Azure Security

Microsoft Azure Security
Infrastructure
Yuri Diogenes
Dr. Thomas W. Shinder
Debra Littlejohn Shinder
PUBLISHED BY
Microsoft Press
A division of Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, Washington 98052-6399
Copyright © 2016 by Yuri Diogenes and Dr. Thomas W.

Shinder
All rights reserved. No part of the contents of this book

may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any
means without the written permission of the publisher.
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016938684

ISBN: 978-1-5093-0357-1
Printed and bound in the United States of America.
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Cover: Twist Creative • Seattle
Contents
Foreword
Introduction
Chapter 1 Cloud security

Cloud security considerations
Compliance
Risk management
Identity and access management
Operational security
Endpoint protection
Data protection
Shared responsibility
Cloud computing
Distributed responsibility in public cloud
computing
Assume breach and isolation
Azure security architecture
Azure design principles
Chapter 2 Identity protection in Azure

Authentication and authorization
Azure hierarchy
Role-Based Access Control
On-premises integration
Azure AD Connect
Federation
Suspicious activity identification
Identity protection
User risk policy
Sign-in risk policy
Notification enabling
Vulnerabilities
Multi-Factor Authentication
Azure Multi-Factor Authentication
implementation
Azure Multi-Factor Authentication option
configuration
Chapter 3 Azure network security

Anatomy of Azure networking
Virtual network infrastructure
Network access control
Routing tables
Remote access (Azure gateway/point-to-site
VPN/RDP/Remote PowerShell/SSH)
Cross-premises connectivity
Network availability
Network logging
Public name resolution
Network security appliances
Reverse proxy
Azure Network Security best practices
Subnet your networks based on security zones
Use Network Security Groups carefully
Use site-to-site VPN to connect Azure Virtual
Networks
Configure host-based firewalls on IaaS virtual
machines
Configure User Defined Routes to control traffic
Require forced tunneling
Deploy virtual network security appliances
Create perimeter networks for Internet-facing
devices
Use ExpressRoute
Optimize uptime and performance
Disable management protocols to virtual
machines
Enable Azure Security Center
Extend your datacenter into Azure
Chapter 4 Data and storage security

Virtual machine encryption
Azure Disk Encryption
Storage encryption
File share wire encryption
Hybrid data encryption
Authentication
Wire security
Data at rest
Rights management
Database security
Azure SQL Firewall
SQL Always Encrypted
Row-level security
Transparent data encryption
Cell-level encryption
Dynamic data masking
Chapter 5 Virtual machine protection with

Antimalware
Understanding the Antimalware solution
Antimalware deployment
Antimalware deployment to an existing VM
Antimalware deployment to a new VM
Antimalware removal
Chapter 6 Key management in Azure with Key

Vault
Key Vault overview
App configuration for Key Vault
Key Vault event monitoring
Chapter 7 Azure resource management

security
Azure Security Center overview
Detection capabilities
Onboard resources in Azure Security Center
Apply recommendations
Resource security health
Respond to security incidents
Chapter 8 Internet of Things security

Anatomy of the IoT
Things of the world, unite
Sensors, sensors everywhere
Big data just got bigger: TMI
Artificial intelligence to the rescue
IoT security challenges
IoT: Insecure by design
Ramifications of an insecure IoT
IoT threat modeling
Windows 10 IoT and Azure IoT
Windows 10 IoT editions
Azure IoT Suite and secure Azure IoT
infrastructure
Chapter 9 Hybrid environment monitoring

Operations Management Suite Security and Audit
solution overview
Log Analytics configuration
Windows Agent installation
Resource monitoring using OMS Security and Audit
solution
Security state monitoring
Identity and access control
Alerts and threats
Chapter 10 Operations and management in the

cloud
Scenario
Design considerations
Azure Security Center for operations
Azure Security Center for incident response
Azure Security Center for forensics investigation
Index
About the authors
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Foreword
Security is a critical requirement of any software system,

but in today’s world of diverse, skilled, and motivated
attackers, it’s more important than ever. In the past,
security efforts focused on creating the strongest possible
wall to keep attackers out. Security professionals
considered the Internet hostile, and treated their own
company or organization’s systems as the trusted inner
core, making relatively modest investments in
segregating different environments and visibility into the
interactions between different components. Now, the
security world has adopted an “assume breach” mindset
that treats perimeter networks as just one aspect of the
protective pillar in a three-pillar approach that also
includes detection and response. Attackers can and will
penetrate the strongest defenses, and they can enter the
network from inside. The perimeter is gone, and security
architectures and investments are continuing to shift to
address the new reality.
At the same time that the changing threat landscape is
reshaping the approach to security, people have
embarked on shifting their compute and data from
infrastructure they deploy and maintain to that hosted
by hyper-scale public cloud service providers.
Infrastructure as a service (IaaS) and platform as a
service (PaaS) dramatically increase agility by offering
on-demand, elastic, and scalable compute and data. IT
professionals and application developers can focus on
their core mission: delivering compliant, standardized
services to their organizations in the case of the former,
and quickly delivering new features and functionality to
the business and its customers in the latter.
You’re reading this book because your organization is
considering or has begun adopting public cloud services.
You likely have already recognized that the introduction
of the cloud provider into your network architecture
creates new challenges. Whereas in your on-premises
networks you use firewall appliances and physical
routing rules to segregate environments and monitor
traffic, the public cloud exposes virtualized networks,
software load balancers, and application gateways, along
with abstractions such as network security groups, that
take their place. In some cases, the cloud offers services
that give you insight and control that’s either impossible
or hard to achieve on-premises, making it easier to
deliver high levels of security. The terminology, tools,
and techniques are different, and creating secure and
resilient “assume breach” cloud and hybrid systems
requires a deep understanding of what’s available and
how to best apply it.
This book will serve as your trusted guide as you
create and move applications and data to Microsoft
Azure. The first step to implementing security in the
cloud is knowing what the platform does for you and
what your responsibility is, which is different depending
on whether you’re using IaaS, PaaS, or finished software
services like Microsoft Office 365. After describing the
differences, Yuri, Tom and Deb then move on to cover
everything from identity and access control, to how to
create a cloud network for your virtual machines, to how
to more securely connect the cloud to your on-premises
networks. You’ll also learn how to manage keys and
certificates, how to encrypt data at rest and in transit,
how the Azure Security Center vulnerability and threat
reporting can show you where you can improve security,
and how Azure Security Center even walks you through
doing so. Finally, the cloud and Internet of Things (IoT)
are synergistic technologies, and if you’re building an IoT
solution on Azure, you’ll benefit from the practical advice
and tips on pitfalls to avoid.
The advent of the cloud requires new skills and
knowledge, and those skills and knowledge will mean not
only that you can more effectively help your organization
use the cloud, but that you won’t be left behind in this
technology shift. With this book, you’ll be confident that
you have an end-to-end view of considerations, options,
and even details of how to deploy and manage more
secure applications on Azure.
— MARK RUSSINOVICH
CTO, Microsoft Azure
July 2016
Introduction
Regardless of your title, if you’re responsible for

designing, configuring, implementing, or managing
secure solutions in Microsoft Azure, then this book is for
you. If you’re a member of a team responsible for
architecting, designing, implementing, and managing
secure solutions in Azure, this book will help you
understand what your team needs to know. If you’re
responsible for managing a consulting firm that is
implementing secure solutions in Azure, you should read
this book. And if you just want to learn more about Azure
security to improve your skill set or aid in a job search,
this book will help you understand Azure security
services and technologies and how to best use them to
better secure an Azure environment.
This book includes conceptual information, design
considerations, deployment scenarios, best practices,
technology surveys, and how-to content, which will
provide you with a wide view of what Azure has to offer
in terms of security. In addition, numerous links to
supplemental information are included to speed your
learning process.
This book is a “must read” for anyone who is
interested in Azure security. The authors assume that
you have a working knowledge of cloud computing basics
and core Azure concepts, but they do not expect you to
be an Azure or PowerShell expert. They assume that you
have enterprise IT experience and are comfortable in a
datacenter. If you need more detailed information about
how to implement the Azure security services and
technologies discussed in this book, be sure to check out
the references to excellent how-to articles on Azure.com.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank Karen Szall and the
entire Microsoft Press team for their support in this
project, Mark Russinovich for writing the foreword of
this book, and also other Microsoft colleagues that
contributed by reviewing this book: Rakesh Narayan,
Eric Jarvi, Meir Mendelovich, Daniel Alon, Sarah
Fender, Ben Nick, Russ McRee, Jim Molini, Jon
Ormond, Devendra Tiwari, Nasos Kladakis, and
Arjmand Samuel.
Yuri: I would also like to thank my wife and
daughters for their endless support and understanding,
my great God for giving me strength and guiding my
path, my friends and coauthors Tom and Deb Shinder,
my manager Sonia Wadhwa for her support in my role,
and last but not least, to my parents for working hard to
give me education, which is the foundation that I use
every day to keep moving forward in my career.
Tom and Deb Shinder: Writing—even with
coauthors—is in some ways an isolated task. You sit
down at the keyboard (or in today’s high tech, alternative
input environment, dictate into your phone or even
scribble onto your tablet screen) alone, and let the words
flow from your mind to the document. However, the
formation of those words and sentences and paragraphs
and the fine-tuning of them through the editing and
proofing process are based on the input of many, many
other people.
Because there are far too many colleagues, experts, and
friends and family who had a role in making it possible
for this book to come into being, we aren’t going to even
attempt to name them all here. You know who you are.
From the family members who patiently waited while we
finished up a chapter, delaying dinner, to the myriad of
Azure professionals both within and outside of
Microsoft, to the folks at Microsoft Press whose
publishing expertise helped shape this collection of
writing from three different authors with very different
writing styles into a coherent whole, and most of all, to
those who asked for and will read and (we hope) benefit
from this book: we thank you.
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Chapter 1. Cloud security
Before you dive into the details about Microsoft Azure

security infrastructure—the main subject of this book—it
is important to have clear expectations regarding cloud
security. To understand what makes Azure a trusted
cloud platform for customers, you must first understand
the essential considerations regarding security in the
cloud. Security in the cloud is a partnership between you
and the service provider. This chapter explains key
characteristics that will enable you to understand the
boundaries, responsibilities, and expectations that will
help you embrace cloud computing as a trusted platform
for your business.
CLOUD SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

Before adopting cloud computing to its fullest,
organizations must first understand the security
considerations that are inherent in this computing
model. It is very important to understand these
considerations in the beginning of the planning
process. Lack of awareness regarding cloud security
considerations can directly impact a successful cloud
computing adoption and compromise the entire
project.
When planning for cloud adoption, consider the
following areas for cloud security:
Compliance
Risk management
Endpoint protection
Data protection
Each of these areas must be considered, with some
areas explored in more depth than others, depending on
the type of business that you are dealing with. For
example, a health care provider might focus on different
areas than a manufacturing company focuses on. The
sections that follow describe each of these areas.
Compliance
When organizations migrate to the cloud, they need to
retain their own compliance obligations. These
obligations can be dictated by internal or external
regulations, such as industry standards that they need
to comply with to support their business model. Cloud
providers must be able to assist customers to meet
their compliance requirements via cloud adoption. In
many cases, cloud service providers will become part
of the customer’s chain of compliance.
To enable customers to meet their compliance needs,
Microsoft uses three major practices, which are:
Compliance foundation
Trustworthy technology
Compliance process investment
Third-party certification
Assistance for customers to meet their compliance
needs
Transparency
Choice
Flexibility
Partnership with industry leaders
Development of standard frameworks
Engagement with lawmakers and regulators
Consider working closely with your cloud provider to
identify your organization’s compliance needs and verify
how the cloud provider can fulfill your requirements. It is
also important to verify whether the cloud service
provider has a proven record of delivering the most
secure, reliable cloud services while keeping customers’
data as private and secure as possible.
More
More Info
Info
For more information about the Microsoft approach to compliance, go to
blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2016/04/07/new-resources-microsoft-
support-customer-privacy-cloud-compliance.
Risk management
When customers adopt cloud computing, it is
imperative that they are able to trust the location used
by the cloud service provider. Cloud service providers
should have policies and programs that are used to
manage online security risks. In a cloud environment,
risk management must be adapted to how dynamic
the environment is.
Microsoft uses mature processes based on long-term
experience delivering services on the web for managing
these new risks. As part of the risk management process,
cloud service providers should perform the following
tasks:
Identify threats and vulnerabilities to the
environment.
Calculate risk.
Report risks across the cloud environment.
Address risks based on impact assessment and
the associated business case.
Test potential remediation effectiveness and
calculate residual risk.
Manage risks on an ongoing basis.
Customers should work closely with cloud service
providers and demand full process transparency to be
able to understand risk decisions, how this will vary
according to the data sensitivity, and the level of
protection required by the organization.
Nowadays, when users are working on different
devices from any location and accessing apps across
different cloud services, it is critical to keep the user’s
identity secure. With cloud adoption, identity
becomes the new perimeter. Identity is the control
pane for your entire infrastructure, regardless of the
location: on-premises or in the cloud. You use identity
to control access to any services from any device, and
you use it to get visibility and insights into how your
data is being used.
Organizations planning to adopt cloud computing
must be aware of the identity and access management
methods available and how these methods integrate with
their current on-premises infrastructure. Some key
considerations for identity and access management are:
Identity provisioning
Identity provisioning requirements can vary
according to the cloud computing model:
software as a service (SaaS), platform as a
service (PaaS), or infrastructure as a service
(IaaS).
Evaluate how to more securely automate the
identity provisioning by using the current on-
premises infrastructure.
Federation
Evaluate the methods available and how to
integrate these methods with the current on-
premises infrastructure.
Single sign-on (SSO)
Evaluate the organization’s requirement for
SSO and how to integrate it with current apps.
Profile management
Evaluate cloud service provider options and
how these options map with the organization’s
requirement.
Access control
Evaluate cloud service provider options to
control data access.
Enforce Role-Based Access Control (RBAC).
Organizations that are migrating to the cloud should
also modify their internal processes adequately to
map to the cloud. These processes include security
monitoring, auditing, incident response, and
forensics. The cloud platform must enable IT
administrators to monitor services in real time to
observe health conditions of these services and
provide capabilities to quickly restore services that
were interrupted.
You should ensure that deployed services are
operated, maintained, and supported in accordance with
a service level agreement (SLA) established with the
cloud service provider and agreed to by the organization.
The following list provides additional considerations for
operational security in the cloud:
Incorporate organizational learning throughout
the process.
Adopt industry standards and practices for
operations, such as National Institute of
1
Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-53.
1
For more information about this standard, go to
nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-
53r4.pdf.
Use a security information management approach

in line with industry standards, such as NIST SP
2
800-61.
2
For more information about this standard, go to
nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-
61r2.pdf.
Use the cloud service provider’s threat

intelligence.
Continuously update controls and mitigations to
enhance the operation’s security.
Endpoint protection
Cloud security is not only about how secure the cloud
service provider infrastructure is. Later in this
chapter, you will learn more about shared
responsibility, and one of the items that organizations
are responsible for when adopting cloud computing is
to keep their endpoint secure. Organizations should
consider increasing their endpoint security when
adopting cloud computing, because these endpoints
will be exposed to more external connections and will
be accessing more apps that could be living in
different cloud providers.
Users are the main target of the attacks, and
endpoints are the primary objects that are used by users
to consume data. The endpoint can be the user’s
workstation, smartphone, or any device that can be used
to access cloud resources. Attackers know that the end
user is the weakest link in the security chain, and they
will continue to invest in social engineering techniques,
such as phishing email, to entice users to perform an
action that can compromise the endpoint. Consider the
following security best practices when planning for
endpoint protection in your cloud security strategy:
Keep endpoint software up to date.
Use automatic deployment to deliver definition
updates to endpoints.
Control access to the download location for
software updates.
Ensure that end users do not have local
administrative privileges.
Use the principle of least privileges and role-
based administration to grant permissions to
users.
Monitor endpoint alerts promptly.
Important
Important
Securing privileged access is a critical step to establishing security
assurances for business. You can read about Privileged Access
Workstations (PAWs) at aka.ms/cyberpaw and learn more about the
Microsoft methodology to protect high-value assets.
Data protection
When the subject is cloud security, the ultimate goal
when migrating to the cloud is to ensure that the data
is secure no matter where this data is located. The
data goes through different stages; the stage depends
on where the data will be located at a certain point in
time. Figure 1-1 illustrates these stages.
FIGURE 1-1 Different data stages by location
In this flow, the stages are:

1. Data at rest in the user’s device In this case,
the data is located at the endpoint, which can be
any device. You should always enforce data
encryption at rest for company-owned devices
and user-owned devices (bring your own device
[BYOD] scenarios).
2. Data in transit from the user’s device to
the cloud When data leaves the user’s device,
you should ensure that the data itself is still
protected. Many technologies, such as Azure
Rights Management, can encrypt the data
regardless of the location. It is also imperative to
ensure that the transport channel is encrypted;
therefore, the use of Transport Layer Security
(TLS) to transfer the data should always be
enforced.
3. Data at rest in the cloud provider’s
datacenter When the data arrives in the cloud
provider’s servers, their storage infrastructure
should ensure redundancy and protection. Make
sure you understand how your cloud service
provider performs data encryption at rest, who is
responsible for managing the keys, and how data
redundancy is performed.
4. Data in transit from the cloud to on-
premises In this case, the same
recommendations specified in stage 2 are
applicable. Enforce data encryption on the file
itself and encrypt the transport layer.
5. Data at rest on-premises Customers are
responsible for keeping their on-premises data
secure. Data encryption at rest at the
organization’s datacenter is a critical step to
accomplish that. Ensure that you have the correct
infrastructure to enable encryption, data
redundancy, and key management.
Cloud
Cloud security
security considerations
considerations
Moving to the cloud requires different thinking. Scale, speed, and

architecture mean that we must treat cloud-based services differently than
local virtual machines (VMs) or time-shared mainframes. Here are a few of
the topics that require special thought when you work with a cloud service
provider like Azure.
Well-organized cloud services add or remove machines from the inventory

in minutes or hours. Many can handle traffic spikes of more than 1,000
percent within a single day. Due to the rapid pace of development, daily or
weekly code changes are normal, and testing must occur by using
production services, but not sensitive production data.
Any organization moving to the cloud must establish a trust relationship

with a cloud service provider and must use all of the tools available to
define and enforce the negotiated requirements of that relationship.
I tell friends that in the 1990s, if I needed a dozen servers for a new
project, it would take four to six months to forecast, order, deliver, rack,
network, configure, and deploy those servers before the team could begin
testing the production service. Today, in Azure, I can do the same thing in
30 minutes, from my phone.
Jim Molini
Senior Program Manager, C+E Security
SHARED RESPONSIBILITY
In a traditional datacenter, the IT organization is
responsible for the entire infrastructure. This is how
on-premises computing has worked from the
beginning of modern client/server computing (and
even before that, in the mainframe era). If something
was wrong with the network, storage, or compute
infrastructure, the IT organization was responsible for
finding out what the problem was, and fixing it.
The same went for the security organization. The
security organization worked with the IT organization as
a whole to ensure that all components of the IT
infrastructure were secure. The corporate security
organization set requirements, rationalized those
requirements with the corporate IT organization, and
then defined controls that could be implemented by the
IT infrastructure and operations staff. The security
organization also defined compliance requirements and
was responsible for auditing the infrastructure to make
sure that those requirements were met on an ongoing
basis.
All of this is still true for the on-premises datacenter.
However, with the introduction of public cloud
computing, the IT and security organizations have a new
partner—the cloud service provider. The cloud service
provider has its own IT infrastructure and is responsible
for the security requirements and controls implemented
on that infrastructure.
This means you need to not only be aware of and
define your own security requirements, you need to also
be able to have enough visibility into the security
infrastructure and operations of your cloud service
provider. The extent to which you need to do this
depends on the cloud security model your company is
using on the cloud service provider’s infrastructure.
Cloud computing
This section provides a quick review of cloud
computing so you have a common understanding of
what cloud computing is and what it is not. This will
help you understand how cloud security works in the
cloud and how it is the same in most respects, and
different in some key areas, from traditional
datacenter computing.
NIST definition of cloud computing

The term “cloud computing” had been used for some
time without a formal definition. Of course, for those
who have been in the industry for a while, “cloud”
represents the Internet. And for some people, that
was what cloud computing was about: services
delivered over the Internet.
Some commentators used the term utility computing
to convey the idea that not only are services delivered
over the Internet, but that service delivery would take on
a “utility” model. A utility model is one where a core set
of capabilities is delivered to anyone who wants to
“consume” those capabilities; the consumers are charged
based on how much they use. This is similar to consumer
utilities such as electricity and gas.
At this time, most countries/regions around the world
and the companies within them accept the NIST
definition of cloud computing to be the most reliable and
actionable definition of cloud computing. NIST is the
United States National Institute of Standards and
Technology.
A major advance in understanding cloud computing
came from NIST in the form of its “five essential
characteristics” of cloud computing and the definition of
cloud service models and cloud deployment models.
Figure 1-2 depicts the five essential characteristics,
the cloud service models, and the cloud deployment
models.
FIGURE 1-2 NIST definition of cloud computing
Cloud computing characteristics

NIST defines the following five essential
characteristics of cloud computing:
On-demand self-service This refers to the
cloud capability of enabling consumers of the
cloud service to requisition required resources
without needing to go through a process that
requires user interaction. For example, users can
use an online form to request and receive
anything they need from the cloud service
provider.
Broad network access This relates to the cloud
capability of resources contained in the cloud to
be available from virtually any location, and from
almost any type of device in the world. It’s
important to point out that while broad network
access is part of the definition of cloud
computing, and the enabling of broad network
access is key to successful cloud deployments, this
does not mean that access is always granted. As
you will learn as you proceed through this book,
access control is a critical component of any
cloud-based solution.
Rapid elasticity This provides consumers of a
cloud service the ability to rapidly obtain cloud
resources when they need them and then release
those resources back into the cloud’s shared pool
of resources when they are no longer required.
Cloud architectures offer elasticity of resources to
consumers of the cloud service. From the tenant’s
perspective, the cloud offers an unlimited pool of
resources. If the consumer of the cloud service
anticipates a burst in demand for their service,
the client can request more resources from the
cloud to ensure that the service is capable of
meeting that demand. The “perception of infinite
capacity” is a key principle behind that of rapid
elasticity.
Resource pooling This is about having all
consumers of a cloud service use the same pool of
resources. All users of the cloud environment use
the same servers, network, and storage; that
resource pool is dynamically partitioned so that
one customer cannot access any other customer’s
data, applications, and virtual machines. As
explained later in this chapter, isolation at all
levels is critical to the success of any cloud
infrastructure because of the requirement for
resource pooling.
Measured service This means that consumers
of the cloud service only pay for what they
consume. This is very similar to a utility model
where you only pay for what you use. For
example, you only pay for the amount of
electricity, water, or gas you use (although there
might be some kind of “base” you have to pay to
access the service). Measured service also means
that the cloud service provider needs to be
transparent in terms of providing consumers of
the cloud service information about usage so that
consumers can audit their usage to make
predictions about future needs and costs.
Cloud service models

According to the NIST definition of cloud computing,
there are three service models and four deployment
models. The service model defines what level of
service out of the entire solution stack the cloud
service provider provides for its customers. The
deployment models define how and to whom those
services are delivered.
The cloud services models are:
Infrastructure as a service (IaaS) This
provides the core physical, processing,
networking, and storage infrastructure. This
infrastructure is owned and operated by the cloud
service provider. The cloud service provider is
responsible for maintaining the uptime and
performance of this infrastructure. It is also
responsible for the security of these components.
In contrast to on-premises computing, with IaaS,
you are not responsible for these core
infrastructure aspects of any solution you put into
a cloud service provider partner’s cloud
infrastructure.
Platform as a service (PaaS) This provides
everything you get with infrastructure as a
service, but adds to it the development platform
components. The cloud service provider is now
responsible not only for the infrastructure, but
also the operating system (or components that
provide capabilities similar to an operating
system), and the runtime environment (such as a
web server platform) required to deliver
customer-developed applications. The security of
these operating systems and their equivalents, in
addition to the runtime environment, is the
responsibility of the cloud service provider and
not the customer.
Software as a service (SaaS) For this, which is
sometimes referred to as “finished services,” the
cloud service provider is responsible for the entire
infrastructure and platform. It is also responsible
for the application environment. Software as a
service provides customers with a complete
application similar to those traditionally run on-
premises, such as Microsoft Exchange Server
email or Microsoft SharePoint collaboration. The
cloud service provider is responsible for secure
deployment and management of the application.
Cloud deployment models

NIST defines four deployment models:
Public cloud This deployment model is designed
so that multiple customers from any place in the
world can use a shared infrastructure. All
customers in a public cloud share the same
hardware—the same servers, the same network,
and the same storage. Of course, all of these
physical infrastructure components are deployed
and managed at cloud scale. As explained later,
the key in making sure that public cloud
computing is successful is strong isolation—the
ability to isolate one customer’s assets from
another customer’s assets at all levels of the stack
is the number one job responsibility of all public
cloud service providers.
Private cloud This deployment model is a cloud
environment hosted by the IT organization. A
private cloud is not the same as a traditional on-
premises datacenter (although the term is often
misused in that way). In contrast to a traditional
on-premises datacenter, a private cloud is able to
deliver on all five of the essential characteristics of
cloud computing as defined by NIST and as
discussed previously. Private cloud is also
concerned with isolation, although perhaps to a
lesser extent than public cloud; that would
depend on the use case scenario and the level of
trust and security zoning that an organization has
in place, and how much they want to reflect that
into their cloud environment.
The difference between public cloud and private
cloud is that the organization owns all aspects of
the private cloud and there are no dependencies
or relationships with external entities.
Hybrid cloud This deployment model is a
combination of a public cloud and a private cloud,
in most cases. It is possible to have other types of
hybrid clouds, such as a public cloud to a
community cloud, or even two different public
clouds. In the typical hybrid cloud deployment,
components of a solution are placed in both the
public cloud and the private cloud.
For example, a three-tier application has a web
front end, an application logic middle tier, and a
database back end. In a hybrid cloud deployment,
the front-end web servers and the application
logic servers would be in the public cloud, and the
database back end would be on-premises. In most
cases, the on-premises network is connected to
the public cloud via a cross-premises connection,
such as a site-to-site virtual private network
(VPN) or dedicated wide-area network (WAN)
link.
Community cloud This deployment model is a
variation of a public cloud, but in the case of
community cloud, the public cloud environment
is not open to all potential users. Instead,
community cloud infrastructures are dedicated to
a particular community, such as local, state, or
federal government.
Distributed responsibility in public cloud

computing
Now that you have an understanding of cloud
computing, take a look at how it influences who is
responsible for security. Figure 1-3 provides a general
overview of who is responsible for various aspects of a
solution that is deployed by using various deployment
models.
FIGURE 1-3 Cloud services and responsibilities
This distribution of responsibility is one of the key
security differences between traditional datacenter
computing and on-premises computing.
Moving from left to right in the figure, you can see
that for on-premises solutions, the entire responsibility
for security belongs to the IT organization and company
that owns the infrastructure. This is the pre-cloud
computing approach to security, which you’re most likely
familiar with.
For infrastructure as a service, the cloud service
provider becomes responsible for some of the security.
Because infrastructure as a service is designed to provide
you with core storage, networking, physical servers, and
a virtualization platform, the responsibility for securing
these levels of the stack belongs to the cloud service
provider. As you move up the stack, above the
components for which the cloud service provider is
responsible, the responsibility for securing those
components belongs to you.
With platform as a service, even more levels of the
stack are managed by the cloud service provider, so there
the cloud service provider is responsible for securing
those additional levels and you have less to secure.
Finally, as you move to software as a service, the
cloud service provider is responsible for managing all
levels of the solution stack except for administrative
tasks such as granting your users access to the service.
With that said, most finished services have some controls
for which you’re responsible.
For example, Microsoft Office 365 provides you with
email services, and Microsoft is responsible for making
sure that the messaging environment is as secure as
possible and all possible controls that Microsoft has
access to are configured in a secure fashion. There are
still some security controls that are made available to
you, such as email encryption, attachment filtering, and
others that you can deploy or not deploy. Therefore, even
though with SaaS the cloud service provider is
responsible for securing the entire stack, the cloud
service provider is not responsible for enabling or
disabling additional data controls to which only the
customer has access.
Understanding the division of responsibility based on
the cloud service deployment model is more than just an
academic exercise. So, if you didn’t understand what was
covered here, read it over again. When you adopt a
public cloud service provider and decide what
applications you want to put into the cloud, you’ll need to
know how to map what you’re responsible for and what
your cloud service provider is responsible for, and then
define your requirements and come up with your designs
based on this understanding.
ASSUME BREACH AND ISOLATION

As previously mentioned, one of the most significant
differences between traditional datacenter security
and cloud security is the new distribution of the
responsibility model based on what cloud deployment
model you use.
Cloud computing security significantly differs from
traditional datacenter security in two other major areas:
assume breach and isolation, which are described in this
section.
For the last several decades, the vast majority of time,
effort, and money has been behind stopping something
“bad” from happening. Some actions taken include the
following:
Deploying antivirus software
Deploying antimalware
Hardening operating systems
Creating perimeter network segments and
network security zones
Instantiating data leakage protection
Requiring complex passwords and passphrases
Requiring multifactor authentication
Encrypting file systems, disks, and individual
documents
Updating operating systems
Scanning ports and testing pens
Preventing distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks
Securing code development by using the
Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle
Scanning for vulnerabilities
We’ve done all those things. And we’ve done them
again as the technologies in these areas have improved.
We bought the best, deployed with secure best practices,
and managed the heck out of our security solutions.
What happened?
Read your daily newspaper or news site. You know
what happened: almost daily breaches of the largest
companies and governments in the world. All these
corporate and government entities did what they could
do from a greater or lesser extent to prevent breach. They
spent the money, they deployed the products, they met
compliance requirements and passed the audits.
And they were breached.
Now that’s not to say that you should stop doing all
these things to prevent breach. Imagine the exponential
increase in security incidents if people weren’t doing all
of these things! Breach prevention makes it harder for
someone to compromise your systems. It slows attackers
down, and in many cases, stops them. But for the
determined opponent, the one who stands to make
thousands, hundreds of thousands, millions, or tens of
millions from breaching your systems, traditional
prevent breach processes and technologies are not
enough.
Microsoft recognizes that preventing breach is not
enough. That doesn’t mean we’ve “given up” or “thrown
in the towel” when it comes to breach prevention. We
continue to use all the traditional breach prevention
processes and technologies, and we’ll continue to use
them as new processes are invented. However, in
addition to those, we realize that we have to do more.
That “more” is encompassed by a philosophy of
“assume breach.” An assume breach mentality means
that people hope that they will never be breached.
However, we know that hope is a poor strategy.
Therefore, we assume that we are about to be breached,
or have already been breached, and we have people,
processes, and technology that help us find out when the
breach occurred as early as possible, and then we eject
the attacker with the goal being to limit expansion of the
breach as much as possible.
We use the assume breach approach to help us
understand how attackers gain access to the system and
then develop methods that enable us to catch the
attacker as soon as possible after the breach takes place.
Because attackers typically enter a system via a low value
target, if we can detect quickly when the target has been
compromised, we can block the attacker from expanding
outward from the low value asset to higher value assets;
these high value assets are the attacker’s ultimate target.
How does Microsoft determine when an attack
occurred? One very effective method we use is Red
Teaming, or Red/Blue team simulations. In these
exercises, the Red Team takes on the role of the attacker
and the Blue Team takes on the role of defender. The
teams define the parameters of the exercise and then for
the time duration for which the exercise is agreed upon,
the Red Team tries to attack the Azure infrastructure and
the Blue Team tries to discover what the Red Team has
done and then attempts to block the Red Team from
compromising additional systems (if indeed the Red
Team was able to compromise any systems).
At the end of the exercise, the Red and Blue teams
discuss what happened, how the Red Team might have
gotten in, and how the Blue team discovered and ejected
the Red Team. Then they suggest new technologies and
operational procedures that will make it easier and faster
to discover compromise.
In addition to these exercises, we have an active bug
bounty program, use the latest in security monitoring
and response, and take advantage of the latest threat
intelligence, which is shared among all the major cloud
service providers.
“Assume
“Assume breach”
breach” does
does not
not mean
mean “assume
“assume failure”
failure”
We adopt the “assume breach” concept as a mental guideline to use when
designing security services and not as resignation to failure. In a “prevent
breach” environment, we’d often build strong perimeter controls, but pay
less attention to compartmentalization inside the organization. Remember
the old concept of hard outside and soft, chewy center? Nevertheless, the
ongoing threat from bad actors requires better thinking.
Using the assume breach mindset, we have to think differently about

collaboration. Instead of opening up all interfaces to all teams, we open up
the design side to extreme collaboration while restricting operational
access at the service layer. This means that any two engineers in the
company can get together to share ideas and source code. At the same
time, an attacker who gains admin privileges in one service cannot affect
another service operating on the same host.
Although it might sound counterintuitive, this actually promotes more

collaboration among teams. If you are the on-call DevOps engineer for a
service and are diagnosing a failure, you must be able to work seamlessly
with other teams to get a complete understanding of the problem.
Transactions cross multiple boundaries in the cloud, and failures often
emerge from multiple small errors. For this reason, the Microsoft incident
response procedures are tuned to encourage cross-team investigative
work. Teams that swarm on an issue tend to build more resilient interfaces
between those services, improving the overall security and reliability of
Azure.
Jim Molini
Senior Program Manager, C+E Security
AZURE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

As described earlier in this chapter, cloud security is a
shared responsibility, and Azure is no different in this
regard. However, Azure was built from a security
foundation that uses the Security Development
Lifecycle (SDL) principles from the ground up. The
Azure platform includes many built-in capabilities
that enhance the overall protection of your assets
located in Azure.
The Azure infrastructure uses a defense-in-depth
approach by implementing security controls in different
layers, which expands from physical security, data
security, identity and access management, and
application security. Figure 1-4 illustrates some of the
core architecture components of Azure.
FIGURE 1-4 Core Azure components that have
security capabilities built in
The first security control in place is to verify the user’s

identity by checking the subscription level. The
subscription owner or account administrator is the
person who signed up for the Azure subscription. This
person is authorized to access the account center and
perform all management tasks available. In a new
subscription, the account administrator is also the
service administrator, and this administrator inherits
rights to manage the Azure portal. Customers should be
very cautious regarding who has access to this account.
Important
Important
Azure administrators should use Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
provided by Azure to delegate appropriate permission to users. Read
more about RBAC at azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/role-
based-access-control-configure.
After the user is authenticated according to her level

of authorization, she can manage her resources by using
the Azure portal. This is a unified hub that simplifies
building, deploying, and managing your cloud resources.
The Azure portal also calculates the existing charges and
forecasts customers’ monthly charges.
A subscription can include zero or more cloud
services and zero or more storage accounts. From the
Azure portal, you can provision new cloud services, such
as a new virtual machine (VM). These VMs use resources
allocated from compute and storage components in
Azure.
These VMs can work within the Azure infrastructure
or they can be publicly available from the Internet. You
can secure publish resources available in your VM, such
as a web server, and harden the access to this resource by
using access control lists (ACLs). You can isolate VMs in
the cloud by creating different virtual networks and
control traffic between virtual networks by using
Network Security Groups (NSGs).
More
More Info
Info
For more information about Azure Active Directory, see Chapter 2,
“Identity protection in Azure.” For more information about Network Security
Groups, see Chapter 3, “Azure network security.”
Going deeper into the Azure layers, you have the
Azure fabric. Microsoft is responsible for managing this
fabric and securing its resources. This fabric manages
compute and storage, allocating resources and ensuring
that it can recover in case of a hardware failure. In this
level, redundancy and fault tolerance are primordial to
deliver the service according to the service level
agreement (SLA).
AZURE DESIGN PRINCIPLES

