed the actual
found, the decision rendered therein is void for lack of jurisdiction. occupants had better be maintained in their possessions of the
land.
Now, as we have said, the foregoing findings of facts are too
ponderous to be ignored. It is indeed a truism that a void original Pursuant to the same order the motion for reconsideration and
certificate of title cannot be the source of a valid transfer new trial was set only for reception of alleged newly discovered
certificate of title and a void judgment is, in the eyes of the law, evidence.
inexistent and cannot give source to any legal right. The Court now understands that the decision of Branch XV is
The evidence now shows that the plaintiffs in said Civil Case No. now under review by order of our Appellate Court.
7-M(10339) before Branch XV of this Court are also the It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order
defendants in the herein eleven cases in which their properties of June 21, 1971, sought to be reconsidered insofar as it ordered
are also involved. Since the case before Branch XV directly the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor
assails the nullity of the proceedings by virtue of which Decree of the plaintiff, also adversely affects the interests of other
No. 1425 and the alleged title of the plaintiff over the parcels of persons and entities like the Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership, which is not a party herein, because the certificate of HOWEVER, IT IS NOT THE DESIRE OF THE UNDERSIGNED
title of the plaintiff is also a derivative of GLRO 917 and Decree PREVAILING PARTY AND SUCCESSOR BY TITLE ACQUIRED
No. 1425 from which Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, AFTER THE ACTIONS WERE BEGUN BY VIRTUE OF HIS
derives titles over wide tracts of land. Since Ortigas & Company, CONTRACT OF LEGAL SERVICES TO DEMAND FOR THE
Limited Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever orders or DEMOLITION OR REMOVAL OF THE IMPROVEMENTS AT
decisions are made in this case cannot be made to affect the said THE EXPENSE OF THE POSSESSOR IN BAD FAITH FOR:
company. Decisions and orders can only affect parties to the
The Civil Code confirms certain time-honored principles of the law
case.
of property. One of those is the principle of accession whereby
The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated the owner of property acquires not only that which it produces but
June 21, 1971, must be reconsidered on two grounds (1) that which it united to it either naturally or artificially. Whatever is
because the decision of Branch XV is now being the subject of built, planted or sown on the land of another, and the
further proceedings and (2) because it has the effect of adversely improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of
affecting the interest of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, the land. Where however, the planter, builder or sower has acted
which is not even a party herein. in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners and it
becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements
WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set
without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the
aside. However, the decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it
impracticability of creating what Manresa calls a state of "forced
denies the ejectment of the present occupants of the land as
co-ownership" (Vol. 3, 4th ed., p. 213), the law has provided a
stated in the decision stands.
just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the
SO ORDERED. option to acquire the improvements after the payment of the
proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the
(Exhibit T, at pp. 2-3). land and the sower to pay the proper rent. It is the owner of the
HABERER appealed from the decision of Judge Navarro while land who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is
the defendants-clients of respondent NAVARRO appealed from older and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to
the decision of Judge Salas. The Navarro order of June 21, 1971 the ownership of the accessory thing." Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 66
was not appealed by respondent NAVARRO's clients. Phil. 598, 602; see also Filipinas Colleges, Inc. vs. Garcia
Timbang, et al., 106 Phil. 247, 254).
After the rendition of the Navarro decision which made reference
to the decision rendered by Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of So caveat emptor (buyers beware) of possesors in bad faith as
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, respondent NAVARRO we are ready to ask for the execution of the decision pursuant to
published in the Manila Times on July 4, 1971 the following: law and avoid a scire facias Ordinary prudence requires that
those involved may please make some kind of arrangements with
LEGAL NOTICE TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED: the undersigned before execution by calling through the following
telephones:
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF LAW AS INTERPRETED
BY OUR SUPREME COURT RESPECTING A VAST TRACT OF x x x           x x x          x x x
LAND LATIFUNDIO COVERING MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN,
PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY, THE DECISION BY THE WAY, YOU ARE ALL INVITED TO JOIN
DATED MAY 26, 1971 REITERATING AND REPEATING THE THEMOTORCADE OF OUR PEOPLE'S VICTORY WHICH WILL
DECLARATION AND ORDER THAT ALL ORIGINAL AND PASS THROUGH THE PRINCIPAL STREETS OF
TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE DERIVED FROM MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND
DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NULL AND VOID AB QUEZON CITY FROM 9 A.M. TO 12 NOON TODAY, SUNDAY,
INITIO RENDERED BY THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF JULY 4, 1971, THE MOTORCADE WILL BEGIN FROM NO. 61
RIZAL IN FAVOR OF THE MYRIAD CLIENTS OF THE AMADO T. REYES STREET, BARRIO BUROL,
UNDERSIGNED HAS AUTOMATICALLY BY MERE LAPSE OF MANDALUYONG, RIZAL RETURNING TO THE SAME PLACE
THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD) BECOME FINAL AND AT NOON FOR LUNCH CELEBRATING TILL MIDNIGHT.
EXECUTORY. (Sgd.) FELIPE C. NAVARRO
But to every possessor in good faith there comes a time when he Counsel for the Defense
is considered a possessor in bad faith. When the owner or
possessor with a better right comes along, when he becomes 60 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City
aware that what he had taken for granted is at least doubtful, and
(Exhibit D, at pages 6-8).
when he learns the grounds in support of the adverse contention,
good faith ceases. The possessor may still believe that his right is Thereafter, respondent NAVARRO claimed ownership of
more secure, because we resign ourselves with difficulty to the properties originally covered by Decree 1425 including the
sight of our vanishing hopes, but when the final judgment of the parcels of land owned by Ortigas & Company, Limited
court deprives him of the possession, all illusion necessarily Partnership (hereinafter called ORTIGAS, for short), and started
disappears. (Tacas vs. Robon, 53 Phil. 356, 361-362 citing selling them.
Manresa and Articles 528, 545, and 1123 of our present Civil
In view of the aforementioned publication, panic ensued among
Code).
the lot buyers of ORTIGAS and among the property owners
He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, whose titles were derived from Decree No. 1425. As a counter
loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity (Art measure to allay the fears of the panicky lot buyers and owners,
449, Civil Code)
ORTIGAS caused the publication in the Manila Times on July 19 1. That the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 917 are null and
and 17, 1971 the following: void;
WARNING 2. That Decree No. 1425 is null and void and/or fictitious;
SO THE PUBLIC MAY KNOW 3. That all the original certificates of title issued by virtue of and
pursuant to the judgments in G.L.R.0 Rec. No. 917 and Decree
In reply to numerous inquiries received by Ortigas & Company,
No. 1425 were utter nullities;
Limited Partnership with reference to an advertisement published
in the Manila Times on July 4, 1971 supposedly affecting the 4. That all transfer certificates of title derived from the original
validity of all original certificates of title and transfer certificates of certificates of title declared void under No. (3) above, particularly
title derived from Decree No. 1425, Ortigas & Company, Limited but not exclusively, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 77652 and
Partnership wishes to announce that it is not a party to ANY case 77653 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and 126575 and
allegedly decided on May 26, 1971 by the Supreme Court or any its derivative Transfer Certificate of Title No. 135879 of the
other court and therefore ALL ITS TITLES DERIVED FROM Register of Deeds of Rizal, were and are null and void;
DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NOT IN ANY WAY AFFECTED BY
5. That the rightfully (sic) owners of the litigated lands covered by
SAID DECISION.
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or
The public is hereby requested to be wary of any person selling 135879) are the herein plaintiffs, the portions owned by them
lands and/or rights to lands belonging to and in the name of being as indicated in Exhibit P;
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership.
6. That the defendant Partnership cease and desist from
The public is also warned to be wary of MISLEADING molesting the plaintiffs in the enjoyment and peaceful possession
adverstisements and/or persons basing their rights to lands of of their respective landholdings;
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership on such "decision" of
7. That the Hon. Andres Siochi, as Presiding Judge, Municipal
May 26, 1971 which is claimed to be "final and executory."
Court, Pasig, Rizal, and Hon. Ricardo Tensuan, as Presiding
ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Judge, Branch II, City Court of Quezon City, and the defendant
Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, their agents,
(Exhibit D, at pages 4-5).
representatives and any and all persons acting in their behalves,
After the publication of the foregoing notices, respondent refrain and desist absolute (sic) and perpetually from proceeding
NAVARRO filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch with or taking any action on Civil Cases Nos. 1134, II 13865, II-
VIII, two (2) complaints for libel against the officers of ORTIGAS 13869, II-13877, II-13913, and II-13921 filed by the herein
and the officials of the defunct Manila 'times. Respondent defendant Partnership against some of the herein plaintiffs;
NAVARRO sought to recover in said cases damages allegedly
8. That the case be dismissed as against defendant Director of
sustained by him on account of his failure to consummate
Lands;
thousands of sales by reason of the publication of the above
notice. In support of his allegation, respondent NAVARRO 9. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs the sum of
presented 169 deeds of sale over lots in his various subdivisions, P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
the locations of which overlap the properties owned by ORTIGAS
10. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs the costs
(marked as Exhibit F, F-1 to F-168 in the instant proceedings).
of the suit; and
On December 13, 1971, Judge Benjamin H. Aquino dismissed
Defendant Partnership's counterclaim is hereby dismissed for
these two cases for libel for lack of merit (Exhibit D).
lack of merit.
Apart from the documents pertaining to the HABERER cases and
SO ORDERED.
the libel cases, the complainants also presented documents
relating to Civil Case No. 7-M(10339), Court of First Instance of (Exhibit EE at pages 5-6).
Rizal, Branch XV, entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, et al." and Civil Case No. Q- ORTIGAS appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals.
16265, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVI, On November 21, 1971, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
entitled "Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. setting aside the decision of Judge Ruiz and ordering a new trial
Navarro." to enable the petitioner to introduce newly discovered evidence.
The case was then remanded to the lower Court. On November
In Civil Case No. 7-M (10339), the plaintiffs therein sought to 3, 1973, Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who took the place of Judge
enjoin ORTIGAS from ejecting them. Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz Ruiz who was separated from the service by the President of the
decided in favor of the plaintiffs, arguing that (1) there was no Philippines, rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which
publication for the Notice of Initial Hearing set in 1905; (2) there reads as follows:
was no survey of the property sought to be registered; (3) the
judge presiding over the defunct Court of Land Registration was WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
fake; and (4) the Clerk of Court of the said Court was also fake. defendant, Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, as against
The dispositive portion of the Ruiz decision reads as follows: the plaintiffs:

