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Introduction
Mischief Rule
As all law including enacted law is a response to a need, which has arisen. In order to appreciate
its true meaning, we have to examine the situation or the context in which the need for
amendment in the existing law arose by in addition or alteration of it. Law, after all, is not static,
it changes in response to the growing situations and needs. It has to serve so as to advance the
public good. Therefore, to construe a statute it is not only legitimate but highly convenient to
refer both the former Act and the present one and to ascertain the evils to which the former Act
has given rise and to the later Act which provides the remedy. To decide the true scope of the
statute in question, or in ascertaining the intention of the legislature, one must have to regard to
all such factors as can legitimately be taken into account such as the history of the legislation
and purpose, thereof the mischief which it intended to suppress, all internal and external aids of
the statute.1

1
A.B. Kafaltiya, Interpretation of Statutes. (New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing, 2008) p. 55.
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Mischief Rule
The mischief rule was laid down in Heydon’s2 case way back in the year 1584 and hence it is
commonly known as "Heydon’s Rule". This rule is also called as "Mischief Rule" because it
envisages adopting that construction by which the mischief is suppressed. It is also referred to
as "Purposive Construction" since it lays emphasis on advancing the purpose and the object of
the statute. This rule, though so old, is still universally accepted and is even today most firmly
established rule for construction of such material words which are capable of having two or
more meanings. According to this rule, if two interpretations are possible, court will prefer that
which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief.3
In Heydon’s Case, in 1584, it was resolved by the Barons of the Exchequer “that for the sure
and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or
enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered:
First. What was the common law before the making of the Act?
Second. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?
Third. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth?
Fourth. The true reason of the remedy.
and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the
mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for
continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and
remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.”4
Thus in order to get its true import it is necessary to view the enactment in retrospect, the
reasons for enacting it, the evils it was to end and objects it was to sub-serve. When two
interpretations are feasible, that which advances the remedy and suppress the evil, as the
legislature envisioned, must find favor with the court. The Act has to be viewed as a whole and
its intention determined by construing all the constituent parts of the Act together and not by
taking detached sections. The statement of objects and reasons can be referred to for the limited
purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time that actuated the sponsor of the Bill
to introduce the same and the extent and urgency of the evil that it sought to remedy.

2
(1584) 3 Co Rep 79: 76 ER 637.
3
D.N. Mathur, Interpretation of Statutes. (Allahabad: Central Law Publications, 2010) p. 182.
4
P. St. J. Langan, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes. (New Delhi: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2004) p. 40.
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Application of the Mischief Rule