Azure was fundamentally designed to provide
confidentiality, integrity, and availability for the
customer’s assets located in Azure. These principles
are included in different areas of Azure, including
operations security. When working with your cloud
service provider, you must understand how these
principles are used to secure your data.
These principles are important for customers
migrating to the cloud. Table 1-1 provides a summary of
the rationale behind each principle and the security
controls provided by Azure to enforce them.
TABLE 1-1 Design principles, rationales, and

security controls
Chapter 2. Identity protection in
Azure
1
According to the Verizon 2015 data breach investigation
report, 95 percent of the incidents involved some sort of
credential theft from customers’ devices. This number
shows that it is imperative that any organization that
wants to increase its level of security must have a good
identity protection strategy in place. The same report
shows that in August 2015, 1.2 billion credentials were
compromised, which was linked to one of the biggest
data breaches in 2015.
1
Go to www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2015 to download this
report.
Credentials exist on-premises and in the cloud, but

they are taken from anywhere by using any device. In
this chapter, you learn how to use Microsoft Azure Active
Directory (Azure AD) to consolidate your identity
management, and how to use Azure AD security
capabilities to enhance your overall security strategy for
identity protection.
AUTHENTICATION AND
AUTHORIZATION
The authentication and authorization process in
Azure AD is similar to the process used in your Active
Directory Domain Services (AD DS) on-premises.
Whereas the authentication goal is to establish and
validate a user’s digital identity, the authorization
goal is to control when and how access is granted to
authenticated users.
Because you can use different scenarios to take
advantage of AD DS for authentication and
authorization, the same applies for Azure AD. Some of
the key scenarios are:
Web browser to web application
Single-page application (SPA)
Native application to web API
Web app to web API
Daemon or server app to web API
To illustrate the most basic authentication method in
Azure AD, you can use a web app (the first scenario in
the preceding list) as an example and describe the four
major steps that are involved in this authentication:
1. A user is using his device to access an app that
uses Azure AD as an authentication and
authorization repository.
2. The user enters his credentials to sign in to the
page. This page uses the Azure AD Authentication
Library (ADAL).
3. Assuming that the authentication was successful,
Azure AD creates an authentication token and
returns a sign-in response to the application. This
response is based on the Reply URL that was
previously configured in the Azure portal.
4. At this point, that app validates the token. To do
that, the app uses a public signing key and issuer
information available at the federation metadata
document for Azure AD. After the application
validates the token, Azure AD starts a new session
with the user. Although the app developer can
control the user’s session expiration, by default,
the user’s session expires when the lifetime of the
token issued by Azure AD expires.
More
More Info
Info
For more information about the libraries included in ADAL, go to

https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/documentation/articles/active-directory-
authentication-libraries.
Azure AD supports several of the most widely used

authentication and authorization protocols, including:
Token and claim types
Federation metadata
OAuth 2.0
OpenID Connect 1.0
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
WS-Federation 1.2
Although a strong authentication method is necessary
to strengthen your identity protection, ensuring that
users are able to access only what they need is a
mandatory step. Using an app that supports OAuth 2.0
as an example, the authorization process takes place
when Azure AD releases an authorization code to the
app. This app presents this authorization code to an
authorization server, and the authorization server
returns an access token that gives the application
permission to access the resource.
More
More Info
Info
For more Azure AD authorization information and code samples, go to

https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/azure/dn645542.aspx.
Azure hierarchy
To better understand how to manage resources and
how to use Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) in
Azure, it is important to understand the hierarchy and
inheritance in Azure. The basic principle is: access
that you grant at parent scope is inherited at child
scope. Figure 2-1 provides an illustration of how this
hierarchy works in Azure.
FIGURE 2-1 Azure hierarchy
In Figure 2-1, you can see that one Azure subscription
can be linked with only one Azure AD directory. This
hierarchy also shows that each resource group belongs to
only one Azure subscription, and although one resource
group can have multiple resources, one resource can be
bound to only one resource group. These concepts are
very important to understand, because, by default, Azure
has three basic roles that you can apply to all resource
types, and to properly authorize access to resources, you
must understand this model.
Role-Based Access Control

Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is one of the best
practices emphasized in the Security Guidance for
Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing V3.0 by
2
Cloud Security Alliance . Most cloud service providers
use some sort of RBAC model to administer their
resources. Azure helps customers manage their own
resources by using RBAC. Some of the key roles
available are:
Owner The user added to this role has full access
to all resources, which includes the right to
delegate access to others.
Contributor The user added to this role is able
to create and manage all types of Azure resources;
however, the user isn’t able to grant access to
others.
Reader The user added to this role is able only to
view existing Azure resources.
2
You can download this document from
https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/guidance/c
saguide.v3.0.pdf.
More
More Info
Info
For a complete list of built-in Azure roles, go to

https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/role-based-access-
built-in-roles. To learn more about how to create custom roles, go to
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/role-based-access-
control-custom-roles.
Complete the following steps to add a user to a
specific role in a resource group by using the Azure
portal:
1. Open the Azure portal and sign in with a user
account that has owner privileges.
2. In the left navigation bar, select Resource Groups.
3. On the Resource Groups blade, select the
resource group that you want to manage, as
shown in Figure 2-2.
FIGURE 2-2 Available Azure resource groups
4. When a new blade with the resource group’s

name opens, select the Access button in the right
corner, as shown in Figure 2-3.
FIGURE 2-3 Resource group options
The Users blade opens, as shown in Figure 2-4.
FIGURE 2-4 User role management options
5. At this point, you can manage the available roles

by selecting Roles, or you can assign a role to a
user. For the purpose of this example, select Add
to assign a role to an existing user. On the Add
Access blade, select Select A Role, and then select
Reader, as shown in Figure 2-5.
FIGURE 2-5 Selecting a role for an existing user
6. When you select the role, the Select A Role blade

automatically closes and you are redirected to the
next step on the Add Access blade. Enter the
user’s name in the search field. When you find the
name, select it and then select Select at the
bottom of the Add Users blade. Select OK at the
bottom of the Add Access blade to close this
blade.
The user that you added to this role now appears
on the Users blade and the access type is
Assigned, as shown in Figure 2-6.
FIGURE 2-6 The Users blade showing the user that
was added to the existing role
Although the Azure portal provides this

comprehensive approach to manage users and groups,
for automation purposes, it is recommended that you use
PowerShell to assign roles to users. The following
example shows the New-AzureRmRoleAssignment
syntax that can be used to assign a role to a user.
Click here to view code image
New-AzureRmRoleAssignment -SignInName <email of user>

quotes> -ResourceGroupName <resource group name>
More
More Info
Info
For more information about how to use PowerShell to assign roles to
users, go to https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/documentation/articles/role-
based-access-control-manage-access-powershell.
ON-PREMISES INTEGRATION
One critical step to enhance the overall identity
protection is to ensure that users don’t need to be
exposed to multiple directories and multiple
passwords when they need to access the same
resource. Consolidating the authentication experience
to allow users to use their credentials to access
different cloud apps at the same time as they access
on-premises resources is the ideal scenario for
identity management.
Azure AD can be integrated with your AD DS located
on-premises. Basically, you have two major options for
integration. How you perform this integration depends
directly on your business needs. The available options
are:
Directory synchronization with Azure AD
Connect This enables single identity with the
same sign-on experience and password hash
synchronization.
Azure AD and on-premises Active
Directory using federation with Active
Directory Federation Services (AD FS) This
enables single federated identity with single sign-
on (SSO).
More
More Info
Info
For more information about design choices that are directly related to your
business requirements, go to aka.ms/azhidcg to read the Azure Hybrid
Identity Design Considerations Guide.
Azure AD Connect
Azure AD Connect is the preferred option for most
scenarios. When you use Azure AD Connect, the users
are either created or joined with existing Azure AD
accounts. The user’s password hash is synchronized
from the on-premises AD DS to Azure AD in the
cloud. This process is called password hash sync.
Azure AD Connect has two scheduler processes that
are responsible for synchronizing passwords and general
objects and attributes. By default, the scheduler runs
every 30 minutes. You can obtain more information
about your own schedule by using the PowerShell
command Get-ADSyncScheduler.
Important
Important
At the time this chapter was written in May 2016, the AD Connect version
was 1.1.180.0. Be sure to look for new capabilities and the latest version
at https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/active-directory-
aadconnect-version-history.
Another built-in security capability in Azure AD

Connect is the capability of preventing accidental
deletion during synchronization. This capability is
enabled by default. The main intent is to avoid
synchronizing export operations that have more than
500 deleted records. For example, if an administrator
accidentally deletes an entire organizational unit (OU)
that has more than 500 accounts, Azure AD Connect will
not synchronize these deletions. The administrator
receives an email informing her that a completed
operation exceeded the configured deletion threshold
value. If your organization has a stricter security policy
and wants to reduce this value, you can use the
PowerShell command Enable-
ADSyncExportDeletionThreshold.
Azure AD Connect implementation

Complete the following steps to configure Azure AD
Connect to synchronize with your on-premises AD
DS:
1. Using an account that has administrative
privileges, log on to the computer on which you
want to install Azure AD Connect.
2. Download the latest version of Azure AD Connect
from go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=615771.
3. After the download finishes, double-click the file
AzureADConnect.msi. The installation process
completes quickly.
4. If User Account Control asks for authorization to
run the .msi file, select Yes. After the installation
finishes, the Welcome To Azure AD Connect page
appears. Read the license terms, select I Agree To
The License Terms And Privacy Notice, as shown
in Figure 2-7, and then select Continue.
FIGURE 2-7 Azure AD Connect welcome screen

5. On the Express Settings page, select Use Express
Settings.
6. On the Connect To Azure AD page (see Figure 2-
8), enter your Azure AD credentials. In this case,
the user must be a global admin for this process
to work. If you use credentials that are not for a
member of this group, the installation will fail
with an Access Denied error.
FIGURE 2-8 Credentials to connect to Azure AD
7. After you enter the correct credentials, select

Next.
8. On the Connect To AD DS page (see Figure 2-9),
enter the on-premises domain credential
(DOMAIN\User name). The user needs to have
enterprise admin privileges.
FIGURE 2-9 On-premises AD DS credentials
9. After you finish entering the credentials, select

Next.
10. On the Ready To Configure page, select Install.
Important
Important
If you want to perform additional configuration, such as filtering, be sure to
clear the Start The Synchronization Process As Soon As Configuration
Completes check box. If you clear this check box, the wizard configures
sync but leaves the scheduler disabled. In this case, it will not run unless
you run the installation wizard again.
11. When the installation finishes, select Exit.

After the synchronization completes, you can validate
the synchronization by opening Azure AD, selecting the
directory that was synchronized, selecting the Users tab,
and verifying that the accounts from your on-premises
AD DS synchronized. Notice that the Source From
column differentiates between Azure AD and Local
Active Directory, as shown in Figure 2-10.
FIGURE 2-10 Source location of the user account
After you install Azure AD Connect, the sync process

takes places under a service account created by the
installation wizard. This account holds the encryption
keys to the database that is used by synchronization. The
password for this service account is set to never expire;
this behavior should not be changed.
Federation
Although Azure AD Connect is the preferred option to
synchronize your on-premises directory with Azure
AD, when you have an environment that has multiple
domains, federation becomes the most appropriate
choice. Other design decisions that might lead you to
choose Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS)
are as follows:
Your organization already has an AD FS
infrastructure in place and wants to keep control
on-premises.
The organization’s security policy prohibits
password hash synchronization.
Your organization requires SSO from domain-
joined machines.
Your organization requires conditional access for
on-premises and cloud resources.
You need to preserve the use of soft account
lockout and work hours policies that were
configured in your on-premises AD DS.
To implement federation, you need an on-premises
3
federation such as AD FS or another supported solution .
Assuming you have the required infrastructure in place,
you will also use Azure AD Connect to perform the
configuration.
3
To find a list of supported solutions, go to
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/active-
directory-aadconnect-federation-compatibility.
Important
Important
If your AD FS and Web Application Proxy servers are behind a firewall,
read the article at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/active-directory-
aadconnect-ports to understand which ports should be open.
AD FS implementation
Complete the following steps to configure AD FS
synchronization via the Azure AD Connect tool to
synchronize with your on-premises AD DS:
1. Using an account that has administrative
privileges, log on to the computer on which you
want to install Azure AD Connect.
2. Download the latest version of Azure AD Connect
from go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=615771.
3. After the download finishes, double-click the file
AzureADConnect.msi. The installation process
completes quickly.
4. If User Account Control asks for authorization to
run the .msi file, select Yes. After the installation
finishes, the Welcome To Azure AD Connect page
appears. Read the license terms, select I Agree To
The License Terms And Privacy Notice, and then
select Continue.
5. On the Express Settings page, select Customize.
6. On the Install Required Components page, leave
the default selection, and select Install.
7. On the User Sign-in page, select Federation With
AD FS (see Figure 2-11), and then select Next.
FIGURE 2-11 Selecting federation with AD FS
Important
Important
Notice that in the lower part of this page, the Azure AD Connect
Installation Wizard tells you exactly what is required in order to deploy this
configuration. Make sure you comply with these requirements before you
move on.
8. On the Connect To Azure AD page, enter your

Azure AD credentials. The same account
requirements that were specified earlier are
applicable here. After entering your credentials,
select Next.
9. On the Connect Your Directories page (see Figure
2-12), select your forest from the list, enter your
AD DS domain credentials, and select Add
Directory. If there is no additional directory to
add, select Next to proceed.
FIGURE 2-12 Selecting the on-premises directory
that you want to federate
10. On the Uniquely Identifying Your Users page (see

Figure 2-13), you can define how users from your
AD DS forests are represented in Azure AD. For
this step, use the default option. If you need to
customize, the available options are:
Users are represented only once across
all directories Use this option if you want all
users to be created as individual objects in
Azure AD (default selection).
Mail attribute Use this option when your
contacts have been created by using GALSync.
ObjectSID and
msExchangeMasterAccountSID/
msRTCSIP-OriginatorSid Use this option if
you want to join an enabled user account in an
account forest with a disabled user account in
a Microsoft Exchange resource forest.
SAMAccountName and MailNickName
Use this option if you want to join attributes
where the sign-in ID for the user can be found.
A specific attribute Use this option if you
want to customize your own attribute.
Source anchor The source anchor attribute
is an immutable (cannot change) attribute that
will always be the same during the object’s
4
lifetime . If you choose this option, be sure to
use a unique attribute.
4
For more information regarding the immutable attribute, see
directory-aadconnect-design-concepts.
User principal name This attribute is used

by users when they sign in to Azure AD and
Microsoft Office 365.
FIGURE 2-13 Customizing how your users will be
identified
11. On the Filter Users And Devices page, leave

Synchronize All Users And Devices selected and
select Next.
12. On the Optional Features page, leave the default
selection and select Next.
13. On the AD FS Farm page (see Figure 2-14), select
Configure A New Windows Server 2012 R2 AD FS
Farm if you don’t have an AD FS infrastructure
on-premises or if your current infrastructure
doesn’t meet the requirements. If your current
infrastructure meets the requirements, select Use
An Existing Windows Server 2012 R2 AD FS
Farm. For this step, leave the first option selected
and select Browse to select the certificate (PFX
file).
FIGURE 2-14 Selecting the AD FS server
14. When the Certificate Password dialog box opens,

enter the certificate’s password, select OK, and
then select Next.
Important
Important
If the certificate you selected has multiple subject names or it is a wildcard

certificate, you can select the correct subject name from the Subject Name
list; in this case, you also need to specify the subject name prefix.
15. On the AD FS Server page, enter the fully

qualified domain name of the server that you
want to use as a federation server, select Add, and
then select Next to proceed. At this point, the
Azure AD Connect Wizard validates the server,
and if the user that you specified earlier is not a
local admin in this server, the wizard prompts you
for credentials.
16. On the Web Application Proxy Servers page,
enter the fully qualified domain name of your
Web Application Proxy Server, select Add, and
then select Next.
17. On the Proxy Trust Credentials page, enter the
credentials that the Web Application Proxy Server
will use to connect to the AD FS Server. This user
needs to be a local administrator on the AD FS
server. After entering the credentials, select Next.
18. On the AD FS Service Account page (see Figure 2-
15), specify the AD FS domain service account
that you will use to authenticate users and to look
up user information in Active Directory. You can
select Create A Group Managed Service Account if
you already have Windows Server 2012 domain
controllers in the domain that AD FS servers will
belong to. If you do not have Windows Server
2012 domain controllers in the domain, select Use
A Domain User Account.
FIGURE 2-15 Selecting the appropriated AD FS
service account according to your environment
19. After you make the selection based on your

environment, select Next.
20. On the Azure AD Domain page, in the list, select
the domain that you want to federate. This option
sets up the federation relationship between AD FS
and Azure AD. It configures AD FS to issue
security tokens to Azure AD and configures Azure
AD to trust the tokens from this specific AD FS
instance. After you finish selecting the domain,
select Next.
21. On the Ready To Configure page, leave Start The
Synchronization Process As Soon As The
Configuration Completes selected if you want to
perform this sync right away. You can also select
Enable Staging Mode if you want to set up a new
sync server in parallel with an existing server. For
this step, leave the default selection and select
Install.
22. On the Installation Complete page, review the
results, and then select Verify to force Azure AD
Connect to verify the DNS settings for you. After
you finish the verification, select Exit.
SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY IDENTIFICATION
In the cloud-first, mobile-first world, it is expected
that you will have users signing in from different
devices and from different locations. Another
important identity management principle is that you
should be able to monitor users’ signing behavior to
5
identify suspicious activities. Azure AD Premium
access and usage reports are based on machine
learning and help you to easily monitor and protect
access to your Azure Active Directory tenant
resources.
5
To get started with Azure AD Premium, go to
directory-get-started-premium.
Important
Important
For more information about the different Azure AD editions, go to

editions.
IT administrators can use these reports to view

information that will help them make the organization’s
resources more secure. The data collected and displayed
by Azure AD Premium reports can be used to better
determine where possible security risks might be present
so that they can be addressed and mitigated. As shown in
Figure 2-16, Azure AD Premium reports monitor user
access habits and usual behaviors; some reports use the
power and the worldwide presence of Azure AD with
billions of authentications every day and information
from the Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit.
FIGURE 2-16 Azure AD Premium reports
mechanism
By cross-checking and synthesizing this information,
Azure tries to identify infected devices or IPs that try to
infect others. This information is compared with the
access attempts to every organizations’ resources and
provides a view of all devices or IPs that were reported
infected in the past few weeks and are accessing
applications published via Azure AD.
To view the reports available for you to run, open the
Azure portal and go to the Reports tab of your Azure AD
directory. You should see a screen similar to Figure 2-17.
FIGURE 2-17 Azure AD premium reports
The report has four sections, and each section has
details about what type of information you can obtain.
The most relevant reports for incident response are
available in the Anomalous Activity section.
To run a report, select the report name in the list,
which takes you to a detailed page for that specific
report. In addition to viewing the report, you can
download a copy of it as a compressed, comma-separated
values (CSVs) format for offline viewing or backup
purposes.
By default, Azure AD retrieves information from the
last 30 days for reporting purposes. If no anomaly
appears in the report that you selected, you get a result
similar to what’s shown in Figure 2-18.
FIGURE 2-18 Sign Ins From Multiple Geographies

report result
IDENTITY PROTECTION
The beginning of this chapter emphasized how
important it is to keep your identity secure, mainly
because of the growing number of attacks targeting
users’ credentials. Azure AD Identity Protection uses
the Azure AD anomaly detection capabilities (shown
in the previous section) and triggers risk events that
can help you to identify suspicious activities. This
goes beyond the reporting capabilities, because it
helps you to see anomalies affecting an organization’s
identity in real time.
Important
Important
At the time this chapter was written, this feature was in public preview and
it was available only for users in the United States region.
The Identity Protection capability in Azure AD works

by calculating a user risk level for each user. You can use
it to configure risk-based policies to automatically
protect the identities of your organization. By using these
risk-based policies, in addition to other conditional
access controls provided by Azure Active Directory and
Enterprise Mobility Suite (EMS), you can automatically
block access or provide remediation actions, such as
password resets and Azure Multi-Factor Authentication
enforcement.
Complete the following steps to access Azure AD
Identity Protection. Keep in mind that these steps use
Azure AD Identity Protection Public Preview, which
requires installation via Marketplace:
1. Open the Azure portal, select Browse in the left
navigation pane, enter Marketplace, and when
it appears, select it.
2. In the search box, on the Everything blade, enter
Azure AD Identity Protection, and when it
appears, select it. When the Azure AD Identity
Protection blade appears, select Create.
3. Select the Azure AD directory that you want, to
enable Azure AD Identity Protection, and select
Create.
4. Open the Azure portal, select Browse in the left
navigation pane, and enter Azure AD Identity
Protection. The Azure AD Identity Protection
dashboard appears (see Figure 2-19). Note that
when you first add Azure AD Identity Protection,
the dashboard might not be populated with
information.
FIGURE 2-19 A partially populated dashboard
The sections that follow explore in more detail the

options available in each section of this dashboard.
Identity
Identity protection
protection with
with Azure
Azure AD
AD
Credential compromise is the single biggest risk to your infrastructure,
allowing unauthorized users to get access they can exploit for lateral
attacks and incremental escalation of privilege, eventually resulting in full
control of your resources. Azure Active Directory identity-driven security
capabilities, by using user behavioral analysis, advanced machine-
learning technologies, and the power of the Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit,
are helping protect the cloud identities of thousands of enterprises. By
gathering and analyzing signals from billions of authentications and
malicious attacks against every Microsoft online service all over the world,
enterprise and consumer, Azure Active Directory can effectively help
protect your business.
Azure Active Directory Identity Protection takes identity protection to the

next level by detecting attacks in real time, informing you of risks and
applying controls to keep your enterprise safe.
In detection, signal is everything. Microsoft is uniquely positioned as a

major consumer, enterprise identity, and email provider to see attacks in
varieties and volumes most others simply can’t. If unauthorized users get
their hands on a set of user name/password pairs—through breach of
another site, phishing, or malware—they will likely test those credentials
against the major mail-providing identity providers (IdPs) in hopes that the
credentials link to other websites, banks, file storage—anything they can
exploit for value. Every day, we analyze tens of terabytes of logs resulting
from 14 billion logon events.
This signal is combined with signals from services like Microsoft Exchange
Server, SharePoint, Skype, and OneDrive to further strengthen our
analysis. We also benefit from research from teams like the Digital Crimes
Unit and Microsoft Security Response Center, law enforcement,
academia, security researchers, and industry partners.
Finally, our attackers help us, because we detect more than 10,000
attacker-controlled IP addresses, and detect and block more than 10
million bogus logon attempts per day, resulting in 1.5 million newly
protected credential pairs every day. This results in world-class signal and
battle-tested algorithms that you can use to protect your identity
infrastructure.
Azure Active Directory Identity Protection uses all this data, analysis, and
experience to generate user and logon risk scores, then use these to
notify you of compromised users, risky logons, and configuration
vulnerabilities in your environment before they can be exploited by cyber
criminals. By providing a consolidated view into risks, remediation
recommendations, and in-line response options, we empower you to
better protect your organization. The service uses advanced machine
learning to detect suspicious activities based on signals including brute
force attacks, leaked credentials, sign-ins from unfamiliar locations, and
infected devices. This investment in real-time threat detection is what
helps us meet our goal of preventing attacks from being effective in the
first place.
The Azure AD Identity Protection signal can be configured to trigger Risk-

Based Conditional Access policies that automatically respond to threats by
blocking logons, issuing Azure Active Directory Multi-Factor Authentication
challenges, or if the evidence is strong enough, requiring the users to
change their credentials. For example, if our machine learning system
believes that a logon is coming from a new, anonymized, or bot-controlled
network location, Conditional Access auto-remediation can intercept the
request with an adaptive two-factor challenge. If our threat intelligence or
advanced machine-learning algorithms indicate that a user’s credentials
are compromised, policies can offer automatic remediation in the form of
blocking the account or, with Multi-Factor Authentication, requiring a user-
initiated password change.
Azure AD Identity Protection also helps you identify and remediate

configuration vulnerabilities, and integrates with Azure AD Privileged
Identity Management, Cloud App Discovery, and Multi-Factor
Authentication to improve your security posture.
Nasos Kladakis
Sr. Product Marketing Manager. Identity and Access Management
User risk policy

This is the first policy you should enable. The intent of
this policy is to remediate user risk by requiring users
to perform Multi-Factor Authentication and change
their passwords. To enforce that, Azure AD Identity
Protection verifies potential risk events, which are
events that were flagged as suspicious activity and
indicate that an identity might have been
compromised. The risks identified by Azure AD
Identity Protection are:
Leaked credentials.
Impossible travel to atypical locations.
Sign-ins from infected devices.
Sign-ins from anonymous IP addresses.
Sign-ins from IP addresses with suspicious
activity.
Signs in from unfamiliar locations.
Complete the following steps to enable this policy:
1. With the Azure AD Identity Protection dashboard
open, under User Risk Policy, verify that Not
Enabled is selected (see Figure 2-20).
FIGURE 2-20 Risk Policy that needs to be changed
The User Risk blade appears, as shown in Figure

2-21.
FIGURE 2-21 Options available for user risk policy
2. Under Set Scope, select Included to display the

Included blade. Select Add (plus sign), and then
add the users that you want to be monitored by
this policy. If you want to enable this policy for all
users, select On next to All Users.
3. After you finish adding the users, on the Included
blade, select Done.
4. The next option is the Risk Level For Password
Change. A user risk level is an indication (High,
Medium, or Low) of the likelihood that the user’s
identity has been compromised. Azure AD
Identity Protection calculates this based on the
user risk events that are associated with the user’s
identity. If your organization has a very strict
security policy, choose Medium, which forces the
user to enable Multi-Factor Authentication if the
risk is medium or higher. For the purpose of
completing this step, select Medium.
5. The next option is Risk Level For Blocking Sign-
In. The same rationale applies here regarding how
the calculation is performed; the difference is
that, in this case, if the user reaches this risk level,
he will not be able to sign in. For the purpose of
completing this step, select Medium.
6. Select On to enable this security policy.
7. At the top of the blade, select Save.
Now that the risk policy is enabled, it is important to
emphasize that risk events are either identified in real
time, or in post-processing after the risk event has
already taken place (offline). When this chapter was
written and this feature was in Public Preview, most risk
events were computed offline and showed up in Azure
AD Identity Protection within two to four hours. For
those evaluated in real time, they will show up in the
Azure AD Identity Protection dashboard within 5 to 10
minutes.
Sign-in risk policy
The intent of the sign-in risk policy is to detect the
likelihood that for a specific sign-in, someone else is
attempting to authenticate with the user’s identity.
The risk level previously explained is also applicable
for this policy, and it is evaluated at the time of a sign-
in. This policy is applicable for all browser traffic and
sign-ins; however, it is not applicable to applications
using older security protocols by disabling the WS-
Trust endpoint at the federated identity providers
(IdPs), such as AD FS.
To enable this policy, under Sign-in Risk Policy, select
Not Enabled, as shown in Figure 2-22, and follow the
same steps that were explained previously for user risk
policy.
FIGURE 2-22 Sign-in risk policy that needs to be

changed
When you enable this policy, keep in mind that

selecting High as your threshold reduces the number of
times a policy is triggered and minimizes the impact to
users. At the same time, it excludes Low and Medium
sign-ins flagged for risk from the policy, which might not
block an attacker from exploiting a compromised
identity. Keep the balance according to your
environment needs and organization-wide security
policy requirements.
Notification enabling
Now that both policies are configured, the next step is
to ensure that you receive notifications in case an
account is compromised. User-compromised alert
email is one type of email that is generated by Azure
AD Identity Protection; the other type is the weekly
digest email, which contains the following:
Users at risk
Suspicious activities
Detected vulnerabilities
Links to the related reports in Azure AD Identity
Protection
To enable email notification, select Settings in the
Azure AD Identity Protection dashboard. On the Settings
blade, select Notifications. Under Weekly Email Digest,
select On, as shown in Figure 2-23, and then select Save.
FIGURE 2-23 Enabling email notifications
Vulnerabilities
The vulnerabilities section of Azure AD Identity
Protection helps you to quickly identify potential
identity risks. Figure 2-24 shows an example of how
the Vulnerabilities tile looks after a vulnerability is
found.
FIGURE 2-24 Vulnerabilities tile showing the
number of occurrences and the risk level
This brief report shows the number of vulnerabilities

that were found (one in this case), the number of
occurrences for this particular vulnerability (three in this
case), and the type of vulnerability (missing Multi-Factor
Authentication). Selecting the vulnerability displays its
remediation, which in this case is to enable Multi-Factor
Authentication, as shown in Figure 2-25.
FIGURE 2-25 Remediation for this vulnerability
MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION
In the previous section of this book, you read that
Azure AD Identity Protection is capable of enforcing
Azure Multi-Factor Authentication via security
policies. This is an important step toward identity
protection. Ideally, all users are already using Multi-
Factor Authentication, because nowadays it is not
recommended to rely only on a user name and
password to verify a user’s authenticity.
With Multi-Factor Authentication, you force users to
provide something that they know (password or PIN),
something that they have (a phone, card, or hardware
token), and something that they are (fingerprint, retina
scan, or other biometric). Figure 2-26 illustrates the
Multi-Factor Authentication flow.
FIGURE 2-26 Azure Multi-Factor Authentication
flow
The illustration shows users using different devices to
sign in. The directory can be on-premises, in the cloud,
or both (hybrid). In a hybrid environment, you can use
your on-premises directory to perform the
authentication, for example, if you are using AD FS to
federate with Azure AD. You also have the option to use a
6
Multi-Factor Authentication server on-premises to keep
the Multi-Factor Authentication process on-premises.
6
To learn how to install and configure an on-premises Multi-Factor
Authentication server, go to
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/videos/multi-factor-
authentication-server.
There are many Multi-Factor Authentication options,

including Multi-Factor Authentication for Office 365,
Multi-Factor Authentication for Azure Administrators,
and Azure Multi-Factor Authentication.
This section of the book covers Azure Multi-Factor
Authentication, which has the richest set of capabilities
and provides additional configuration options via the
Azure Management portal, such as advanced reporting
and support for a range of on-premises and cloud apps.
This version of Azure Multi-Factor Authentication comes
as part of Azure Active Directory Premium.
More
More Info
Info
For design considerations regarding Azure Multi-Factor Authentication, go
to https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/active-directory-
hybrid-identity-design-considerations-multifactor-auth-requirements.
Azure Multi-Factor Authentication provides

additional security by requiring a second form of
authentication, and it supports a range of verification
options, which are as follows:
Phone call This method triggers a call to the
user’s phone and asks for a verification number.
This verification number is assigned by the user
during the Multi-Factor Authentication
registration process.
Text message Using this method, the user
receives a text message that has a six-digit
number that needs to be entered during the
authentication process.
Mobile app notification In this method, a
verification request is sent to a user’s phone,
asking her to complete the verification by
selecting Verify From The Mobile App.
Mobile app verification code For this
method, a verification code is sent to the mobile
app that is running on a user’s smartphone.
Before you implement Azure Multi-Factor
Authentication, you must understand what options are
available to obtain this capability. If your license is for
Azure AD Premium, Enterprise Mobility Suite, or
Enterprise Cloud Suite, you automatically get Azure
Multi-Factor Authentication. If you don’t have it, you can
purchase separate Azure Multi-Factor Authentication
licenses and assign them to your users.
You can have per user usage, which is a good option
for organizations that want to license a fixed number of
users, or you can have per authentication usage. This
method is ideal for a scenario in which an organization
has users who infrequently need authentication.
Azure Multi-Factor Authentication implementation

The Azure Multi-Factor Authentication
implementation covered in this section is the cloud-
based implementation. This implementation is
basically three primary steps (assuming that you
already have an Azure subscription). These steps are:
1. Create the Azure Multi-Factor Authentication
provider.
2. Enable Azure Multi-Factor Authentication for
your users.
3. Notify the users about Multi-Factor
Authentication.
Complete the following steps to enable Azure Multi-
Factor Authentication in the cloud for users:
1. Open the Azure portal, select Browse, and then
select Active Directory.
2. When you are redirected to the classic portal,
select Active Directory in the left navigation pane,
and then select Multi-Factor Auth Providers. If
you are doing this process for the first time, you
should see something similar to what’s shown in
Figure 2-27.
FIGURE 2-27 Creating a new Multi-Factor

Authentication provider
3. Select Create A New Multi-Factor Authentication

Provider. The options to create a new provider
appear at the bottom of the window, as shown in
Figure 2-28.
FIGURE 2-28 Selecting the options to create a new
provider
4. In the Name box, enter the name for this

provider. In the Usage Model list, select Per
Authentication or Per Enabled User. Notice the
warning that says that after you select this
method, you cannot change it.
5. In the Directory box, select the directory you want
to link this provider to.
6. Select Create to display a screen similar to what’s
FIGURE 2-29 Multi-Factor Authentication provider
successfully created
7. Go to the Directory tab, select the directory in

which you enabled the Multi-Factor
Authentication provider, the directory where you
want to enable Azure Multi-Factor
Authentication, and then go to the Users tab.
8. In the lower part of the window, select Manage
Multi-Factor Auth Status to display the Multi-
Factor Authentication page (see Figure 2-30).
FIGURE 2-30 Selecting users to enable Azure Multi-

Factor Authentication
9. The bottom part of this window might vary

because it will show the users that are in your
directory. Beside each user is a check box that you
can select to enable Azure Multi-Factor
Authentication for that particular user. You can
select the Display Name check box if you want to
enable it for all users. After you select the user,
under Quick Steps, select Enable.
10. When a dialog box opens, asking you to confirm
that you want to enable Azure Multi-Factor
Authentication for that user, select Enable Multi-
Factor Auth. In the Updates Successful dialog
box, select Close.
After you finish enabling Azure Multi-Factor
Authentication for the users, you should notify them
about this change. This notification usually is done via
email, and the following instructions should be included:
1. Sign in to the Office 365 Portal at
portal.microsoftonline.com.
2. Follow the instructions to set up your preferred
Multi-Factor Authentication method when
signing in to Office 365 by using a web browser.
3. Create one app password for each device.
4. Enter the same app password in all applicable
apps (such as Microsoft Outlook, Mail client,
Lync, Word, PowerPoint, Excel, and Dynamics
CRM) on that device.
5. Update your Office client applications or other
mobile applications to use an app password.
The email should also explain why the organization is
enforcing this policy and should include your support
service contact information.
Azure Multi-Factor Authentication option

configuration
After configuring Azure Multi-Factor Authentication,
you can customize some options. To access these
options, go back to the Manage Azure MFA option
and select Service Settings. Figure 2-31 shows the
available options.
FIGURE 2-31 Azure Multi-Factor Authentication
options
This window has four sections; each section has its

own set of customizable options. The default selection in
App Passwords is configured to allow users to create app
passwords to sign in. Although this option provides
greater flexibility, you should keep in mind that when
users can have multiple app passwords, the likelihood of
theft increases: the more apps that deal with passwords,
the greater the attack surface.
7
Also be careful with apps that cache passwords.
When used in on-premises scenarios, authentication
might fail because the app password is known outside of
the organizational ID.
7
For more options regarding app passwords, go to
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/multi-factor-
authentication-whats-next/#app-passwords.
In the second section of this window, you can

configure a list of trusted IPs. This is particularly useful if
you have some locations where you trust the source IP
and do not want to enforce Multi-Factor Authentication
for traffic coming from that location. In the third section,
you can configure the verification options, which are the
available validation options for the users. By default, all
options are selected, but you can customize it and leave
enabled only those that you want to implement in your
environment.
The last option provides the capability of
remembering Multi-Factor Authentication from trusted
devices. In this case, you can enforce the number of days
that this information is cached before it expires. After
you finish configuring these options, select Save.
Chapter 3. Azure network security
To understand Microsoft Azure network security, you

have to know all the pieces and parts that are included.
That means this chapter begins with a description and
definition of all the features and services related to Azure
networking that are relevant to security. For each
feature, the chapter describes what it is and provides
some examples to help you understand what the feature
does and why it’s good (or bad) at what it does. Some
capabilities in Azure networking don’t have a security
story to tell, so the chapter leaves out those capabilities.
After the groundwork is laid and you have a better
understanding of Azure networking, the chapter
discusses Azure security best practices. These best
practices are a compilation of things that you should do
regarding Azure network security if they are appropriate
to your deployment.
The chapter ends with a description of some useful
patterns that you might want to use as reference
implementation examples on which you can build your
own solutions.
The goal of this chapter is to help you understand the
“what’s” and “why’s,” because if you don’t understand
those, you’ll never get to the how’s; if you implement the
“how’s” without understanding the “what’s” and the
“why’s,” you’ll end up with the same “it sort of grew that
way” network that you might have on-premises today. (If
your network isn’t like that, consider yourself
exceptionally wise or lucky.)
To summarize, the chapter:
Discusses the components of Azure networking
from a security perspective.
Goes over a collection of Azure networking best
practices.
Describes some Azure network security patterns
that you might want to adopt for your own
deployments.
One more thing before you venture into the inner
workings of Azure networking: If you’ve been with Azure
for a while, you’re probably aware that Azure started
with the Azure Service Management (ASM) model for
managing resources. Even if you haven’t been around
Azure since the beginning, you’re probably aware of the
“old” and “new” portals (the “old” portal is now called
the “classic” portal and the new portal is called the
“Azure portal”). The classic portal uses the ASM model.
The new portal uses the resource management model
known as Azure Resource Management. This chapter
focuses only on the Azure Resource Management model
and the networking capabilities and behavior related to
this model. The reason for this is that the ASM model is
being phased out and there is no future in it, so it would
be best to migrate your ASM assets (if you have any) to
the new Azure Resource Management model.
More
More Info
Info
For more information about the differences between the ASM and Azure
Resource Management models, read the article “Azure Resource
Manager vs. classic deployment: Understand deployment models and the
state of your resources” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/resource-manager-
deployment-model.
ANATOMY OF AZURE NETWORKING