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby 1. Dismissing the amended complaint;
declares and/or orders: 2. Confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, issued in
Expediente 917 and all titles emanating therefrom;
3. Directing each of the plaintiffs to individually pay the defendant On December 16, 1972, Judge Sergio A.F. Apostol rendered a
Company: decision in favor of Ortigas as follows:
(a) P30.00 per month as rental of the premises occupied by them x x x           x x x          x x x
from the time of the filing of the complaint on October 20, 1967,
It having been found that defendant was guilty of bad faith and
with legal rate of interest, until they surrender the possession
fraud in claiming and selling plaintiff's land, plaintiff is entitled to
thereof to defendant Company;
attomey's fees. This court finds the amount of attorney's fees in
(b) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. the sum of P50,000.00 to be fair and reasonable considering the
extent and value of the property involved and the nature of the
(4) Ordering plaintiff and their successors-in-interest, agents or
case.
any person or persons acting in their behalf, who are found to be
in possession of defendant company's land to vacate the same Defendant, in his answer and motion to dismiss, alleged that as a
and remove and demolish their improvements thereon at plaintiffs result of the issuance of the restraining order, he suffered
expenses; damages in the amount of Pl,000,000.00 daily.
(5) Ordering Atty. Emilio D. Castellanes to return the attorney's Firstly, the same was not raised as a counterclaim. Therefore,
fees in the amount of P 1,030.00 he prematurely collected from this court can only treat it as an affirmative defense.
defendant company, with interest; and
Secondly, no evidence was submitted to prove this claim of
(6) To pay the costs. damages. Under the same authorities cited in support of the
denial of plaintiffs claim for damages, therefore, he has failed to
SO ORDERED.
establish what damages he had suffered.
(Exhibit DD at pages 44-45).
Lastly, the court has found that plaintiff is entitled to the injunction
The aforesaid decision was appealed. During the pendency of the prayed for. It follows, therefore, that the issuance of the
approval of the record on appeal, ORTIGAS filed a motion for restraining order was proper and, hence, can not be the basis for
immediate execution of judgment. After exchange of pleadings by a claim for damages.
the parties, the trial court presided by Judge Alcantara granted
This court cannot help but end this decision with a note of
the motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in
admonition and hope. The people who will ultimately suffer the
favor of Ortigas upon filing a bond in the amount of P250,000.00.
most from defendant's acts in question are his buyers, who in all
Del Rosario, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the
probability are middle class people who themselves wanted to
aforesaid order. Despite opposition by Ortigas, Judge Florellana
make money out of the apparent sad predicament that defendant
Castro-Bartolome, who was appointed to Branch XV vice Judge
had brought upon the plaintiff. It is the fervent hope of this court,
Alcantara, granted the motion for reconsideration and set aside
therefore, that with the advent of the NEW SOCIETY defendant
the order of Judge Alcantara. Ortigas contested the order of
will turn a new page and make a fresh start in life.
Judge Bartolome through a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-04060. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
On September 1, 1975, the Court of Appeals promulgated a 1. Upholding the validity and indefeasibility of plaintiffs Transfer
decision in the aforesaid case, the dispositive portion of which Certificates of Title over the land in question;
reads as follows:
2. As a consequence thereof, forever enjoining and barring the
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The order of the defendant, his successors-in-interest, assigns, agents or any
respondent Judge dated February 25, 1975, is hereby annulled person or persons acting for or in his behalf, from selling and
and set aside and the order of Judge Arsenio Alcantara, granting advertising, verbally, or in writing, the sale of the lands in question
immediate execution, is hereby revived, with instructions to the and from asserting any claim or dominion or possession
respondent judge to fully implement the latter order, including the whatsoever on or over the said property, directly or indirectly,
approval of the petitioner's bond and the issuance of the adverse to the plaintiff; and
necessary writ or writs of execution. The restraining order issued
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of
at the inception of this action is hereby (sic) permanent.
P50,000.00 plus cost of suit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit II-I-a, at pages 409-411 of Exhibit II).
(Exhibit EE at pages 50-51).
The afore-quoted decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals,
This decision was the subject of a petition for review filed by docketed as CA-G.R. No. L-53125-R.
respondents Del Rosario, et al., but the same was denied. So
On December 13, 1978, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
also with the motion for reconsideration filed with the Supreme
decision in the aforesaid case affirming the decision of Judge
Court (Annex "A" of Exhibit FF)
Apostol.
In order to stop respondent NAVARRO from selling its titled
Respondent NAVARRO elevated the case to this Honorable
properties, ORTIGAS also filed Civil Case No. Q-16265, Court of
Tribunal (G.R. No. L-50156). Again, his petition was denied for
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVI, entitled "Ortigas
lack of merit. His subsequent motion for reconsideration was also
& Company, Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro.
denied. Consequently, the issue brought forth in the sala of Judge na sa mula't sapul ay pinaninirahan ng mga nakalagda sa ibaba
Apostol has now been laid to rest. ng kasunduang ito at ng kanilang ninuno o nagpamana
(predecessors-in-interest) na siyang mga pangyayari ay sapat na
EVIDENCE FOR THE RESPONDENT
upang maigawad ang mabisang titulo sapagkat ang nasabing
Respondent NAVARRO presented both testimonial and lupain kailanmay di naging pambayan kungdi pribado o di kaya'y
documentary evidence. His testimonial evidence consist of his sariling pag-aari ng nakalagdang may-ari sa ibaba ng
testimony and those of Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez, one of the kasunduang ito, dahil sa mga nabanggit ng mga pangyayari na
complainants; and Arsenio de Guzman, Chief of Section of the 'natamo sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay-bisa ng batas di lamang
Bureau of Lands. His documentary evidence consist of Exhibits 1 ng karapatan sa pag-aangkin ng lupain kungdi maging ang
to 13, inclusive. karapatang ipinagkaloob sa kanila ng pamahalaan ay nagsasaad
na ang aktuwal na pagkakaloob sa kanila ng pamahalaan ng
On direct examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that the titulo ay di na kinakailangan upang ang nasabing karapatan ay di
present charges are the same as the charges in administrative kilanlin o pagtibayin ng Hukuman (Susi vs. Razon and Director of
Case No. 1154, entitled, "In Re: Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, Lands, 48 Phil. 242; Director of Lands vs. Abaldonado CA-G.R.
respondent", which was referred to the Office of the Solicitor No. 177-R, Jan. 12, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz 2188). Ngunit sa dahilang
General for investigation. He further declared that this Honorable mayroon huwad na titulo ang mga nag-aangkin ng mga lupain at
Court deferred action on the said administrative case until such nararapat iharap sa Hukuman ang bagay na ito upang ang
time that G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709, the heirs of the late Hukuman magpatibay at magbigay-bisa ng mga titulo sa mga
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al. is nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito ayon sa Section 10 ng
terminated. Respondent's direct testimony dwelt only on these Rule 39 ng Rules of Court. Sapagkat ang pamumusisyon sa
two matters and on the identification of his Exhibits 1 to 9. isang bagay ang batayang di mapagtatalunan hinggil sa kalaunan
On cross-examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that he is ng pagmamay-ari nito ng makalipas ang mahabang panahong
the counsel for the defendants in the twenty-two (22) cases takda ng batas, maging ito man ay walang karampatang titulo o
before Judge Pedro Navarro and Judge Emilio Salas of the Court mabuting hangarin ay nagpapahina at sumisira sa saklaw-bisa at
of First Instance of Rizal; that he became the owner of the lands halaga ng pinakamahusay na titulo na maaring nasa bagay na
not occupied by his clients by virtue of his contract of legal iyon na pinanghahawakan ng taong hindi nagmamay-ari. Bunga
services signed by them (pp. 76-78, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; pp. 7-10, nito, ang pamumusisyon ng mahigit sa tatlumpung (30) taon na
t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). Said contract for legal services, which tinatamasa ng isang tao bilang may-ari kahit na walang
appears on pages 224-232 of Exhibit "1", reads as follows: karampatang titulo o mabuting hangarin ay gumaganap ng sapat
na titulo upang makuha ang pag-aari ng lupaing tangan sapagkat
KASUNDUAN HINGGIL SA SERBISYO NG ABOGADO SA MGA ang lampas-bisa o ang panahong itinakda ng batas sa
KINAUUKULAN NA ANG MGA BAGAY NA ITO AY MALAMAN pamamagitan ng pamumusisyon ng mahigit na tatlumpung (30)
AT MAKARATING taon ay tiyakang hadlang na maging ang pinakamahusay na titulo
na kinikilala ng batas ay hindi makatitinag o makapangingibabaw
Itong kasulatan na ito ay nagpapatibay at nagbibigay-bisa hinggil
(Kincaid vs. Cabututan, 35 Phil. 383).' Hindi maaring sabihin o
sa serbisyo ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro tungkol sa aming karapatan
ipagmalakdan ng mga nangamkam na sa pamamagitan ng
sa lupaing nasasakop ng diumanoy Kautusan-Blg. 1425 (Decree
kanilang huwad na titulo ay naangkin na nila ang lupain o di
No. 1425) sa diumanoy Usapin Blg. 699, 875, 917, aip (Cases
kayay gawing batayan ang kanilang huwad na titulo upang
Nos. 699, 875, 917, etc.) sa dating Hukuman ng Pagpapatala ng
masabing sila ay nagmamay-ari ng lupa. Hindi ito maaring
Lupain defunct Court of Land Registration) na ang nasabing
maganap sapagkat ang krimen at panlilinlang ay hindi maaring
diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 na siyang pinagbatayan ng
maging batayan ng panimula ng ay isang tunay at mabisang titulo
ipinapatalang gawagawang dalawanput anim (26) ng mga
kahit na ipinagbili at nabili sa isang mabuti ang hangarin ng bumili
Original Certificates of Title ng Register of Deeds ng Pasig at
ng karampatang halaga ng lupain (Levin vs. Bass, 91 Phil. 419,
nagbunga ito ng maraming Transfer Certificates of Title na sa
439). Dahil sa itinuring ng batas na sila ay 'constructive trustees,
kasalukuyan iginigiit ng mga mayhawak ngunit yan ay wala
lamang kaya hindi maganap ang lampas-bisa (Gayondato vs.
namang bisa at katuturan (Viz., City of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil.
Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, 49 Phil. 244-249). Subali't
324, 340) dahil sa kapaltosan ng nasabing diumano'y Kautusan
dahilan sa ilang katiwalian ng katotohanan na di nabatid ng mga
Blg. 1425 na sa mula't sapul magpahanggang ngayon sa
nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito na di-umano'y siyang
kasalukuyan ay iginigiit sa mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng
naganap na pangyayari ngunit ang tunay na katotohanan ay di
kasunduang ito kasama na rin ang mga dati at ibang mga kliyente
naman ito naganap at naliligaw sa paniniwalang nararapat silang
ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ngayon ay siyang nararapat maging
nagbayad ng rentas o alkila at ang ilan ay binili ang lupain
kalahok sa animnapung usapin na sa kasalukuyang hawak ni
gayong ang katotohanan ay sila ang nararapat at tunay na may-
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (Civil Cases Nos. 8322, etc. of the Court
ari sa di-umano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 (Decree No. 1425) ng
of First Instance of Rizal, Branches I, II, and VI contesting the
defunct Court of Land Registration na nagbunga ng gawa-
genuineness and due execution of Decree No. 1425 of the
gawang titulo na sumasakop sa buong kalawakan ng humigit
defunct Court of Land Registration) upang mabigyan ang mga
kumulang ng 4,000 hectares na samakatuwid ay apatnapung (40)
nakalagda sa ibaba ng mga kanikaniyang katibayan o kung sila
milyong metro kuwadrado ng lupaing ngayon ay matatagpuan sa
man ay mayhawak ng titulo na sakup ng diumano'y Kautusan
buong bayan ng Mandaluyong, ang buong bayan ng San Juan
Blg. 1425 ay babagohin iyan o mapapalitan ng maybisa galing sa
sapagkat sakop ito noon ng bayan San Felipe Neri ayon sa Act
Hukuman upang matahimik at mapayapa ang dahilan
No. 942, ang bahagi ng Punta sa Maynila sapagkat sakop ito
paninirahan kanilang mula't sapul ay kanila nang
noon ng Mandaluyong na ngayon, kalahati ng bayan ng Pasig,
pinamamayanan sa buong kaalaman ng sambayanan at walang
kalahati ng bayang Mariquina, at kalahati ng Lungsod ng Quezon
paglilihim ng kanilang mapayapang pagmamay-ari ng mga lupain
sapagka't pinilas lamang ito buhat sa bayan ng Mariquina, Pasig,
San Juan at Mandaluyong sa pamamagitan ng Commonwealth bawat metro kuwadrado ay aming magiging paunang-bayad
Act No. 502 na pinagtibay noong Oktubre 12, 1939 at sang-ayon upang ang proyektong ito ay mapanimulan kaagad sa lalong
sa mga paglalarawan ng di-umano'y pagsusukat o survey madaling panahon at ang matitirang dapat bayarang halaga na
nagsimula sa Maytunas creek patungong ilog ng San Juan Labing-limang Piso (P15.00) bawa't metro kuwadrado ay aming
patungong dakong ibaba ng agos ng ilog ng San Juan hanggang babayaran kapag naipagkaloob na ang titulo ng lupa sa amin sa
sa bahaging matatagpuan ang ilog ng Pasig sa Punta, Maynila at kasunduang kapag buhat sa isang taon mula sa petsang
lumilisya sa patungong itaas ng agos ng ilog Pasig na ipinagkaloob ang titulo ng lupa ay hindi kami nakababayad ng
nababanggit ang sapa ng Buayang Bato sa Namayan, buo sa halagang natitira o balanse na Labing-limang Piso
Mandaluyong pagkatapos ay pabalik sa ilog Pasig sa dakong (P15.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado, ang titulo ng lupain ay
pataas ng agos ng ilog hanggang sa ilog ng Mariquina at mapupunta sa pangalan ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro nguni't ang
pagsunod sa dakong pataas ng agos ng ilog ng Mariquina kasunduang ito na isang taong pagbibigay-palugit ni Atty. Felipe
hanggang sa sapa ng Pinagpatayang Buaya at lumalakdaw C. Navarro upang siya ay mabigyan ng kabuuang kabayaran sa
hanggang sa pinagmulan ng sapa ng Diliman na umaagos ng kanyang mga paglilingkod sa usaping ito at sumasang-ayon si
pababa patungong ilog ng San Juan at pabalik sa sapa ng Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na kami ay pahintulutang isangla ang
Maytunas na ang nasabing baybay-sukat o survey sa abot aming mga ari-ariang may karampatang titulo na di huwad at
makakaya ng sino mang may sapat ng kakayahang agrimensor pinagtibay ng batas sa alinmang bangko upang ito ang
(surveyor) ay di makabuo ng ni isa man lamang maramihang-gilid magsilbing bayad sa mga paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro
na hugis o anyo (polygon). sa usaping ito at iyon lamang ang natatanging sandali o
panahong kami ay mawawalan na ng obligasyon o tungkuling
Dahilan sa mga nabanggit na pangyayari, ang mga nakalagda sa
bayaran ang Dalawampu't Limang Piso (P25.00) sa bawat metro
ibaba ng Kasunduang ito ay sumasang-ayon na kasunduin ang
kuwadrado ng lupaing ikinasundo namin ang serbisyo ni Atty.
paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro ng No. 66 Azucena, Roxas
Felipe C. Navarro upang matituluhan nang naayon sa batas.
District, Quezon City upang gumawa ng karampatang hakbang
Sumasang-ayon din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang sinuman sa
sa Hukuman ng Unang Dulungan ng Rizal pati Quezon City
aming nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito na hindi kayang
hanggang sa Corte Suprema kung kinakailangan at gawin ang
magbayad ng paunang-halaga na Sampung Piso (P10.00) sa
anumang paraang isinasaisip niyang tumpak at nararapat gawin
bawa't metro kuwadrado ay bibigyan ng karampatang magbayad
sang-ayon sa batas upang matamo ng mga makalagda sa ibaba
ng makahalintulad na halaga sa bawa't buwan sa loob ng sampu
ng kasunduang ito ang kani-kaniyang titulo ayon sa paraang
(10) o dalawampung (20) taon sang-ayon sa mga hinihingi ng
minamarapat ng batas at kaming mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng
pangyayari, ang titulo ng lupain ay ipagkakaloob lamang sa
kasunduang ito ay nagkakaloob ng buong kapangyarihan kay
nagnanais umangkin nito kung mababayaran na ang kabuuan ng
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ilagay sa kanyang pangalan at kung sa
paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro kasama na ang "legal
kanino man niya naising ipagkaloob ang ibang bahagi ng lupain
interest" at ang amortization nito ngunit kinakailangan magbigay
na aming minana o pinagsundan (predecessors-in-interest)
sila ng paunang bayad na Limangpung Piso (P50.00) upang
nguni't ipinaubaya na namin kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro bilang
panimulan ang pagbabayad buwan-buwan (monthly installment
bahagi ng buong kabayaran ng kanyang serbisyo at karapatang
condition) at magiging mabisa lamang ito kung matutupad ng
maangkin niya sangayon sa mga inilalahad ng kasunduang ito
buong katapatan ang pagbabayad ng hulugang buwan-buwan
maliban na lamang doon sa bahagi ng lupaing nais naming
(monthly installment) na maaring magbuhat sa halagang Limang
mapatituluhan sa ilalim ng aming kani-kaniyang pangalan at
Piso (P5.00) hanggang Limangpung Piso (P50.00) sa bawat
sumasangayon kami sa pagbabayad ng karampatang halaga sa
buwan nang naayon sa laki o kalawakan ng lupaing nararapat na
paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro nang naayon sa isinasaad
mapasa-amin ayon sa batas. Sa dahilang ang buhay ng tao ay
ng kasunduang ito. Na sa bawa't kilos na magaganap sa
walang katiyakang magtatagal na habang panahon ay isinasalin
pagpapatitulo ng aming mga ariarian ang mamamahala sa mga
namin ang aming mga karapatan at tungkulin sa aming
gastos o kabayaran ay si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang ibig
tagapagmana lamang at gayon din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na
sabihin na mula sa pagpapasukat (survey) ng mga ari-arian
maaring manahin ang kanyang karapatan sa kasunduang ito sa
hanggang sa pagbibigay ng mga plano ng mga sukat upang
mga tagapagmana lamang niya upang itaguyod nila ang
mapagtibay ito ng Kagawaran ng Lupain (Bureau of Lands),
paglilingkod sa anumang paraan ayon sa batas.
paghahanda at pagnonotaryo ng mga affidavit' ng pagmay-ari,
pagkuha ng mga katibayan ng pagkamayari, bayad sa pagpasok SA KATUNAYAN AT KATIBAYAN NG LAHAT NG NABANGGIT
sa husgado (filing fees), pagpapatala (registration), paggawa ng NA KASUNDUANG ITO
mga kasulatan (documentation), pagsalin ng mga rekord
ay lumalagda kami sa kasunduang ito na aming tutuparin ang
(transcripts), pagpapatunay (certifications) at iba pang mga
lahat ng isinasaad sa kasunduang ito na sinasang-ayunan din ni
kinakailangang bayaran at pagkagastuhan ay nasa kalayaan na
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na kanyang tuparin ang kanyang
ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na pagpasiyahan ng naaayon sa
tungkulin bilang manananggol na tutulong sa amin upang kami ay
kaniyang sariling kagustuhan na ang nilalayon sa bandang huli at
mapagkalooban ng Hukuman ng titulo sa aming kani-kaniyang
ang tunay na hangarin ay ang mapatituluhan ng ayon sa batas
lupain ng naayon sa batas at siyang isinasaad din ng
ang aming kani-kaniyang mga lupain sa aming kani-kaniyang
kasunduang ito at kasama ng paglagda ng aming mga pangalan
pangalan na sa pamamagitan ng mga tungkuling iniatang namin
na siyang nais naming pangalang lumitaw sa titulo, ang aming
kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa pamamagitan ng kasunduang ito,
kani-kaniyang tirahan, kalawakan ng lupain, paraang pagbabayad
sumasang-ayon kami at natatalian o nabibigkisan ng kasunduang
at petsa na kami'y lumagda sa kasunduang ito bilang
ito na magbayad ng halagang Dalawampu't Limang Piso (P25.00)
pagpapatunay sa aming taos-pusong pagsang-ayon at hangarin
sa bawat metro kuwadrado ng lupaing matitituluhan sa aming
tumupad sa lahat ng napapaloob sa KASULATANG ITO.
pangalan bilang kabayaran sa serbisyo o paglilingkod ni Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro; ang halagang Sampung Piso (P10.00) sa
In the course of the proceedings, respondent NAVARRO Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
admitted that he has sold, and is still selling, properties covered recommendation. 18
by Torrens titles in the names of ORTIGAS & CO., Madrigal, and
On August 28, 1989, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted
others, but he claims that the titles of said parties are null and
its report, with the following findings and recommendation:
void because they emanated from Decree No. 1425; that he has
no title over the properties sold by him except the contract of legal CHARGES
services which his clients allegedly signed; that he has no
approved plans for the various subdivisions allegedly owned by In their Complaint dated March 13, 1979, complainants charged
him; that he has not obtained any certificate of registration or respondent with deceit, malpractice and gross conduct in office,
license to sell from the National Housing Authority; that he has and blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath, for having
not declared for taxation purposes the thousands of hectares of deliberately misrepresented the facts and the law while acting as
prime lands in Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Quezon City and counsel for the defendants in the following civil cases:
Marikina, allegedly owned by him; and that he has not filed any a. His insistence that our clients are no longer owners of the land
case directly attacking the title of ORTIGAS and others (pp. 7-33, subject of the cases mentioned above; he falsely alleged that to
t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977; Exhibit J). his personal knowledge the title to the land is in the name of one
Respondent NAVARRO also admits that he is the defendant in Leopoldo Cojuangco. This false allegation was made despite the
the "25-Billion-peso-case" before Judge Sergio Apostol, docketed final decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVII,
as Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas & Company Limited in Civil Case No. Q-18221 entitled "E Conrad and Virginia B.
Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro's Court of First Instance of Geeslin vs. Leopoldo Cojuangco, et al." (1) declaring the transfer
Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City"; that said case covers lands in of the lot to Leopoldo Cojuangco was fraudulent and had been
Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Marikina and Quezon City effected thru falsification; and, (2) ordering the cancellation of the
including those involved in the present case (pp. 8-21, t.s.n., July title issued to Cojuangco and the reversion of the title to our
7, 1977; Exhibits F, F-I to F-168). clients. Copies of the Complaint and the Decision in said case are
hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C", respectively.
Despite the decision of Judge Apostol upholding the validity of the
Ortigas Transfer Certificate of Title and enjoining respondent b. Mr. Navarro persisted and still persists in representing that our
NAVARRO from selling lots covered by said title, NAVARRO still clients' title was rendered null and void by virtue of the expiration
continued selling properties covered by the injunction claiming of the Parity Amendment and the decision of the Supreme Court
that the said decision is ineffectual because the same has been in the case of Quasha vs. Republic, 46 SCRA 160. Our clients'
appealed. (pp. 33-34, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). 4 title to the aforesaid property was acquired by hereditary
succession from the late Dr. Luther Bewley who acquired said
On the basis of the foregoing report, the Solicitor General filed a land in 1925. The ownership therefore of our clients is protected
complaint with Francisco Ortigas, Jr. as complainant, praying that both under the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. Any lawyer, even a
respondent Navarro be disbarred, that his name be stricken from law student, knows that the Parity Amendment and the decision
the roll of attorneys, and that his certificate of admission to the in the Quasha case, supra, covers cases where property was
bar be recalled. acquired by virtue of the Parity Amendment. Mr. Navarro is either
guilty of abysmal ignorance of the law or of complete and
On May 23, 1980, respondent Navarro filed his answer with
unabashed contempt for facts, the law of the land and for the
prayer to lift the order of suspension. 5 Complainant Ortigas, Jr.
Courts.
filed an opposition to said motion to lift suspension .6 Respondent
Navarro reiterated his plea in his manifestation dated August 8, c. Mr. Navarro persists in misrepresenting to the Court that the
1980. 7 In a resolution dated September 2, 1980, this Court title covering the land subject of the above cases had been
denied the motion to lift the order of suspension. 8 declared null and void in the "final and executory"  decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II. He deliberately omits to
On October 29, 1980, respondent Navarro filed an urgent ex
give the title of the case and its docket number for the obvious
parte  motion praying for the lifting of the order of
and malicious reason that the case he relies upon (Heirs of
suspension 9 which was denied by this Court on November 13,
Nuguid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 42699-42709) is still
1980. 10 He reiterated his prayer in another motion filed on
pending resolution before the Supreme Court and hence cannot
January 5, 1981 11 but the same was likewise denied in our
be "final and executory."
resolution of January 22, 1981. 12
d. He misrepresents to the Court that the land subject of the
II. Administrative Case No. 2033 arose from a letter-complaint,
cases heretofore enumerated is not within the territorial
dated March 13, 1979, filed by the spouses E. Conrad and
jurisdiction of the Quezon City Court and hence the court has no
Virginia Geeslin with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
jurisdiction. Further, that title thereto having described the land to
charging respondent Navarro with deceit, malpractice and gross
be part of the Municipality of San Juan del Monte, is void. He
misconduct in office, and blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath.
cannot disclaim knowledge however of the fact that the area in
Said letter was thereafter referred to this Court by Integrated Bar
the vicinity of Santolan Road in Quezon City was originally part of
of the Philippines President (now Chief Justice) Marcelo B.
the Municipality of San Juan del Monte territory of Quezon City
Fernan for appropriate action. 13
when the latter was created on 14 June 1950. In the light of this
Pursuant to our resolution of June 4, 1979, 14 respondent Navarro fact, Mr. Navarro's representation is false and malicious.
filed his answer with motion to dismiss on June 29, 1979. 15 The
e. Mr. Navarro has shown a complete and total disregard for
corresponding
basic norms of honesty and decency in that having prejudiced the
reply 16 and rejoinder 17 were subsequently filed. In a resolution of
interest of his clients because of his gross neglect to appeal in a
this Court dated October 1, 1985, the case was referred to the
timely manner from the decision of the court and having adopted (20) other defendants did his bounden duty in defense of their
the wrong remedy, in complete ignorance of the law, he had rights and exerted his utmost learning and ability within what the
influenced his clients into commencing a case before the Tanod law allows that at this stage, the controversy is still under litigation
Bayan against the Presiding Judge of the City Court of Quezon before the courts as stated above.
City, Branch 1, and Hon. Minerva Genovea The case is obviously
3. Under the foregoing circumstances, the administrative action
calculated to harrass and coerce the Honorable Presiding Judge.
must have been resorted to by the complainants at the instigation
Mr. Navarro's conduct speaks ill of his respect for the law and the
of their counsel who failed in wanting to defeat the defendants of
courts.
their God-given rights to the land in litigation that there can be no
f. The penchant of Mr. Navarro to misrepresent and deceive did other conclusion left but that the administrative complaint against
not stop before the City Court of Quezon City. He continues to do the respondent is 'pure' harassment. (pp. 53-54, Record)
so in the petition he filed before the Honorable Court of Appeals
FINDINGS
docketed as CA-G.R. No. S.P. 08928 entitled "Adolfo Corpus, et
al. 'vs. Hon. Minerva Genovea et al." Copies of the Petition and When the case was set for hearing by the Office of the Solicitor
the undersigned attorney's Comments thereto are hereto General, the parties agreed that there is no dispute as to the fact
attached as Annexes "D" and "E", respectively. (pp. 2-4, Record) of the case. Hence, they were granted a period of thirty (30) days
within which to file their respective memoranda, if they so desire,
RESPONDENTS ANSWER
after which the case will be considered submitted for resolution.
In his Answer dated June 29, 1979, respondent averred:
Since respondent did not deny the allegations of the Complaint,
1. From the face of the Resolution itself showing that the and in fact admitted during the hearing of the case set by the
undersigned respondent was never furnished with a copy of the Office of the Solicitor General that there is no dispute as to the
complaint, it can be gathered therefrom that the complaint is facts of this case, it follows that the specifications of the charges
clearly intended to prevent the undersigned respondent to against him, which are duly supported by documents, are
proceed in defending his clients' cause in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 deemed sufficiently proven.
(Adolfo M. Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon. Minerva C. Genovea, the
The only justification invoked by respondent is that he "gave his
Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et al.)
entire devotion to the interest of his clients" and that he "did his
still pending at this writing before the Court of Appeals. To allow
bounden duty in defense of their rights and exerted his utmost
complainants to harass respondent while the case (is) still
learning and ability.
pending in our courts of justice is an act in contempt of court for
which complainants and their counsel is (sic) liable. Consequently, respondent is deemed to have committed the
misrepresentations specified by complainants, as quoted above.
2. Undersigned respondent as counsel for the defendants Adolfo
Corpuz, et al. gave his entire devotion to the interest of his RECOMMENDATION
clients, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights
and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that Respondent was also charged in Administrative Case No. 2148
nothing be taken or be withheld from his clients, save by the rules entitled Ortigas vs. Navarro and has been suspended from the
of law, legally applied; for his clients are entitled to the benefit of practice of law since May 5, 1980. His suspension is still in effect.
any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by law as The acts complained of in the present case also warrant the
was done by the undersigned respondent in the ejectment case suspension of respondent from the practice of law.
filed by the complainants Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B.
Geeslin against the several clients of the undersigned. (pp. 42-43, WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent
Record) Atty. Felipe C. Navarro be likewise suspended from the practice
of law.
After complainants filed a Reply dated July 17, 1979 pointing out
that respondent's Answer does not deny any of the six (6) counts Makati, for Manila, August 17, 1989. 19
of charges specified in the Complaint, respondent filed a
No justiciable issue was raised in Administrative Case No. 2033
Rejoinder dated September 7, 1979, wherein he averred:
as respondent Navarro failed to deny the material allegations in
1. The complainants alien spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and the complaint of the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin.
Virginia B. Geeslin who are citizens of the United States of
The two main issues raised by the Solicitor General in
America held TCT No. 153657 which was cancelled on
Administrative Case No. 2148 are:
December 31, 1970 by TCT No. 180231 issued in the name of
Leopoldo A. Cojuangco both of which TCTs are described to be 1. Whether or not respondent Navarro sold properties titled in the
located at Santolan Road, Municipality of San Juan, Province of names of other persons without the consent of the latter; and
Rizal, (now part of Metro-Manila) filed ejectment proceedings
before the City Court of Quezon City against my clients Victorino 2. If in the affirmative, whether or not such acts constitute
Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and twenty others in Civil Case Nos. sufficient grounds for suspension or disbarment.
I-29872 to I-29931 which later were elevated to the Court of Respondent reiterated in his answer that the transfer certificates
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 entitled Adolfo M. Corpuz, et of title of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina
al. vs. Hon. Minerva C. Genovea the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin Nuguid Vda. de Haberer were declared null and void in the
and Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et al. decision dated March 31, 1970 of the Court of First Instance of
2. Undersigned respondent being retained as counsel for the Rizal, Branch XV, in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) entitled "Pedro
defendants Victorino Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and the twenty del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership, et al.," and
in the order dated June 21, 1971 of the Court of First Instance of occupants had better be maintained in their possessions of the
Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8369, land. 21
8376, 8379, 8383, 8685, 8686 and 8700 entitled "Florentina
However, to repeat, the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV
Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Federico Martinez, et al."
was set aside by the Court of Appeals which remanded the case
Respondent likewise reiterated his claim of ownership over all
for new trial and another one was rendered, this time by a
parcels of land (including those of Ortigas & Company, Limited
different judge on November 3, 1973 upholding the validity of
Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer) covered by
Decree No. 1425 and all titles issued as a consequence thereof.
Decree No. 1425, G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which was declared
Respondent cannot feign ignorance of the November 3, 1973
null and void in the decision dated March 31, 1970 of Branch XV
decision, which superseded the March 31, 1970 decision, for the
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 20 Furthermore, he asserts
simple reason that it was his clients who appealed the former
ownership over the subject properties as payment for his legal
decision to the Court of Appeals. In spite thereof and indicative of
services rendered in the ejectment cases filed against his clients
his bad faith, he stubbornly continues to invoke the decision of
in Branches I and II of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal.
March 31, 1970 as the source of his alleged ownership rights
1. To clarify, Civil Case No. 7-M(10339)filed before Branch XV of over the Ortigas properties.
the then Court of First Instance of Rizal directly assailed the
2. In the order of June 21, 1971, Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch
nullity of the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917 by virtue of
II ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
which Decree No. 1425 was issued, as well as the original
15043 issued in the name of Haberer and the issuance of new
certificates of title issued as a consequence thereof. These
titles in the name of the defendants, subject to the lien for
original certificates of title include the properties belonging to
attorney's fees in favor of respondent pursuant to the terms of the
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid
contract for his legal services. However, the same judge issued
Vda. de Haberer. On March 31, 1970, Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz
an amendatory order dated September 15, 1972, which provides
then presiding over said Branch XV rendered a decision declaring
in part that:
Decree No. 1425, as well as the original certificates of title issued
pursuant thereto, null and void. Ortigas appealed the Ruiz It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order
decision to the Court of Appeals which set the same aside and of June 21, 1971, sought to be reconsidered insofar as it ordered
remanded the case to Branch XV for new trial. On November 3, the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor
1973, Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who replaced Judge Ruiz, of the plaintiff, also adversely affects the interests of other
rendered a decision confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425 persons and entities like the Ortigas and Company, Limited
and all titles emanating therefrom. The said decision was pending Partnership, which is not a party herein, because the certificate of
appeal with the Court of Appeals when the investigation of title of the plaintiff is also a derivative of GLRO 917 and Decree
respondent by the Solicitor General was conducted. No. 1425 from which Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership,
derives titles over wide tracts of land. Since Ortigas & Company,
We take judicial notice of the fact that on December 29, 1983, the
Limited Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever orders of
Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming in toto  the
decisions are made in this case cannot  be made to affect the
November 3, 1973 decision of Judge Alcantara, which became
said company. Decisions and orders can only affect parties to the
final and executory on May 25, 1984 insofar as plaintiffs-
case.
appellants Pascual Santos, et al. are concerned. The plaintiffs-
appellants Pedro del Rosario, et al. appealed to the Supreme The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated
Court in a petition for review on certiorari which was, however, June 21, 1971, must be reconsidered on two grounds (1)
denied on February 18, 1985. The denial became final and because the decision of Branch XV is now being the subject of
executory on April 10, 1985. Thereafter, the records of the case further proceedings and (2) because it has the effect of adversely
were remanded to Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of affecting the interest of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership,
Rizal for execution. which is not even a party herein.
The records further show that the March 31, 1970 decision of WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set
Branch XV in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) became the basis of the aside. However, the decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it
decision rendered by Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II on May denies the ejectment of the present occupants of the land as
21, 1971 which dismissed the complaint for ejectment filed by stated in the decision stands. (Emphasis supplied) 22
Haberer against the clients of respondent Navarro. However,
Judge Navarro in his decision categorically stated that "it is the It is apparent, therefore, that since the order of June 21, 1971,
considered opinion of this court that until and unless the decision was set aside, the inescapable conclusion is that Transfer
of Branch XV of this court is reversed or set aside by final Certificate of Title No. 15043 stands and remains in the name of
judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the herein eleven defendants Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. Consequently, the
in these eleven cases to vacate the parcels which they occupy defendants therein never acquired title to the property covered by
and on which their respective houses are built has become the title of Haberer. And, since respondent Navarro merely
premature." This condition was reiterated in Judge Navarro's derives his supposed title to the properties as a mere transferee,
order of September 15, 1972 wherein he stated that: with more reason can he not validly become the owner of the
above properties.
In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to
reiterate that its decision in this case was mainly predicated on 3. Respondent intransigently relies on his contract for legal
the decision of Branch XV of this Court that the certificate of title services executed with his clients, the defendants in the Haberer
emanating from the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were case, as another basis of his claim of ownership over the entire
null and void and plaintiffs title happened to be one of them. The property covered by Decree No. 1425. It must be noted that the
Court opined that until said decision is reversed the actual said contract was executed pursuant to the ejectment cases filed
against respondent Navarro's clients which involve only the We have painstakingly scrutinized and evaluated the records of
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 these two administrative cases and we cannot but find that strong
containing an aggregate area of 12,700 square meters, more or and unassailable evidence exist to render it our irremissible duty
less. It appears that the defendants assigned rights to respondent to impose the ultimate sanction of disbarment on respondent.
Navarro over properties which they did not actually occupy and
Respondent's defense is anchored primarily on the contract for
which virtually extended to all the properties covered by titles
legal services, executed by his clients whom he represented in
issued under Decree No. 1425. As correctly observed by the
the twenty-two ejectment cases filed before Branches I and II of
Solicitor General, said defendants have not presented any
the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, and quoted in full in
document evidencing their ownership of the parcels of land they
the earlier part of this discussion.
assigned to their lawyer.
It is extremely relevant to note that both of the aforesaid two
From the foregoing considerations, it is incontrovertible that
branches of the trial court made no finding as to the validity of the
respondent's pretended ownership rights over the parcels of land
claim of ownership favorable to the defendants therein. On the
covered by Decree No. 1425 have no bases whatsoever, either in
contrary, Judge Salas of Branch I found for the plaintiff and
fact or in law, and it is an assault on credulity to assume that he
ordered the defendants, clients of respondent, to vacate the
was not aware of the vacuity of his pretensions and
premises.
misrepresentations.
In the case before Judge Navarro of Branch II, the complaint was
In resolving this disbarment case, we must perforce initially focus
dismissed merely on the ground that "since the evidence is
on the degree of integrity and respectability required and
uncontroverted that the defendants in all these eleven cases have
expected of the law profession. There is no denying that
been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of their
membership in the legal profession is achieved only after a long
respective parcels dating back since their predecessors in
and laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability the
interest, their possession must be maintained and respected. 30
attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his
family. This is not to say, however, that the emphasis is on the Thereafter, on June 21, 1971, the aforesaid judgment of dismissal
pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social prestige dated May 26, 1971 was modified, and the Register of Deeds
and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to was thereafter ordered to cancel the transfer certificate of title
the same by reason of the fact that everyone is deemed an officer issued in favor of plaintiff and to issue new titles in the name of
of the court. 23 defendants subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of herein
respondent in accordance with the contract for legal services
The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has
hereinbefore discussed.
been judiciously stated by Chief Justice Marshall of the United
States Supreme Court in this wise: Eventually, however, this subsequent order was reconsidered
and set aside in the order of September 15, 1972, "because it has
On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to
the effect of adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Co., Ltd.
an individual and the prosperity of his life may depend on its
Partnership, which is not even a party herein," but it reinstated
exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or
the decision of May 26, 1971 insofar as it denied the ejectment of
capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is extremely
the present occupants.
desirable that the respectability of the Bar should be maintained
and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For As earlier noted, there is nothing in the records to show that the
these objects, some controlling power, some discretion, ought to defendants in the ejectment cases were declared the true owners
be exercised with great moderation and judgment, but it must be of the land subject of said cases. Only the fact of possession was
exercised. 24 ruled upon, and what the courts recognized was merely the
defendants' right of possession. They, therefore, never become
In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed
the owners of the subject lots in any sense of the word in the
that the purpose of disbarment is not meant as a punishment to
absence of any declaration to that effect, by reason of which they
deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather intended
could not have legally transmitted any ownership rights or
to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the
interests to herein respondent. Furthermore, we have seen that
officers of the court and to ensure the proper administration of
any further claim of ownership on their part was finally settled by
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important
the order of September 15, 1972, setting aside the order of June
function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in
21, 1971, wherein the trial court correctly held that the earlier
whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 25 Its objectives
order unjustifiedly affected adversely the rights of Ortigas &
are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his client
Company, Limited Partnership. In addition, said court specifically
and to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct
excluded the title of said partnership from the effects of its
has proven him unfit for the duties and responsibilities belonging
decision.
to the office of an attorney. 26
Pursuant to the provisions of the contract of legal services, the
As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is
defendants-clients agreed to convey to respondent whatever
innocent of the charges until the contrary is proved, and that, as
properties may be adjudicated in their favor in the event of their
an officer of the court, he has performed his duty in accordance
failure to pay the attorney's fees agreed upon. As hereinbefore
with his oath. 27 Therefore, in disbarment proceedings, the burden
stated, there was nothing awarded to the said defendants except
of proof rests upon the complainant 28, and for the court to
the right to possess for the nonce the lots they were occupying,
exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent
nothing more. That respondent acquired no better right than the
must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. 29
defendants from whom he supposedly derived his claim is further
confirmed in the order of Judge Navarro, dated June 21, 1971,
denying the issuance of new certificates of title to herein As correctly observed by the Solicitor General:
respondent who, to further stress the obvious, was not even a
Respondent Navarro knew that the decision of Judge Vivencio
party but only a lawyer of the defendants therein. It follows that
Ruiz declaring as null and void certificates of titles emanating
his act of selling the Ortigas properties is patently and
from Decree No. 1425 was reversed and set aside. He knew that
indisputably illegal.
Judge Pedro Navarro of the Rizal Court of First Instance
Respondent admits that he has no Torrens title but insists on the exempted Ortigas & Company from the effects of his decision. He
puerile theory that his title is his contract of legal also knew that Judge Sergio Apostol of the Rizal Court of First
services. 31 Considering that the effectivity of the provisions of Instance in Quezon City had upheld the validity of the certificates
that contract is squarely premised on the award of said properties of title of Ortigas & Company. Despite all these pronouncements
to the therein defendants, and since there was no such and his awareness thereof, respondent NAVARRO still continued
adjudication, respondent's pretense is unmasked as an to sell properties titled in the name of Ortigas & Company and the
unmitigated deception. Furthermore, it will be recalled that the Madrigals. 34
land involved in the two ejectment cases consists of only 1.2
Lastly, the motion to dismiss filed by respondent should be, as it
hectares whereas respondent is claiming ownership over
is hereby, denied for lack of merit. Respondent inexplicably posits
thousands of hectares of land, the sheer absurdity of which he
that the charges against him should be dismissed on the ground
could not be unaware.
that his suspension was automatically lifted by virtue of our
Respondent further admits that he has been and is continuously resolution, dated June 30, 1980, which merely reads:
selling, up to the present, the entirety of the land covered by
The manifestation of counsel for respondent stating among other
Decree No. 1425 32 pursuant to the decision of Branch XV of the
things that the complaint against respondent could not prosper if
then Court of First Instance of Rizal, dated March 31, 1970,
respondent's manifestation dated March 3, 1980 in G.R. No. L-
declaring the said decree null and void as well as the titles
42699-42709 and his request for certification by the Chief Justice
derived therefrom.
to the effect that the petition in G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709 is
It must nonetheless be remembered that the decision of Judge deemed dismissed pursuant to Sec. 11(2) of Art. X of the
Navarro recognizing the defendants' right of possession is subject Constitution are granted, are NOTED.
to the final outcome of the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV
There is absolutely nothing in the resolution to support
which nullified Decree No. 1425. The latter decision, at the time
respondent's typical distortion of facts. On the contrary, our
the decision of Judge Navarro was rendered, was pending
resolutions dated September 2, 1980, November 8, 1980, and
appeal. This is precisely the reason why Judge Navarro had to
January 22, 1981 repeatedly denied respondent's motions for the
amend his decision a third time by setting aside the order of
lifting of his suspension.
registration of the land in the name of the defendants. He could
not properly rule on the ownership rights of defendants therein It further bears mention at this juncture that despite the
pending a final determination of the validity of said decree, which suspension of respondent Navarro from the practice of law, he
thus prompted him to find merely on the fact of possession. continues to do so in clear violation and open defiance of the
Besides, a mere declaration of nullity cannot,  per se  justify the original resolution of suspension and the aforestated resolutions
performance of any act of ownership over lands titled in the name reiterating and maintaining the same. Thus, the records of this
of other persons pursuant to said decree. To cap it all, as earlier Court disclose that in G.R. No. L-78103, entitled "Jose de Leon,
discussed, that decision dated March 31, 1970 has been et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," a Second Division case filed on
reversed and set aside, and a new one entered confirming the April 25, 1987, counsel for private respondents therein
validity of Decree No. 1425, which latter decision has long questioned herein respondent Navarro's personality to intervene
become final and executory. in the case since he was under suspension, to which respondent
Navarro rejoined by insisting that his suspension had allegedly
In Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas and Co., Ltd.
been lifted already. In G.R. No. 85973, entitled "Hilario Abalos vs.
Partnership vs. Navarro," herein respondent was enjoined from
Court of Appeals, et al.," the petition wherein was filed on
selling, offering for sale and advertising properties of the plaintiff
December 2, 1988 and assigned to the First Division, respondent
therein. We have seen that a decision was subsequently
Navarro also appeared as counsel for therein petitioner. Said
rendered therein on December 16, 1972 by Branch XVI of the
petition was denied since the same was prepared, signed and
Court of First Instance of Rizal upholding the validity of the
verified by respondent Navarro, a suspended member of the
transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Ortigas and Co.,
Philippine Bar. Over his expostulation that his suspension had
Limited Partnership which became final and executory after
already been lifted, the Court directed the Bar Confidant to take
respondent's petition for review was denied by this Court.
appropriate action to enforce the same. Again, in G.R. No. 90873,
However, respondent continued to sell properties belonging to
entitled "Matilde Cabugwang et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,"
Ortigas in blatant disregard of said decision. This was
the Second Division, in a resolution dated January 31, 1990,
categorically admitted by respondent himself during the
imposed a fine of P1,000.00 upon said respondent for appearing
investigation conducted by the Solicitor
therein as counsel for petitioner which fine he paid on February 5,
General. 33
1990.
Respondent avers that the said decision cannot be enforced
In at least three (3) other cases in the Second Division,
during the pendency of the appeal therefrom. Even if this were
respondent Navarro appeared before the Court as counsel for
true, the fact that respondent was enjoined by the court from
petitioners therein, viz: (1) G.R. No. L-74792 (Lorenzo Valdez, et
selling portions of the Ortigas properties is compelling reason
al., vs Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.), filed on June 11, 1986
enough for him to desist from continuing with his illegal
and decided on December 7, 1986; (2) G.R. No.
transactions.
L-76589 (Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.), filed on November 28, 1986 and decided on May 4,1987; and
(3) G.R. No. 81482 (Ricardo Rasalan vs. Flaviano Pascua, et al.),
filed on January 30, 1988 and decided on February 15, 1988. The
rollos in said cases show that he also appeared as counsel for
the petitioners in the Court of Appeals, but since the lower courts'
original records were not forwarded to this Court, said rollos do
not reflect whether he also appeared before the different courts a
quo.
Such acts of respondent are evidential of flouting resistance to
lawful orders of constituted authority and illustrate his incorrigible
despiciency for an attorney's duty to society. Verily, respondent
has proven himself unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed
in him by law and by this Court, through his deliberate rejection of
his oath as an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Felipe C. Navarro is hereby
DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll A.M. No. 3360               January 30, 1990
of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished to the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant
the personal records of respondent. This resolution is vs.
immediately executory. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989,
respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks
this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed
upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October
1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia
A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of
P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition
that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and
return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February
1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of
returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to
approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check
dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check
dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c)
a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00.
Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their
issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee
bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds.
Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent
made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of
checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her
obligations to Ms. Marquez.
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases
Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial,
the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3)
cases, and sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify
the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law
8538359; imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The
Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that
of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which
P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and
deleteriously affects public interest and public order. In Lozano v.
to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case Martinez,2 the Court explained the nature of the offense of
of insolvency, and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:
P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs
x x x           x x x          x x x
in all three (3) cases.
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093
of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in addition,
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. . . . The thrust of
suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The
the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
pertinent portion of the decision read as follows:
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
sustain the conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense
to this modification. against property but an offense against public order.

