LTD

Case Digests
2015-2016

FEU JD Block JD4202

1 Cruz vs Sec of the DENR 347 SCRA 128 12/6/2000 Aguilar,
Charles Tito R.
FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known
as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR).
The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the Regalian Doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

RULING:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in
the law that grants to the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICC)/Indigenous Peoples (IP) ownership
over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the
natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on
which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the
same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They
are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession
by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right
to alienate the same.

2 Sec of DENR vs Yap 568 SCRA 164 10/8/2008 Aguilar, Charles

Tito R.
FACTS:

This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by
respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.

On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist
zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a
judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed
a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition countering that
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No.
705 or the Revised Forestry Code.

ISSUE:

Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land, therefore
making these lands alienable.

RULING:

No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and
a legislative act or statute.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of
state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

3 Republic vs Lao 405 SCRA 291 Aguilar, Charles Tito R.

FACTS:

Lao filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City application for registration of a parcel of land. She allegedly
acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria Valenzuela who
inherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina,
who acquired the same from Edilberto Perido by transfer. She prayed that the land be registered in her
name under Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act) based on her and her predecessor-in-interests’
open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and occupancy under bona
fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. She presented witnesses and evidence
constituting of deed of sale, survey plan, the technical description of property and tax declarations in her
and her predecessors’ names. The court approved the application. The petitioner represented by the
Solicitor General appealed the decision before the CA which re-affirmed the lower court decision, hence
this petition for review before the SC. The petitioner contends that there is no sufficient evidence to
warrant the issuance of the title to the respondent as she fails to comply with the required periods and
acts of possession mandated by law and her failure to prove that the land is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain.
ISSUE:

Whether the respondent sufficiently complied with the required period and acts of possession?

Whether the respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application was alienable and
disposable land of the public domain?

RULING:

The court held that Commonwealth Act 141 requires that before one can register one’s title over a
parcel of land, the applicant must show that he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; in adverse possession over the land for at
least 30 years and the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. Petitioner was right to contend that the respondent did not prove by incontrovertible evidence
that she possessed the property in the manner and time required by law. She did not provide the exact
period when her predecessors-in-interest started occupying the property. No extrajudicial settlement of
the property from its previous owners was shown and she did not show any relationship between the
parties where she obtained her deed of sale. She further did not present any certification from
appropriate government agency to show that the property is re-classified as disposable and alienable
land of the public domain. It is incumbent for an applicant of a land registration to provide these
incontrovertible evidences to support her claim for her application. In the absence of these evidences,
her application shall fail. Hence the petition was granted and her application was denied.

4 La Bugal B'laan vs Ramos 127882 12/2/2006 Albay, Miami

Frianz F.
Facts:

Jul. 25, 1987: Pres. Aquino issued EO 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and
evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations for contracts involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals. The President may
execute with the foreign proponent, upon recommendation of the Secretary.

Mar. 3, 1995: Pres. Ramos approved RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act 1995) to govern the exploration,
development, utilization, and processing of all mining resources. It took effect on Apr. 9, 1995.

Mar. 30, 1995: Pres. Ramos entered into a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with
WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in S. Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and N. Cotabato.

WMCP sold all its shares to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (Sagittarius), a corporation organized under Philippine
Laws with at least 60% of its equity owned by Filipinos and/or Filipino owned corporations.

By virtue of such sale and transfer, the DENR Secretary approved the transfer and registration of the
FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius.

Petitioners allege that RA 7942 allows fully foreign owned corporations to explore, develop, utilize and
exploit mineral resources contrary to Sec. 2, Par. 4, Art. 12.
 It allows foreign-owned companies to extend more than mere financial or technical assistance.
It permits foreign owned companies to OPERATE AND MANAGE mining activities.

It allows foreign-owned companies to extend BOTH financial AND technical assistance instead of
financial OR technical assistance.

Issue:

W/N RA 7942, the Philippine Mining Act is constitutional.

Held:

NO. It is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the
phrase “financial and technical agreements” in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, it actually treats
these agreements as service contracts.

It follows that the WMCP FTAA entered into under such Act is also unconstitutional.

All provisions of the DENR AO 96-40 not in conformity with the Decision are also invalidated.

Following the literal text of the Constitution, assistance accorded by foreign-owned corporations
in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils
should be limited to “technical” or “financial” assistance only. Contrary to this, the WMCP FTAA allows
WMCP, a fully-foreign-owned mining corporation, to extend more than mere financial or technical
assistance to the State, for it permits WMCP to manage and operate every aspect of the mining activity.

In Section 33, Chapter VI the underlying assumption is that the foreign contractor manages the
mineral resources, just like the foreign contractor in a service contract.

Chapter XII grants foreign contractors in FTAAs the same auxiliary mining rights that it grants
contractors in mineral agreements.

An FTAA contractor “has or has access to all the financing, managing, and technical expertise…”,
suggesting that some management assistance is prescribed.

Section 1.3 of the WMCP FTAA grants WMCP “the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize,
process and dispose of all Minerals products and by-products thereof that may be produced from the
Contract Area.”

Under Section 1.2, WMCP shall provide all “financing, technology, management and personnel
necessary for the Mining Operations”.

All in all, WMCP is granted beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to
the State and are intended for the benefit of the citizens.

Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est. The phrase “management or other forms of assistance”
in the 1973 Constitution was deleted in the 1987 Constitution, which allows only “technical or financial
assistance”. The omission was intentional and purposeful.
 The phrase “service contracts” has likewise been deleted in the 1987 Constitution. This omission
is indicative of a difference in purpose. The concept of “technical or financial assistance” agreements is
not identical to that of “service contracts”. The drafters, as evidenced from their deliberations, intended
to do away with service contracts which were used to circumvent the capitalization (60%-40%)
requirement. It was intended to be a safeguard to prevent abuses. Service contracts are not allowed.

The CONCOM took into consideration the “Draft of the 1986 UP Law Constitutional Project”
when it adopted the concept of “agreements…involving either technical or financial assistance”.

The UP Law draft proponents viewed service contracts under the 1973 Constitution as grants of
beneficial ownership of the country’s natural resources to foreign owned corporations. While in theory,
the State owns these natural resources – and Filipino citizens, their beneficiaries – service contracts
actually vested foreigners with the right to dispose, explore for, develop, exploit, and utilize the same.
This is clearly incompatible with the constitutional ideal of nationalization of natural resources, with the
Regalian doctrine, and with Philippine sovereignty.

But the proponents still recognized the need for capital and technical know-how in the large-
scale exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources. Thus, they proposed a compromise:
“agreements…involving either technical or financial assistance”. This compromise is deemed to be more
consistent with the State’s ownership of and its “full control and supervision” over such resources.

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs with foreign-owned
corporations is an exception to the general rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is
reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Such provision must be construed strictly against non-Filipinos.

5 Sotto vs Sotto 43 Phil. 688 9/1/2022 Albay, Miami Frianz F.

Facts:

The petitioner alleges that he is the owner of said lot No. 7510; that in or about the year 1907 he
absented himself from the city of Cebu, leaving the respondent in charge of the lot; that on or about the
16th of April, 1921, upon visiting the office of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Cebu he
discovered that the respondent had fraudulently obtained the registration of said lot in his own name
and that a certificate of title for said lot had been issued to said respondent. Due to his long absence
from Cebu, he was unable to appear in court in the land registration proceedings and to defend his
rights; and that this action is his only remedy to recover the property in question.

Issue:

Whether the final decree of confirmation and registration be reopened and the term “judgment” is
within the meaning of section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Held:

Yes, the final decree of confirmation and registration can be reopened. The final "decree of confirmation
and registration" cannot be reopened except for the reasons and in the manner stated in section 38 of
the Land Registration Act. The final "decree of confirmation and registration" provided for in the Land
Registration Act is not a judgment within the meaning of section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
that section is not applicable to decisions covered or confirmed by such final decrees. The remedy
provided for in section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure may, in land registration matters, be applied
to judgments not confirmed by final decrees.

6 Legarda vs Saleeby 31 Phil. 590 10/2/1985 Albay, Miami Frianz F.

Facts:

Legarda obtained a decree of registration of a parcel of land on the 25th of October, 1906.
Saleeby, on the 25th of March, 1912, obtained a certificate of registration for his land which joined the
land theretofore registered by Legarda. The certificate of title issued to Saleeby included a narrow strip
of the land theretofore registered in the name of Legarda. On the 13th of December, 1912, Legarda
presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the adjustment and correction of the error
committed in the certificate issued to Saleeby, which included said narrow strip of land.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner has a better title over the wall and the land occupied by it.

Held:

Yes, the petitioner has a better title over the property. In a case where two certificates of title
include or cover the same land, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original parties, whether
the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly or only in part comprised in the earlier certificate.
In successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular interest in
land, the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who
obtained the second certificate. The decree of registration is conclusive upon and against all persons.

The real purpose of the torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop
forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted, at the time of
registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the
law, it would seem that once the title was registered, the owner might rest secure, without the necessity
of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of
losing his land. The proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is a judicial
proceeding, but it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action.

The registration under the torrens system and the issuance of a certificate of title do not give
the owner any better title than he had. He does not obtain title by virtue of the certificate. He secures
his certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title. If he obtains a certificate of title, by
mistake, to more land than he really and in fact owns, the certificate should be corrected. If he does not
already have a perfect title, he can not secure his certificate. Having a fee simple title, and presenting
sufficient proof of that fact, he is entitled to a certificate of registration. The certificate of registration
simply accumulates, in one document, a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee
simple title, which the owner, in fact, has. The certificate, once issued, is the evidence of the title which
the owner has. The certificate should not be altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except
to correct errors, in some direct proceedings permitted by law. The title represented by the certificate
can not be changed, altered, modified, enlarged or diminished in a collateral proceeding.
7 Capitol Subdivision vs Province of Negros Occidental 7 SCRA 60 1963
Añonuevo, Jon-jon
FACTS:

Lot 378, which is the subject matter of this case, is part of Hacienda Madalagan, registered
under the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar, covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
1776 issued in the name of the aforementioned in 1916. Sometime in 1920, the Amenabars sold the
aforementioned Hacienda to Jose Benares for the purchase price of P300,000, payable in instalments. In
1924, the Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of the Amenabars was cancelled, and in lieu
thereof, Benares obtained a Transfer Certificate of Title under his name.

Meanwhile, in 1921, Benares mortgaged the Hacienda including Lot 378 to Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co. And then later in 1926, he again mortgaged the Hacienda, including said Lot 378, on the
Philippine National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.

In 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to the son of Jose Benares, Carlos Benares, for the
sum of P400,000, payable in annual installments, subject to the condition that the title will remain with
the Bank until full payment.The Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to the plaintiff
and a transfer certificate of title covering Lot 378 was issued. It should be noted that, despite the
acquisition of the Hacienda in 1934 by the Bank, the latter did not take possession of the property for
Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged right of lease.

When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale 1949, plaintiff took steps to take
possession the Hacienda and it was discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the Provincial
Hospital of Negros Occidental. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff made representations with or on
October 4, 1949, plaintiff made representations with the proper officials to clarify the status of said
occupation. Not being satisfied with the explanations given by said officials, it brought the present action
on June 10, 1950.

In its answer, defendant maintained that it had acquired the lot in question in the year 1924-
1925 through expropriation proceedings and that it took possession of the lost and began the
construction of the provincial hospital thereon. They further claimed that for some reason beyond their
comprehension, title was never transferred in its name and it was placed in its name only for
assessment purposes.

And that defendant acted in bad faith in purchasing the lot knowing that the provincial hospital was
situated there and that he did not declare such property for assessment purposes only until 1950.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not defendant herein had acquired the lot in question in the aforementioned expropriation
proceedings.

HELD/RATIO:

The Court held that defendant was not able to sufficiently prove that they have acquired the
legal title over Lot 378. Several circumstances indicate that the expropriation had not been
consummated.
 First, there, the entries in the docket pertaining to the expropriation case refer only to its filing
and the publication in the newspaper of the notices. Second, there was an absence of a deed of
assignment and of a TCT in favour of the Province as regards Lot 378. Third, the property was mortgaged
to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Lot 378 could not have been expropriated without the intervention of the
Milling Co. And yet, the latter was not made a party in the expropriation proceedings. And fourth, a
second mortgage was constituted in favour of the Back, which would not have accepted the mortgage
had Lot 378 not belonged to the mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been expropriated without the
Bank’s knowledge and participation.

Furthermore, in the deed executed by the Bank promising to sell the Hacienda Mandalagan to
Carlos Benares, it was explicitly stated that some particular lots had been expropriated by the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary implication, that Lot 378 had not been
expropriated.

8 Director of Lands vs Santiago 160 SCRA 186 4/15/1988 Añonuevo,

Jon-jon
FACTS:

On Sept. 8, 1973, an application for land registration was filed by respondent Garcia in the CFI of
Bataan. A copy of the application was forwarded to the SolGen thru the director of Lands. On Feb. 19,
1974, the Director of lands filed an opposition to this application, and at the same time the SolGen
entered his appearance and authorized the Provincial Fiscal to appear on his behalf at the hearing of the
same. Subsequently, respondent IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., with the conformity of the
respondent Garcia, filed a Motion to Substitute Party Applicant from Maria Garcia to Imperial Corp
without amending the boundaries of the area stated in the original application. Said motion was granted
by the respondent Judge Santiago.

A notice of initial hearing was sent by respondent Judge to all parties concerned, with the
warning that a party who failed to appear would be declared in default. The same notice was likewise
published in the Official Gazette and posted by the sheriff as required by law.On Jan. 23, 1975, the date
of the initial hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel was present; an order of general default was
issued by the respondent Judge on the same date. After the reception of the evidence for the applicant
before the clerk of court, the respondent Judge rendered the questioned decision and adjudicated the
lands in favor of the respondent corporation.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial on the grounds that the failure of his counsel
to appear at the initial hearing was excusable,a nd that the decision was contrary to facts and to law.
The motion was however denied.

ISSUE/S

WON respondent Judge Santiago erred in decreeing the following orders and decisions:

1. Admitting the Amended Application for Registration and adjudicating the parcels of land in favor of
respondent corporation,

2. Declaring the Director of Lands in default,

HELD/RATIO:

The petition is Granted. The Supreme Court is not convinced with the conclusion of the
respondent Judge and with the arguments of the respondent corporation that the latter, through its
predecessors-in- interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years.

The pertinent provision of law which states: “If no person appears and answers within the time
allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing,
order a general default to be recorded …,” cannot be interpreted to mean that the court can just
disregard the answer before it, which has long been filed, for such an interpretation would be nothing
less than illogical, unwarranted, and unjust.

Especially in this case where the greater public interest is involved as the land sought to be
registered is alleged to be public land, the respondent Judge should have received the applicant’s
evidence and set another date for the reception of the oppositor’s evidence. The oppositor in the Court
below and petitioner herein should have been accorded ample opportunity to establish the
government’s claim. In view of the basic presumption that lands of whatever classification belong to the
State, courts must scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate.

Section 48, paragraph b, of the Public Land Act, to wit:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:…

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

9 Barroga vs Albano 157 SCRA 131 1/20/1986 Añonuevo, Jon-

jon
FACTS:

CFI of Ilocos Norte adjudicated a parcel of land in favour of Delfina Aquino. One of the
oppositors was Ruperta Pascual, who was declared in default. For unrecorded reasons, the decree of
registration did not issue except until after lapse of 14 years or so (October 14, 1955). It was only after
24 years (November 17, 1979) that OCT was issued in Delfina Aquino’s name.

1970 after the decree of registration had been handed down but before the title issued in
Delfina Aquino’s favour, the children and heirs of Ruperto Pascual, appellants Eufemia Barroga and
Saturnina Padaca, brought suit against the children and heirs of Delfina Aquino, appellees Angel Albano
et al.

Barroga had been in possession of the land since 1941 and real owners thereof prayed that Aquino’s
title be cancelled and new title be made out in their names. Aquino’s title encroached upon a 4sqm
portion of an adjoining lot belonging to Cesar Castro who filed a complaint in intervention.

CFI dismissed Barroga’s and Padaca’s complaint and declared the intervenor Castro the owner of
4sqm portion overlapped by Aquino.their action was barred by prior judgement. Res adjudicata, the
judgement of the cadastral court was one against a specific thing and therefore conclusive upon the title
of the thing. As possessor of the lot in question, they could not be ejected therefrom by mere writ of
possession.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not they can be ejected.

HELD/RATIO:

Yes. The Writ of possession could properly issue despite the not inconsiderable period of time
that had elapsed from the date of the registration decree, since the right to the same does not
prescribe. The appellees must be declared to be entitled to the writ over the subject lot, despite the
lapse of many years, their rights thereto being imprescriptible, in enforcement of the decree of
registration and vindication of the title issued in favour of the predecessor-in-interest. The writ may be
correctly enforced against the appellants. The appellants, it must be said, have succeeded in prolonging
the controversy long enough. They should not be allowed to continue doing so.

10 Republic vs Malabanan 587 SCRA 172 4/29/2009 Batulan, Kervin

Facts:

Mario Malabanan filed an application for registration of his land situated in Silang, Cavite, with
the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, on February 20, 1998, which he purchased from Eduardo Velasco. He
assailed that his predecessors-in-interests were in an open, notorious, continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than 30 years. Malabanan alleged that the subject property is an
alienable and disposable patrimonial property of the State, as evidenced by the certificate issued by
CENRO-DENR, hence the Regional Trial Court granted the petition. The OSG appealed with the CA,
alleging that the RTC erred in granting the petition filed by Malabanan because the petitioner failed to
prove that the subject land is a patrimonial property of the State. During the pendency of the case with
the CA, Malabanan died hence his interest is represented by his heirs.

Issue:

In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
Ruling:

In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession.

Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands
should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

11 Averia vs Caguioa 146 SCRA 459 Batulan, Kervin

Facts:

The petitioner herein, refused to participate in the hearing of the registration proceedings below,
claiming the respondent court, acting as a cadastral court, had no competence to act upon the said case
under Section 112 of Act 496, otherwise known as the "Land Registration Act." It is argued that the
lower court had no competence to act on the registration sought because of the absence of unanimity
among the parties as required under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act.

Issue:

Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to order the registration of a deed of sale

Ruling:

With reference to Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (now Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529), the court
is no longer fettered by its former limited jurisdiction which enabled it to grant relief only in cases where
there was "unanimity among the parties" or none of them raised any "adverse claim or serious
objection." Under the amended law, the court is now authorized to hear and decide not only such
noncontroversial cases but even the contentious and substantial issues, such as the question at bar,
which were beyond its competence before.

12 Arceo vs CA185 SCRA 489 5/8/1990 Batulan, Kervin

Facts:

Spouses Arceos owned unregistered parcels of land, they had a son named Esteban who has five
children. One of Esteban’s children named Jose who was then married to Virginia Franco. Jose and
Virginia had then six children. Before the spouses Arceo passed away, they executed a deed of donation
in favor of Jose covering the subject disputed land.

Sometime in 1972, Virgina together with her children filed an application for registration of the
subject land with the cadastral court. The same was contested by the other heirs, hence the court
denied the petition and distributed the land according to the law. Soon thereafter, the decision was
appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, the petitioners
now argue with the Supreme Court that the cadastral court was bereft of the power to determine
conflicting claims of ownership, and that its authority was solely to confirm an existing title, and that
anyway, all the lots should have been awarded to them by virtue of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession since 1941 (1942, when Jose took possession of the parcels) or otherwise, by
acquisitive prescription.

Issue:

Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the matter

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land registration court, is no longer as circumscribed
as it was under Act No. 496, the former land registration law. The Supreme Court said that the Decree
“has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court.” The
amendment was aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration
proceedings by conferring upon the required trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for
registration’ but also ‘over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising from such applications or petitions.

13 SM Prime Holdings vs Madayag 578 SCRA 552 2/12/2009

Borja, Mark Joseph

14 Delos Angeles vs Santos 12 SCRA 622 12/24/1964 Borja, Mark

Joseph

15 Bureau of Forestry vs CA 153 SCRA 351 Borja, Mark

Joseph

16 Martinez vs CA 56 SCRA 647 Caratiquit, Reyville

FACTS:

Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez are the registered owner of a fishpond in Lubao, Pampanga. The
fishpond was originally owned by Montemayor who secured “titulo real” over it. After Montemayor’s
death, the property was passed to his successors-in-interest, who in turn, sold it to Garcia. Because
Garcia was prevented by then municipal president of Lubao, Beltran, from restoring the dikes on the
constructed property, Garcia filed a case to retrain Beltran in his official capacity from molesting him in
possession of the parcel and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction. The writ was issued against the
municipal president and was declared permanent by the Court and was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Garcia applied for the registration of the land in his name and the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
sitting as land registration court, granted the registration. Pursuant to this decision, OCT was granted to
Garcia. Ownership of the property changed hands until eventually acquired by Martinez by virtue of TCT.
To avoid any untoward incident, the disputants agreed to refer the matter to the Committee on Rivers
and Streams which appointed a sub-committee. The sub-committee submitted a report that the parcel
was not a public river but a private fishpond own by Martinez. The committee rendered a decision that
Martinez should be restored to the exclusive possession, use and enjoyment of the parcel. The
municipal official of Lubao refused to recognize the decision. Martinez filed a case against the mayor
praying that the latter be enjoined from molesting them in their possession of the property and in the
construction of the dikes therein. While the case was still pending, then Sec. Moreno of Public Works
and Communications ordered another investigation, directing Martinez to remove the dikes they had
constructed, on the strength of the authority vested in him by RA 2056 entitled “An Act to Prohibit,
Remove and/or Demolish the Construction of Dams, Dikes, or Any Other Walls in Public Navigable
Waters, or Waterways and in Communal Fishing Grounds, To Regulate Works in such Water or
Waterways and in Communal Fishing Grounds, and to Provide Penalties for its Violation, and for other
Purposes.” The order embodied a threat that the dikes would be demolished should the Martinez fail to
comply in 30 days. Martinez filed a case in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga which ruled in his
favor. The lower court declared that the decision rendered by the Undersecretary of Public Works and
Communications null and void. The officials of the Department of Public Works and Communications
appealed contending that Martinez have no cause of action because the property in dispute is a public
river. The CA reversed the ruling of the lower court and declared parcel covered by TCT of Martinez is a
public stream and that said title should be cancelled and the river covered reverted to public domain.
Martinez assails this decision being a collateral attack on the indefeasibility of the torrens title originally
issued in 1925 in favor of their predecessor-in-interest.

ISSUE:

Whether the Land Registration Court can adjudge the registration of a land of the public domain.

HELD:

No. The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registerable properties, such as public
navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title
in favor of a private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as
regards the Lot No. 2 of Certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be attacked at any
time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided
for by the Statute of Limitations. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public
properties fraudulently registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or private
acquisition does not prescribe.

17 Republic vs CA 299 SCRA 199 Caratiquit, Reyville

FACTS:

RA 1899 authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities. Invoking the provision of RA
1899, Pasay City Council passed an ordinance for the reclamation of 300 hectares of foreshore lands,
empowering the City Mayor to award and enter into reclamation contracts, and prescribing terms and
conditions therefor. The ordinance was amended authorizing the Republic Real Estate Corporation
(“RREC”) to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms and conditions. The Republic of
the

Philippines (“Republic”) filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Preventive Injunction and Mandatory Injunction before the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The complaint was amended questioning subject Agreement between Pasay City and RREC on the
grounds that the subject matter of such Agreement is outside the commerce of man, that its terms and
conditions are violative of RA 1899, and that the said Agreement was executed without any public
bidding. CFIC issue an order that the defendants, their agents, and all persons claiming under them, to
refrain from ‘further reclaiming or committing acts of dispossession or despoliation over any area within
the Manila Bay or the

Manila Bay Beach Resort.’ It also issued a writ of preliminary injunction which enjoined the defendants,
RREC and Pasay City, their agents, and all persons claiming under them “from further reclaiming or
committing acts of dispossession.” The CFIC ruled in favor of Pasay City and RREC. Republic appealed to
CA. Before appeal could be resolved, PD 3-A was issued, thus: “The provisions of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to
the National Government or any person authorized by it under a proper contract. All reclamations made
in violation of this provision shall be forfeited to the State without need of judicial action. Contracts for
reclamation still legally existing or whose validity has been accepted by the National Government shall
be taken over by the National Government on the basis of quantum meruit, for proper prosecution of
the project involved by administration.” Republic and the Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines (“CDCP”) signed a Contract for the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project (Phases I and II) which
contract included the reclamation and development of areas covered by the Agreement between Pasay
City and RREC. Then, there was issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 which transferred to the Public
Estate Authority (“PEA”) the rights and obligations of the Republic of the Philippines under the contract
between the Republic and CDCP. CA Affirmed the Decision of the CFIC and RREC has the option to buy
60% of 21 hectares of land already reclaimed. Pasay City and RREC filed a motion that 55 hectares had
been reclaimed. CA modified its decision and ordered the turn-over to Pasay City of the ownership and
possession of 9 lots titled in the name of CCP.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA is correct in deciding that the ownership and possession of the 9 titled lots be turned-
over Pasay City.