Azure networking has a lot of moving parts, and
figuring out what these different parts do can be
intimidating. The networking documentation on
Azure.com focuses on the names of the products, and
unfortunately these product names do not always
make it easy for you to intuit the functionality of the
product or feature. (Of course, this isn’t just an Azure
networking problem; you can go to any major cloud
service provider’s site and be assailed with the same
problem.)
For this reason, this section is broken down into
headings that focus on the capability you’re interested in.
For example, instead of providing the product name
“Azure ExpressRoute” (which is explained later in
detail), the heading for that networking capability is
“Cross-premises connectivity.” Because most people in
networking know what that is, you don’t need to try to
figure it out from a product name. This format should
help you understand what Azure has to offer in the
networking arena.
This section describes the following Azure networking
capabilities:
Routing tables
Remote access
Network logging
Reverse proxy

Before getting into the Microsoft Azure Virtual
Network itself, you should know that all servers that
you deploy in Azure are actually virtual machines
(VMs). This is important to understand, because some
people new to the cloud might think that a public
cloud service provider like Microsoft offers dedicated
hardware servers as a service.
With the understanding that you use VMs to host
servers in Azure, the question is, how do those VMs
connect to a network? The answer is that VMs connect to
an Azure Virtual Network.
Azure Virtual Networks are similar to virtual
networks that have virtualization platform solutions,
such as Microsoft Hyper-V or VMware. Hyper-V is used
in Azure, so you can take advantage of the Hyper-V
virtual switch for networking. You can think of the
Hyper-V virtual switch as representing a virtual network
interface that a VM’s virtual network interface connects
to.
One thing that might be different than what you use
on-premises is how Microsoft isolates one customer’s
network from another customer’s network. On-premises,
you might use different virtual switches to separate
different networks from each other, and that’s perfectly
reasonable. You can do that because you control the
entire network stack and the IP addressing scheme on
your network, in addition to the entire routing
infrastructure. In Azure, Microsoft can’t give each
customer that level of control because Microsoft needs to
reuse the same private IP address space among all the
different customers, and Microsoft can’t tell each
customer which segment of the private IP address space
to use for their VMs.
To get around this challenge, Microsoft takes
advantage of the Windows Server software-defined
networking stack—also known as “Hyper-V Network
Virtualization” (HNV). With HNV, Microsoft can isolate
each customer’s network from other customer networks
by encapsulating each customer’s network
communications within a generic routing encapsulation
(GRE) head that contains a field that is specifically for
the customer. This effectively isolates each customer’s
network from the others, even if different customers are
using the same IP address schemes on their Azure
Virtual Networks.
More
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Info
For more information about Hyper-V network virtualization, read the article
“Hyper-V Network Virtualization Overview” on TechNet at
https://technet.microsoft.com/library/jj134230(v=ws.11).aspx.
Azure Virtual Network provides you with the

following basic capabilities:
IP address scheme
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
server
Domain Name System (DNS) server
IP address scheme
Azure Virtual Networks require you to use private IP
addresses (RFC 1918) for VMs. The address ranges
are:
Class A: 10.0.0.0/24
Class B: 172.16.0.0/12
Class C: 192.168.1.0/24
You should create an Azure Virtual Network before
you create a VM, because all VMs need to be placed on
an Azure Virtual Network. Just like with on-premises
networking, you should carefully consider which IP
address scheme you want to use, especially if you think
you will connect your Azure Virtual Network to your on-
premises network. In that scenario, you should make
sure there is no overlap between the IP addresses you
use on-premises and those you want to use on an Azure
Virtual Network.
When you create an Azure Virtual Network, you’ll
typically choose a large block (or the entire Class A, B, or
C range in the preceding list). Then you’ll subnet that
range, just as you do on-premises.
From a security perspective, you should think about
how many subnets you need and how large to make
them, because you’ll want to create access controls
between them. Some organizations use subnets to define
security zones, and then create network access controls
between the subnets by using Network Security Groups
(which is explained later) or a virtual appliance.
Another type of addressing you should consider is
public addresses. When you create a VM, a public
address is assigned to that VM. Note that the public
address isn’t bound to the actual network interface
(although it might appear that way when you see the
description in the portal or read the documentation). The
public IP address is the address that external users or
devices can use to connect to the VM from over the
Internet.
Similar to the IP addresses that are actually bound to
the network interfaces on the VM itself (explained in the
next section), you can assign either a dynamic or static
public IP address to a VM.
Dynamic IP addresses on a public interface aren’t as
much of a problem as they might be on the internal
network—that is to say, on the Azure Virtual Network
itself. The reason for this is that DNS is used for Internet
name resolution, and few (if any) users or devices are
dependent on a static IP address to reach an Internet-
reachable resource.
However, there might be situations where you need to
use a static IP address on the Internet. For example, you
might have network security devices that have access
controls so that specific protocols or source IP addresses
are allowed access only to specific IP addresses in Azure.
When that is the case, you should take advantage of
static public IP addresses.
Other scenarios where static public IP addresses
might be used include the following:
You’ve deployed applications that require
communications to an IP address instead of a
DNS name.
You want to avoid having to remap DNS entries
for publicly accessible resources on an Azure
Virtual Network.
Applications deployed on Azure or other public or
private cloud networks need to use static
addresses to communicate with your services on
You use SSL certificates that are dependent on a
static IP address.
More
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Info
To learn more about Azure Virtual Networks, read the article “Virtual
Network Overview” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/virtual-networks-
overview.
DHCP servers
After you create an Azure Virtual Network and then
place a VM on the network, the VM needs to have an
IP address assigned to it to communicate with other
VMs on the Azure Virtual Network (in addition to
communicating to on-premises resources and even
the Internet).
You can assign two types of IP addresses to VMs:
Dynamic addresses
Static addresses
Both types of addresses are managed by an Azure
DHCP server.
Dynamic addresses are typically DHCP addresses that
are assigned and managed by the Azure DHCP server.
Like any other DHCP-assigned address, the VM’s
address is assigned from the pool of addresses defined by
the address space you chose for your Azure Virtual
Network.
In most cases, the address won’t change over time and
you can restart the VM and it will keep the same IP
address. However, there might be times when the VM
needs to be moved to another host in the Azure fabric,
and this might lead to the IP address changing. If you
have a server that requires a permanent IP address, then
do not use dynamic addressing for that VM.
For VMs that perform roles requiring a static IP
address, you can assign a static IP address to the VM.
Keep in mind that you do not configure the NIC within
the VM to use a static IP address. In fact, you should
never touch the NIC configuration settings within a VM.
All IP addressing information should be configured
within the Azure portal or by using PowerShell Remoting
in Azure.
Examples of VMs that might need dedicated
addresses include:
Domain controllers.
Anything that needs a static address to support
firewall rules you might configure on an Azure
Virtual Network appliance.
VMs that are referenced by hard-coded settings
requiring IP addresses.
DNS servers you deploy on an Azure Virtual
Network (discussed in the next section).
Keep in mind that you cannot bring your own DHCP
server. The VMs are automatically configured to use only
the DHCP server provided by Azure.
More
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For more information on IP addressing in Azure, read the article “IP
addresses in Azure” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/virtual-network-ip-
addresses-overview-arm.
DNS servers
You can use two primary methods for name
resolution on an Azure Virtual Network:
Azure DNS server
Your own DNS server
When you create an Azure Virtual Network, you get a
simple DNS server in the bargain, at no extra charge.
This simple DNS server service provides you with basic
name resolution for all VMs on the same Azure Virtual
Network. Name resolution does not extend outside of the
Azure Virtual Network.
The simple Azure Virtual Network DNS is not
configurable. You can’t create your own A records, SRV
records, or any other kind of record. If you need more
flexibility than simple name resolution, you should bring
your own DNS server.
You can install your own DNS server on an Azure
Virtual Network. The DNS server can be a Microsoft
standalone DNS server, an Active Directory–integrated
DNS server, or a non–Windows-based DNS server.
Unlike the situation with DHCP servers on an Azure
Virtual Network, you are encouraged to deploy your own
DNS servers if you need them.
The bring-your-own-device (BYOD) DNS server is
commonly used when you want to create a hybrid
network, where you connect your on-premises network
with your Azure Virtual Network. In this way, VMs are
able to resolve names of devices on your on-premises
network, and devices on your on-premises network are
able to resolve names of resources you’ve placed on an

Network access control is as important on Azure
Virtual Networks as it is on-premises. The principle of
least privilege applies on-premises and in the cloud.
One way you do enforce network access controls in
Azure is by taking advantage of Network Security
Groups (NSGs).
The name might be a little confusing. When you hear
“Network Security Group,” you might think it’s related to
a collection of network devices that are grouped in a way
that allows for common or centralized security
management. Or maybe you’d think such a group might
be a collection of VMs that belong to the same security
zone. Both of these assumptions would be wrong.
A Network Security Group is the equivalent of a
simple stateful packet filtering firewall or router. This is
similar to the type of firewalling that was done in the
1990s. That is not said to be negative about NSGs, but to
make it clear that some techniques of network access
control have survived the test of time.
The “Group” part of the NSG name refers to a group
of firewall rules that you configure for the NSG. This
group of rules defines allow and deny decisions that the
NSG uses to allow or deny traffic for a particular source
or destination.
NSGs use a 5-tuple to evaluate traffic:
Source and destination IP address
Source and destination port
Protocol: transmission control protocol (TCP) or
user datagram protocol (UDP)
This means you can control access between a single
VM and a group of VMs, or a single VM to another single
VM, or between entire subnets. Again, keep in mind that
this is simple stateful packet filtering, not full packet
inspection. There is no protocol validation or network
level intrusion detection system (IDS) or intrusion
prevention system (IPS) capability in a Network Security
Group.
An NSG comes with some built-in rules that you
should be aware of. These are:
Allow all traffic within a specific virtual
network All VMs on the same Azure Virtual
Network can communicate with each other.
Allow Azure load balancing inbound This
rule allows traffic from any source address to any
destination address for the Azure load balancer.
Deny all inbound This rule blocks all traffic
sourcing from the Internet that you haven’t
explicitly allowed.
Allow all traffic outbound to the Internet
This rule allows VMs to initiate connections to the
Internet. If you do not want these connections
initiated, you need to create a rule to block those
connections or enforce forced tunneling (which is
explained later).
More
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To learn more about Network Security Groups, read the article “What is a
Network Security Group (NSG)?” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/virtual-networks-nsg.
Routing tables
In the early days of Azure, some might have been a bit
confused by the rationale of allowing customers to
subnet their Azure Virtual Networks. The question
was “What’s the point of subnetting, if there’s no way
to exercise access controls or control routing between
the subnets?” At that time, it seemed that the Azure
Virtual Network, no matter how large the address
block you chose and how many subnets you defined,
was just a large flat network that defied the rules of
TCP/IP networking.
Of course, the reason for that was because no
documentation existed regarding what is known as
“default system routes.” When you create an Azure
Virtual Network and then define subnets within it, Azure
automatically creates a collection of system routes that
allows machines on the various subnets you’ve created to
communicate with each other. You don’t have to define
the routes, and the appropriate gateway addresses are
automatically assigned by the DHCP server–provided
addresses.
Default system routes allow Azure VMs to
communicate across a variety of scenarios, such as:
Communicating between subnets.
Communicating with devices on the Internet.
Communicating with VMs that are located on a
different Azure Virtual Network (when those
Azure Virtual Networks are connected to each
other over a site-to-site VPN running over the
Azure fabric).
Communicating with resources on your on-
premises network, either over a site-to-site VPN
or over a dedicated WAN link (these options are
explained later in the chapter).
That said, sometimes you might not want to use all of
the default routes. This might be the case in two
scenarios:
You have a virtual network security device on an
Azure Virtual Network and you want to pump all
traffic through that device. (Virtual network
security devices are explained later in the
chapter.)
You want to make sure that VMs on your Azure
Virtual Network cannot initiate outbound
connections to the Internet.
In the first scenario, you might have a virtual network
security device in place that all traffic must go through so
that it can be inspected. This might be a virtual IDS/IPS,
a virtual firewall, a web proxy, or a data leakage
protection device. Regardless of the specific function,
you need to make sure that all traffic goes through it.
In the second scenario, you should ensure that VMs
cannot initiate connections to the Internet. This is
different from allowing VMs to respond to inbound
requests from the Internet. (Of course, you have to
configure a Network Security Group to allow those
connections.) Also ensure that all outbound connections
to the Internet that are initiated by the VMs go back
through your on-premises network and out your on-
premises network security devices, such as firewalls or
web proxies.
The solution for both of these problems is to take
advantage of User Defined Routes. In Azure, you can use
User Defined Routes to control the entries in the routing
table and override the default settings.
For a virtual network security device, you configure
the Azure routing table to forward all outbound and
inbound connections through that device. When you
want to prevent VMs from initiating outbound
connections to the Internet, you configure forced
tunneling.
More
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Info
For more information about User Defined Routes, read the article “What
are User Defined Routes and IP Forwarding?” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/virtual-networks-udr-
overview. For more information about forced tunneling, read “Configure
forced tunneling using the Azure Resource Manager deployment model”
at https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/vpn-gateway-forced-
tunneling-rm.
Remote access (Azure gateway/point-to-site

VPN/RDP/Remote PowerShell/SSH)
One big difference between on-premises computing
and public cloud computing is that in public cloud
computing you don’t have the same level of access to
the VMs as you do on-premises. When you run your
own virtualization infrastructure, you can directly
access the VMs over the virtual machine bus (VMbus).
Access through the VMbus takes advantage of hooks
in the virtual platform to the VM so that you don’t
need to go over the virtual networking infrastructure.
This isn’t to say that accessing a virtual machine over
the VMbus is easy to achieve. There are strong access
controls over VMbus access, just as you would have for
any network-level access. The difference is that VMbus
access for on-premises (and cloud) virtualization
platforms is tightly controlled and limited to
administrators of the platform. Owners of the virtual
machines or the services that run on the virtual machines
typically aren’t allowed access over the VMbus—and if
they are, this level of access is often temporary and can
be revoked any time the virtualization administrators
decide it’s necessary.
When you have VMs on a cloud service provider’s
network, you’re no longer the administrator of the
virtualization platform. This means you no longer have
direct virtual machine access over the virtualization
platform’s VMbus. The end result is that to reach the
virtual machine for configuration and management, you
need to do it over a network connection.
In addition to needing to go over a network
connection, you should use a remote network
connection. This might be over the Internet or over a
dedicated WAN link. Cross-premises connectivity
options (so-called “hybrid network connections”) are
explained in the next topic. This section focuses on
remote access connections that you use over the Internet
for the express purpose of managing VMs and the
services running on the VMs.
Your options are:
Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)
Secure Shell Protocol (SSH)
Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP)–based
point-to-site VPN
Each of these methods of remote access depends on
the Azure Virtual Network Gateway. This gateway can be
considered the primary ingress point from the Internet
into your Azure Virtual Network.
Remote Desktop Protocol
One of the easiest ways to gain remote access to a VM
on an Azure Virtual Network is to use the Remote
Desktop Protocol (RDP). RDP allows you to access the
desktop interface of a VM on an Azure Virtual
Network in the same way it does on any on-premises
network. It is simple to create a Network Security
Group rule that allows inbound access from the
Internet to a VM by using RDP.
What’s important to be aware of is that when you
allow RDP to access a VM from over the Internet, you’re
allowing direct connections to an individual VM. No
authentication gateways or proxies are in the path—you
connect to a VM.
Like all simple things, using RDP might not be the
best option for secure remote access to VMs. The reason
for this is that RDP ports are often found to be under
constant attack. Attackers typically try to use brute force
to get credentials in an attempt to log onto VMs on Azure
Virtual Networks. Although brute-force attacks can be
slowed down and mitigated by complex user names and
passwords, in many cases, VMs that are not
compromised are considered temporary VMs and
therefore do not have complex user names and
passwords.
You might think that if these are temporary VMs, no
loss or risk is involved with them being compromised.
The problem with this is that sometimes customers put
these temporary VMs on Azure Virtual Networks that
have development VMs, or even production VMs, on
them. Compromising these temporary VMs provides an
attacker with an initial foothold into your deployment
from which they can expand their breach. You don’t want
that to happen.
RDP is easy, and if you’re sure that you’re just testing
the services and the VMs in the service, and you have no
plans to do anything significant with them, then this
scenario is reasonable. As you move from pure testing
into something more serious, you should look at other
ways to reach your VMs over the Internet. Other
methods are described later in this chapter.
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For more information about more secure remote access that uses RDP
and other protocols, read the article “Securing Remote Access to Azure
Virtual Machines over the Internet” at
https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/azuresecurity/2015/09/08/securing-
remote-access-to-azure-virtual-machines-over-the-internet.
Secure Shell Protocol

Remote Desktop Protocol and the Secure Shell
Protocol (SSH) are similar in the following ways:
Both can be used to access both Windows and
Linux VMs that are placed on an Azure Virtual
Network.
Both provide for direct connectivity to individual
VMs.
User names and passwords can be accessed by
brute force.
As with RDP, you should avoid brute-force attacks.
Therefore, as a best practice, you should limit direct
access to VMs by using SSH over the Internet. An
explanation of how you can use SSH more securely is
provided in the next section.
More
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Info
For more information about how to use SSH for remote management of
VMs located on an Azure Virtual Network, read the article “How to Use
SSH with Linux and Mac on Azure” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/virtual-machines-linux-
ssh-from-linux.
SSTP-based point-to-site VPN
Although “point-to-site” VPN in relation to Azure
might sound like a new VPN-type technology (sort of
like how so-called “SSL-VPN” is not really a VPN in
many cases), it’s not new. Rather, it’s a new name
applied to traditional remote access VPN client/server
connections, which has been around a long time.
What makes point-to-site VPN special is the VPN
protocol that’s used, which is the Secure Socket
Tunneling Protocol (SSTP).
The SSTP VPN protocol is interesting because, unlike
other methods of remote access VPN client/server
connections (such as IPsec, LTP/IPsec, or PPTP), the
SSTP protocol tunnels communications over the Internet
by using a TLS-encrypted HTTP header. What this
means in practice is that SSTP can be used across
firewalls and web proxies. Some people might find it
funny to hear someone say that SSTP can be used to get
across “restrictive firewalls” because it uses TCP 443 to
connect to the VPN gateway server from your Azure
Virtual Network. It sounds funny because, among
network security and firewall experts, TCP port 443 is
known as the “universal firewall port.” That is to say, if
you allow outbound TCP 443, you allow just about
everything.
For those of you who are not networking experts, you
should understand what a remote access VPN
client/server connection is and how it works (from a high
level).
When you establish a VPN connection, what you’re
doing is creating a virtual “link layer” connection. (Think
of an Ethernet cable connection as a link-layer
connection.) The amazing thing about VPN is that this
link-layer connection actually happens over the Internet
and you can use it to establish that connection with a
VPN server. In the case of Azure, you’re establishing that
connection between your laptop and the Azure gateway.
The link-layer connection is like a virtual cable
(referred to in this book as a “tunnel”) and you can pass
just about any kind of network traffic through that
tunnel. This is useful because the tunnel is encrypted, so
no one can see inside the tunnel because the traffic
inside the tunnel moves over the Internet.
After the VPN connection is established between your
laptop and the Azure VPN gateway, your laptop isn’t
connected to a specific Azure VM. Instead, your laptop is
connected to an entire Azure Virtual Network, and with
this connection, you can reach all the VMs on that Azure
Virtual Network. This helps you make RDP and SSH
connections more secure. But how does it do that?
The key here is that in order to establish the point-to-
site VPN connection, you have to authenticate with the
VPN gateway. The Azure VPN gateway and VPN client
both use certificates to authenticate with each other.
Certificate authentication isn’t susceptible to brute-force
attacks like direct RDP or SSH connections over the
Internet can be. This is a nice security advantage.
The big advantage comes from the fact that you can
run RDP or SSH traffic inside the SSTP VPN tunnel.
After you establish the point-to-site VPN connection, you
can start your RDP or SSH client application on your
laptop and connect to the IP address of the VM on the
Azure Virtual Network that you’re connected to. Of
course, you have to authenticate again to access the VM.
This means that you can block direct inbound access
for the RDP and SSH protocols to VMs on your Azure
Virtual Network over the Internet and still reach them by
using those protocols after you establish the VPN
connection. This entire process is secure because you
have to authenticate the VPN connection first, and then
authenticate again with the RDP or SSH protocols.
More
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To learn more about point-to-site connectivity between individual
computers such as laptops and tablets, read the article “Configure a Point-
to-Site VPN connection to a VNet using the classic portal” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/vpn-gateway-point-to-
site-create.
The previous section explained how you can connect a
single device like a laptop or tablet to an Azure Virtual
Network to gain network access to all the VMs
connected to that Azure Virtual Network. This section
explains how you can connect an entire network to an
This introduces the topic of what is known as “cross-
premises connectivity.” Probably a better term would be
“across sites” connectivity, but that doesn’t sound as
fancy. Regardless, what this term means is connectivity
between two sites. The first site is usually your on-
premises network (which is a network that your
organization owns and controls) and an Azure Virtual
Network. When cross-premises connectivity is enabled,
you can pass traffic between the on-premises network
and your Azure Virtual Network.
You can do this in two ways with Azure:
Site-to-site VPN
Dedicated WAN link
Site-to-site VPN
Site-to-site VPN is similar to the point-to-site VPN
described earlier. Recall that with a point-to-site VPN,
you can connect a single device (at a time) to an Azure
Virtual Network. To be clear, that doesn’t mean that
when you use a point-to-site VPN you can only
connect a single device at a time, which would block
all other connections to the Azure Virtual Network.
What it means is that when you use a point-to-site
VPN, only that device is connected to the Azure
Virtual Network. Other devices can connect to the
same Azure Virtual Network by using a point-to-site
VPN at the same time.
In contrast to a point-to-site VPN, with a site-to-site
VPN, you can connect an entire network to an Azure
Virtual Network. Site-to-site VPNs are sometimes called
“gateway-to-gateway” VPNs because each end of the
connection is a VPN gateway device.
VPN gateways are like routers. On a non-VPN
network, a router is used to route packets to different
subnets on your on-premises network. The routed
connections go over Ethernet or wireless connections. A
VPN gateway acts as a router too, but in the case of the
VPN gateway, connections routed over the VPN gateway
are not routed from one subnet to another subnet on
your on-premises network. Instead, they are routed from
your on-premises network to another network over the
Internet by using a VPN tunnel. Of course, the remote
network can also route packets back to your on-premises
network.
When you use a site-to-site VPN with an Azure Virtual
Network, you route packets to and from the Azure
Virtual Network and your on-premises networks. You
must have a VPN gateway on your on-premises network
that works with the VPN gateway used by Azure. Most
industry standard on-premises VPN gateways work with
the Azure VPN gateway. Note that in contrast to the
point-to-site VPN connections that use SSTP, the site-to-
site VPN uses IPsec tunnel mode for the site-to-site VPN
connection.
Using site-to-site VPN connections has a couple of
downsides:
Connections to Azure top out at around 200
megabits per second (Mbps).
They, by definition, traverse the Internet, which
could be a security issue.
The first issue really isn’t a security problem, although
it’s related to performance and performance limitations,
which can bleed into availability, which could lead to
problems with the “A” in the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability (CIA) triad of security. If you exceed your
site-to-site VPN bandwidth and your users and devices
can’t get to what they need on your Azure Virtual
Network, then you have a compromise in availability,
and, hence, security issues. That is to say, you’ve
essentially created a denial-of-service (DOS) attack on
yourself because you chose a connectivity option that
doesn’t support your application and infrastructure
requirements.
The second issue is more of a classic security problem.
Any traffic that moves over the Internet will potentially
be exposed to “hacking,” “cracking,” redirection, and
other attempts to compromise the data. Although it is
true that the site-to-site VPN uses a more secure IPsec
tunnel that supports the latest cipher suites and modern
encryption technologies, there is always the chance that
if you have a dedicated attacker that wants your
information, he will find weaknesses and compromise
the data within the tunnel.
That said, if the attacker wants your data that much,
he can find easier ways to get to it than to try and
compromise your site-to-site VPN connection. But the
possibility should be mentioned because the topic of this
chapter and book is network security.
For environments that need the highest level of
security and performance, you should review the option
discussed in the next section, a dedicated WAN link.
More
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For more information about site-to-site VPN connectivity to Azure, read
the article “Create a virtual network with a Site-to-Site VPN connection
using the Azure classic portal” at https://azure.microsoft.com/en-
us/documentation/articles/vpn-gateway-site-to-site-create.
Dedicated WAN link

A dedicated WAN link is a permanent connection
between your on-premises network and another
network. With Azure Virtual Network, a dedicated
WAN link provides a permanent connection between
your on-premises network and an Azure Virtual
Network. These dedicated WAN links are provided by
telco providers and do not traverse the Internet.
These connections are private, physical connections
between your network and an Azure Virtual Network.
Microsoft provides you with the option to create a
dedicated WAN link between your on-premises network
and Azure Virtual Network by using ExpressRoute. (The
name might change over time, so be sure to check the
Azure Security Team blog on a regular basis.)
ExpressRoute provides you with:
Up to 10 gigabits per second (Gbps) of
connectivity between your on-premises network
and an Azure Virtual Network.
A dedicated, private connection that does not
traverse the Internet.
A service-level agreement (SLA) that guarantees
uptime and performance.
As you can see, the level of performance you get with
an ExpressRoute dedicated WAN link far exceeds what
you get from a site-to-site VPN. That 10 Gbps is 50 times
the maximum speed available with any site-to-site VPN
you can establish to an Azure Virtual Network.
The security advantage is clear: the connection
doesn’t traverse the Internet and therefore isn’t exposed
to all the potential risks that are inherent in an Internet
connection. Sure, someone might be able to gain access
to the telco, but the odds of that happening are much
lower than the security risks that you’re exposed to on
the Internet.
The SLAs are important. With a site-to-site VPN,
you’re depending on the Internet. The Internet doesn’t
have SLAs, and you get the best possible effort from all
the telco providers and the network they manage. Your
packets move over a number of networks and you hope
for the best, but in no way can anyone guarantee you
uptime or performance. That’s how the Internet-at-large
works.
With dedicated WAN links, the telco providers control
the entire network. From your premises or co-location,
the telco controls all traffic and performance across the
channel. They can identify where problems are and fix
them, and they can improve performance anywhere they
want in the path. That’s why dedicated WAN links are so
efficient and expensive.
Note that ExpressRoute provides two different types
of dedicated WAN links:
Multiprotocol line switching (MPLS) to your on-
premises network
Exchange Provider connectivity, where the
ExpressRoute connection terminates at a Telco
Exchange Provider location
The MPLS version of ExpressRoute tops out at
around 1 Gbps, whereas the Exchange Provider option
provides you with up to 10 Gbps.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about dedicated WAN links to Azure Virtual Networks, read
the article “ExpressRoute Technical Overview” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/expressroute-
introduction.
As explained earlier, the “A” in the CIA security triad
is availability. From a network perspective, you
should ensure that your services are always available
and that you take advantage of network availability
technologies. Azure has a few availability services that
you can take advantage of:
External load balancing
Internal load balancing
Global load balancing

To understand external load balancing, imagine that
you have a three-tier application: a web front end, an
application logic middle tier, and a database back end.
The web front-end servers accept incoming
connections from the Internet. Because the web front-
end servers are stateless servers (that is to say, no
information is stored on the servers that needs to
persist beyond sessions), you deploy several of them.
It doesn’t matter which of these your users connect to,
because they are all the same and they all forward
connections to the middle-tier application logic
servers.
To get the highest level of availability and
performance from the web front-end server, you should
ensure that all the incoming connections are equally
distributed to each of the web front ends. You should
avoid a situation where one server gets too much traffic.
This kind of situation decreases application performance
and possibly could make the application unavailable if
that server becomes unavailable. To solve this problem,
you can use external load balancing.
When you use external load balancing, incoming
Internet connections are distributed among your VMs.
For web front-end servers, external load balancing
ensures that connections from your users are evenly
distributed among those servers. This improves
performance because no VM is handling an excessive
load, and also improves uptime because if for some
reason one or more VMs fail, other VMs you’ve
configured the connections to be load balanced to are
able to accept the connections.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about external load balancing, read the article “Load
balancing for Azure infrastructure services” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/virtual-machines-linux-
load-balance.

External load balancing is used for incoming
connections from the Internet. If you refer back to the
example three-tier application discussed earlier, you
might want to load balance the other tiers in the
solution. The application logic tier and the database
tiers are different from the web front ends because
they are not Internet facing. These tiers do not allow
incoming connections to the Internet. In fact, it’s
likely that you’ll configure them so that these other
tiers are only allowed to communicate with VMs that
they must communicate with.
For example, the application logic tier needs to accept
incoming connections from the web front ends, and no
other service (for the time being, ignore the discussion
about management access). In this case, you configure a
Network Security Group so that the application logic tier
VMs can accept only incoming connections from the web
front-end servers.
Similarly, the database tier VMs do not need to accept
connections from the Internet or the web front ends;
they need to accept incoming connections from the
application logic VMs only. In this case, you configure a
Network Security Group in such a way as to allow only
incoming connections from an application logic tier.
That handles the connection security part of the
puzzle, but you still have the availability component to
deal with. The web front ends have external load
balancing to help them out with that. But what about the
application logic and database servers?
For these VMs, you should use internal load
balancing.
Internal load balancing works the same way as
external load balancing, with the difference being that
the source and destination VMs are internal; no source
or destination devices are on the Internet for internal
load balancing. The source and destination can all be on
Azure Virtual Networks, or on an Azure Virtual Network
and an on-premises network.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about internal load balancing, read the article “Internal Load
Balancer Overview” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/load-balancer-internal-
overview.

With cloud computing in Microsoft Azure, you can
massively scale your applications—so much so that
you can make applications available to almost
anybody in the world, and each user, regardless of
location, can have great performance and availability.
So far, you’ve read about external and internal load
balancing to improve availability. Although these
technologies are critical to ensuring that your
applications are always online, they suffer from the same
limitation: they work on a per-datacenter basis. That is
to say, you can only configure internal and external load
balancing among VMs located in the same datacenter.
At first you might think that’s not a big problem. The
Azure datacenters are large, they have a huge reserve
capacity, and if one or a thousand physical servers in the
Azure datacenter go down, you’ll still be up and running
because of the built-in redundancy in the Azure fabric.
Although that’s all true, you should consider what
might happen if an entire datacenter becomes
unavailable, or even an entire region. It’s possible that
the power might go out for a datacenter or an entire
region due to some kind of natural or unnatural event. If
your solutions are confirmed to a single datacenter or
region, you might suffer from outages.
If you want to better secure yourself against these
kinds of outages, you should design your applications to
take advantage of the scalability of the cloud. Azure
makes it possible for you to increase the scale by placing
components of your applications all over the world.
The trick is to make sure that your users can access
those applications. To do this, you should take advantage
of something known as a “global load balancer.” Global
load balancers take advantage of the Domain Name
System (DNS) to ensure that:
Users access your service by connecting to the
datacenter closest to that user. (For example, if a
user is in Australia, that user connects to the
Australian Azure datacenter and not one in North
America.)
Users access your service by connecting to the
closest alternate datacenter if the closest
datacenter is offline.
Users have the best experience with your service
by accessing the datacenter that is most
responsive, regardless of the location of that
datacenter.
Azure provides you with a global load balancer in the
form of Azure Traffic Manager. With Azure Traffic
Manager, you can:
Improve the availability and responsiveness of
your applications.
Perform maintenance tasks or upgrade your
applications and have them remain online and
available by having users connect to an alternate
location.
Distribute and load balance traffic for complex
applications that require specific load balancing
requirements.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about Traffic Manager and how you can take advantage of
all its global load balancing features, read the article “What is Traffic
Manager?” at https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/traffic-
manager-overview.
Network logging
It’s standard practice to access network information
from the network itself. You can do this in many ways,
but typically enterprise organizations include some
kind of network intrusion detection system (NIDS)
inline so that all network traffic can be monitored. It’s
a matter of opinion regarding how valuable such
devices are, given the large number of never-seen
alerts that are generated, and if seen, that are never
addressed.
Regardless, there is some value in having visibility at
the network level. For that reason, many customers are
interested in how they can get the same or similar level
of visibility into network traffic on their Azure Virtual
Network.
At the time this chapter was written, you can’t get the
same level of visibility into network traffic that you can
get on-premises. Many of the on-premises devices work
at the Link layer (OSI layer 2), which is not available on
Azure Virtual Networks. The reason for this is that Azure
Virtual Networks make use of software-defined
networking and network virtualization, so the lowest
level of traffic analysis you can get is at the Network layer
(OSI layer 3).
It is possible to get network layer network
information if you want to push all traffic through a
virtual network security device. That is pretty easy to do
for traffic destined to and from a particular network
subnet, and the way you do it on an Azure Virtual
Network is the same as you would do it on-premises: you
ensure that the virtual network security device is in the
path to the destination subnet by configuring the routing
tables on your Azure Virtual Network. You do this by
configuring User Defined Routes, which were described
earlier in this chapter.
Although this is easy for inter-subnet
communications, it’s not easy if you want to see what’s
happening between two VMs on the same subnet on your
Azure Virtual Network. The reason for this is that you
can’t easily take advantage of an intermediary virtual
network security device between subnets, because the
two VMs that are communicating with each other are on
the same subnet. That doesn’t mean it can’t be done. You
can install a VM on each subnet that acts as a proxy (web
proxy and perhaps a SOCKS proxy). Then all
communications are sent to the proxy, and the proxy
forwards the connections to the destination host on the
same subnet. As you can imagine, this can end up being
complex and unwieldy if you have even a few subnets.
At this time, you have the ability to get some network
information for traffic that moves through Network
Security Groups. In particular, you can:
Use Azure audit logs to get information about
connections made through a Network Security
Group.
View which Network Security Group rules are
applied to VMs and instance roles based on the
MAC address.
View how many times each Network Security
Group rule was applied to deny or allow traffic.
Although this is much less than you can do on-
premises, the situation will most likely change soon. In
fact, by the time you read this chapter, you might be able
to obtain network information and bring your level of
access much closer to what you have on-premises. Be
sure to check the Azure Security Blog on a regular basis,
where that information will be shared with you when it
becomes available.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about how you can obtain logging information from Network
Security Groups, read the article “Log Analytics for Network Security
Groups (NSGs)” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/virtual-network-nsg-
manage-log.

Although the Azure DNS service is not strictly a
security offering and it doesn’t necessarily connect to
any specific security scenario, you should be aware
that Azure has a DNS server.
You can configure DNS zones in Azure DNS.
However, Azure does not provide DNS registrar services,
so you’ll need to register your DNS domain name with a
commercial domain registrar.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about the Azure DNS service, read the article “Azure DNS
Overview” at https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/dns-
overview.