It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a x x x           x x x          x x x

member of the Bar, and the offense for (sic) which she is found The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the
guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended
private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction
from the practice of law and shall not practice her profession until and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief
further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with
it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an
Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can
required by Section 29 of the same Rule. very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
SO ORDERED. 1 banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest. 3(Italics supplied)
On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of
9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and law because she had been convicted of crimes involving moral
advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, Court provide as follows:
respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted what grounds.  A member of the bar may be removed or
without action respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of
the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
final and executory upon expiration of the period for filing a grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
Resolution, the Court found that respondent had lost her right to is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
reglementary period. for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent
states: Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a
Court of First Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of
not painful penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such
considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until
the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics
motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the supplied)
offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the
herein plaintiff-appellee. We should add that the crimes of which respondent was
convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which
she had not violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a
upon the ground that when she issued the checks which crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case,
bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the
Marquez. profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects
the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense.
In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:
the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she
shall be a person of good moral character.1âwphi1 This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to
the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.  5
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift
Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from
the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of
this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of
respondent.

G.R. No. L-47431          December 19, 1940

In the matter of the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis, deceased.
CONCORDIA CUEVAS ( alias CONCORDIA
ABESAMIS), executrix-appellant, vs. PEDRO ABESAMIS, 2. o ET
AL., oppositors-appellees.
Villasan, Valenton and Santiago for appellant.
Angel Cecilio for appellees.
LAUREL, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija dated May 27, 1937, the dispositive part of which
reads as follows:
Wherefore, the court sustains the opposition to the approval of
the amended project of partition presented by the executrix and
hereby orders the latter to present another inventory and another
project of partition which shall include only the property
adjudicated to the defendants in the final decision of this court in
case No. 4816, consisting of only one-eight (1/8) of the three
parcels of land described in the will of the deceased
Crescenciano Abesamis.
On February 11, 1928, Crescenciano Cuevas submitted for
probate in the court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija the last will
and testament of her deceased natural father, Crescenciano
Abesamis, which bequeathed three parcels of land, one share of
stock in the "Gallera de Peñaranda" of a par value of P100, and
two carabaos worth P100 to Concordia Cuevas ( alias Concordia
Abesamis), Francisco Abesamis, Perpetua Abesamis, Isaias
Abesamis and Pedro Abesamis in the manner and under the
conditions stated therein.
On March 15, 1928, however, Pedro Abesamis and twenty-five
others entered their opposition to the distribution of the properties
described in the will, for the reason that "a que dichos bienes son
de propiedad pro indiviso entre los aqui opositores y la
testamentaria," and simultaneously informed the court that they
had commenced an action for the partition of said properties.
On May 14, 1928, the will was admitted to probate and Concordia
Cuevas was appointed executrix with a bond of P1,000.
On May 13, 1928, Pedro Abesamis and the other oppositors did 3. The court erred in not finding that it has no jurisdiction as a
institute civil case No. 4816 in the Court of First Instance of probate court to decide the question of ownership of the property
Nueva Ecija against the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis, involved in these proceedings part of which is claimed by the
Concordia Nuevas, Francisco Abesamis and Isaias Abesamis for oppositors to be their property not by virtue of any right of
the partition, alleging that said properties belonged, in the first inheritance from the deceased Crescenciano Abesamis but by
instance, to Anacleto Mercado, their common causante, who title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate.
entrusted them to Crescenciano Abesamis with the
4. The court erred in not holding that the oppositors have no
understanding that they were not to be subdivided as long as the
personality to object to the project of partition presented by the
minor children of her other deceased son, Teodorico Abesamis,
executrix on February 8, 1937, which was drafted in accordance
were living with the Crescenciano. A demurrer interposed by the
with the provision of the will of the deceased Crescenciano
defendants on the ground that there was another pending action
Abesamis.
involving the same subject matter was sustained after which the
plaintiffs were required to amend their complaint, the amendment Under the first assignment of error, appellant impugns the validity
consisting simply in eliminating therefrom the estate of of the decision of the lower court in civil case No. 4816 declaring
Crescenciano Abesamis and leaving as party defendants that the legatees here, defendants in that action, are entitled only
Concordia Cuevas, Francisco Abesamis and Isaias Abesamis. As to one-eight of the property on the ground that the estate of
these defendants failed to answer the amended complaint, they Crescenciano Abesamis was not a party in said proceeding. It
were declared in default and , on July 3, 1930, judgment was should be noted that all the coheirs, except Perpetua Abesamis,
rendered adjudicating seven-eights (7/8) of the properties in favor were defendants therein, and that by order of the court, in its
of the plaintiffs and the other one-eight (1/8) for the defendants. instructions to the partition commissioners dated February 7,
On February 7, 1931, the court ordered the commissioners of 1931, the herein executrix-appellant was pronounced by the sole
partition to declare as sole heiress Concordia Cuevas to the heiress of the deceased. As said defendants were declared in
exclusion of Francisco and Isaias Abesamis. default and are, to be sure, bound by the decision in that case,
we are of the opinion that the appellant cannot now be permitted
On March 3, 1931, the partition commissioners submitted their
to assail its virtuality not to regard it as totally ineffectual against
report, upon which the court declared that "no hay lugar a
the testate estate. The rights to the succession of a person are
aprobar por ahora el informe de los comisionados partidores
transmitted from the moment of death (article 657, Civil Code),
hasta que se haya verificado la particion en dicha testamentaria
and where, as in this case the heir is of legal age and the estate
en la cual pueden las partes de esta causa hacer valer los
is not burdened with any debts, said heir immediately succeeds,
derechos que pudieran tener sobre los terrenos en cuestion." A
by force of law, to the dominio n, ownership and possession of
motion for reconsideration having been denied on September 15,
the properties of his predecessor, and consequently stands
1932, plaintiffs, on February 14, 1934, moved for the approval of
legally in the shoes of the latter. (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17
the project of partition filed by the commissioners . On February
Phil., 321; Dais vs. Court of First Instance of Capiz, 51 Phil., 396.)
26, 1934, the court ordered the suspension of the approval of the
In the absence of a special proceeding for the settlement of the
partition of the properties until the termination of the testamentary
estate, there is no necessity of a previous declaration of status
proceedings.
and the heir or heirs can sue and be sued in that capacity
On January 9, 1937, Concordia Cuevas presented to the probate (Arsenio de Vera et al. vs. Cleotilde Galauran, 37 Off. Gaz.,
court a partition plan adjudicating the three lots and the two 1821). This disposes likewise of the second assignment of error.
carabaos in favor of the legatees mentioned in the will. This was
With reference to the third assignment of error, it should be
rejected by the court for the reason that it was not in conformity
observed that the oppositors instituted a separate action (civil
with the inventory of the estate and the decision in civil case No.
case No. 4816) for the partition of the properties described in the
4816. On January 26, 1937, the executrix submitted an amended
will of Crescenciano Abesamis. No question of ownership,
inventory and later another project of partition distributing the
therefore, was in fact determined in the testamentary proceedings
properties of the estate in accordance with the terms of the will,
(civil case No. 4797) by the probate court. It results that when, on
which were objected by the defendants, because these included
February 8, 1937, the court disapproved the project partition filed
their legitimate shares under the decision in civil case No. 4816.
by the executrix, it did not decide adverse claims of proprietorship
The opposition was upheld by the court in kits decision of May 27,
but only lent force and effect to the decision rendered in civil case
1937, the dispositive part of which is quoted in the beginning of
No. 4816.
this opinion.
Under the fourth and last assignment of errors, it is vigorously
The executrix-appellant assigns the following errors:
contended that only heirs or legatees may present an opposition,
1. The court erred in not holding that the decision in civil case No. and that only inasmuch as the oppositors-appellees are not heirs
4816 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, declaring that or legatees, they have no legal personality to object to the
the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis is entitled only to one-eight approval of the project of partition. By virtue of the judgment in
(1/8) of the property described in the will, is a nullity and can not civil case No. 4816 adjudicating seven-eights of the property in
bind the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis. their favor, the herein oppositors had the right to oppose any
project of partition which, in effect, would divest them of their right
2. The court erred in not approving the amended project of
of ownership. To conclude otherwise would be to permit the
partition presented by the executrix on February 8, 1937, and in
executrix to enrich herself at the expense of the oppositors.
not distributing the estate of the deceased Crescenciano
Abesamis according to the provision of the will. The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the appellants. So ordered.
A.C. No. 190             September 26, 1964
MARCOS MEDINA, complainant,
vs.
LORETO U. BAUTISTA, respondent.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
In a complaint filed on September 15, 1954, Marcos Medina
charged respondent Atty. Loreto U. Bautista with the commission
of certain acts constituting malpractice and conduct unbecoming
a member of the bar. To this complaint respondent filed an
answer on October 19, 1954. The case was referred to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
This official in turn referred the case to the provincial fiscal of
Cagayan for investigation and report. Later after the reception of
the corresponding evidence, the Solicitor General submitted his
report to this Court finding respondent guilty of the acts of
malpractice complained of and recommending his disbarment.
Together with this report he submitted a complaint formally
charging respondent with acts constituting the alleged
malpractice as found in his investigation with the prayer that the
name of respondent be stricken off from the roll of attorneys.
A copy of this formal complaint was served on respondent so that
he may answer it if he so desires in accordance with the rules.
Thereupon, he answered the complaint denying the material
allegations thereof and praying that it be dismissed. He, however,
also prayed that he be allowed to introduce additional evidence.
This was allowed and the case was set for hearing. The first
hearing was set on May 4, 1964, which, by agreement of the
parties was postponed to June 22, 1964. On this last date,
however, no hearing was held, and so it was again postponed to
July 22, 1964. And having neither respondent nor his counsel
appeared on the last date set, complainant and his counsel
submitted additional evidence consisting of several decisions of
the Court of Appeals showing that respondent was found guilty of
estafa. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision.
It appears that sometime in 1953, Maria Ragsac Cabel filed a controversy. According to complainant, he paid all in all to
complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land before the Court of respondent the sum of P500.00.1awphîl.nèt
First Instance of Cagayan against complainant Marcos Medina. In
From the foregoing narration, the following facts are deemed to
the early of January, 1954, complainant Medina approached the
have been established: (1) respondent after agreeing with
plaintiff seeking a compromise of the case. Plaintiff told him to
complainant to settle the case amicably prepared a motion for
see her lawyer Loreto Bautista, respondent herein, whereupon he
extension of time to file an answer, but instead he filed a motion
went to see the latter in his office at Aparri, Cagayan. Respondent
to declare the latter in default; (2) being fully aware of the
demanded P500.00 as a consideration for the amicable
decision rendered in the civil case, respondent prepared two
settlement, and as complainant had no ready cash then, he
fictitious deeds of sale in the sense that the consideration in
asked to be allowed to pay the same in small installments paying
either was never in fact received; (3) pretending to arrange an
on that occasion the sum of P35.00. Respondent agreed and
amicable settlement of the case, respondent received on different
thereupon prepared a motion for an extension of time to file his
occasions from complainant several sums totalling P500.00. (4)
answer in the case. Complainant returned to his hometown.
respondent, taking advantage of the ignorance of his client Maria
One month later, complainant received an order declaring him in Ragsac Cabel, ask her to sign a document wherein it was made
default and so he went to respondent to ask him why in spite of to appear that she received P8,000.00 when in truth and in fact
their agreement he was declared in default. Respondent assured she did not receive said amount; and (5) respondent received
him that he had nothing to worry about, and on that occasion from his client Mrs. Cabel the amount of P800.00 with the
respondent again asked for P50.00 which then and there understanding that the amount was to be deposited in court for
complainant gave. Before complainant left respondent told him to the repurchase of the property, but instead of depositing it he
look for more money. misappropriated the money. These facts constitute malpractice
and conduct unbecoming a member of the bar.
It turned out that respondent opposed his own motion for an
extension of time to file an answer for, in lieu thereof, he filed a In addition, the record shows that in CA-G.R. No. 18560-R,
motion to declare complainant in default. Consequently, a respondent was convicted of estafa and sentenced to an
decision was rendered detrimental to complainant since the court indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 months of arresto mayor to
allowed plaintiff to repurchase the property in litigation for the sum 1 year and 1 day of prision correccional, with the accessories of
of P1,200.00. the law, and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of
P800.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. And
On March 2, 1954, complainant again went to the office of
in CA-G.R. No. 21796-R, the Court of Appeals made the following
respondent in Luna, Mt. Province apparently with the purpose of
derogatory comment against respondent:
having the papers for the amicable settlement of the case
prepared, but on this occasion respondent prepared two A lengthy discourse of the relationship of attorney and client need
documents, Exhibits C and D, wherein, on one hand, it was made not be indulged in. Suffice it to say that a lawyer should be
to appear that Maria Ragsac Cabel sold the property to scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his
complainant in consideration of the sum of P8,000.00 and, on the professional capacity. A high degree of fidelity and good faith on
other, the latter reconveyed the same property to the former for his part is exacted. (Alindogan v. Gerona Adm. Case No. 221,
the sum of P1,200.00. Both documents were witnessed by May 21, 1958). Here, appellee (herein respondent Bautista)
respondent. Both documents were also found to be fictitious in violated the trust. He was bound to deposit the P800.00 in court.
the sense that the considerations mentioned therein were never But he did not; he converted it to his own use and benefit to the
received. Maria Ragsac Cabel was asked by respondent to sign damage of appellant. Indeed, he was convicted of estafa. Not
Exhibit C without knowing its contents upon the assurance that it only that. The confidence reposed in him by appellant was once
was necessary in order that she could recover the land. again infringed when he lent his signature to Exhibits 2 and 3
which he knew to be spurious. Upon these documents, appellant
Sometime later, complainant received a letter from Atty.
— for nothing — lost the land already won in court. She had to
Bienvenido Jimenez, co-counsel of respondent in the civil case,
compromise with the defeated suitor. But she got the very short
requesting him to bring the title of the property pursuant to the
end of the bargain. And yet, appellee had the temerity to come to
decision of the court, and complying with this request complainant
court for attorney's fees. Good morals and sound public policy bar
went to see Atty. Jimenez but instead of bringing the title he
the portals of justice to him. Guilty of fraud on one count and bad
showed him the document which he was made to sign purporting
faith on another, he has forfeited all legal claims for services in
to be a deed of sale by Maria Ragsac Cabel in his favor of the
procuring the judgment in Case No. 634-A of the Cagayan Court
property for the consideration of P8,000.00. Atty. Jimenez asked
(6 C.J. 725; C.J.S. 1025; 5 Am. Jur. 363; Martin, Legal and
Mrs. Cabel if she received the amount mentioned therein, which
Judicial Ethics, 2nd Ed. [1961], p. 99).
she denied. Instead Mrs. Cabel told Atty. Jimenez that she had
given P800.00 to respondent to be deposited in court with the There is no question that the crime of estafa is one which
understanding that said respondent would raise the additional involves moral turpitude within the purview of Section 27, Rule
P400.00 to complete the sum of P1,200.00 which was fixed by 138, of the Rules of Court.
the court as the consideration of the reconveyance of the
WHEREFORE, respondent Loreto U. Bautista is hereby disbarred
property. After inquiry, Atty. Jimenez found that there was no
and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the
such amount deposited in court, and in order to correct the wrong
roll of attorneys.
generated by the two fictitious documents, Atty. Jimenez
prepared another document embodying the terms of the amicable
settlement which they agreed would be submitted in the civil
case. This settlement having been carried out, it put an end to the
 It is therefore ordered that respondent be removed from his office
as attorney and that his name be stricken out from the Roll of
Attorneys. So ordered.