HELD:

No. A notice of lis pendens is necessary when the action is for recovery of possession or ownership of a
parcel of land. In the present litigation, RREC and Pasay City, as defendants in the main case, did not
counterclaim for the turnover to Pasay City of the titled lots aforementioned. What is more, a torrens
title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue of validity of a torrens title, whether fraudulently issued
or not, may be posed only in an action brought to impugn or annul it. Unmistakable, and cannot be
ignored, is the germane provision of Section 48 of P.D. 1529, that a certificate of title can never be the
subject of a collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding
instituted in accordance with law.
18 Alvarez vs PICOP 606 SCRA 444 12/3/2009 Caratiquit, Reyville
FACTS:

PICOP filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an application to have
its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA. In the middle of the processing of
PICOP’s application, however, PICOP refused to attend further meetings with the DENR. Instead, on 2
September 2002, PICOP filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition for
Mandamus against then DENR Secretary Alvarez. PICOP seeks the issuance of a privileged writ of
mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute and deliver an IFMA to PICOP.

While PICOP did not seek any certification from the NCIP that the former’s concession area did not
overlap with any ancestral domain, PICOP initially sought to comply with the requirement under
Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code to procure prior approval of the Sanggunians
concerned. However, only one of the many provinces affected approved the issuance of an IFMA to
PICOP. Undaunted, PICOP nevertheless submitted to the DENR the purported resolution of the Province
of Surigao del Sur indorsing the approval of PICOP’s application for IFMA conversion, apparently hoping
either that the disapproval of the other provinces would go unnoticed, or that the Surigao del Sur
approval would be treated as sufficient compliance.

The cause of action of PICOP in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial court is that the government is
bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then Pres. Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest
Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.

ISSUES:

a) Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause by
which the government may be bound for the issuance of the IFMA.

b) Whether PICOP complied with the LGC requirement of obtaining prior approval of the
Sanggunian concerned by submitting a purported resolution of the Province of Surigao del Sur indorsing
the approval of PICOP’s application for IFMA conversion.

HELD:

a) No. A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition
of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or a privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. ‘A license is merely a permit or
privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it a property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation’. Thus, this Court held that the granting
of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights. Since timber
licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.

b) No. The approval of the Sanggunian concerned is required by law, not because the local
government has control over such project, but because the local government has the duty to protect its
constituents and their stake in the implementation of the project. Again, Section 26 states that it applies
to projects that “may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of nonrenewable resources, loss of
crop land, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species.” The local government
should thus represent the communities in such area, the very people who will be affected by flooding,
landslides or even climatic change if the project is not properly regulated, and who likewise have a stake
in the resources in the area, and deserve to be adequately compensated when these resources are
exploited. Indeed, it would be absurd to claim that the project must first be devolved to the local
government before the requirement of the national government seeking approval from the local
government can be applied. If a project has been devolved to the local government, the local
government itself would be implementing the project. That the local government would need its own
approval before implementing its own project is patently silly.

19 Heirs of Clemente vs Heirs of Vicente Ermac 403 SCRA 291

Castillo, Frinz Lemwel
Facts:

At Lot No. 666 was originally owned by Claudio Ermac and, after his death, was inherited by his children
Esteban, Balbina and Pedro. Clemente Ermac registered the said Lot to his name alone without regards
to the other predecessors-in-interests. The respondents were able to prove consistently and
corroboratively that they as well as their predecessors-in-interests had been in open, continuous and
undisturbed possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners.

According to the appellate court, “[t]he fact that [petitioners] have in their possession certificates of
title which apparently bear out that it [was] Clemente Ermac alone who claimed the entire property
described therein [has] no discrediting effect upon plaintiffs’ claim, it appearing that such titles were
acquired in derogation of the existing valid and adverse interests of the plaintiffs whose title by
succession were effectively disregarded.”

Issue:

1. Whether or not the alleged tax declarations and tax receipts are sufficient to defeat the title over the
property in the names of petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest [Spouses] Clemente Ermac and
Anunciacion Suyco

2. Whether or not laches has set in on the claims by the respondents on portions of Lot No. 666

The Court’s Ruling

First Issue:

Ownership of the Disputed Lot

Petitioners claim that the CA erred in relying on the hearsay and unsubstantiated testimony of
respondents, as well as on tax declarations and realty tax receipts, in order to support its ruling that the
land was owned by Claudio Ermac.

We are not persuaded. The credence given to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents is a
factual issue already passed upon and resolved by the trial and the appellate courts. It is a hornbook
doctrine that only questions of law are entertained in appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The trial court’s findings of fact, which the CA affirmed, are generally conclusive and binding upon
this Court.19
Moreover, while tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership, they may
constitute strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for
prescription.20 Considering that respondents have been in possession of the property for a long period
of time, there is legal basis for their use of tax declarations and realty tax receipts as additional evidence
to support their claim of ownership.

Second Issue:

Prescription and Laches

Petitioners assert that the ownership claimed by respondents is barred by prescription and laches,
because it took the latter 57 years to bring the present action. We disagree.

When a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title to property, a constructive trust is
created in favor of the defrauded party. Since Claudio Ermac has already been established in the present
case as the original owner of the land, the registration in the name of Clemente Ermac meant that the
latter held the land in trust for all the heirs of the former. Since respondents were in actual possession of
the property, the action to enforce the trust, and recover the property, and thereby quiet title thereto,
does not prescribe.

Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations.23 It

cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice.24 Its application should not
prevent the rightful owners of a property to recover what has been fraudulently registered in the name
of another.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

20 Republic vs Iglesia ni Cristo 591 SCRA 438 6/30/2009 Castillo,

Frinz Lemwel
Facts:

Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre.

On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), represented by Erao G. Manalo, as corporate sole, filed its
Application for Registration of Title before the MCTC in Paoay-Currimao. Appended to the application
were the sepia or tracing cloth of plan Swo-1-001047, the technical description of subject lot,[3] the
Geodetic Engineers Certificate,[4] Tax Declaration No. (TD) 508026[5] covering the subject lot, and the
September 7, 1970 Deed of Sale[6] executed by Bernardo Bandaguio in favor of INC.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), entered its appearance and deputized
the Provincial Prosecutor of Laoag City to appear on its behalf. It also filed an Opposition to INCs
application.

Issue:

WON THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE [MCTC] DECISION
GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION

Held:
INC entitled to registrable right over subject lot

With the resolution of the core issue, we find no error in the findings of the courts a quo that INC had
indeed sufficiently established its possession and occupation of the subject lot in accordance with the
Public Land Act and Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529, and had duly proved its right to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title over subject lot.

As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive on, and
cannot be reviewed on appeal by, this Court as long as they are borne out by the record or are based on
substantial evidence. The Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only
errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts.[24] This is applicable to the instant
case.

The possession of INC has been established not only from 1952 and 1959 when it purchased the
respective halves of the subject lot, but is also tacked on to the possession of its predecessors-in-
interest, Badanguio and Sabuco, the latter possessing the subject lot way before June 12, 1945, as he
inherited the bigger lot, of which the subject lot is a portion, from his parents. These possessions and
occupationfrom Sabuco, including those of his parents, to INC; and from Sabuco to Badanguio to INC
had been in the concept of owners: open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation under a bona fide claim of acquisition of property. These had not been disturbed as attested
to by respondents witnesses.

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the October 11, 2007 CA Decision in CA-G.R.
CV No. 85348 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

21 Chavez vs PEA 384 SCRA 152 12/9/2002 Castillo, Frinz Lemwel

FACTS:

President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA, which was tasked with the
development, improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of lands. The then president
also transferred to PEA the foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal

Road and Reclamation Project.

Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land and then, years later, PEA
entered into a JVA with AMARI for the development of the Freedom Islands. These two entered
into a joint venture in the absence of any public bidding.

Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Maceda denouncing the JVA as the
grandmother of all scams. An investigation was conducted and it was concluded that the lands that PEA
was conveying to AMARI were lands of the public domain; the certificates of title over the

Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This prompted Ramos to form an investigatory
committee on the legality of the JVA.

Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to lose billions by the
conveyance or sale of the reclaimed areas to AMARI. He also asked for the full disclosure of the
renegotiations happening between the parties.
ISSUE:

W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of the lands, reclaimed or to be
reclaimed, violate the Constitution.

HELD:

The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian
doctrine, which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain.

The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It declares that all natural resources are
owned by the State and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural
resources cannot be alienated.

The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750 hectare
reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the area are still submerged areas forming part
of Manila Bay. Further, it is provided that AMARI will reimburse the actual costs in reclaiming the
areas of land and it will shoulder the other reclamation costs to be incurred.

The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public domain, waters
and other natural resources and consequently owned by the State. As such, foreshore and
submerged areas shall not be alienable unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the public
domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by the PEA doesn’t convert these inalienable natural
resources of the State into alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law
or presidential

proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable if the law has
reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.

22 Oh Cho vs Director of Lands 75 Phil. 890 8/31/1946 Castillo, Kaycelle

Facts:

Oh Cho is a citizen of the Republic of China who purchased a residential parcel of land in Guinayangan,
Tayabas in 1938. The subject land has been in the continuous, public, and adverse possession of the
predecessors in interest since 1880. In June 1940, Oh Cho applied for the registration of the subject
land, which was opposed by the Director of Lands following the Constitutional prohibition against aliens
acquiring private or public agricultural lands. The CFI however overruled the opposition and decreed the
registration applied for. Hence, the present appeal by the Director of Lands. The Director of Lands
maintained its opposition on the ground of lack of title to the lot and of disqualification as alien from
acquiring lands of the public domain.

Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act.
He also failed to show that he and ay of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant.

Issue:

Whether Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration he was applying for, considering that he failed to
show title to the lot and that he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of public domain.
Held/Ratio:

NO, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration because the earliest possession of the subject land
by Oh Cho’s first predecessor in interest began in 1880 and because his immediate predecessors failed
to apply for registration.

All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain, unless the land has been in the possession of an occupant and predecessors in interest
since time immemorial since such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never
been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. As such, the applicant does not qualify under
the exception.

Oh Cho is neither entitled to a decree of registration under the provisions of the Public Land Act since he
is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of public domain.

Arguably, Oh Cho’s immediate predecessors in interest could have been entitled to a decree of
registration had they applied for registration; consequently, the right of the immediate predecessors in
interest to a decree of registration must be deemed to also have been acquired. However, Oh Cho’s
immediate predecessors failed to apply for registration. As such, they did not have any vested right in
the lot amounting to title, which was transmissible to the applicant.

Judgment was reversed and the application for registration was dismissed.

23 Diaz vs Republic 181502 2/2/2010 Castillo, Kaycelle

Facts:

Flora Garcia filed an application for registration of a vast tract of land in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan
City in 1976, alleging that she possessed the land as owner and worked, developed, and harvested the
agricultural products and benefits from the land continuously, publicly, and adversely for more or less 26
years. The Republic of the Philippines opposed such application because the subject land was inalienable
as part of public domain for being within Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation established in 1955.

In an earlier case (Reyes case) involving the same land, the Supreme Court already ruled that such
property was inalienable as it formed part of the military reservation. Also, the existence of the
possessory information title to which the applicant in the Reyes case anchored its claim, was not proven.
In said case therefore, the decree of registration issued was declared null and void.

Despite the Reyes case, the CFI ruled in favor of Garcia in the present case. The Republic appealed the
decision to the CA, who reversed the CFI decision, ruling that the Reyes case shall apply in Garcia’s case
since both cases involve the same property. The CA concluded that Garcia did not validly acquire title to
the land since her ownership to the land traces to the same possessory information title, the probative
value of which was already passed upon by the SC and because the land was situated inside military
reservation.

Meanwhile, the CA approved a compromise agreement between the Republic and petitioner Diaz, who
substituted applicant Garcia, excluding from the claim a portion of the land supposedly not within the
military reservation. The OSG however moved for reconsideration informing the CA that the land subject
of the amicable settlement was still within the military reservation. The CA annulled the compromise
agreement. The SC denied the petition for review filed by Diaz, as well as the first two MR filed. Hence,
the present letter of petitioner deemed by the SC as a third MR.

Issue:

Whether the registration of land subject of the compromise agreement between Diaz and Republic
should be granted, considering that in a previous case involving the same property, the Supreme Court
ruled that the subject land is inalienable for being part of a military reservation, and the existence of the
possessory information title, to which applicant Garcia’s claim of title can also be traced, was not
proven.

Held/Ratio:

NO, the decree of registration could not be granted since the SC Order in Reyes case dismissing the
application for registration and declaring the land as part of public domain bars the claim of applicant
Garcia and present petitioner Diaz. Petitioner’s contended private rights over the land could not be
respected because the SC had already recognized the same land to be public forest even before the
FMMR was established.

In registration cases filed under the provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an
incomplete and imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration and declaring the land
as part of the public domain constitutes res judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also
against all persons. It was incumbent upon the lower court to respect the SC ruling in Reyes case.

Before the military reservation was established, evidence showed that the subject land is largely
forested and mountainous. It was ruled in Reyes case that forest lands are not registrable under the
Public Land Act. The inclusion of a forest land in a title, whether issued using Spanish sovereignty or
under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title. Forest lands may only be registered
when they have been reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical manner (upon
the recommendation of the proper department head who has the authority to classify the lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands) coupled with possession by the
claimant as well as that of her predecessorsininterest. Since petitioner did not produce such evidence,
her occupation thereof, and that of her predecessorsin interest, could not have ripened into ownership
of the subject land because prior to the conversion of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or
possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with the thirtyyear possession
requirement under the Public Land Act.

Moreover, the fact that the possessory information title on which Diaz bases their claim of ownership
was found to be inexistent in Reyes case, thus rendering its probative value questionable, further works
against granting the decree of registration applied for.

24 Carino vs Insular Government 212 US 449 Castillo, Kaycelle

Facts:

Mateo Carino applied for registration of a certain land. Initially it was granted by the court, but the
Government of the Philippines and the government of the United States appealed to the Court of First
Instance of Benguet, because they were taking the property for public and military purposes. The CFI
dismissed the application for registration. On appeal, the CFI decision was affirmed by the Philippine
Supreme Court. The case was brought to the US Supreme Court via writ of error.

Carino is an Igorot, and possessed the subject land for more than 30 years before the Treaty of Paris. He
and his ancestors had held the land for years. The local community recognizes them as the owners of
the said land. His grandfather lived upon it and maintained fences around the property. His father raised
cattle on the property and he had inherited the land according to Igorot custom. However, no title was
issued to them from the Spanish Crown. He tried twice to have it registered during the Spanish
occupation but was not successful. In 1901 he filed a petition alleging ownership of the land but he was
only granted a possessory title.

Relevant Laws:

• Philippine Commission’s Act No. 496

• Philippine Commission’s Act No. 926 (An Act Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the
Homesteading, Selling, and Leasing of Portions of the Public Domain of the Philippine Islands) – this law
dealt with acquisition of new titles and perfecting of titles begun under the Spanish law. Benguet was
one of the excluded provinces under this Act.

Carino’s contention: he could register the land under Philippine Commissions Act no. 496 which covered
the entire Philippine archipelago.

Government’s contention: Spain had title to all the lands in the Philippines except those it saw fit to
permit private titles to be acquired. There was a decree issued by Spain that required registration within
a limited time but Carino’s land wasn’t registered, hence, such land became public land.

Issue:

Primary: Whether Carino could register title to the land albeit Benguet was excluded from Phil Com Act
No. 926.

Based on the issue: Whether Carino owns the land.

Held/Ratio:

YES, Carino could register the land if ownership could be maintained.

“Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived
of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.”

Whatever the position of Spain was on the issue, it does not follow that the US would view Carino to
have lost all his rights to the land – this would amount to a denial of native titles throughout Benguet
just because Spain would not have granted to anyone in the province the registration of their lands.

The Organic Act of July 1, 1902 provides that all the property and rights acquired there by the US would
be for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof. This same statute made a bill of rights embodying the
safeguards of the Constitution, and it provides that “'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein
the equal protection of the laws”. It would be hard to believe that “any person” didn’t include the
inhabitants of Benguet, nor it meant “property” to refer only to those lands which had become such
under a ceremony (of registration) many of the people of the land may have not even heard of.

Although in Sec. 14 of the Organic Act, it is said that the Philippine Commission may prescribe rules and
regulations for perfecting titles to public lands, it should be noted that this section refers to those cases
where the land was admitted to be public land. The US SC hesitates to suppose that it was intended to
declare every native who had not a paper title, a trespasser. The question still remains: what property
and rights did the US acquire?

In cases such as the instant case, the presumption would and should be against the government. As far
back as memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership; it was
never public land. It would not be proper to just let the conqueror to dictate how to deal with the
Philippine tribes if it really meant to use the rights acquired by them “for the benefit of the inhabitants
thereof”.

The natives were recognized by the Spanish laws to own some lands, irrespective of any royal grant.
They didn’t intend to turn all the inhabitants into trespassers. Principle of prescription was admitted:
that if they weren’t able to produce title deeds, it is sufficient if they show ancient possession, as a valid
title by prescription.

Although there was a decree in June 25, 1880 that required everyone to get a document of title or else
lose his land, it does not appear that it meant to apply to all but only those who wrongfully occupied
royal lands. It doesn’t appear that the land of Carino was considered as Royal land nor was it considered
to have been wrongfully occupied. Two articles of the same decree provided that titles would be
attributed to those who may prove possession for the necessary time. There were indications that
registration was expected but it didn’t mean that ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of
the proof was not to confer title to them but to establish it.

25 Baguio City vs Masweng578 SCRA 88 2/4/2009 Castillo, Rio Star

Facts:

City Mayor of Baguio Yaranon issued three 3 orders for the demolition of the illegal structures
constructed on a portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation without the required building permits and
in violation of Section 69 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 1096 and
Republic Act No. 7279.

Private repondents Gumangan et al filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction and claimed that the lands where
their residential houses stand are their ancestral lands which they have been occupying and possessing
openly and continuously since time immemorial; that their ownership thereof have been expressly
recognized in Proclamation No. 15. Thus, demolition of their residential houses is a violation of their
right of possession and ownership of ancestral lands accorded by the Constitution and the law.

NCIP granted private respondent’s application and was affirmed by the CA.

Issues:
1. Whether or not NCIP has jurisdiction or authority to issue temporary restraining orders and
writs of injunction

2. Whether or not private respondents Gumangan et al are entitled of relief

Ruling:

1. Yes, NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction.

Under Sec. 5, Rule III of the NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03:

The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and
interpretation of R.A. 8371.

The allegations in the petition prove the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of a particular
tribunal, squarely qualify it as a dispute(s) or controversy(s) over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO.

Sec. 69 of IPRA & Section 82, Rule XV of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 says NCIP may
issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction without any prohibition against the issuance
of the writ when the main action is for injunction. The power to issue temporary restraining orders or
writs of injunction allows parties to a dispute over which the NCIP has jurisdiction to seek relief against
any action which may cause them grave or irreparable damage or injury. In this case, the Regional
Hearing Officer issued the injunctive writ because its jurisdiction was called upon to protect and
preserve the rights of private respondents who are undoubtedly members of ICCs/IPs.

1. No, private respondents are not entitled to the relief granted by the Commission.

Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private
respondents ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan
families, the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, as claimants of a portion of the Busol
Forest Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same. Proclamation No. 15
explicitly withdraws the Busol Forest Reservation from sale or settlement. The fact remains, too, that the
Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the Court as inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of
Appeals. The declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as such precludes its conversion into private
property. The courts are not endowed with jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest lands.

The petition is granted.

26 City Mayor of Paranaque vs Ebio 621 SCRA 555 6/23/2010

Castillo, Rio Star
Facts:

Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land which was an accretion
of Cut-cut creek, originally occupied by their great grandfather Vitalez. The city government later
advised all the residents to vacate the said area for the proposed road construction, however
respondents immediately registered their opposition which caused the suspension of construction.
Later, City Administrator Aldip sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate the area within
the next thirty (30) days. The respondents then applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against
Petitioners in the RTC.

RTC denied while the CA reversed the decision and ruled in favor of the respondents.

Issue:

Whether the character of respondents’ possession and occupation of the subject property
entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction.

Ruling:

Yes, the character of possession and ownership by the respondents over the contested land
entitles them to the avails of the action. A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right. A party
seeking to avail of an injunctive relief must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or one that is
actual or existing. It should not be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may never arise.

From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one conclusion
can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local
government of Parañaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register the accreted portion.
Respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription.
Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over the said
lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only
the registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never
intended as a means of acquiring ownership. A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not
confer, ownership.

Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either through judicial
proceedings or through administrative process. Respondents’ application for sales patent, however,
should not be used to prejudice or derogate what may be deemed as their vested right over the subject
property. The sales patent application should instead be considered as a mere superfluity particularly
since ownership over the land, which they seek to buy from the State, is already vested upon them by
virtue of acquisitive prescription. Moreover, the State does not have any authority to convey a property
through the issuance of a grant or a patent if the land is no longer a public land. Nemo dat quod dat non
habet. No one can give what he does not have. Such principle is equally applicable even against a
sovereign entity that is the State.

27 PNB vs Garcia, et. al. 182839 6/2/2014 Castillo, Rio Star

Facts:

Jose Sr is indebted to Garcia spouses. To secure payment, he issued special power of attorney in
favor of the Garcia spouses for purposes of their loan application with PNB. Jose Sr. also executed an
Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The transactions were without the knowledge and
consent of Jose Sr.’s children.

Garcia failed to pay their loan. Respondents then filed before the RTC a Complaint for Nullity of
the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage, Damages with Preliminary Injunction against the spouses
Garcia and PNB claiming they acquired subject property during their marriage and became owners with
his children upon death of his wife Ligaya and that consent of his children were not obtained.

RTC dismissed the complaint CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the subject property is conjugal

2. Whether the registration of the subject property in the name of one spouse destroy the
presumption that the property is conjugal

Ruling:

1. Yes, all property acquired during marriage is presumed conjugal.

Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it can be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
PNB failed to rebut the allegation that the subject property was acquired during the former’s marriage
to Ligaya, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the property, in line with Article 160 of the
Civil Code.

2. No, registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal
nature. What is material is the time when the property was acquired.

The registration of the property is not conclusive evidence of the exclusive ownership of the
husband or the wife. Although the property appears to be registered in the name of the husband, it has
the inherent character of conjugal property if it was acquired for valuable consideration during
marriage. It retains its conjugal nature. To rebut the presumptive conjugal nature of the property, the
petitioner must present strong, clear and convincing evidence of exclusive ownership of one of the
spouses.

In the present case, the petitioner bank failed to overcome the legal presumption that the
disputed property was conjugal.

28 Director of Lands vs Reyes 68 SCRA 177 11/28/1975 Castro,

Floricel
FACTS:

Applicant Alinsunurin claiming ownership in fee simple by inheritance of a vast tract of land admittedly
inside the boundary of military reservation of Fort Magsaysay sought the registration of title under Act
496. Petitioners opposed the application claiming that the applicant was w/o sufficient title, not in
possession in the concept of an owner for atleast 30 years preceding the filing of application.

Applicant filed a motion for substitution of parties, requestion P.I.D Corporation be considered as
applicant having acquired all his rights over the property. The court granted the motion and ordered
that the parcel of land applied for be registered in favor of P.I.D Corporation 2/3 portion and the other
1/3 in favor of certain Tamayo.

Petitioners filed Notice of Appeal from the said decision to Supreme Court. PEnding Approval of Record
On Appeal applicant PID Corporation and Tamayo filed a motion for issuance of decree of registration
and despite opposition of the petitionert, Lower Court granted the motion and issued a decree of
registration.

ISSUE:

WON the issuance of a decree of registration to PID Corporation and Tamayo is valid despite the Appeal
filed by the Petitioner.

HELD:

No. Execution pending appeal is not applicable in a Land Registration proceeding. It is fraught with
dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real properties upon
reliance on a judgement w/c may be reversed on appeal.

A torrens title issued on the basis of a judgement that is not final is a NULLITY, as it is violative of the
explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act which requires that a decree shall be issued only after
decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory.

29 Benin vs Tuazon 57 SCRA 531 6/28/1974 Castro, Floricel

FACTS:

Plaintiffs filed three separate complaints alleging that they were the owners and possessors of three
parcels of agricultural land and while enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands, defendants
illegally entered and started destroying the dwellings and improvements.

Plaintiffs prayed that they be declared owners as well as to declare null and void all transfers certificate
of title issued by Register of Deeds because they were based on the Original Certificate of title which
was allegedly null and void. According to the petitioner, when the registered owners mentioned in
Original Certificate of title applied for the registration, the original application was published in the
Official Gazette but they alleged that the amendment and alteration made on the area boundaries and
technical description of the parcel prior to the decision was NOT published. Despite the failure of said
publication, the decision rendered in Land Registration Case was based on the amended plan.

Now the plaintiffs are questioning the jurisdiction of Land Registration Court to render the decision for
lack of publication.

ISSUE:

WON LRC has jurisdiction to issue the decree based on the amended plan despite its failure to be
published.