You’ve read about the option to use virtual network
security appliances in a number of places in this
chapter. A virtual network security appliance is a VM
that you can obtain from the Azure Marketplace and
is usually provided by an Azure partner. These VMs
are similar or the same as the network security device
VMs you might be using on-premises today. Most of
the major network security appliance vendors have
their offerings in the Azure Marketplace today, and
new ones are added daily. If you don’t find what you
want today, be sure to check tomorrow.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about what virtual network security devices are available in
the Azure Marketplace, on the Azure Marketplace home page
(https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/marketplace), enter security in the
search box. You can find Azure security partners at
https://azure.microsoft.com/marketplace/?term=security.
Reverse proxy
The final Azure Network component to cover before
moving on to the Azure network security best
practices section is that of a reverse proxy. If you are
relatively new to networking, or haven’t delved into
networking beyond what you needed to know, you
might not be familiar with the concept of proxy or
reverse proxy.
A proxy is a network device that accepts connections
for other devices and then recreates that connection to
forward the connection request and subsequent packets
to the destination. The proxy device, as the name
implies, acts on behalf of the computer that is sending
the request or the response. The proxy sits in the middle
of the communications channel and, because of that, can
do many security-related “things” that can help secure
your network and the devices within it.
The most popular type of proxy is the “web proxy.” A
web proxy accepts connections from a web proxy client
(typically a browser configured to use the IP address of
the web proxy as its web proxy). When the web proxy
receives the request, it can inspect the nature of the
request and then recreate the request on behalf of the
web proxy client. When the destination website
responds, the web proxy receives the response on behalf
of the web proxy client, and it can inspect the response.
After receiving the response, the web proxy client
forwards the response traffic back to the client that made
the original request.
Why are proxy devices useful in a security context?
Some of the things they can do include the following:
Require the requestor to authenticate before the
proxy accepts and forwards the connection
request.
Inspect the destination URL to determine
whether the destination is safe or dangerous; if
it’s dangerous, the proxy can block the
connection.
Look at request and response traffic to determine
whether there is dangerous payload, such as
viruses or other malware, and block the malware
from being delivered.
“Crack open” encrypted communications between
client and destination server (such as SSL
connections) so that malware, leaked data, and
other information that shouldn’t be crossing the
proxy boundary is stopped at the proxy. This type
of “SSL bridging” can significantly improve
security, because attackers often hide what they’re
trying to accomplish by encrypting
communications, which normally works because
most communications are not subject to SSL
bridging.
Proxy devices can do these things and a lot more. One
could write a book about just proxies. But this book and
chapter aren’t about proxies, so don’t dig deeper into
them than necessary.
The reason to bring up proxies in this chapter is that
Azure has a reverse proxy service that you can use to
proxy connections to your on-premises resources. The
reverse proxy service is called Azure Active Directory
Application Proxy. You won’t find this service in the list
of Azure Active Directory products on Azure.com, and
you won’t find it in the table of contents. However, you’ll
learn about it in this book.
Before going any further, it’s important that you
understand the difference between a “forward proxy”
and a “reverse proxy.” A forward proxy accepts
connections from clients on your on-premises network
and forwards those connections to servers on the
Internet (or on networks other than the one on which the
clients are making the requests). In contrast, a reverse
proxy is one that accepts connections from external
clients and forwards them to servers on your on-
premises network. For those of you with a lot of
experience in this area, you recognize that this is a bit of
an oversimplification, but it does describe in general the
differences between a forward and reverse proxy.
Traditional reverse proxy devices are typically placed
near the edge of your on-premises network. Servers such
as mail servers and collaboration servers (like Microsoft
Exchange and SharePoint) can be reached by Internet-
based clients through the reverse proxy server. Microsoft
used to have its own reverse proxy servers named
Internet Security and Acceleration Server (ISA Server)
and Threat Management Gateway (TMG). Both those
products were excellent but unfortunately were
discontinued.
With that said, maintaining on-premises proxy
servers can be a lot of work. If you don’t manage them
well, they can take down your services, which makes no
one happy. What if you could hand the management,
troubleshooting, and updating of your reverse proxy
server to someone else and avoid all that hassle?
That’s the core value of the public cloud, and the core
value of using the Azure Application Proxy server instead
of using an on-premises reverse proxy.
The Azure Application Proxy is already built into
Azure, and you configure it so that when client systems
want to request resources on your on-premises servers,
they actually make the request to the reverse proxy on
Azure. The Azure Application Proxy forwards those
requests back to your on-premises servers.
Like most reverse proxy solutions, they add a measure
of security. Here are some things you can do with the
Azure Application reverse proxy service:
Enable single sign-on for on-premises
applications.
Enforce conditional access, which helps you to
define whether or not a user can access the
application based on the user’s current location
(on or off the corporate network).
Authenticate users before their connections are
forwarded to the Azure Application Proxy.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about the Azure Application Proxy, read the article “Publish
applications using Azure AD Application Proxy” at
application-proxy-publish.
AZURE NETWORK SECURITY BEST

PRACTICES
At this point, you should have a good understanding
of what Azure has to offer in the network security
space. This chapter provided information about all
the major components of Azure networking that have
some kind of tie to security, and went over a number
of examples so that you have context for each of the
components. If you remember and understand
everything you’ve read so far, consider yourself in the
top 10 percent of the class when it comes to Azure
networking.
Although understanding the various aspects of Azure
networking is required to ensure that your deployments
are secure, knowing what those aspects are and how they
work is the first step. What you should do now is put that
knowledge into action by learning a few best practices.
About
About best
best practices
practices
The best practices I describe in this section are based on my 20-year
experience with network security in general and my 5-year experience
with Azure networking in particular. Of course, best practices are based on
two things: the positive experience others have had using a specific
practice and the confirmation that the best practices work across a
number of environments. Understanding this is key, because it’s important
for you to understand that I didn’t come up with these best practices on my
own—I’ve learned from our customers, from the Microsoft field, and from
the engineers who created the Azure networking technologies. Thus,
these best practices represent an amalgam of multiple groups of people
who are smarter than me—and now I’m sharing with you the results of my
experiences.
Tom Shinder
Program Manager, Azure Security Engineering
One more thing about best practices: one size does

not fit all. Although these best practices are good things
to do in most cases, they aren’t good things to do in all
cases. You always have to consider the environment in
which you’re considering these best practices. Sometimes
you won’t need to use one of these best practices because
they just don’t apply. Use your best judgment and do
what is best for your network.
This section covers the following Azure networking
best practices:
Subnet your networks based on security zones.
Use Network Security Groups carefully.
Networks.
Configure host-based firewalls on infrastructure
as a service (IaaS) virtual machines.
Configure User Defined Routes to control traffic.
Require forced tunneling.
Deploy virtual network security appliances.
devices.
Use ExpressRoute.
Optimize uptime and performance.
machines.
Enable Azure Security Center.
Extend your datacenter into Azure.
Subnet your networks based on security zones

As mentioned earlier, in the section about Azure
Virtual Networks, when you create a new Azure
Virtual Network, you’re asked to select an IP address
space in the Class A, B, or C range. These Azure
Virtual Network IP address ranges are large, so you
should always create multiple subnets. This is no
different than what you do on-premises today.
One thing you should think about is what IP address
space you want to use on your Azure Virtual Network. If
you plan to connect your on-premises network to one or
more Azure Virtual Networks, you need to ensure that
there are no IP address conflicts. That is to say, you have
to ensure that the IP address ranges you select and the
subnets you create on your Azure Virtual Networks do
not overlap with what you have on-premises. If there is
overlap, that would cause routing table conflicts, and
traffic will not be routed correctly to your subnets on
your Azure Virtual Networks.
After you decide on your IP address range for your
Azure Virtual Network, the next step is deciding how you
want to define your subnets. One approach is to define
your subnets based on the roles of the VMs you intend to
place on those subnets.
For example, suppose you have the following classes
of services you want to deploy on an Azure Virtual
Network:
Active Directory Domain Controllers You
want these to support domain-joined VMs on
your Azure Virtual Network.
Web front-end servers You use these to
support your three-tier applications.
Application logic servers You use these to
support middleware functions for your three-tier
applications.
Database servers You use these as the database
back ends for your three-tier applications.
Update servers You use these servers to
centralize operating system and application
updates for the VMs on your Azure Virtual
Network.
DNS servers You use these to support Active
Directory and non–Active Directory name
resolution for servers on your Azure Virtual
Network.
You could create just one big subnet and put all your
VMs on the same subnet. However, that’s not a great way
to help you enable secure network access control. A
better solution is to define subnets for each of these roles
and then put each VM that supports these roles into a
subnet created for each role. That leads you to putting
the domain controllers on the domain controllers’
subnet, the database servers on the database server
subnet, the web front ends on the web front-ends subnet,
and so on.
Not only does this help you keep track of where the
various servers that participate in each role are located, it
also makes it much easier to manage network access
controls. For example, if you choose to use NSGs for
network access control, you can create a set of rules that
is appropriate for all the VMs on the particular subnet. If
you need to put another VM on one of the subnets, you
don’t need to update the NSG rules, because the existing
rules will support all the machines on the subnet because
they perform the same roles.
To make this clearer, consider the following simple
situation with two subnets:
Web front-end subnet
Application logic subnet
Only web front-end VMs go into the web front-end
subnet, and only application logic VMs go into the
application logic subnet.
The rules for the web front-end subnet might look like
this:
Allow inbound TCP port 443 from the Internet to
all IP addresses on the web front-end subnet.
Allow outbound TCP port 443 from the web front-
end subnet to all IP addresses in the application
logic server’s subnet.
The rules for the application logic server subnet might
look like this:
Allow inbound TCP port 443 from the web front-
end subnet to all IP addresses on the application
logic server’s subnet.
Allow outbound TCP port 1433 from the
application logic server’s subnet to all IP
addresses on the database server subnet.
With these basic rules in place, you can easily put
more front-end web servers onto the front-end web
server’s subnet without having to make any changes in
the Network Security Group rules. The same goes with
the application logic server’s subnet.
Use Network Security Groups carefully

Although Network Security Groups are useful for
basic network access control, keep in mind that they
do not provide you any level of application layer
inspection. All you have control over is the source and
destination IP address, source and destination TCP or
UDP port number, and the direction to allow access.
Another thing to be aware of is that if you want to
create restrictive access rules with Network Security
Groups, you have to be aware of what you might
inadvertently block. Here are a few examples:
VMs need to be able to communicate with IP
addresses specific to the host operating system to
get DHCP information. If you block access to this
host port (which you need to discover by checking
an ipconfig on your VMs to see what IP address is
being used by the DHCP server), then your VMs
will not be able to communicate with the DHCP
server and will not be assigned IP addressing
information.
The DHCP server not only assigns an IP address
to the VMs; it also assigns a DNS server and a
default gateway. The DNS server will be a host
server IP address (that is to say, an IP address
owned by the host server, not by you), and the
default gateway will be an address on your Azure
Virtual Network subnet. If you block access to
these IP addresses, you won’t be able to perform
name resolution or reach remote subnets. Neither
of these conditions leads to trouble-free
performance.
Another scenario you might not think of is
communications outside of your Azure Virtual
Network, but still within the Azure fabric itself;
for example, when you encrypt Azure Virtual
Machines by using Azure Disk Encryption. To
encrypt your operating system and data disks, the
VM needs to be able to reach the Azure Key Vault
Service and an Azure Application (these are
prerequisites for Azure Disk Encryption). If you
lock down your NSGs too tight, you won’t be able
to reach the Key Vault or the Azure Active
Directory application, and your VMs won’t start
because the disks can’t be unencrypted.
These are just a few examples. The message is to test
your NSG rules thoroughly before going into production.
By thoroughly testing, you won’t have to deal with nasty
surprises that might turn a successful deployment into a
painful experience.
Networks
Eventually, you might decide you want to move the
majority of your on-premises services into the Azure
public cloud. You are likely going to find that as your
presence in Azure grows, so will your need to use
multiple Azure Virtual Networks.
You might want more than one Azure Virtual Network
for many reasons. Some examples include:
You have multiple on-premises datacenters and
you want to connect to Azure Virtual Networks
that are closest to the datacenter.
You want resources in one region to be able to
communicate with resources in another region
over the fastest route possible.
Note
Note
Communications over the Azure fabric are faster than looping back
through your on-premises network or looping through the Internet.
You want to use different Azure Virtual Networks

to manage different classes of services, or assign
them to different departments, or even different
divisions or subsidiaries within your company.
These are just three examples, but you can probably
come up with more. The point is that Azure Virtual
Networks can grow as quickly as your on-premises
network has over time. And at some point, you’re going
to want to connect some of those Azure Virtual Networks
to one another.
The best way to do this is to connect them to each
other over a site-to-site VPN connection over the Azure
fabric. The site-to-site connection between the Azure
Virtual Networks is similar to the site-to-site connection
you establish between your on-premises network and an
Azure Virtual Network. The difference is that the entire
communications path between the Azure Virtual
Networks is contained within the highly optimized Azure
fabric itself.
An alternative to this approach is to have the Azure
Virtual Networks communicate with each other over the
Internet. This approach has security and performance
implications that make it inferior to site-to-site VPN over
the Azure fabric. Another alternative is to loop back
through your on-premises network and out through
another gateway on your network. In most cases, this is
also a less efficient and potentially less secure solution.
More
More Info
Info
For more information about how to create a site-to-site VPN connection
between two Azure Virtual Networks, read the article “Configure a VNet-
to-VNet Connection by using Azure Resource Manager and PowerShell”
at https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/vpn-gateway-vnet-
vnet-rm-ps.
Configure host-based firewalls on IaaS virtual

machines
This is a best practice on-premises and in the cloud.
Regardless of what operating system you deploy in
Azure Virtual Machines, you want to make sure that a
host-based firewall is enabled, just as you do on-
premises.
Another feature of the host-based firewall on
Windows virtual machines is IPsec. Although IPsec for
intranet communications isn’t widely used, there’s
always a good reason to turn on IPsec—that reason being
that no network can be trusted and, therefore, regardless
of where that network is and who owns and operates it,
you should always consider any network (wired and
wireless) untrusted and untrustable.
The dichotomy of the “trusted corporate network”
versus “untrusted non-corporate networks” sounded
good in the past before the widespread use of the
Internet. But with the collision of multiple trends, such
as cloud computing, using your own device, multi-homed
devices (wireless devices that connect to a corporate
network and other wireless networks at the same time),
and numerous portable storage devices of all shapes,
sizes, and capacities, it’s not realistic to think that there
is a material difference between the innate security of
your on-premises network and any other network,
including the Internet.
Well, there might be, but to think and act otherwise
puts you at more risk than you need to be. That’s why
you should use IPsec for all communications that aren’t
encrypted by some other method (such as HTTPS or
encrypted SMB 3.0). You can use IPsec on Azure Virtual
Network to authenticate and encrypt all wire
communications between VMs on the Azure Virtual
Network, in addition to communications between those
VMs in Azure and any devices you have on-premises.
If you do choose to use IPsec, be careful not to block
host ports responsible for DHCP and DNS resolution, in
addition to the default gateway and any storage
addresses your VM might need access to.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about how to use IPsec for server and domain isolation,
read the article “Server and Domain Isolation Using IPsec and Group
Policy” at https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc163159.aspx.
Configure User Defined Routes to control traffic

When you put a VM on an Azure Virtual Network, you
might notice that the VM can connect to any other
VM on the same Azure Virtual Network, even if the
other VMs are on different subnets. This is possible
because there is a collection of system routes that are
enabled by default that allow this type of
communication. These default routes allow VMs on
the same Azure Virtual Network to initiate
connections with each other, and with the Internet
(for outbound communications to the Internet only).
Although the default system routes are useful for
many deployment scenarios, sometimes you might want
to customize the routing configuration for your
deployments. These customizations allow you to
configure the next hop address to reach specific
destinations.
You should configure User Defined Routes when you
deploy a virtual network security appliance, which is
described in a later best practice.
There are other scenarios where you might want to
configure custom routes. For example, you might have
multiple network security appliances that you want to
forward traffic to on the same or other Azure Virtual
Networks. You might even have multiple gateways you
want to use, such as a scenario where you have a cross-
premises connection between your Azure Virtual
Network and your on-premises location, in addition to a
site-to-site VPN that connects your Azure Virtual
Network to another Azure Virtual Network or even
multiple Azure Virtual Networks.
Just as in the on-premises world, you might end up
requiring a complex routing infrastructure to support
your network security requirements. For this reason,
paying close attention to your User Defined Routes will
significantly improve your overall network security. Of
course, ensure that you document all your
customizations and include the rationale behind each
one you make.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about User Defined Routes, read the article “What are User
Defined Routes and IP Forwarding” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/virtual-networks-udr-
overview.
Require forced tunneling

If you haven’t spent a lot of time in the networking
space, the term “forced tunneling” might sound a little
odd. In the context of Azure networking, it can sound
odd even to those who have experience in networking.
To understand why the term might sound odd, it
helps to understand where the term comes from. First,
what is “tunneling”? As explained earlier in this chapter
when we covered VPN technologies, tunneling is a way to
move data through an encrypted channel. (For you
network purists out there, yes, you can tunnel within
non-encrypted protocols, but let’s keep it simple here.)
When you establish a VPN connection, you create an
encrypted tunnel between two network devices. After the
tunnel is established, information can travel more
securely within that tunnel.
Now consider a common scenario that many have
experienced. You’re at a hotel room and need to create a
VPN connection between your laptop and the VPN server
at your company. You use whatever software you need to
use to establish the VPN connection. After you establish
the connection, you can access servers and services on
the corporate network as though you are directly
connected to the corporate network.
Let’s say that you want to go to a non-corporate
website. You open your browser, enter the address, and
go to the site. Does that connection go over the VPN
connection and out your corporate firewalls, and then
back through your corporate firewalls and back to your
laptop over the VPN connection for the response?
It depends.
If your computer is configured to allow split-
tunneling when using the VPN connection, it means that
your computer will access the site by going over the
Internet—it will not try to reach the site by going through
your VPN connection to the corporate network and out
to the Internet through your corporate network firewalls.
Most organizations consider this a security risk
because when split-tunneling is enabled, your computer
can essentially act as a bridge between the Internet and
the corporate network, because it can access both the
Internet and your corporate network at the same time.
Attackers can take advantage of this “dual connection” to
reach your corporate network through your split-
tunneling computer.
The term “split-tunneling” itself is a bit of a
misnomer, because there’s only a single “tunnel” here:
the encrypted VPN tunnel to your corporate network.
The connection to the Internet itself is not “tunneled.” So
technically, you don’t have a “split tunnel”; you have a
“dual connection.” Regardless, sometimes names for
things aren’t rational, so you’ll have to accept the
industry standard name for this phenomenon.
Let’s say that you don’t want to deal with the risk of
split tunneling when your users are connected to your
corporate network over VPN. What do you do? You
configure something called “forced tunneling.” When
forced tunneling is configured, all traffic is forced to go
over the VPN tunnel. If you want to go to a non-
corporate website, then that request is going to go over
the VPN connection and over your corporate network to
your corporate firewalls, and then the corporate firewalls
will receive the responses and forward the responses
back to you over the VPN connection. There will be no
“direct” connections to any Internet servers (with
“direct” meaning that the connections avoid going over
the VPN connection).
What does this have to do with Azure network
security?
The default routes for an Azure Virtual Network allow
VMs to initiate traffic to the Internet. This process can
pose a security risk because it represents a form of split
tunneling, and these outbound connections could
increase the attack surface of a VM and be used by
attackers. For this reason, you should enable forced
tunneling on your VMs when you have cross-premises
connectivity between your Azure Virtual Network and
your on-premises network.
If you do not have a cross-premises connection, be
sure to take advantage of Network Security Groups
(discussed earlier) or Azure Virtual Network security
appliances (discussed next) to prevent outbound
connections to the Internet from your Azure Virtual
Machines.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about forced tunneling and how to enable it, read the article
“Configure forced tunneling using the Azure Resource Manager
deployment model” at https://azure.microsoft.com/en-
us/documentation/articles/vpn-gateway-forced-tunneling-rm.
Deploy virtual network security appliances

Although Network Security Groups and User Defined
Routes can provide a certain measure of network
security at the network and transport layers of the
OSI model, in some situations, you’ll want or need to
enable security at high levels of the stack. In such
situations, you should deploy virtual network security
appliances provided by Azure partners.
Azure network security appliances can deliver
significantly enhanced levels of security over what is
provided by network level controls. Some of the network
security capabilities provided by virtual network security
appliances include:
Firewalling
Intrusion detection and prevention
Vulnerability management
Application control
Network-based anomaly detection
Web filtering
Antivirus protection
Botnet protection
If you require a higher level of network security than
you can obtain with network-level access controls, then
you should investigate and deploy Azure Virtual Network
security appliances.
More
More Info
Info
To learn about what Azure Virtual Network security appliances are
available, and about their capabilities, visit the Azure Marketplace at
https://azure.microsoft.com/marketplace and search on “security” and
“network security.”

devices
A perimeter network (also known as a DMZ,
demilitarized zone, or screened subnet) is a physical
or logical network segment that is designed to provide
an additional layer of security between your assets
and the Internet. The intent of the perimeter network
is to place specialized network access control devices
on the edge of the perimeter network so that only the
traffic you want is allowed past the network security
device and into your Azure Virtual Network.
Perimeter networks are useful because you can focus
your network access control management, monitoring,
logging, and reporting on the devices at the edge of your
Azure Virtual Network. Here you would typically enable
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) prevention, IDS
and IPS, firewall rules and policies, web filtering,
network antimalware, and more. The network security
devices sit between the Internet and your Azure Virtual
Network and have an interface on both networks.
Although this is the basic design of a perimeter
network, many different perimeter network designs
exist, such as back-to-back, tri-homed, and multi-homed.
For all high-security deployments, you should
consider deploying a perimeter network to enhance the
level of network security for your Azure resources.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about perimeter networks and how to deploy them in Azure,
read the article “Microsoft Cloud Services and Network Security” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/best-practices-network-
security.
Use ExpressRoute
Many organizations have chosen the hybrid IT route.
In hybrid IT, some of the company’s information
assets are in Azure, while others remain on-premises.
In many cases, some components of a service are
running in Azure while other components remain on-
premises.
In the hybrid IT scenario, there is usually some type
of cross-premises connectivity. This cross-premises
connectivity allows the company to connect their on-
premises networks to Azure Virtual Networks. Two
cross-premises connectivity solutions are available:
Site-to-site VPN
ExpressRoute
Site-to-site VPN represents a virtual private
connection between your on-premises network and an
Azure Virtual Network. This connection takes place over
the Internet and allows you to “tunnel” information
inside an encrypted link between your network and
Azure. Site-to-site VPN is a secure, mature technology
that is deployed by enterprises of all sizes. Tunnel
encryption is performed by using IPsec tunnel mode.
Although site-to-site VPN is a trusted, reliable, and
established technology, traffic within the tunnel does
traverse the Internet. In addition, bandwidth is relatively
constrained to a maximum of about 200 Mbps.
If you require an exceptional level of security or
performance for your cross-premises connections, you
should consider using Azure ExpressRoute for your
cross-premises connectivity. ExpressRoute is a dedicated
WAN link between your on-premises location or an
Exchange hosting provider. Because this is a telco
connection, your data doesn’t travel over the Internet
and therefore is not exposed to the potential risks
inherent in Internet communications.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about how Azure ExpressRoute works and how to deploy it,
read the article “ExpressRoute Technical Overview” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/best-practices-network-
security.
Optimize uptime and performance

Confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) make
up the three factors for evaluating a customer’s
security implementation. Confidentiality is about
encryption and privacy, integrity is about making sure
that data is not changed by unauthorized personnel,
and availability is about making sure that authorized
individuals are able to access the information they are
authorized to access. Failure in any one of these areas
represents a potential security breach.
Availability can be thought of as being about uptime
and performance. If a service is down, information can’t
be accessed. If performance is so poor as to make the
data unavailable, then you can consider the data to be
inaccessible. Therefore, from a security perspective, you
should do whatever you can to ensure that your services
have optimal uptime and performance. A popular and
effective method used to enhance availability and
performance is to use load balancing. Load balancing is a
method of distributing network traffic across servers that
are part of a service. For example, if you have front-end
web servers as part of your service, you can use load
balancing to distribute the traffic across your multiple
front-end web servers.
This distribution of traffic increases availability
because if one of the web servers becomes unavailable,
the load balancer will stop sending traffic to that server
and redirect traffic to the servers that are still online.
Load balancing also helps performance, because the
processor, network, and memory overhead for serving
requests is distributed across all the load balanced
servers.
You should consider employing load balancing
whenever you can, and as appropriate for your services.
The following sections discuss appropriateness
situations. At the Azure Virtual Network level, Azure
provides you with three primary load balancing options:
HTTP-based load balancing
HTTP-based load balancing

HTTP-based load balancing bases decisions about
which server to send connections to by using
characteristics of the HTTP protocol. Azure has an
HTTP load balancer named Application Gateway.
You should consider using Azure Application Gateway
when you have:
Applications that require requests from the same
user or client session to reach the same back-end
VM. Examples of this are shopping cart apps and
web mail servers.
Applications that want to free web server farms
from SSL termination overhead by taking
advantage of Application Gateway’s SSL offload
feature.
Applications, such as a content delivery network,
that require multiple HTTP requests on the same
long-running TCP connection to be routed or load
balanced to different back-end servers.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about how Azure Application Gateway works and how you
can use it in your deployments, read the article “Application Gateway
Overview” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/application-gateway-
introduction.
External load balancing takes place when incoming
connections from the Internet are load balanced
among your servers located in an Azure Virtual
Network. The Azure External Load Balancer can
provide you with this capability, and you should
consider using it when you don’t require the sticky
sessions or SSL offload.
In contrast to HTTP-based load balancing, the
External Load Balancer uses information at the network
and transport layers of the OSI networking model to
make decisions on what server to load balance
connections to.
You should consider using External Load Balancing
whenever you have stateless applications accepting
incoming requests from the Internet.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about how the Azure External Load Balancer works and
how you can deploy it, read the article “Get Started Creating an Internet
Facing Load Balancer in Resource Manager using PowerShell” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/load-balancer-get-
started-internet-arm-ps.

Internal load balancing is similar to external load
balancing and uses the same mechanism to load
balance connections to the servers behind them. The
only difference is that the load balancer in this case is
accepting connections from VMs that are not on the
Internet. In most cases, the connections that are
accepted for load balancing are initiated by devices on
You should consider using internal load balancing for
scenarios that will benefit from this capability, such as
when you need to load balance connections to SQL
servers or internal web servers.
Public cloud computing makes it possible to deploy
globally distributed applications that have
components located in datacenters all over the world.
This is possible on Azure due to its global datacenter
presence. In contrast to the load balancing
technologies mentioned earlier, global load balancing
makes it possible to make services available even
when entire datacenters might become unavailable.
You can get this type of global load balancing in Azure
by taking advantage of Azure Traffic Manager. Traffic
Manager makes it possible to load balance connections
to your services based on the location of the user.
For example, if the user is making a request to your
service from the European Union, the connection is
directed to your services located in a European Union
datacenter. This part of Traffic Manager global load
balancing helps to improve performance because
connecting to the nearest datacenter is faster than
connecting to datacenters that are far away.
On the availability side, global load balancing ensures
that your service is available even if an entire datacenter
becomes available.
For example, if an Azure datacenter becomes
unavailable due to environmental reasons or outages
such as regional network failures, connections to your
service would be rerouted to the nearest online
datacenter. This global load balancing is accomplished
by taking advantage of DNS policies that you can create
in Traffic Manager.
You should consider using Traffic Manager for any
cloud solution you develop that has a widely distributed
scope across multiple regions and requires the highest
level of uptime possible.
machines
It is possible to reach Azure Virtual Machines by using
RDP and SSH protocols. These protocols make it
possible to manage VMs from remote locations and
are standard in datacenter computing.
The potential security problem with using these
protocols over the Internet is that attackers can use
various brute-force techniques to gain access to Azure
Virtual Machines. After the attackers gain access, they
can use your VM as a launch point for compromising
other machines on your Azure Virtual Network or even
attack networked devices outside of Azure.
Because of this, you should consider disabling direct
RDP and SSH access to your Azure Virtual Machines
from the Internet. With direct RDP and SSH access from
the Internet disabled, you have other options you can use
to access these VMs for remote management:
Point-to-site VPN
Site-to-site VPN
ExpressRoute
Point-to-site VPN is another term for a remote access
VPN client or server connection. A point-to-site VPN
enables a single user to connect to an Azure Virtual
Network over the Internet. After the point-to-site
connection is established, the user is able to use RDP or
SSH to connect to any VMs located on the Azure Virtual
Network that the user connected to via point-to-site
VPN. This assumes that the user is authorized to reach
those VMs.
Point-to-site VPN is more secure than direct RDP or
SSH connections because the user has to authenticate
twice before connecting to a VM. First, the user needs to
authenticate (and be authorized) to establish the point-
to-site VPN connection; second, the user needs to
authenticate (and be authorized) to establish the RDP or
SSH session.
A site-to-site VPN connects an entire network to
another network over the Internet. You can use a site-to-
site VPN to connect your on-premises network to an
Azure Virtual Network. If you deploy a site-to-site VPN,
users on your on-premises network are able to connect to
VMs on your Azure Virtual Network by using the RDP or
SSH protocol over the site-to-site VPN connection, and it
does not require you to allow direct RDP or SSH access
over the Internet.
You can also use a dedicated WAN link to provide
functionality similar to the site-to-site VPN. The main
differences are:
The dedicated WAN link doesn’t traverse the
Internet.
Dedicated WAN links are typically more stable
and performant.
Azure provides you with a dedicated WAN link
solution in the form of ExpressRoute.
Enable Azure Security Center

Azure Security Center helps you prevent, detect, and
respond to threats, and provides you with increased
visibility into, and control over, the security of your
Azure resources. It provides integrated security
monitoring and policy management across your Azure
subscriptions, helps detect threats that might
otherwise go unnoticed, and works with a broad
ecosystem of security solutions.
Azure Security Center helps you optimize and monitor
network security by:
Providing network security recommendations.
Monitoring the state of your network security
configuration.
Alerting you to network-based threats both at the
endpoint and network levels.
It is highly recommended that you enable Azure
Security Center for all of your Azure deployments.
More
More Info
Info
Azure Security Center is covered in more detail in Chapter 7, “Azure
resource management security.”
Extend your datacenter into Azure

Many enterprise IT organizations are looking to
expand into the cloud instead of growing their on-
premises datacenters. This expansion represents an
extension of existing IT infrastructure into the public
cloud. By taking advantage of cross-premises
connectivity options, it’s possible to treat your Azure
Virtual Network as just another subnet on your on-
premises network infrastructure.
However, many planning and design issues need to be
addressed first. This is especially important in the area of
network security. One of the best ways to understand
how you approach such a design is to see an example.
Microsoft has created the Datacenter Extension
Reference Architecture Diagram and supporting
collateral to help you understand what such a datacenter
extension would look like. This provides a reference
implementation that you can use to plan and design a
secure enterprise datacenter extension to the cloud. You
should review this document to get an idea of the key
components of a secure solution.
More
More Info
Info
For more information about the Datacenter Extension Reference

Architecture Diagram, read “Datacenter extension reference architecture
diagram – Interactive” at https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/Datacenter-
extension-687b1d84.
Chapter 4. Data and storage security
Data and storage security are about securing the data

while it is at rest. The title of the chapter might seem a
bit redundant, because data and storage security can be
thought of as the same thing. However, many people
think of storage security as securing the disk on which
the data is stored. Any security for the data itself is
inherited from the security applied to the storage system.
In contrast, data security is security applied directly to
the data, so no matter what the storage medium is, the
data remains as secure as possible. Both data and storage
security can be contrasted with network security, where
the data is off the disk, and data inherits whatever
security characteristics are applied to the network
communications.
All this is to say that this chapter is mostly about data
at rest. The data could reside on a file server, in a
database, in an email client, or in many other types of
services or applications. The key factor is that the data
isn’t moving over the wire, with the exception of a wire
encryption protocol that you can use to share data over
the wire. Wire encryption is also discussed in this
chapter.
This chapter provides insights into a variety of
Microsoft Azure security–related services and
technologies that are applied to data-at-rest scenarios.
These include:
Virtual machine (VM) encryption
Storage encryption
File share wire encryption
Hybrid data encryption
Rights management
Database security
Each topic describes the feature or service, what value
it brings to you, and what problems it solves. You also
receive pointers to valuable resources where you can get
more information on each of the subjects.
VIRTUAL MACHINE ENCRYPTION

In the past, IT organizations ran their services on
physical hardware, and in many cases, ran a single
service per physical server. If you needed 20 servers
running Microsoft Exchange Server, then you ran 20
physical servers. To support those Exchange Servers,
you needed Domain Name System (DNS) servers,
domain controllers, DHCP servers, certificate
services, firewalls, database servers, and more. All of
these supporting servers, in addition to the Exchange
Servers, ran on physical hardware. As you can
imagine, things got expensive fast.
Today, most datacenters use server virtualization
technology to replace the “one service per server”
situation. Now, you can virtualize all those physical
servers and run them as virtualized instances on a
virtualization server. The virtualization platform might
be Microsoft Hyper-V, VMware, or some other
virtualization platform. With server virtualization, you
can run 10 to 20 or more virtualized servers on a single
physical server.
IT organizations rallied behind server virtualization
because it solved a major cost and facilities problem:
there was no more room to put physical servers and no
more money to buy them. Server virtualization was
quickly adopted by IT organizations because it saved
money, time, and space, and made most IT shops’ lives
easier.
However, regardless of how compelling and useful a
technology like server virtualization can be (and is),
security concerns always follow. Back in the day of the
physical server, if someone wanted to steal all the disks
in the physical server, that person had to gain access to
the facility and then the server room, and then try to get
into the server enclosures themselves. Although this
could be (and has been) done, a lot of overhead and risk
was involved, so stealing physical hard drives was never
the top choice for attackers who wanted to access all the
data on a physical disk. More often, they did that over
the network.
In today’s world of virtualized servers, the “server”
isn’t a piece of hardware; it’s now a piece (or pieces) of
software. The operating system disk is just a disk file.
Data disks that are used by the operating system disk are
also disk files. These files are like any other files and can
be changed, copied, or deleted with relative ease.
The implication of this is that anyone who has access
to the storage can potentially copy the VM’s files to
another location. The attacker who has copied these VM
files can then easily mount them and view anything on
the file system. Even if the storage media itself is
encrypted (as with whole-volume disk encryption), when
the files are removed from the volume, they no longer
inherit the security from the volume that they were
located on; they are now unencrypted.
To solve this problem, you need to be able to encrypt
the actual virtual disk files that include your VMs. Azure
has such a solution, known as Azure Disk Encryption.
AZURE DISK ENCRYPTION

Azure Disk Encryption is a technology that you can
use to encrypt the VM disk files for your Azure VMs.
Azure uses Hyper-V as its virtualization platform, so
the VMs you run on Azure use the .vhd file format.
With Azure Disk Encryption, you can encrypt both the
operating system .vhd and any data disk .vhd files
that you have attached to your VMs.
If an attacker successfully accessed your VM disk files
and copied them, the attacker would not be able to
mount them, because the disks are encrypted and the
attacker does not have the key required to decrypt them.
This is a powerful security technology that you should
always employ on any VM you run on Azure. You should
also use similar technology on any VM you run on-
premises.
Azure Disk Encryption works for both Windows and
Linux VMs. For Windows VMs, Microsoft uses BitLocker
as the disk encryption technology. For Linux VMs,
Microsoft uses dm-crypt. Although the specifics of the
encryption technologies are a bit different, both of these
volume encryption methodologies have passed the test of
time and are well-trusted in the security community.
At the time this chapter was written, Azure Disk
Encryption is still in public preview except in Australia,
where it is generally available. There is a good chance
that the service will be generally available for almost all
countries/regions by the time you read this chapter.
Azure Disk Encryption supports the following
scenarios:
You can bring a VM that you’ve already encrypted
on-premises into Azure and use the same keys
you used to encrypt that VM.
You can create a VM from the Microsoft Azure
Marketplace and encrypt that VM as you create it.
You can have unencrypted VMs that are currently
running in Azure and encrypt them.
You can unencrypt VMs that you have encrypted,
regardless of whether you’ve encrypted them on-
premises, encrypted them from the time you
created them in Azure, or encrypted them after
you created them.
The location of the encryption keys is important
because these keys safeguard your disks. If these keys
were compromised, your VMs would be too. To help
ensure the security of your keys, you can sort the keys (in
the case of BitLocker) or the secrets (in the case of dm-
crypt) in Azure Key Vault. Key Vault is the Azure
“vaulting” solution that provides you with a hardware
security module (HSM) in which you store your disk
encryption keys. When you encrypt a VM by using Azure
Disk Encryption, you use can use an existing Key Vault
or create a new one.
Figure 4-1 provides a high-level view of Azure Disk
Encryption.
FIGURE 4-1 High-level view of how Azure Disk