A.C. No. 350             August 7, 1959

In re: DALMACIO DE LOS ANGELES, respondent.
VILLASANTA             April 30, 1957
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor
In Re Charges of LILIAN F. VILLASANTA for Immorality,
Emerito M. Salva for the Government. vs.
Dalmacio de los Angeles and Luis F. Gabinete for respondent.
HILARION M. PERALTA, respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Ramon J. Diaz for respondent.
Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the crime of
PARAS, C. J.:
attempted bribery in a final decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (40 months, G.R. No. L-9513 has a direct bearing on the present complaint.
and one (1) day of destierro, and to pay a fine of P2,300, with Said case originated from a criminal action filed in the Court of
subsidiary destierro in case of insolvency (CA-G.R. No. 11411-R), First Instance of Cagayan by the complainant against the
and under section 1, Rule 128, of the Rules of Court, he was respondent for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal
required to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the Code of which the respondent was found guilty. The verdict,
practice of his profession. when appealed to the Court of Appeals, was affirmed. The appeal
by certiorari taken to this Court by the respondent was dismissed
In his written explanation he appealed to the sympathy and mercy
for lack of merit.
of this Court considering that he has six children to support the
eldest being 16 years old and the youngest 4 years who will bear The complaint seeks to disqualify the respondent, a 1954
the stigma of dishonor if disciplinary action be taken against him. successful bar candidate, from being admitted to the bar. The
He made manifest to this Court that if he ever committed what is basic facts are the same as those found by the Court of Appeals,
attributed to him, it was merely due to an error of judgment which to wit: On April 16, 1939, the respondent was married to Rizalina
he honestly and sincerely deplores. E. Valdez in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. On or before March 8, 1951, he
courted the complainant who fell in love with him. To have carnal
Under section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar may be
knowledge of her, the respondent procured the preparation of a
removed from his office as attorney if he is convicted of a crime
fake marriage contract which was then a blank document. He
involving moral turpitude the reason behind this rule being that
made her sign it on March 8, 1951. A week after, the document
the continued possession of a good moral character is a requisite
was brought back by the respondent to the complainant, signed
condition for the rightful continuance of the lawyer in the practice
by the Justice of the Peace and the Civil Registrar of San Manuel,
of law with the result that the loss of such qualification justifies his
Tarlac, and by two witnesses. Since then the complainant and the
disbarment (Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil., 586; 53 Off. Gaz., No. 3,
respondent lived together as husband and wife. Sometime later,
628). And since bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral
the complainant insisted on a religious ratification of their
turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this Court, much as
marriage and on July 7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was
it sympathizes with the plight of respondent, is constrained to
performed in Aparri by the parish priest of said municipality. The
decree his disbarment as ordained by section 25 of Rule 127.
priest no longer required the production of a marriage license
because of the civil marriage contract shown to him. After the
ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned to Manila as husband
and wife and lived with some friends. The complainant then children named Linda and Nonong but he did not mention his
discovered that the respondent was previously married to wife's name. In his information sheet for GSIS insurance dated
someone else; whereupon, she filed the criminal action for a November 9, 1960 he named his children as Ulpiano, Evangelina
violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code in the Court of and Asuncion, twelve, ten and six years old, respectively. Again,
First Instance of Cagayan and the present complaint for he did not state his wife's name. See pages 7 and 58 of his
immorality in this court.. personal record).
Upon consideration of the records of G.R. No. L-9513 and the The respondent admits that the thirty-seven-year old Gloria
complaint, this Court is of the opinion that the respondent is Tropicales (his alleged housemaid) is his mistress. Out of their
immoral. He made mockery of marriage which is a sacred union, two children, named Juana and Paulo, were born in 1970
institution demanding respect and dignity. His conviction in the and 1972 when the respondent was already a sex-agenarian. *
criminal case involves moral turpitude. The act of respondent in
Respondent Judge, invoking "the interest of justice" and article
contracting the second marriage (even his act in making love to
344 of the Revised Penal Code, prays for the dismissal of the
another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage
immorality charge on the ground that his wife, Rosario V. Veluz
still valid and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency,
(she is named Ligaya in the marriage certificate), condoned his
and morality.
acts of concubinage, as shown in her affidavit of November 21,
Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of 1974. In that affidavit, she unabashedly stated that, because her
Court, the respondent is hereby declared disqualified from being husband's thighbone was broken in a vehicular accident in 1955,
admitted to the bar. So ordered. she chose Gloria Tropicales to serve her husband, like a real wife
("upang paglingkuran ang aking asawa na ang gagawin niyang
paglilingkod ay parang tunay na asawa"). She gave the
assurance that she would not prosecute their offspring.
The respondent also presented to the Investigating Judge the
affidavit dated March 5, 1976 of complainant Virrey wherein the
latter withdrew his complaint for immorality (on the condition that
he would not incur any liability) because he was convinced that
Mrs. Veloso hired her husband's mistress to take care of him
(Exh. A).
A.M. No. 689-MJ April 13, 1978 Respondent's counsel in his memorandum in lieu of the oral
FELIX LEYNES, complainant, argument scheduled before the Court en banc  on December 9,
vs. 1976 made the preposterous contention that the respondent
MUNICIPAL JUDGE PEDRO D. VELOSO of General Nakar, should be exonerated because there was no evidence presented
Quezon, respondent. against him since the complainant did not appear at the hearing.
A.M. No. 809-MJ April 13, 1978
BENJAMIN H. VIRREY, complainant, Respondent and his counsel should know that since he had
vs. admitted the commission of concubinage, that charge is
MUNICIPAL JUDGE PEDRO D. VELOSO of General Nakar, conclusively established and it does not have to be proven
Quezon, respondent. anymore. His admission is a confession (Sec. 2, Rule 129 and
secs. 22 and 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court).

AQUINO, J: We hold that Judge Veloso should be dismissed by reason of his

immoral conduct. His moral delinquency renders him unfit for the
For having illicit relations with a concubine under scandalous office of municipal judge and warrants his removal from office
circumstances in a house located at the poblacion of General (Sec. 97, Judiciary Law).
Nakar, Quezon, Pedro D. Veloso, the municipal judge of that
town, was charged by Atty. Benjamin H. Virrey with immorality in A lawyer, of course, should have good moral character. He may
public office (Complaint dated October 23, 1974, p. 10, Rollo of be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct or when he is convicted
Administrative Matter No. 809- MJ). of a crime involving moral turpitude such as concubinage (Secs. 2
and 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court; In re Isada, 60 Phil. 915).
Judge Veloso, who is now sixty-eight years old and who was
admitted to the bar in 1938, started his judicial career in 1946 as If good moral character is required of a lawyer, with more reason
a justice of the peace of Infanta, Quezon. Since 1950, he has that requirement should be exacted of a member of the judiciary
been functioning as the incumbent judge of General Nakar. who at all times is expected to observe irreproachable behavior
and is bound not to outrage public decency (Canon 3 of Judicial
The respondent contracted marriage with Ligaya Veluz at the Ethics, Administrative Order No. 162 of the Secretary of Justice,
parish church of Infanta on October 24, 1955. Curiously enough, August 1, 1946. 42 O.G. 1803).
that was the date (one day after his 46th birthday) when he
suffered serious injuries in a vehicular accident at Infanta and Judge Veloso, in relying on his wife's condonation of his
when he was brought by plane to Manila and admitted to the V. immorality, erroneously confounded or equated the extinction of
Luna General Hospital at six- thirty in the evening. his criminal liability with his moral fitness to occupy the position of
town magistrate. While the moral stigma connected with
Apparently, Judge Veloso married Ligaya Veluz when he had concubinage may be tolerated in a private person by those who
already begotten three children. (In his personal reference sheet are not fastifious, it is intolerable when the concubinage is
of September 10, 1947, he indicated that he was married with two committed by a judge and even if the spouse of the judge
allegedly condones the offense. (See marital disqualification rule
in section 20, Rule 130, Rules of Court; Ordoño vs. Daquigan, L-
39012, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 270,
272-3).
A judge suffers from moral obtuseness or has a weird notion of
morality in public office when he labors under the delusion that he
can be a judge and at the same time have a mistress in defiance
of the mores and sense of morality of the community. The
absence of criminal liability does not preclude disciplinary action
by reason of his highly unconventional and censurable behavior.
Nor does the withdrawal by complainant Virrey of his charge
render the administrative case moot. This Court may motu
proprio investigate a judge for his continuing, grossly immoral
conduct.
Felix Leynes, who complained against Judge Veloso for
acquitting Ricardo Pujeda and Esperidion Pujeda of the charge of
having assaulted his son, Juancho Leynes (Criminal Case No.
872), adopted the charge of immorality withdrawn by Virrey.
According to Leynes's counsel, the respondent lives with his
concubine in a house just across the municipal hall and plaza.
Leynes posed a rhetorical question: how can the inhabitants of a
town have confidence in the administration of justice by an
immoral judge who himself violates the law? (p. 326, Rollo of
Administrative Matter No. 489- MJ).
In view of the result arrived at in this case, it becomes
unnecessary to make any adjudication on the charge of Leynes
that Judge Veloso was guilty of partiality in the disposition of A.C. No. 407             August 15, 1967
Criminal Case No. 872 and the other charges of Virrey imputing IN RE — ATTORNEY JOSE AVANCEÑA, respondent.
to the respondent malicious delay in the administration of justice,
misconduct in office, neglect of duty and failure to hear, try and J. Gonzales and Orense for respondent.
decide Election Case No. 8. Office of the Solicitor General for complainant.

WHEREFORE, respondent Veloso is removed from the office as ANGELES, J.:

municipal judge. His application for disability retirement is On January 12, 1951, the Supreme Court entered a resolution as
disapproved. follows:
SO ORDERED. In Administrative Case No. 407, In re Atty. Jose Avanceña, it
appearing that respondent was convicted in criminal case No.
10220 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People of
the Philippines vs. Jose Avanceña, of the crime of falsification of
public document under Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code, and
that in the decision rendered to that effect the Court has found
that said respondent has taken advantage of the law profession in
committing said crime to defraud his clients, the Court ordered
that respondent be, as he is hereby, provisionally suspended
from the practice of law, pending final termination of the criminal
case No. 10220, now pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.
Jose Avanceña, a member of the Bar, was charged with
falsification of public document before the Court of First Instance
of Manila, in criminal case No. 10220. After trial, he was found
guilty as charged and was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of two years to six years of prision correccional, to pay a
fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. The trial court also found that he
took advantage of the law profession in committing the crime of
falsification of public document to defraud his clients. A copy of
the decision was sent to the Supreme Court for whatever the
action it may deem appropriate to take in the premises.
Conformably thereto, the Supreme Court adopted the resolution
hereinabove quoted.
From the decision of the lower court, Jose Avanceña appealed to
the Court of Appeals. On February 28, 1962, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the lower court.
On a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals to
the Supreme Court, the latter Court, on June 13, 1962, dismissed
the petition for lack of merit.
On January 21, 1963, Jose Avanceña was committed to prison at
the National Penitentiary.
On September 25, 1963, the President of the Philippines
extended conditional pardon to Jose Avanceña.
On October 1, 1963, Jose Avanceña was discharged from
confinement.
In the decision of the trial court, the following is said:
The evidence on record conclusively establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt as the author of the
falsification of the Power of Attorney (Exhibit A), with grave abuse
of confidence. The accused is a lawyer and has taken advantage
of the law profession in committing the crime of falsification of a
public document to defraud his clients. A lawyer of the type of the
accused is a disgrace to the law profession and should be
disbarred.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals
said:
A la vista de los datos expuestos el Juzgado cree y asi concluye
que el apelante no ha explicado satisfactoriamente como Ilego a
su posesion el poder especial Exhibito A; la presuncion es
December 7, 1928
concluyente que aquel es el autor de la falsification de las firmas
de los hermanos Joa que aparecen en el poder especial Exhibito In re FELIPE DEL ROSARIO
A. (People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338).
Felipe del Rosario in his own behalf.
La conclusion es, pues, que el apelante fue quien preparo el City Fiscal Guevara for the Government.
exhibito A; fue quien falsifico las firmas de los hermanos Jao que
aparecen en dicho document; y, fue quien Ilevo dicho documento MALCOLM, J.:
a la oficina del notario Tumblos para su ratificacion. The supplementary report on bar examination irregularities of the
EN SU VIRTUD, habiendose probado fuera de toda duda fiscal of the City of Manila, dealing with the case of Felipe del
racional la culpabilidad del apelante, y la decision apelada Rosario, has been laid before the court for consideration and
estando de conformidad con las pruebas y la ley, la misma se action. It is recommended by the city fiscal that Felipe del Rosario
confirmation in toto, con las costas contra el apelante. be ordered to surrender his certificate of attorney and that he be
forever prohibited from taking the bar examination. An answer to
There can, therefore, be no doubt, that Jose Avanceña has the report has been permitted to be made, in which the court is
committed the crime of falsification of public document against his asked to disapprove the report and to direct the setting aside of
clients with grave abuse of confidence, having been found guilty the suspension to practice law by the respondent, heretofore
thereof by final judgment of competent jurisdiction. His acts ordered by the court.
amount to deceit, malpractice or misconduct in office as an
attorney, which constitute grounds for removal from office under Felipe del Rosario was a candidate in the bar examination who
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, not to mention failed for the second time in 1925. He presented himself for the
conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. succeeding bar examination in 1926 and again was unable to
obtain the required rating. Then on March 29, 1927, he
The fact that the respondent was extended conditional pardon by authorized the filing of a motion for the revision of his papers for
the Chief Executive is of no moment. Such conditional pardon 1925 based on an alleged mistake in the computation of his
merely partially relieved him of the penal consequences of his grades. The court, acting in good faith, granted this motion, and
act, but did not operate as a bar to his disbarment, especially so admitted Felipe del Rosario to the bar, but with justices
when he is being disbarred on the ground of professional dissenting. Subsequently, during the general investigation of bar
misconduct for which he had been convicted by final judgment. examination matters being conducted by the city fiscal, this case
(Cf. In re  Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.) was taken up, with the result that a criminal charge was lodged in
the Court of First Instance of Manila against Juan Villaflor, a
Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered declaring Jose Avanceña
former employee of the court and Felipe del Rosario. Villaflor
disbarred from the practice of law, and striking his name from the
pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced accordingly.
roll of attorneys.
Del Rosario pleaded not guilty, and at the conclusion of the trial cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral
was acquitted for lack of evidence. turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against
good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. ( In
The acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not
re  Hopkins [1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard vs. Lyon [1875], 91
a bar to these proceedings. The court is now acting in an entirely
U.S., 225; 5 Ops. Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185; decisions of the
different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal
Supreme Court of Spain of November 30, 1876 and June 15,
cases. It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to
1895.)
have them believe that Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware of
the illegal machinations culminating in the falsification of public When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action
documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary. Indeed, the which should be taken by the court, we do so regretfully and
conviction of Juan Villaflor in itself demonstrates that Felipe del reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by
Rosario has no legal right to his attorney's certificate. While to the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the
admit Felipe del Rosario again to the bar examination would be other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to
tantamount to a declaration of professional purity which we are the uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be
totally unable to pronounce. The practice of the law is not an utterly ruined.
absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a
It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos
privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound
S. Basa shall be discharged from prison, he be suspended from
discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied
his office of lawyer for one year. So ordered.
by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of
the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive
one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to
clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to
permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of the
bar. (In re Terrell [1903], 2 Phil., 266; People ex rel. Colorado Bar
Association vs. Thomas [1906], 36 Colo., 126; 10 Ann. Cas., 886
and note; People vs. Macauley [1907], 230 Ill., 208; Ex parte Wall
[1882], 107 U. S., 265.)
The recommendation contained in the special report pertaining to
Felipe del Rosario is approved, and within a period of ten days
from receipt of notice, the respondent shall surrender his
attorney's certificate to the clerk of this court.
December 7, 1920
In re  CARLOS S. BASA A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981
MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant,
Pedro Guevara for respondent. vs.
Attorney-General Feria for the Government. SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.
MALCOLM, J.:
AQUINO, J.:
The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the disbarment
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked
of Attorney Carlos S. Basa.
for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct
to the bars of California and the Philippine Islands. Recently he because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their
was charged in the Court of Fist Instance of the city of Manila with illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of
the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilt in a decision their child, Michael Dino Maniwang.
rendered by the Honorable M.V. del Rosario, Judge of First
Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October,
Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two
1970 at Cebu City. Magdalena was then a medical technology
years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On
student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a
appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed down by
law student in the San Jose Recoletos College. They became
the second division of the Supreme Court. 1
sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with
The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A Segundino in a motel in January, 1971, Segundino stopped
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office visiting her.
of lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the
crime involving moral turpitude . . ." The sole question presented,
following month. They renewed their relationship. After they had
therefore, is whether the crime of abduction with consent, as
dinner one night in March, 1971 and finding themselves alone
punished by article 446 of the Penal Code, involves moral
(like Adam and Eve) in her boarding house since the other
turpitude.
boarders had gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When
"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is Segundino asked Magdalena why she had refused his earlier
done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." proposal to have sexual intercourse with him, she jokingly said
(Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although that she was in love with another man and that she had a child
no decision can be found which has decided the exact question, it
with still another man. Segundino remarked that even if that be requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.
the case, he did not mind because he loved her very much. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases
to have good moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino
started telling his acquaintances that he and Magdalena were A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by
secretly married. reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A
member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao
professional probity.
del Sur. He continued his law studies in Davao City. .Magdalena
remained in Cebu. He sent to her letters and telegrams It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard
professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z). as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral
delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what
pregnant, she and Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan,
appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may
Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were married
not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
although they were not really so. Segundino convinced
Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is
after he had passed the bar examinations. He secured his birth willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license. indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members
of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959).
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he
expressed his love and concern for the baby in Magdalena's Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a
womb. He reassured her time and again that he would marry her child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married
once he passed the bar examinations. He was not present when lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the
Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In
Cebu Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973 re  Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
for the baptism of his child.
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be
Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were inconsonance with the canons of the moral code but he is not
released on April 25, 1975. Several days after his oath-taking, subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or
which Magdalena also attended, he stopped corresponding with deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. It
Magdalena. Fearing that there was something amiss, Magdalena is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex
went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her lover. Segundino told where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a
her that they could not get married for lack of money. She went lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the
back to Ivisan. benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral
conduct," will depend on the surrounding circumstances.
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to
see Segundino who was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned
followed him there only to be told that their marriage could not morality still prevailed, observed that "the legislator well knows
take place because he had married Erlinda Ang on November 25, the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man, whose
1975. She was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao. sense of dignity, honor and morality is not well cultivated, falls
into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon
he feels himself attracted. An occasion is so inducive to sin or
her because she had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang.
crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An
She reported the assault to the commander of the Padada police
open door may tempt a saint" has become general." (People vs.
station and secured medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J).
De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535).
Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated
lovers and that he is the father of the child Michael. He also
in the following cases:
admits that he repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that
he breached that promise because of Magdalena's shady past. (1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal
She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and knowledge of Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of marriage,
had already an illegitimate child before Michael was born. which he refused to fulfill, although they had already a marriage
license and despite the birth of a child in consequence of their
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In
sexual intercourse; he married another woman and during
his opinion, respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and
Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the
his reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his
flow of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an
disbarment.
abortion to which she did not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez,
An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169.
character. He is required to produce before this Court satisfactory See Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102).
evidence of good moral character and that no charges against
(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe
him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in
that they were married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall
any court.
of Manila, and, after such fake marriage, they cohabited and she
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256).
then the continued possession of good moral character is also a
(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative
cohabited with another women who had borne him a child Case No. 997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91).
(Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to disbarment for
Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents,
contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101
the complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby
Phil. 313).
dismissed.
(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing her to
spend for his schooling and other personal necessities, while
dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another
girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage
a secret while continuing to demand money from the complainant,
and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their
broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are
indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar
(Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450).
(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was
engaged to lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by him to
have sexual congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it
was alright to have sexual intercourse because, anyway, they
were going to get married. She used to give Puno money upon
his request. After she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby
boy, Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa vs. Puno,
Administrative Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439).
(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man,
misrepresenting that he was single and making a promise of
marriage, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with. Josefina
Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina and his own
son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till
the end of my years in this world. I will bring you along with me
before the altar of matrimony." "Through thick and thin, for better
or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always be
the first, middle and the last in my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100
Phil. 586).
(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having
adulterous relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a A.C. No. 376             April 30, 1963
married woman separated from her husband, seduced her
JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,
eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and begot a child.
vs.
(Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.
The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing
BARRERA, J.:
cases. This case is similar to the case of Soberano vs.
Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959,
had sexual relations with Mercedes H. Soberano before his complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J.
admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in frequent sexual Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly
intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon
making reference to their trysts in hotels. requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer
denying all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be
On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual,
not disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case
tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to
to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
impart the firm conviction that, because of the close intimacy
recommendation.
between the complainant and the respondent, she felt no restraint
whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity. On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on
the case with the recommendation that the respondent "be
According to the complainant, two children were born as a
permanently removed from his office lawyer and his name be
consequence of her long intimacy with the respondent. In 1955,
stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report
she filed a complaint for disbarment against Villanueva.
reads as follows:
This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958,
complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant
Cecilia Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone in their house
disbarment. (See Montana vs. Ruado, Administrative Case No.
and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m.,
507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs. Wong,
while she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor
Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667,
of the house the respondent entered and read a newspaper at
her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and with she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the victim of
the other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house an outrage involving her honor ....
and forced her to lie down on the floor. She did not shout for help
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned
because he threatened her and her family with death. He next
cannot in conscience recommend respondent's exoneration. The
undressed as she lay on the floor, then had sexual intercourse
respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not
with her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows
long after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable
on the thigh with his fist to subdue her resistance. After the sexual
that the spouses never reconciled because of him. His own
intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her foster parents,
evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of
otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family.
adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse
She resumed ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that
that she, Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced
afternoon when she joined her foster mother on the first floor of
Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her
the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became
pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959. The
pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21,
seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and
23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
by means of promises of marriage which he knew he could not
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook her
heard by the neighbors that she did not report the outrage to husband so that he, respondent, could have all of her. He also
anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that she took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood,
still frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata'
sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of
coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on November 14, her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old
1958, when respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone then), it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him.
with him in his house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent
Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of
filed a sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a
August 5, 1959).
person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar examinations to be
complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He testified given on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the
that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Court may fix.."
Civil Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in
But he was not then the person of good moral character he
the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the
represented himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has
administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34,
continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose
t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations woman and that her marriage still subsists. This fact permanently
with the complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958, disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had it been
when their clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been
foster parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, permitted to take the bar examinations that year or thereafter, or
according to him, he limited himself to kissing and embracing her to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently
and sucking her tongue before she completed her eighteenth disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his
birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the
after she had reached eighteen, and the second one week later, same misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent
on May 18. The last intercourse took place before Christmas in disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of morality,
December, 1958. In all, they had sexual intercourse about fifty one for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for
times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house whenever disbarment from the office of a lawyer.
they had the opportunity. He intended to marry her when she
xxx     xxx     xxx
could legally contract marriage without her foster parents'
intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot RECOMMENDATION
ask permission to marry, for her foster parents will object and
even my common-law wife, will object.' After the discovery of their Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after
relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed the due hearing, respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently
affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken
something she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, from the roll of attorneys.
t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960). In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that
xxx     xxx     xxx even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless
he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General
FINDINGS AND COMMENT formulated another complaint which he appended to his report,
charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his
There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal
application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good
knowledge of the complainant. The complainant claims she
moral character; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the
surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and
same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant
intimidation, but the undersigned are convinced that the sexual
Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of
intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly and with her
public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal
consent. From her behaviour before and after the alleged rape,
business of others, and praying that this Court render judgment
ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an
office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of affidavit at a later date, which request was also granted. The
attorneys." affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent
averring, among others, the following:.
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the
special defense that "the complaint does not merit action", since ... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against
the causes of action in the said complaint are different and the complainant, because the latter was born on February 19,
foreign from the original cause of action for rape and that "the 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May
complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, 11, 1958, when she was already above 18 years of age; that he
Rule 128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after had been living with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for
due notice and hearing for additional evidence, the complaint be almost 20 years, but from the time he began courting her, he 'had
dismissed. no intention to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to
commit the crime of adultery; that he courted Briccia on October
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court
16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on
Investigators to receive the additional evidence. Accordingly the
February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who told
case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified.
him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other
On September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a
evacuees; that from said date (February 21), to the present, he
memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the
and Briccia had been living together as common-law husband
same was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape
and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry
has not been proven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed
him, but she confessed she was already married, and maybe her
by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent
husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he could not then
concealment was committed by the respondent when he filed his
drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor
petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is
could he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left
not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.
Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; that
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months
Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again,
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët was ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband
(Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his already living with another woman; that he had 'no choice but to
common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows: live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest
met respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. intention to hide' from this Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation
23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not state
to Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of the
(to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be stated; and that
from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man of good
Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he
asked her about her status she told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. first learned he was not so; and that he did not commit perjury or
25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar
respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8,
Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we March 6, 1962).
will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding
was married (to Arines) when she and respondent were already that: 1) Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take
living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as
Respondent asked her to marry him, when they were living as he did, that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free from
husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross
months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even
because she and respondent 'had already a good after he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That
understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his
and went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because petition to take the 1954 bar examinations, being then immorally
respondent was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia
was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also recommended
she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended
already a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then from the practice of law for a period of one year.
went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with
respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that she Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served
live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently living with on respondent, through his counsel of record, the case was set
respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March 6, for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked
1962, pp. 5-6]." leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was
granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called
sexual relations with the complainant several times, and as a him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a
consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years
likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an old then), her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it
adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present. is not difficult to see why she could not resist him." Furthermore,
the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the complainant
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the
reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral
complainant Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation with
compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of
Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to
criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be
cause the respondent's disbarment.
devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office,
notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his
may constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a
open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman,
principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44
because he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral
Phil. 567, where this Court quoted with approval the following
turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been convicted of
portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the
rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds
case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
upon which the disbarment proceedings is based are not among
those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between
for which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and
that this enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys,
courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good moral
inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license
justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to
authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and
statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be
give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and
legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer
power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require upon him. (Emphasis supplied).
disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no
merely regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that
way directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered
such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of the
him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot
court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be
give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be — as the
removed for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the
Solicitor General puts it — recognizing "a double standard of
United States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived,
morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another
"the continued possession of a fair private and professional
for disbarment from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that
character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for
respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction
the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has
of his paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him from
been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment
continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be
even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground of
requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission
disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be
to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral
disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or
depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar.
non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the
decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as stand that even if he admittedly committed fornication, this is no
a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if
phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as
misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency,
at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the
His pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth prestige of the noble profession of the law. The reasons
birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so advanced by the respondent why he continued his adulterous
as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared — and that relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in some
he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and
sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his
with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are
purpose. hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he
employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself from the
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the
predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and
complainant was the niece of his common-law wife and that he
maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more
enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as
revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The
her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took
noblest means he could have employed was to have married the
advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood,
complainant as he was then free to do so. But to continue
maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have
simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of good
niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned. moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was
Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a
for the privileges of the legal profession. As good character is an member of the bar.
essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of
may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such
herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.
character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General
exceeded his authority in filing the present complaint against him
for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or
offenses different from those originally charged in the complaint
of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.— Based upon the
evidence adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no
sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall
submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his findings of
fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be
exonerated unless the court orders differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the
respondent. — If the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to
proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding
complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his
investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall
be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the
complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the
foregoing rules requires the Solicitor General to charge in his
complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally
filed by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law
provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient grounds
to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding
complaint, accompanied by the evidence introduced in his
investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file
any case against the respondent he may be justified by the
evidence adduced during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition
to take the bar examinations in 1954 since according to his own
opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of
good moral character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's A.M. No. RTJ-92-904 December 7, 1993
own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral DR. NORBERT L. ALFONSO, complainant,
character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which vs.
corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person JUDGE MODESTO C. JUANSON, Branch 30, Regional Trial
really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As former Court of Manila, respondent.
Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice Nicanor B. Padilla and Roberto A. Demigillo for complainant.
law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is,
as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion S.N. Barlongay and W.B. Lachica for respondent.
generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by DAVIDE, JR., J.:
the public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante
the standard of personal and professional integrity which should On 15 September 1992, the complainant, a doctor of medicine by
be applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by profession, filed with this Court a sworn complaint charging the
such conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of respondent with immorality and violation of the Code of Judicial
criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common Ethics. He accuses the respondent of maintaining illicit sexual
honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] relations with his wife, Sol Dinglasan Alfonso. The complainant
626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. and his wife were married on 10 December 1988 and their union
Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and bore them three children, all boys, ages 3 years old, 2 years old,
People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not and 4 months old, respectively. He alleges that their married life
possess a good moral character at the time he applied for was peaceful and happy until the discovery of the sordid affair,
admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia which came about in this manner:
Sometime in February 1991, the complainant received a phone communicating with each other casually and innocently," but
call from the wife of the respondent who informed him that Sol denies that they are lovers and were having an illicit affair, that
and her husband (respondent) have been carrying on an affair Sol has been sending love letters to him, and that, except for the
and that she has in her possession the love letters of Sol which 11 and 17 July 1992 meetings, he and Sol had been going to the
she wants to show to the complainant. Although he did not apartment situated at 130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong,
believe the information and even berated Mrs. Juanson for trying Metro Manila, and staying there for hours. He asserts that he
to ruin his family, he, nevertheless, told Sol about it. Sol assured came to know Sol sometime in 1987 when she engaged his
him of her love and concern for the family and claimed that the professional services in connection with five criminal cases filed
respondent was just a client of by her in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal and the
her former office, the Banco Filipino (EDSA Cubao Branch). Two in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. In the course of their
weeks later, Mrs. Juanson called him again to inquire if he had attorney-client relationship, Sol sought legal advice from him and
received the photocopies of Sol's love letters to the respondent. during those occasions they usually talked over the phone and
He again scolded Mrs. Juanson and told her not to call him up not in the office. In June 1992, he received an overseas call from
anymore. On 12 June 1992, he and Sol left for the United States Sol who was then in the USA. Sol asked for advice concerning
of America (USA) for a vacation. He stayed there up to 19 July her problem with her employer, the Security Bank and Trust Co.
1992; however, Sol returned ahead of him on 10 July 1992. (Dau Central Branch). They agreed that Sol would see him upon
During his absence, specifically on 17 June 1992, Mrs. Juanson her return to the Philippines. On 11 July 1992, shortly after her
called up his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso, and divulged to the arrival from the USA, he ad Sol met at the aforementioned
latter the illicit affair between the respondent and Sol. On 20 June apartment, which was leased not by the respondent but by
1992, Mrs. Juanson sent to Atty. Alfonso photocopies of Sol's Celestino Esteban. After discussing her problem, with Celestino
love letters to the respondent. During their pre-arranged meeting and two other persons present, he and Sol left the apartment and
on 25 June 1992, Mrs. Juanson delivered the original copies of took a late lunch at Fastfood, Robinson. He reassures the
Sol's alleged letters to complainant "that his wife has always been faithful to him and
Atty. Alfonso who was accompanied by the complainant's sister, that he would do nothing as would tarnish their warm relationship,
Celestine A. Barreto. much less destroy the complainant's family."
When Sol arrived in the Philippines on 10 July 1992, Atty. Alfonso On 4 May 1993, the Court referred the case to Associate Justice
decided to hire a private investigating agency to undertake an Lourdes T. Jaguros of the Court of Appeals for investigation,
inquiry on the alleged illicit affair between Sol and the respondent. report and recommendation.
Through surveillance conducted by its private investigators, the
Justice Jaguros conducted a full-blown investigation. At the
agency found that Sol had met with the respondent on 11 and 17
hearings on 17, 18, 21 and 29 of June 1993 and 6, 8, 9 and 12 of
July 1992 at Unit 412-A of Citihomes at 130 San Francisco St.,
July 1993, the parties submitted testimonial and documentary
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and that they stayed inside the unit
evidence. On 4 October 1993, she submitted her Report and
for two to three hours.
Recommendation dated 30 September 1993. Pertinent portions
Complainant further alleges that on 25 July 1992, five days after of her findings of facts read as follows:
his arrival from the USA, his sister Celestine told him about the
As culled from the evidence of this case, Complainant Dr. Norbert
illicit relationship between Sol and the respondent. Celestine
L. Alfonso and Sol Dinglasan were married at Sta. Ana Catholic
showed him the pictures taken by the private investigators and
Church on December 10, 1988 as evidenced by a marriage
the alleged love letters of Sol. In the evening of the said date, in
contract (Exh. "N"). Three children were born of this marriage,
the presence of their respective parents, the complainant
John Jason, three (3) years old, Jan Norbert, two (2) years old,
confronted Sol and showed her the proofs; Sol still denied the
and the youngest Jan Joseph, four (4) months old. Complainant
affair and insisted that she was just discussing some business
and his family lived a happy and normal life with their Sundays
with the respondent. Later, however, at about 1:30 a.m. in their
spent on outings after the Sunday mass. (p. 9, tsn, June 29,
house, Sol finally admitted to having an illicit affair with the
1993).
respondent since late 1983 when she was an employee of Banco
Filipino (EDSA Cubao Branch) and that before they left for the In February, 1991, Complainant received phone calls from a
USA, she met with the respondent at Unit 412-A Citihomes. woman introducing herself as a concerned friend telling that
complainant's wife is having an illicit affair with her said woman
As a result of this revelation, the complainant sent his wife out of
caller's husband. Said caller did not identify herself but only said
the house. He and Sol have been living separately since 26 July
she was in possession of love letters of complainant's wife Sol to
1992. He also subsequently discovered from the statement of the
said caller's husband. After two weeks, said "concerned friend"
billing from Pacific Bell for overseas calls which he and Sol made
called up the Complainant again to ask him if he had received
while they were in the USA that on 17 and 25 June 1992 Sol had
said caller's registered mail. Complainant after both calls asked
made calls to the respondent's office at the Manila Regional Trial
his wife Sol about her having an affair with another man, and in
Court.
both instances, Sol assured him of her love. Then the calls
Complainant submits that the respondent is undeserving of the stopped for the rest of the year 1991 and early part of 1992
noble office of the judiciary and prays that he be meted the although Complainant noticed that his wife Sol used to go out
appropriate administrative sanction for immorality and violation of alone every Saturday.
the Code of Judicial Ethics.
On June 12, 1992, Complainant and his wife Sol went to the
In compliance with this Court's Resolution of 22 October 1992, U.S.A. for a vacation but the latter decided to return to Manila
the respondent filed his Comment on 21 December 1992. He ahead of the former on July 10, 1992 (Exh. "O"). Complainant
admits that he knows Sol and that "they have been followed in returning home only on July 19, 1992 (Exh. "O-1").
On July 25, 1992, Complainant was invited by his father, Atty. Robinson's Supermarket. Inside the supermarket, Marjorie Juinio
Norberto Alfonso to his sister Celestine Barreto's house, and saw the Respondent Judge put his arm on the shoulder of Sol,
there his father showed him five (5) love letters written by and they were also seen holding hands (pp. 23-26, tsn, June 21,
Complainant's wife Sol with envelopes addressed to Atty. 1993). Then the two, Respondent Judge and Sol boarded the
Modesto C. Juanson (Exhs. "A" to "E" and submarking), and Wrangler jeep. At about 3:45 p.m., Sol alighted at the corner of
pictures taken by private investigators of Complainant's wife and Suter and Roxas Streets and then boarded a tricycle while the
respondent Judge in company of each other jeep left. The formal report of the Truth and Verifier System, Inc.
(Exhs. "F-5" to "F-22", "G-2" to "G-14"). Complainant recognized has
the handwriting of his wife Sol in said love letters, specifically the been offered by Complainant as Exhibit "F-1" to "F-4" while the
GAIN memo pad paper used by Sol in her love letter (Exh. "D") many pictures taken of Respondent Judge and Sol were marked
which is a prescription pad of Complainant to his patients. and offered as Exhibits "F-5" to "F-22".
Likewise, in the pictures, Complainant recognized his wife Sol
The other team of the Truth Verifier System, Inc. led by Edgardo
holding a "Payless" bag (Exh. "F-6") with the Respondent Judge
Tamayo practically corroborated the findings of the Marjorie
holding the same bag later on (Exh. "F-14"). In practically all the
Juinio team. A formal report marked and offered as Exhibit "G" to
pictures, Complainant identified his wife Sol and the respondent
"G-1", and pictures taken of Respondent Judge and
Judge. The Respondent Judge was no stranger to Complainant
Complainant's wife Sol marked and offered as Exhibits "G-2" to
as the latter knows said Judge personally. Said Judge is one of
"G-14" were presented before the Investigator.
the best friends of Complainant's parents-in-law and was even a
sponsor in the wedding of Complainant's sister-in-law. Both Five days after the arrival of Complainant Dr. Norbert L. Alfonso,
Complainant and Respondent Judge had met thrice and talked he was invited by his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso to Norbert's
with each other. sister's house in San Juan, Metro Manila. In the house of
Celestine Alfonso Barreto, Atty. Alfonso showed his son, Norbert
The five love letters, including a picture of the Respondent Judge
the love letters written by his wife Sol to Respondent Judge
(Exh. "K") were handed to Complainant's father, Atty. Norberto
(Exhs. "A" to "E"). Complainants recognized the handwritings of
Alfonso by a lady who introduced herself, as Mrs. Ceferina
his wife Sol and even the GAIN memo stationery which
Juanson in the presence of Complainant's sister, Celestine
complainant was using as his prescription pad for his patients
Barreto. The three met at the front entrance of the Sto. Domingo
(Exh. "D"). He recognized his wife Sol and Respondent Judge in
Church, Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City and proceeded to the
the pictures taken by the private detectives. On said day,
City Diners Restaurant in the same city where the three had a talk
Complainant Norbert Alfonso experienced the greatest shock of
and where Mrs. Juanson handed to Atty. Alfonso the five love
his life and wondered what happened to his life. His father, Atty.
letters with a picture, at about 10:30 to 11:30 a.m. in late June
Alfonso, however, advised him not to hurt his wife Sol. In that
1992. Prior to said meeting on June 17, 1992, at about 11:00 a.m.
same party, Complainant showed Sol the pictures and the love
a "concerned woman" had called up Atty. Alfonso at his home
letters which made Sol turn pale and stammer when talking. Sol's
and in the vernacular had said "Tinataihan ang ulo ng anak mo
own parents were embarrassed and walked out of the party.
ng babaeng iyan" referring to Complainant's wife. To clear Atty.
Alfonso's doubt, the woman promised to send proofs which Atty. On the same night at about 10 in the evening, Complainant
Alfonso received by LBC in a parcel containing the xerox copies Dr. Norbert Alfonso confronted his wife Sol as to the truth of her
of Complainant's wife's love letters to Atty. Modesto C. Juanson. relationship with Respondent Judge. Before the Investigator said
Complainant made the following testimony on direct examination:
After the meeting with the lady who identified herself as
Mrs. Ceferina Juanson, Atty. Alfonso got an overseas call from xxx xxx xxx
Complainant that his wife Sol was coming home to Manila earlier
so that Atty. Alfonso engaged the services of a private ATTY. DEMIGILLO:
investigating agency, Truth Verifier System, Inc., to conduct Q What else did your wife tell you during that confrontation, her
surveillance of the activities of Complainant's wife, Sol upon her exact words ?
arrival from the U.S.A. Sol Alfonso did arrive on July 10, 1992,
and on July 11 and 17, 1992, the Truth Verifier System, Inc. x x x           x x x          x x x
through Marjorie Juinio and Edgardo Tamayo, licensed private
A She took a deep breath again and told me, "Sweetheart, I am
detectives conducted surveillance operation on Mrs. Sol
very, very, very sorry, I made a mistake." I asked, "What mistake
Dinglasan and respondent Judge Modesto Juanson. On said date
is that ?" She replied, "I had sexual intercourse with the Judge."
of July 17, 1992, said private detectives together with Raymond
Tabangcura and Edgar Naquilla, saw, Sol Dinglasan Alfonso go x x x           x x x          x x x
out of her house carrying a bag, take a tricycle and alight at
Lamayan St., walk towards Sta. Ana Church then board a Q What else, if any, happened during that confrontation?
taxicab. Following said taxicab, the taxi stopped at City Homes, A I asked my wife "How many times did you have sexual
San Francisco Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Sol went intercourse with the Judge"?
inside Unit 412-A Citihomes, and stayed inside for about three
hours. Respondent Judge Modesto Juanson came out first of said Q Was there any response?
unit, wearing blue walking shorts and light colored polo and
A She answered five times and then right away I said, "Putangina
carrying the plastic bag which Sol was seen carrying earlier, and
mo, five times lang. Alam mo ba kung ilan beses kitang
then followed by Sol. At around 1:00 p.m., the Respondent Judge
naganyan? Tarantado ka." With my voice not so loud because
and Sol were inside said Respondent's Wrangler jeep on their
the door and the windows were opened. If I shout the neighbors
way to Robinson Galeria at EDSA. The two ate at Mongolian
will hear and then the yayas will go down right away.
Restaurant and at Gusto Unico, then they proceeded to
Q What was your wife doing at that time? advice regarding the letter Sol had received from the Security
Bank requiring her to explain why she should not be declared
A My wife was crying and saying, "Sweetheart, I am very, very
absent without leave (AWOL) for leaving her work without an
sorry. Forgive me." She was kneeling before me and begging
approved leave of absence. He told Romeo that he would not be
forgiveness. "Forgive me, sweetheart, I love you."
able to give any advice unless he saw the letter and talked with
I told my wife, "you do not love me, you love your stupid Judge." Sol. A few days later, he received an overseas call from Sol who
said that she left the Philippines sometime after 10 June 1992. He
Q Is there anything else that you discussed during that told her that he could not give any written or oral advice until he
confrontation aside from the admission? read the letter and talked with her. This overseas call might have
A After that admittance of my wife having sexual relationship with been the 17 June 1992 call referred to in the Pacific Bell
the Judge, reminiscing the past events when we were together I Statement. (Exhibit "Q"). He was not able to talk to her in the
told my wife, "That's why pala every Saturday umaalis ka second overseas call referred to in Exhibit "Q." Two or three
dito. Sinong pinupuntahan mo?" And definitely, she admitted to weeks alter, he received local call from Sol who told him that she
me, "To the Judge." (pp. 35-41, tsn, June 29, 1993) was back and that she has the letter. Sol begged to see him at
his office. He, however, told her that he was busy; besides, it was
The confrontation between Complainant and his wife Sol ended already late in the afternoon. She got frantic and so he told her
at about 5:00 a.m. of the following day, July 16, 1992 with that they could meet the following day at Unit 412-A, Citihomes,
Complainant asking Sol to leave the house. at 130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong, since he was to meet his
godson, George Zari, in the said place. They did meet there at
Sol also admitted to the Complainant that when she went to
11:00 o'clock in the morning the following day —
Hongkong on December 26, 1989 up to December 29, 1989 she
11 July 1992, a Saturday. Sol gave him the letter from the
was with Respondent Judge, and records of the Commission on
Security Bank and after interviewing her he promised to prepare a
Immigration for said dates show that both Sol Alfonso and
draft of a "reply." Present at that time were Celestino Esteban,
Respondent Judge Modesto Juanson departed for Hongkong via
lessee of the unit who is his friend, George Zari, and his live-in
Cathay Pacific plane on December 26, 1989 and returned to
partner, Marissa. Forty-five minutes later, he decided to go home.
Manila on December 29, 1989 (Exhs. "P" and "P-1").
Sol requested for a ride in his vehicle in order to alight at the
Also, Complainant received from his sister in California, U.S.A., a place of her employer along EDSA and Shaw Boulevard to which
Pacific Bell Statement of Telephone Calls reflecting two calls he obliged. While on their way, Sol invited him for lunch and they
made by his wife Sol to Manila, at numbers 632 476120. Number went to the Mongolian Restaurant at Robinson's where they had
632 is the country code while number 476120 is the phone lunch. They had coffee nearby and then parted ways. Thereafter,
number of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, where on separate days, Sol called him by phone to ask about the draft
Respondent Judge is the Presiding Judge. of the reply. On the second call, he told her that since he would
meet George Zari on the 17th of July at Unit 412-A Citihomes,
As of now, Complainant Dr. Norbert Alfonso and his wife Sol live she might just as well meet him there. She acceded and on that
separately, and their three children are alternately in the custody date he left his office at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning and
of Complainant or Sol for certain number of days. arrived at Unit 412-A thirty minutes later. (TSN, 12 July 1993, 25).
Upon the other hand, Respondent Judge main defense is denial Sometime after Sol arrived, he gave to her the draft of the reply
as he advances the position that Sol Dinglasan Alfonso was a and instructed her to type the letter, date and sign it, and then
former client when Respondent Judge was still a practicing send it to her employer. He also referred her to Atty. Lachica to
lawyer, and that from time to time Sol would consult him whom she should henceforth communicate because he,
regarding her cases. As to the Hongkong trip, Respondent Judge respondent, is busy at his office. When he was
simply accompanied a former client who was looking for a house about to leave, Sol asked if she might ride in his vehicle in order
to buy in Hongkong and as to the visit in the Citihomes unit, to alight at EDSA-Shaw Boulevard to which he agreed. After that
Respondent Judge claimed that he was only visiting his godson he did not meet Sol again. (TSN, 9 July 1993, 3-15).
George Zari who spent a vacation in the Philippines for a month. Respondent denies having gone to Hongkong with Sol on 26
Some elaboration of the respondent's version is necessary. He is December 1989 and having seen her in Hongkong. According to
now 56 years old. (TSN, 8 July 1993, 31). He and his wife, him, his traveling companion was Cua Sen. (Id., 16-23). Cua Sen
Ceferina, were married in 1961 and have two sons. Ceferina is corroborated him on this point. (TSN, 6 July 1993, 5-10). When
eight years his senior. (TSN, 12 July 1993, 4-5). From 1967 to confronted about the charge of immorality and unethical conduct
1969, he was the Chief Legal Officer in the Office of the City for having illicit relations with Sol, he answered: "I deny it very
Mayor of Quezon City and from 1969 to 1982 he was the Second strongly, your Honor." (Id., 32).
Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City. After that and until Respondent further suggests that it was impossible for him to
November 1990, when he was appointed Judge of the Regional have sexual intercourse with Sol because he was suffering from
Trial Court at Urdaneta Pangasinan, he was in private practice of two debilitating diseases — diabetes mellitus, for which he has
law. In April 1992, he was assigned to Branch 30 of the Regional been "taking insulin" since 1987, and prostatitis — which have
Trial Court of Manila. (TSN, 8 July 1993, 32). He first came to seriously affected his sexual potency. In his own words, he "could
know Sol when she hired his services as her counsel in six hardly make it," and that he has "no erection whatsoever."
criminal cases involving dishonored checks she filed against (Id., 29-32; Exhibits "11" and "12").
Santiago Maramag and Evangeline Maramag. (Id., 33-39). In
1989, he saw Sol at the wedding of her sister Jennifer to Romeo Justice Jaguros gives full faith and credit to the complainant's
Dizon; he stood as sponsor for the groom then. In June 1992, version for she finds no reason not to believe the complainant.
Romeo saw him at his office at the City Hall in Manila and sought According to her, "[n]o man in his correct mind would come
forward and claim that his honor and good name have been notes written by her after November 1990 were presented in
stained by an adulterous wife, doubt the paternity of his children, evidence. If she did, they could have been kept with Exhibits "A"
and in the process destroy his family and home." She ruled that to "E" in some secret place which was not, however, unknown
the testimonies of the witnesses for the respondent — Cua Sen, anymore to the respondent's wife. Sol's admission or confession
Celestino Esteban and former Judge Zari — do not inspire belief. to the complainant that she had carnal knowledge of the
respondent on five occasions made no reference to specific dates
Justice Jaguros then concludes that the immoral conduct of the
and is hearsay. In his direct examination, the complainant's
respondent has ruined two families — his own and that of the
counsel exerted no further effort to obtain clarifications as to the
complainant. Respondent "cannot escape from the blame and sin
dates thereof. He perhaps realized its futility because the
of what he has caused Complainant's once happy family." More
narration by the complainant of the information clearly indicated
pertinently she adds:
that the complainant did not ask Sol to elaborate on the five illicit
But beyond the domestic confines of these two families, sexual acts. On cross-examination, counsel for the respondent
Respondent Judge is no ordinary mortal who can live the life he carefully avoided any entanglement with the details of the
pleases having two women at the same time — his wife and admission not only because it might have provided an occasion
worst [sic], another man's wife. He is a Judge who symbolizes the for the complainant to elaborate thereon, but because it would
law and the highest degree of morality in the community. The have operated as a waiver of his objection to the testimony as
citizens look up to him as the embodiment of justice and decency, hearsay. The transcripts of the stenographic notes discloses that
as he decides cases brought to his court. He can be no less. the counsel for the respondent objected and entered a continuing
objection to questions directed to elicit or which tended to elicit
And invoking our decision in Leynes vs. Veloso (82 SCRA 325 statements or admissions supposedly made or given by Sol on
[1978] ) and Castillo vs. Calanog (199 SCRA 75 [1991] ) as the grounds that any such statements or admissions would be
precedent and moral compass, she asserts that she has no other hearsay or otherwise barred by the res inter alios acta rule.
alternative but to find respondent "GUILTY as charged of Justice Jaguros recognized the merit of the objection; hence, she
Immorality and Violation of Judicial Conduct" and to recommend allowed the answers to be taken merely as part of the narration
his "DISMISSAL . . . from office." nut not as evidence of the truth thereof. Thus:
In the light of the conclusions of the Investigating Justice and her ATTY. DEMIGILLO:
recommendation for the imposition upon the respondent of the
severest administrative penalty — dismissal from the service — it Q. What was her response to your exhortation?
is all the more imperative to conduct as assiduous examination
A. After a few minutes she took a deep breath and said,
and evaluation of the records and the evidence.
"Sweetheart, patawarin mo ako, nagkaroon ako ng kasalanan sa
There is no doubt in our minds that a very special relationship iyo."
existed between the respondent and the complainant's wife. For
ATTY. BARLONGAY:
one, there are the cards or notes, which the complainant and the
Investigating Justice described as love letters. These five "love At this juncture, Your Honor, we would like to register our
letters" are marked as Exhibits "A." "B," "C," "D," and "E," and objection as to the issue of the truth of the statement as purported
dated 3 July 1987, 23 May 1988, 15 February 1988, 11 January to be answered by her wife for two reasons: One, it is hearsay.
1989, and 7 March 1989, respectively. For another, if we were to We have no opportunity to cross-examine the . . .
give full credit to the complainant's testimony that during their
COURT:
confrontation Sol had admitted having sexual intercourse with the
respondent on five occasions (TSN, 29 June 1993, 39-40), it As part of the narration.
would appear that the relationship had developed into an extra-
marital liaison. It was furthermore established that both Sol and ATTY. BARLONGAY:
the respondent took the same flights of Cathay Pacific aircraft to Yes, as part of the narration, but just for the purposes of record
Hongkong on 26 December 1989 and back to the Philippines on we would like to register our objection as to the truth of the
29 December 1989. There is, however, no evidence that they statement itself. First, it is hearsay; second . . .
stayed together in the same hotel in Hongkong. On the other
hand, there is the unrebutted testimony of Mr. Cua Sen that he, a COURT:
client of the respondent, was the latter's travelling companion.
Precisely, admitted only as part of his narration.
From the foregoing, it is clear that their affair began before Sol
ATTY. BARLONGAY:
and the complainant were married on 10 December 1988 and
might have blossomed from the attorney-client relationship That is alright. Second, it is . . . on the basis of the  inter-alia  [sic]
between respondent and Sol. Her marriage to the complainant rule, the admission of a party should not prejudice the rights of
did not diminish Sol's love for the respondent, for even after she another.
committed herself to the complainant alone and made a vow of
fidelity to him till death at the solemn ceremony of marriage, she xxx xxx xxx
still sneaked out her love notes to the respondent. ATTY. DEMIGILLO:
It must, however, be stressed that the respondent is not charged Q. What was the exact statement of your wife?
with immorality or misconduct committed before he was
appointed to the judiciary. As to the post-appointment period, we xxx xxx xxx
find the evidence for the complainant insufficient to prove that the
ATTY. BARLONGAY:
respondent and Sol continued their extramarital affair. No love
Again, subject to the observation of this Honorable Court, we Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27 [1974]). And the lawyer who is thereafter
would register our objections on these two grounds: Hearsay appointed thereto must perforce be presumed to have solemnly
and res inter-alia  [sic] rule. bound himself to a way of conduct free from any hint or suspicion
of impropriety. The imputation of illicit sexual acts upon the
xxx xxx xxx
incumbent judge must be proven by substantial evidence, which
ATTY. BARLONGAY: is the quantum of proof required in administrative cases. This the
complainant failed to do. The meetings of the respondent and Sol
Excuse me, I have some manifestations . . . at Unit 412-A of Citihomes on 11 July and 17 July 1992 do not by
COURT: themselves prove that these were trysts for libidinal gratification.
Evidence was offered by the respondent to prove otherwise.
You have a continuing objection? However, considering their prior special relationship, the
respondent and Sol's meetings could reasonably incite suspicion
ATTY. BARLONGAY:
of either its continuance or revival and the concomitant intimacies
Yes, I am not going to do this at every turn. I just want to say that expressive of such relationship. In short, the respondent suddenly
our objection is a continuing one. (TSN, 29 June 1993, 36-39). became indiscreet; he succumbed to the sweet memories of the
past and he was unable to disappoint Sol who asked for his legal
If they were then allowed by the Investigating Justice as merely advice on a matter which involved her employment. Such
"part of the narration," they should only be considered as indiscretions indubitably cast upon his conduct an appearance of
independently relevant statements, i.e., proof that Sol made impropriety. He thus violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial
statements or admissions, but not as proof of the truth of facts Ethics which mandates that "[a] judge's official conduct should be
revealed in the said statements or admissions. Elsewise stated, free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
the admission in evidence of the words spoken by Sol is not to be behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of
used in determining the issue of their truth. (FRANCISCO, judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
V.J., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines,  vol. VII, Part reproach," and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
I, 1973 ed., 438). This being so, the acts of sexual intercourse provides that "[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the
admitted by Sol cannot, insofar as the respondent is concerned, appearance of impropriety in all activities." It has been said that a
be deemed proven by the said admission or confession. While it magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such
is true that technical rules of evidence should not be applied in manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most
administrative cases, however, since the Investigating Justice searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the
herself had specifically allowed the hearsay answers merely as epitome of integrity and justice. (Dia-Añonuevo v. Bercacio, 68
part of the narration, or more specifically as independently SCRA 81 [1975] ). The ethical principles and sense of propriety of
relevant statements, it would be unfair and arbitrary to thereafter a judge are essential to the preservation of the faith of the people
disregard the ruling. All told, there is in this case no direct and in the judiciary. (Candia vs. Tagabucba, 79 SCRA 51 [1977] ).
competent evidence against the respondent that he had illicit sex
with Sol. It is to be noted that 17 July 1992 fell on a Friday. On that date,
the respondent left his office at the City Hall of Manila at about
But even if the admission of Sol were to be taken as proof of the 11:00 o'clock in the morning and arrived at Unit 412-A Citihomes
truth of the facts so admitted, considering, however, that Sol's thirty minutes later. (TSN, 12 July 1993, 25). Per report of the
admission that she engaged in sexual intercourse on five private detectives (Exhibit "G"), the respondent and Sol left the
occasions made no reference to specific dates, that their affair unit as 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon on board a vehicle and that
antedated Sol's marriage, that their last proven tryst was in twenty-five minutes later, Sol alighted near the crossing overpass
Hongkong in 1989, and that there is an absence of positive and at United Street. It is, therefore, clear that on 17 July 1992 the
competent evidence to show that any of the five acts of sexual respondent had left his office during office hours and, considering
intercourse took place after the respondent's appointment to the the distance between Mandaluyong and his office at the City Hall
judiciary , it cannot be safely presumed that the respondent of Manila and the usual traffic condition, it was impossible for him
committed any of the sexual indiscretions after he became a to have reached his office — if at all he did proceed to it — in time
judge. Respondent is not charged for immorality committed for the commencement of the official session hours in the
before his appointment. Accordingly, proof of prior immoral afternoon,
conduct cannot be a basis for his administrative discipline in this i.e., 2:00 p.m. (Paragraph 5, Interim and Transitional Rules and
case. The respondent may have undergone moral reformation Guidelines Relative to the Implementation of the Judiciary
after his appointment, or his appointment could have completely Reorganization of 1981). Thus, for purely personal sessions, he
transformed him upon the solemn realization that a public office is violated the rule regarding the official sentence. Such violation
a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times amounted to neglect of duty.
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism Finally, a word on the respondent's defense that he not have
and justice, and lead modest lives. (Section 1, Article XI, 1987 sexual congress with Sol because he was suffering from diabetes
Constitution). It would be unreasonable and unfair to presume mellitus and prostatitis. The claim is both self-serving and
that since he had wandered from the path of moral righteousness, irrelevant. No expert testimony was presented to prove the stage,
he could never retrace his steps and walk proud and tall again in extent or degree of seriousness of the diseases and their effects
that path. No man is beyond reformation and redemption. A on his capacity to copulate. The physicians who purportedly
lawyer who aspires for the exalted position of issued the medical certificates did not testify thereon. Besides,
a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that he must pay a high immorality — for which the respondent is charged — is not based
price for that honor — his private and official conduct must at all alone on illicit sexual intercourse. It is settled that:
times be free from the appearance of impropriety. (Jugueta vs.
immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes
conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption,
indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or
shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of
respectable members of the community, and as an inconsiderate
attitude toward good order and public welfare. (Black's Law
Dictionary, Sixth ed., 1990, 751).
WHEREFORE, for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, and the rule on official time,
respondent JUDGE MODESTO C. JUANSON is hereby
sentenced to pay a FINE of TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(P2,000.00) and, further, sternly warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 266             April 27, 1963