HELD:

LRC lacks jurisdiction to the area and parcel added on the amended plan. Under Sec. 23 of Act 496, the
registration court may allow or order an amendment of the application for registration when it apperas
to the court that the amendment is necessary and proper. Under Sec 24 of same act, the court may at
anytime order an application to be amended by striking out one or more parcels or by severance of the
application. The rule is, if the amendment is consist of an inclusion of area or parcel of land not
previously included in the original application for registration a new publication of the amended plan
must be made. The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding
the amended application. WIthout the new publication the registration court cannot acquire jurisdiction
over the area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the original application, and the
decision of the registration court would be nullity in so far as the decision concerns the newly included
land.

30 SM Prime Holdings vs Madayag 578 SCRA 552 2/12/2009

31 Mendoza vs CA 84 SCRA 677/14/1978 Castro, Floricel

FACTS:

In 1964, it was proven that a parcel of land is owned by Mendoza. Mendoza applied for a title. During
pendency of the application before the land registration court, Mendoza sold the land to Daniel Cruz.
The contract of sale was admitted in court in lieu of the pending application for land title. The
registration court rendered a decision in July 1965, ordering the registration of the two parcels of land in
the name of Cruz subject to the usufructuary rights of Mendoza.

The decision became final and executory. In 1968, however, upon failure of Cruz to pay Mendoza,
Mendoza petitioned that the title issued in the name of Cruz be cancelled. The land registration court
ruled in favor of Mendoza on the ground that the court erred in its earlier decision in issuing the land
title to Cruz – who was not a party to the application of title initiated by Mendoza. Cruz appealed. The
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Cruz.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the title can be dealt with in the name of a “third party”.

HELD:

Yes. First of all, it was proven that Mendoza caused the registration in the name of Cruz pursuant to
their contract of sale. Second, Mendoza overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which
expressly authorizes the registration of the land subject matter of a registration proceeding in the name
of the buyer (Cruz) or of the person to whom the land has been conveyed by an instrument executed
during the interval of time between the filing of the application for registration and the issuance of the
decree of title. A stranger or a third party may be dealt with in the land registration proceedings. The
only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the interested
party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that
prior notice be given to the parties to the case. And the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in
this case show that these requirements have been complied with in this case.

32 Director of Lands vs CA 276 SCRA 276 7/28/1997 Chua, Christian

Edmund
Facts:

Private respondent filed a petition for original registration of his title under PD No. 1529. The Land
Registration Court dismissed the petition for non-compliance with the mandatory publication of notice
of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling. The CA
held that the publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing and posting at the site were
sufficient to comply with the requirements under PD No. 1529.

Issue:

Whether the publication in general circulation of the notice of hearing is a mandatory requirement for
land registration

Held:

Yes. Although the law only requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette, publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is still required. The reason is due process and the reality that the
Official Gazette is not widely read and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed.

33 Adviento vs Alvarez 562 SCRA 434 8/20/2008 Chua, Christian

Edmund
Facts:

Adviento allegedly acquired the property against the interest of Alvarez. He traced his title to a person,
who bought the property from Gaya. Alvarez allegedly constructed a building in the subject property.
Adviento filed a case for damages against Alvarez. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Alvarez. Among
other faults of the Adviento, Adviento failed to give notice to the respondents for the registration of the
property.

Issue:

Whether publication of the notice is enough to inform the respondents about the registration of the
property

Held:

No. The applicable law for the case was Act No. 496. Under Act No. 496, applicants, who wants to
register an imperfect title, must provide notice to the contiguous owners, occupants and those known to
have interests in the property, among other requirements. In this case, the respondents have interests
in the property and Adviento admitted that notice was not provided to the respondents. Hence, notice
of publication was not enough to fulfill the requirements of land registration.

34 Garcia vs Bello 13 SCRA 769 Chua, Christian Edmund

Facts:

A writ of possession over the subject property was issued in favor of Guzman. Garcia (Benjamin,
Anatalia, Fabian and Vicente) filed for an action of prohibition to restrain the Court of First Instance from
enforcing the writ of execution. Garcia argued that the decision on the writ of possession is not binding
upon them, because they were not parties in the decision.

Issue:

Whether the decision is not binding to the respondents because they were not parties in the case
Held:

No. A land registration case is a proceeding in rem. The decision rendered is binding upon the whole
world.

35 De Castro vs Marcos 26 SCRA 644 1/27/1969 De Vera, Queenie

Respondent Akia filed a petition before the CFI, acting as a cadastral court, for the reopening of
cadastral proceedings, pursuant to R.A. No. 931. Respondent there sought the registration in his name a
15,922 sqm of land. Petitioner De Castro then moved to intervene. Her interest is in the 1000 sqm
allegedly included in the 15,922 sqm of land specified in the respondent’s petition. According to the
petitioner, the land was awarded in her favor since she was the highest bidder in a public auction.
Petitioner fully paid the purchase price with interests and she also claimed that she had been paying
taxes on the lot. Petitioner’s motion for intervention was granted. Petitioner presented documentary
and testimonial evidence in support of her opposition to the inclusion of said 1000 sqm of land.
Respondent judge ruled out petitioner’s intervention and dismissed her opposition to the reopening of
the cadastral proceedings. Petitioner filed two Motions for Reconsideration and both motions were
denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the reopening of the cadastral case is jurisdictionally tainted by lack of publication.

HELD:

NO. Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 931 establishes the procedure for reopening cadastral proceedings. Such
procedure does not include publication. Neither publication is mentioned in any of the provisions of the
said law. Sec. 1 of the said law merely states that, “the competent Court of First Instance, upon receiving
such petition, shall notify the Government, through the Solicitor General.”

If a prospective intervenor claims a piece of land by an alleged right that has occurred prior to the
institution of the original cadastral case, a proceeding in rem, he is to be deemed to have received
notice through publication therein made. If his rights are derived from government after the land has
been declared part of the public domain by the cadastral court, the notice to the government of a
reopening petition as provided by law, should suffice. For, the government is supposed to take up the
cudgels for a public land grantee, or, at the very least, notify the latter.

In sum, the subject matter of the petition for reopening – a parcel of land claimed by the respondent –
was already embraced in the cadastral proceedings filed by the Director of lands. Consequently, the
Baguio cadastral already acquired jurisdiction over the said property. The petition need not be
published. the authority of the cadastral court over the reopening proceedings below is not impaired by
failure of publication.

36 Valisno vs Plan 143 SCRA 502 De Vera, Queenie

FACTS:

Petitioners purchased 2 parcels of land from the family of Blanco’s and subsequently declared
ownership over the land for taxation purposes and took possession thereof by assigning a caretaker over
the property who built his house thereon. Respondent Cayaba claims to be the owner of the property by
virtue of a deed of sale executed in his and Bienvenido Noriega’s favor from the heirs of Verano and
ousted the caretaker from the property and constructed an apartment thereon. Petitioners filed an
action for recovery of possession of the land. The court decided in favor of the petitioner but on appeal,
the CA reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint of the petitioner on grounds that the
description of the property in the complaint is different from the subdivision plan provided by the
respondents with their respective area and boundaries appearing to be completely different. The court
did not find any compliance to the requirement of the law that the property in dispute must be clearly
identified. Under the Civil Code, Articles 433 and 541, the actual possessor of the property has the
presumption of a just title and he need not be compelled to show or prove why he possesses the same.
It was clear that the respondent is the current possessor of the property having constructed the
apartment on the property in dispute. Contrasting the evidence of the respondent and petitioner, the
court choose the respondent’s evidence as they were able to provide a vicinity plan that shows the land
position in relation to the adjoining properties with known boundaries and landmarks. Petitioner merely
presented a sketch prepared by Dr. Blanco constituting as mere guess works. Subsequently, the
respondents filed a petition for registration of the property before the CFI which was opposed by the
petitioner. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the opposition that the same is barred by a prior
judgment of the court.

ISSUE:

Whether res judicata can be set up in a land registration case.

HELD:

YES. Res judicata operates in the case at bar with its requisites present in the case: [a] the former
judgment must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject
matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the
first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. The inclusion of
private respondent Cayaba's co‐owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does
not result in a difference in parties between the two cases. One right of a co‐owner is to defend in court
the interests of the co‐ownership. Although the first action was captioned for the recovery of
possession, possession is sought based on ownership, thus the action was one in the nature of accion
reinvidicatoria. The second action is for registration of title where the registration is sought based on
one’s ownership over the property. The difference between the two is that the plaintiff seeks to exclude
other persons from ownership over the property in the first action while it seeks to exclude the whole
world in the second action. The cause of action however remains the same. The employment of two
different actions does not allow one to escape against the principle of res judicata where one and the
same cause of action cannot be litigated twice. Although the first action was litigated before a
competent court of general jurisdiction and the other over a registration court is of no significance since
that both courts should be of equal jurisdiction is not a requisite for res judicata to apply. For
convenience, the SC should decide whether to dismiss the application for registration or the opposition
thereto. Because the conflicting claims of both parties have been settled and decided by the court
previously, it upheld the finality of its decision and dismissed the petition.

37 Republic vs Lee 197 SCRA 13 1991 De Vera, Queenie

FACTS:
Respondent filed before the RTC a registration of a parcel of land in her favor which was opposed by the
Dir. Of Lands on grounds that respondent or her predecessor‐in‐interest acquired the land under any
recognized mode for acquisition of title; they have not been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years prior to the filing of application
and the land in dispute is a public domain belonging to Republic of the Philippines. The court rendered
judgment in favor of respondents. Upon appeal by RP, it affirmed the lower court decision thus this
appeal to the Supreme Court.

Republic of the Phil. contends that respondent failed to prove by conclusive evidence that she has
ownership of the land by fee simple title and her testimony as to the ownership of her predecessor‐in‐
interest is self serving after claiming that she obtained her Deed of Sale of the property from Mataban
and Espiritu who obtained their title from the previous owners of the land, Diaz and Vinluan. From the
time of filing the application of registration, the respondent was in possession of the land for 13 years
but she sought to tack her possession on the said land from her predecessor‐in‐interests who were in
possession of the land for 20 years. Conditions provided by Sec. 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141
where one is under a bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership through their predecessor‐in‐interest or
by themselves have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
agricultural land in public domain for 30 years shall be entitled to a certificate of title.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent is able to provide sufficient and substantial evidence as complying with the
requirement of law for confirmation of her ownership of the land in dispute.

HELD:

NO. The most basic rule in land registration cases is that “no person is entitled to have land registered
under the Cadastral or Torrens system unless he is the owner in fee simple of the same, even though
there is no opposition presented against such registration by third persons. In order that the petitioner
for the registration of his land shall be permitted to have the same registered, and to have the benefit
resulting from the certificate of title the burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute
owner, in fee simple. Equally basic is the rule that no public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from government. A grant is conclusively presumed by law when
the claimant, by himself or through his predecessors‐in‐interest, has occupied the land openly,
continuously, exclusively, and under a claim of title since 26 July 1894 or prior thereto. The doctrine
upon which these rules are based is that all lands were not acquired from government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.

It is incumbent upon the private respondent to prove that the alleged 20 year or more possession of
Diaz and Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the 30 year period prior to the filing of the
application, was open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This burden, private
respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the court. The bare assertion that Diaz and Vinluan
had been in the possession of the property for more than 20 years found in private respondent’s
declaration is hardly the “well‐nigh incontrovertible” evidence required in cases of this nature. Private
respondent should have presented specific facts that would have shown the nature of such possession.
The phrase “adverse, continuous, open, public and peaceful and in concept of owner” by which she
described her own possession in relation to that of her predecessors‐in‐interest are mere conclusions of
law which require factual support and substantiation.

Private respondent having failed to prove by convincing, positive proof that she has complied with the
requirements of the law for confirmation of her title to the land applied for, it ws error on the part of
the lower court to have granted her application.

38 Republic vs Sayo 191 SCRA 71 1990 Dimao, Sittee Junaira

DOCTRINE: Under the regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the state. Hence, it is that all applicants in land registration
proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain. The applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to
substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusion of law other than
factual evidence of possession and title.

FACTS

In a compromise agreement entered into between different parties in an application for registration of
lot 7454 situated in the Municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela now transferred to Nueva Vizcaya,
Judge Sofronio G. Sayo (respondent) approved and confirmed such and the title and ownership of the
parties in accordance with its terms on March 5, 1981.

The Solicitor General has taken the present recourse in a bid to have the decision on March 5, 1981
annulled as being patently void and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
contending that:

1) No evidence was adduced by the parties to support their registration

2) Some of the parties in the compromise agreement has no authority to enter into the
compromise agreement

3) The counsel of the Republic of the Philippines was not given notice of the agreement to take
part therein nor the decision approving the same.

The respondents argued that the proposition of the Solicitor General are premised on the proposition
that the lot is public land.According to them, the private character of the land is demonstrated by the
following circumstances:

a) The possessory information title of the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest

b) The fact that the lot 7454 was never claimed to be public land by the Director of Lands in the
proper cadastral proceedings

c) The prewar certification of the National Library appearing in the Bureau of Archives that the
property in question was registered under the Spanish system of land registration as private property
owned by Don Liberato Bayaua, applicants predecessors-in-interest.

d) The proceedings for registration brought under Act 496 (Torrents Act) presupposes that there is
already a title to be confirmed by teh court, distinguishing it from proceedings under the Public Land Act
where the presumption is always that the land involved belongs to the State.
ISSUE

Whether or not the subject land belongs to the respondents as part of their private property.

HELD/RATIO

No. The respondents failed in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was
acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands. The applicant
must present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general
statements, or mere conclusion of law other than factual evidence of possession and title. Hence, the
property must be held to be part of the public domain.

Th principal document relied upon and presented by the applicant to prove the private character of the
land was a photocopy of a certification of the National Library to the effect that the property in question
was registered under the Spanish System of land registration as private property of Don Liberato
Bayaua. But the court ruled that Spanish document cannot be considered a title to property, it not being
one of the grants made during the Spanish regime and obviously not constituting primary evidence of
ownership.

The argument that the initiation of an application for registration of land under the Torrens Act is proof
that the land is of private ownership cannot be given merit. It is precisely the character of the land as
private which the applicant has the obligation of establishing. In the absence of any adverse claim to
show a proper title for registration, the applicant is not assured of a favorable decree by the Land
Registration Act 496.

Further, the decision of the Registration Court is based solely on the compromise agreement of the
parties.The compromise agreement included private persons who had not adduced any competent
evidence of their ownership over the land subject of the registration proceeding. What was done was to
consider the compromise agreement as proof of title of the parties taking part therein, a totally
unacceptable proposition.

As to the Informacion posesoria invoked by the respondents, it requires condition such as inscription in
the Registry of Property and actual, public, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the land for 20
years to be considered a mode to acquire public lands. The proof of fulfillment of these conditions are
absent, hence, cannot be considered as anything more than prima facie evidence of possession.

Under the regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the state. Hence, it is that all applicants in land registration proceedings have the
burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain.

It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it must be, as they are
hereby, declared null and void and set aside.

39 Ong vs Republic 548 SCRA 160 3/12/2008 Dimao, Sittee Junaira

DOCTRINE/S:

* Applicants for registration of title must prove the following:

1) That the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain

2) That they have been in an open, continuous , exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.

* The law requires possession and occupation to acquire title to alienable lands of public domain.
Occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a
mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such
a nature as a party would naturally exrcise over hiw own property.

FACTS

Petitioner Charles L. Ong in his behalf and as duly representative of the brothers Roberto, Alberto, and
Cesar files and Application for Registration of Title over a lot situated in Brgy. Anolid, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan. They alleged that they are the co-owners of the lot and an exclusive property purchased
from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998. That they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in an open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of
owners for more than thirty (30) years.

The Office of the Solicitor general opposed the application contending that the applicants nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in an open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject lot as required by the Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1073. Also the applicants failed to adduce any muniment of
title to prove their claims; that the tax declaration appended to the application does not appear genuine
and merely shows pretended possession of recent vintage; that the application was filed beyond the
period allowed under PD No. 892 and that the subject lot is part of the public domain which cannot be
the subject of private appropriation.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner and his brothers. In an appeal to the
supreme court , the decision was reversed and set aside. The CA ruleed that despite the land being of
public domain, it is part of those disposable and alienable lands and is incumbent upon the applicant to
prove that they possessed the lot in the nature and for the duration required by law. However,
petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in adverse possession of the
lot in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945. It was also noted that the earliest tax declaration
presented is dated 1971. Hence, could not fairly claim posession of the land prior to 1971. Neither they
can prove that they actually occupied the lot prior to the filing of the application.

ISSUE

Whether or not Ong and his brothers and their predecessors-in-interest have been in an open,
continuous and notorious and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of owners for more
than thirty (30) years.

HELD/RATIO

No. Petitioner failed to prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in an open, continuous
and notorious and peaceful possession of the subject lot since June 12, 1945. The records shows that
petitioners bought the lot from spouses Tony Bautista abd Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998 who in turn
purchased the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera on Jnauary 16, 1997. The latter bought the subject lot
from Cynthia cacho et al on July 10, 1979. The earliest tax declaration submitted was issued in 1971 in
the name of of spouses Cacho. If to tack the petitioners claim of ownership with his predecessors in
1971, still it would fall short of the required possession from June 12, 1945.

Moreover, petitioner’s evidence failed to establish specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim
that he and his predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject lot in the nature and
duration required by law. Petitioners admitted that none of them occupied the subject lot. No
improvements were made thereon and the most that they did was to visit the lot on several occasions.
Tony Bautista, petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest also testified that they also never actually occupied
the lot.

As held in Republic vs Alconaba: “ the law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the
word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a
mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such
a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.

40 Republic vs Guinto Aldana 175578 8/11/2010 Dimao, Sittee

Junaira
DOCTRINE:

* While the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is teh original
tracing cloth plan issued by the Bureau of Lands (now the land Management services of DEBR), blueprint
copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification.

* Application for registration requires teh establishment of evidence taht teh applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have exercised acts of dominion over the lot under the bonafide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. He must prove that for at least 30 years he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in an open, continuous , exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land.

* Tax declarations and realty tax payments constitute at least prof that a holder has a claim of title
over the property, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or at least constructive possession. It announces his adverse claim against all other parties who
may have conflict with his interest.

FACTS

Respondents Guinto-Aldana filed with the RTC of Las Pinas City an application for registration of title
over teo pieces of land in talango Pamplona Uno. Las Pinas City. They professed themselves to be co-
owners of these lots having acquired them by successsion from their predecessors (parents of the
respondents) who in turn had acquired the property under a 1969 documents denominated as
“Kasulatan sa Paghahari ng Lupa na Labas sa Hukuman na may Pagpaparaya at Bilihan”. Under this
document, the parents of the respondent acquired such in for a consideration in his respective share
from Romualdo Guinto. They also alleged that until the time of the application, they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in an actual, open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous
possession of these lots in the concept of owner and that they had consistently declared the property in
their name for purposes of real estate taxation.

In support of their application, respondents submitted the blueprint of plans well as copies of the
Technical descriptions of each lot, certification from the geodetic engineer and the pertinent tax
declarations together with the receipts of payment therefor. They averred that the property’s original
tracing cloth plan had previously been submitted to the RTC of Las Pinas on a previous registration case
in an LRC case No. LP -125.

Opposing the application. Petitioner through the Office of the City Prosecutor, advanced that the land
sought to be registered were inalienable lands of the public domain; that neither of the respondents nor
their predecessors-in-interest had been in prior possession thereof; and that the muniment of title and
the tax declaration submitted to the court did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona
fide acquisition or of a prior possession in the concept of owner.

Petitioner Zenaida Guinto-Aldana,in her testimony declared that the subject land was owned by her
family since she was 5 years of age and her grandparents had lived in the lots until teh death of her
grandmother in 1961. That aside from her grandparents, there are caretakers who had tilled the land
and who had lived until sometime between 1980-1990. She remembered that her grandmother
constructed a house on the property. That sometime on 1970, her family built an adobe fence around
the perimeter and on 1990s they reinforced it with hollow blocks and concrete after an inundation
caused by the flood. She claimed that she and her father had been religiously paying real estate taxes
shown in the tax declarations and tax receipts submitted to the court. Zenaida’s claim or prior open,
exclusive and continuous possession of the land was corroborated by Josefina Luna, one of the adjoining
lot owner, who strongly declared that Zenaida’s parents are the owner of the land had not of her
knowledge that she came to know of any other claim.

The Regional Trial Court on July 10, 2003 rendered a decision denying the application for registration. It
found that respondents failed to establish with certainty the identity of the lots applied for registration
because of failure to submit to the court the original tracing cloth plan s mandated by the Presidential
Decree no. 1529.

Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. In the petition to the SC, Petitioner avers that the
CA committed an error as Section 17 of PD No. 1529 states that the submission in court of the original
tracing cloth plan of the property sought to be registered is a mandatory requirement in registration
proceedings in order to establish the exact identity of the property. Invoking Del Rosario vs Republic of
the Philippines, petitioner believes that respondents are not relieved of their procedural obligation to
adduce in evidence the original copy of the plan, because they could have easily retrieved it from the
LRA and presented it in court. It suggests that the blueprint submitted cannot be an approximate
substantial compliance of the Section 17 of PD no. 1529 and is illegible ad unreadable for it does not
even bear the certification of the lands Management Bureau. Further, it also attacks claim of the
respondent’s prior possession as there was no clear and convincing evidence to show proof.

ISSUE
1) Whether or not blue print, technical specifications and tax declaration and real estate payments
are sufficient evidence to provide identification of the subject land claimed of ownership in compliance
of the Section 17 of PD 1529.

2) Whether or not the respondents has exercised acts of dominions over the land under a bonafide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

HELD/RATIO

1) Yes. If the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original tracing cloth plan
is merely to provide a convenient and necessary means to afford certainty as to the exact identity of the
property applied for registration and to ensure that the same does not overlap with the boundaries of
the adjoining lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration application must be denied for failure
to present the original tracing cloth plan, especially when it is accompanied by pieces of evidence- such
as a duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and a duly executed technical description of the property
which may likewise substantially and with as much certainty prove the limits and extent of the property
sought to be registered.

As laid down in the doctrinal precept laid down in the republic of the Philippines V CA and in the
later cases of spouses Recto vs Republic of the Philippines and Republic of the Philippines vs Hubilla,
that while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the original
tracing cloth plan, blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification.
Therewith, the submission of the respondents of the blueprint plan together with the technical
description of the property operates as substantial compliance with the legal
requirements of the law. It was noted that the blueprint submitted proceeded
officially from the Land Management services and bears the approval of Surveys division
Chief and was endorsed by the Community Environment and Natural resources Office of the
DENR. This accompanied by the technical descriptions of the lot executed and verified also by the
Geodetic Engineer.

2) Yes. Respondents had established evidence that she and her predecessors-in-interest have
exercised acts of dominion over the land complying the number of more than 30 years in an open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land.

From the records, possession of the respondents of the said land dates back to 1937 and had been
declared for taxation by Zenaida’s father. Such declaration for tax purposes continues up to 1979, 1985
then to 1994. The respondents could have served further proof of declarations if not for the filed being
burned as certified by the Office of the Rizal Provincial Assessor when a fire broke out in that certain
office. Also, respondent’s receipt for tax expenditures between 1977 and 2001 are likewise fleshed out
in the records and in these documents the herein respondents are the name owners of the property
with Zenaida being identified as the one who delivered the payment in 1994 receipts.

These unbroken chain of positive acts exercised by respondent’s predecessors as demonstrated by these
pieces of evidence, yield no other conclusion than that as early as1937, they had already demonstrated
an unmistakable claim to the property.

No. Petitioner failed to prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in an open, continuous
and notorious and peaceful possession of the subject lot since June 12, 1945. The records shows that
petitioners bought the lot from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998 who in turn
purchased the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera on January 16, 1997. The latter bought the subject lot
from Cynthia cacho et al on July 10, 1979. The earliest tax declaration submitted was issued in 1971 in
the name of of spouses Cacho. If to tack the petitioners claim of ownership with his predecessors in
1971, still it would fall short of the required possession from June 12, 1945.

Moreover, petitioner’s evidence failed to establish specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim
that he and his predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject lot in the nature and
duration required by law. Petitioners admitted that none of them occupied the subject lot. No
improvements were made thereon and the most that they did was to visit the lot on several occasions.
Tony Bautista, petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest also testified that they also never actually occupied
the lot.

As held in Republic vs Alconaba: “ the law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the
word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a
mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such
a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.

Land registration proceedings are governed by the rule that while tax declarations and tax realty tax
payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are a good indication of possession in the
concept of owner these documents such as tax declarations and realty tax payments constitute at least
proof that a holder has a claim of title over the property, for no one in his right mind would be paying
taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. It announces his adverse
claim against all other parties who may have conflict with his interest.

Indeed the respondents have been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner which makes
the right thereto unquestionably settled and hence, deserving protection under the law.