Encryption works with Azure Key Vault
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about Azure Key Vault, read Chapter 6, “Key management
in Azure with Key Vault.”
The following lists key points you might want to know

about Azure Disk Encryption:
Currently, no charges are incurred for encrypting
VMs.
Not all operating systems can be encrypted.
Not all operating systems can be decrypted.
Not all types of virtual disk storage can be
encrypted.
You can use the Azure command-line interface
(CLI), Azure PowerShell, or Azure Resource
Manager templates to encrypt an Azure VM.
The Azure VM and the Key Vault you use to store
the VM’s keys must be in the same Azure
country/region.
An Azure Active Directory application must be
configured for Azure Disk Encryption usage.
A Key Vault access policy must be configured.
More
More Info
Info
Note that we’re not providing specific details on these key points, because
they might change by the time you read this. To get detailed information,
read “Azure Disk Encryption for Windows and Linux Azure Virtual
Machines” at https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/Azure-Disk-Encryption-
for-a0018eb0 or “Encrypt an Azure Virtual Machine” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/security-center-disk-
encryption.
Azure Disk Encryption is also integrated into Azure

Security Center. Azure Security Center is an Azure
service that helps you prevent, detect, and respond to
threats against your Azure resources. It provides
integrated security monitoring and policy management
across your Azure subscriptions, helps detect threats that
might otherwise go unnoticed, and works with a broad
ecosystem of security solutions. Many of the benefits of
Azure Security Center are covered in Chapter 7, “Azure
resource management security.”
Azure Security Center alerts you if you have
unencrypted VMs and categorizes unencrypted VMs as a
high security risk, as shown in Figure 4-2.
FIGURE 4-2 Azure Security Center displaying an
alert for unencrypted disks
When you get such an alert, you can use Azure CLI,
Azure PowerShell, or Azure Resource Manager templates
to encrypt the VM. At the time of this writing, you can’t
remediate this alert from within the Azure Security
Center console.
More
More Info
Info
If you are proficient in CLI, PowerShell, or Azure Resource Manager

templates, you’ll find the information you need to know to encrypt VMs in
the articles “Azure Disk Encryption for Windows and Linux Azure Virtual
Machines” at https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/Azure-Disk-Encryption-
for-a0018eb0 and “Encrypt an Azure Virtual Machine” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/security-center-disk-
encryption.
If you’re not completely comfortable with these

technologies but still want to see how Azure Disk
Encryption works, you can follow the step-by-step
directions in the article “Encrypt an Azure Virtual
Machine” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/se
curity-center-disk-encryption. You’ll be able to encrypt
an Azure VM without knowing anything more than
what’s in the article!
After you encrypt your VMs, you’ll see that disk
encryption is enabled in the Azure console, as shown in
Figure 4-3.
FIGURE 4-3 Disk encryption status, shown as

Enabled in the Azure console
You should always encrypt your Azure VMs,

regardless of the role that VM performs on your network.
STORAGE ENCRYPTION
The previous section explained how you can encrypt
Azure VMs. The encryption process for Azure VMs is
essential for encrypting specific files. For Azure VMs,
those files are the .vhd files that include the operating
system and the data disks.
Azure Storage Service Encryption is another option
for file encryption. It includes the automatic encryption
of all files contained in a particular location, which is
similar to whole-volume encryption available with
technologies such as BitLocker.
Azure Storage Service Encryption automatically
encrypts blob files (binary large objects) when you save
them to your Azure storage account. When you save the
object to Azure storage, the object is automatically
encrypted for you. When you read the file from storage,
the file is automatically decrypted for you. You don’t
need to maintain any keys or secrets—Azure does all that
for you in the background. This significantly reduces
your security overhead.
Although this might sound similar to volume
encryption like you have on a physical hard disk, it’s not
the same, because encryption is applied on an account
rather than on a volume basis. The reason for this is that
your storage account isn’t confined to a particular hard
disk or hard disk array. Your “bits” are distributed
throughout the Azure storage fabric and are identified as
yours by a customer-specific tag assigned to your storage
objects. This allows for greater reliability, in addition to
security and isolation of your storage from all other
storage objects and accounts within Azure.
The level of encryption used by Azure Storage Service
Encryption is similar to what is used in the rest of Azure,
which is Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)–256.
Encryption is available for all levels of storage
redundancy:
Locally Redundant Storage (LRS)
Zone Redundant Storage (ZRS)
Geo-Redundant Storage (GRS)
Read-Access Geo-Redundant Storage (RA-GRS)
At the time of this writing, the service is limited to a
small number of regions, but is expected to be in wide
distribution (and perhaps generally available) by the
time you read this. Features might change in the interim.
Encryption scenarios supported at this time include
encryption of:
Blob files (block, append, and page blobs).
VM .vhd files that you bring from your on-
premises environment.
VMs that you create in Azure, such as from the
Azure Marketplace or from a customized template
you store in Azure.
Customers have asked whether VMs that have been
encrypted by using Azure Disk Encryption have
significant overhead, because these machines would have
double encryption if you also use Azure Storage Service
Encryption. This double encryption causes nominal
overhead. Although multiple encryption/decryption
operations still take place, the overhead isn’t comparable
to what you see with double encryption of network traffic
because with storage encryption, you don’t have the
protocol overhead also.
The following list provides key facts you should know
about Azure Storage Service Encryption:
Only Azure Resource Manager storage accounts
are supported.
You cannot encrypt classic storage accounts that
have been migrated to Azure Resource Manager
accounts.
Azure Storage Service Encryption will not encrypt
data that exists in a storage account prior to
enabling encryption on the account. If you enable
storage encryption on a storage account that
already has data in it, you will need to remove the
data from the account and then put it back in,
because the encryption takes place when the data
is actually placed into the storage account.
VMs created by using images available from the
Azure Marketplace are a special situation: the
base image will remain unencrypted, but any
subsequent writes will be encrypted. Because your
private data appears only on the subsequent
writes, your information is more secured.
Other types of Azure storage are not encrypted by
using Azure Storage Service Encryption; this
excludes table, queue, and file storage options.
In the Azure portal, you can access the Encryption
option when you view the details of your storage account,
as shown in Figure 4-4.
FIGURE 4-4 The Encryption option in the Azure

console
Enabling storage encryption is as easy as “turning it

on,” as shown in Figure 4-5.
FIGURE 4-5 Azure Storage Service Encryption
configuration interface
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about Azure Storage Service Encryption, read the article
“Azure Storage Service Encryption for Data at Rest” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/storage-service-
encryption.
FILE SHARE WIRE ENCRYPTION
File shares have been around since the first file
servers were set up in datacenters. A file share is a
folder on a file server that might contain files or
subfolders, and those files and subfolders can be
accessed from over the network. The network protocol
used to connect to file shares is the server message
block (SMB) protocol (sometimes referred to as a
Common Internet File System [CIFS] protocol).
File servers are already a challenge to maintain. Often
complex clustering and replication is required to support
high availability and redundancy. This can end up taking
a lot of time, especially when something goes wrong.
That’s where a cloud-based solution can be handy.
Azure helps you in this area by providing Azure Files.
Azure Files use the same SMB protocol currently used
on-premises. Server and client applications that use the
SMB protocol to access file shares on-premises now can
also access information in Azure Files. In fact, you can
configure Azure file shares so that they are accessible
over the Internet through TCP port 445.
You don’t need to set up complex clustering and file
replication either, because availability and redundancy
are inherited from the Azure storage fabric itself. You can
have the same level of replication you have for any other
objects in your Azure storage accounts. That’s because
you create the file shares inside existing or new Azure
storage accounts.
One significant difference between on-premises file
shares and Azure Files is the level of access control. On-
premises, you can apply robust and granular access
controls to file shares and you can assign even deeper
NTFS permissions to the files inside of those file shares.
With Azure Files, access to objects within the share is
controlled by a single storage account key that gives the
same level of access to all files. There is also no Azure
Active Directory support for permissions assignment to
data contained within the file shares.
The exception to this is when you want to access
Azure Files programmatically. In this case, you can take
advantage of the REST API and generate a Share Access
Signature for a file share or even individual files. You can
do this by creating a shared access policy for the share.
More
More Info
Info
You can learn more about creating a shared access policy by reading the
“Generate a shared access signature for a file or file share” section of the
article “Develop with File storage,” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/storage-dotnet-how-to-
use-files/#generate-a-shared-access-signature-for-a-file-or-file-share.
Although the access control limitations are certain to

improve over time, Azure Files are still useful and highly
recommended.
Perhaps more interesting than the access controls you
can use with Azure Files is that when you use the SMB
3.x protocol to access Azure Files, you can also take
advantage of automatic and transparent encryption of
file data over the wire. You might have winced when you
read that you could access these shares from over the
Internet, but now you know why you can do this safely:
it’s because all data is encrypted over the wire!
If the client fully supports SMB 3.x, it will be able to
transparently work with Azure File Storage to generate
per-session encryption keys. The encryption protocol is
AES-128 CCM (128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard
with CCM mode), which provides some of the highest
levels of security available and enables you to confidently
access these file shares across any type of network.
Although the idea of using net use over the Internet
sounds fun, you most likely will still want additional
security, if for no other reason than that auditors might
be wary of allowing SMB access to private data over the
Internet. You can still take advantage of accessing Azure
File Shares over the Internet through site-to-site VPN
connections. Or, if you want to avoid the Internet
entirely, you can access Azure File Shares by using the
SMB protocol through ExpressRoute, which was
described in Chapter 3, “Azure network security.”
Figure 4-6 shows that SMB encryption can be used
across any kind of cloud network infrastructure—public,
private, or even hybrid clouds.
FIGURE 4-6 SMB encryption use across cloud

network infrastructures
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about Azure Files, read the article “Get Started with Azure
File Storage on Windows” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/storage-dotnet-how-to-
use-files/#develop-with-file-storage.
HYBRID DATA ENCRYPTION

StorSimple is an on-premises storage solution that
can be integrated with Azure storage. You might
consider using StorSimple for many reasons,
including the following:
You can use StorSimple as a primary storage
solution for your on-premises workloads, such as
a file server, collaboration server, database server,
and for VMs.
You can configure policies that offload “cold” data
from the on-premises StorSimple appliance into
Azure storage.
You can create automated storage snapshots and
have the data backed up to Azure storage.
You can use StorSimple to help with disaster
recovery by installing StorSimple appliances to
your new on-premises locations and then
retrieving the data you need from Azure storage.
StorSimple is highly recommended as a hybrid
storage solution.
More
More Info
Info
You can learn more about StorSimple at https://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/server-cloud/products/storsimple/features.aspx.
From a security perspective, StorSimple addresses

four different security scenarios:
User authentication to the Azure storage account
where the data is stored
StorSimple appliance access to the data stored in
Azure storage
Security of the data as it moves over the network
Security of the data at rest, as it sits on the disk
when not being accessed
Figure 4-7 depicts these scenarios.
FIGURE 4-7 Key scenarios for StorSimple
Authentication
StorSimple system administrators control the use of
cloud storage resources through the online Azure
portal. Administrators authenticate to the Azure
portal with a user name and password or with Azure
Multi-Factor Authentication. Users with access to the
Azure portal can change configuration parameters in
addition to adding and deleting storage accounts and
storage assets.
Authentication of the StorSimple system to an Azure
storage account requires configuration of storage access
keys. Two 512-bit keys are generated by Azure for each
storage account, one of which must match one of the two
keys loaded into the cloud configuration of a StorSimple
system. Storage access keys can be individually
regenerated by using a tool provided in the Azure portal.
By alternating the regeneration of access keys, you
can maintain existing connections to Azure storage while
generating new keys for subsequent access. For this
reason, it is highly recommended that you become
familiar with how to change access keys in the Azure
portal and in your StorSimple systems. You should also
configure Azure to regenerate access keys every 90 days.
It’s possible that you have multiple storage accounts
in your subscription. StorSimple systems can connect to
as many as 64 different storage accounts. You can use
multiple storage accounts and their associated storage
access keys to compartmentalize access to data in Azure
Storage by department, role, team, project, or other
categorizations that might work best for you.
Wire security
Over-the-network encryption protects you from
situations in which an attacker is able to tap the
transmission of data at any point in the network that
links the StorSimple system and Azure.
Data transmission between the StorSimple system
and cloud storage is encrypted by using Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL), supporting up to AES-256 session
encryption during data transfers between the StorSimple
system and Azure Storage. This encryption is separate
from the storage access keys and data-at-rest encryption,
although both of these measures are also in force when
data is on the wire.
Data at rest
Data-at-rest encryption helps protect you from
intruders who gain access to the storage access keys of
a storage account and then download your
information. It also helps protect you from common
situations such as when physical drives or tape media
are lost or stolen. With StorSimple, cloud provider
employees, contractors, or other entities cannot read
data because only you have access to the encryption
keys.
StorSimple encrypts data stored in the cloud with an
encryption key that you provide, and also uses AES-256
encryption that is derived from a passphrase you define
or one that is generated by a key management system for
you. Because StorSimple can support up to 64 storage
accounts, up to 64 different encryption keys can be used
in a single StorSimple system.
StorSimple also performs data deduplication. This
can help security by obfuscating data in both the
StorSimple system and in Azure Storage. When data is
deduplicated in the StorSimple system, it is translated
from host-directed storage blocks into content-
addressable data objects that are accessed by metadata
mapping information. The security advantage conferred
here is that the deduplicated data objects are stored
independently of the metadata. This means that no
storage-level context stored would allow access based on
volume, file system, or file names.
When it comes to Azure storage, the data objects in
Azure Storage are distributed across many cloud
datacenter physical disks. It’s not just “pieces of files”
that are distributed and easily reassembled. These bits
are managed by the fabric management system, and it
would require access to the Azure fabric management
system to reassemble this data. In general, 16 million
objects are distributed across an indeterminate number
of cloud storage disks for every 1 terabyte (TB) of data
stored in the cloud.
RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
Rights management is a mechanism that you can use
to help secure the data itself, without any
dependencies on the encryption or security
mechanism that might be available in the
infrastructure that supports that data. For example,
you can use rights management to help secure data
while that data is in flight, even if it is traveling over a
network by using an unencrypted protocol. Similarly,
rights managed data that sits on the disk is better
protected, even if the disk or the volume itself is
unencrypted.
This is the goal of security and where security experts
would like to be in the future. This allows data to be
easily shared among people who need to see the data,
while keeping those who don’t need to see the data away
from that data. The security is on the data itself, and not
inherited by another system.
You can get this kind of protection by taking
advantage of Azure Rights Management (RMS). Azure
RMS uses encryption to help secure the data that you
want to secure. Only users who are authorized to
unencrypt the file are allowed to do so. This means that
data is protected in two ways:
Authentication and authorization Users
must be able to authenticate. If they cannot
authenticate, then they are denied access to the
data. If they can authenticate but are not
authorized, then they cannot access the data. If
they can authenticate and they are authorized,
then they can receive the keys to decrypt the data.
Encryption The data is encrypted by using AES-
128 or AES-256. This prevents so-called “offline
attacks” against the data, which can be used in
some cases to circumvent certain authentication-
only–based access controls.
Specific files are protected. Files could be text,
presentations, graphics, videos, or virtually any other
type of file.
User identities are stored in Azure RMS as certificate
files. When a user encrypts a document, a small RMS
client application creates a content key and encrypts the
document with that key. The RMS client application
creates a certificate that includes a policy for the
document. This policy has the rights for the users or
groups and the restrictions on how the document can be
used. These policies are template based, so you don’t
have to create them from nothing.
After that, the RMS client uses the company’s key to
encrypt the policy and the content key. The RMS client
then signs the policy by using the certificate of the user
who set rights management on the file.
What happens when a user wants to read a rights-
managed protected file? The RMS client starts by
requesting access to the Azure RMS service. It sends the
document policy and the user’s certificate to Azure RMS.
The Azure RMS service decrypts and evaluates the policy
and creates a list of rights that the user has for the
document (assuming that the user has any rights to it; if
not, the process stops here).
The Azure RMS service decrypts the AES content key
from the decrypted policy and then encrypts it with the
user’s public RSA key that was obtained when the RMS
client made the request to the Azure RMS service to
access the document.
This re-encrypted content is embedded into an
encrypted use license and the list of user rights and is
sent back to the Azure RMS service.
At this point, the RMS client decrypts the use license
with its own user private key. This enables the RMS
client to decrypt the document so that you can see it on
your display.
Figure 4-8 provides a high-level depiction of the
process.
FIGURE 4-8 Encrypting and decrypting data by

using Azure Rights Management
You should remember the following four key things

about Azure RMS:
File content is never sent to the Azure RMS
service. Microsoft never has access to the actual
data.
Applications enable RMS protection by allowing
the configuration and enforcement of access
rights.
Applications use the Azure RMS SDK to
communicate with the RMS service and servers.
Azure RMS takes advantage of Azure Rights
Management, Active Directory RMS, Active
Directory, and Azure Key Vault.
Figure 4-9 depicts these four key areas.
FIGURE 4-9 Four key features to understand in

Azure Rights Management
This barely touches upon what Azure Rights

Management has to offer, but this book has limited
space. It is highly recommended that you employ Azure
Rights Management as part of your comprehensive end-
to-end security coverage for your Azure solutions that
lend themselves to file management.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about Azure Right Management, read the article “What is
Azure Rights Management?” at https://docs.microsoft.com/rights-
management/understand-explore/what-is-azure-rms.
DATABASE SECURITY
Azure SQL Database includes a number of security
features and technologies that you can use to enhance
data security. These include:
Azure SQL Firewall
Row-level security
This section provides a short overview of what each of
these features does, and pointers to where you can learn
more about each of them.
Azure SQL Firewall

Azure SQL provides a rudimentary firewall that allows
simple source IP address access control. This is a
popular feature because you can enforce access
controls on a network level so that only IP addresses
that you deem safe are allowed to connect to the
Azure SQL Database server or specific databases
contained within the server.
There are two types of firewall access rules you can
configure:
Those that allow IP addresses that you define
access to the entire Azure SQL Database server
and all the databases contained within it
Those that allow IP addresses that you define
access to specific databases contained within the
Azure SQL Database server
The default configuration is to block incoming
connections from all IP addresses. You must explicitly
configure firewall rules to allow incoming connections
from your preferred IP addresses.
The firewall logic is quite simple:
The firewall first checks to see whether the source
IP address in the request matches any server-
based rule. If the source IP address is on the list,
the connection is allowed.
If the source IP address is not on the list for the
server-based firewall rules, then it checks the
source IP address against the list of firewall rules
for databases contained within the firewall. If the
source IP address matches a rule that allows the
connection to a particular database, then the
connection is allowed.
If the source IP address doesn’t match any IP
address on any of the firewall rules, then the
connection attempt is dropped.
You can also configure applications from Azure to
connect to your database by using specialized firewall
rules.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about the Azure SQL Firewall and how to configure it, read
the article “Configure Azure SQL Database firewall rules - overview” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/sql-database-firewall-
configure.

SQL Always Encrypted allows sensitive data inside
client applications while keeping the encryption keys
outside the scope of the database engine. This
separates data owners and data managers. Data
owners control the data, and data managers can
manage the data without having any visibility into it.
Another benefit of SQL Always Encrypted is that it
makes encryption transparent to applications. A SQL
Always Encrypted driver is installed on the client
computer. This driver automatically encrypts and
decrypts data within the client application. The driver
encrypts the data in protected columns before sending it
to the database engine. In addition, it automatically
rewrites queries so that the semantics to the application
are preserved. This driver also transparently decrypts the
data that is stored in encrypted database columns, which
is contained in query results.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about SQL Always Encrypted, read the article “Always
Encrypted (Database Engine)” at
https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/mt163865.aspx.
Row-level security
SQL row-level security (RLS) makes it possible for
you to control access to rows in a database. Access
control to rows is based on the user context, such as a
user or group. RLS makes it easier to design and code
security in your applications.
For example, the feature helps ensure that users
access only the rows that are relevant to them, or
restricts customer access to only the data relevant to
their company. This capability helps you to enforce least
privilege throughout your organization and beyond.
Access restriction logic is located in the database tier,
in contrast to SQL Always Encrypted, which takes place
away from the data at the client tier. The database
service applies the access control each time there is an
attempt to access the data.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about row-level security, read the article “Row-Level
Security” at https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dn765131.aspx.
Transparent data encryption encrypts data at rest.
As described earlier in this chapter, data-at-rest
protection is critical to protect against situations
where the physical media might be stolen, which
could lead to an attacker restoring the data or
attaching a database and browsing the data.
One solution to the problem is to encrypt high-value
data in a database and protect the keys that are used to
encrypt the data by using a certificate. This prevents
anyone without the keys from using the data.
Transparent data encryption performs real-time
encryption and decryption of both data and log files. The
encryption process uses a database encryption key. The
database encryption key is:
A symmetric key secured by a certificate stored in
either the master database or the server.
An asymmetric key protected by an Extensible
Key Management module.
With this feature, you have the ability to comply with
your organization’s security requirements, in addition to
government and industry compliance directives.
Transparent data encryption enables software IT pros to
encrypt data by using AES-encryption and 3DES-
encryption algorithms without requiring the need for
developers to change existing applications.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about SQL transparent data encryption, read the article
“Transparent Data Encryption (TDE)” at
https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/bb934049.aspx.
Cell-level encryption does just what it sounds like: it
provides encryption at the cell level. It works similarly
to transparent data encryption; however, transparent
data encryption and cell-level encryption accomplish
two different objectives.
If the amount of data that must be encrypted is small
or if the application can be designed to use cell-level
encryption and if performance is not a concern, cell-level
encryption is recommended over transparent data
encryption. Otherwise, you should use transparent data
encryption for encrypting existing applications.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about cell-level encryption, read the article
“Recommendations for using Cell Level Encryption in Azure SQL
Database” at
http://i1.blogs.msdn.com/b/sqlsecurity/archive/2015/05/12/recommendatio
ns-for-using-cell-level-encryption-in-azure-sql-database.aspxv.

Dynamic data masking hides protected data in the
result set of a query over designated database fields
without changing the actual data contained within the
database. You don’t need to make any changes to your
application to use this feature because the masking
rules are applied in the results of the query when they
are sent back to the client from the server.
Consider the following scenario: a support
professional identifies users by digits used in users’
credit card numbers, phone numbers, or other personally
identifiable information (PII). However, you don’t want
all of the PII to be available to the support person.
With dynamic data masking, you can create a
masking rule that obfuscates any component of the PII
information in the result set of a query. This helps to
limit exposure of sensitive data and prevents users who
should not have access to the data from viewing it.
However, you should be aware that dynamic data
masking is not intended to prevent users from
connecting directly to a database and then running
queries that might expose sensitive data. Therefore,
consider dynamic data masking as a complement to
other Microsoft SQL Server security features discussed.
It is highly recommended that you use the dynamic data
masking feature in SQL Database.
More
More Info
Info
To learn more about dynamic data masking, read the article “Dynamic
Data Masking” at https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/mt130841.aspx.
Chapter 5. Virtual machine protection
with Antimalware
Regardless of the location of your compute resource, it is

important that you use all capabilities available to
enhance the overall security of that resource. A defense-
in-depth approach is also applicable in cloud computing.
For compute resources, this means having an
antimalware solution that can help you identify and
remove malicious software from these resources.
Microsoft Antimalware for Azure Cloud Services and
Virtual Machines is built on the same common
antimalware platform as Microsoft Security Essentials,
Microsoft Forefront Endpoint Protection, Microsoft
System Center Endpoint Protection, Microsoft Intune,
and Windows Defender for Windows 10, Windows 8.1,
and Windows 8. In this chapter, you learn how
Antimalware for Azure Virtual Machines works, how to
deploy it, and how to configure it to help protect your
virtual machines (VMs).
UNDERSTANDING THE ANTIMALWARE

SOLUTION
Administrators that are planning to implement
Antimalware should be aware that they can deploy it
in different ways according to the scenario, as shown
in Figure 5-1.
FIGURE 5-1 Antimalware deployment scenarios
As shown in Figure 5-1, regardless of the scenario, the

customer’s Azure storage is used to store the
antimalware event information. The event provider
source name is Microsoft Antimalware, which is
recorded by the Antimalware service. The Antimalware
service also uses the Azure Diagnostics extension to
collect these events from the Azure system into tables in
the customer’s Azure storage account.
Important
Important
In Windows Server 2016, Microsoft Antimalware is called Windows

Defender.
App developers can also use Antimalware Scan
Interface (AMSI), which is a generic interface standard
that allows applications and services to integrate with
any antimalware product present on a machine. AMSI is
mostly suitable for in-memory content that never
accesses a disk. For anything that actually is located in a
disk, you usually need to do a dedicated scan on it only if
real-time scanning is off, unless the location is excluded
or this file is such an expensive package (for example,
.zip or .cab) that the antivirus engine chooses to not
extract individual files inside it due to performance
reasons.
More
More Info
Info
For more information about the capabilities of AMSI, go to
https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dn889588(v=vs.85).a
spx.
Keeping the core scenarios in mind, you can use the

following table as a reference to choose the deployment
option that fits your organization’s requirements.
The deployment options shown in the table are also

applicable for daily operations and management tasks.
IT administrators can use the Azure portal or PowerShell
cmdlets to push the Antimalware extension package file
to the Azure system at a predetermined fixed location.
One component that runs in the fabric level (Azure guest
agent) launches the Antimalware Extension and applies
the Antimalware configuration settings supplied as
input. This means that you can enable the Antimalware
service with either default or custom configuration
settings.
After the initial deployment is done and Antimalware
is running in the system, the service automatically
downloads the latest protection engine and signature
definitions from Microsoft.
Antimalware
Antimalware under
under the
the hood
hood
Microsoft Antimalware is designed to run in the background without
human intervention. You can deploy protection and monitoring based on
the needs of your application workloads to enable real-time protection,
scheduled scanning, malware remediation, protection updates, and active
protection, and you can enable antimalware event collection to your
storage account for insight into the antimalware service health.
Microsoft Antimalware Client and Service is installed by default in a

disabled state in all cloud services. You can enable the Antimalware
service with either basic secure-by-default or advanced custom
antimalware configuration. The default configuration settings have been
preoptimized for running in the Azure environment. You can customize the
default antimalware configuration settings as required for your Azure
application or service deployment and apply them for the Antimalware
deployment scenarios. Antimalware Client and Service is not installed by
default in the VM’s platform; it is available as an optional security
extension.
Rakesh Narayan
Program Manager, Microsoft Azure Antimalware Team
ANTIMALWARE DEPLOYMENT
The first step to deploy Antimalware is to add the
extension to your subscription. Complete the
following steps to perform this task:
1. Access the Azure portal and sign in to an Azure
account that has administrative privileges.
2. In the Azure portal, select New.
3. In the Search box, enter Antimalware, and then
select Microsoft Antimalware.
4. Select the Microsoft Antimalware that has VM
Extensions in the category column, as shown in
the last line in Figure 5-2.
FIGURE 5-2 Selecting the correct version of
Antimalware
5. On the Microsoft Antimalware blade, select

Create.
6. On the Add Extension blade (see Figure 5-3), you
can enter a list of files, folders, file extensions,
and processes that should be excluded from the
scanning. By default, Real-Time Protection is
enabled, and you should keep it that way unless
you have business justifications to change it. The
other default options are suitable for most cases;
you should evaluate how these options match
your current antimalware solution on-premises
and see whether changes are necessary. After you
configure your settings, select OK and close all
other blades.
FIGURE 5-3 The Add Extension blade showing the
Microsoft Antimalware deployment options
When you provision a new VM and you want to add

Microsoft Antimalware during this provisioning process,
you use the options that you configured in the previous
steps. The same applies for adding the Microsoft
Antimalware extension to existing VMs.
Antimalware deployment to an existing VM
For scenarios where you already have VMs running in
your Azure infrastructure, you can use the Azure
portal to provision Antimalware. It is important to
note that VMs created in 2015 or earlier that have an
old version of the Virtual Machine guest agent might
need to be manually updated to a newer version of the
Virtual Machine guest agent before you deploy the
antimalware. The older version of the Virtual Machine
guest agent has an issue that results in the %temp%
folder being filled with log files, and that prevents the
antimalware installation from succeeding.
Complete the following steps to deploy Microsoft
Antimalware to an existing VM:
1. Access the Azure portal and sign in with an Azure
2. In the left navigation pane, select Virtual
Machines, and then select the VM that you want
to deploy Microsoft Antimalware on. A new blade,
with the same name as the VM, opens.
3. On the new blade, select Settings (shown in
Figure 5-4).
FIGURE 5-4 Options for the new blade
4. On the Settings blade, select Extensions.

5. On the Extensions blade, select Add (+).
6. On the New Resource blade, select Microsoft
Antimalware (see Figure 5-5).
FIGURE 5-5 Adding the Microsoft Antimalware
extension

Create.
8. On the Install Extension blade, make the
appropriate changes according to your business
requirements, and then select OK.
In the upper-right corner, a deployment progress
bar appears (see Figure 5-6).
FIGURE 5-6 The deployment progress bar
When this deployment finishes, the Extensions

blade changes to show the IaaSAntimalware
extension with the status of Provisioning
Succeeded (see Figure 5-7).
FIGURE 5-7 Extension showing the current

provision status
9. To view more details about this extension, select

the extension to open the IaaSAntimalware blade
(see Figure 5-8).
FIGURE 5-8 Microsoft Antimalware fully

provisioned and ready to use
10. Close all blades and return to the main
dashboard.
After you finish this deployment, you can verify that
the provisioning succeeded in the VM itself. You can
perform a validation test and verify that the Antimalware
process is running in the background. You can view the
process by opening Task Manager and going to the
Background Processes tab (see Figure 5-9).
FIGURE 5-9 Microsoft Antimalware Service
By default, the antimalware files are installed in

%ProgramFiles%\Microsoft Security Client. The
Antimalware user interface (UI) is not available in the
VM; however, you can create custom policies to turn the
UI on if your organization needs that. You can also use
the mpcmdrun command line in the VM itself if you need
to perform a manual scan. The following example shows
a custom scan (scantype = 3) against an EICAR virus test
file.
c:\>"\Program Files\Microsoft Security Client"\mpcmdr

EICAR-131034157784199385.txt
Scan starting...
Scan finished.
Scanning c:\EICAR-131034157784199385.txt found 1 thre
Cleaning started...
Cleaning finished.
More
More Info
Info
You can find more information about EICAR at www.eicar.org. To learn
how to create custom policies to turn on the UI, read the blog at
https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/azuresecurity/2016/03/09/enabling-
microsoft-antimalware-user-interface-post-deployment.
Enabling Antimalware through the Azure portal does

1
not enable its diagnostics logs . However, if you use
PowerShell for Antimalware to enable it, PowerShell has
an option to enable diagnostics logs. The following is an
example of how to perform that via PowerShell.
1
For more information about this behavior, go to
https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/azuresecurity/2016/04/19/enabl
ing-diagnostics-logging-for-azure-antimalware.
PS C:\> Add-AzureAccount
PS C:\> Select-AzureSubscription -SubscriptionName "<
PS C:\> $StorageContext = New-AzureStorageContext -St
account name>" -StorageAccountKey (Get-AzureStorage
storage account name>").Primary
PS C:\> Set-AzureServiceAntimalwareExtension -Service
name>" -Monitoring ON -StorageContext $StorageConte
If you need to deploy Antimalware via PowerShell for

Azure Resource Manager VMs, you use the Set-
AzureRmVMExtension cmdlet. Be sure to install Azure
2
PowerShell release 1.3.0 or later on the computer that
you will use to manage your Azure infrastructure. After
doing that, complete the following steps:
2
If you don’t have Azure PowerShell installed, follow the information
in the article at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/powershell-
install-configure.
1. Run the Azure PowerShell cmdlet.