PAZ ARELLANO TOLEDO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JESUS B. TOLEDO, respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a disbarment proceeding under Rule 128 of the Rules of
Court.
On 9 July 1956 Paz Arellano Toledo filed in this Court a sworn
complaint in the form of a letter alleging that she is the wife of
Jesus B. Toledo, a member of the Bar;1 that they were married on
27 December 1946 while he was still a second year student of
law; that she supported him and spent for his studies; that after
passing the bar examination and becoming a full-fledged member
of the Bar he abandoned her; that he is at present employed in
the Bureau of Mines2 and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City; and
that he is cohabiting with another woman who had borne him
three children. She prayed that the respondent be disbarred from
the practice of law. On 11, July 1956, this Court directed the
respondent to answer the complaint within ten days from receipt
of notice and a copy of the complaint.3 The respondent mailed his
answer in the form of a letter, which was received in this Court on also within the extension of time previously granted, the Solicitor
4, October 1956, averring that the complaint was not in due form General, his memorandum in reply.
because "It does not set out distinctly, clearly and concisely the
Section 6, Rule 128, provides:
legal causes for the suspension or disbarment of a member of the
Philippine Bar as provided in the Rules of Court hence his The evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his
"answer could not be made in the logical sequence of a formal investigation may be considered, by the Supreme Court in the
pleading;" that there seems to be an irregularity in the filing of the final decision of the case, if the respondent had an opportunity to
complaint because while the letter-complaint was dated 25, June object and cross-examine. If in the respondent's answer no
1956, and received at the Docket Section of this Court on 2, July statement is made as to any intention of introducing additional
1956, by an employee whose initials are "A.L."4 It was subscribed evidence, the case shall be set down for hearing, upon the filing
and sworn to before a notary public on a later date, 5 July 1956; of such answer or upon the expiration of the time to file the same .
and the alleged information furnished by Esperanza D. Almonte (Emphasis supplied)
that the respondent was cohabiting with another woman who had
borne him three children is not true because her very informant, The above-quoted rule in no uncertain terms requires the
whose true name is Leoncia D. Almonte, executed an affidavit to respondent in disbarment or suspension proceedings from the
the effect that the respondent was employed in the Bureau of practice of law to file an answer to the complaint filed by the
Lands, not in the Bureau of Mines, and that the three children Solicitor General after investigation and, should he desire to
referred to by the complainant were the children of Mr. and Mrs. present evidence in his behalf, to expressly say so in the answer.
Ruperto Ll. Jose, with whom the respondent was boarding. Instead of doing what the rule requires, the respondent filed a
Attached to his answer are the affidavit of Leoncia D. Almonte motion to dismiss without stating that he intended to present
and a copy of his answer to a complaint filed by the complainant evidence in his behalf, thereby waiving his right. The fact that at
with the Director of Lands for abandonment and immorality. In 9 the close of the hearing conducted by the Solicitor General, he
October 1956, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor made of record his desire to present evidence in his behalf, is not
General for investigation, report and recommendation and on 11 sufficient. The correct manner and proper time for him to make
October 1956 the record of the case was received by the Office of known his intention is by and in the answer seasonably filed in
the Solicitor General. On 19 November 1956, 10 December 1956, this Court.
7, 8, 14, and 15 February 1957, 18 March 1957 and 5 August The complainant testified as follows: On 27 December 1946 she,
1957, the office of the Solicitor General conducted hearings a dentist by profession, and the respondent, then a second year
during which the complainant presented her evidence both oral law student, were married civilly in Camiling, Tarlac, by the
and documentary and the respondent, who appeared in his own Justice of the Peace (Exhibit A). For a period of two weeks after
behalf, cross-examined her witnesses. The respondent did not their wedding, they lived in the house of her parents at No. 76
present evidence in his behalf but reserved the right to present it General del Pilar street in Camiling. After two weeks, the
under the provisions of Section 6, Rule 128. After finding that respondent went to Manila to resume his studies at the Far
there is sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, on Eastern University,5 and she remained in Camiling to practice her
24 July 1958 the Solicitor General filed a complaint in this Court profession. While the respondent was still studying, he either
charging the respondent with abandonment of his wife and returned to Camiling once a week or she came to Manila twice a
immorality for cohabiting with another woman by whom he has a week to visit with each other. Sometimes the respondent stayed
child, and praying that he be disbarred or suspended from the with her in Camiling for a week, and when she came to Manila to
practice of law. On 30 July 1958 the Clerk of Court sent to the buy dental materials she slept with him at his boarding house or
respondent by mail a copy of the complaint filed by the Solicitor at the house on Economia street where he on lived with his
General and directed him to answer the same within 15 days from brother Cleto and Aniceto and cousin Felisa Bacera, who cooked
receipt thereof, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 128. On 28 August their meals for them. They were in good terms until about three or
1958 the respondent filed in this Court a motion to dismiss the four months before his graduation. On the day of his graduation,
complaint on the ground "that the charges contained therein are he showed her indifference and humiliated and embarrassed her
not based on and supported by the facts and evidence adduced by calling her a "provinciana" and telling her that she was a
at the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor nuisance whenever she came to see him. Nevertheless, being his
General." On 2 September 1958 this Court set the case for wife, she continued to see him while he was reviewing for the bar
hearing on 17 September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning. On examinations. She specifically mentioned that three days before
13 September 1958 the respondent filed a motion praying that his the last examination, she came to see him. A week after the bar
motion to dismiss filed on 28 August 1958 be first resolved or, examinations, she again came to see him. Since then they
that, should it be denied, he be given a period of ten days within became actually separated and she never saw him again until the
which to file an answer; that upon receipt of his answer the case hearing of the case. Through Mrs. Esperanza Almonte, she
be returned to the Solicitor General for reception of his evidence learned that the respondent was employed in the Bureau of
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 128; and that the hearing of the case Lands and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City. The respondent
set for 17 September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning be held never wrote to her and asked her to follow him at his place of
in abeyance pending resolution of his motion. At the hearing of work and she did not care to either.
the case on 17 September 1958, counsel for the respondent
appeared and was given a period of 15 days within which to Marina Payot gave the following testimony: From 28 February to
submit a written memorandum in lieu of oral argument, and the 3 June 1955 she lived and worked as maid, laundress and cook
Solicitor General the same period of time from receipt of a copy of for the respondent, his family composed of himself, Mrs. Corazon
the respondent's memorandum within which to reply. On 22 Toledo and their child in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The respondent
October 1958, within the extension of time previously granted, the and Corazon Toledo lived as husband and wife, and have a child
respondent filed his memorandum and on 17 November 1958, named Angie who was less than a year old at the time she lived
with them. The couple slept together in the same room with their few words, was kind and did not know how to get angry; and that
daughter Angie and ate their meals together although sometimes the reason she left them was because she just felt lonesome for
Corazon ate alone when the respondent was out somewhere. her parents. Further testing her credibility, the Solicitor asked how
The respondent used to call Corazon "Honey" and Corazon used the respondent's paramour looked, and she described her as a
to call the respondent "Jess". Corazon Toledo is not the same woman of fair complexion. Comparing her (Corazon) to the
person as the complainant. complainant, she said that the complainant was more beautiful
but Corazon was not ugly and that the latter had a nicer figure,
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
because she was stouter and taller than the complainant. To find
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable
out if it was another and not the respondent who lived with
Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
Corazon, the Solicitor asked her if she had not seen Teodoro
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 
Nieva, who lived with the respondent and Corazon in the same
Lino Domingo testified in the following manner: He is employed house, kiss or embrace Corazon, and she replied that she had
as operator-mechanic in the Bureau of Public Highways in not.
Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and has resided there since 1952. He
Testing the credibility of Lino Domingo, the investigating Solicitor
knows the respondent because he headed a survey party that
asked him whether he was related to Claudio Arellano, brother of
surveyed public lands in Malaybalay for distribution to the
the complainant, and Lino readily answered that he is his brother-
landless. Sometime in March 1955 he went to the respondent's
in-law and added that he (Lino) is the cousin of the wife of
place of residence and office at Moreno street, where his friend
Claudio. Asked if he had been asked by the complainant to testify
Mr. Nieva, an Ilocano, also resided to apply for a parcel of public
at the hearing, he frankly answered in the affirmative. Questioned
land, and about ten times he went to the respondent's place of
as to the description of the respondent's paramour, the witness
residence and office. Among those who lived with the respondent
stated that Corazon is fair in complexion, five feet tall; that she is
were Mrs. Corazon Toledo, Mr. Nieva, a maid and Mr. Abad (the
taller and fairer in complexion, more beautiful and has a nicer
latter only slept at the place whenever he was in town). He knew
figure than the complainant.
that Corazon Toledo, who is not the same person as Paz Arellano
Toledo, was the wife of the respondent. At the respondent's place The testimony of these two witnesses are worthy of credence. Marina
of residence and office, he saw a room where the respondent, Payot is a simple girl of eighteen years, a mere maid, scant in
Corazon and a baby slept and where man's pajamas and shirts education, and understands little English. She did not even finish the
were hung. One day at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while sixth grade of the elementary course. The sharp and incisive questions
propounded to her by the investigating Solicitor and the lengthy cross-
the respondent and his (the witness') friend Mr. Abad were
examination to which she was subjected by the respondent himself
repairing the front mudguard and seats of a station wagon behind would have revealed herself if she was lying. The apparent
the respondent's place of residence and office, his friend Mr. inconsistencies in her answers may be attributed to her innocence and
Abad introduced him to the respondent. He helped Abad place simple-mindedness and her failure to understand the questions
the seats of the station wagon in their proper places and while he propounded to her. Moreover, she could not be expected to remember
was helping Abad, he heard the respondent address Corazon as the dates asked of her in the same way that a person of more than
"Mama" and ask her for money to buy cigarettes. His friends average intelligence would. Add to this the fact that she was subjected
Nieva and Abad used to address Corazon as "Mrs. Toledo." to a thorough examination by three lawyers and her confusion was
compounded. Lino Domingo's frank and ready answers to the questions
The respondent admits that he is married to the complainant (p. propounded by the Solicitor show sincerity and do not reveal any
14, t.s.n.).The fact that he is cohabiting with another woman who intention to pervert the truth. And even if his testimony be discarded, still
had borne him a child has been established by the testimony of the testimony of Marina Payot stands unrebutted.
Marina Payot and Lino Domingo, whose sincerity and truthfulness The annexes attached to the respondent's memorandum cannot be
have been put to a severe and searching test by the investigating taken into consideration for they were not properly introduced in
Solicitor in the presence of the respondent who appeared in his evidence during the investigation.
own behalf and cross-examined the witnesses during the
investigation. Asked by the investigating Solicitor how she came The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with
another woman who had borne him a child, has failed to maintain the
to testify at the investigation, or whether anybody taught or
highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the
coached her on what to testify or whether she testified because of
Bar.6
any promise of reward or consideration, Marina Payot without
hesitation and in a straight forward manner answered that the THEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred from the practice of law.
complainant, Mr. Domingo and Mr. Reyes (the latter is the
Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984
complainant's counsel) spoke to her and told her to tell nothing PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant,
but the truth about the respondent's affair with his paramour in vs.
Malaybalay; that nobody taught or coached her on what to testify GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.
at the investigation; and that she was not promised anything by Roger Castuciano for complainant.
way of reward or consideration or given money for testifying. Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.
Going further in his investigation, the Solicitor asked the witness AQUINO, J.:
how she was treated by the respondent to find out if she harbors
any ill-feeling or grudge against him and his alleged paramour, This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon
which could be a motive for falsely testifying against them, and against her husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground of
she answered that she was well treated by the Toledos; that they adultery or grossly immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar
considered her a sister; that they paid regularly her salary of P15 in 1968.
a month; that they bought her a dress during the town fiesta on In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the
May 15; that Corazon never scolded her for she was a woman of Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation, he became
acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who represented to him that Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife
she was a widow. They had carnal relations. He begot with her a that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's
son who was born on November 27, 1972. He was named John wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a
Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso came to know that Natividad's married woman, fails within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant,
marriage to Tony Garcia was subsisting or undissolved. or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community"
Four days  after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August
Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The
14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).
marriage was ratified in a religious ceremony held on December
30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1) Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife
and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.
The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street,
He failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
Tondo, Manila for more than one year. In the evening of April 13,
required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil.
1974, when his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan asked
768).
permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house and take a
vacation in his hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off
has never returned to the conjugal abode. the Roll of Attorneys.
Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much SO ORDERED.
patient investigation and surveillance, she discovered that he was
living and cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment located at 85-
A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his
car to that place.
The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife
was corroborated by Linda Delfin, their housemaid in 1974;
Remedios Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a plumber,
their neighbors staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three
executed the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and F, which were
confirmed by their testimonies.
Romegil Q. Magana, a pook  leader, testified that Obusan
introduced himself as the head of the family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26,
1976). His name is at the head of the barangay list (Exh. E, G
and H). Nieves Cacnio the owner of the apartment, came to know
Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She Identified five photographs, Exhibits
I to I-D where respondent Obusan appeared as the man wearing
eyeglasses.
Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad
was terminated when he married Preciosa. He admitted that from
time to time he went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for the
purpose of giving financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer
Rogelio Panotes, the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated
respondent's testimony.
He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the
plumber. He claims that they were paid witnesses. He declared
that he did not live with Natividad. He resided with his sister at
Cypress Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave
the conjugal home because he could not endure the nagging of
his wife, their violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal
home (she allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres
Street) and her interference with his professional obligations.
The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. A.C. No. 10185               March 12, 2014
He filed a complaint for disbarment against the respondent. LICERIO DIZON, Complainant,
Obusan did not answer the complaint. He waived the vs.
presentation of additional evidence. His lawyer did not file any ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, JR., Respondent.
memorandum. RESOLUTION