41 Republic vs Cuaves 167 SCRA 150 11/9/1988 Fadera, Juna

Carlo
Facts:

Romerico Chavez, the alleged owner of the subject property which consists of 181.4776 hectares,
applied for its registration with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. He claimed that the land was
originally owned by his grandfather who had been in peaceful, exclusive, continuous and open
possession of the land since time immemorial and he acwuired the land by virtue of a Deed of Definite
Sale. He also claimed that he had been paying taxes on the property and had planted coconut and
mango trees thereon. The Director of Lands opposed with such application but this was granted by the
CFI after due hearing relying on Chavez’s lone testimony. Herein Petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the said decision but reduced the area to 144 hectares. Hence, this petition for
certiorari. Petitioner contends that: first, the land was not sufficiently identified with indubitable
evidence because what was submitted was only a blueprint copy of the survey plan contrary to the
statutory requirement of mandatory character thst the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for
which must be approved by the Director of Lands should be submitted; and second, the nature and
length of possession required by law had not been adequately established.

Issue/s:

1. WON the land was not sufficiently identified by presenting a blueprint copy of the survey plan?

2. WON the nature and length of possession required by law had not been adequately established

Held/Ratio:

1. NO.

As a rule, the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes was the original tracing
cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands, however, blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide
sufficient identification.

Here, there was a considerable compliance with the requirement of the law as the subject property was
sufficiently identified with the presentation of the blueprint copy which was certified by the Bureau of
Lands including the technical description that goes with it. Hence, the subject land was sufficiently
identified by the blueprint copy of the survey plan.

2. YES.

As a rule, the applicant must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot
offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law that factual evidence of possession.

Here there is not enough evidence to support his claim except his own unsupported declarations.

Hence, private respondent failed to prove his claim of ownership.

The petition was GRANTED. Although the subject property was sufficiently identified, the applicant has
failed to prove the peaceful, exclusive, continuous and open possession necessary to support his claim
of ownership. Hence, the registration was denied.

42 Serra vs CA 195 SCRA 482 3/22/1991 Fadera, Juna Carlo

Facts:

The Hernaezes (Primitivo, Rogaciana, and Luisa), herein private respondents, filed with the CFI of
Bacolod City a petition for reconstitution of allegedly lost original certificates of title covering 3 lots
which was supported by a certification from the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental that no
certificates of titles had been issued covering the properties. The petition was granted and the ROD of
Negros Occidental reconstituted original certificates of title to the subject lots and a transfer certificates
were issued in their names. Upon learning of the existence of the TCTs, Serra Serra, herein petitioner
filed with the ROD an adverse claim against reconstituted certificates of title. They filed a motion for
cancellation of said certificates of title, claiming that they are holders of valid existing certificates of title
and that they are in actual possession of the properties covered by the reconstituted certificates of titles
since before the war. The CFI denied the motion for cancellation without conducting a formal hearing.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but this was denied. The Hernaezes filed a motion for execution
of the order granting the petition for reconstitution and prayed that they be placed in possession of the
subject properties. The trial court granted the motion and issued a writ of possession. This was
challenged by the petitioner before the Court of Appeals which issued a writ of preliminary injunction
and thereafter lifted the same. Hence, this petition.

Issue/s:

WON the issuance of a writ of possession was proper. (procedure and reconstitution of original
certificate of title)

Held/Ratio:

NO. As a rule, writ of possession may be issued only in the following cases; 1)land registration
proceeding; 2)extra-judicial foreclosure of REM; 3)judicial foreclosure of mortgage, a quasi in rem
proceeding, provided that the mortgagor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person,
not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; 4)execution sales. In land registration case, a writ of
possession may be issued only pursuant to a decree of registration in an original land registration
proceedings “not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration case but also against
anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the proceedings up to the issuance
of the decree. However, it cannot be issued in a petition for reconstitution of an allegedly lost or
destroyed certificate of title. Reconstitution does not confirm or adjudicate ownership over the property
covered by the reconstituted title as in original land registration proceedings where, in the latter, a writ
of possession may be issued to place the applicant-owner in possession. The purpose of the
reconstitution of any document, book or record is to have the same reproduced, after observing the
procedure prescribed by law in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred. A
person who seeks a reconstitution of a certificate of title over a property he does not actually possess
cannot, by a mere motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, which is summary in nature, deprive
the actual occupants of possession thereof. Possession and/or ownership of the property should be
threshed out in a separate proceeding. Here, petitioners were not mere possessors of the properties
covered by the reconbsituted titles, they are possessors under claim of ownership. Actual possession
under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. Hence, the writ of possession
was not proper.

Petition GRANTED.

43 Republic vs Nilas 512 SCRA 286 1/23/2007 Fadera, Juna Carlo

Facts:

In 1941 The trial court adjudicated the subject property to the Calingacions and ordered the Chief of the
General Land Registration, upon finality of the decision, to issue the corresponding decree of
registration. Spouses Abiera, Respondent Nillas’ parents, acquired the subject lot through Deed of
Absolute Sale and thereon Respondent Nillas acquired it from her parents through a Deed of Quitclaim.
No decree of registration has ever been issued over the subject lot ever since the decision was made by
the trial court. Nillas now (1997, 56 years after the 1941 decision) sought the revival of the 1941
decision and the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration for the said lot with the RTC which
granted the petition and directed the Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority to issue the
corresponding decree of confirmation and registration. Office of the Solicitor General appealed the RTC
decision, arguing that the right of action to revive judgment had already prescribed and Nillas should
have established that a request for issuance of a decree of registration before the Admonistrator of the
LRA. The appeal was denied by CA which reiterated that the provisions of Sec.6 Rule 39 of the ROC,
which imposes a prescriptive period for enforcement of judgment by motion, refer to ordinary civil
actions and NOT to “special” proceedings such as land registration cases. Hence this petition. The OSG
contends that the principles of prscription and laches do apply to land registration cases, that under Sec
6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that a final and executory judgment or
order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry, after which time it may
be enforced by action before it is barred by statute of limitations.

Issue/s:

1. WON the principles of prescription and laches applies to the decision in a land registration cases.

2. WON the judgment in Land Registration cases may be executed on mition or enforced by action
within the purview of Rule 39.

Held/Ratio:

1. NO. In the case of Sta. Ana v. Menla (Sta. Ana Doctrine), the court extensively explained that the
provision of Sec. 6 Rule 39 refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a
land registration case. This is so because a party in a civilaction must immediately enforce a judgment
that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a
reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In
special proceedings, the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the
ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said
ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and
the winning party desires to oust him therefrom. Further, There is nothing in the law that limits the
period within which the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is xxx that the judgment is merely
declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party.
Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land
Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no
motion therefor has been filed cannot prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered
to be registered.

2. NO. Sec. 39 of PD 1529, lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of judgment
and the issuance of certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the
prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The obligations
provided in the Section are levied on the land court (that is to issue an order directing the Land
Registration Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court
(that is to transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land
Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of registration and the
transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on the officers charged
with their performance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review. The failure on
the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of the decree of registration
cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such applicant to
follow up with said authorities can.

Petition DENIED

44 Manotok Realty vs LLT Realty 540 SCRA 304 12/17/2007 Aguilar,

Charles Tito R.
FACTS:

The Petition involved properties covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 which in turn
encompasses 1,342 hectares of the Maysilo Estate. The vast tract of land stretches over three (3) cities
within Metropolitan Manila. CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover from
Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotoks) the possession of Lot 26 of the
Maysilo Estate. CLT’s claim was anchored on Transfer Certificate of Title derived from Estelita Hipolito.
Hipolito’s title emanated from Jose Dimson whose title appears to have been sourced from OCT No. 994.

For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied on by CLT, claiming that Dimson’s
title, the proximate source of CLT’s title, was irregularly issued and, hence, the same and subsequent
titles flowing therefrom are likewise void. The Manotoks asserted their ownership over Lot 26 and
claimed that they derived it from several awardees and/or vendees of the National Housing Authority.
The Manotok title likewise traced as its primary source OCT No. 994. The trial court ruled for CLT.
Manotoks appeal to the CA was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the title issued in the name of CLT is valid.

HELD:

It is evident from all three titles─CLT’s, Hipolito’s and Dimson’s—that the properties they purport to
cover were “originally registered on 19 April 1917” in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Rizal. These titles could be affirmed only if it can be proven that OCT No. 994 registered on
19 April 1917 had actually existed. CLT were given the opportunity to submit such proof but it did not.
The established legal principle in actions for annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it
should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that
the land sought to be reconveyed is his. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.

Considering that CLT clearly failed to meet the burden of proof reposed in them as plaintiffs in the action
for annulment of title and recovery of possession, there is a case to be made for ordering the dismissal
of their original complaints before the trial court.

As it appears on the record, OCT No. 994, the mother title was received for transcription by the Register
of Deeds on 3 May 1917 based from the issuance of the decree of registration on 17 April 1917.
Obviously, April 19, 1917 is not the date of inscription or the date of transcription of the decree into the
Original Certificate of Title. Thus, such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date
when the title took effect. It appears that the transcription of the decree was done on the date it was
received by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917.
There is a marked distinction between the entry of the decree and the entry of the certificate of title;
the entry of the decree is made by the chief clerk of the land registration and the entry of the certificate
of title is made by the register of deeds. The certificate of title is issued in pursuance of the decree of
registration. It was stressed that what stands as the certificate of the title is the transcript of the decree
of registration made by the registrar of deeds in the registry.

Moreover, it is only after the transcription of the decree by the register of deeds that the certificate of
title is to take effect.

Hence, any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 is void, for such mother title is
inexistent. The fact that CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 casts
doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact,
sufficient to invalidate the CLT claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placed by them on
the dates appearing on their respective titles.

The Court hereby constitutes a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the case on remand. In
ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the Special Division is directed to
make further determinations based on the evidence already on record and such other evidence as may
be presented at the proceedings before it.

WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special Division of the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings.

45 Manotok Realty vs LLT Realty 582 SCRA 583 3/31/2009 Albay,

Miami Frianz F.

46 Rosales vs Burgos 577 SCRA 264 1/30/2009 Añonuevo, Jon-jon

FACTS:

Petitioner Adoracion Rufloe is the wife of Angel Rufloe, now deceased, while co-petitioners
Alfredo and Rodrigo are their children. During the marriage of Adoracion and Angel, they acquired a
371-square meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. 406851 which is the subject of the present
controversy. Sometime in 1978, respondent Elvira Delos Reyes forged the signatures of Adoracion and
Angel in a Deed of Sale dated September 8, 1978 to make it appear that the disputed property was sold
to her by the spouses Rufloe. On the basis of the said deed of sale, Delos Reyes succeeded in obtaining a
title in her name, TCT No. S-74933.Thus, in November 1979, the Rufloes filed a complaint for damages
against Delos Reyes alleging that the Deed of Salewas falsified as the signatures appearing thereon were
forged because Angel Rufloe died in 1974, which was four (4)years before the alleged sale in favor of
Delos Reyes.During the pendency of the case, Delos Reyes sold the subject property to respondent
siblings Anita, Angelina, Angelitoand Amy (Burgos siblings). A new title, TCT No. 135860, was then issued
in their names.The Burgos siblings, in turn, sold the same property to their aunt, Leonarda Burgos.

However, the sale in favor of Leonarda was not registered. Thus, no title was issued in her name.
The subject property remained in the name of the Burgos siblings who also continued paying the real
estate taxes thereon.The RTC rendered its decision declaring that the Deed of Sale in favor of Delos
Reyes was falsified as the signatures of the spouses Rufloe had been forged. The trial court ruled that
Delos Reyes did not acquire ownership over the subject property. Such was the state of things when the
Rufloes filed their complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Contract and Cancellationof Transfer Certificate
of Titles against respondents Leonarda and the Burgos siblings, and Delos Reyes.

The trial court rendered a decision declaring that Leonarda and the Burgos siblings were not
innocent purchasers for value and did not have a better right to the property in question than the true
and legal owners, the Rufloes. The trial court also held that the subsequent conveyance of the disputed
property to Leonarda by the Burgos siblings was simulated to make it appear that Leonarda was a buyer
in good faith. The CA reversed and set aside that of the trial court, declaring in the process that
respondents were purchasers in goodfaith and for value. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE/S:

(1) Whether the sale of the subject property by Delos Reyes to the Burgos siblings and the subsequent
sale by thesiblings to Leonarda were valid and binding; and

(2) Whether respondents were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value despite the forged deed
of sale of their transferor Delos Reyes

HELD/RATIO:

Petition Granted. The issue concerning the validity of the deed of sale between the Rufloes and
Delos Reyes had already been resolved with finality which declared that the signatures of the alleged
vendors, Angel and Adoracion Rufloe, had been forged. It is undisputed that the forged deed of sale was
null and void and conveyed no title. It is a well-settled principle that no one can give what one does not
have, nemo dat quod non habet. One can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer
can acquire no more right than what the seller can transfer legally. Due to the forged deed of sale, Delos
Reyes acquired no right over the subject property which she could convey to the Burgos siblings. All the
transactions subsequent to the falsified sale between the spouses Rufloe and Delos Reyes are likewise
void, including the sale made by the Burgos siblings to their aunt, Leonarda.

As a general rule, every person dealing with registered land, as in this case, may safely rely on
the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and will in no way oblige him to go beyond the
certificate to determine the condition of the property. However, this rule admits of an unchallenged
exception: . . . a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title
and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party has actual knowledge of facts
and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the
purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a
reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation.

This simulated sale is the handiwork of Amado who apparently acted advisedly to make it
appear that his sister Leonarda as the second transferee of the property is an innocent purchaser for
value. Since he or his children could not plausibly assume the stamp of a buyer in good faith from the
forger Elvira Delos Reyes.

47 Pajomayo vs Manipon 39 SCRA 676 6/30/1971 Fernando, Niezel

Facts:
On June 5, 1963 the plaintiffs (Pajomayo) filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch IX, at
Urdaneta, Pangasinan) a complaint alleging that they are co-owners pro-indiviso of the parcel of land
described in the complaint which is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 in the name of Diego
Pajomayo, issued by the office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan; that they had acquired the land
as an inheritance from their late father Diego Pajomayo; that they and their predecessor-in-interest had
been in actual, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of said property in the concept of owners for a
period of more than 70 years until the early part of the year 1956 when the defendants dispossessed
them of said property.

The defendants (Manipon), after denying some of the allegations of the complaint, alleged that they are
the exclusive owners of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 14043 issued by the
office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan, the said land having been adjudicated to them in the
cadastral proceedings of the Malasique cadastre, and that apparently the plaintiffs are claiming the
same parcel of land. The defendants claim they had acquired the land mentioned in their answer by
inheritance from their deceased father Pioquinto Manipon, and that they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in actual, peaceful, and adverse possession of said land for more than 70 years, to
the exclusion of plaintiffs.

Issue:

Whether the Title No. 1089 held by the plaintiffs-appellees (Pajomayo) which was issued in
virtue of the homestead patent should prevail over the Title No. 14034 held by the defendants-
appellants (Manipon) which was issued in connection with the cadastral proceedings.

Held:

Yes, Title No. 1089 should prevail. The Court held the trial court correctly ruled that plaintiff's
O.C.T. No. 1089 prevails over defendants' O.C.T. No. 14034, the former having been issued on 27
November 1931, or prior to the issuance of the latter on 1 April1957.

The plaintiffs base their claim of title to the land in question, on Original Certificate of Title No. 1089
issued to their father, Diego Pajomayo, on November 27, 1931 in virtue of a free patent that was
granted to him. Once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the Public Land Act is registered
pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, as amended, the Certificate of Title issued in virtue of said patent
has the force and effect of a Torrens Title under the Land Registration Act.

When one of the two titles is held to be superior over the other, one should be declared null and void
and should be ordered cancelled. And if a party is declared to be the owner of a parcel of land pursuant
to a valid certificate of title said party is entitled to the possession of the land covered by said valid title.
The decree of registration issued in the cadastral proceedings does not have the effect of annulling the
title that had previously been issued in accordance with the provisions of the land Registration Law (Act
496).

48 Wee vs Mardo 202414 6/4/2014 Fernando, Niezel

Facts:

Respondent (Mardo) was granted a registered Free Patent No. (IV-2) 15284, dated April 26, 1979,
covering the Lot No. 8348, situated in Putting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite.
On February 1, 1993, respondent allegedly conveyed to petitioner Josephine Wee, through a Deed of
Absolute Sale a portion of the said lot known as Lot No. 8348-B, for a consideration of P250,000.00
which was fully paid. Respondent however refused to vacate and turnover the subject property claiming
that the alleged sale was falsified.

Petitioner (Wee) file an Application for Original Registration of a parcel of land claiming that she is the
owner of said unregistered land by virtue of a deed of absolute sale.

Respondent filed a Motion to dismiss the application alleging that the land described in the application
was different from the land being claimed for titling. The motion was however, denied. A motion for
reconsideration and second urgent motion for reconsideration were subsequently filed by respondent,
but both were denied by the RTC.

Upon presentation of evidence by the parties, the RTC granted the application of the petitioner.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC, hence, respondent
appealed to the CA.

The CA held, among others, that petitioner was not able to comply with the requirement of possession
and occupation under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529. Her admission that the subject lot was not
physically turned over to her due to some objections and oppositions to her title suggested that she was
not exercising any acts of dominion over the subject property, an essential element in the requirement
and occupation contemplated under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner is entitled to the subject property as evidenced by the alleged deed of
absolute sale and despite respondent’s possession of the subject property.

Held:

No, the petitioner is not entitled to the subject property. The Court held that the subject land is already
registered under OCT No. OP-1840 (Patent No. 042118-03-6111) of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite,
under the name of respondent Felicidad Mardo.

In addition, the Court held that the applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) must
sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. (Republic v. Manimtim, G.R. No. 169599, March 16, 2011)

The CA denied the application on the issue of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land. It was of the view that she could not have complied with the
requirement of possession and occupation under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 considering that she
admitted that it was not physically turned over to her.

49 Campit vs Gripa, et al. 195443 9/17/2014 Fernando, Niezel

Facts:
Subject of this case is a 2.7360 hectare agricultural land situated in Umangan, Mangatarem, Pangasinan,
presently occupied by respondents Isidra B. Gripa, Pedro Bardiaga, and Severino Bardiaga, represented
by his son Rolando Bardiaga, but covered by TCT No. 122237 issued in the petitioner’s name. The
petitioner (Campit) claimed to have purchased the property from his father Jose Campit in 1977.

On the other hand, respondents (Gripa) claimed to be the rightful owners of the subject property, as
earlier adjudged by the court in Civil Case No. 11858 decided on June 12, 1961, and in Civil Case No.
15357 decided on August 8, 1978. The Court, in these cases, cancelled the titles of the petitioner and his
father Jose because they were obtained through the misrepresentation of the petitioner’s grandfather,
Isidro Campit.

Issue:

Whether that the title of the petitioner to the subject property shall prevail because the August
8, 1978 decision in Civil Case No. 15357, which declared his title null and void, was never executed and
under the Torrens system of registration, a certificate of title is an indefeasible and incontrovertible
proof of ownership of the person, in whose favor it was issued.

Held:

No, the title of the petitioner will not prevail. The Court held the validity of petitioner’s title,
having been settled with finality in Civil Case No. 15357, could no longer be reviewed. Because the
doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes as an absolute
bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.

The Court also held that it cannot allow the petitioner to maintain his title and benefit from the fruit of
his and his predecessors’ fraudulent acts at the expense of the respondents who are the rightful owners
of the subject property. The Torrens system of registration cannot be used to protect a usurper from the
true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or to permit one to enrich oneself
at the expense of others.

Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner can still be compelled
under the law to re-convey the property registered to the rightful owner under the principle that the
property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is
registered.

An action for re-conveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from
the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. There is, however, an exception to this rule where
the filing of such action does not prescribe, i.e., when the plaintiff is in possession of the subject
property, the action, being in effect that of quieting of title to the property, does not prescribe.

50 Republic vs Vera 120 SCRA 210 1/27/1983 Frias, Helen May

Facts:

Private respondents filed with the lower court an application for registration of title under Act 496 over
parcels of land located in the Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan. The Court of First Instance of Bataan
confirmed the titles to subject parcels of land and adjudicated them in favor of the private respondents.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed with the lower court an opposition to the application stating
that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic, not
subject to private appropriation. Petitioner stressed that the lands in question can no longer be subject
to registration by voluntary proceedings, for they have already been subjected to compulsory
registration proceedings under the Cadastral Act.

Issue:

Whether the lands in question being a subject of a cadastral proceeding may be a subject of private
appropriation in favor of the private respondents.

Held/Ratio:

No.

In cadastral proceedings any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands object of the petition
is required by Section 9 of Act No. 2259 to file an answer on or before the return day or within such
further time as may be allowed by the court. In the absence of successful claimants, the property is
declared public land.

In this case, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in the aforesaid cadastral
proceedings or failed to substantiate their claims over the portions they were then occupying,
otherwise, titles over the portions subject of their respective claims would have been issued to them.
The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public lands, and its decision had already
become final and conclusive.

51 Pamintuan vs San Agustin 43 Phil. 558 6/22/2022 Frias, Helen May

Facts:

The lot in question was decreed in favor of petitioner Florentino Pamintuan by the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga and that certificate of said lot was thereupon issued to him by virtue of the
decision in a land registration case. In the meantime, a cadastral case was instituted. Due to the
petitioner’s failure to claim the lot at the trial of the Cadastral case, the said lot was awarded to the
private respondents. Petitioner then presented a motion to the Court of First Instance, asking that the
decision of the court in regard to the lot in the Cadastral case be set aside and that the writ of
possession issued by virtue of said decision be recalled.

Issue:

Whether a final decree in an ordinary land registration case can be set aside by a subsequent decree of
the Court in a cadastral case.

Held/Ratio:

No.

The title to the land is fully as well settled and adjudicated, within the meaning of the Cadastral Act, by a
final decree in an ordinary land registration case as it would be by a similar decree in a Cadastral case.
Obviously, it cannot have been the intention of the Legislature to provide a special proceeding for the
settlement and adjudication of titles already settled and adjudicated. In this case, the subsequent filing
of a cadastral case does not give the court the jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land
already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and
void. The jurisdiction of the court in cadastral cases over lands already registered is limited to the
necessary correction of technical errors in the description of the lands.

52 Director of Lands vs Pastor 106 SCRA 426 7/31/1988 Frias,

Helen May
Facts:

Respondent Manuela Pastor filed with the Court of First Instance of Batangas an application for
confirmation of imperfect title over thirteen (13) lots situated in Gulod and Pallocan, Batangas City. In
her application, the respondent claims that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in
continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and notorious possession of the lots under claim of
ownership for more than thirty (30) years. The Director of Lands filed an opposition to the application on
the ground that said lots were declared public land in a previous cadastral proceeding.

Issue:

Whether lands declared as public land in a cadastral proceeding may still be a subject of a judicial
confirmation of title.

Held/Ratio:

Yes.

A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant from
subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he thereafter
complies with the provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as
said public land remains alienable and disposable (now sections 3 and 4, P.D. No. 1073).

53 Navarro vs Director of Lands 5 SCRA 8347/31/1962 Gaffud, Marvela

Angela
Facts:

This is an appeal by Anacleto P. Navarro from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dismissing his application for registration of 2 residential lots in Malate. The Director of Lands interposed
an opposition claiming that both lands belong to the State. Navarro submitted an evidence wherein the
Director of Lands filed a motion to dismiss on 2 grounds: 1) that the application was barred by prior
judgment and 2) that the same was improper as an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under the Public Land law which is only applicable to public agricultural lands and not to those which are
residential in character.
It appears that sometime in 1950 the Director of Lands filed a cadastral proceeding in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to settle and adjudicate title to the same lots in question. The State claimed it as part
of the public domain.

Issue/s:

Whether the lots applied for are part of the public domain or have so far been possessed by appellant
that he must be deemed to have acquired title thereto which is sufficient for registration in his name?

Held/Ratio:

The lots applied for are part of the public domain.

The declaration by final judgment in the cadastral proceeding that they are public lands settled this
issue.

It is a rule long familiar in this jurisdiction that all lands are presumed to be a part of the public domain;
that to overcome this presumption, evidence must be more than a mere preponderance and that vague
and indecisive proofs are insufficient even in the absence of opposition on the part of the government.

Appellant Navarro admits that neither Caridad Guillen Cortez nor her predecessors ever declared the
land in question for taxation purposes; And that none of them paid taxes on said land. In spite of the
averment that the two lots in controversy constitute privately owned property, the evidence is
unanimous to the effect that none of the alleged owners ever declared the land for taxation purposes.
None of them ever paid taxes on the property. It has been truthfully said that tax declarations and tax
receipts constitute evidence of great weight in support of possession or ownership. Any owner, the most
ignorant included, knows his obligation of seeing to it that his real property is declared for taxation
purposes and that he regularly pay the taxes thereon.

54 Lahora vs Dayanghirang 37 SCRA 346 1/30/1971 Gaffud,

Marvela Angela
FACTS:

Spouses Francisco lahora and Toribia Moralizon brought this appeal to this court from the order of the
Court of First Instance of Davao dismissing their petition with the lot in issue (Lot No. 2228) on the
ground of previous registration.

The records show that appellants petitioned the Court of First Instance of Davao for registration of 9
parcel of lands located in Manay, Davao, ½ of which was acquired by Toribia Moralizon by inheritance
and the other half by purchase and by continuous, open, public and adverse possession in the concept
of owner. One of the said parcels of land was identified as lot no. 2228. Such petition was opposed by
Emilio Dayanghirang Jr. claiming that the lot no. 2228 belonged to him in his wife covered by OCT P-
6055 in his wife’s name. The Director of Lands also alleged that the applicants never had a sufficient title
over the lands, nor have they been open, continuous and notorious possession for at least 30 years.