2. Enter Login-AzureRmAccount, and then
press Enter.
3. If you receive a message asking whether you want
to enable data collection, read it, and then enter Y
(Yes) or N (No) according to your organization’s
policy.
4. When a pop-up window appears asking for your
Azure credentials, use an account that has
permission from the subscription level. Enter
your credentials, and then select Sign In.
5. If this is the first time you are interacting with
Azure PowerShell, you might have to run Install-
Module AzureRM to install the Azure Resource
Manager modules from the PowerShell Gallery,
and Install-Module Azure to install the Azure
Service Management module from the PowerShell
Gallery.
6. If you have multiple subscriptions and want to
specify the one you want to use, enter Get-
AzureRmSubscription to see the subscriptions
for your account.
7. To specify the subscription you want to use, enter
the following command.
Get-AzureRmSubscription –SubscriptionName "yo

Select-AzureRmSubscription
8. After doing that, you can use the following

3
sample script.
3
For more information about this script, go to
https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/azuresecurity/2016/02/24/upda
te-on-microsoft-antimalware-and-azure-resource-manager-arm-
vms.
# Script to add Microsoft Antimalware extensi

(IAAS V2) VM's
# specify location, resource group, and VM fo
#$location = "LOCATION HERE" # eg., "Southeas
#$resourceGroupName = "RESOURCE GROUP NAME HE
#$vmName = "VM NAME HERE"
# JSON configuration file can be customized a
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn
$settingString = '{ "AntimalwareEnabled": tru
# retrieve the most recent version number of
$allVersions= (Get-AzureRmVMExtensionImage -L
$versionString = $allVersions[($allVersions.c
$allVersions[($allVersions.count)-1].Split(".
# set the extension using prepared values
Set-AzureRmVMExtension -ResourceGroupName $re
-Name "IaaSAntimalware" -Publisher "Microsoft
"IaaSAntimalware" -TypeHandlerVersion $versio
-Location $location
More
More Info
Info
You can use PowerShell to deploy non-Microsoft antimalware solutions
also. Read more about deployment of other antimalware solutions at
https://azure.microsoft.com/blog/deploying-antimalware-solutions-on-
azure-virtual-machines.
Antimalware deployment to a new VM

You can install Antimalware during the provisioning
process of a new VM. Complete the following steps to
create a new VM and enable Antimalware by using a
Resource Manager VM:
1. Access the Azure portal and sign in with an Azure
2. In the left navigation pane, select Virtual
Machines.
3. On the Virtual Machines blade, select Add (+).
4. Select the operating system that you want to
deploy; in this case the selection is Windows
Server.
5. On the Windows Server blade, select the template
that you want to use; in this case the selection is
Windows Server 2012 Datacenter.
6. On the Windows Server 2012 Datacenter blade,
in the Select A Deployment Model list, ensure that
Resource Manager is selected, and then select
Create.
7. On the Create Virtual Machine blade, fill in the
basic information (step 1) according to your
needs, select the size of the VM (step 2), and then
in Settings (step 3), select Extensions. The
Extensions blade opens, as shown in Figure 5-10.
FIGURE 5-10 Extensions blade available during the

VM creation
8. Select Add Extension, and then on the New

Resource blade (see Figure 5-11), select Microsoft
Antimalware.
FIGURE 5-11 Selecting Microsoft Antimalware as an

extension
Create.
10. On the Install Extension blade (see Figure 5-12),
configure the settings according to your
requirements, and then select OK.
FIGURE 5-12 Configuring Microsoft Antimalware

deployment settings
11. With Microsoft Antimalware selected, return to

the Extensions blade. Select OK to proceed, and
then on the Summary blade, select OK again.
The VM provisioning process starts. When it
completes, antimalware will be installed on your VM.
4
You can perform the same step by using PowerShell.
For Microsoft Antimalware extension selection via
PowerShell, use the following sample code.
4
For information about how to use PowerShell to do this step, go to
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/virtual-
machines-windows-create-powershell.
{
"publisher": "Microsoft.Azure.Security",
"type": "IaaSAntimalware",
"typeHandlerVersion": "1.2",
"settings": {
"AntimalwareEnabled": "true",
"ExclusionsPaths": "Optional : ExclusionsPath
"ExclusionsExtensions": "Optional : Exclusion
"ExclusionsProcesses": "Optional : Exclusions
"RealtimeProtectionEnabled": "Optional : True
"ScheduledScanSettingsIsEnabled": "Optional :
"ScheduledScanSettingsScanType": "Optional :
"ScheduledScanSettingsDay": "Optional : Sunda
"ScheduledScanSettingsTime": "Optional : When
measured in minutes from midnight,0-1440"
}
}
After finishing the deployment process, you can

access the VM’s settings by going to Audit Logs and
verifying that a Write Extensions operation performed
successfully, as shown in Figure 5-13.
FIGURE 5-13 Write extensions operation
successfully performed
When you select the Write Extensions operation, the

Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/extensions/write
blade opens with a detailed log explanation of all
IaaSAntimalware extension operations. If you want to
view more details, you can select the extension to open
the Detail blade, as shown in Figure 5-14. (Some
information is hidden to preserve the privacy of the
tenant.)
FIGURE 5-14 Details about the Write Extensions
operation
This can be useful information for troubleshooting

scenarios, for example to obtain more details about the
reason the extension failed to install.
More
More Info
Info
The easiest way to monitor your VMs for antimalware compliance is by

using Azure Security Center, which is described in more detail in Chapter
7, “Azure resource management security.”
Antimalware removal
You can quickly perform the uninstall process for
Antimalware by using Azure portal. Open the VM’s
settings, select Extensions, and then on the
Extensions blade, select the IaaSAntimalware
extension, as shown in Figure 5-15.
FIGURE 5-15 Removing an extension via VM

settings
After you open the IaaSAntimalware blade, shown in

Figure 5-16, select Uninstall. When you receive a prompt
to confirm that you want to remove this extension, select
Yes to proceed.
FIGURE 5-16 Option to remove the
IaaSAntimalware extension
You can view the Audit Logs again to confirm that the
Remove Extension operation performed correctly, as
shown in Figure 5-17. You can also use the Remove-
5
AzureVMMicrosoftAntimalwareExtension PowerShell
cmdlet to remove the antimalware extension from your
VM.
5
For more information about the Remove-
AzureVMMicrosoftAntimalwareExtension cmdlet, go to
https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dn771720.aspx.
FIGURE 5-17 Delete Extensions operation accepted
Important
Important
As a best practice, you should always install an antimalware solution on a

VM.
Chapter 6. Key management in Azure
with Key Vault
As explained in Chapter 4, “Data and storage security,”

data encryption is important regardless of where your
data is located. However, when planning to adopt data
encryption, you should also plan how to manage the
encryption keys because if the keys are compromised, the
data is no longer secure. In the cloud, you can take
advantage of the Microsoft Azure Key Vault service to
safeguard cryptographic keys and other secrets used by
cloud apps and services. This chapter explains in more
detail how Key Vault works and how to implement it.
KEY VAULT OVERVIEW

Organizations migrating to the cloud should keep
control of their data’s security, and one of the primary
elements of data security is encryption. Some
organizations also have to be compliant with
regulatory requirements for data encryption, for
example, organizations that are under Federal
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2 level
1
2 . Some cryptographic models validated by FIPS 140-
2
2 are hardware based, which leads some
organizations to adopt a hardware security module
(HSM). Key Vault might contain a mix of keys and
secrets, and access for the two types of objects is
independently controlled.
1
For more information about FIPS 140-2, go to
csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/standards.html.
2
For a list of validated cryptographic models, go to
csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm.
One important concept to keep in mind is the

difference between a secret and a key. A secret is any
sequence of bytes under 10 kilobytes (KB) and used by
authorized users and apps to write and read back the
secret value. Key Vault stores these secrets by encrypting
them with a unique key per vault. A key refers to a
cryptographic key, such as RSA 2048. The key is used by
authorized users and apps to import the key or ask the
service to generate one key for them. In this case,
authorized users cannot read it back; they must ask the
service to decrypt or sign with the key. This provides
higher isolation, at the cost of higher latency because
every decryption requires a remote call to the service. If
your app needs frequent, low-latency access to a key (for
example, Secure Sockets Layer [SSL] keys), then the key
should be stored as a secret. If your app reads the key at
runtime and uses it locally, and the security is more
important than performance, it should be stored as a key.
As organizations start to evaluate which key
management solution they should adopt based on their
business requirements and on a solution’s usefulness in
the cloud and on-premises, common requirements might
arise, such as:
I need to control the lifecycle of my encryption
keys.
I want to control keys for my cloud apps from a
single place.
I need to keep encryption keys in the
country/region.
I need to keep encryption keys on-premises.
I need to keep encryption keys in dedicated
HSMs.
Key Vault is the cloud-based solution for these
requirements. Key Vault normalizes the key management
process and helps organizations maintain control of keys
that access and encrypt their data. In addition,
developers can quickly create keys for development and
testing apps, and then seamlessly migrate them to
production keys. Security administrators can grant (and
revoke) permission to keys as needed. Figure 6-1 shows
an example of the process.
FIGURE 6-1 Key Vault solution for key management
As shown in Figure 6-1, developers can use Key Vault

to create and manage keys. This can be done via the
REST API, PowerShell, the command-line interface
(CLI), or an Azure Resource Manager template. Security
administrators are in charge of creating or importing a
key or secret, revoking or deleting a key, authorizing
users or applications to access the Key Vault, and
configuring and monitoring key usage. Security
administrators also provide the URIs that developers will
use to call from their applications, and provide IT
administrators with key usage logging information.
More
More Info
Info
For more information about the Key Vault REST API, go to
https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/azure/dn903609.aspx.
After the developer gets used to using Key Vault to

protect the keys and deploy the app into production,
scale and quickly deploying other apps becomes easier,
FIGURE 6-2 Final app deployment
Although developers can benefit from Key Vault,

other scenarios can also benefit from this key
management capability, as shown in the following table.
In all these scenarios, Key Vault manages the keys
and the secret; however, the customer is responsible for
controlling their Key Vault. All requests to Key Vault
must be authenticated. Key Vault supports Azure Active
Directory access tokens that can be obtained by using
OAuth2.
APP CONFIGURATION FOR KEY VAULT

As described previously, you can use Key Vault in
multiple scenarios, such as the Azure Disk Encryption
scenario, which was explained in Chapter 4. Another
common scenario is to configure apps to use Key
Vault. For that, you need to create a service principal
name for the app, create a Key Vault, configure the
access control list (ACL), configure your code to use
Key Vault, and build and run your app.
Complete the following steps to configure your app to
use Key Vault:
1. Access the Azure portal, and then sign in to an
Azure account that has administrative privileges.
2. In the Azure portal, select Browse.
3. Select Active Directory.
4. When you are redirected to the old Azure portal,
select the directory that will host the application,
and then go to the Applications tab.
5. If this is a new app, select Add, and then select
Add An Application My Organization Is
Developing (see Figure 6-3).
FIGURE 6-3 Selecting the type of application that

you want to add
6. In the Tell Us About Your Application dialog box,

enter the application name, and then select Web
Application And/Or Web App (see Figure 6-4).
FIGURE 6-4 Naming the application and selecting
the application’s type
7. Select Next (the right arrow) to open the App

Properties dialog box. In the dialog box, enter the
Sign-On URL for this app and the App ID URI
(see Figure 6-5). Then select Complete (the check
mark).
FIGURE 6-5 URL sign-on information and app ID
The app page with the name of your app appears,

FIGURE 6-6 App page
8. On the Configure tab, near the bottom of the

page, select Copy to the right of the Client ID box
(see Figure 6-7).
FIGURE 6-7 Available options to configure the app
9. In the list in the Keys section, select 1 Year (see

Figure 6-8).
FIGURE 6-8 Creating a key valid for one year
10. Select Save.

11. When the save process completes, notice the value
in the Keys section. Select Copy next to this value
(see Figure 6-9).
FIGURE 6-9 The key value appears after saving the

app’s configuration
This completes the creation of the service principal

name. Next, you create the Key Vault and configure the
ACLs. For this, you need to start Azure PowerShell.
Important
Important
Always use the latest version of PowerShell from
https://github.com/Azure/azure-powershell/releases.
Create the Key Vault and configure the ACLs by

completing the following steps:
1. Run the Azure PowerShell cmdlet.
2. Enter Login-AzureRMAccount, and then
press Enter.
3. When a dialog box opens asking for your Azure
credentials, be sure you use an account that has
permission from the subscription level. Enter
your credentials, and then select Sign In.
4. If this is the first time you are interacting with
Azure PowerShell, you might need to run Install-
Module AzureRM to install the Azure Resource
Manager modules and the Azure Service
Management module from the PowerShell
Gallery.
5. Enter the following command, replacing
DemoApp1 with the name of the resource group
that you want to create, and ensure that the
location matches your needs.
New-AzureRmResourceGroup -Name DemoApp1 -Loca
6. In the output for this command, verify that the

ProvisionStage value is Succeeded. Next, enter the
following command to create a new Key Vault.
Replace DemoAppContoso with the name of your
Key Vault and ensure that the resource group
matches the resource group created in the
previous step.
New-AzureRmKeyVault -VaultName DemoAppContoso

-Location "Central US" -Sku Standard
The output of this command should look similar

to the following (note that some fields are marked
with XXX to preserve the privacy of the
subscription).
Vault Name : DemoAppContoso

Resource Group Name : DemoApp1
Location : Central US
Resource ID : /subscriptions/XXX
providers/Microsof
Vault URI : https://DemoAppCon
Tenant ID : XXX
SKU : Standard
Enabled For Deployment? : False
Enabled For Template Deployment? : False
Enabled For Disk Encryption? : False
Access Policies :
Tenant ID : XXX
Object ID : 432aed01-79a4-46c7
Application ID :
Display Name : Yuri Diogenes
Permissions to Keys : get, create, delet
backup, restore
Permissions to Secrets : all
Important
Important
Take note of the Key Vault URI; you will need it later.
7. Configure the Access Policy by entering the

following command.
Set-AzureRmKeyVaultAccessPolicy -VaultName De
DemoApp1
-ServicePrincipalName 75842e34-35bf-4e17-80
-PermissionsToKeys all -PermissionsToSecret
The –ServicePrincipalName parameter in this

case is the Client ID that was obtained in step 8 of
the previous procedure, when you were
configuring the app. This command grants full
access to all keys and secrets for this app. This
command has no output if it executes correctly.
This completes the Key Vault configuration. Now that
you have an app and the Key Vault associated with it, you
need to make changes in your code.
More
More Info
Info
If you do not have an application, you can download a sample app for Key
Vault from https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=45343.
The first step is to open the application configuration

file (App.config). Application configuration files contain
settings specific to an application. This file contains
configuration settings that the common language
runtime (CLR) reads (such as assembly binding policy or
remoting objects), and settings that the application can
read. If you use the sample code mentioned previously,
you should see content similar to that shown in Figure 6-
10.
FIGURE 6-10 Sample code for the App.config file
You need to replace the following lines with

information that was generated during the previous
steps.
<add key="VaultUrl" value="URL to your Vault" />

<add key="AuthClientId" value="Client Id of your Serv
<add key="AuthClientSecret" value="Client Secret of y
After finishing it, you can build the solution by using

Microsoft Visual Studio and run the application.
More
More Info
Info
For information about Key Vault, read the Developer’s Guide at

https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/key-vault-developers-
guide.
KEY VAULT EVENT MONITORING
When you work with technical security controls, you
should ensure that monitoring is also included in the
solution. One advantage of using Key Vault is that the
events are integrated with the Azure platform;
therefore, when you associated your Key Vault with
the resource group, events were logged in that
particular resource group. Complete the following
steps to access these events:
1. Access the Azure portal and sign in to an Azure
2. In the Azure portal, select Browse, and then enter
resource groups. Select this option when it
appears.
3. Select the resource group that was created
previously, select Settings, and then select Audit
Logs (see Figure 6-11).
FIGURE 6-11 Accessing the audit logs for the

resource group that was created
4. On the Events blade, note the timeline of events

and the type of event (see Figure 6-12).
FIGURE 6-12 The Events blade shows a timeline of
events and the operation that was done
5. When you select the event (in this case, use the
Error event), another blade that has more details
about the event opens (see Figure 6-13).
FIGURE 6-13 More details about the operations that
generated this event
6. To see a detailed explanation about the error

event, open the Detail blade by selecting the event
(see Figure 6-14). (Some information has been
removed to preserve the subscription privacy.)
FIGURE 6-14 The Detail blade with a full
description of the error
On the Detail blade, you can look at the Properties

setting to obtain an explanation of the operation that
failed. In this case, the explanation is as follows.
statusCode:Conflict serviceRequestId:
statusMessage:{"error":{"code":"VaultAlreadyExists"
already in use."}}
In bold is the explanation for this error, which is a

conflict that occurred while creating the Key Vault by
using a name that already exists. This error also appears
in the PowerShell console immediately after running the
command.
Chapter 7. Azure resource
management security
Nowadays it is much harder for IT administrators to

assess the security of cloud resources, which are often
managed by DevOps, distributed across subscriptions,
rapidly uploaded and downloaded, and include virtual
machines (VMs) and platform as a service (PaaS)
services. Because IT administrators lack important
security insights, their approach to date has been to slow
down or block cloud deployments. Focus has shifted and
IT administrators are now looking for ways to help
DevOps teams who manage cloud deployments but are
not cloud security experts, to ensure that the right
protections are in place. In addition, enterprises bring
with them the same challenges they have on-premises
today.
This chapter explains how Microsoft Azure Security
Center can be used for continuous security monitoring
and how its integration security management can help IT
administrators gain visibility and control of their Azure
resources.
AZURE SECURITY CENTER OVERVIEW

Azure Security Center is an Azure service that can be
used to monitor your infrastructure as a service (IaaS)
resources, such as Azure Virtual Machines and Azure
Virtual Network, in addition to PaaS resources such
1
as Azure SQL Database . Security Center can help you
to prevent, detect, and respond to threats with
increased visibility and control over the security of
your Azure resources. IT administrators can use a
dashboard to view the security state of all your Azure
resources. This enables them to verify that the
appropriate security controls are in place and identify
which resources require attention. Figure 7-1 shows a
diagram of an architecture overview of the solution.
1
1
When this chapter was written, Azure Security Center was still in
Public Preview. New capabilities might be available by the time you
read this chapter. For the latest news about this service, visit
https://azure.microsoft.com/services/security-center.
FIGURE 7-1 The Azure Security Center core
architecture
Security Center can monitor one or more
subscriptions while keeping a centralized view of all
resources through the dashboard. To detect threats,
Azure Security Center uses global threat intelligence
from Microsoft products and services, the Microsoft
Digital Crimes Unit (DCU), the Microsoft Security
Response Center (MSRC), and external feeds. For
detection purposes, it also applies advanced analytics,
including machine learning and behavioral analysis.
IT administrators can define policies for your Azure
subscriptions and resource groups based on your
organization’s security requirements, the types of
applications that you use, and the sensitivity of your
data. By using these policies, IT administrators can
prevent and mitigate threats.
If your organization already has a Security Incident
2
Response Process in place, it can include Security
Center as part of its process, because Security Center
provides insights into the source of the attack and
impacted resources, prioritizes security of incidents or
alerts, and suggests remediation steps for the current
attack.
2
For more information about Security Incident Response, read the
article “Why Create a Security Incident Response Process” at
https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc512623.aspx.
Important
Important
You can use Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) to delegate
administrative tasks to other IT personnel based on the need to access
information. For more information about this, read “Azure Security Center
Planning and Operations Guide” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/security-center-
planning-and-operations-guide.
Detection capabilities
Security Center uses a combination of advanced
detection capabilities that are necessary to identify
3
threats throughout the entire attack. The following
table shows the four methods that are used by
Security Center to detect threats.
3
3
For more information, refer to the paper “A Discussion of Threat
Behavior: Attackers & Patterns” by Jonathan A. Espenschied at
http://aka.ms/bupuqk.
Management
Management of
of emerging
emerging threats
threats in
in Security
Security Center
Center
The threat landscape is rapidly evolving, and so is your IT environment.
Keeping up with both can be a challenge. The volume and sophistication
of attacks continues to increase, and new vectors are being exploited to
target cloud resources. Meanwhile, management of cloud workloads is
increasingly distributed across the organization, creating complexity for IT
security teams tasked with mitigating risk and defending against cyber
threats.
Azure Security Center provides the visibility organizations need to assess

the security state of their cloud workloads, identifies vulnerabilities and
recommends mitigations, and uses advanced analytics to detect active
threats. In addition, Security Center integrates with an ecosystem of
partners, making it easy for organizations to deploy and monitor a variety
of security solutions, like endpoint protection, firewalls, and more. Security
information from the organization’s Azure virtual machines, Azure services
like SQL Database, the Azure network, and integrated partner solutions is
analyzed by using Microsoft global threat intelligence and security
analytics, including machine learning. When suspicious activity is
detected, a security alert is created with details about the source of the
attack and recommendations on how to respond.
Security Center researchers and data scientists continuously monitor

threat intelligence from across the Azure platform and from customers,
and share insights from other Microsoft products and services to identify
trends, new attack tactics, and malicious actors. This helps Microsoft keep
pace with attackers and innovate quickly in response to emerging threats.
Sarah Fender
Principal Program Manager, Azure Security Center Team
These detections are dynamic and are based on

ongoing security research and collaboration among
different areas within Microsoft. Microsoft threat
intelligence monitoring shares analysis across Microsoft
security products and services. Different teams are
continuously working in specialized fields, like forensics
and web attack detections. The result of this is the
culmination of new detection algorithms, which are
validated and tuned. This process flow often results in
new security insights or threat intelligence that informs
security research.
ONBOARD RESOURCES IN AZURE
SECURITY CENTER
The first step to enable Azure Security Center for your
subscription is to opt in by enabling data collection.
When you enable data collection in the subscription,
all resource groups inherit the same security policy.
However, if your organization requires different
polices per resource group, you can disable
inheritance and configure unique policies.
When you are onboarding new resources, it is
recommended that you enable all policies; this ensures
that all security recommendations are evaluated. IT
administrators are often not fully aware of what is
running on VMs in the cloud. When you enable all
prevention policies, you receive accurate information
regarding the security state of your resources. The
prevention policies available are as follows:
System updates This policy verifies whether the
operating system running in the VMs monitored
by Security Center is fully updated.
Baseline rules This policy verifies the VM
settings against a set of security baseline rules to
verify whether the VMs are using a recommended
configuration. Security Center uses Common
4
Configuration Enumeration (CCE) to assign
unique identifiers for configuration rules.
4
You can download a Microsoft Excel file with all these rules from
https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/Azure-Security-Center-
a789e335.
Endpoint Protection This policy verifies

whether the VM has an endpoint protection
solution installed on it. If it does not, Endpoint
Protection suggests installing one.
Network Security Group This policy evaluates
your network security group and makes
recommendations according to the current
configuration.
Web Application Firewall This policy
evaluates whether there are web applications
exposed to vulnerabilities and suggests the
installation of a WAF solution.
Next Generation Firewall This policy verifies
the current networking configuration and, based
on the current configuration, might suggest an
installation of a next-generation firewall solution.
SQL Auditing This policy evaluates your current
SQL Azure PaaS solution and verifies whether
auditing is enabled in the database. If it is not
enabled, SQL Auditing suggests that you enable it.
SQL Transparent Data Encryption This
policy evaluates your current SQL Azure PaaS
solution and verifies whether the database has
transparent data encryption enabled.
Security
Security Center
Center detection
detection under
under the
the hood
hood
Azure Security Center uses a multi-layer approach to detect attacks on
your Azure environment. The first layer is Network Analytics, which is
used to detect incoming brute-force attacks and compromised machines
(bots) that are used for malicious activity (for example, sending spam).
This layer heavily uses machine learning to build usage profiles in order to
accurately perform the detections. The second layer is Virtual Machines
Behavior Analysis, which detects suspicious behavior on the VM by
analyzing security events and processes crash dumps. The third layer
includes alerts sent from deployed partner solutions and alerts generated
by the Azure resources themselves. Lastly, Azure Security Center fuses
the alerts from the different layers into incidents, which detail the attack
timeline and what the attacker actually performed.
Daniel Alon
Principal Program Manager, Azure Security Center Team
Complete the following steps to enable data collection

for your subscription:
1. Access the Azure portal and sign in to your Azure
subscription by using an account that has
administrative privileges.
2. In the Azure portal sidebar, select Security Center
to display the main dashboard (Figure 7-2).
FIGURE 7-2 The Security Center main dashboard
3. Select the Policy tile, and when the Security
Policy blade opens, select the subscription that
you want to use to enable Azure Security Center.
Another Security Policy blade opens, as shown in
Figure 7-3.
FIGURE 7-3 The Security Policy blade with data

collection options
4. Under Data Collection, select On, and then select

Prevention Policy. When the Prevention Policy
blade opens, change the recommendation of all
policies to On, as shown in Figure 7-4, and then
click OK.
FIGURE 7-4 Prevention Policy options
5. On the Security Policy blade, click Save, and then

close the next two blades.
APPLY RECOMMENDATIONS
After you enable prevention policy, you need to wait
until Security Center initializes the data collection
process on all VMs that belong to the subscription (or
resource group) that you selected. The amount of time
it takes for this process to finish varies according to
the number of VMs and settings available on each
machine.
When this process completes, the recommendations
are displayed in the Prevention section of the Security
Center dashboard. In this section, you can view the
recommendations under Resource Security Health or on
the Recommendations tile, as shown in Figure 7-5.
FIGURE 7-5 The Prevention section in Azure
Security Center.
To see a comprehensive list of recommendations

organized by severity (see Figure 7-6), select the
Recommendations tile.
FIGURE 7-6 The Recommendations blade with the
entire list of recommendations
The recommendation list gives you a summary of the

issue, the affected resources, whether the issue was
addressed or is still open, and how critical this issue is. If
the recommendations are false positives or are not
important for your environment, you can select the
ellipsis next to the recommendation and then select
Dismiss (see Figure 7-7).
FIGURE 7-7 Dismissing a recommendation
Each recommendation has its own process flow,

which means that although the overall experience in
viewing the recommendation is the same, the process to
address the recommendation might change according to
the resource. For example, in place of installing
Antimalware in an Azure VM, as described in Chapter 5,
“Virtual machine protection with Antimalware,” with
Security Center, you can follow the Install Endpoint
Protection recommendation to deploy an Antimalware
solution directly from this dashboard. When you select
the Install Endpoint Protection recommendation, the
Install Endpoint Protection blade opens, as shown in
Figure 7-8.
FIGURE 7-8 Virtual machines that are missing

endpoint protection
By default, all VMs that are missing protection are

selected, and you can deploy the antimalware solution by
clicking Install On 4 VMs (the name of the button
changes according to the number of VMs). If you do this,
the Select Endpoint Protection blade opens and you can
choose which solution you want to deploy, as shown in
Figure 7-9.
FIGURE 7-9 Selecting an endpoint protection
solution
If you select Microsoft Antimalware, the solution will

be free. If you select another solution, you must have the
appropriate license for the product.
Resource security health

You can also view the recommendations by using the
resource security health, which breaks down the
resources into four categories: Virtual Machines,
Networking, SQL, and Applications. Note that all the
categories are displayed only if your current workload
has each category. For example, if you don’t see SQL
under Resource Security Health, it is because you
don’t have an Azure SQL Server.
The first resource is Virtual Machines, which has a
collection of recommendations that are relevant to all
VMs monitored by Security Center. When you select this
option, the Virtual Machines blade opens, as shown in
Figure 7-10.
FIGURE 7-10 The Virtual Machines blade with all
relevant recommendations for this type of resource
The Monitoring Recommendations section of this

blade shows the status of the data collection initialization
in the current VMs. The Virtual Machine section has the
same recommendations that you viewed previously in
the Recommendations tile. The only difference is the way
the information is presented; this view shows the total of
VMs affected by each recommendation. The Virtual
Machines section provides a comprehensive table that
you can use to quickly assess the current security state of
the VMs.
The second resource is Networking, which has a
collection of recommendations that are relevant to all
virtual networks monitored by Security Center. When
you select this option, the Networking blade opens, as
FIGURE 7-11 The Networking blade with all relevant
recommendations for this type of resource
The Networking Recommendations section of this

blade has the same recommendations that you viewed
previously in the Recommendations tile. Critical (red)
recommendations always appear at the top. In the
example shown in Figure 7-11, the first recommendation
is to install a Next Generation Firewall (NGFW). This
option uses Microsoft partners that are able to provide
this type of solution through Security Center. When you
select this recommendation, the Add A Next Generation
Firewall blade opens, as shown in Figure 7-12.
FIGURE 7-12 The Add A Next Generation Firewall

blade with the endpoints that need this type of
solution
At this point, you can select the endpoint on which

you want to install the NFGW. When the Add A Next
Generation Firewall blade opens, click Create New and
5
select the partner solution for this recommendation, as
5
In the example shown in Figure 7-13, the partner solution available is
Check Point. You can obtain more information about this solution at
https://www.checkpoint.com/products/vsec-microsoft-azure.
FIGURE 7-13 Adding a next generation firewall
solution from a Microsoft partner
The Internet Facing Endpoints section in the

Networking blade has the endpoint names and their
status. From there, you can easily identify whether each
endpoint has a Network Security Group (NSG) or an
NGFW assigned to it.
The Networking Topology section provides a
hierarchical view of the virtual network, subnet, and VM.
For each element of this hierarchical tree, you have the
NSG status.
More
More Info
Info
For more information about Network Security Group (NSG), see Chapter
3, “Azure network security.”
The third resource is SQL, which has a collection of

recommendations that are relevant to all Azure SQL
Databases that are monitored by Security Center. When
you select this option, the SQL blade opens, as shown in
Figure 7-14.
FIGURE 7-14 SQL blade in Security Center
The SQL Recommendations section of this blade has

the same recommendations that you viewed previously
in the Recommendations tile. The process to apply a
recommendation is similar to the resources previously
described. For example, in this case, the first
recommendation is Server Auditing Not Enabled. If you
select this recommendation, the Enable Auditing On SQL
Servers blade opens, from where you can identify which
SQL Server needs this setting to be enabled. When you
6
select it, the Auditing Settings blade opens, and from
there you can enable auditing, as shown in Figure 7-15.
6
For more information about Azure SQL Server auditing, read the
article “Get started with SQL database auditing” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/sql-database-
auditing-get-started.
FIGURE 7-15 Steps to enable auditing capability in
SQL Server
The SQL section of the SQL blade has a hierarchical

view of each SQL Server and its database, along with the
security recommendations for auditing and TDE.
The fourth resource is Applications, which has a
collection of recommendations relevant to all Internet
Information Services (IIS) applications running on Azure
VMs and monitored by Security Center. When you select
this option, the Applications blade opens, as shown in
Figure 7-16.
FIGURE 7-16 The Applications blade with the
relevant recommendations
The Applications Recommendations section of the

Applications blade has the same recommendations that
you viewed previously in the Recommendations tile. In
this case, the only recommendation is to apply a web
application firewall to the web application server. If you
select this recommendation, you can add a new web
application firewall based on a Microsoft partner
solution, as shown in Figure 7-17.
FIGURE 7-17 Adding a web application firewall
RESPOND TO SECURITY INCIDENTS

After you address all relevant recommendations, your
Azure resources will be in a much better security
state; however, it does not mean that your resources
won’t be attacked and that new vulnerabilities will not
arise. For this reason, it is imperative to have a
continuous monitoring for security incidents in place
and use this system to help you rapidly respond to
incidents.
More
More Info
Info
Chapter 10, “Operations and management in the cloud,” explores in more
detail how to use Security Center as part of your Incident Response
strategy.
The detection capabilities explained earlier in this

chapter will help you to identify potential threats to your
environment. When Security Center identifies a potential
threat, it triggers an alert in the Security Alerts tile,
which is located in the main dashboard, as shown in
Figure 7-18.
FIGURE 7-18 Security alerts in a timeline graph
The Security Alerts tile shows you the timeline of

when the incidents occurred, the severity, and the total
number of incidents. This example shows that 25
medium-level severity incidents occurred. To access
more information about each alert, select the part of the
graph that represents the day you want to view, which
opens the Security Alerts blade, as shown in Figure 7-19.
FIGURE 7-19 Security Alerts blade with more details
about each alert
Although the alert’s graph is the same, the bottom

part of this blade has a unique view of the alert with its
description, and the number of occurrences for this
specific resource on that particular day. It also has the
detection source, which in this example is all Microsoft,
but it could be a Microsoft partner component. This table
also shows the status of this alert, showing that it was not
resolved yet, and the alert’s criticality.
After you identify which alert you want to address,
select it to open a new blade that corresponds to that
alert. In this case, the Failed RDP Brute Force Attack
blade opens, as shown in Figure 7-20.
FIGURE 7-20 A security alerts blade with more

details about each alert
In this blade, you can see which resource was

attacked, the number of occurrences, when the detection
was done, the current status of the issue, and the
severity. Keep in mind that the status does not mean that
the attack is taking place right now; it only means that
you did not act on this issue yet. After you do, you can
dismiss this alert (as shown previously in Figure 7-7). To
obtain more information about this alert, select it to
display the complete explanation about this attack, as
FIGURE 7-21 The security alerts blade expanded to
show a full description of the attack
The full description of the attack can help you
understand more about the attack, which includes the
attack duration, the number of failed attempts, and from
7
where the attack came . You also have a list of
remediation steps that you should take to protect the
target machine that belongs to your Azure resources.
7
In some cases, it is not possible to obtain the information related to
the source of the attack. For more information about this, read the
article “Missing Source Information in Azure Security Center Alerts”
at
https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/azuresecurity/2016/03/25/missi
ng-source-information-in-azure-security-center-alerts.
More
More Info
Info
You can also use Power BI to visualize Security Center data related to
your security status, threats, and detections. For more information, read
the article “Get insights from Azure Security Center data with Power BI” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/security-center-
powerbi.
Chapter 8. Internet of Things security
Previous chapters discussed the general principles of

securing assets in a cloud-based environment and delved
into the specifics of Microsoft Azure authentication and
authorization methods, network isolation and access
control, data and virtual machine (VM) security, key
management, and security monitoring.
This chapter focuses on an important aspect of the
larger environment in which the Azure cloud exists: the
rapidly expanding Internet of Things (IoT) that is already
having a profound impact on how people live and work.
As with any new technological development, IoT has the
potential to simplify both personal lives and jobs as IT
pros, but it also has the ability to introduce new
complications.
One of those complications is how to ensure the
security and privacy of the massive amounts of
information, some of it very personal, that all of those
disparate devices share among one another as they
communicate across the IoT. Microsoft is getting ahead
of the game by providing guidelines for a strategy that
builds security into your IoT infrastructure from the
ground up.
ANATOMY OF THE IOT
The Internet, by its very nature, has been an
amalgamation of “things” since its very beginning. An
internet is, after all, a network of networks, and a
network is, according to the standard dictionary
definition, “a group or system of interconnected
people or things.” What’s with all the hype, then,
about this new phenomenon labeled IoT? The
difference is that up until recently, the vast majority
of those “things” that made up the Internet were
traditional computers: client and server machines
running Windows, Mac, or Linux/UNIX operating
systems on desktop or portable hardware.
Over the last decade and a half, smartphones and
tablets running mobile operating systems such as the
mobile versions of Windows, iOS and Android, have
grown more popular, with the BBC reporting last year
that smartphones were overtaking laptops as the favorite
device for accessing the Internet in parts of the UK.
However, these devices are still basically full-fledged
computers, albeit in a different format.
The Internet of Things is about connecting a range of
devices to our local networks and to the global network
of networks. An explosion of task-focused or industry-
specific, purpose-built, dedicated devices that look
nothing like traditional computers but which contain
similar components—microprocessors, memory, and
data storage space—are now available, often in
miniaturized form.
The IoT will connect personal, business, industrial,
and public sector devices to one another and to larger
systems in homes and offices where the information the
devices collect can be sorted, analyzed, and stored.
Things of the world, unite
Imagine a world where most machines and gadgets
are routinely connected to the Internet. Your lights
and air conditioning or heating units will be
accessible online via your smartphone so you can turn
them on and off no matter where you are. Here are
just a few of the scenarios that are made possible by a
robust Internet of Things:
You can have a whole system of cameras watching
areas inside and outside your home or business
offices, and they can be set up to detect when
there is motion or out-of-the-ordinary activity,
and then send you a text or an email in real time.
Baby monitors and hidden “nanny cams” can help
you keep watch over your children and child care
provider. Businesses can use the same types of
systems to observe employees’ actions and
prevent thefts by both insiders and customers.
You can remotely set the hot tub to warm up, tell
the oven when to start cooking dinner, and start
and pause your washer and dryer. You can unlock
the front door for your housekeeper, whom you
know has arrived at your house because you see
her car in the driveway via your IP surveillance
camera. You can also remotely tell your DVR to
record that special that’s coming on tonight, and
that you just found out about from an office
colleague.
Consider the convenience of an Internet-
connected refrigerator that can detect that you’re
running low on your favorite perishables and
automatically order more, or a printer for your
small business that will order more toner or ink
before you run out. What about a coffee storage
that keeps you stocked with your preferred beans
so that you don’t have to experience caffeine
withdrawal?
Smart watches such as the Microsoft Band can
track your exercise, keep tabs on your heart rate
and UV exposure, monitor your sleep quality and
duration, and notify you of incoming email, phone
calls, texts and social media posts. Your scales can
record your weight and share it with your calorie-
tracking app on your phone, or even send it to
your doctor or share it with your diet support
group.
Implanted medical devices can detect symptoms
such as an irregular heart rhythm and report back
to healthcare providers or even administer
defibrillation to save a life when there is no time
for human response. Smart drug pumps can
provide insulin or pain medication when it’s
needed, without the necessity for patients to visit
a hospital or doctor’s office. IoT-connected
robotic arms can be controlled by surgeons in
another city or on another continent to perform
delicate specialized operations when no surgeons
on site have the needed skill sets. The Internet of
Medical Things (IoMT) is a whole subset of IoT.
Internet-connected automobiles can not only
collect information about speed, turns, routes,
and so forth in motor vehicle accidents, but can
also send you email or texts when your oil is low,
your tires need air, a critical screw is coming
loose, or internal components show signs of wear
or impending failure so that you can avoid
potentially serious problems. Vehicles can also
collect data about weather and road conditions
and send that data to social apps to help others
select the best routes to prepare for their drives.
Businesses can have continuous, real-time insight
into where the vehicles in their fleets are
deployed, fuel usage, mileage, and so forth. One
day, of course, these connected cars are expected
to drive themselves, becoming even more
sophisticated IoT devices.
In the manufacturing world, IoT-connected
industrial power tools can enable remote fitting,
testing, and assembly on factory floors. These
tools can communicate with one another to
ensure the most precise and accurate adjustment
of torque to tighten hundreds of thousands of
bolts that must be within specific tolerances for
critical components of complex consumer and
industrial machines. In these cases, a lack of
precision could have life-or-death ramifications
(for example, in aircraft manufacture).
In retail, IoT has already begun to transform the
buying and payment experience with point-of-sale
systems through which near-field communication
(NFC)–enabled smartphones can be used to make
purchases. Radio-frequency identification
(RFID)–tagged products and sensors can detect
where those products are, preventing shoplifting
and helping to track inventory and even
automatically restock items that are low. Smart
screens can detect which items customers are
looking at and provide them with additional
product information or show them alternative or
complementary products.
Companies of all kinds can not only track their
product inventories and their physical corporate
assets, but can have that information available in
real time to know exactly when deliveries are
made or when and where vital pieces of
equipment break down and need repair. IoT
sensors can also detect workplace hazards so they
can be addressed before accidents occur, saving
companies money in workers’ compensation
benefits and possible lawsuits or fines.
In the public sector, IoT can change the way local
governments operate to provide services to their
citizens. Smart meters can transmit public utility
usage information without the need for a human
meter reader to travel around to homes. Smart
parking systems can help commuters more
quickly find empty spaces in parking lots and
garages. Internet-connected dumpsters can let
waste management services know when they’re
full. In law enforcement, IoT-connected dash
cams and body cams can help dispatch monitor
officers’ calls to immediately send help when an
officer is in trouble. Sensors or cameras in public
places can detect gunshots or other indicators of
crime so police can be dispatched to the scene
without waiting for a victim or witness to report
it. IoT-enabled smoke detectors can send
information directly to fire department
monitoring stations.
The scenarios represent only a fraction of the many
already-existing and potential future use cases for IoT
devices. Most areas of our personal and business lives
will be touched in some way by the IoT.
Note that some devices or objects, such as RFID tags
and barcoded objects, don’t directly connect to the
Internet but contain embedded digitalized information
that can be read by devices that do connect and send that
data across the IoT.
As illustrated by Figure 8-1, as the IoT grows, much of
what people do and how they do it will revolve around
the conveniences and efficiencies that it facilitates.
FIGURE 8-1 The Internet of Things at the center of
our lives
However, it’s likely that in reading through the

examples given, at least one or two of them triggered a
nagging question in many readers: “What about
security?” In fact, almost every one of those sample IoT
situations presents inherent security issues. But before
you read about the security threats that are specific to
IoT and what you can do to mitigate or eliminate them,
you should first have a basic grasp of how the IoT works
“under the hood.” That means understanding the
important role played by sensors.
Sensors, sensors everywhere
A sensor is an object that gets its name from the fact
that it is sensitive to a particular property. That can be
temperature, sound, pressure, proximity, moisture,
motion, position, light, electrical fields, the presence
of particular substances, or other variables. The
sensor converts the physical parameter into a
measurable electrical signal that can be output
digitally.
The typical “thing” on the IoT contains one or more
sensors that measure something. These measurements
constitute raw data that is then transmitted over the
Internet to a location where it is stored in a database or
further processed. All of these interoperate, as illustrated
by Figure 8-2.
FIGURE 8-2 IoT “things” with sensors that provide

data that is communicated across the Internet
Sensors can be classified into different groups,

depending on what they measure and how they do it. For
example, biosensors are based on electrochemical
technology. They can convert biological responses into
electrical signals and are used in healthcare devices,
water and food testing, and other circumstances where
measurement of biological substances is required.
Another example is image sensors, which are based on
Complementary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS)
technology and are used in collecting images and
patterns in fingerprint and other biometrics, security
surveillance and other cameras, and many consumer
electronics.
Sensors are also divided into two broad groups:
Active sensors that need a power supply in order
to operate
Passive sensors that do not require a power
supply
People are surrounded by sensors, although most
don’t even know the sensors are there. Many sensors are
small, some only a thousandth of an inch in size. These
are known as micro electro-mechanical systems or
1
MEMS.
1
For more information about MEMS, read the article “MEMS and
More: Sensor Technologies that will drive the Internet of Things” at
www.broadcom.com/blog/wireless-technology/mems-and-more-
sensor-technologies-that-will-drive-the-internet-of-things.
Sensors provide the data on which the IoT runs. It’s

the moisture or flow sensor that detects when you have a
plumbing leak and notifies you (or in a more advanced
application, signals your device to call the plumber
itself). It’s the pressure sensor in the hotel mini-fridge
that detects that you removed the tiny bottle of water and
adds the exorbitant charge for it to your bill. It’s the
combination of the motion and heart-rate sensors in
your fitness band that detect that you’ve fallen asleep
and record that information for you to track in your
health app, as shown in Figure 8-3.
FIGURE 8-3 Sensor-collected data output to
applications that turn it into useful information
Some have argued that the IoT should really be called

the IoS, or Internet of Sensors, because the real point of
having all these machines talk to one another is to get
2
usable data.
2
For more information about this argument, read the article “Is the
IoT Really ‘Internet of Sensors’?” at
www.enterprisetech.com/2015/05/08/is-the-iot-really-internet-of-
sensors.
Whatever you call it, with predictions that the IoT will
grow to more than 38 billion devices by 2020 (up from
3
fewer than 14 billion in 2015) , and with many of those
devices containing multiple sensors, it becomes obvious
that the amount of data that will be generated is beyond
the scope of anything that the IT world has handled
before. Some of that data will be unimportant, some will
be mission-critical, and some will be confidential
business and personal information. All of it will travel
over the Internet: an inherently non-secure network.
3
For more information about these predictions, read the article
“‘Internet of Things’ Connected Devices to Almost Triple to Over 38
Billion Units by 2020” at www.juniperresearch.com/press/press-
releases/iot-connected-devices-to-triple-to-38-bn-by-2020.
Big data just got bigger: TMI