The rule is a firmly established rule. When words of a statute are capable of bearing two
constructions, this well recognized rule which has become a classic rule, is applied. The rule
says that in such cases, the court must adopt the construction which supersedes the mischief and
advances the remedy. This rule is also known as “purposive construction rule” or “mischief
rule”. It applies to all statutes, in general, be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of
the common law.5
In Smith v. Hughes6, under section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959 "soliciting in a street”
was an offence. It was held that prostitutes who attracted the attention of passers-by from
balconies or windows were soliciting “in a street” within the meaning of the said provision.
Lord Parker in this case said: “I approach the matter by considering what the mischief is aimed
at by this Act. Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable
people to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes.
Viewed in that way, the precise place from which a prostitute addressed her solicitations to
somebody walking in the street became irrelevant.”
In Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar7, the Supreme Court, in construing Article 286 of
the Constitution, applied Heydon’s Rule. It referred to the State of law prevailing in the
provinces prior to the Constitution. It also referred to the chaos and confusion brought about by
indiscriminate exercise of taxing powers in regard to inter-State trade and commerce by
different provincial legislatures founded on the principle of “territorial nexus”. This was done to
cure the mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow of inter-State trade and
commerce in the Union of India. Article 286 had created provincial trade barrier by multiple
taxation.
A statute, as is well known, must be construed having regard to parliamentary intent. For the
said purpose, it is open to a court not only to take into consideration the history of the
legislation including the mischief sought to be remedied but also the objects and purpose it
seeks to achieve. When court looks into the mischief, which the legislature intended to redress,
it has to look to the whole situation and not just one to one relation. This increases court’s
discretion to interpret. However, the court cannot substitute its own notions for the legislative
intention.8
In Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sodra Devi 9, a partnership was entered into between Sodra
Devi and her three minor sons. The question was whether under section 16(3) of the Income
Tax Act, 1922 the income falling to the share of the three minor sons was liable to be included
in the total income of Sodra Devi, the assessee. Section 16(3) provided that “in computing the
total income of any individual for the purpose of assessment, there shall be included so much
income of wife or minor child of such individual as arises directly or indirectly by partnership
5
B.M. Gandhi, Interpretation of Statutes. (Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 2014) p. 57.
6
(1960) 1 WLR 830.
7
AIR 1955 SC 661, 674: (1955) 2 SCR 603.
8
B.M. Gandhi, Interpretation of Statutes. (Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 2014) p. 58, 59.
9
AIR 1957 SC 832: (1957) 32 ITR 615 (SC): (1958) 1 SCR 1.
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etc.” If the word individual in the section was held to include both male and female, the income
was liable to be so included. However, there was no knowing with the certainty as to whether
the legislature meant to enact the said provision with reference to a male or a female. The
Supreme Court, therefore, observed:
“The legislature certainly was guilty of using an ambiguous term in enacting section 16(3) of
the Act, as it did. In order to resolve this ambiguity therefore we must of necessity have resort to
the state of law before the enactment of the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1922; the
mischief and defect for which the law did not provide; the remedy which the legislature
resolved and appointed to cure the defect and; the true reasons of the remedy within the
meaning of the authorities referred to above.” Holding that the income of minor sons not liable
to be included in the income of the assessee, Justice Bhagwati held: “Before the enactment of
section 16(3), there was no provision at all for the inclusion of the income of wife and minor
child in the computation of total income of any individual for the purpose of assessment, and
therefore, neither the husband nor the father could be made liable for income tax in respect of
such income. The said lacuna caused difficulties for the revenue department, since with a view
to evade income tax the individuals adopted such a joint status of partnership in practice. This
evil was to be remedied by the enactment of section 16(3) in the Act”. Considering the
background of the said section, it was held that there is no room for any doubt that howsoever
that mischief sought to be remedied by the amending Act; the only intention of the legislature in
doing so was to include the income of the male assessee, the husband or the father. “Any
individual" in the provision is therefore restricted to males only. The courts cannot fill up the
lacuna in a fiscal statute.10
Similarly in Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra11, section 292 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (45 of 1860) was considered in the light of its object and the mischief it intended to
suppress. The relevant portion of the section says: “Whoever sells, lets to hire, distributes,
publicly exhibits or in any manner put into circulation, or for purposes of sale, hire, distribution,
public exhibition or circulation, makes, produces or has in his possession any obscene book,
pamphlet, paper, drawing, painting, representation or figure or any other obscene object
whatsoever....... shall be punished...” The accused, in this case, was convicted for selling an
obscene book titled Lady Chatterley’s Lover. The contention on behalf of the accused was that
the intent and act must both concur to constitute the crime, and therefore unless the prosecution
proves against him the mens rea or guilty mind he cannot be punished for the alleged offence
though his act was duly proved. A shopkeeper is not expected to know the contents of every
book, or to go through each book to see as to whether among lots of books some contain
obscene literature.
Rejecting the contention the Supreme Court held that the prosecution need not prove something
that the law does not burden it with. The court will presume that the, owner of the shop is guilty

10
A.B. Kafaltiya, Interpretation of Statutes. (New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing, 2008) p. 59.
11
AIR 1965 SC 881: (1965) 67 BLJR 506: 1965 Cr LJ 8: 1 SCR 65.
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if the book is sold on his behalf and later found to be obscene unless he can establish that the
sale was without his knowledge or consent.12