After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant MENDOZA, J.:

has sustained the burden of proof. She has proven his
On May 14, 2004, complainant Licerio Dizon (complainant) filed a
abandonment of her and his adulterous relations with a married
petition against Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. (Atty. Cabucana),
woman separated from her own husband.
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), praying for the certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document
disbarment of the latter for falsification of public document. is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it,
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
In his petition, complainant alleged that he was one of the would-
certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is required
be-buyers of a parcel of land owned by the heirs of the late
by law to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
Florentino Callangan, namely, Susana, Jun and Angeleta, all
surnamed Callangan who were parties in Civil Case No. 1-689 The requirement of affiant's personal appearance was further
filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch I, Santiago emphasized in Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial
City (MTCC); that on November 6, 2003, a compromise Practice of 2004 which provides that:
agreement was executed by the parties in the said case and
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as
notarized before Atty. Cabucana on the same date it was signed
signatory to the instrument or document –
at the MTCC; that at the hearing conducted on December 11,
2003 regarding the due execution and the veracity of the (1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
compromise agreement, the signatories therein testified that they notarization; and
signed the instrument in the court room of MTCC but not in the
presence of Atty. Cabucana as Notary Public; that because of the (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
irregularity in the due execution of the Compromise Agreement, identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
there was undue delay in the resolution/decision of Civil Case No. identity as defined by these Rules.
1-689 which caused damage and injury to complainant; that Atty. As a notary public, Atty. Cabucana should not notarize a
Cabucana violated the Notarial Law in notarizing the document in document unless the person who signs it is the same person
the absence of most of the signatories/affiants; and that he executing it and personally appearing before him to attest to the
should be sanctioned in accordance with Rule 138, Section 27 of truth of its contents. This is to enable him to verify the
the Rules of Code and Code of Professional Responsibility. genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
Complainant further alleged that Atty. Cabucana uttered grave ascertain that the document is the party's free and voluntary act
threats against him on July 20, 2004 after the hearing of the said and deed.
case in MTCC.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Marcelino
In his Answer, Atty. Cabucana averred that the complaint was Cabucana, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon l of the
intended to harass him because he was the private prosecutor in Code of Professional Responsibility.1âwphi1 Accordingly, the
a criminal case filed against complainant before the MTCC; that Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for three (3)
complainant had no cause of action as his right was not violated months, REVOKES his incumbent notarial commission, if any,
because he was just a "would be" buyer and not a party to the and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public
compromise agreement; and that complainant would not suffer for two (2) years, effective immediately, with a stern WARNING
any damage by the pendency of the case or by any defects that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with
obtaining in the notarization of the compromise agreement. more severely.
In its Report and Recommendation,1 dated January 22, 2007, the Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be
Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Cabucana violated included in the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of
when he notarized the compromise agreement without the the Court Administrator for dissemination to all cou1is throughout
presence of all the parties, and recommended that he be the country.
suspended as Notary Public for a period of two (2) years and
from the practice of law for six (6) months. SO ORDERED.

In its Resolution,2 dated May 31, 2007, the IBP Board of

Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with
modification that Atty. Cabucana be suspended for only six (6)
months for violation of his obligation as Notary Public.
On motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors, in a
Resolution,3 modified its earlier resolution and suspended Atty.
Cabucana from the practice of law for one (1) month and
disqualified him from re-appointment as notary public for one (1)
year.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors except as to the penalty.
A.C. No. 932             June 21, 1940
Section 1, Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent,
Law states: Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta as petitioner-complainant.
LAUREL, J.:
The acknowledgment shall be before a notary public or an officer
duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint of the
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The Solicitor-General against the respondent Roque Santiago,
notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall
charging the latter with malpractice and praying that disciplinary in view of the circumstances stated in the report of said
action be taken against him. investigator and the fact that immediately after discovering his
mistakes, respondent endeavored to correct it by making the
It appears that one Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then
parties sign another document cancelling the previous one.
separately from his wife Soledad Colares for some nine
consecutive years and who was bent on contracting a second The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice
marriage, sought the legal advice of the respondent, who was at and is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of
the time a practicing and notary public in the Province of one year. So ordered.
Occidental Negros. The respondent, after hearing Baniquit's side
of the case, assured the latter that he could secure a separation
from his wife and marry again, and asked him to bring his wife on
the afternoon of the same day, May 29, 1939. This was done and
the respondent right then and there prepared the document
Exhibit A in which it was stipulated, among other things, that the
contracting parties, who are husband and wife authorized each
other to marry again, at the same time renouncing or waiving
whatever right of action one might have against the party so
marrying. After the execution and acknowledgment of Exhibit A
by the parties, the respondent asked the spouses to shake hands
and assured them that they were single and as such could
contract another and subsequent marriage. Baniquit then
remarked, "Would there be no trouble?" Upon hearing it the
respondent stood up and, pointing to his diploma hanging on the
wall, said: "I would tear that off if this document turns out not to
be valid." Relying on the validity of Exhibit A, Ernesto Baniquit, on
June 11, 1939, contracted a second marriage with Trinidad
Aurelio. There is also evidence to show that the respondent tried
to collect for this service the sum of P50, but as the evidence on
this point is not clear and the same is not material in the
resolution of the present case, we do not find it necessary to
make any express finding as to whether the full amount or any
portion thereof was paid or, as contended by the respondent, the
service were rendered free of charge.
The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit A, put up
the defense that he had the idea that seven years separation of
husband and wife would entitle either of them to contract a
second marriage and for that reason prepared Exhibit A, but
immediately after the execution of said document he realized that
he had made a mistake and for that reason immediately sent for
the contracting parties who, on June 30, 1939, came to his office
and signed the deed of cancellation Exhibit A.
There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and
between the spouses Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares
upon the advice of the respondent and prepared by the latter as a
lawyer and acknowledged by him as a notary public is contrary to
law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family.
The advice given by the respondent, the preparation and
acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute malpractice
which justifies disbarment from the practice of law. The admission
of a lawyer to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that
his continued enjoyment of the privilege conferred is dependent
upon his remaining a fit and safe person to society. When it
appears that he, by recklessness or sheer ignorance of the law, is
unfit or unsafe to be entrusted with the responsibilities and
obligations of a lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment of
this professional privilege should be declared terminated. In the
present case, respondent was either ignorant of the applicable
provision of the law or carelessly negligent in giving the
complainant legal advice. Drastic action should lead to his G.R. No. 1203            May 15, 1903
disbarment and this is the opinion of some members of the court. In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from
The majority, however, have inclined to follow the the practice of law.
recommendation of the investigator, the Honorable Sotero Rodas,
Solicitor-General Araneta for Government.
W. A. Kincaid for defendant.
PER CURIAM:
Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause
in the Court of First Instance, in the city of Manila, on the 5th day
of February, 1903, why he should not be suspended as a
member of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:
First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro
Bellas Artes" Club, after he had been notified that the said
organization was made for the purpose of evading the law then in
force in said city; and,
Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes"
during the time of and after its organization, which organization
was known to him to be created for the purpose of evading the
law.
The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W.
A. Kincaid, made answer to these charges, denying the same,
and filed affidavits in answer thereto. After reading testimony
given by said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States
vs. H. D. Terrell,1 wherein he was charged with estafa, and after
reading the said affidavits in his behalf, and hearing his counsel,
the court below found, and decided as a fact, that the charges
aforesaid made against Howard D. Terrell were true, and
thereupon made an order suspending him from his office as a
lawyer in the Philippine Islands, and directed the clerk of the court
to transmit to this court a certified copy of the order of
suspension, as well as a full statement of the facts upon which
the same was based.
We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the
conclusion that they were such as to justify the court below in
arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge and acts of the
accused in connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas
Artes" Club were of such a nature and character as to warrant his
suspension from practice.
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects,
for the purpose of violating or evading the laws against crime
constitutes such misconduct on the part of an attorney, an officer
of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his
office, and for which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of
Civil Procedure, sec. 21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme
which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or the conniving at a
violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment.
In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of
the United States, vs.  Terrell was acquitted on the charge
of estafa, and has not, therefore, been convicted of crime, and as
the acts with which he is charged in this proceeding, while
unprofessional and hence to be condemned, are not criminal in
their nature, we are of opinion that the ends of justice will be
served by the suspension of said Howard D. Terrell from the
practice of law in the Philippine Islands for the term of one year
from the 7th day of February, 1903.
It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be
suspended from the practice of law for a term of one year from
February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.
 A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995 judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud  (Rollo,
RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner, Vol. I, p. 35; Emphasis supplied).
vs.
On January 15, 1988, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.
Reconsideration and Motion to Set Motion for Reconsideration for
Oral Arguments of the CA decision. The CA denied the motion.
QUIASON, J.: Again, respondent requested the CA to set his Motion For Oral
Arguments on April 14, 1988.
This is a complaint for disbarment. Pursuant to paragraph 2,
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court In a resolution dated February 12, 1988, the CA denied the
resolved to refer it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Motion for Oral Argument and in a resolution dated October 18,
for investigation, report and recommendation. 1988, denied the motion for reconsideration of the February 12
Resolution.
On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors rendered a
decision, finding respondent guilty of malpractice and Respondent then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this
recommending that he be suspended from the practice of law. Court (G.R. No. 86084) questioning the decisions of the MTC and
the RTC in favor of petitioner's mother. In a Resolution dated
I
January 4, 1989, we denied the petition for having been filed and
Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a paid late on December 12, 1988 and November 12, 1988,
favorable judgment from the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra respectively. A motion for reconsideration from such resolution
(MTC) which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the premises subject was likewise denied with finality.
of the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 844). Co, through
Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Prohibitory or
respondent as counsel, appealed the decision to the Regional
Restraining Order (dated July 6, 1988) in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690.
Trial Court, Branch 11, Bangued, Abra (RTC). She neither filed a
supersedeas bond nor paid the rentals adjudged by the MTC. On April 12, 1988, the mother of complainant filed a Motion for
The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. Execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 844. Respondent
filed an Opposition to the Motion for Execution on the ground that
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Co's appeal from the
the case was still pending review by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
decision of the RTC for failure to comply with Section 22 of B.P.
11690 and therefore the motion for execution was premature. On
Blg. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines
August 23, 1988, the MTC ordered the issuance of a writ of
(CA-G.R. CV No. 11404). According to the CA, Co should have
execution. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which
filed a petition for review and not an ordinary appeal ( Rollo, Vol. I,
was denied. The RTC affirmed the order for the issuance of the
p. 22).
writ of execution. Thus, a writ of execution was issued on October
The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on 18, 1988.
November 19, 1986.
On October 26, 1988, respondent filed a special civil action (SP
On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by CV No. 624) with the RTC, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra
respondent as counsel for Co in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404, arguing for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction
that the decisions of the MTC and the RTC were null and void for against the MTC, Provincial Sheriff and complainant's mother,
being contrary to law, justice and equity for allowing the lessor to seeking to annul the writ of execution issued in MTC Civil Case
increase by 300% the rentals for an old house. Respondent, No. 844 and RTC Civil Case No. 344. Respondent alleged that
admitting his mistake in filing an ordinary appeal instead of a the order granting the writ of execution was issued with grave
petition for review, prayed that he be allowed to file an action for abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since a
annulment. petition to annul the decisions (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690) was still
pending with the CA.
On February 23, 1987, the CA gave due course to respondent's
Manifestation and Motion and let the records remain with it. On October 28, 1988, the provincial sheriff, Romulo V. Paredes,
However, on November 10, 1987, the said court ordered the deferred the implementation of the writ of execution until the
records in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 to be remanded to the court a petition filed in SP CV No. 624 for certiorari was resolved. The CA
quo. denied in SP CV No. 624 respondent's Urgent Motion to Set
Aside and Declare Null and Void the Writ of Execution.
On March 9, 1987, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for
Annulment of Decisions and/or Reformation or Novation of From the decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Abra in SP CV No. 624
Decisions of the MTC and the RTC (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690), denying the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with
insisting that the decisions were not in accordance with existing Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order, respondent again filed
laws and policies. On December 17, 1987, the CA dismissed the an Appeal and/or Review by Certiorari, Etc. with the CA (CA-G.R.
petition for annulment or novation explaining that — SP No. 17040).

. . . , aside from the reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 II

& 2, Rule 38), there is no other means whereby the defeated
We have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP Board of
party may procure final and executory judgment to be set aside
Governors.
with a view to the renewal of the litigation, unless (a) the
judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
law, or (b) it has been obtained by fraud, . . . . There is no lawyer is required to represent his client "within the bounds of the
allegation in the present complaint to the effect that the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and enforce that judgment and has no jurisdiction either to modify in
warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in any way or to reverse the same. . . . (at p. 430).
handling the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for
(See also Valenzona v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 306 [1993]
hire.
and Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250 [1993]).
Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to
Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to
use any arguable construction of the law or rules which is
frustrate the execution of the MTC judgment in Civil Case No.
favorable to his client. But the lawyer is not allowed to knowingly
844, to wit:
advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing
law. He cannot prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals (1) Civil Case No. 344 — Appeal from the decision rendered in
or institute clearly groundless actions (Annotated Code of Civil Case No. 844 of the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra,
Professional Responsibility 310 [1979]). Professional rules with the Regional Trial Court, Abra;
impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary
restrictions and qualifications (Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 579- (2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 — Appeal from the decision of the
582 [1986]). Regional Trial Court, Abra;

Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a (3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 — An Action For the Annulment of
lawyer is required to exert every effort and consider it his duty to Decisions And/Or Reformation or Novation of Decisions filed with
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. the Court of Appeals;
Implementing said Canon are the following rules: (4) G.R. No. 86084 — Petition For Review On Certiorari filed with
Rule 12.02. — A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the Supreme Court;
the same cause. (5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 — Appeal And/Or Review
xxx xxx xxx By Certiorari, Etc. filed also with the Court of Appeals; and,

Rule 12.04. — A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the (6) SP Civil Action No. 624 — Petition For Certiorari,
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes. Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory
Order filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued,
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial Abra.
process, like the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and
frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to
the execution of a judgment (Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory forestall the execution of the same judgment, respondent is also
Motions Practice: Time for Change, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1069 guilty of forum shopping.
[1976]; Overmeyer v. Fidelista and Deposit Co., 554 F. 2d 539, In Villanueva v. Adre 172 SCRA 876 (1989), the Court explained
543 [2d Cir. 1971]). that forum shopping exists when, by reason of an adverse
The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC decision in one forum, defendant ventures to another for a more
were fully protected and her defenses were properly ventilated favorable resolution of his case. In the case of Gabriel v. Court of
when he filed the appeal from the MTC to the RTC. But Appeals, 72 SCRA 272 (1976), this Court explained that:
respondent thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court's
means to delay the execution of the judgment rendered by the processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct
MTC adverse to his client. The said decision became executory and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as
even pending its appeal with the RTC because of the failure of Co contempt of court. Needless to add, the lawyer who filed such
to file a supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly rentals as they multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the
fell due. Furthermore, his petition for annulment of the decisions execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to
of the MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No. disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better)
11690) was defective and dilatory. According to the CA, there or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney  to act with all
was no allegation therein that the courts had no jurisdiction, that good fidelity to the courts and to maintain only such actions as
his client was denied due process, or "that the judgments in the appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor
former cases were secured through fraud." (at p. 275).
As ruled in Regidor v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 530 (1993): By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in
A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that the his efforts to get a favorable judgment, which efforts were all
judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a member of the Bar to
of law, or (b) that it has been obtained by fraud. . . . (at p. 534). institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses as
he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws (Garcia v.
Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the case be Francisco, 220 SCRA 512 [1993]). As correctly noted by the
remanded, respondent knew very well that the decision of the Committee on Bar Discipline "in filing a number of pleadings,
MTC was already ripe for execution. actions and petitioner, respondent 'has made a mockery of the
judicial processes' and disregarded canons of professional ethics
This Court, in People of Paombong, Bulacan v. Court of
in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a
Appeals, 218 SCRA 423 (1993), ruled:
judgment in the case was rendered, thus, 'abused procedural
. . . [w]hen the judgment of a superior court is remanded to the rules to defeat ends of substantial justice'" (Report and
trial court for execution, the function of the trial court is ministerial Recommendation, IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, p. 2).
only; the trial court is merely obliged with becoming modesty to
WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year. salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an
explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty.
SO ORDERED.
Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and legal
adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands,
however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC, for brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No.
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994 VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed therein as RAB
Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal dismissal
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner, with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
vs. payment of full back wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as
DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and JON DE YSASI, respondents. attorney's fees.
F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner. On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was
dismissed by the NLRC,1 holding that petitioner abandoned his
Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.
work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid
cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the
amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of
REGALADO, J.: said termination of employment to the Department of Labor and
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and
naught in this case, notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation
filiation between the parties. It would indeed have been the better vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.2 On appeal to the
part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was
reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of affirmed in toto.3
familial amity and with the grace of reciprocal concessions. His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been
Father and son opted instead for judicial intervention despite the denied for lack of merit,5 petitioner filed this petition presenting
inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste, the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the
the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled
with the same reasoned detachment accorded any judicial to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay
proceeding before it. and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees
his father, herein private respondent, as farm administrator of because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these issues will
Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private
April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as sales respondent, such as the exact date when petitioner ceased to
manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as function as farm administrator, the character of the pecuniary
operations manager of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His amounts received by petitioner from private respondent, that is,
employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary, with whether the same are in the nature of salaries or pensions, and
other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner of his
gasoline, medical and dental expenses. functions as farm administrator.