The enormous amount of data that will be collected by
the billions of sensors embedded in billions of
connected devices means people are at a point of
convergence between two of the most important
technology developments of the twenty-first century:
IoT meets—or more accurately, produces—big data.
According to some statistics, the number of RFID tags
alone will reach more than 10 billion by the end of 2016,
with projections showing more than 100 billion tags in
4
use by 2020. Cisco predicted in 2014 that by 2018, the
5
IoT would be generating 400 zettabytes (ZB).
4
For more information about RFID tags, read the article “The Global
Market for RFID 2010 – 2020” at www.centrenational-
rfid.com/docs/applications-
rfid/RFID/Markets/Toulouse/IDTechEx/V2/GOOD/ONE.pdf.
5
For more information about this prediction, read the article “Internet
of Things to generate 400 zettabytes of data by 2018” at
www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/2379626/internet-of-things-to-
generate-400-zettabytes-of-data-by-2018.
Note
Note
A zettabyte is equal to a million petabytes, a billion terabytes, or a trillion
gigabytes. Breaking it down to its smallest component, it is
21
1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 bytes (10 bytes).
No matter which way you look at it, that is deserving

of the label “big data.” And with big data comes big
problems—unless you take steps to anticipate and
address them. The first problem with data quantities this
large is that as the amount of data grows, so does the
noise-to-signal ratio. Much of the data that’s collected is
irrelevant to the mission at hand, but sorting through it
all, much less comprehending it, is beyond the
capabilities of the human mind and even taxes the
resources of our powerful computer hardware and
software.
Traditional databases aren’t equipped to handle big
data, both due to its volume and due to its nature; much
of it is unstructured and doesn’t fit into the relational
database model that served us well for so many years.
That’s where data analytics comes in. Figure 8-4
illustrates the overlapping relationship of IoT, big data,
and data analytics.
FIGURE 8-4 Relationship of IoT, big data, and data

analytics
Big data analytics involves examining massive
amounts of data so that the relevant data can be
extracted and analyzed to discover patterns and
correlations that will give business decision makers
insights to guide them in developing better strategies and
making the right choices. The need for effective analytics
becomes apparent when you consider the words of
Clifford Stoll, author of The Cuckoo’s Egg, which details
his role in the investigation that resulted in the arrest of
Markus Hess:
Data is not information, information is not

knowledge, knowledge is not understanding
and understanding is not wisdom.
Analysis is what turns data into information and

sometimes knowledge. Occasionally, it can even inspire a
spark of wisdom. Collecting and storing vast amounts of
data, like hoarding newspapers and books you never read
or shoes you never wear, provides little real benefit.
Effective analysis of the data (and pruning of what’s not
needed) is what makes the data valuable.
Data analytics has been around for a long time, but
analyzing big data generated by the IoT is different, due
to some of its unique characteristics, represented here by
the “six Vs” of big data:
Volume The sheer amount of data.
Value Some of the data is of great value to the
organization and some is of no value at all.
Velocity The rate at which new data comes in,
making it difficult to ever catch up, much less get
ahead of the constant stream.
Variety Data comes in from many different
sources and sensors in different forms: numeric,
text, photographic, video, audio, and so forth.
Veracity Some of the data might be accurate and
some might come from questionable sources or be
collected under circumstances that decrease its
reliability.
Vintage Some data might be out of date by the
time you analyze it, rendering it less relevant.
Despite its challenges, big data has the power to
enhance our decision-making ability because the larger a
statistical sample, the more accurate the conclusions
based on those statistics tend to be. IoT, by providing
you with the biggest data of all, has the potential to
change the direction of business if you process that data
properly.
A comprehensive, high performance big-data
analytics solution can also aid you in securing that data,
by helping you more effectively classify it as to
sensitivity. But analyzing the enormous amounts of data
that are currently generated, much less what will be
dumped into the systems by the expected rapid growth of
the IoT over the next few years, is something that can’t
be accomplished by humans.
People need machines that can look at data and
understand it in a way similar to the way they see it, spot
subtle patterns and make connections in the intuitive
way the human brain works, and learn from its actions
how to do it better the next time.
Artificial intelligence to the rescue

If Cisco’s prediction comes true and the IoT generates
hundreds of ZB of data, today’s already-overworked
data analysts might as well give up; there’s no way
they can possibly keep up. A report from MGI and
McKinsey’s Business Technology Office predicts a
serious shortage of trained personnel with the deep
6
analytical skills needed for this role by the year 2018.
6
To read the full report, “Big Data: the next frontier for innovation,
competition and productivity,” go to www.mckinsey.com/business-
functions/business-technology/our-insights/big-data-the-next-
frontier-for-innovation.
What’s the alternative? Luckily, this is exactly the type
of task for which artificial intelligence (AI) is well suited.
Through machine learning, AI can process and analyze
massive amounts of data much more quickly than the
fastest team of humans. AI is capable of going beyond
the typical software application that reacts in a very
specific and limited way that humans have programmed.
AI at its best can figure out what to do based on the data
it has. Using big data as the basis of its decisions makes it
more likely that those decisions will be right.
Many believe AI is absolutely essential to the
7
operation of the IoT as it grows, but AI brings with it its
own unique security concerns and challenges that have
to be addressed.
7
To learn more about this point of view, read the article “IOT Won’t
Work without Artificial Intelligence,” at
www.wired.com/insights/2014/11/iot-wont-work-without-
artificial-intelligence.
IOT SECURITY CHALLENGES

IoT is big business, and securing the IoT is a big
subset of that business. According to a recent Gartner
report, by 2020 more than 25 percent of the identified
attacks on enterprise resources will in some way
involve the IoT. Researchers expect spending on IoT
security to reach almost $350 million by the end of
8
2016, increasing to almost $550 million in 2018.
8
To read the full article, “Gartner Says Worldwide IoT Security
Spending to Reach $348 million in 2016,” go to
www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3291817.
The security issues related to all the “things” that are

coming to populate the Internet are nearly as numerous
as those things themselves. Many businesses and
individuals who are already using IoT devices have no
idea whether they’re secure or how to better secure them
if they aren’t. The lack of security on the IoT is so
9
obvious that it’s becoming a subject of popular fiction.
9
An example of this is the book The Steel Kiss by Jeffrey Deaver. For a
summary of the book, go to www.jefferydeaver.com/novel/the-steel-
kiss.
IoT: Insecure by design
To understand the lack of security on the IoT, you
should understand how most IoT devices are made.
Think about it: smart cars, coffeepots, and microwave
ovens aren’t manufactured and marketed by software
companies; they’re sold by automobile manufacturers
and home appliance makers. With a few exceptions
(such as smart watches), the companies making IoT
products have been making the “dumb” versions of
those items for decades and understand the workings
of motor vehicles or kitchen equipment, but don’t
really understand the technical details of how the
Internet works or the security issues involved in
writing software.
The majority of those who create IoT machines speak
“security as a second language”—if they’re talking about
it at all. Because the device vendors aren’t tech
companies with teams of top coders on staff, and because
IoT in its infancy is a highly competitive market and they
need to keep the costs of development as low as possible,
the software to power these devices is often created in a
piecemeal way.
These devices are highly specialized computers made
up of hardware, operating systems, and applications like
any computer. However, they often run out-of-date
operating systems and application software. Worse yet, it
can’t be updated. That’s because in most cases the device
vendors don’t write the software; they pull in
components that already exist and modify them to fit
their needs. Much of this code is not actively maintained
or supported by the third-party developers who are the
original authors.
IoT devices seem simple from the user’s perspective,
but under the hood, they are anything but simple. That
inner complexity is required to achieve the user-friendly
outward appearance, because the less the user has to do
to operate and maintain it, the more the software is
required to do.
Most consumers don’t know and don’t want to know
the technicalities of how their IoT devices operate; they
want them to “just work.” Even those technically savvy
individuals who do want to know often are unable to find
out much about the devices’ underlying software,
because many times it provides no way to access system
information such as operating system and software
versions, configurations, and update history. There
might be no way to force a manual update; you have to
depend on the vendor to distribute patches when
security vulnerabilities are found. Unlike with popular
desktop, laptop, tablet, and phone operating systems,
there might be little documentation and no tools publicly
available for verifying a device’s security status.
Vendors might be secretive about this information for
different reasons. In some cases, it’s because they really
don’t know—the support people you’re able to contact
aren’t software developers or security experts and might
not understand your questions, much less be able to
answer them. In addition, companies might not want to
reveal information about the device software because
they believe giving that information to the public helps
attackers to devise ways to attack their devices. In a more
self-serving scenario, device vendors don’t want to
release information because they know the software on
which their devices run is outdated and not secure and
they don’t want to open themselves up to the possible
ramifications of admitting that: customer complaints,
loss of business, and legal liability if users suffer losses
due to their negligence.
Software composition analysis and disclosure, also
called software supply chain analysis, has been suggested
as a solution to this problem. Some have even called for
government regulation requiring device vendors to
publish a list of the components of the software
somewhat like the listing of ingredients that food
vendors are required to include on the package. This
would help individuals and companies that use IoT
devices on their networks make a more realistic
vulnerability and risk assessment.
Although IoT device vendors bear much of the
responsibility for security, users have an obligation to do
their part, too. Many users don’t think of IoT devices in
the same way as their “real” computers, and aren’t as
diligent in applying updates when they are available.
They think these devices aren’t security threats if they
aren’t storing trade secrets or client credit card
information on them, but a smart TV connected to the
home or company network, for example, can be accessed
and used as an avenue to get to other, more security-
sensitive systems on the network.
Other problems exist, too. Many IoT devices are
severely limited in terms of resources (processing power,
memory, storage space). Although this might mean they
contain less stored sensitive data that can be accessed by
an attacker, it also means they are less capable of using
strong encryption to protect the data that they do create,
store, and send, because robust encryption requires
resources. In addition, the low cost of many IoT devices
means they’re less well made and more vulnerable to
physical tampering.
Most IoT devices today are where PCs were 25 years
ago in terms of security. That is, it’s not at the top of
designers’ and developers’ minds; they’re often more
focused on cool features rather than on security, which
almost always adds to cost, slows down performance,
and causes frustration for users. Unfortunately, failing to
make security a priority can have serious consequences.
Ramifications of an insecure IoT
What are some of the potential undesirable outcomes
that can result from this mixed method of software
assembly and hit-or-miss security maintenance
process that affects a significant percentage of the IoT
devices on the market? Refer back to the IoT use case
scenarios presented earlier and think about the
security issues surrounding each of them:
Smart home appliances These appliances
include refrigerators, ovens, washers and dryers,
pools and hot tubs, microwaves, and
coffeemakers. When connected to a home
network, any of these can be attacked and used to
provide access to that network and the computers
connected to it. Such appliances are also used in
company break rooms and could pose bigger
threats if used to gain unauthorized access to
business networks. Even more worrisome, most
of these have heating elements that could
overheat and cause a fire.
Smart TVs, DVRs, and other
entertainment devices Modern TVs might
have built-in microphones through which an
attacker could eavesdrop on the conversations of
those in the room, whether in a home living room
or in a corporate conference room.
Home and office security devices These
devices include surveillance cameras, baby
monitors, alarm systems, and door locks. In
addition to being conduits to the rest of the
network, these types of devices are critical to
home security. If they’re accessed, the attacker
could shut down your cameras and alarms, open
your doors, and gain access to your home and all
of the valuables within it. Surveillance cams and
baby monitors can be used to see inside your
home and spy on what you’re doing, listen to your
conversations and gather information about your
habits, your children, your valuables, and so forth
to plan burglaries, kidnappings, blackmail, or
other crimes.
Home and office safety devices These devices
include fire and carbon monoxide alarms, leak
detectors, and baby monitors. The dangers here
are obvious. An attacker could set off false alarms
that result in inconvenience or cause evacuation
of the premises, giving the attacker time to enter
and burglarize the house or business.
Smart watches, glasses, scales, and other
fitness-focused wearables and home
electronics Fitness information, including heart
rates, UV exposure, weight, and so on is private
medical data that could be accessed through
compromising these devices. Many of the devices
also receive notifications or full or partial
contents of email, text, and social media messages
that the attacker can read. GPS-enabled devices
could reveal the wearer’s location. There have
even been indications that smart watch motion
sensors could be used to expose what you’re
10
typing while wearing the device.
10
For more information about this, read the article “Smartwatches
vulnerable to hacking says Researchers,” at
www.techworm.net/2015/09/smartwatches-vulnerable-to-
hacking-says-researchers.html.
Implanted medical devices An attacker who

gained control over an implanted pacemaker,
cardioverter defibrillator, or drug dispensing
pump could cause serious physical injury or death
to the victim. They could administer unneeded
electrical shock, dispense an overdose of drugs, or
shut down the device so that it fails to perform its
11
normal life-saving or life-sustaining functions.
11
As an example, read the article “Thousands of medical devices are
vulnerable to hacking, security researchers say” at
www.pcworld.com/article/2987813/thousands-of-medical-devices-
are-vulnerable-to-hacking-security-researchers-say.html.
Internet-connected automobiles Gaining
access into driverless or even driver-assisted IoT-
connected vehicles could possibly enable
attackers to shut them down and strand
passengers or send them speeding out of control,
allow them to track the location of the passengers,
or divert them to a route of the attacker’s
choosing. Well-known security researchers
Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek gained access
into a Jeep Cherokee in 2015, taking control of
several of its systems and disabling the
12
accelerator. Earlier that same year,
unauthorized access of BMW’s ConnectedDrive
system exposed 2.2 million vehicles to remote
13
unlocking.
12
Read the full article, “Five Lessons on the ‘Security of Things’ from
the Jeep Cherokee Hack,” at
www.forbes.com/sites/johnvillasenor/2015/07/27/five-lessons-on-
the-security-of-things-from-the-jeep-cherokee-hack.
13
Read the full article, “BMW ConnectedDrive hack sees 2.2 million
cars exposed to remote unlocking,” at www.ibtimes.co.uk/bmw-
connecteddrive-hack-sees-2-2-million-cars-exposed-remote-
unlocking-1486215.
IoT-connected industrial power tools and

factory robots Factory floors are dangerous
places where heavy equipment and tools such as
saws and compression machines operate. A
malicious attacker who took over control of these
could cause millions of dollars of damage to
machines or cause industrial accidents resulting
in injury or death to workers.
RFID tags Passive RFID tags can be read by
persons near them who have the appropriate
readers, and active RFID chips that transmit their
information can be even more easily queried and
read, providing attackers with varying types and
amounts of information. RFID is currently used
in a variety of applications, including credit cards,
ATM cards, enhanced drivers’ licenses, highway
toll tags, and inventory tracking systems. RFID
security has improved over the last few years, but
some cards and devices still use the older chips.
Hazard detection sensors used in retail
and industrial environments As with home
and office fire alarms, attackers could shut down
these important safety devices, exposing workers
to risks, or they could create false alarms as a
diversion.
Public sector IoT devices These devices
include smart utility meters, parking sensors, and
dumpsters. Although these devices might not
have the potential for life-threatening attacks,
unauthorized access to them could be used to
inconvenience individuals or prevent them from
accomplishing what they need to do (for example,
by indicating that no parking spaces are available,
which causes them to go elsewhere, and possibly
miss an important meeting).
Public safety IoT devices These devices
include traffic signals, police dashboard and body
cams, and automatic crime detection sensors.
Attacking traffic signals could have deadly
consequences if, for example, the lights are set to
display as green on both cross streets at an
intersection. Attackers could also manipulate the
signals to allow their cohorts to evade police, back
up traffic to slow down or trap a victim, or create
chaos “just for fun.” Unauthorized access to the
video from police dashboards and body cams
could give criminal conspirators information for
ambushing officers, and shutting down or setting
off crime detection sensors could prevent police
from knowing about crimes in progress or send
them on wild goose chases to one area while
criminals hit another area.
Commercial building components such as
elevators, escalators, and fire doors
Elevators could be stopped to trap people inside
or sent plunging to the ground at top speed. Fire
doors could automatically close to trap victims in
a certain part of the building.
This list describes only some of the ways that IoT
security flaws could be exploited, with results ranging
from annoying to deadly.
IOT THREAT MODELING

Threat modeling refers to the process of setting
security objectives based on the value of the assets
you want to protect, identifying existing and potential
vulnerabilities, assessing the severity and risk of each,
prioritizing, and defining and implementing
countermeasures that will prevent or mitigate the
effects of those threats.
You could think of the IoT as a collection of devices,
but there is more to it than that. To perform proper
threat modeling, you should consider the entire IoT
infrastructure: the full attack surface, as shown in Figure
8-5. This includes the following:
IoT endpoints (the devices)
Local networks on which the devices operate
(private or public)
Gateways
IoT services in the cloud (Internet)
Applications in the enterprise to which IoT
devices send data
Storage services where the data is stored
Human operators, including the end users of the
devices and operators and administrators of
servers and services along the way
FIGURE 8-5 IoT attacks can occur at any point in
the IoT infrastructure
Attacks can target any of these points, not just the

device itself. Some of the most effective attacks are
against network operations, especially administrative
operations. In conducting a threat analysis, it is
important to be able to “think like an attacker.” You need
to be able to recognize what the key targets would be;
that is, identify which assets would be of value to an
attacker. The next step is to figure out what security
protections are in place to protect those assets, and how
those protections can be bypassed.
Too many device designers and developers are
reluctant to look for vulnerabilities in their own
products. To be effective, you have to search for
vulnerabilities as if they were prizes. Remember that to
the attacker, a vulnerability is an opportunity. Think
outside the box; you might have to take a roundabout
route to get to the targeted assets.
There are many ways to compromise a device,
including tampering with:
Authentication data
Application data
The applications
The operating system
Of course, one of the easiest and most effective means
of gaining unauthorized access is through social
engineering. Convincing an authorized user to divulge
legitimate credentials doesn’t require technical skill, just
“people skill.” Unfortunately, there are few technological
defenses; preventing socially engineered attacks hinges
on educating users.
After you identify a vulnerability, it’s time to shift
your mindset and “think like a protector.” During the
vulnerability detection phase, you were playing offense;
now you’re playing on the defensive team. Don’t ignore
the obvious, such as physical security. IoT devices,
because of their widespread physical distribution, are
particularly vulnerable to physical breach. An attacker
can steal one, reverse-engineer it, and use the
information to attack other devices of the same type.
As identity is the key to authenticating people, it’s also
key to securing IoT devices. It is important that devices
have unique assigned identifying information that can’t
be changed or spoofed to prevent the use of the same
security credentials across numbers of devices of the
same type. This should be a given, but given the
immaturity of the IoT and the lack of focus on security by
many of its vendors, that’s not the case.
Elements of a secure IoT infrastructure include
management of device identities and their associated
credentials, policies, a device platform that supports
security mechanisms, an operating system designed with
security in mind, robust hardware, and a development
framework that incorporates security from the ground
up.
WINDOWS 10 IOT AND AZURE IOT
The commitment of Microsoft to the Internet of
Things is evident in its current offering of IoT-focused
products and services. The investment in security is
evident in its longstanding Trustworthy Computing
14
initiative, established by Bill Gates in 2002. This has
evolved into the SD3 security development lifecycle
principles (secure by design, secure by default, secure
in deployment), and culminated in the Microsoft
Cybersecurity Commitment, published in January
2015. In this commitment, the company outlines its
security and privacy fundamentals regarding software
development, cloud operations, malware protection,
security response, product and cloud security, and
15
security expertise.
14
To read the full initiative, “TwC Next: Marking a Milestone.
Continuing our Commitment,” go to
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/twc/twcnext/default.aspx.
15
To learn more about this commitment, read the article “MSDN TV:
Thinking About Security - Secure by Design, Secure by Default,
Secure in Deployment and Communications” at
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?
id=21629.
Microsoft brings almost a decade and a half of

trustworthy computing to its reimagined vision as a
“cloud first, mobile first” devices and services company.
That experience and dedication to security form the
foundation for Windows 10 IoT and Azure IoT Suite.
Windows 10 IoT editions

Windows 10 IoT is, according to Microsoft
documentation, “a family of Windows 10 editions
targeted towards a wide range of intelligent devices,
from small industrial gateways to larger more
complex devices like point of sales terminals and
ATMs.” These consist of three iterations:
Windows 10 IoT Enterprise
Windows 10 IoT Mobile Enterprise
Windows 10 IoT Core
Windows 10 was designed to work with all types of
devices as part of the “One Windows” philosophy that
brings the same universal apps to both traditional
desktop and mobile devices and IoT dedicated devices,
along with IoT gateways. Windows 10 connectivity is
supported for device-to-device, device-to-cloud, and
sensor-to-device communications, and is built on open
device interoperability standards.
The Windows 10 IoT Enterprise edition supports
classic Windows applications, in addition to universal
apps, and runs a variety of industry devices. Windows 10
IoT Mobile Enterprise edition is created for line-of-
business mobile devices and supports barcode scanners
and other peripherals for retail, healthcare,
manufacturing, and other industry-specific applications.
Windows 10 IoT Core is designed as a more minimalist
operating system for small, low-cost devices that run a
single line-of-business application.
Windows IoT Core provides identity and access
controls through Windows Hello and Microsoft Passport,
with the added security of multifactor authentication. It
also supports Credential Guard to protect users’
credentials via virtualization-based security (VBS). IoT
data is protected by BitLocker and BitLocker to Go, in
addition to file-level encryption and Rights Management
Services (RMS). Of course, data in transit is protected by
IPsec and VPNs. Further, new and enhanced features in
Windows 10, such as Device Guard, VBS, and the
Microsoft Edge browser, along with Windows Defender,
protect the system from malware.
Windows 10 was designed to be the most secure
operating system from Microsoft, with enterprise grade
security built in under the guidance of end-to-end
security expert engagement. Some of the defenses
enhanced or introduced in Windows 10 include Secure
Boot, BitLocker, Device Guard, and Credential Guard, in
addition to the ability to lock down access to
unauthorized peripherals.
The Windows 10 IoT editions are designed to work
with Azure IoT services.
Azure IoT Suite and secure Azure IoT

infrastructure
The Azure IoT Suite is a set of tools with which you
can monitor your IoT devices, capture and analyze the
information, and then use the information to discover
patterns and correlations that provide better insight
into your business processes.
The Azure IoT Suite is built on the Azure cloud
infrastructure, which in turn is built upon the Security
Development Lifecycle (SDL), and operates in
conjunction with the Microsoft Operational Security
Assurance process and Cyber Defense Operations Center,
putting device security and cloud security at the forefront
of Azure IoT technology engineering.
Azure provides machine learning, data analytics, data
storage, and networking—the components that are
necessary to a more secure IoT infrastructure—protected
by the Microsoft software security “red team” that is
constantly testing to uncover emerging threats and
vulnerabilities, and the global incident response team
that takes action to mitigate effects of attacks.
Some of the security mechanisms in Azure include:
Continual intrusion detection and prevention
Service attack prevention
Penetration testing
Forensics tools
Multi-Factor Authentication
Azure IoT Suite builds on the inherent security focus
in Azure to secure your IoT deployments at the device
level, at the connection level, and at the cloud level, as
16
shown in more detail in Table 8-1.
16
For more information about IoT security in Azure, read the blog post
“How Microsoft Azure engineers for IoT security” at
https://blogs.microsoft.com/iot/2016/03/24/how-microsoft-azure-
engineers-for-iot-security.
TABLE 8-1 Azure IoT Security
Note
Note
Non-IP-enabled devices connect over Bluetooth or other short-range
protocols.
The Azure IoT Suite secure device provisioning gets

your IoT implementation off to a more secure start by
generating a key that is associated with the unique device
ID. There are two types of device IDs: physical and
logical. The physical ID can be flashed into the memory
of a hardware trust module so that it will be difficult to
change. You can also establish logical device IDs.
The identities and their corresponding keys are stored
in the Azure IoT Hub identity registry. Here, you can
manage the identities and control their access by adding
them to allow or block lists. The Hub policies also enable
you to disable individual device identities. You can
revoke access credentials and permissions almost
instantaneously.
For better security, devices establish connections as
outbound-only. Commands cannot be received by a
device unless it explicitly establishes a connection, and
then when the connection is established,
communications can take place in both directions. The
Hub doesn’t initiate communications with the devices;
instead, it waits for the device to connect to receive
commands. The command can be stored for up to two
days.
The Internet of Things and the myriad of devices
connected to it are changing the way people
communicate, gather information, and make personal
and business decisions. IoT devices come in an endless
number of forms, from full-fledged computers running
desktop operating systems to tiny single-purpose devices
running stripped-down operating systems. Securing the
IoT is complicated by the diversity of hardware and
software, in addition to the lack of focus on security
demonstrated by some manufacturers of IoT devices.
Responsibility for the security of the IoT
infrastructure is, by necessity, a shared one. The IoT
hardware manufacturers or integrators; the IoT
developers and deployment specialists; the IoT operators
who run, monitor, update, maintain and troubleshoot
the IoT solution; in addition to the cloud provider, local
network administrators, and end-users of the devices
must all do their part to follow security best practices to
thwart attackers who target all points within the IoT
infrastructure.
Windows 10 IoT editions and Azure IoT Suite running
on Microsoft Azure include security features and tools
that can help businesses deploy IoT more securely. This
chapter provides a high-level overview of how the IoT
works, the security issues and challenges inherent in the
sudden influx of “things” onto the Internet, threat
modeling for IoT, and how Microsoft IoT-related
products and services can help to protect the ever-
expanding number of “things” on the Internet.
Chapter 9. Hybrid environment
monitoring
So far, the capabilities covered in this book relate to

resources running in the Microsoft Azure platform.
However, many companies need to use Microsoft threat
intelligence and security monitoring capabilities to
monitor on-premises resources or resources running in a
different cloud solution, such as Amazon Web Services
(AWS). For these scenarios, you can use Operations
Management Suite (OMS) Security and Audit solution.
This chapter explains how OMS Security and Audit
solution can be used for continuous security monitoring
in a hybrid environment and how it can assist IT
administrators in gaining visibility and control of their
resources.
OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT SUITE

SECURITY AND AUDIT SOLUTION
OVERVIEW
OMS Security and Audit solution collects security-
related data from virtually any source, regardless of
volume, format, or location. After collecting the data,
OMS analyzes it and provides a dashboard for data
visualization. By using Microsoft threat intelligence,
OMS provides insights that can help you determine
whether you have a compromised resource in your
environment, as shown in Figure 9-1.
FIGURE 9-1 Typical scenario where OMS is the
most appropriate solution
The following list summarizes what you need to get

started with the OMS Security and Audit solution:
1
An Azure subscription to use Log Analytics
1
For more information about Log Analytics, read the article “Get
started with Log Analytics” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/log-analytics-
get-started.
An OMS workspace, which is a logical container

where your management data is stored
A connection from your Windows or Linux
computers to your OMS workspace
A user OMS Security and Audit solution to
monitor your resources
Chapter 7, “Azure resource management security,”
described Azure Security Center, which provides security
management, including policies, security assessment,
and threat detection, for Azure resources. Security
Center is built in to Azure, and basic monitoring is
available at no charge. OMS offers security insights and
threat detection across on-premises and cloud IT
environments, including private and public datacenters.
Based on their needs, customers could choose to use one
or both solutions.
At the time this chapter was written, these two
solutions were separated; over time, the same
capabilities will be available in both OMS and Azure,
providing a single security management and monitoring
solution that can be used to protect the customers’ entire
IT environment, including workloads running in private
and public datacenters (Azure and AWS).
LOG ANALYTICS CONFIGURATION

Log Analytics is a service in OMS that helps you to
collect and analyze data generated by resources in the
cloud and on-premises environments. To use Log
Analytics, you need a paid Azure subscription.
Complete the following steps to configure Log
Analytics:
1. Access the Azure portal and sign in to the
subscription account that has administrative
privileges.
2. In the Azure portal, select Browse.
3. Enter Log, and when Log Analytics (OMS)
appears, select it. The Log Analytics (OMS) blade
opens, as shown in Figure 9-2.
FIGURE 9-2 The Log Analytics blade
4. Select Add. The OMS Workspace blade opens, as

FIGURE 9-3 Creating a new OMS workspace
5. In the OMS Workspace text box, enter a unique

name for this workspace (or link to an existing
one if you already have it), and then select the
subscription and the resource group that you
want to use for this workspace or select an
existing one.
6. Select the location in which you want to store the
workspace and the pricing tier. When you finish
setting all the options, select Create to display the
details of the workspace, as shown in Figure 9-4.
FIGURE 9-4 OMS workspace details, with the
subscription and workspace information masked for
privacy purposes
At this point, you finished the first configuration step
for OMS. Now you have an OMS workspace to store your
data. The second step is to configure the computers that
will be monitored by OMS, which is described in the next
section.
WINDOWS AGENT INSTALLATION

Although you can monitor Windows and Linux
2
systems in OMS, this book describes the steps to
install the agent only on a Windows system. The
following steps guide you through the addition of
3
OMS Solutions, which include the Security and Audit
solution and the installation of the Windows agent:
2
For more information about the Linux agent, read the article
“Connect Linux computers to Log Analytics” at
linux-agents.
3
For more information about OMS Solutions. read the article “Add
Log Analytics solutions from the Solutions Gallery” at
add-solutions.
1. In the OMS Workspace blade, select OMS Portal.

A new browser tab (or window, depending on
your browser configuration) opens.
2. If prompted, sign in by using your Azure
subscription credentials. The window opens to the
Microsoft Operations Management Suite
dashboard, as shown in Figure 9-5.
FIGURE 9-5 The OMS main dashboard
3. On the left side of the dashboard, select Solutions

Gallery. Ensure that the solutions shown in Figure
9-6 are added (showing as owned). If you don’t
see a solution here, click Visit the Gallery at the
bottom of this list to add it.
FIGURE 9-6 OMS solutions
4. Select Home (the house icon in the left navigation

pane), and then select Settings.
5. On the Connected Sources tab, shown in Figure
9-7, download the appropriate Windows agent
(64-bit or 32-bit). Copy the Workspace ID and the
Primary Key by clicking the Copy button, and
then paste them in a Notepad file. These values
are used later during the agent installation.
FIGURE 9-7 Selecting the appropriate Windows
agent
6. For this example, you will be using the Windows

Agent 64-bit (MMASetup-AMD64.exe file) and
installing it in a Windows Server 2012 computer.
After manually copying this file to the destination
system, double-click it and then select Next on the
Welcome To The Microsoft Monitoring Agent
Setup Wizard page.
7. Read the license and terms, and then select I
Agree.
8. On the Destination Folder page, select the
destination folder or leave the default selection,
and click Next.
9. On the Agent Setup Options page, select the
Connect The Agent To Microsoft Azure
Operational Insights check box, and click Next.
10. On the Azure Operational Insights page, shown in
Figure 9-8, enter the workspace ID (saved in step
5). In the Workspace Key box, enter the primary
key (also saved in step 5), and then click Next.
FIGURE 9-8 Connecting the agent to the OMS
workspace ID
Important
Important
If this computer is behind a proxy, be sure to select Advanced and enter
Specify The Proxy Configuration.
11. On the Ready To Install page, select Install.