ISSUE/S:

(1) Whether the patent issued to the wife of Emilio Dayanghirang Jr. as well as the original
certificate of title obtained by her were null and void?
(2) Whether the same lot can be the subject of two registration proceedings?

RATIO/S:

(1) No, the patent and original certificate of title issued to Dayanghirang Jr.’s wife is valid.

The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of title that
may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a private individual,
the corresponding patent therefor is, recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee;
Thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title
issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In
other words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become
irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding.

(2) No, the same lot cannot be the subject of 2 registration proceedings.

In the present case, Lot No. 2228 was registered and titled in the name of oppositor’s wife as of 21 June
1956, nine (9) years earlier. Clearly, appellants’ petition for registration of the same parcel of land on 26
November 1965, on the ground that the first certificate of title (OCT No. P6053) covering the said
property is a nullity, can no longer prosper. Orderly administration of justice precludes that Lot 2228, of
the Manay Cadastre, should be the subject of two registration proceedings. Having become registered
land under Act 496, for all legal purposes, by the issuance of the public land patent and the recording
thereof, further registration of the same would lead to the obviously undesirable result of two
certificates of title being issued for the same piece of land, even if both certificates should be in the
name of the same person. And if they were to be issued to different persons, the indefeasibility of the
first title, which is the most valued characteristics of Torrens Titles, would be torn away.

For this reason, the Supreme Court has ruled in Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558, that in a
cadastral case the court has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an
earlier case; and that a second decree for the same land would be null and void.

55 Republic vs Aquino 120 SCRA 186 1/27/1983 Gaffud, Marvela

Angela
Facts

Vivencio p. Angeles filed an application of registration of title over a parcel of land in San Mateo, Rizal
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal wherein an opposition was filed jointly by Victorino Perez and
Dionisio, Conrado, Jose, Nicanor, Lourdes and Trinidad, all surnamed Sta. Maria, and individually by Felix
Lorenzo, as representative of the heirs of Victor Lorenzo. Unfortunately, their opposition was dismissed.
One of the grounds of the opposition was that the said lot was declared a public land by the Court of
First Instance of Rizal. The same lot was also a subject of a homestead application filed by Gonzalo
Lorenzo wherein he sold such property to Vivencio P. Angeles – who was also granted with his
homestead application and withdrew such for the application of the registration on the said property.

Issue
Whether the lower court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the application for registration of title and
in ruling that the applicant-respondent Vivencio P. Angeles has a registrable title over the lot in
question?

Ratio

Yes, the lower court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the applicatition for registration f title and in
ruling that Vivencio Angels has a registrable title over the lot.

In the first place, in Land Registration Case No. 1196, GLRO Rec. 50288, entitled “Isabelo Lorenzo et al.
vs. The Director of Lands, et al. the Court of First Instance of Rizal had already declared subject property
as a public land. That the decision had long become final and, therefore, cannot be disturbed anymore
on the ground of res judicata. And, Republic Act 931 does not apply to persons claiming title to land
which has been declared public land in an ordinary registration proceeding.

The fact that he had filed a homestead application over the property is an admission that their
possession was not in the concept of an owner.

56 Republic vs T.A.N. Properties Inc 555 SCRA 477 6/26/2008

Galicia, Monico King A.
FACTS:

Case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
covering Lot located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.on 11 November 1999, the trial court
called the case for initial hearing, there was an Opposition of the Republic of the Philippines represented
by the Director of Lands (petitioner). During the hearings, respondent presented three witnesses:
Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager; Evangelista, a 72year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto.
Tomas, Batangas since birth; and the Records Officer II of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon
City.

The testimonies of respondent’s witnesses showed that Kabesang Puroy had peaceful, adverse, open,
and continuous possession of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang
Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio. The land was adjudicated to one of Antonio’s children,
Prospero Dimayuga (Porting). Then on 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to respondent.

Respondent submitted two certifications issued by the DENR. First certification by the CENRO, that the
lot falls within the alienable and disposable zone. Second certification by Regional Technical Director of
DENR, stating that the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land.

RTC adjudicated the land in favor of respondent, that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for
registration of land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest

have possessed the land for 30 years or more. Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s
Decision.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent, a private corporation, is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the
Public Land Act.
HELD/RATIO:

No, respondent TAN Properties is not qualified.

The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably
belong to the State. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.

It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant
for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO
or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves,
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, the Court traced the law on disposition
of lands of the public domain. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against private
corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution limited the alienation of lands of
the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution,
private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire
alienable lands of the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution continues the prohibition against
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the corporate applicant for
land registration to establish that when it acquired the land, the same was already private land by
operation of law because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed.
The length of possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to complete the statutory
30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of such acquisitive prescription since
both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations from acquiring lands of the public domain.

In applying for land registration, a private corporation cannot have any right higher than its predecessor-
in-interest from whom it derived its right.—Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is
limited only to 12 hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private
individual may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable land.

57 Nieto vs Quines 1 SCRA 2271/28/1961 Galicia, Monico King A.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1917, Quines filed with the Bureau of Lands a homestead application covering a tract of
land. Upon the approval, homestead by Quines was designated as Lot No. 3044, and he began clearing
and cultivating the land.

In the years 1923 to 1925, cadastral surveys were made by the Bureau of Lands. On 1927, cadastral
proceedings were initiated by the Director of Lands, and Quines did not file any answer therein.
Maria Florentino filed an answer claiming several lots including Lot No. 3044.

On August 16, 1930, the cadastral court awarded Maria Florentino Lot No. 3044.

On August 29, 1930, pending the issuance of the final decree of registration and the original certificate
of title to Maria Florentino, a homestead patent covering Lot No. 3044 was granted to Bartolome
Quines, and issued Original Certificate of Title in his name.

Six months thereafter, or on March 12, 1931, the same Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of
Title No. 11982 in the name of Maria Florentino covering the lots awarded to her, including Lot No.
3044.

Sometime in 1952, Maria Florentino sold all the lots to Arturo Nieto, who subsequently secured the
issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title in his name. On the other hand, Quines executed a deed of sale
on 1953 transferring Lot No. 3044 to Atty. Miguel P. Pio.

Nieto filed a complaint against Quines that the homestead patent and Original Certificate of Title No.
623 were obtained through fraud and misrepresentations, prayed that the patent and title be cancelled
and that the title issued in plaintiff's name be declared as the true and valid title over the lot in dispute.

Lower court rendered judgment in defendants' (Quines and Pio) favor dismissing the complaint. Nieto
appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the title issued to a homestead applicant prevail over a subsequent registration of an awardee
in cadastral court proceedings.

HELD/RATIO:

Yes. As a homestead applicant, the defendant religiously complied with all the requirements of the
Public Land Act and, on August 29, 1930, a homestead patent was issued in his favor.

Also, the defendant having complied with all the terms and conditions which would entitle him to a
patent, Bartolome Quines, even without a patent actually issued, has unquestionably acquired a vested
right on the land and is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof. (Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil.
498). Under these circumstances and applying by analogy the principles governing sales of immovable
property to two different persons by the same vendor, Bartolome Quines' title must prevail over that of
Maria Florentino not only because he had always been in possession of the land but also because he
obtained title to the land prior to that of Maria Florentino.

58 Del Prado vs Caballero 148225 3/3/2010 Sevilla, Victor

Emmanuel

59 DBT Mar Bay vs Panes 594 SCRA 578 7/31/2009 Ganchero, Kevin
Ken
Facts:
The subject land was conveyed by B. C Regalado to DBT through a dacion en pago for services rendered.
On June 24, 1992, the respondents Ricaredo Panes and his sons filed a complaint for quieting of title
with damages and petition for injunction against Regalado and DBT because the transferred land
covered the Panes' lot which they alleged was exclusively theirs. In the complaint, Ricaredo alleged that
he is the lawful owner of the covered portion which he had declared for taxation purposes in his name.
Respondents claimed that Ricaredo and his immediate family had been and still are in actual possession
of the subject property, and their possession preceded the 2nd world war. For its part, DBT, alleged that
it is the legitimate owner and occupant of the subject property after they registered the same among
other defenses. Ricaredo Panes insists that despite DBT’s registration of the TCT, he has acquired the
land through acquisitive prescription.

Issues:

Whether title to registered land may be acquired through prescription.

Held:

No. Respondents' claim of acquisitive prescription over the subject property is baseless. Under Article
1126 of the Civil Code, acquisitive prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land
Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496, as amended by PD No.
1529, provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by adverse possession. In the instant case, proof of possession by the respondents is
immaterial and inconsequential.

60 Lonoy vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform 572 SCRA 185 11/27/2008

Ganchero, Kevin Ken
Facts:

After her husband Gregorio died, Hilaria Tabuclin sold their conjugal land to Deleste. Hilaria died soon
after and her brother-in-law, Juan was appointed as special administrator of the estate together with
Noel as regular administrator. However, Noel could not take possession of the subject property as it was
with Deleste already hence he filed an action for reversion of title. The case reached the Supreme Court
which ruled in favor of Noel and held that Deleste is only entitled to ½ of the subject property as Hilaria
is only entitled to the same since the property is conjugal. They were adjudged as co-owners as was
their heirs who failed to partition the land.

Portions of the subject property was expropriated and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries under Operation
Land Transfer. But since Deleste has long since passed away, with the land remaining unpartitioned
among his heirs, the just compensation cannot be awarded. The heirs of co-owners then filed an action
for the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents given to farmer-beneficiaries as the awarding was done
without sufficient notice to them.

Issue:

Whether the certificates of title may be cancelled because of DAR’s failure to issue sufficient notice.

Held:
No. A certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from
the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent as in the present case. Land covered
by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to
another person. After the expiration of the one year period, a person whose property has been wrongly
or erroneously registered in another’s name may bring an ordinary action for reconveyance, or if the
property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, Section 32 of the Property
Registration Decree gives petitioners only one other remedy, i.e., to file an action for damages against
those responsible for the fraudulent registration

61 Ybanez vs IAC 194 SCRA 743 3/6/1991 Ganchero, Kevin Ken

Facts:

Respondent Ouano was able to secure homestead patents over the subject land. After complying with
all the requirements he was issued an original certificate of title. He occupied the land and harvested its
fruits for 19 years until petitioner, together with his sons, contested his ownership and forcefully took
possession of the said land effectively evicting Ouano. Petitioners alleged that the Director of lands had
issued a ruling favorable to them as the true owners and that Ouano wasn’t in actual possession of the
land as he did not have a house built on it.

Issue:

Whether Ouano’s title may be revoked on the basis of the Director of land’s decision.

Held:

No. It was erroneous for petitioners to question the Torrens Original Certificate of Title issued to private
respondent over Lot No. 986 in Civil Case No. 671, an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession
filed by the registered owner of the said lot, by invoking as affirmative defense in their answer the Order
of the Bureau of Lands, dated July 19, 1978, issued pursuant to the investigatory power of the Director
of Lands under Section 91 of Public Land Law (C.A. 141 as amended). Such a defense partakes of the
nature of a collateral attack against a certificate of title brought under the operation of the Torrens
system of registration pursuant to Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 103 of P.D.
1259. The case law on the matter does not allow a collateral attack on the Torrens certificate of title on
the ground of actual fraud. The rule now finds expression in Section 48 of P.D. 1529 otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree. In the instant case, the public land certificate of title issued to private
respondent attained the status of indefeasibility one (1) year after the issuance of patent on April 15,
1963, hence, it is no longer open to review on the ground of actual fraud. Consequently, the filing of the
protest before the Bureau of Lands against the Homestead Application of private respondent on January
3, 1975, or 12 years after, can no longer reopen or revise the public land certificate of title on the ground
of actual fraud. No reasonable and plausible excuse has been shown for such an unusual delay. The law
serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act.

62 Ponce de Leon vs RFC 36 SCRA 289 1976 Garcia, Anne Sherina

Bianca
FACTS:
Jose L. Ponce de Leon filed with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) Manila, his loan
application, in the amount of P800,000.00 offering as security certain parcels of land, among which, was
the parcel which Ponce de Leon and Soriano mortgaged to the PNB. The application stated that the
properties offered for security for the RFC loan are encumbered to the PNB, Bacolod, and to Cu Unjieng
Bros. The application was approved for P495,000.00 and the mortgage contract was executed by Jose L.
Ponce de Leon, his wife, and Francisco Soriano. The same parties signed a promissory note for
P495,000.00, with interest at 6% per annum, payable on installments every month for P28,831.64 in
connection with the mortgage deed. The mortgage deed specifically stipulated that the proceeds
thereof shall be used exclusively for the purchase of machinery and equipment, construction of
buildings and the payment of obligations and that the release of the amounts loaned shall be at the
discretion of the RFC. Subsequently, none of the amortization and interests which had become due was
paid and, for this reason, the RFC took steps for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties consisting of real estates and the sawmill and its equipments of Ponce de Leon situated in
two places in Samar. Previous to the expiration of the one-year period of redemption, Francisco Soriano,
through Teofila Soriano del Rosario offered to repurchase the Soriano lot the last day for the
redemption of the lot but the offer was rejected and they were told to participate in the public sale of
the land to be conducted by the RFC. Jose L. Ponce de Leon did not offer to redeem the mortgaged
properties sold at anytime before the expiration of the period of redemption. Subsequently, Ponce de
Leon instituted the present action alleging that there was delay in the releases of the amount of the loan
and the sheriff’s sales were null and void because the properties were sold in an inadequate prices and
that the it was not in accordance with law. These allegations were denied by RFC sustaining the legality
of the mortgage and Sheriff's sales. On the other hand, Francisco Soriano wrote a letter, to the President
asking the latter's intervention so that the projected sale on the same date to be conducted by the RFC
may be suspended insofar as the lot in his name is concerned and that he be allowed to redeem it which
was granted under the conditions that the property could be redeem in its appraised value of
P59,647.05, payable 20% down and the balance in ten years, with 6% interest. Soriano did not redeem
the lot under the conditions of the RFC. In due course, the lower court ruled in favor of RFC. The
Sorianos appealed this decision pointing out that the selling price of the said properties were
ridiculously inadequate.

ISSUE:

Whether the Sheriff’s foreclosure is valid.

HELD:

Yes. Mere inadequacy of the price obtained at the sheriff's sale unless shocking to the conscience will
not be sufficient to set aside the sale if there is no showing that, in the event of a regular sale, a better
price can be obtained. The reason is that, generally, and, in forced sales, low prices are usually offered.
The records further show that two (2) days after the execution of the deed of mortgage for P10,000 in
favor of the PNB — Francisco Soriano received P2,000 from plaintiff, Francisco Soriano received a letter
informing him that the PNB mortgage on the Parañaque property would be foreclosed, unless the debt
guaranteed therewith were settled; that, accordingly, his children came to know of the mortgage in
favor of the PNB; that said mortgage was transferred to the RFC. Under these circumstances, it is
difficult to believe that Sorianos did not know then of the mortgage constituted by Francisco Soriano in
favor of the RFC. Their aforementioned failure to contest the legality of the mortgage for over five (5)
years and these attempts to redeem the property constitute further indicia that the same belonged
exclusively to Francisco Soriano, not to the conjugal partnership with his deceased wife, Tomasa
Rodriguez. Apart from the fact that said attempts to redeem the property constitute an implied
admission of the validity of its sale — and, hence, of its mortgage to the RFC — there are authorities to
the effect that they bar the Sorianos from assailing the same.

63 Mercado vs Liwanag 115 Phil. 469 6/30/1976 Garcia, Anne

Sherina Bianca
FACTS:

Ramon Mercado and Pio D. Liwanag executed a Deed of Sale of a parcel of land situated in Quezon City.
The said sale was issued in the name of the Ramon Mercado and Basilia Mercado as co-owners PRO-
INDIVISO, and the sale was without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff Basilia Mercado. The said
land was thereafter expropriated by NPC at a price of P10,000.

ISSUE:

Whether the Deed of Sale was vaild.

HELD:

Yes. A co-owner may dispose of under Article 493 is only his undivided aliquot share, which shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him upon the termination of the co-ownership. He has
no right to divide the property into parts and then convey one part by metes and bounds. The title is the
final and conclusive repository of the rights of the new co-owners. The question of whether or not the
deed of sale should be annulled must be considered in conjunction with the title issued pursuant
thereto. Since, according to this title, what appellee acquired by virtue of the sale is only an undivided
half-share of the property, which under the law the vendor Ramon Mercado had the absolute right to
dispose of, the trial court committed no error in dismissing the action.

64 Guaranteed Homes Inc vs Valdez 577 SCRA 441 1/30/2009

Garcia, Anne Sherina Bianca
FACTS:

Respondents, who are the descendants of Pablo Pascua (Pablo), filed a complaint seeking reconveyance
of a parcel of land situated in Cabitaugan, Subic, Zambales. The property had already been sold by Pablo
during his lifetime to Alejandria Marquinez and Restituto Morales. They alleged that Pablo died intestate
and was survived by his four children, one of whom was the deceased Cipriano who declared himself as
the only heir of Pablo and confirmed the sales made by the decedent during his lifetime, including the
alleged sale of the disputed property to spouses Rodolfo. Subsequently, the spouses Rodolfo sold the
disputed property to petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. On the other hand, Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the action is barred by the Statute of
Limitations. The RTC granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Noting that respondents had never claimed
nor established that they have been in possession of the property and that they did not present any
evidence to show that petitioner has not been in possession of the property either, the RTC applied the
doctrine that an action to quiet title prescribes where the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.
The trial court found that the complaint per its allegations presented a case of implied or constructive
trust on the part of Cipriano who had inaccurately claimed to be the sole heir of Pablo in the deed of
extrajudicial settlement of estate which led to the issuance of TCT No. T- 8241 in his favor. Upon appeal,
the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether the sale of the property was valid.

HELD:

YES. It is basic that a person dealing with registered property need not go beyond, but only has to rely
on, the title of his predecessor-in-interest. Since "the act of registration is the operative act to convey or
affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned," it follows that where there is nothing in the
certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance
thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face
indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto.
It is enough that petitioner had examined the latest certificate of title which in this case was issued in
the name of the immediate transferor, the spouses Rodolfo. The purchaser is not bound by the original
certificate but only by the certificate of title of the person from whom he had purchased the property.
Registration in the public registry is notice to the whole world. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien,
attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall be, if registered, filed or
entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land to which it relates
lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.

65 Panganiban vs Dayrit 464 SCRA 370 7/28/2005 Gonzales, Liezel

FACTS:

The petitioners alleged that they are the possessors and owners of Lot 1436 which they inherited from
the late Juan and Ines Panganiban, father and daughter respectively. The owner’s duplicate copy of OCT
No. 7864 covering Lot 1436 had been lost but upon petition with the trial court by Erlinda Pacursa (one
of the heirs and petitioner herein) the trial court granted the petition. The Register of Deeds of Misamis
Oriental issued an owner’s duplicate copy to Erlinda.

Petitioners further alleged that unknown to them, a certain Cristobal Salcedo asserted ownership over
Lot 1436 and believing it was unregistered, sold a portion of it to respondent. The latter discovered that
what she had bought was registered land. Unable to annotate the deed of sale at the back of the OCT,
respondent fraudulently filed a petition for issuance of the owner’s copy of said title. This petition
alleged that the copy issued to Erlinda was lost in the fire. It was granted and the Register of Deeds
issued an owner’s duplicate certificate to respondent which contained the annotation of a Notice of
Adverse Claim filed by Erlinda wherein it is alleged in part that Erlinda is one of the lawful heirs of Juan
and Ines, the registered owners of the property and she has legitimate claim thereto. Moreover,
petitioners alleged that the newly issued owner’s duplicate certificate to respondent was prejudicial to
their previously issued title which is still in existence.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that Lot 1436 was sold by the petitioners and their father which
was covered by a Deed of Definite Sale and Salcedo came into ownership. Salcedo sold the property to
respondent.
ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the petitioners’ duplicate certificate of title is valid and subsisting

(2) Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the possession of the property

HELD:

(1) The CA correctly ruled that the duplicate certificate of title on petitioners’ possession is valid and
subsisting. The Court had already ruled in Serra Serra v CA that if a certificate of title has not been lost
but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering
the decision has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of a new title. Since the owner’s
duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 earlier issued to Erlinda is still in existence, the lower court did not
acquire jurisdiction over respondent’s petition for reconstitution of title. The duplicate certificate of title
subsequently issued to respondent is therefore void and of no effect.

(2) The Court rules in the negative. Petitioners are no longer entitled to recover possession of the
property by virtue of the equitable defenses of laches. In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that
even a registered owner of property may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of
laches.

The petitioners’ inaction for 45 years reduced their right to recover the subject property into a stale
demand.

66 Mejia de Lucas vs Gamponia 100 Phil. 277 10/31/1956 Gonzales,

Liezel
FACTS:

Free patent No. 3699 was issued over the land subject of the action in the name of Domingo Mejia
which was transcribed in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya and certificate of title No.
380 issued in the name of Domingo Mejia. After the issuance of the patent but before the registration of
the same, Mejia deeded the land to Zacarias Ciscar. Upon his death the property was included in the
distribution of his estate and adjudicated to Roque Sanchez. Sanchez sold the land to Andres Gamponia.

Domingo Mejia, upon his death, left his brother Pedro Mejia who is survived by his daughter Concordia
Mejia de Lucas.

The court a quo held that the sale by the patentee to Zacarias Ciscar is null and void, as the sale was
made only 11 days after the issuance of a patent in violation of the provisions of section 35 of Act No.
926. It further held that since the land is registered land no title in derogation to that of the registered
owner could have been acquired either by Zacarias Ciscar or Sanchez and Gamponia.

The main defense is plaintiff’s right of action has already prescribed by virtue of the possession of the
land by the defendant and his predecessors in interest for a period of 37 years. This defense was
overruled by the court a quo on the ground that as the land is registered, with a certificate of title in the
name of patentee Domingo Mejia, title thereto may not be acquired by the defendant and his
predecessors in interest against said registered owner. This ruling is evidently based on Section 46 of the
Land Registration Act, which provides that “no title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Mejia de Lucas is entitled to the property

HELD:

The Court ruled in the negative.

While no legal defense to the action lies, an equitable one lies in favor of the defendant and that is, the
equitable defense of laches. No hold that the defense of prescription or adverse possession in
derogation of the title of the registered owner Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable
defense of laches. Otherwise, stated, we hold that while defendant may not be considered as having
acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessors’ long continued possession for 37 years, the original
owner’s right to recover back the possession of the property and the title thereto from the defendant
has, by the long period of 37 years and by patentee’s inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale
demand.

It is to be noted that all the complications would never had been occasioned had the original patentee
and his successors in interest not slept on their rights for more than a generation. Add to this the fact
that the original conveyance made by the patentee is not absolutely null and void. The prohibition
against the sale of free patents is for a period of seven years (Section 35, Act No. 926) ; after that period
of time a patentee would be free to dispose of the land. Within seven years from the conveyance the
original patentee could have brought an action to recover back his property. Since nothing of this sort
was done by him, it was certainly natural for the purchase to have assumed that the original patentee
gave up his right to recover back the property and acquiesced in vendee’s right and title. The successor
in interest of the original purchaser must also have believed in good faith that the patentee and his
successors in interest were reconciled to the idea of allowing the property to stay in the hands of the
successors in interest.

67 Manotok vs Borque (or Manotok vs CLT Realty?) 582 SCRA 583

12/18/2008 Sevilla, Victor Emmanuel

68 Gregorio Araneta vs RTC 580 SCRA 532 3/4/2009 Gonzales,

Liezel
FACTS:

The Gonzales or Maysilo estate in Malabon, Rizal was expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines,
with the understanding that the Government would resell the property to its occupants. However, due
to its failure and its instrumentality, PHHC, the occupants and tenants of the estate filed a complaint to
compel PHHC to sell to the tenants their respective occupied portions of the Gonzales estate.

The Gregorio Araneta University Foundation (GAUF) sought to intervene in the case on the ground that
52 tenants of the property and Araneta Institute of Agriculture entered into a “Kasunduan” whereby the
former conveyed to the latter priority rights to purchase portion of the estate.
In the basis of this “Kasunduan,” a compromise agreement was duly approved by the court. Included in
this compromise agreement are Lots 75 and 54 awarded to Gregorio Bajamonde. Incidentally, it appears
that on the basis of the “Kasunduan” and the forged compromise, Araneta University was able to
register in its name with the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City TCT No. C-24153 for Lots 75 and 54
which had been awarded to Gregorio Bajamonde.

On the other hand, the compromise agreement between Araneta University and the tenants was
declared null and void for being a forgery and the partial decision rendered in accordance therewith
was likewise declared null and void and of no force and effect.

The lower court ordered the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City to cancel the title of GAUF and to issue a
new TCT over Lots 75 and 54 in the name Gregorio Bajamonde or heirs and ordered the Clerk of Court to
issue writ of possession in favor of Gregorio Bajamonde or heirs.