Where rule not applicable

The object-oriented approach, however, cannot be carried to the extent of doing violence to the
plain language used by rewriting the section or substituting words in place of the actual words
used by the legislature. Similarly, purposive construction need not be applied when the relevant
Act has been amended from time to time on the basis of fresh needs and has, thus, not remained
static. It is, therefore, necessary to give full effect to the purport and object of the Act. However,
when the words of a statute frustrate its patent purpose, the courts are not bound to accept the
same. In the guise of giving a purposive interpretation, one cannot interpret a section in a
manner which would lead to a conflict between two sub-sections of the same section.
Purposive construction need not be applied when relevant Act has been amended from time to
time on the basis of fresh needs and has, thus, not remained static. The correct principle is that
after the words have been construed in their context and it is found that the language is capable
of bearing only one construction, the rule in Heydon’s ceases to be controlling and gives way to
the plain meaning rule.13
State of Karnataka v. B.V. Thimmappa14
In this case, the Karnataka Service Examinations Act, 1976 provided that non-passing of the
prescribed examination by a government servant would entail the consequences as specified in
the rules. The rules enumerated the consequences. It was held that the court cannot infer any
additional consequence solely on the basis of the supposed object and purpose of the rules.
Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corpn.15
Purposive construction is resorted to when or where doubt arises on account of ambiguity. It is
to be preferred when object and purpose of the Act is required to be promoted. When
Parliament created tribunals with certain purpose and object, it does not confer them another
jurisdiction so that the High Court or the Supreme Court could transfer cases from civil court to
tribunal. This doctrine cannot be extended where it leads to anomaly and amounts to rewriting
of a statute.

Objectives of the use of Mischief Rule

Absurdity, anomaly, hardship, inconvenience, injustice, redundancy and repugnancy are to be
avoided. The court has to avoid hardship, inconvenience, injustice, absurdity and anomaly
which lead to inconsistency or uncertainty and friction in the system, which the statute intends
to regulate. In case of any manifest absurdity or repugnance, the language of the statute may be
varied or modified so as to avoid inconvenience, but no further.
12
A.B. Kafaltiya, Interpretation of Statutes. (New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing, 2008) p. 61.
13
B.M. Gandhi, Interpretation of Statutes. (Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 2014) p. 60.
14
1994 Supp (I) SCC 124, 127.
15
(2009) 8 SCC 646: (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 481.
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It is a rule of interpretation of statutes that the statutory provisions are so construed as to avoid
absurdity and to further rather than defeat or frustrate the object of the enactment. In doing so,
a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, or even the
structure of the sentence. Where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces
a manifestly unjust result, which could never have been intended by the legislature, the court
might modify the language used by the legislature so as to achieve the intention of the
legislature and produce a rational construction. The task of interpretation of a statutory
provision is an attempt to discover the intention of the legislature from the language used. It is
necessary to remember that language is at best an imperfect instrument for the expression of
human intention.
While construing a provision or an exemption notification, not only a pragmatic view is
required to be taken but also its practical aspect must be considered. When there is more than
one interpretation possible, “the court will adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible
than that which is none of these things”. This proposition is on the presumption “that the
legislature should have used the word in that interpretation which least offends our sense of
justice”. Thus, a statute should be read in a manner so as to do justice to the parties. Where
language of a statute bears more than one construction, the judge must consider the
consequences of taking into account or adopting the alternative constructions.
A view, which advances the cause of justice, should be preferred to one which defeats it.
Interpretation should sub serve social and economic justice but an interpretation which renders
a provision unconstitutional or which renders any word superfluous or surplus should not be
preferred, but avoided. Courts should avoid unintended results. It should resort to harmonious
construction in order to make the provision meaningful in the context. The construction resorted
to must be in consonance with the intention of the rule-makers.16

16
B.M. Gandhi, Interpretation of Statutes. (Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 2014) p. 61-63.
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