As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor
supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane General recommended a modification of the decision of herein
farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing, public respondent sustaining the findings and conclusions of the
harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84,6 for which
the hacienda  and attending to such other tasks as may be reason the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the
assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived petition. In compliance with the Court's resolution of November
on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there. 16, 1992,7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12, 1992 largely
reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Executive Labor Arbiter.8
Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work daily. He
suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the
occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he observation of the labor arbiter is worth noting:
underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact
deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted over that because of the special relationship of the parties and the
four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In June, nature of the action involved, this case could very well go down
1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, (in) the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its kind.
for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984. For this case is an action filed by an only son, his father's
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private namesake, the only child and therefore the only heir against his
respondent took care of his medical expenses and petitioner own father.9
continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) position cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on
observations were noted that may justify why this labor case solid bases in law and jurisprudence.
deserves special considerations. First, most of the complaints
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due
that petitioner and private respondent had with each other, were
process dictate that no worker shall be dismissed except for just
personal matters affecting father and son relationship. And
and authorized cause provided by law and after due
secondly, if any of the complaints pertain to their work, they allow
process.14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes
their personal relationship to come in the way.10
for which an employer may validly terminate an employment, to
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was wit:
illegal because of want of just cause therefor and non-observance (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of
of the requirements of due process. He also charges the NLRC the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection
with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of
executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
the hearings thereof. reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or
abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator,
his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes
thereby arming private respondent with a ground to terminate his
analogous to the foregoing.
employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is
wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings of the The employer may also terminate the services of any employee
executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only questions of law due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy,
may be appealed for resolution by this Court. Furthermore, in retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of
seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing
faults herein petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding is for the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the
pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes, erroneously citing Labor Code, by serving a written notice on the workers and the
Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month
[d], before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which corresponding separation pay rates provided by law.15 Suffering
provide that want of page references to the records is a ground from a disease by reason whereof the continued employment of
for dismissal of an appeal. the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his
co-employee's health, is also a ground for termination of his
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of
services provided he receives the prescribed separation
the Labor Code that technical rules of evidence prevailing in
pay.16 On the other hand, it is well-settled that abandonment by
courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, and that every
an employee of his work authorizes the employer to effect the
and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain
former's dismissal from employment.17
the facts in each case shall be availed of, without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of due process. After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that
public respondent gravely erred in affirming the decision of the
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision
executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his
in a case to be rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that
employment and was not illegally dismissed from such
matter, other than the one who conducted the hearing. The fact
employment. For want of substantial bases, in fact or
that the judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness
the decision does not impair the validity of the
normally accorded to the factual findings of an administrative
judgment,11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution
agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC, 18 as even
with due care and makes certain that they truly and accurately
decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by
reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts
law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19
of and evidence submitted in the case.12
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor
this point deserve acceptance:
Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio, who conducted the hearings therein
from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985, and was later It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from
transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who October 1982 to December 1982, cannot be construed as
eventually decided the case, presents no procedural infirmity, abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse.
especially considering that there is a presumption of regularity in Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal
the performance of a public officer's functions,13 which petitioner around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr.
has not successfully rebutted. Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn,
Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor
Code relaxing the application of technical rules of procedure in This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by
labor cases in the interest of due process, ever mindful of the medical bills sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan,
long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must be January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in
cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on
Bacolod City upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to
trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. The strength of one's
recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative matters of
the hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not really With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao,
obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao. petitioner unmistakably may be classified as a managerial
employee23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in the
xxx xxx xxx
discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special assigned myself where I want to go,"24 he was simply being
circumstances involved and basic human experience, petitioner's candid about what he could do within the sphere of his authority.
illness and strained family relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi His duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to
II may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times, or
Ysasi III's absence from work during the period of October 1982 to be subjected to specific control from his employer in every
to December 1982. In any event, such absence does not warrant aspect of his work. What is essential only is that he runs the farm
outright dismissal without notice and hearing. as efficiently and effectively as possible and, while petitioner may
definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this regard he
xxx xxx xxx proved to be quite successful, as there was at least a showing of
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an increased production during the time that petitioner was in charge
employee are as follows: of farm operations.

(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over
reason; and (2) clear intention to sever the employer-employee petitioner during the years 1983 to 1984, this is because that was
tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and Social Legislation, the period when petitioner was recuperating from illness and on
1989 edition, p. 133). account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm
operations were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision and
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute control exercisable by private respondent as employer was
abandonment. In Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC  (191 SCRA necessarily limited. It goes without saying that the control
328), the Court rules that for abandonment to arise, there must be contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as
a concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act farm administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal
from which it may be inferred that the employee has no more affairs and activities.
interest to work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative,
Inc. v. NLRC  (184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his
valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a duties as farm administrator, petitioner would be staying at the
deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his house in the farm, there really was no explicit contractual
employment. . . Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin
accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his
employee simply does not want to work anymore. employment or that any transfer of residence would justify the
termination of his employment. That petitioner changed his
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no residence should not be taken against him, as this is undeniably
abandonment. First, petitioner's absence and his decision to among his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of
leave his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his residence per se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-
illness and strained family relations. Second he has some employee relationship.
medical certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to
work, petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet
respondent of his intention to assume again his employment. uncertain of his son's intention of returning to work after his
Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a complaint for illegal confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on the payroll,
dismissal when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these reported him as an employee of the hacienda for social security
are indications that petitioner had no intention to abandon his purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated
employment.20 deductions therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was
only in January, 1983 when he became convinced that petitioner
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of would no longer return to work that he considered the latter to
petitioner's confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions have abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed
which required medical treatment. Neither can it be denied that him as an employee. According to private respondent, whatever
private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of health amount of money was given to petitioner from that time until
as the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical and April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or
hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City mere gratuitous doles from a father to a son, and not salaries as,
until he was fit to work again. The disagreement as to whether or in fact, none of the usual deductions were made therefrom. It was
not petitioner's ailments were so serious as to necessitate only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely stopped
hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation is giving said pension or allowance when he was angered by what
beside the point. The fact remains that on account of said he heard petitioner had been saying about sending him to jail.
illnesses, the details of which were amply substantiated by the
attending physician,21 and as the records are bereft of any Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo
suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner, there was Gomez taken on oral deposition regarding petitioner's alleged
justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it statement to him, "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I
is clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of
and not mere absence that is required to constitute abandonment petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In addition to
as a valid ground for termination of employment.22 insinuations of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in working
at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon
accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the
novel position that the agreement to support his son after the abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by private
latter abandoned the administration of the farm legally converts respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect
the initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation.25 or to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to
or expected of him with respect to what would then be his past
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent
and terminated employment. It is hard to imagine what further
undoubtedly knew about petitioner's illness and even paid for his
authority an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as
hospital and other medical bills. The assertion regarding
to compel him to continue to perform work-related tasks:
abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his
continued performance of various services related to the It is also significant that the special power of attorney32 executed
operations of the farm from May to the last quarter of 1983, his by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner,
persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and legal adviser specifically stating —
about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued
xxx xxx xxx
since April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered and his
willingness and capability to resume his work at the farm as That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a
expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984. 26 With these, resident of Hda. Manucao, hereinafter called and referred to as
petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the monthly PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a
pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary, pension or duly accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA
allowance, with or without deductions, as he was entitled thereto PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;
in view of his continued service as farm administrator.27
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of BIPA representing payment for all checks and papers to which I
abandonment may justly be made there must be a concurrence of am entitled to (sic) as such planter-member;
two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these
sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second presents
element as the more determinative factor and being manifested I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and
by some overt acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in this lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
case. JON de YSASI III
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR
unsure of his son's plans of returning to work. The absence of ME and in my name, place and stead, my check/checks
petitioner from work since mid-1982, prolonged though it may aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given
have been, was not without valid causes of which private the power and authority to sign for me and in my name, place and
respondent had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks.
to believe that petitioner was no longer returning to work, private PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
respondent neither explains nor substantiates by any reasonable cannot cash the said check/checks, but to turn the same over to
basis how he arrived at such a conclusion. me for my proper disposition.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my
given credence as even after January, 1983, when private Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the
respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner would receipts therefor.
no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform
services directly required by his position as farm administrator. That I further request that my said check/checks be made a
These are duly and correspondingly evidenced by such acts as "CROSSED CHECK".
picking up some farm machinery/equipment from G.A.
xxx xxx xxx
Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for additional farm
equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to remained in force even after petitioner's employment was
Bacolod through Zip Forwarders,29 getting the payment of the supposed to have been terminated by reason of abandonment.
additional cash advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation
from Agrotex Commodities, Inc.,30 and remitting to private regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits, 33 the
respondent through issuance of withholding tax reports,34 as well as correspondence
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back to
medicine and oil.31 work,35 and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took
work.
care of, relate to the normal activities and operations of the farm.
True, it is a father's prerogative to request or even command his We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo
child to run errands for him. In the present case, however, Gomez, as witness for private respondent, ascribing statements
considering the nature of these transactions, as well as the to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention to
property values and monetary sums involved, it is unlikely that abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of
private respondent would leave the matter to just anyone. such deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and
Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone the failure of private respondent to serve reasonably advance
who can be trusted or at least be held accountable therefor, and notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby foreclosing his
who is familiar with the terms, specifications and other details opportunity to
relative thereto, such as an employee. If indeed petitioner had cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to
serve notice thereof on the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so
the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative Assistant Celestina G. desires.
Ovejera of said office.36 Fair play dictates that at such an
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately
important stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking of
notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating
testimony, both parties must be afforded equal opportunity to
clearly the reasons therefor.
examine and cross-examine a witness.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether
employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to
denominated as salary, pension, allowance or ex gratia handout,
contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint
there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement thereto
with the Regional Branch of the Commission.
inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as
farm administrator. The change in description of said amounts xxx xxx xxx
contained in the pay slips or in the receipts prepared by private
respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative of petitioner's Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a
employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances above monthly report to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over the
set out. Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of place of work at all dismissals effected by him during the month,
allowances given by a parent out of concern for his child's specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers, the
welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts therefor37 should be reasons for their dismissal, the dates of commencement and
necessary and required as if they were ordinary business termination of employment, the positions last held by them and
expenditures. such other information as may be required by the Ministry for
policy guidance and statistical purposes.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that
petitioner's alleged abandonment was converted into an implied Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no
voluntary resignation on account of the father's agreement to question that petitioner was denied his right to due process since
support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have he was never given any notice about his impending dismissal and
determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as
monthly sums received by petitioner, regardless of designation, private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory
were in consideration for services rendered emanating from an twin requirements of procedural due process in this particular
employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that case, he in effect admits that no notice was served by him on
can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the certification issued on
and solicitude. We are also hard put to imagine how September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the
abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the
resignation without any positive act on the part of the employee employment of petitioner was submitted thereto.41
conveying a desire to terminate his employment. The very Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it
concept of resignation as a ground for termination by the nonetheless cannot be denied that notice still had to be served
employee of his employment38 does not square with the elements upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as the second
constitutive of abandonment. sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a explicitly requires service thereof at the employee's last known
violation by private respondent of the due process requirements address, by way of substantial compliance. While it is conceded
under the Labor Code for want of notice and hearing.39 Private that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an employee,
respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book especially when there is just cause therefor, the requirements of
V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies due process cannot be lightly taken. The law does not
only to cases where the employer seeks to terminate the services countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative
of an employee on any of the grounds enumerated under Article when it has the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee
282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation obtaining in this of security of tenure in favor of the employee.42
case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on
ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his the Wenphil case, the Solicitor General rejoins as follows:
employment.40
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to
labor cases are set out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his
Implementing the Labor Code in this wise: defense of implied resignation and/or abandonment, records
somehow showed that he failed to notify the Department of
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic)
dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. And for this failure, the
particular acts or omission(s) constituting the grounds for his other requisite for a valid termination by an employer was not
dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, notice shall be complied with. This however, would not work to invalidate the
served at the worker's last known address. otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The
xxx xxx xxx validity of the cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times
provided however that sanctions must be imposed on the
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due process
allegations as stated against him in the notice of dismissal within requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587).
a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer (Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" Petition), . . .
shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation (Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement
v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this Honorable Court
is: once an employee is dismissed for just cause, he must not be held that when it comes to reinstatement, differences should be
rewarded made between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to Court concluded that a company which no longer trusts its
observe procedural due process. The public policy behind this is managers cannot operate freely in a competitive and profitable
that, it may encourage the employee to do even worse and manner. The NLRC should know the difference between
render a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be managers and ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently order
observed. However, the employer must be penalized for his the reinstatement of managers with the same ease and liberality
infraction of due process. In the present case, however, not only as that of rank and file workers who had been terminated.
was petitioner dismissed without due process, but his dismissal is Similarly, a reinstatement may not be appropriate or feasible in
without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment case of antipathy or antagonism between the parties (Morales,
because he has a justifiable excuse.43 vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be
disregarding the mandatory provisions of Article 279 of the Labor reinstated as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The
Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to present relationship of petitioner and private respondent (is) so
reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the strained that a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer
imposition of the penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for relationship is hardly possible.49
violation of the due process requirements. Private respondent, for
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages,
his part, maintains that there was error in imposing the fine
arguing that his dismissal from employment was attended by bad
because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the
faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was contrary to
employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional
morals, good customs or public policy. He further prays for
office, as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of
exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts
the implementing rules, and not the failure to serve notice upon
of unjust dismissal by other employers.
the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no
awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental
uncertain terms the right of every worker to security of
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social
tenure.44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory
humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act
mandates, the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an
or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause
employee in case of its denial:
thereof.50 Exemplary damages, under Article 2229, are imposed
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. They are
except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the court to
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.51
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in
and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his
the past allowing recovery of moral damages where the dismissal
other benefits of their monetary equivalent computed from the
of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted
time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of
an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to
actual reinstatement.
morals, good customs or public policy,52 and of exemplary
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with damages if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or
full back wages in the absence of just cause for dismissal. 45 The malevolent manner.53 We do not feel, however, that an award of
Court, however, on numerous occasions has tempered the rigid the damages prayed for in this petition would be proper even if,
application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that seemingly, the facts of the case justify their allowance. In the
in some cases certain events may have transpired as would aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary
militate against the practicability of granting the relief thereunder damages were awarded, the dismissed employees were
provided, and declares that where there are strained relations genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring
between the employer and the employee, payment of back wages employers' capricious exercise of power.
and severance pay may be awarded instead of
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private
reinstatement,46 and more particularly when managerial
respondent can equally be faulted for fanning the flames which
employees are concerned.47 Thus, where reinstatement is no
gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy, instead of
longer possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed
sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate
employee be given his fair and just share of what the law accords
claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with
him.48
mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor negates the likelihood that either of them acted in good faith. It is
General's ratiocination, to wit: apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the
other. For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from
damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner.
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and to his backwages computed from the time his On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the
compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement. following recommendation of the Solicitor General:
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be impartial exposition and extended explanation of their respective
modified. There was no voluntary abandonment in this case rights in this decision, the parties may eventually see their way
because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence, or clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences on more
such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice convivial terms.
and hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor
dismissal. He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period
Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent
not exceeding three years from date of dismissal. And in lieu of
is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not
reinstatement, petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent
exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or
to one (1) month('s) salary for every year of service, a fraction of
deduction,58 and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay
six months being considered as one (1) year in accordance with
equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of
recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all
six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
claims for damages should be dismissed, for both parties are
equally at fault.54 SO ORDERED.
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed
by the records, sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof.
Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical duty as
lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective
causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more
importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal
conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of
the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their
clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a
lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever
possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often
called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise
counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for
concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso
of technicality in the conduct of litigation.56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly
provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end
or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement." On
this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was
expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the
court. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate
steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their
clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges
could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may
have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective
clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled
this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and
spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert
all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute
within his jurisdiction."57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained
the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this
controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish
having been obliged to make. The task of resolving cases
involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad taste
in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful
and enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations.
While we are convinced that we have adjudicated the legal issues
herein squarely on the bases of law and
jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the
thought that we may have failed to bring about the reconciliation
of the father and son who figured as parties to this dispute, and
that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly
contribute to the breaking, instead of the strengthening, of familial
bonds. In fine, neither of the parties herein actually emerges
victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that with the
 same were already sold, but did not make the full payment up to
the present time;
"3. That defendant is still indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of
P354.85, representing the balance of her account as the value of
the said goods, which is already overdue and payable."
Instead of answering the complaint against her, Gloria Pajares,
however, moved for a bill of particulars praying the inferior court
to require the Udharam Bazar & Co. to itemize the kinds of goods
which she supposedly purchased from the said company, the
respective dates they were taken and by whom they were
received as well as their purchase prices, alleging that without
this bill she would not be able to meet the issues raised in the
complaint.
After due hearing, the inferior court denied the motion of Gloria
Pajares for a bill of particulars. Her motion for reconsideration
having been denied too by the said court, she then brought the
incident on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Manila,
alleging in support of her petition that in denying her motion for a
bill of particulars, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of
discretion.
But on July 19, 1962, herein respondent Udharam Bazar & Co.
filed a motion to dismiss the petition for a writ of certiorari, as well
as the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction, for the reasons:
(1) that the allegations of the complaint filed by the said company
in the inferior court, particularly paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof, are
clear, specific and sufficiently appraise the defendant, now herein
G.R. No. L-29543      November 29, 1969 petitioner Gloria Pajares, of the nature of the cause of action
GLORIA PAJARES, petitioner-appellant, against her so as to enable her to prepare for her defenses; and
vs. (2) that things asked for in the motion for a bill of particulars are
JUDGE ESTRELLA ABAD SANTOS, MUNICIPAL COURT OF evidentiary matters, which are beyond the pale of such bill.
MANILA and UDHARAM BAZAR CO., respondents-appellees. Convinced that the said motion of the company is well founded,
Moises C. Nicomedes for petitioner-appellant. the lower court accordingly dismissed the petition on April 21,
Tomas Lopez Valencia for respondents-appellees. 1962.

TEEHANKEE, J.: Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been similarly

denied by the court below, Gloria Pajares undertook the present
We dismiss as frivolous petitioner-appellant's appeal from the appeal to this Court, contending under her lone assignment of
lower Court's Order of dismissal of her petition for a writ error to maintain her such appeal that the lower court erred in
of certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction against dismissing her petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, in
respondent judge's order denying her motion for a bill of its order dated July 21, 1962, as amended by its order dated
particulars as the defendant in a simple collection case. August 18, 1962.
The origin of the case is narrated in the Court of Appeals' The only genuine issues involved in the case at bar are: (1)
Resolution dated August 16, 1968 certifying the appeal to this whether the allegations of the complaint sufficiently appraise
Court as involving purely questions of law: Gloria Pajares of the nature of the cause of action against her;
This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Gloria Pajares from the and (2) whether the items asked for by the said Gloria Pajares in
order dated July 21, 1962 issued by the Court of First Instance of her motion for a bill of particulars constitute evidentiary matters.
Manila, dismissing her petition for certiorari with preliminary To our mind these are purely legal questions. A perusal of the
injunction against respondent Judge Estrella Abad Santos of the brief of the parties has shown that no genuine factual questions
Municipal Court of Manila and respondent Udharam Bazar & Co. are at all involved in this appeal.

There is no dispute that on April 25, 1962, the Udharam Bazar & It is plain and clear that no error of law, much less any grave
Co. sued Gloria Pajares before the Municipal Court of Manila for abuse of discretion, was committed by respondent judge in
recovery of a certain sum of money. The lawsuit was docketed in denying appellant's motion for a bill of particulars in the collection
the inferior court as Civil Case No. 97309 and was eventually case instituted in the Municipal Court of Manila by private
assigned to the sala of the respondent Judge Abad Santos. respondent-appellee for the recovery of her indebtedness of
P354.85 representing the overdue balance of her account for
In its complaint the Udharam Bazar & Co. averred, among others, ready-made goods ordered by and delivered to her in 1961.
as follows: Appellee's complaint precisely and concisely informed appellant
of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the cause of action
"2. That defendant in 1961, ordered from the plaintiff quantities of
against her, in accordance with the requirements of the Rules of
ready made goods and delivered to her in good condition and
Court.1
It was therefore improper for appellant, through her counsel, to court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There
insist on her motion that appellee as plaintiff "submit a bill of must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules
particulars, specifying therein in detail the goods represented by of Court which provides that "the signature of an attorney
the alleged amount of P354.85, giving the dates and invoice constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and
numbers on which they were delivered to the defendant, the that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is
amount due on each such invoice and by whom they were good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay "
received." These particulars sought all concerned evidentiary and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule
matters and do not come within the scope of Rule 12, section 1 of an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action."
the Rules of Court which permits a party "to move for a definite
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, and
statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not
petitioner-appellant's counsel shall pay treble costs in all
averred with sufficient definiteness or particularly to enable him to
instances. This decision shall be noted in the personal record of
prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial."
the attorney for petitioner-appellant in this Court for future
Since appellant admittedly was engaged in the business of reference. So ordered.
buying and selling merchandise at her stall at the Sta. Mesa
Market, Quezon City, and appellee was one of her creditors from
whom she used to buy on credit ready made goods for resale,
appellant had no need of the evidentiary particulars sought by her
to enable her to prepare her answer to the complaint or to
prepare for trial. These particulars were just as much within her
knowledge as appellee's. She could not logically pretend
ignorance as to the same, for all she had to do was to check and
verify her own records of her outstanding account with appellee
and state in her answer whether from her records the outstanding
balance of her indebtedness was in the sum of P354.85, as
claimed by appellee, or in a lesser amount.
The record shows, furthermore, that a month before appellee filed
its collection case, it had written appellant a demand-letter for the
payment of her outstanding account in the said sum of P354.85
within one week. Appellant, through her counsel, wrote appellee
under date of March 23, 1962, acknowledging her said
indebtedness but stating that "Due to losses she has sustained in
the operation of her stall, she would not be able to meet your
request for payment of the full amount of P354.85 at once. I
would therefore request you to be kind enough to allow her to
continue paying you P10.00 every 15th and end of the month as
heretofore."
No error was therefore committed by the lower court in summarily
dismissing appellant's petition for certiorari against respondent
judge's order denying her motion for a bill of particulars, as
pretended by appellant in her lone assignment of error. Well may
we apply to this appeal, the words of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in
an analogous case,2 that "the circumstances surrounding this
litigation definitely prove that appeal is frivolous and a plain trick
to delay payment and prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such
attitude deserves condemnation, wasting as it does, the time that
the courts could well devote to meritorious cases."
Here, this simple collection case has needlessly clogged the court
dockets for over seven years. Had appellant been but prudently
advised by her counsel to confess judgment and ask from her
creditor the reasonable time she needed to discharge her lawful
indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she has incurred by
way of filing fees in the Court of First Instance, premiums for her
appeal bond, appellate court docket fees, printing of her
appellant's brief, and attorney's fees would have been much more
than sufficient to pay off her just debt to appellee. Yet, here she
still remains saddled with the same debt, burdened by
accumulated interests, after having spent uselessly much more
than the amount in litigation in this worthless cause.
As we recently said in another case,3 the cooperation of litigants
and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the