GAUF filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the Joint Order alleging that the twin orders in
question were issued by the trial court without jurisdiction. The CA denied the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to issue the Joint Order which directed the cancellation of
the petitioner’s title over Lot 54 and 75

HELD:

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action is to nullify the title,
and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the
object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other
hand, it is indirect or collateral when, in an action or proceeding to obtain a different relief, an attack on
the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.

Here, while it may be true that Civil Case No. C760 was originally an action for specific performance and
damages, nonetheless the case cannot constitute a collateral attack on the petitioner’s title which, to
begin with, was irregularly and illegally issued. It bears stressing that the source of GAUF’s title was the
Compromise Agreement purportedly executed by Gregorio Bajamonde, et al. which were declared null
and void. Well settled is the rule that the indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by
fraud and misrepresentation. In view of these circumstances, it was as if no title at all was ever issued in
this case to the petitioner and therefore this is hardly the occasion to talk of collateral attack against a
title.

The Court agree with the CA that the trial court had jurisdiction to annul petitioner’s title. It must be
emphasized that, notwithstanding the original denomination of the said action as one for specific
performance and damages, it was petitioner GAUF no less which sought to intervene in Civil Case No.
C760 and claimed that it has rights or interests in the subject matter being litigated therein. It is
undeniable that petitioner’s TCT was issued in enforcement of a partial decision in Civil Case No. C760.
As it were, the validity of petitioner’s title was an issue litigated in Civil Case No. C760 on account of the
presentation therein of the Compromise Agreement which, to stress, was the springboard of petitioner’s
title. Hence, when that same Compromise Agreement and the Partial Decision in connection therewith
were eventually nullified, the trial court acted very much within its jurisdiction in ordering the
cancellation of petitioner’s title in the same Civil Case No. C760.

69 Ono vs Lim 614 SCRA 514 3/9/2010 Julo, Ma.Victoria

Facts:

Vicente Lim filed an action in the RTC a petition for the reconstitution of the owner’s duplicate copy of
the OCT alleging it has been lost during the World War II by his mother, Luisa. The land was sold to Luisa
by the spouses Diego Ono and Estefania Apas. The deed evidencing the sale had been lost without being
registered. Antonio Ono, the only legitimate heir of the spouses, executed a notarized confirmation of
sale in favor of Luisa. Zosimo Ono and Teofisto Ono opposed Lim’s petition contending that they had the
certificate of title in their possession as the successors-in-interest of the Spouses Ono. Lim converted the
petition for reconstitution into a complaint for quieting of title, stating that he had been in the actual
possession of the property since 1937, cultivating and developing it, enjoying its fruits, and paying the
taxes of the land.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Lim. RTC ordered the Register of Deeds of Cebu to register the land
in favor of Luisa Lim. The lower court found that Lim had been in peaceful possession of the land since
1937; that the possession had never been disturbed by Ono; that Lim declared the lot in their name for
taxation purposes; that Lim paid the tax related to it; and that the signature of Antonio Ono on
confirmation of sale document was genuine.

On the appeal, CA affirmed the decision of RTC. CA ruled that the action for quieting of title was not a
collateral, but a direct attack on the title; and that Lim’s undisturbed possession had given them a
continuing right to seek the aid of the courts to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third
party and its effect on their own title. The CA corrected the RTC, by ordering that the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Cebu City issue a new duplicate certificate of title in the name of Luisa, considering
that the owners duplicate was still intact in the possession of the Ono.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the validity of the OCT could be collaterally attacked through an ordinary civil action
to quiet title;

2. Whether or not the ownership over registered land could be lost by prescription, laches, or adverse
possession;

3. Whether or not there was a deed of sale executed by Spouses Ono in favor of Luisa and whether or
not said deed was lost during World War II;

4. Whether or not the confirmation of sale executed by Antonio in favor of Luisa existed; and

Ruling:

The Court ruled in favor of Lim and declared that the petition has no merit.

Action for cancellation of title is not an attack on the title. The attack is direct when the objective is to
annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or
collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made
as an incident thereof. Lim was asserting only that the existing title registered in the name of the
petitioners predecessors had become inoperative due to the conveyance in favor of Lim’s mother, and
resultantly should be cancelled. Lim did not thereby assail the validity of OCT or challenge the judgment
by which the title of the lot involved had been decreed.

Prescription was not relevant. Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or losing ownership and
other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law.
However, prescription was not relevant to the determination of the dispute herein, considering that Lim
did not base his right of ownership on an adverse possession over a certain period. He insisted herein,
instead, that title to the land had been voluntarily transferred by the registered owners themselves to
Luisa, his predecessor-in-interest. Lim showed that his mother had derived a just title to the property by
virtue of sale; that from the time Luisa had acquired the property in 1937, she had taken over its
possession in the concept of an owner, and had performed her obligation by paying real property taxes
on the property, as evidenced by tax declarations issued in her name; and that in view of the delivery of
the property, coupled with Luisa’s actual occupation of it, all that remained to be done was the issuance
of a new transfer certificate of title in her name.

70 Radiowealth Finance vs Palileo 197 SCRA 245 Julo,

Ma.Victoria
Facts:

The defendant spouses Enrique Castro and Herminia R. Castro sold to plaintiff-appellee Manuelito
Palileo (private respondent herein), a parcel of unregistered coconut land. The sale is evidenced by a
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. The deed was not registered in the Registry of Property for
unregistered lands. Since the execution of the deed of sale, appellee Manuelito Palileo exercised acts of
ownership over the land through his mother Rafaela Palileo, as administratrix or overseer. Appellee has
continuously paid the real estate taxes on said land from 1971 until the present.

In another civil case, a judgment was rendered against Enrique Castro and was directed by the RCT to
pay Radiowealth Finance Company. A writ of execution was issued. The Provincial Sheriff sold at public
auction the subject land that defendant Enrique Castro had sold to appellee Manuelito Palileo. A
certificate of sale was executed by the Provincial Sheriff in favor of defendant- appellant Radiowealth
Finance Company, being the only bidder. After the period of redemption has expired, a deed of final sale
was also executed by the same Provincial Sheriff. Both the certificate of sale and the deed of final sale
were registered with the Registry of Deeds.

The Private respondent Manuelito Palileo filed an action for quieting of title over the same. After a trial
on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision in his favor. On appeal, the decision of the trial court
was affirmed.

Issue:

As between the two buyers of unregistered land, who is the rightful owner (the first buyer in a prior sale
that was unrecorded, or the second buyer who purchased the land in an execution sale whose transfer
was registered in the Registry of Deeds)?

Ruling:
Palileo has the better right over the land.

There is no doubt that had the property in question been a registered land, this case would have been
decided in favor of petitioner since it was petitioner that had its claim first recorded in the Registry of
Deeds. It must be stressed however that this case deals with a parcel of unregistered land and a
different set of rules applies. The Court affirm the decision of the CA. Under Act No. 3344, registration of
instruments affecting unregistered lands is “without prejudice to a third party with a better right”. The
aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in one’s
favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land
having previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. It was held
therein that Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to land not registered under Act No. 496.
Section 35, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the Court held that Article 1544 of the Civil Code
cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though the latter was a buyer in good
faith and even if this second sale was registered. It was explained that this is because the purchaser of
unregistered land at a sheriffs execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and
merely acquires the latter's interest in the property sold as of the time the property was levied upon.
Applying this principle, the CA correctly held that the execution sale of the unregistered land in favor of
petitioner is of no effect because the land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time of
the said execution sale. Findings of fact of the CA are conclusive on this Court and will not be disturbed
unless there is grave abuse of discretion. The finding of the CA that the property in question was already
sold to private respondent by its previous owner before the execution sale is evidenced by a deed of
sale. Said deed of sale is notarized and is presumed authentic. There is no substantive proof to support
petitioner’s allegation that the document is fictitious or simulated. There is no reason to reject the
conclusion of the CA that private respondent was not a mere administrator of the property. That he
exercised acts of ownership through his mother also remains undisputed.

71 Bernabe vs Court of Appeals 559 SCRA 53 7/21/2008 Julo,

Ma.Victoria
Facts:

Titan Construction Corporation filed a case before the RTC against petitioners predecessor-in-interest,
Antonio F. Bernabe, and his siblings Patricio F. Bernabe, Jose F. Bernabe and Cecilia Bernabe Perez who
are co-owners of an undivided one-half share in two parcels of land located in Paranaque. The Deed of
Sale of Real Estate is entered into by Titan and the defendants.

A compromise agreement was subsequently entered into by Titan and the remaining defendants,
whereby the latter agreed to the sale of their one-half share in the properties to Titan and waived
whatever cause of action for damages they might have against each other. By virtue of the compromise
agreement, similar Deeds of Conditional Sale were separately entered into by respondent Titan as
vendee, and defendants Patricio, Cecilia, and Antonio, as vendors of their undivided shares in the two
properties. The three deeds were similarly worded and contained the same terms and conditions and
differed only as to the amount of the purchase price.

Defendant Jose and Antonio died. Titan subsequently filed a supplemental complaint alleging that
Antonio had already received a substantial portion of the down payment for the sale of his share in the
properties; that prior to his death, Antonio executed a SPA in favor of his two children, Jose III and
Shirley Ann, empowering them to execute in his favor the Deed of Conditional Sale involving his share in
the properties; that on the basis of the deed, it made additional substantial advances on the purchase
price and even expended certain amounts to satisfy the judgment debt of Antonio in Civil Case No. 92-
2328; that the heirs of Antonio refused to execute the formal deed of sale; and that through its exclusive
efforts, the one-half share of the original defendants in both properties was segregated and TCT No.
86793 covering the same was subsequently issued.

The trial court upheld the validity of both the Deed of Sale of Real Estate and the Deed of Conditional
Sale. It held that there was no basis to rescind the contracts since petitioners had not proven that Titan
had failed to comply with its undertaking under them. The RTC modified the decision, specifying that in
view of the compromise agreements entered into by Titan and defendants Patricio and Cecilia, the
decision should be rendered against the heirs of Antonio. Accordingly, said heirs were ordered to
execute a registrable Deed of Absolute Sale over the one-third (1/3) share of Antonio in the property
covered by TCT No. 86793 of the Register of Deeds of Paranaque, pursuant to the Deed of Conditional
Sale, upon Titans payment to them of the amount of P3,431,058.42 representing the balance of the
purchase price.

Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was dismissed in the Decision
dated 22 January 2002, and the RTC decision was affirmed in toto.

Petitioners, contending that the Deed of Sale of Real Estate and Deed of Conditional Sale are contracts
to sell and not contracts of sale, allege that Titan has no cause of action to file the complaint for specific
performance since it failed to pay the purchase price in full as agreed upon in the contracts. The Deed of
Conditional Sale, which necessarily superseded and nullified the Deed of Sale of Real Estate, expressed
this intent more clearly when it stated that upon full payment of the purchase price, Vendor shall
execute the necessary Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Vendee transferring and conveying all his
undivided shares in the properties.

Titan dismisses petitioners’ claim. Instead, it relies on the declaration of the Court of Appeals that there
was a perfected contract of sale of real estate evidenced by the Deed of Sale of Real Estate. However,
Titan expounds, said contract was not in the form required for registration under the law and so the
courts below, in affirming it and requiring petitioners to execute a registerable deed, simply followed
the provisions of the Civil Code governing the form of contracts, particularly Articles 1356, 1357 and
1358. Titan adds that it is only upon the execution of a registerable deed of sale that full payment of the
consideration should be made, and that since the contract still has to be put in a registerable form as
required by law, there is nothing yet to rescind.

Issues:

(1) Under a deed of conditional sale of a parcel of land, may the vendee compel the vendors to
execute a registerable deed of sale based on the allegation that it had paid a substantial portion of the
P1 million down payment of the total consideration of P17,700,000.00, where it was expressly stipulated
that the vendors would execute the necessary deed of absolute sale in favor of the vendee only upon
full payment?

(2) May the vendors in a deed of conditional sale ask for rescission of contract for failure of the
vendee to pay in full the agreed consideration?
Ruling:

The petition is denied. Respondent Titan Construction Corporation is ORDERED to PAY petitioners Heirs
of Antonio F. Bernabe and petitioners are ORDERED to ACCEPT the payment and thereupon EXECUTE
the proper deed of absolute sale. Both parties are ORDERED to COMPLY with the other stipulations in
the Deed of Conditional Sale.

Ratio:

No. Petitioners cannot ask for rescission of the Deed of Conditional Sale since it has been proven that far
from violating the conditions of the deed, Titan was ready and willing to perform its contractual
obligations. That the balance had not yet become due and demandable is a result of the appeal from the
RTC and CA decisions, and is not due to Titans alleged refusal to comply with the contract. Accordingly,
the Deed of Conditional Sale remains valid, but petitioners cannot be compelled by specific performance
to execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of Titan until and unless Titan settles the balance of the
purchase price as agreed upon.

The whole essence of a compromise is that by making reciprocal concessions, the parties avoid litigation
or put an end to one already commenced. A compromise agreement can be entered into without
novating or supplanting existing contracts, but in this case, the irreconcilable incompatibility between
the Deed of Sale of Real Estate and the Deed of Conditional Sale inevitably resulted in extinctive
novation.

The difference between contracts of sale and contracts to sell is relevant. In a contract of sale, the title
to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; in a contract to sell, ownership
is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the
purchase price. Otherwise stated, in a contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership over the property
and cannot recover it until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell,
title is retained by the vendor until full payment of the price. In the latter contract, payment of the price
is a positive suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevents the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective.

Titan has a cause of action since it has already partially performed the contract by making down and
other payments on the purchase price, as well as effecting and spending for the segregation and titling
of the shares of petitioners and their co-owners in the properties. Titan seeks only to enforce the
contract. The first condition, i.e., that Eriberta Development Corporation must agree to make the
vendors share pertain to the northern half of the properties, was deemed fulfilled with the segregation
and titling of the interests of Antonio, Patricio and Cecilia under TCT No. 86793. The separation of the
property was registered on 12 October 1994, just a few months after the parties executed the Deed of
Conditional Sale. With the segregation of the property and the issuance of TCT No. 86793, the fourth
condition, i.e., that the titles to the properties be surrendered to Titan, was also satisfied since the
segregation would not have transpired had the old titles not been surrendered. The second condition
involving the co-owners waiver of their right of first refusal was also complied with, as evidenced by
similar declarations in the deeds of conditional sale executed by Patricio and Cecilia. It is only the third
condition the acquisition of a right of way over the northern part of the propertythat had not yet been
fulfilled at the time of the filing of the supplemental complaint. It was on the basis of the fulfillment of
all the conditions that the RTC ordered the execution of the registerable deed of sale but only upon
Titans payment of the balance. But since the trial courts decision was appealed all the way to this Court,
it could not attain finality and execution could not be ordered. In short, the pendency of the appeal put
resolution of the controversy on hold.

72 Egao vs CA 174 SCRA 484 1989 Manuel, Maurice Victoria

Facts:

The private respondents filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and and/or Recovery of Possesion and
Ownership. They alleged that they are the legitimate owners and possessors of two parcels of land Lot
662 and Lot 661 through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Marfori in favor of the respondents, the
Tax Declarations were transferred to them. Marfori acquired the properties from Egao through a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated May 7, 1964, January 14 and October 6, 1965 while the Lot 661 is from Conejos
to Marfori by Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 3, 1965. The private respondents also alleged that the
petitioners occupied illegally portions of the land, hence this complaint.

The petitioners alleged that the Lot No. 662 is covered by Free Patent dated August 12, 1965 and the
OCT No. P-3559 was issued March 1, 1966 in the name of Apolonio Egao, that he and his family has been
occupying the land even before the free patent was issued. They are aware that the land cannot be a
subject of the sale since it is still under the five year prohibition period. Petitioners likewise deny the
authenticity of the Deeds of sale to Marfori.

Issue:

Whether the sale of patented lands perfected within the prohibited five (5) year period is null and void.

Held/Ratio:

Yes.

In the Section 118 of the Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, prohibits the alienation or
encumbrance within a period of five (5) years from the date of issuance of the patent lands acquired
under free patent or homestead; In the present case, it is clear that the deeds were executed within the
prohibited period of 5 years. The free patent was issued August 12, 1965 and the Deeds of Sale were
executed May 24, 1964, January 4 and October 6, 1965, assuming the authenticity of the said Deeds of
Sale still it is considered within the prohibited period. Therefore, no title passed from the Egaos to
Marfori which could be validly transferred to herein respondents Bontilao and Dignos.

73 Soliven vs Franciso 170 SCRA 218 1989 Manuel, Maurice

Victoria
Facts:

Petitioners are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Davao as evidenced by TCT No. T-10985. They
alleged that Tompong and Ngoho obtained an agreement to sell the property to certain Espinosa from
Masbate for P60,000.00. Tompong and Ngoho gave a partial payment of P10,000.00 and persuaded the
petitioners to give them the Certificate of Title of the property and promised that the sale will be
consummated and the balance will be paid within six months, however they never returned to make
good their promise.
A number of Deed of Sales were executed in favor of different persons, such as Atty. Mapayo and
Paulino Cagas. The Deeds were supported by a power of attorney constituting the fact that Ngoho is
appointed as an Attorney-in-fact of the Solivels. The said power attorney was allegedly forged. Cagas,
one of the buyers, obtained the cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Solivels
and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title in his name. Upon the knowledge of the Solivels, they
procured an inscription of an adverse claim on the title.

Issue:

Whether the title to the real property is passed to an innocent purchaser by a deed of sale in his favor
executed in the name of the owners by one falsely claiming to be said owners’ duly appointed and
authorized attorney-in-fact.

Held/Ratio:

No.

The innocent purchaser for value protected by the law is one who purchases a titled land by virtue of a
deed of sale executed by the registered owner himself and not by virtue of a forged deed. It is also ruled
the case of Joaquin vs Madrid that, in order that the holder of a certificate for value issued by a virtue of
the registration of a voluntary instrument may be considered a holder in good faith for value, the
instrument registered should not be forged. When the instrument presented is forged, even if
accompanied by the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his
title and neither does the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the property.

Therefore, the deed of sale of September 8, 1972 executed by Isaias Ngoho as purported attorney-in-
fact of the petitioners in favor of Cags is declared null and void.

74 Llanto vs Alzona 450 SCRA 288 1/31/2005 Manuel, Maurice

Victoria
Facts:

Bernardo and Maria Sales are spouses and they have twelve children, 11 of whom are the petitioners
while the remaining child Estela is one of the herein respondents. Maria was the registered owner of a
certain parcel of land covered with Original Certificate of Title No. P-3225 which she acquired under a
Free Patent. On January 29, 1990, a real estate mortgage contract whom Estela is a witness, was
executed in favor of herein respondent Dominador Alzona. Maria died on August 27, 1986 which shows
that Maria was not the one who executed the said Real Estate Mortgage.

The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed due to the mortgagors’ failure to settle their obligation.
Ernesto Alzona was the highest bidder and caused the cancellation of the OCT in the name of Maria and
acquired a Transfer Certificate of Title in his name. Upon the knowledge of the said cancellation of OCT,
the petitioners caused the inscription of an adverse claim on the title of the property. They alleged that
the Real Estate Mortgage was not executed by the owner of the property hence it is void, while the
respondents alleged that they mortgagee in good faith.

Issue:

Whether Dominador is a mortgagee in good faith to validly transfer the title to the highest bidder.
Held/Ratio:

Yes.

The mortgagee is considered as a mortgagee in good faith. Under this doctrine, even if the mortgagor is
not the owner of the mortgaged property, the mortgage contract and any foreclosure sale arising
therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy. The principle is based on the rule that all persons
dealing with property covered by a Torrents Certificate of Title, as buyers or mortgagees; are not
required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title and in the absence of any sign that might
arouse suspicion, the mortgagee has no obligation to undertake further investigation. However, those
persons who are engaged in real estate or financing business like herein respondents Ernesto and
Dominador to be considered as mortgagees in good faith, jurisprudence requires that they should take
the necessary precaution expected of a prudent man to ascertain the status and condition of the
properties offered as a collateral and to verify the identity of the persons they transact business with,
particularly those who claim to be the registered property owners.

In the present case, Ernesto sufficiently established that he acted in good faith in exercising due
diligence in ascertaining the status of the property by visiting the property and he also identify the
owners and occupants, it was Estela and the persons represented themselves as Bernardo and Maria
who perpetrated the fraud, hence Ernesto and Dominador are mortgagees in good faith and are entitled
to the protection of the law.

75 LP Leviste vs Noblejas 89 SCRA 520 4/30/1979 Geologo, Noel

Paolo
FACTS:

This involves property with a total area of 1.6 hectares which is situated in Paranaque, Rizal, covered by
a Transfer certificate in the name of Z. Garcia Realty, Inc converted the property into a subdivision called
the Garville subdivision. Blocks and certain lots are the controversy specifically Lot 6, Block 4
(subsequently Lot 16, plan (LRC) Psd-56800).

Notice of lis pendens was presented by Melecio B. Emata, noting the pendency of Civil Case of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal entitled Vivencio R. de Guzman vs. Z. Garcia & Company referring specifically to
Lot 3, redesignated as Lot 5 of the new subdivision plan.

The lis pendens does not refer to Lot 6, Block 4.

Affidavit of Adverse Claim covering Lot 1, Block 5 presented by J. Antonio Leviste, Executive Vice
President of petitioner company, based on an assignment in his favor by one Leticia P. Ramos, buyer of
said lot from Garcia Realty.

No reference to Lot 6, Block 4.

Affidavit of Adverse covering Lot 6, Block 4 (subsequently Lot 16, plan (LRC) Psd 56800), consisting
presented by respondent Maria Villanueva based on an agreement to sell in her favor executed by
Garcia Realty. (Disputed Lot)

Attachment (Disputed Lot) was presented by Leviste & Co and participation with Garcia Realty, Inc.
Attachment(Disputed Lot) and participation of the defendants of Z.

Garcia Realty and respondent Villanueva consummated a contract of sale over the Disputed Lot.

Respondent Villanueva sought to have the sale registered and title issued in her favor, free of any
encumbrance, but petitioners Leviste and Berthelsen objected alleging that they had registered adverse
claims and attachments.

The Register of Deeds refused to issue a new title to Villanueva without carrying over

(A) Two annotations registered prior to Villanueva's adverse claim,

(B) Attachments covering the entire property annotated on the title subsequent to Villanueva's adverse
claim

ISSUE:

Whether Villanueva's adverse claim is, in fact, registerable, and if so, whether it can be preferred over
the attachments.

HELD:

No, Villanueva merely filed an adverse claim based on said agreement to sell considering that Section 62
of the Land Registration Act prescribes the procedure for the registration of Villanueva's interest less
than an estate in fee simple on the disputed lot and there being no showing of her inability to produce
the owner's duplicate certificate, the remedy provided in Section 110 of Act 496, which was resorted to
by Villanueva, is, therefore, ineffective for the purpose of protecting her right or interest on the disputed
lot.

Adverse claim filed by Villanueva was not valid, the same did not have the effect of a conveyance of her
right or interest on the disputed lot and could not prejudice any right that may have arisen thereafter in
favor of third parties. Consequently, the attachments of Berthelsen, Leviste, and that in Civil Case No.
2489-P of the Court of First Instance of Rizal covering the disputed lot are superior to that acquired by
Villanueva and will have to be carried over to the new title to be issued in her favor.

Thus, Section of Act 496 provides that:

If at the time of any transfer there appear upon the registration book encumbrances or claims adverse
to the title of the registered owner, they shall be stated in the new certificate or certificates, except so
far as they may be simultaneously released or discharged

76 LBP vs Republic 543 SCRA 453 2/4/2008 Geologo, Noel Paolo

FACTS:

OCT No. P-2823 was issued on September 26, 1969 in favor of one Angelito C. Bugayong. The mother
title came from Sales Patent No. 4576 issued in Bugayongs name which covers a parcel of land located in
Bocana, Kabacan, Davao city. It was originally identified and surveyed as marshy and under water during
high tide, it used to be a portion of a dry river bed near the mouth of Davao River.
The land was subdivided into 4 lots initially. Bugayong sold all the 4 lots to different persons. 2 of the
lots was sold to Spouses Du. The previous TCT under the name of Bugayong was cancelled then
registered to spouses Du.

Spouses Du sold one lot to spouses Felix and Guadalupe Dayola.

Du spouses TCT was cancelled and was replaced by another TCT registered in the name of Lourdes
Farms, Inc which is the subject of this case.

Lourdes Farms, Inc mortgaged this property to petitioner LBP.

Some residents of the land it covered, particularly along Bolton Diversion Road, filed a formal petition
before the Bureau of Lands.

Investigation and ocular inspection were conducted on the subject land.

They found that:

(1)Sales Patent No. 4576 was issued to Bugayong, the land it covered was still within the forest zone,
classified under Project No. 1, LC-47; it was released as alienable and disposable land only on March 25,
1981

(2) the land was marshy and covered by sea water during high tide;

(3) Bugayong was never in actual possession of the land.

Bureau of Lands resolved that the sales patent in favor of Bugayong was improperly and illegally issued
and that the Director of Lands had no jurisdiction to dispose of the subject land.

Upon recommendation of the Bureau of Lands, the Republic of the Philippines represented by the
Director of Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), instituted a complaint before the
RTC in Davao for the cancellation of patent and reversion of the land covered by OCT No. P-2823 into
the mass of public domain.