12. When the Microsoft Monitoring Agent
Configuration Completed Successfully page
appears, select Finish.
More
More Info
Info
You can also deploy the agent by using a command-line interface (CLI) or
PowerShell. For more information about automating this process, read the
article “Connect Windows computers to Log Analytics” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/log-analytics-windows-
agents.
RESOURCE MONITORING USING OMS
SECURITY AND AUDIT SOLUTION
After you configure your environment so that all
computers report to OMS, you can use the Security
and Audit solution to closely monitor your resources.
Open the OMS Portal (step 1 in the previous section).
On the main dashboard are tiles that represent
solutions; for example, the Malware Assessment tile
includes items managed by the Malware Assessment
solution. The number of dashboard tiles varies
according to the number of solutions you have.
In a hybrid environment where you want to more
securely manage resources that are on-premises and in
the cloud, you use the Security and Audit solution. The
information available in the tile varies according to the
environment. Figure 9-9 shows an example of 16
computers active in the last 24 hours and an increase of
198 in the number of accounts authenticated in the last
24 hours. To access this solution, click the Security And
Audit tile.
FIGURE 9-9 Accessing an OMS Security and Audit

solution
The solution dashboard is divided into four sections:

Security Domains This section provides an
overview of security records over time,
antimalware assessment, update assessment,
identity and access information, computers with
security events, and access to Azure Security
Center.
Notable Issues This section provides a security
alert overview ranked by criticality.
Threat Intelligence This section provides an
instant threat map that uses the Microsoft threat
intelligence capability to provide information
regarding potential threats in your environment.
Common Security Threats This section
includes a predefined list of queries that can assist
you in finding security-related activities in your
environment.
Security state monitoring

One of the biggest challenges to monitor resources
located in multiple locations (cloud and on-premises)
is to aggregate all resources in a single console and
easily find the security state of these resources. The
security state of a computer can include identification
of the current state of the antimalware solution in the
target computers, the system’s updates, and security-
related events.
To access the antimalware state of the computers,
select the Antimalware Assessment tile. A dashboard
similar to the one shown in Figure 9-10 is displayed.
FIGURE 9-10 The Malware Assessment dashboard
This dashboard gives you a comprehensive view of
major elements related to antimalware assessment.
From the Threats Status tile, you can easily identify
active threats (red) in your environment and remediated
threats (yellow). The Detected Threats tile has a list of all
threats detected and which computers were
compromised by those threats. From the Protection
Status tile, you can identify computers that have out of
date antimalware signatures and computers without any
antimalware protection. The Type Of Protection tile
shows what type of endpoint protection is used by each
monitored computer. With this information available in
a single dashboard, you can easily assess your
environment. If you need to investigate further, you can
select each tile for more details.
However, having a system with antimalware installed
is usually not enough. Many threats try to exploit known
vulnerabilities, such as attacking an unpatched system.
To access the current state of your systems, select the
Update Assessment tile to display a dashboard similar to
Figure 9-11.
FIGURE 9-11 The Updates dashboard
From the three sections of this dashboard, you can

quickly identify which computers are missing critical,
security-related, or other types of updates. It also helps
you identify how old the update is and which computers
are missing it. These three views show the same
information differently, which helps you assess your
environment from different perspectives.
During an investigation process, you might need to
cross-reference information; for example, say you
identified that some systems are missing a critical update
and now you want to understand if there are security
events in these systems. You can use the Computers tile
to search for the specific system or to obtain a list of the
systems where security events were triggered. If you
select this tile, a dashboard similar to the one in Figure
9-12 is displayed.
FIGURE 9-12 Searching for a security-related event
The Log Search dashboard in OMS inherits the Log

4
Analytics search feature , which you can use to combine
and correlate any machine data from multiple sources
within your environment. As you select each computer
on the right, the details of the security events that were
trigged are displayed, as shown in Figure 9-13.
4
For more information about search syntax, read the article “Log
Analytics search reference” at
search-reference.
FIGURE 9-13 Filtering the search results for one
computer
Figure 9-13 shows an example of the result when you

select a computer that has many security events. The
advantage of this view is that you can quickly identify the
type of event and the activity that was performed. This
valuable piece of information can be used during a
security investigation process.
Identity and access control

As stated in Chapter 2, “Identity protection in Azure,”
95 percent of data breach incidents involve some sort
of credential theft; therefore, it is imperative that you
closely monitor your identity and access across
devices and locations. In a hybrid environment with
resources located in multiple clouds and on-premises,
this becomes even more critical. To help with
monitoring, you can use the Identity And Access tile
in the OMS Security And Audit dashboard. Figure 9-
14 shows an example of what’s displayed when you
select this tile.
FIGURE 9-14 Identity And Access dashboard
The tiles on this dashboard help you to identify failed

and successful logon attempts and the reason that some
logons were not successful. The dashboard also provides
a comprehensive timeline of successful and failed logon
attempts. Other tiles, located under the Identity Posture
section, can help you to identify the number of:
Accounts that were logged on
Accounts that failed to log on
Locked accounts
Accounts with a changed or reset password
Active critical issues
Active warning issues
If you want to further investigate any of those
attributes, you can select the tile to open another
dashboard that displays more details based on a search
result, similar to what was shown in Figure 9-12.
Alerts and threats

OMS Security and Audit has a dedicated section to
5
address what it calls notable issues , which are
basically security alerts ranked by criticality, as shown
in Figure 9-15.
5
For more information about notable issues, read the article “OMS
security notable issues” at
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/msoms/2016/05/31/oms-
security-notable-issues.
FIGURE 9-15 Current list of notable issues
You can use the diagram shown in Figure 9-15 to

access the active issues based on the criticality. The
information under it provides a brief description of the
active issue, the number of occurrences of that issue, and
the severity. If you select one of these issues, another
dashboard with more details about that problem
appears, as shown in Figure 9-16.
FIGURE 9-16 Details of a specific notable issue
This dashboard provides useful information for
security administrators who are trying to understand
how this issue affects this particular system. On the right
is the full explanation of the notable issue, the security
events that are associated with it, and the antimalware
status for this system. With this information, you can
understand the impact of the issue on the target system,
and also what needs to be done to resolve it.
You can use this information in a variety of scenarios,
such as incident response, forensics investigation, or
post-mortem analysis. However, in some circumstances,
you might not see any evidence that the target system
was compromised, which could lead you to believe that
the system is secure. If a system doesn’t raise an alert, it
might mean that it’s being used by a compromised
network to perform illicit activity. To identify potential
issues on outgoing and incoming activity, you can use the
6
information available in the Threat Intelligence section,
6
For more information about this capability, read the article
“Monitoring and responding to security alerts in Operations
Management Suite Security and Audit Solution” at
https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/articles/oms-security-
responding-alerts.
FIGURE 9-17 Threat Intelligence section
By using this option, security administrators can

identify security threats against the environment; for
example, they could identify whether a particular
computer is part of a botnet. Computers can become
nodes in a botnet when attackers illicitly install malware
that secretly connects this computer to the command
and control. It can also identify potential threats coming
from underground communication channels, such as
darknet. To build this threat intelligence, OMS Security
and Audit uses data coming from multiple sources within
Microsoft. OMS Security and Audit uses this data to
identify potential threats against your environment. In
hybrid environments, OMS will detect if there are
computers inside the network (on-premises or in the
cloud) that are communicating with a botnet located
outside the network.
Chapter 10. Operations and
management in the cloud
After you correctly configure all your resources to use the

Microsoft Azure security capabilities, you should ensure
that your operations are also employing security
considerations in all management phases. Throughout
this book, you learned how Azure can help protect your
cloud resources by using built-in capabilities. This
chapter provides a scenario in which the target company
needs to design its cloud infrastructure, taking into
consideration connectivity with on-premises resources,
virtual machine (VM) protection, and secure operations.
This chapter explains how to combine the capabilities
that were described throughout this book to accomplish
this fictitious organization’s goals.
SCENARIO
Many people struggle to understand the difference
between on-premises computing and cloud
computing. Most of you have many years of
experience with on-premises computing, and with
that, on-premises security. You have your
technologies, processes, and procedures in place, and
those have all withstood the test of time.
But now you’re confronted with moving to the cloud.
How do you learn about cloud computing? How can you
use what you understand about on-premises computing
and apply that knowledge to cloud computing?
The following scenario might help you understand
cloud computing security. The scenario begins with a
fictitious company named Contoso. Contoso is a
multinational company and has a complex network that
includes approximately 25,000 users. The company’s
computing and network infrastructure has been in place
for more than 15 years. It has well-established security
controls in place for compute, networking, and storage.
The chief technical officer has given the Contoso IT
organization a directive to begin moving corporate assets
to the cloud. This directive is driven by the fact that the
company no longer wants to invest in expanding your
on-premises datacenters. The Contoso datacenters are
nearing maximum capacity. Any more compute, storage,
or networking expansion must be done with a public
cloud service provider.
The Contoso IT administrators have always been
careful in evaluating new solutions. Due to the nature of
the business, the company cannot risk extended periods
of downtime due to untested solutions. For this reason,
they have decided to begin with a small pilot project that
will result in extending the company’s on-premises
datacenter into the Azure public cloud.
The IT administrators first decide which cloud service
model to use. They know about infrastructure as a
service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), and software
as a service (SaaS). Given that the motive for moving to
the cloud is to stop the rising costs of on-premises
datacenters, they decide that the best place for them to
start is with IaaS. They understand the benefits of PaaS
and SaaS, and will consider those cloud service models in
the future.
If possible, Contoso would like to mirror components
of its infrastructure in Azure IaaS. Its current
infrastructure provides, at a high level, the following:
A Class A private address network that has
multiple subnets
Network access control devices located between
subnets
Firewalls and proxies used for all Internet
connectivity, inbound and outbound
Multiple perimeter networks in place at the
Internet edges
Dedicated storage arrays used to support file
services and database servers
Widespread use of virtualization, mostly Hyper-V,
but with islands of VMware and Citrix
Active Directory–integrated DHCP service
Active Directory–integrated authentication for
the company’s applications
Microsoft Antimalware on all client systems, and
non–Microsoft antimalware on servers
Multitier applications
Given that this is the company’s current design, what
can the Contoso IT administrators do to instantiate a
similar design in Azure?
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
The IT administrators need to consider the following
design issues when extending their on-premises
infrastructure into Azure IaaS.
How will they connect their on-premises
infrastructure to Azure Virtual Networks?
How will they handle IP addressing?
How is subnetting done in Azure?
How is network access control done between
subnets?
How is inbound and outbound Internet access
controlled on Azure Virtual Networks?
How is storage deployed and managed in Azure?
How do they map their current VM sizes to the
sizes available in Azure?
How do they deploy multitier applications in
Azure?
How do they improve security and perform
incident response in Azure?
How do they integrate their on-premises identity
infrastructure with Azure?
How do they protect their VMs from viruses and
other types of malware?
The IT administrators asked all these questions and
performed their due-diligence research. After reviewing
their options, they decided on the following for the initial
design for their pilot project:
The goal of the pilot project is to show that they
can effectively extend their on-premises
infrastructure into Azure.
They will use a site-to-site VPN for the initial
phases of the project. Subsequent project phases
will use Azure ExpressRoute so that the IT
administrators have the bandwidth needed to
deploy multiple applications in Azure IaaS.
On-premises subnets are defined by the roles of
the servers on those subnets. The IT
administrators will do the same in Azure, by using
a Class C private address space, and creating a
subnet so that they can add more Azure Virtual
Networks in the future. They are also careful not
to overlap their address spaces between on-
premises and Azure.
Network access control between subnets will
initially be performed by Network Security
Groups (NSGs). In the future, the IT
administrators will investigate using virtual
network appliances, which will give them an
additional level of security.
Inbound and outbound access from and to the
Internet will be controlled by NSGs. In addition,
the administrators will configure forced tunneling
so that VMs on Azure Virtual Networks are not
able to initiate outbound connections to the
Internet but can respond to inbound requests.
Azure Storage will be used to support databases
and file services.
The IT administrators will map on-premises VM
sizes to those available in Azure. They will also
standardize VM sizes to simplify the deployment.
Multitier applications will be deployed by placing
each tier on different subnets and by creating
NSG rules to apply to all VMs in each subnet. This
will simplify network access control management.
Incident response will use Azure Security Center.
Microsoft Antimalware will be installed on all
VMs.
They will extend their on-premises Active
Directory deployment into Azure so that they do
not need to change their authentication scheme.
They will integrate Azure Active Directory (Azure
AD) with their on-premises Active Directory so
that they can use their on-premises credentials to
manage their infrastructure through the Azure
portal.
Figure 10-1 provides a general view of the structure of
the pilot project.
FIGURE 10-1 The Contoso pilot project
Now that you have an understanding of the

company’s goals and design decisions, you need to know
how to use Azure Security Center to support your
security operations and incident response. The next
section explains how Azure Security Center can be a
powerful and effective partner in helping to secure your
Azure deployments.
AZURE SECURITY CENTER FOR

OPERATIONS
After the Contoso IT administrators properly
configure the environment based on the previously
established design considerations, they need to
maintain more secure operations for their resources
located in Azure. The onboarding process in Security
Center takes place by ensuring that all VMs have the
Security Center agent installed. This process happens
automatically when they enable data collection.
Operations
Operations security
security
The last thing any blue team member, incident handler, monitoring analyst,
or forensic investigator wants to hear is, “Logs? What logs? We don’t have
any logs.” As you consider adopting or expanding your use of Azure cloud
services, be sure to consider the need for more secure management of
those resources. There are very clear methods for avoiding the “What
logs?” scenario, as provided by Azure Security Center. From your Azure
portal, you have immediate access to these tools.
Azure Security Center helps you set security policies for your
deployments, implement security recommendations to ensure best
practices are adhered to, and monitor the security health of your assets, in
addition to the partner solutions you might be using.
If you need detection and response, you can enable the robust options in
Azure Security Center to manage security alerts. You can enable alerts for
brute-force attempts via network and endpoint. You might want to know
when your VMs are communicating with malicious IP addresses, or worse,
when those same VMs show signs of being compromised.
Above all else, remember to enable, and leave enabled, Azure Security
Center data collection. With data collection ensuring that you have an
audit trail, and activity history, the Azure Monitoring Agent and the Azure
Security Monitoring extension will scan for security-relevant data to send
to Event Tracing for Windows (ETW). The Azure Monitoring Agent also
reads your operating system event logs; ETW traces and writes the logs to
the storage account you enable, along with security policies. The
Monitoring Agent even includes crash dumps for in-depth analysis.
Azure Security Center gives you a convenient and centralized feature set
that you can use to help protect, detect, and respond to your Azure
deployments. No more “We don’t have those logs.” Feel empowered to
conduct insightful root cause analysis and be able to instead say, “We
prevented that attack and understand our adversary’s behavior.” The only
thing you’ll hear thereafter will be “Job well done.”
Russ McRee
Principal Security PM Manager, Windows & Devices Group
After the IT administrators complete the onboarding
process, they should focus on following the
recommendations explained in Chapter 7, “Azure
resource management security.” After they apply all
recommendations and the environment is stable, then
the ongoing secure management takes place. Most of the
operations management will be done by reviewing the
information in the Prevention section of the Security
Center dashboard, shown in Figure 10-2.
FIGURE 10-2 Prevention section in Security Center
As part of your operations process, be sure to review

the resource security health of your Azure assets from
this dashboard at least once a day. Ideally, you should
have a dashboard without high and medium severity
recommendations. However, depending on your
environment size and type of business, this might not be
possible, for example, if you have multiple tenants that
are constantly provisioning new resources, such as Azure
SQL Database servers and VMs. In this case, it is
expected that as new resources are being provisioned,
1
they will not automatically follow the baseline
recommendations.
1
Azure Security Center uses CCE (Common Configuration
Enumeration) to assign unique identifiers for configuration rules.
You can download these rules from
https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/Azure-Security-Center-
a789e335.

INCIDENT RESPONSE
Different organizations have different needs when the
subject is incident response. For this reason, the
incident response lifecycle used as a foundation for
2
this section is based on the Microsoft five-stage
incident response process shown in Figure 10-3.
2
For more information about Incident Response in the Cloud, read the
article “Microsoft Azure Security Response in the Cloud” at
https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/Azure-Security-Response-in-
dd18c678.
FIGURE 10-3 Incident response lifecycle used by

Microsoft
The five lifecycle stages are briefly described here:

Detect Identification of a suspicious activity
Assess Triage of the identified suspicious activity
Diagnose Examination of the collected data to
gain a better understanding of the issue
Stabilize Correction and repair of the services
affected by the identified activity
Close The final phase, which is responsible for
post-mortem analysis, technical documentation,
final reporting, and incident closure
Now that you know the goal of each phase, you should
understand how Security Center can be included to assist
you during an incident response. You can use Security
Center in multiple stages of an incident response
lifecycle. For the first stage (Detect), you can use the
Security Alerts tile, shown in Figure 10-4.
FIGURE 10-4 Using the Security Alerts tile for the

first incident response stage
The Security Alerts tile can be used to detect a

suspicious activity. Because Security Center
automatically ranks the severity of the threat, you can
quickly determine whether this is a high-priority threat
that needs to be addressed immediately. You can
perform the initial assessment (stage two) of the issue by
selecting the alert in this tile to display more information
regarding the issue. Select the resource that suffered the
suspicious activity to view a detailed explanation of what
happened, as shown in Figure 10-5.
FIGURE 10-5 Complete details of the suspicious

activity
This blade has a detailed explanation of the suspicious

activity. You can better understand the behavior by
reading the information in the Description field. You can
review the Attacked Resource and Compromised
Machine information also (which in this case are hidden
for privacy reasons). The next section of this blade
(which you can use for the third stage) is Remediation
Steps. Security Center provides a comprehensive list of
steps that you can use to remediate the issue. You can
incorporate these suggestions as part of the resolution of
the problem. Notice that these suggestions are not
automatically run by Security Center. You should
manually follow the steps and run them on the target
system.

FORENSICS INVESTIGATION
Another process that is becoming very common
nowadays is for organizations to have their own
Forensics Team, and in many circumstances, this
team is responsible for performing forensics analysis
on the organizations’ on-premises and cloud
resources. For on-premises resources, forensics is not
a new field, but forensics in the cloud might introduce
some challenges depending on the type of service and
the cloud provider. The scope of this section focuses
only on how to use Security Center to assist you
during a forensics investigation for your VMs located
3
in the cloud .
3
Microsoft can work with customers to help them in performing
forensic analysis of large scale breaches. For more information, read
the article “Cloud Security as a Shared Responsibility” at
https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/azuresecurity/2015/06/05/clou
d-security-as-a-shared-responsibility.
Based on the information in “Guide to Integrating

Forensic Techniques into Incident Response” from the
4
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) ,
forensics is about obtaining data from multiple sources
to reconstruct an event and use this data as evidence for
a case. Most of the work that can be done in Security
Center to help in a forensics investigation is focused on
data collection.
4
You can download the “Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into
Incident Response” from
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-86/SP800-86.pdf.
Part of the data collection process is a matter of

answering questions regarding the issue that you are
trying to investigate. For example, you can use Security
Center to answer the following questions:
When did the issue take place?
Use the Security Alert timeline to obtain this
answer.
What systems were affected?
Use the Security Alert tile to obtain the list of
affected resources.
What protocol and port were used to perform this
attack?
Use the Security Alert blade with the details of
the issue to obtain this answer.
How many times did this attack take place?
Use the Security Alert timeline to obtain this
answer.
Did the attacker exploit any known vulnerability?
Use the Security Alert blade with the details of
the issue to obtain this answer.
Was the target computer fully updated?
Use the Resource Security Health tile for the
VM in question to obtain this answer.
Answering questions like these is imperative during a
forensics investigation process. The intent is to narrow as
much as you can so your scope of action can be more
focused, which makes it easier to reconstruct the event
and rationalize the potential causes for the issue.
Index
A
access keys, StorSimple 97
access rules for firewalls 102–103
Active Directory Domain Controllers 73
Add Access blade 23–24
Add A Next Generation Firewall blade 148
Add Extension blade 110
AD FS synchronization with on-premises AD DS 29–32
AI (artificial intelligence) 165
alerts
Fusion method 139
responding to 152–155
timeline graphs 152
AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) 108
Antimalware
cloud service (PaaS) deployment options 108
deploying via PowerShell 114–115
uninstalling 120–121
virtual machines (IaaS) deployment options 108
Antimalware deployment 109–110
to existing virtual machines 110–115
to new virtual machines 115–119
options 108
Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) 108
antimalware state, accessing 184–185
application logic servers 73
Applications blade 151
Applications security health resource 151–152
apps
configuring to use Key Vault 126–132
passwords 49
artificial intelligence (AI) 165
assuming breach and isolation 12–14
authentication
multi-factor 44–47
StorSimple 97
authentication and authorization 19–20
availability 81
Azure Active Directory Application Proxy 70
Azure AD
identity protection 38–40
on-premises integration 25–31
Azure AD Connect 25–27
Azure AD Identity Protection 36–42
Azure AD Identity Protection blade 37
Azure Application Gateway 82
Azure design principles 17
Azure Disk Encryption 89–91
Azure Files 94–96
Azure hierarchy 20–21
Azure IoT Hub 175
Azure IoT Hub Registry 174
Azure IoT Security 174
Azure IoT Suite 173–175
Azure Key Vault 89
Azure Multi-Factor Authentication
configuring options 48
implementing 45–47
licensing options 45
Azure portal 51
Azure Rights Management (RMS) 99–101
Azure security architecture 15–17
Azure Security Center See Security Center
Azure security mechanisms 173
Azure SQL Firewall 102–103
Azure Storage Service Encryption 92–94
Azure Traffic Manager 67
Azure Virtual Networks 53
connecting using site-to-site VPN 75–76
IP address schemes 54
name resolution 56
B
baseline rules threat prevention policy 140
big data analytics 164
big data, IoT 164
binary large objects 92
biosensors 161
blades
Add Access 23–24
Add A Next Generation Firewall 148
Add Extension 110
Azure AD Identity Protection 37
Detail 134–135
Events 133
Extensions 112, 116
Failed RDP Brute Force Attack 153–154
Included 40
Log Analytics (OMS) 178–179
Networking 148–149
OMS Workspace 179
Prevention Policy 143
Recommendations 145
Resource Groups 22
Security Alert 153
SQL 150–151
User Risk 40
Users 23
Virtual Machines 147–148
blob files 92
breach, assuming 12–14
bring-your-own-device (BYOD) DNS server 56
broad network access cloud computing 8
Brute Force Attack blade 153–154
C
cell-level encryption 104
classic portal 51
cloud
analyzing resource data 178
cloud adoption, security considerations 1–6
cloud computing
broad network access 8
characteristics of 8–9
measured service 9
NIST definition 7–8
on-demand self-service 8
rapid elasticity 8
resource pooling 9
cloud deployment models 10
cloud security
Azure IoT Suite 174
compliance 1–2
considerations 1
vs. datacenter security 12
data protection 5–6
endpoint protection 4
example scenario 193–194
identity and access management 3
operational security 3
public cloud, distributed responsibility for 11–13
risk management 2–3
shared responsibility for 6–7
cloud service models 9
cloud services (PaaS), antimalware deployment 108
commands
Enable-ADSyncExportDeletionThreshold 25
Get-ADSyncScheduler 25
storing 175
community cloud 10
compliance 1–2
confidentiality 81
connection security, Azure IoT Security 174
cross-premises connectivity 62–64
D
data-at-rest encryption 98
data collection, threat prevention policies 141–143
data deduplication 98
data encryption
authentication 97
cell level 104
data-at-rest 104
hybrid 96–98
SQL Always Encrypted 103
StorSimple 96–98
transparent 104
wire security 98
data protection 5–6
data security
rights management 99–102
database security
dynamic data masking 105
row-level security 103
transparent data encryption 104
database servers 73
databases 103
datacenter security vs. cloud security 12
datacenters, extending into Azure 85
dedicated WAN links 64
default system routes 57–58
demilitarized zone 80
denial-of-service (DOS) 63
Detail blade 134–135
device IDs 174
devices 174
DHCP servers 55
disk encryption 89–91
DMZ 80
DNS servers 56, 73
Domain Name System (DNS) global load balancing 67
DOS (denial-of-service) 63
drivers, SQL Always Encrypted 103
dual-connection 78
dynamic IP addresses 54
E
Enable-ADSyncExportDeletionThreshold command 25
encryption
Azure Rights Management 99–101
Azure Storage Service Encryption 92–94
cell-level 104
data-at-rest 98
file share wire 94–96
hybrid data 96–98
storage 92–94
storage redundancy levels 92
transparent data 104
virtual machines 88–89
encryption keys 95
Azure Key Vault 89
Key Vault 124–125
location 89
StorSimple 98
endpoint protection 4
Endpoint Protection threat prevention policy 140
Events blade 133
Exchange Provider connectivity 64
ExpressRoute
in hybrid ITs 80
Extensions blade 112, 116
external load balancing 65, 82
F
federation 28–29
file encryption, rights management 99–101
file shares
encryption 94–96
on-premises access control 95
file share wire encryption 94–96
firewalls
access rules 102
host-based, configuring on IaaS virtual machines 76
forced tunneling 78–79
forensics investigation 201–202
forward proxy 70
G
gateway-to-gateway VPNs 62
Get-ADSyncScheduler command 25
global load balancing 66–67, 83
H
HNV (Hyper-V Network Virtualization) 53
host-based firewalls, configuring on IaaS VMs 76–77
HTTP-based load balancing 81–82
hybrid cloud 10
hybrid data encryption 96–98
hybrid IT 80
hybrid network connections 59
Hyper-V Network Virtualization (HNV) 53
I
IaaS (infrastructure as a service) 9
IaaS virtual machines, configuring host-based firewalls
76–77
identity and access management 3
identity protection
with Azure AD 38–40
Azure Multi-Factor Authentication 44–47
enabling notifications 42–43
suspicious activity 34–35
vulnerabilities 42–43
identity provisioning 3
identity registry, Azure IoT Hub 175
identity verification options 45
image sensors 161
incident remediation 198–199
Included blade 40
infrastructure as a service (IaaS) 9
integrity 81
internal load balancing 66, 82
internet 157
IoT (Internet of Things)
attacks 170
big data 164
devices 165–167
devices, compromising 171
infrastructure 170
overview 157–160
security challenges 165–169
threat modeling 170–171
Windows 10 editions 172
IP addresses
access control 102
dynamic 54
public 54
static 54
virtual machines 55
IP address scheme, Azure Virtual Network 54
IPsec 76
K
keys 123, 175
Key Vault
configuring apps to use 126–132
creating 129–131
monitoring events 132–135
L
licensing options, Azure Multi-Factor Authentication 45
link-layer connection 61
load balancing 65–67, 81–83
Log Analytics 178–179
logon attempts, tracking 188
M
Malware Assessment dashboard 185
measured service cloud computing 9
MEMS (micro electro-mechanical systems) 161
Microsoft Antimalware
See Antimalware; Antimalware deployment
monitoring resources 183–187
MPLS (multiprotocol line switching) 64
Multi-Factor Authentication See Azure Multi-Factor
Authentication
multiprotocol line switching (MPLS) 64
N
name resolution 56
network access control 56–57, 80
network availability 65–67
network intrusion detection system (NIDS) 67
network security
See also security
Azure Security Center 84–85
best practices 71–85
forced tunneling 78–79
IP address schemes 54
network access control 56–57
network intrusion detection system (NIDS) 67
network logging 67–68
Network Security Groups 56–57
perimeter networks 80
proxies 70–71
public name resolution 69
reverse proxy 69–71
routing tables 58
site-to-site VPN 62–63
SSTP VPN protocol 61
subnets 54
subnetting networks based on security zones 73–74
network security appliances 69
Network Security Groups (NSGs) 56–57, 74–75
Network Security Group threat prevention policy 140
Networking blade 148–149
networking security health resource 148
Next Generation Firewall threat prevention policy 140
NIDS (network intrusion detection system) 67
notable issues 189
NSGs (Network Security Groups) 56–57, 74–75
O
OMS Security and Audit
dashboard 184
Log Analytics, configuring 178–179
resources, monitoring 183–187
OMS solutions 180–182
OMS Workspace blade 179
onboarding new resources 140
on-demand self-service cloud computing 8
on-premises
analyzing resource data 178
storage solutions 96–98
on-premises AD DS, synchronizing with Azure AD
Connect 26–27
on-premises infrastructure, extending into Azure IaaS
194–196
on-premises networks
cross-premises connectivity 62–63
operational security 3–4
operations management 196
Operations Management Suite Security and Audit See
OMS Security and Audit
P
PaaS (platform as a service) 9
password hash sync 25
PAWs (Privileged Access Workstations) 4
perimeter networks, Internet-facing devices 80
platform as a service (PaaS) 9
point-to-site VPN 61
policies
sign-in risk 41–42
user risk 39–40
portals 51
PowerShell, deploying antimalware 114–115
prevention policies
enabling 141–143
recommended, applying 144–147
types 140
Prevention Policy blade 143
private cloud 10
Privileged Access Workstations (PAWs) 4
proxy 69–71
public addresses 54
public cloud 10–12
public name resolution 69
R
rapid elasticity cloud computing 8
RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) 15
delegating administrative tasks 138
key roles 21
RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) 59–60
Recommendations blade 145
remote access connection options 59
Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) 59–60
reports, access and usage 34–35
Resource Groups blade 22
resource monitoring 183–187
resource pooling cloud computing 9
resource security health 147–152
resources
access control roles 21
monitoring 184–185
security health 147–152
reverse proxy 69–71
risk management 2–3
RLS (row-level security) 103
RMS (Azure Rights Management) 99–101
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 15, 21
roles
access control 21
assigning 22–23
routing tables 57–58
row-level security (RLS) 103
S
SaaS (software as a service) 9
screened subnet 80
secret 123
secure infrastructure 173–175
Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) 59–61
Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP) 59, 61
security
See also network security; Security Center
alerts, responding to 152–155
assume breach and isolation 12–14
Azure architecture 15–17
Azure IoT Hub 175
Azure IoT Suite 173–175
Azure Multi-Factor Authentication 44–47
breach and isolation 12–14
cloud 1–6, 174
cloud vs. datacenter 12
connections 174
data-at-rest encryption 98
databases 101–104
detecting threats 138–140, 152–153
device IDs 174
devices 174
enabling data collection 141–143
encryption keys 89
firewalls 102–103
identifying suspicious activity 34–35
incidents, responding to 152–155
IoT challenges 165–169
onboarding new resources 140
public cloud, distributed responsibility for 11–13
recommended prevention policies, applying 144–147
resource health 147–152
row-level security 103
StorSimple 96–98
threat prevention policies 140
virtual machine encryption 88–89
security alerts
ranking by criticality 189–190
Security Alerts blade 153
Security Alerts tile 152–153
Security Center
See also security
data collection, enabling 141–143
fusing alerts into incidents 141
operations management 196
prevention policies 140
recommended prevention policies, applying 144–147
threats, detecting 138–141
security events, identifying triggered 186
security health resource categories 147–152
Security Incident Response Process 138
security mechanisms in Azure 173
security state monitoring 184–185
sensors 160–162
ServicePrincipalName parameter 130
Set-AzureRmVMExtension cmdlet 114
Share Access Signature 95
sign-in risk policy 41–42
site-to-site VPN 62–63, 75–76
software as a service (SaaS) 9
split-tunneling 78
SQL Auditing threat prevention policy 140
SQL blade 150–151
SQL row-level security (RLS) 103
SQL security health resource 150
SQL Transparent Data Encryption threat prevention
policy 140
SSH (Secure Shell Protocol) 59–61
SSTP-based point-to-site VPN 61–62
SSTP (Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol) 59, 61
static IP addresses 54–55
storage encryption 92–94
storage solutions 96–98
StorSimple 96–98
subnets 54
defining 73
networks based on security zones 73–74
rules 74
suspicious activity
explanations 200
identifying 34–35
system updates threat prevention policy 140
T
threat intelligence 139
threat modeling 170–171
threats
active, identifying 185
applying recommended prevention policies 144–147
detecting 138–139
prevention policies 140
remediated, identifying 185
traffic, controlling with User Defined Routes 77
transparent data encryption 104
U
update servers 73
User Defined Routes 58, 77
User Risk blade 40
user risk policy 39–40
users, assigning roles 22–23
Users blade 23
utility computing 7
utility model 7
V
virtual machine bus (VMbus) 59
virtual machines (VMs)
accessing remotely 59–60
Azure Disk Encryption 89
and Azure Virtual Network 53
controlling access to 57
controlling traffic 77
dedicated addresses 55
default system routes 58
deploying antimalware to existing 110–115
deploying antimalware to new 115–119
direct connections to 60
disabling management protocols 83–84
encryption 88–89
IP addresses 55
User Defined Routes 77
Virtual Machines blade 147
virtual machines (IaaS), antimalware deployment 108
Virtual Machines security health category 147
virtual network infrastructure 53–54
virtual network security appliances 79
virtual private connections See VPNs
VMbus (virtual machine bus) 59
VMs (virtual machines)
accessing remotely 59–60
Azure Disk Encryption 89
and Azure Virtual Network 53
controlling access to 57
controlling traffic 77
dedicated addresses 55
default system routes 58
direct connections to 60
disabling management protocols 83–84
encryption 88–89
IP addresses 55
User Defined Routes 77
VPNs
gateways 63
gateway-to-gateway connections 62
link-layer connections 61
site-to-site 75–76
site-to-site connections 62–63
SSTP-based point-to-site 61
W
Web Application Firewall threat prevention policy 140
web front-end servers 73
web proxy 70
Windows 10, IoT editions 172
Windows Agent installation 180–181
Windows Defender 108
wire security 98
Z
zettabyte 163
About the authors
YURI DIOGENES is a Senior Content Developer on the CSI

Enterprise Mobility and Security Team, focusing on
enterprise mobility solutions, Azure Security Center, and
OMS Security. Previously, Yuri worked at Microsoft as a
writer for the Windows Security team and as a Support
Escalation Engineer for the CSS Forefront team. He has
a Master of Science degree in Cybersecurity Intelligence
and Forensics from Utica College and an MBA from FGF
in Brazil, and he holds several industry certifications. He
is co-author of Enterprise Mobility Suite—Managing
BYOD and Company-Owned Devices (Microsoft Press,
2015), Microsoft Forefront Threat Management
Gateway (TMG) Administrator’s Companion (Microsoft
Press, 2010), and three other Forefront titles from
Microsoft Press.
DR. THOMAS SHINDER is a program manager in Azure
Security Engineering and a 20-year veteran in IT
security. Tom is best known for his work with ISA Server
and TMG, publishing nine books on those topics. He was
also the leading voice at ISAserver.org. After joining
Microsoft in 2009, Tom spent time on the UAG
DirectAccess team and then took a 3-year vacation from
security to be a cloud infrastructure specialist and
architect. He’s now back where he belongs in security,
and spends a good deal of time hugging his Azure
Security Center console and hiding his secrets in Azure
Key Vault.
DEBRA LITTLEJOHN SHINDER, MCSE, is a former police

officer and police academy instructor who is self-
employed as a technology consultant, trainer, and writer,
specializing in network and cloud security. She has
authored a number of books, including Scene of the
Cybercrime: Computer Forensics Handbook (Syngress
Publishing, 2002) and Computer Networking Essentials
(Cisco Press, 2001). She has co-authored more than 20
additional books and worked as a tech editor,
developmental editor, and contributor to more than 15
books. Deb is a lead author for WindowSecurity.com and
WindowsNetworking.com, and a long-time contributor
to the GFI Software blog and other technology
publications, with more than 1,500 published articles in
print magazines and on websites. Deb focuses on
Microsoft products, and has been awarded the Microsoft
MVP (Most Valuable Professional) award in the field of
enterprise security for 14 years in a row. She lives and
works in the Dallas-Fort Worth area and has taught law
enforcement, computer networking, and security courses
at Eastfield College in Mesquite, Texas. She currently sits
on the advisory board of the Eastfield Criminal Justice
Training Center Police Academy.
Code Snippets
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examples. To optimize the presentation of these
elements, view the eBook in single-column, landscape
mode and adjust the font size to the smallest setting. In
addition to presenting code and configurations in the
reflowable text format, we have included images of the
code that mimic the presentation found in the print
book; therefore, where the reflowable format may
compromise the presentation of the code listing, you will
see a “Click here to view code image” link. Click the link
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What are the main components of Azure security architecture discussed in the book?

What are the main components of Azure security architecture discussed in the book?

How does the book describe identity protection in Azure?

How does the book describe identity protection in Azure?

Microsoft Azure Security

Copyright © 2016 by Yuri Diogenes and Dr. Thomas W.

All rights reserved. No part of the contents of this book

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016938684

Printed and bound in the United States of America.

Microsoft Press books are available through booksellers

This book is provided “as-is” and expresses the author’s

Some examples depicted herein are provided for

Microsoft and the trademarks listed at

Acquisitions and Developmental Editor: Karen

Chapter 1 Cloud security

Chapter 2 Identity protection in Azure

Chapter 3 Azure network security

Chapter 4 Data and storage security

Chapter 5 Virtual machine protection with

Chapter 6 Key management in Azure with Key

Chapter 7 Azure resource management

Chapter 8 Internet of Things security

Chapter 9 Hybrid environment monitoring

Chapter 10 Operations and management in the

About the authors

What do you think of this book? We want to

Security is a critical requirement of any software system,

Regardless of your title, if you’re responsible for

FREE EBOOKS FROM MICROSOFT

ERRATA, UPDATES, & BOOK SUPPORT

WE WANT TO HEAR FROM YOU

Before you dive into the details about Microsoft Azure

CLOUD SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

Use a security information management approach

Use the cloud service provider’s threat

In this flow, the stages are:

Moving to the cloud requires different thinking. Scale, speed, and

Well-organized cloud services add or remove machines from the inventory

Any organization moving to the cloud must establish a trust relationship

NIST definition of cloud computing

Cloud computing characteristics

Cloud service models

Cloud deployment models

Distributed responsibility in public cloud

ASSUME BREACH AND ISOLATION

Using the assume breach mindset, we have to think differently about

Although it might sound counterintuitive, this actually promotes more

AZURE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The first security control in place is to verify the user’s

After the user is authenticated according to her level

AZURE DESIGN PRINCIPLES

TABLE 1-1 Design principles, rationales, and

Credentials exist on-premises and in the cloud, but

For more information about the libraries included in ADAL, go to

Azure AD supports several of the most widely used

For more Azure AD authorization information and code samples, go to

Role-Based Access Control

For a complete list of built-in Azure roles, go to

FIGURE 2-2 Available Azure resource groups

4. When a new blade with the resource group’s