The complaint, as amended, was filed against Bugayong and other present owners and mortgagees of
the land, such as Lourdes Farms, Inc. and the latters mortgagee, petitioner LBP.

The mother Title, OCTP-2823 in the name of defendant Bugayong was issued at a time when the area
was not yet released by the Bureau of Forestry to the Bureau of Lands.

The area covered by OCT No. P. 2823 was not yet declared by the Bureau of Lands alienable and
disposable when the said OCT was issued.

ISSUE:

Whether CA erred in not finding that petitioner Land Bank of The Philippines mortgage right and interest
as an innocent purchaser (mortgagee) for value and in good faith over the subject land is valid and
subsisting in accordance with the law and existing jurisprudence in our country.

HELD:

No, LBP has no valid and subsisting mortgagees interest over the land
It has been established and admitted by LBP that:

(1) the subject land mortgaged to it by Lourdes Farms, Inc. is covered by TCT No. T-57348; and

(2) the said TCT is derived from OCT No. P-2823 issued to Bugayong

It was ascertained the land it covered was still within the forest zone. It was declared as alienable and
disposable only on March 25, 1981.

The mortgagor, Lourdes Farms, Inc. from which LBP obtaining its alleged interest has never been the
owner of the mortgaged land. Acquisition of the subject land by Lourdes Farms, Inc. is legally impossible
as the land was released as alienable and disposable only on March 25, 1981. Hence, LBP acquired no
rights over the land. Since Lourdes Farms, Inc. is not the owner of the land, it does not have the capacity
to mortgage it to LBP.

77 St Dominic Corporation vs IAC 151 CRA 577 1987 Geologo,

Noel Paolo
FACTS:

Two decisions of the appellate court are involved in this case

1 ) Court of Appeals rendered a decision in an action for specific performance filed by the private
respondents against the St. Dominic Corporation

2) Promulgated by the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court in an action to set aside an order of
the Regional Trial Court directing receipt in consignation of the amount ordered to be paid by the Court
of Appeals in its 1981 decision

Private respondents Constantino B. Acosta and Eva Acosta signed a Land Purchase Agreement wherein
herein Petitioner St. Dominic Corporation sold to the former Lot No. 1-A, S-2, Block 8, covered by T.C.T.
No. 842,00, Quezon City.

The Acostas were about 7 months in money debt of the corresponding monthly payments due, when
they sent to the St. Dominic Corp. two separate money orders on. These payments were rejected by the
St. Dominic Corporation in a letter sent to the Acostas by its Corporate Secretary because their contract
had been cancelled said Corporate Secretary had sent to the Private Respondents herein a letter
informing the latter that their contract had been cancelled one month after their final notice, and that
postal money order sent by the Acostas were sent back to them.

Private Respondents Acostas instituted in the then CFI of Manila an action against the St. Dominic
Corporation to compel the latter to accept payment of the lot in question. Later a decision was rendered
in said case adverse to the Acostas.

Acostas appealed the same to the then Court of Appeals. The CA rendered its decision, setting aside the
decision of the CFI of Manila.

The petitioner corporation sought reconsideration of the appellate court's decision.

ISSUE:
Whether IAC erred in not finding that it is legally impossible for the petitioner, without its fault, to
transfer to the Acostas the title to land in question, it having been transferred to a third party.

HELD:

The respondents did not have a notice of lis pendens annotated on the title of the property during the
whole time that said property was in litigation.

A notice of lis pendens in an announcement to the whole world that a particular piece of real property is
in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so on his
own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.

Since the private respondents failed to file such notice, the subsequent purchaser for value cannot be
prejudiced by the outcome of the litigation and in the absence of proof of any fraud on his part, such
purchaser is presumed to have acquired his title in good faith and for a valuable consideration. The rule
is elementary that fraud is not presumed. Private respondents were given by the Court of Appeals only
until December 29, 1981 to pay the remaining balance of unpaid installments. Actual consignment was
made on October 25, 1982 or almost ten (10) months late.

Innocent third party who has the title to the land and who has built a residence on it should be
respected and protected in his possession and ownership. The petitioner should, however, pay damages
to the private respondents after returning all amounts it has received from them.

78 Maglaque vs Planters 307 SCRA 156 5/17/1999 Ong, Gecel

Facts:

A real estate mortgage was executed to secure a loan obtained by the spouses Sabina and Egmidio
Maglaque from Bulacan Development Bank now known as Planters Development Bank. After the death
of Sabina, partial payment was made by Egmidio which the Bank accepted. However, the real estate
mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed for non-payment in full of the loan. Title was consolidated in the
name of the bank as the highest bidder. The defendant-Bank contends that the formalities provided for
by law were duly observed while the plaintiff claims that there was no such compliance. After the lapse
of the redemption period, the bank consolidated its title to the property, and became its registered
owner. Thereafter, petitioners, heirs of the spouses, filed a complaint for annulment of sale,
reconveyance of title, with damages, and injunction. The bank sold the property to the spouses Angel S.
Beltran and Erlinda C. Beltran, for thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos. The plaintiff amended the
complaint twice to implead the other heirs of the spouses Maglaque, and defendant Beltran spouses,
the buyers of the property in question.

Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the bank should have filed its claim
in the settlement of estate of the deceased mortgagor.

Issue:

Whether the Bank should have filed its claim in the settlement of estate of the deceased mortgagors

Ruling:
No. The rule is that a secured creditor holding a real estate mortgage has three options in case of death
of the debtor. These are:

(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an
ordinary claim;

(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and

(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at anytime before it is barred by
prescription, without right to file a claim for any deficiency.

Obviously, respondent bank availed itself of the third option.

79 Nagtalon vs UCPB 172504 7/31/2013 Ong, Gecel

Facts:

Spouses Nagtalon entered into a credit agreement with respondent UCPB. To secure the credit, Spouses
Nagtalon executed real estate mortgage over several properties. Upon failure to pay, the mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed and sold at public auction to UCPB as highest bidder. With the petitioner’s
failure to exercise her right to redeem the properties, UCPB consolidated the ownership over the
properties and TCTs in the name of UCPB were issued. Thereafter, UCPB filed an ex parte petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC. The petitioner opposed the petition, citing mainly the
pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of foreclosure, etc. Petitioner argued that the issuance
of a writ of possession was no longer a ministerial duty on the part of the court in view of the pendency
of the case.

Issue:

Whether the pendency of a civil case challenging the validity of the credit agreement, the promissory
notes and the mortgage can bar the issuance of a writ of possession after the foreclosure and sale of the
mortgaged properties and the lapse of the one-year redemption period.

Ruling:

No. The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial function of the
court, which cannot be enjoined or restrained, even by the filing of a civil case for the declaration of
nullity of the foreclosure and consequent auction sale. Once title to the property has been consolidated
in the buyer's name upon failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property within the one-year
redemption period, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right belonging to the buyer.
Consequently, the buyer can demand possession of the property at anytime. Its right to possession has
then ripened into the right of a confirmed absolute owner and the issuance of the writ becomes a
ministerial function that does not admit of the exercise of the court's discretion. The court, acting on an
application for its issuance, should issue the writ as a matter of course and without any delay. (Sections
6 and 7 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118)

There are however exceptions to the rule that issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function,
as follows:

1. Gross inadequacy of purchase price

2. Third party claiming right adverse to debtor/mortgagor

3. Failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale to mortgagor

The petitioner's case does not fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

80 Labora vs Dayanghirang 37 SCRA 346 1/30/1971

(SUPRA)

81 Republic vs Aquino 120 SCRA 186 1/27/1983

(SUPRA)

82 Republic vs TAN Properties INC 555 SCRA 477 6/26/2008

(SUPRA)

83 Nieto vs Quines 1 SCRA 2271/28/1961

(SUPRA)

84 Register of Deeds vs RTC of Malabon 181 SCRA 788 2/5/1990

Ong, Gecel
Facts:

A Deed of Absolute Sale of a property covered by TCT No. R-3899 in the name of Salome Castillo in favor
of Jose M. Castillo, was presented to the Register of Deeds (Atty. Francisco Romero) in Caloocan City for
registration. It could not be given due course because the original of said TCT No. R-3899 in the Registry
of Deeds was missing. As the missing title covered a parcel of land in Malabon, Atty. Gaudencio Cena,
the Register of Deeds for Malabon, filed in the RTC of Malabon, a verified petition for reconstitution of
the original of TCT No. R-3899. The court directed that a copy of its order setting it for hearing on August
17, 1988 be published in 2 consecutive issues of the Official Gazette as provided in Section 9 of Republic
Act No. 26. However, the certificate of publication issued by the Director of the National Printing Office
stated that the order of the court was published in the May 23 and May 30, 1988 issues of the Official
Gazette and that the May 30, 1988 issue was released for circulation on October 3, 1988 (i.e., 47 days
after the date set for hearing). The RTC of Malabon dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction because
the notice of the petition was not published in the Official Gazette "at least 30 days prior to the date of
hearing which had been set on August 17, 1988.

Issue:

a. Whether the actual publication of the notice of the petition in the Official Gazette 47 days after
the hearing, instead of "at least 30 days prior to the date of hearing" was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in
the court to hear and determine the petition.

b. Whether the Register of Deeds of Malabon is the proper party to file the petition for
reconstitution

Ruling:
a. No, it did not. The purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in
the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is
minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within 30 days before the date set by the court for
hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the
case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Where there is a defect in the
publication of the petition, such defect deprives the court of jurisdiction.

b. No. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 26, which allowed the Register of Deeds to motu proprio
reconstitute a lost or destroyed certificate of title from its corresponding owner's duplicate certificate,
was expressly repealed or declared to be "inoperative" by Section 6 of Republic Act 6732, approved on
July 17, 1989. A petition for reconstitution may now be filed only by "the registered owner, his assigns,
or any person who has an interest in the property" (Section 12, Republic Act No. 26).

85 Tahanan Development vs CA 118 SCRA 273 11/15/1982 Orquia,

Basil Ian
Facts:

The records of the case show that on October 5, 1977, private respondent hereinafter referred to as the

Pascuals, claiming as intestate heirs of Manuela Aquial who died on January 26, 1967, filed a petition for
judicial reconstitution of lost certificate of title under Republic Act No. 26 docketed as Reconstitution
Case No. 504P, Land Registration Case No. 9368 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Manuela Aquial,
the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, was the registered owner of those contiguous lands, Lots 2 and
4 San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal now, Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal. The private respondents said that
original certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copies, covering said lands have been lost or
destroyed in the last World War II and diligent efforts to locate the same have been all in vain; that said
title was subsisting and in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, free from liens and encumbrances
of any kind and nature up to the present; that there is no record of any sales patent, sales certificate or
any land grant over said lands to any person or entity; that no Co-owner's, Mortgagee's, Lessee's or any
lien holder's copy of said Original Certificate of Title have ever been issued.

Issue:

Whether the petition for reconstitution should be granted.

Ruling:

The Court denied the petition for reconstitution. The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
petition for reconstitution.

Rationale:

Republic Act No. 26 entitled "An act providing a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens
Certificates of Title lost or destroyed" approved on September 25, 1946 confers jurisdiction or authority
to the Court of First Instance to hear and decide petitions for judicial reconstitution. The Act specifically
provides the special requirements and mode of procedure that must be followed before the court can
properly act, assume and acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grant the reconstitution
prayed for. These requirements and procedure are mandatory. The Petition for Reconstitution must
allege certain specific jurisdictional fact and the notice of hearing must be published in the Official
Gazette and posted in particular places and the same sent or notified to specified persons. Sections 12
and 13 of the Act provide specifically the mandatory requirements and procedure to be followed.

These sections state as follows:

Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c),

3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered
owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain,
among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost
or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's, mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had
been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed: (c) the location, area and boundaries of the property;
(d) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the
owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e)
the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of
the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed
description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or
other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the
registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies
thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached
thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from
sources enumerated in section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a
plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of the
covering the same property.

Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published,
at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on
the main entrance of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at the provincial building and
of the municipal building at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a
copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every
person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said
notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known,
the name of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property,
the owners of the adjoining properties and an other interested parties, the location, area and
boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear
and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall at the hearing, submit proof of the
publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.

As the Court have earlier quoted in fun the petition for reconstitution in Reconstitution Case No. 504P
and substantially the Notice of Hearing issued by the court published in the Official Gazette together
with the Certification of Posting by the Deputy Sheriff, it would not be a difficult task to check and verify
whether the strict and mandatory requirements of Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26 have been
faithfully complied with by therein petitioners Pascuals, now the private respondents here.
Upon a cursory reading of both the petition for reconstitution and the notice of hearing, it is at once
apparent that Tahanan has not been named, cited or indicated therein as the owner, occupant or
possessor of property adjacent to Lot 2, title to which is sought to be reconstituted. Neither does the
petition and the notice state nor mention that Tahanan is the occupant or possessor of a portion of said
Lot 2. The result of this omission or failure is that Tahanan was never notified of the petition for
reconstitution and the hearings or proceedings therein.

We also find that the Notice of Hearing directed that copies thereof be posted only in the bulletin board
of the Court of First Instance of Pasay City and no more, whereas the law specifically require that the
notice of the petition shall be posted on the main entrance of the municipality or city on which the land
is situated, at the provincial building and at the municipal building at least 30 days prior to the date of
hearing. In the instant case as certified to by Deputy Sheriff Arsenio C. de Guzman, the Notice of Hearing
was posted on the bulletin board of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch located at the
Hall of Justice, City Hall Building, Pasay City. Evidently, the Notice of Hearing was not posted at the main
entrance of the provincial building in Pasig, Rizal. It was not posted at the main entrance of the
municipal building of Muntinlupa where the land is now comprised in Barrio Cupang, or at least in the
municipal building of Paranaque where Barrio San Dionisio was then embraced.

86 Alabang Development vs Valenzuela 116 SCRA 261 8/20/1982

Orquia, Basil Ian
Facts:

The petition for certiorari and prohibition filed against the order of reconstitution alleges that the
petitioners are registered owners as evidenced by certain Transfer Certificates of Title issued by the
Register of Deeds of Rizal covering parcels of land located at Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa. The parcels of
land surrounded by a high perimeter wall on their boundaries were sold to innocent purchasers in good
faith for valuable consideration as part of Alabang Hills Village Subdivision, owned by petitioner Alabang
Development Corporation, many of whom were already issued in turn the corresponding Transfer
Certificates of Title in their favor. These innocent purchasers for value have been in open, actual,
adverse, continuous, notorious and uninterrupted possession of their respective lands since 1969.
Petitioners alleged that in the reconstitution case below, filed only in 1977, herein respondents as
petitioners therein sought to reconstitute a lost certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copy,
allegedly lost or destroyed over 30 years earlier in the last World War II. On the basis of the technical
descriptions contained in petitioners' titles and as appear in the alleged title sought to be reconstituted,
the latter overlap the parcels of land owned by petitioners and duly registered in their name. The
petitioners alleged that being actual possessors and registered owners were not served with notice of
the hearing of the petition for reconstitution in violation of Republic Act 26 such that the court a quo
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in granting the reconstitution and that there is no appeal nor
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Issue:

Whether the petition for reconstitution should be granted. The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over t

Ruling:
The Court denied the petition for reconstitution.

Rationale:

Upon examination of the subject petition for reconstitution, the Court notes that some essential data
required in section 12 and section 13 of Republic Act 26 have been omitted: the nature and description
of the buildings or improvements, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and
addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements, and the names and addresses of the
occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all
persons who may have any interest in the property. Neither do these data appear in the Notice of
Hearing such that no adjoining owner, occupant or possessor was ever served a copy thereof by
registered mail or otherwise. And since the above data do not appear in the Amended Petition, the
same data do not also appear in the Notice of Hearing of the petition published in the Official Gazette.
Patently, the provisions of Section 12 which enumerates mandatorily the contents of the Petition for
Reconstitution and Section 13 which similarly require the contents of the Notice have not been complied
with. In view of these multiple omissions which constitute noncompliance with the above cited sections
of the Act. The Court rules that said defects have not invested the lower court with the authority or
jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as
prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all
proceedings utterly null and void.

87 Serra vs CA 195 SCRA 482 3/22/1991

(SUPRA)

88 Republic vs Ramos 169481 2/22/2010 Orquia, Basil Ian

Facts:

On February 23, 2001, respondents filed a Petition for Reconstitution before the RTC. The late Julio
Ramos, grandfather of herein respondents, is the original claimant of Lot No. 54 of the Cadastral Survey
of Orani, Bataan, as evidenced by a Relocation Plan of said lot duly approved by the Chief, Regional
Surveys Division, Ruperto P. Sawal, and the Regional Technical Director Eriberto V. Almazan.The Acting
Registrar of Deeds of Bataan likewise issued a Certification to the effect that OCT No. 3613 covering Lot
No. 54 of Orani Cadastre is not among the salvaged records of the said Registry. The owner’s copy of
OCT No. 3613 was lost and all efforts exerted to locate the same are in vain. The said Lot No. 54 is
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Julio Ramos and taxes due thereon are fully paid up to the
current year. There is no document pending registration with the Registry of Deeds of Bataan affecting
said Lot 54. Respondents prayed for the issuance of an order directing the Registrar of Deeds to
reconstitute OCT No. 3613 on the basis of the approved plan and technical description. Respondent
Reynaldo Ramos Medina, a 62year old watch technician, testified on the material allegations of the
petition. He likewise declared on the witness stand that his mother used to keep the owner’s copy of
OCT No. 3613. During the Japanese occupation, however, it was buried in a foxhole and since then it
could no longer be found. Reynaldo further testified that he and his coheirs are the present occupants of
Lot 54.

Issue:
Whether the petition for reconstitution should be granted.

Ruling:

The Court denied the petition for reconstitution. The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
petition for reconstitution.

Rationale:

RA 26 lays down the specific procedure for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed Torrens certificates of
title. It confers jurisdiction upon trial courts to hear and decide petitions for judicial reconstitution.
However, before said courts can assume jurisdiction over the petition and grant the reconstitution
prayed for, the petitioner must observe certain special requirements and mode of procedure prescribed
by law.

Perusal of respondents’ Petition for Reconstitution, for the purpose of verifying whether the strict and
mandatory requirements of RA 26, particularly Section 12 (b) and (e) thereof, have been faithfully
complied with, would reveal that it did not contain an allegation that no co-owner’s, mortgagee’s or
lessees duplicate had been issued or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed. The
petition also failed to state the names and addresses of the present occupants of Lot 54.
Correspondingly, the Notice of Hearing issued by the court a quo did not also indicate the names of the
occupants or persons in possession of Lot 54, in gross violation of Section 13 of RA 26. Because of these
fatal omissions, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over respondents’ petition. Consequently, the
proceedings it conducted, as well as those of the CA, are null and void.

89 Ragua vs CA 885211/21/1991 Sevilla, Victor Emmanuel

90 Manotok vs Barque 574 SCRA 468 12/18/2008 Sevilla, Victor

Emmanuel

91 Alipon vs CA 305 SCRA 118 Borja, Mark Joseph

92 OCA vs Matas 247 SCRA 9 Ramirez, Karen Tatiana

FACTS:

Private respondent Judgw Matas took cognizance of the petition for issuance of new duplicate copies of
OCT Nos. P-12658, P-12659, P-12661 and T-9857 filed before his Sala, notwithstanding the fact that his
court has no jurisdiction over Kapalong and Sto. Tomas Davao where the subject properties covered by
the aforesaid titles where located.

ISSUE:

Whether Judge Matas acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of Miscellaneous Case No. 1626.
HELD:

Administrative order No. 7 defines the territorial jurisdiction of RTC in Regions 1 to 12 of RTC Davao Del
Norte. Br. 1 and 2 has jurisdiction over Kapalong and Br. 4 has jurisdiction over Sto. Tomas. Branch 1 of
RTC of Davao del Norte the presided by Judge Matas has jurisdiction ocer Mis. 1626. Sec. 2 of Pd 1529
states that CFI shall have jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands
including and interest therein and over all petitions filed after original registration of title. Also, Sec. 17
of PD 1529 provides that the application for land registration shall be filed with CFI, now RTC. Of the
province or municipality where the land lies.

Petition for replacement of lost certificates as in Mis. 1626 was properly taken cognizance by Br. 1 of
RTC Davao del Norte since the petition stated that lots covered by the lost duplicate are situated in
Kapalong and Sto. Tomas which are both in the province of Davao del Norte. If at all, there was an
unwitting violatiom of Adm. Order 7 which places Kapalong within either Br. 1 or 2 and Sto. Tomas with
Br. 4. He exceeds the territorial area of his branch for at the time Mis. 1626 was filed, Sto. Tomas which
was composed of the barrios of Kapalong was not yet declared as non existent. The error consisted
merely of the impropriety of the venue of the petition.

93 New Durawood vs CA 253 SCRA 740 2/20/1996 Ramirez, Karen

Tatiana
FACTS:

Petitioner-corporation filed a petition for judicial reconstitution of the lost owner's duplicate certificates
of TCT Nos. 140486, 156454, 140485. attached thereto was an afgidavit of loss. subsequently, petitioner
discovered that the original TCTs on file with the RD were cancelled and in lieu thereof,TCTs in the name
of Durawood Corp. & Lumber Supply Inc. Were issued. Petitioner found out about the reconstitution and
filed a suit before the CA praying for the annulment of the assailed order and for the cancellation of
TCTs in the name of Durawood. CA dismissed the suit and in effect affirmed RTC order declaring TCTs
140486, 156454, 140485 null and void.

ISSUES:

1. Whether a court has jurisdiction to issue a new owner's duplicate of Torrens Certificate of Title, when
in fact, the existing owner's copy has not been lost or destroyed.

2. which law governs the issuance of new owner's duplicate certificate of title in lieu of lost ones?

HELD:

Petition was granted. The owner's duplicate of certificates of title were in the possession of the
petitioner's chairman of the board and the certificates were not in fact lost or destroyed, hence, there
was no necessity for the petition filed in the trial court for the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy of
certificate of title. The court never acquired jurisdiction to order the issuance of new certificates. Thus,
the newly issued duplicates are null and void. The remedy in case of refusal or failure of the holder to
surrender the owner's duplicate certificates of title is a petition in court to compel surrender of the
duplicate certificate to the RD and not a petition for reconstitution.
Section 109 of PD 1529 is the law applicable in petitions for issuance of a new owner's duplicate
certificate of title which was lost or stolen or destroyed. RA 26 applies only in cases of reconstitution of
lost or destroyed original certificates on file with the RD.

94 Gocheco vs CA (Republic vs. CA?) 317 SCRA 504 Ramirez,

Karen Tatiana
FACTS:

Vicente Yupangco, owner of a unit in a condiminium building in Makati, filed a petition for the issuance
of a new duplicate certificate of title in lieu of his lost copy pursuant to Sec. 109 Pd 1529. Register of
Deeds of Makati posted no objection. RTC granted the petition and the Solicitor General was furnished
with a copy of the decision. The Solicitor General moved for revonsideration on the ground that no copy
of the petition or notice had been given to him. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. The Courtb
of Appeals affirmed RTC order.

ISSUE:

Whether the Office of the solicitor General is required to be notified and be heard in a proceeding for
issuance of an owner's duplicate certificate of title.

HELD:

CA decision was affirmed. The request for representation should have come from the Register of Deeds
of Makati who was the proper party to this case; who was notified and manifested no objection to the
petition. The petition is anchored on Sec 109 Pd 1529 does not impose a notification requirement in
proceedings for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title. The lack of notice to the
Solicitor General as counsel for the Register of Deeds, was at most, only a formal and not a jurisdictional
defect.

95 Spouses Alcazar vs Arante 177042 12/10/2012 Rementina, Mary

Grace
Facts:

Petitioner Crisanto Alcazar filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Lost Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title. He alleged that the original owners were his deceased parents and he is the sole heir.
Being unknowledgeable about the procedures for transferring the title of the property in his name, he
entrusted to a group of individuals (who identified themselves as connected with the Land Registration
Authority) the owner’s duplicate of title for the transfer. However, the said group never contacted the
petitioner. The fact of its loss was reported to the Register of Deeds of Pasig by way of Affidavit of Loss.

The RTC of Pasig ruled in favor of Alcazar, declaring the owner’s duplicate copy of title null and void and
ordering the Registry of Deeds of Pasig to issue a new Owner’s Duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title
based on the original thereof on file in its office. The RTC Decision has become final and executory.

Respondent Arante filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Final Decision contending
that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain Alcazar’s petition because the subject owner’s duplicate
title was not in fact lost but actually exists. She alleged that the petitioners obtained a loan from her and
as a security, they executed a real estate mortgage over the subject property. She added that the
petitioners personally delivered and turned over the original owner’s duplicate copy of title. Due to the
failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, respondent decided to register the mortgage with the
Register of Deeds of Pasig but she was informed that the petitioners had caused to be annotated to the
copy of TCT on file, an affidavit stating the owner’s duplicate copy thereof was lost.

Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action for reconstitution filed by the petitioners.

Held/Ratio:

NO, the RTC has no jurisdiction. When the owner’s duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is
in fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted certificate is void, because the court
that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of
the original certificate. Thus, with proof and with the admission of petitioners that the owner’s duplicate
copy of the TCT was actually in the possession of respondent, the RTC Decision was properly annulled
for lack of jurisdiction.

96 Selph vs Aguilar 107 Phil. 443 3/29/1960 Rementina, Mary Grace

Facts:

The subject property was first acquired by Spouses Capule. Valentin Devilles obtained a judgment
against Spouses Capule and the latter’s right and interest to the property were levied upon which
culminated in the sale to Devilles of the land at an auction. The sale was noted on TCT No. 4610.

Capule filed Civil Case No. 2614 against Devilles wherein Capule won and, thereafter, reacquired the
land at the Sheriff's sale. Capule mortgaged the property to Manila Trading & Supply Co. to secure the
payment of 16 promissory notes.

Devilles filed Civil Case No. 3145 to annul the execution of the judgment in favor of Capule and to cancel
the Sheriff's sale. He also caused a Notice of Lis Pendens to be inscribed in Capule's certificate of title
and in the land records.

The Capules failed to pay Manila Trading and judgment having been rendered in favor of the latter, the
Sheriff sold the property at foreclosure sale. Capule's TCT was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 8578,
was issued to Manila Trading. The notice of Lis Pendens was annotated in this new TCT.

A judgment was rendered in Civil Case No. 3145 in favor of Devilles, declaring the sale in Case No. 2614
null and void and ordering the issuance of a new certificate of title in favor of Devilles. Devilles sold the
property to Spouses Aguilar and Gliceria Vda. de Aguilar, herein respondent.

Instead of surrendering the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 8578 to the Register of Deeds, as required,
Manila Trading sold the property, subject to the Lis Pendens, to Julius Reese. Reese presented to the
court a petition under Act 496 for cancellation of the annotation of lis pendens. According to him, the lis
pendens may not adversely affect him because the Supreme Court decision in Case No. 3145 was not
shown to the Register of Deeds until after 21 years, contrary to Sec. 79 of the Land Registration Law.

Issue:
Whether Reese may invoke the ground of non-enforcement and prescription of the Supreme Court
decision in Civil Case No. 3145 to bar the issuance of a new TCT in favor of respondent.

Held/Ratio:

NO. Sec. 79 does not say that if the judgment is not registered within 60 days, the notice will not be
binding. And even if it said so, the judgment will not be binding only as against persons other than the
parties to the suit. It is still binding on the parties (the Capules) and their successors (Manila Trading and
Reese), particularly because the titles of these successors bear the annotation relating to the lis
pendens.

Although action on a judgment prescribes after ten years, the period begins from the time such
judgment becomes final and no proof exists as to the date when the judgment in Case No. 3145 became
final. And then, in so far as Reese's attempt to get possession, the decision may be invoked in defense as
res judicata which does not prescribe.

Reese may not object on the ground of nonenforcement and prescription of the SC decision, because if
any one could object thereto, it was the Register of Deeds who was called upon to implement the order
of cancellation and issuance; and yet he has shown willingness to comply. It is true that in complying,
the Register is now requiring Reese in turn to surrender his title. But the latter may not properly refuse,
because he received such title from the Register upon his undertaking to respect the outcome of the
litigation, the title being expressly subject thereto, by the annotation of lis pendens.

Manila Trading’s refusal or failure to surrender the title, upon the request of the Register of Deeds, gave
Devilles’ successors the right to petition the court for appropriate orders.

97 Ligon vs CA244 SCRA 693 6/1/1995 Rementina, Mary Grace

Facts:

Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed a complaint for specific performance with damages against the Islamic
Directorate of the Philippines (IDP), alleging that by virtue of an Absolute Deed of Sale, IDP sold to it two
parcels of land, both of which IDP is the registered owner. They stipulated in the Deed that IDP shall
undertake to evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the property within 45 days from the execution
of the contract. IDP failed to fulfill its obligation hence INK prays that the trial court order IDP to comply
and to pay damages.

IDP contended that it was INK which violated the contract by delaying the payment of the purchase
price and prayed that the contract of sale be rescinded and revoked.

The trial court rendered a partial judgment, granting the reliefs prayed for by INK except damages. INK
filed a motion praying that petitioner Ligon, who was in possession of the certificates of title over the
properties, be directed to surrender the certificates to the Register of Deeds for the registration of the
Absolute Deed of Sale in its name. INK alleged that the document could not be registered because of the
refusal and/or failure of petitioner to deliver the certificates of title despite requests.

The trial court granted the motion of INK and ordered petitioner to surrender to INK the owner’s copy of
the certificates of title for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in INK’s name and the annotation
of the new mortgage executed in favor of petitioner on the new transfer certificates of title to be issued
to INK.

Issue:

Whether INK has a superior right to the possession of the owner’s copies of the certificates of title.

Held/Ratio:

YES. Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of
Deeds unless the owner’s duplicate certificate is presented together with such instrument, except in
some cases or upon order of the court for cause shown. In case the person in possession of the
duplicate certificates refuses or fails to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds so that a voluntary
document may be registered and a new certificate issued, Sec. 107, Chapter 10, of P.D. No. 1529 states:

Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates.—Where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title

pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the title of the registered owner against his
consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the
holder to surrender the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in
court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing, may order the
registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same and direct
the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If the person withholding the
duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if for any reason the outstanding
owner’s duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as
well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate and all duplicates
thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate.

Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529 eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional
trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a
cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits the change has simplified registration proceedings
by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for original
registration but also over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions.

Even while Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529 speaks of a petition which can be filed by one who wants to compel
another to surrender the certificates of title to the Registry of Deeds, this does not preclude a party to a
pending case to include as incident therein the relief stated under said section, especially if the subject
certificates of title to be surrendered are intimately connected with the subject matter of the principal
action.

The principal action filed by INK was for specific performance with damages based on a document of
sale. Such action was well within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. When IDP did not
question the genuineness and validity of said deed of sale and its obligations thereunder, the summary
judgment issued by the court granting the reliefs sought by INK was also an exercise of its general
jurisdiction. Hence, when INK filed a motion for the issuance of an order from the same court to compel
the holder of the duplicate certificates of title to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds for the
registration of the deed of sale subject of the principal action, the motion was a necessary incident to
the main case.
98 PNB vs Fernandez 61 Phil. 448 5/13/1935 Sanchez, Antonio

99 Avesta vs Caguion 146 SCRA 459 12/29/1986

100 Cuyugan vs Sy Quia 24 Phil. 567 3/27/2013 Sanchez, Antonio

101 Del Prado vs Caballero 148225 3/3/2010

102 Concepcion vs Concepcion 448 SCRA 31 1/11/2005 Sanchez,

Antonio

103 Sajonas vs CA 258 SCRA 79 7/5/1996 Taguiling, Chrislyn

Faith
Facts:

Domingo Pilares filed for collection of sum of money against Ernesto Uychocde. On June 25, 1980, a
Compromise Agreement was entered into by the parties in the said case under which Uychocde
acknowledged his monetary obligation to Pilares amounting to P27,800 and agreed to pay the same in
two years from June 25, 1980.However, Uychocde failed to comply with his undertaking in the
compromise agreement so Pilares moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the decision
based on the compromise agreement. The court granted it so Sheriff Garcia presented said notice of levy
on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same was annotated at the back of TCT
No. 79073.

Meanwhile, spouses Uychocde agreed to sell a parcel of residential land to spouses Sajonas on
installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell. On August 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the
annotation of an adverse claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject
property.Upon full payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale involving the
property in question in favor of the Sajonas couple on September 4, 1984. Hence TCT No. N79073 was
cancelled and TCT No. N109417 was issued in the name of the Sajonas couple. The notice of levy on
execution annotated by defendant sheriff was carried over to the new title. The Sajonas spouses
demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution upon Pilares but Pilares refused to cause
the cancellation of said annotation.

Issue:

Whether the adverse claim inscribed in the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N190417 still in force when
Sheriff Garcia caused the notice of levy on execution to be registered and annotated in the said title
Held:

Yes. In ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of adverse claim, we must read the law in
its entirety. Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides: “The adverse claim shall
be effective for a period of thirty daysfrom the date of registration.”

At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the adverse claim to
thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but should be read in
relation to the sentence following, which reads: “After the lapse of said period, the annotation of
adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest.”

If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse of
thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and
complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated
by mere lapse of time, the law would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act.

It should be noted that the law employs the phrase“may be cancelled,” which obviously indicates, as
inherent in its decision making power, that the court may or may not order the cancellation of an
adverse claim, notwithstanding such provision limiting the effectivity of an adverse claim for thirty days
from the date of registration. The court cannot be bound by such period as it would be inconsistent with
the very authority vested in it. A fortiori, the limitation on the period of effectivity is immaterial in
determining the validity or invalidity of an adverse claim which is the principal issue to be decided in the
court hearing. It will therefore depend upon the evidence at a proper hearing for the court to determine
whether it will order the cancellation of the adverse claim or not. To interpret the effectivity period of
the adverse claim as absolute and without qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose
for which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an
adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property
where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration
Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third
parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right
than the registered owner thereof.

Hence, the disputed inscriptions of adverse claim on the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N79073 was still
in effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff Roberto Garcia annotated the notice of levy on
execution thereto.

104 Register of Deeds vs Nicandro 111 Phil. 989 4/29/1961 Taguiling,

Chrislyn Faith
Facts:

People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) sold to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now
the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), 159 lots which were included in a larger parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 1356. Subsequently, without the knowledge of the DBP:

1) the 159 lots were segregated and a new transfer certificate of title No. 36533 covering the same
was issued;
2) that the subdivision plan segregating them was not annotated on the bigger title No. 1356; 3)
the fact that title No. 1356 was pro tanto cancelled by the new title No. 36533.

4) PHHC sold 2 parcel of lands which were among the 159 lots already sold to the appellant DBP

A month later, Honesto C. Nicandro and Elisa F. Nicandro presented to the Register of Deeds for
registration two deeds of sale executed by the PHHC in their favor yet were denied registration. Hence,
Nicandros filed affidavits of adverse claim over the two lots, which were annotated on TCT No. 3653 to
protect their right.

DBP on the other hand, discovering that the lots it had purchased are already covered by TCT No. 36533,
caused the annotation thereon of its deed of sale of October 20, 1955.

Issue:

Whether adverse claim is the right remedy for the Nicandros

Held:

No. "SEC. 110 provides that “Whoever claims any right or interest in registered land adverse to the
registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is
made in this Act for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right
or interest, and how or under whom acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate
of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed. x x
x."

In this case, Although admittedly we have here a case of double sale, actually this is not an instance of
double registration. Only the deed of sale in favor of appellant was inscribed on the certificate of title
covering the lots in question. The Nicandros were not able to register their deeds of sale; Instead,
informed of the prior registration by the DBP, they sought to protect their right by filing adverse claims
based on the said deeds of sale under Section 110 of Act496.

It is clear from the above quotation that for this special remedy (adverse claim) to be availed of, it must
be shown that there is no other provision in the law for registration of the claimant's alleged right or
interest in the property. The herein claim of the Nicandros is based on a perfected contract of sale
executed in their favor by the lawful owner of the land.

Considering that the Land Registration Act specifically prescribes the procedure for registration of a
vendee's right on a registered property, the remedy provided in Section 110. Which was resorted to and
invoked by appellees, would be ineffective for the purpose of protecting their said right or interest on
the two lots.

Furthermore, the adverse claim of the Nicandros was annotated on TCT No. 35633 only on February 17,
1959 and the sale to the DBP was registered as of January 15, 1959, the certificate of title on the two
lots in controversy should be issued in favor of the first registrant, the DBP.

105 Villaflor vs Juezan 184 SCRA 315 4/17/1990 Taguiling,

Chrislyn Faith
Facts:
On February 22, 1961 Juezan registered his affidavit of adverse claim in Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T1217 (formerly a part of Original Certificate of Title 806) under primary entry No. 26083 of the Register
of Deeds of Davao. On March 1, 1961, Juezan filed Civil Case 3496 seeking from Villaflor the surrender of
owner’s duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title T1217 in order that the deed of sale in his favor will be
registered or annotated in the certificate of title. Juezan further questioned the validity of the deed of
sale in favor of Villaflor.

More than four (4) years after Juezan’s adverse claim was annotated that is, on October 15, 1965 and
while case No. 3496 is pending, Villaflor presented for registration two (2) deeds of sale affecting the
land subject of the action, the first dated March 21, 1963 conveying 8.6186 hectares and the second
dated September 6, 1986 conveying the remaining 3.0219 hectares and as a consequence, Transfer
Certificate of Title T1217 was cancelled so Transfer Certificate of Title T7601 was issued to Villaflor
wherein the adverse claim annotated was carried on.

Issue:

Whether the adverse claim of Juarez should be cancelled

Held:

Yes. The basis of Civil Case No. 3496 is a deed of absolute sale dated July 7, 1956, allegedly executed by
Simon Maghanay in favor of Juezan. This document is also the basis of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim
ordered cancelled by the trial court. The purpose of said adverse claim is to protect the interest of the
appellant pending this litigation. Thus, considering that a notice of lis pendens had been annotated on
T.C.T. No. T7601 Vi, the Court finds no basis for maintaining the adverse claim. This Court sees no reason
for disturbing the questioned order of the trial court dated August 25, 1967 directing the cancellation of
the Juezan’s adverse claim at the back of transfer certificate of Title No. T7601. The notice of lis pendens
filed by Juezan affecting the same property in connection with Civil Case No. 3496 is sufficient.

106 Ching vs Enrile 565 SCRA 402 9/17/2008 Trinidad, Nathaniel

FACTS:

On September 5, 1985, petitioners purchased from a certain Raymunda La Fuente a 370¬-square meter
lot covered by TCT No. 83618.

_____________________________________________________________________________

La Fuente delivered to petitioners a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale with the Owner’s Duplicate
Certificate of Title and thereafter, petitioners took physical possession of the subject property.
_____________________________________________________________________________

The conveyance was not registered in the Register of Deeds as prescribed by Section 51 of PD 1529.
Instead, on November 20, 1986, petitioners executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which was recorded
and annotated at the back of TCT No. 83618 reflected in the Memorandum of Encumbrances under
Entry No. 86¬ 62262.
_____________________________________________________________________________

On August 19, 1988—three years after they purchased the disputed property, petitioners received a
Notice of Levy on Attachment and Writ of Execution issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig in
favor of respondents, in Civil Case No. 54617 entitled Sps. Adolfo Enrile and Arsenia Enrile v. Raymunda
La Fuente.

The Notice of Levy on Attachment was recorded at the dorsal portion of TCT No. 83618 under Entry No.
3433¬2 while the Writ of Execution was inscribed under Entry No. 3434¬2. Also inscribed in the TCT is
the Certificate of Sale dated January 26, 1989 covering the disputed property in favor of respondents.
_____________________________________________________________________________

Petitioners filed a Petition to Remove Cloud on or Quiet Title to Real Property asserting ownership of the
disputed property.
_____________________________________________________________________________

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners upholding the latter’s superior right over the
disputed property in view of the registration of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim prior to the Certificate of
Sale annotated in favor of respondents.
_____________________________________________________________________________

Respondents appealed to the CA, principally arguing that the RTC committed reversible error in ruling
that petitioners had a better right over the disputed property. Respondents theorized that the prior
conveyance of the disputed property made by La Fuente to petitioners being a voluntary dealing with a
registered land, mere registration of their adverse claim was insufficient. To respondents, in order to
have petitioners’ interest protected, they should have registered the Deed of Absolute Sale with the
Register of Deeds pursuant to Section 51 of PD 1529 and not merely register an adverse claim under
Section 70 of the same law. Citing the second paragraph of Section 70 which provides that an adverse
claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration, respondents insisted that
the annotated Adverse Claim of petitioners had already expired, hence, it offered no protection when
respondents acquired the disputed property through execution sale.

_____________________________________________________________________________

The CA rendered the herein challenged decision reversing that of the RTC. Even as the CA viewed the
prior sale of the disputed lot in favor of petitioners as perfected and consummated, it nonetheless
upheld respon¬dents’ preferential right over the disputed property.
_____________________________________________________________________________

The CA declared that respondents, as attaching creditors who registered the order of attachment and
the sale of the property to them as the highest bidders, acquired a valid title to the disputed property as
against petitioners who had previously bought the same property from the registered owner but failed
to register their deed of sale.
_____________________________________________________________________________

The CA further declared respondents as purchasers in good faith. On the premise that petitioners’ filing
of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim was procedurally flawed and that the annotated adverse claim had
already prescribed on December 20, 1986 after the lapse of 30 days from its registration which was
November 20, 1986, the CA ruled that it cannot be considered sufficient notice to third person like the
respondents who were not aware of the sale of the disputed lot to petitioners prior to the levy on
attachment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the adverse claim is still valid

RULING:

The adverse claim is still valid.

The Court finds that the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the annotated adverse claim
had already prescribed by the mere lapse of 30 days from its registration. The issue is no longer of first
impression. In the 1996 case of Sajonas v. Court of Appeals,we explained that a notice of adverse claim
remains valid even after the lapse of the 30 ¬day period provided by Section 70 of PD 1529. Section 70
provides:

“Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree for
registering the same, make a statement in writing, setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and
how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the registered
owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant’s residence,
and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration
as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty
days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be
cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest. Provided, however that after
cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same
claimant.”

In the same case, we held that for as long as there is yet no petition for its cancellation, the notice of
adverse claim remains subsisting: Thus:

“At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the adverse
claim to thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but should be
read in relation to the sentence following, which reads:

After the lapse of said period, the annotation of the adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing
of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest.

If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the
lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and
complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated
by mere lapse of time, the law would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act.”

In a petition for cancellation of adverse claim, a hearing must first be conducted. The hearing will afford
the parties an opportunity to prove the propriety or impropriety of the adverse claim

107 Lozano vs Ballesteros 195 SCRA 681 4/8/1991 Trinidad,

Nathaniel
FACTS:
Maria Nieves Nunez Tuazon, deceased mother of the plaintiffs, was the original registered exclusive
owner of the land in question comprising Lots Q, B and O as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No.
46076. However only Lot Q is the subject of this present action. By virtue of a deed of absolute sale,
Tuazon sold the land in question to Marciana de Dios.

________________________________________________________________________________

Augusto, Dario, Jaime, Cresencia, Lourdes and Alicia, all surnamed Lozano, together with Marciana de
Dios filed a verified petition before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan seeking the approval of the
consolidation¬subdivision plan and for the annotation of several documents at the back of the Original
Certificate of Title No. 46076.

The court approved the consolidation¬ subdivision plan and directed the inscription, among others, of
said deed of sale at the back of the title. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26537 was issued in the name of
Marciana de Dios.

________________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiffs caused the annotation of their adverse claim at the back of the title of the said lot. Thereafter,
a petition for the settlement of the estate of Augusto Lozano was filed by the plaintiffs.

________________________________________________________________________________

De Dios sold lot Q to defendant Ignacio Ballesteros and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 63171 was later
transferred in his name.

________________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiffs filed an action for reconveyance against De Dio alleging that the estate of Augusto Lozano is
the absolute owner of Lots Q, O and B.

________________________________________________________________________________

The court rendered a default decision in favor of the plaintiffs. However, the judgment was not satisfied
on the ground that De Dios was insolvent and did not have any registered property.

Having failed to effect the recovery and/or reconveyance of the lots, plaintiffs filed several complaints
before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for reconveyance and recovery of possession
________________________________________________________________________________

The trial court rendered a decision declaring defendant Ignacio Ballesteros the absolute owner of the
land in question; ordering the cancellation of plaintiffs’ adverse claim at the back of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 63171 at the expense of the plaintiffs;

Hence, plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals in its
resolution ruled that “the matter submitted for determination is purely a question of law that is beyond
the jurisdiction of this court." Thus, the records of the case were elevated to this Court.

The appellants insist that “the said adverse claim has been carried along in the subsequent titles of the
defendants.” Thus, they conclude that the consequence of this cautionary notice is that whatever would
be the result of their claim against Marciana de Dios is binding on subsequent purchasers or successors¬
in¬interest. They contend that the “defendants¬-appellees should have waited for the decision of the
court on the question of the validity of the adverse claim or should have first moved for the removal or
cancellation of the adverse claim.” Hence, appellants conclude that defendants-¬appellees are
purchasers in bad faith as they have knowledge of the claims against De Dios.

However, the appellee stresses that “a cursory examination of the adverse claim filed by the plaintiffs¬
appellants readily reveals that the same has failed to comply with the formal requirements of Section
110 of Act 496 with respect to adverse claims. And for which, and for all legal purposes, the adverse
claim under comment is not valid and effective.” Appellee argues that “there was a fatal non¬-joinder of
necessary or indispensable parties.” Thus, the position of the appellants is untenable because “the
non¬-joinder of necessary and indispensable parties renders null and void as against them any decision
in a case in which they were not made parties -litigants.” Furthermore, appellee “submits that the
protection given by the law to adverse claimants in regard to the property subject to an adverse claim is
available only to the party whose registered adverse claim meets all the formal requisites of law, and
not when the same is a nullity.”

Hence, appellee concludes that “an invalid and ineffective adverse claim cannot validly serve as a notice
or warning to third parties who may deal with the properties subject thereto because such adverse
claim by reason of its nullity is deemed not existent and unregistered.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the adverse claim is valid

RULING:

NO. The applicable law in the case at bar is still Section 110 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act despite the modification introduced by Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

The said section particularly deals with adverse claim, to wit:

“Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Act for
registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and
how or under whom acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.

“The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant’s residence, and
designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to
registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition of any party in interest, shall grant a
speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree
therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be
cancelled. If in any case the court after notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus registered was
frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double or treble costs in its discretion.”

Hence, for the purpose of registration and as required by the above quoted provision, as amended, the
following are the formal requisites of an adverse claim:

1. The adverse claimant must state the following in writing:

 a. his alleged right or interest;

b. how and under whom such alleged right or interest is acquired;

c. the description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed, and

d. the certificate of title number

2. the statement must be signed and sworn to before a notary public or other officer authorized to
administer oath; and

3. The claimant should state his residence or the place to which all notices may be served upon
him.

The lower court quoted in part the adverse claim filed by the plaintiffs, to wit:

“That this adverse claim is being filed prior to the filing of a court action because all the properties
above¬ described formerly belong to my husband, the late Augusto Lozano.”

However, the lower court noted that “the adverse claim filed and annotated on the back of the title of
Marciana de Dios and later to the title of the herein defendant, did not meet the requirements provided
for in Section 110 of Act 496, that is setting forth fully how or under whom the heirs of Lozano acquired
the property.

We adhere to the lower court’s findings and find appellee’s position meritorious. A cursory reading of
the afore quoted adverse claim filed by the plaintiffs shows that the same has failed to comply with the
formal requisites of Section 110 of Act 496, more specifically the appellants’ failure to state how and
under whom their alleged right or interest is acquired. Thus, the effect of such non¬compliance renders
the adverse claim non-¬registrable and ineffective.

In a case where the adverse claim filed for registration did not fully comply with the formal requisites of
Section 110 of Act No. 496, or more specifically, there being no description of the land in which right or
interest is claimed nor the place to which all notices may be served upon the adverse claimant given,
such adverse claim could not be registered. (LRC Consulta No. 144, Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
pet., February 18, 1957)

108 Portes vs Arcala 468 SCRA 343 8/30/2005 Trinidad, Nathaniel

FACTS:

Respondents Segunda, Eulalia, Salustancia, Vamerco, Josefina, Felomino, Marciano, Lydia, and Salome,
all surnamed Arcala claimed that as early as 1908, their parents, Vicente and Felisa had already occupied
and developed the disputed parcels of land, Lots 2 and 3.

______________________________________________________________________________

On 20 June 1912, the Director of Lands approved Vicente’s homestead application for Lots 2 and 3.

______________________________________________________________________________

Respondents filed the complaint against their cousins, Vicente, Jr., Perfecta, Sotera, and Consolacion, all
surnamed Arcala, the nephew and nieces of respondents’ father, Vicente.
______________________________________________________________________________

Respondents alleged that on 30 November 1917, Felomina, the aunt of Luis, registered Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
and 6 in her name.

______________________________________________________________________________

The decree of registration dated 11 November 1920 was issued to Felomina by the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental in GLRO Case No. 15426.

______________________________________________________________________________

However, on 26 July 1930, the cadastral court issued another decree of registration excluding Lots 2 and
3 from the decree of registration issued to Felomina.

______________________________________________________________________________

The cadastral court amended Felomina’s decree of registration because Vicente and Felisa had already
obtained a homestead patent over Lots 2 and 3.

______________________________________________________________________________

Despite the amended decree of 26 July 1930, Felomina was still able to have the title of Lot 2
reconstituted by invoking GLRO Case No. 15426.

______________________________________________________________________________

The reconstituted title of Lot 2, OCT No. RO¬8932, was issued to Felomina.

______________________________________________________________________________

Felomina then subdivided Lot 2 into Lots 2¬A and 2¬B.

______________________________________________________________________________

Lot 2¬A was issued to Luis while TCT No. T¬39332 covering Lot 2¬B was issued to Felomina.

Luis sold Lot 2¬A to Napoleon

______________________________________________________________________________

Heirs of Napoleon insisted that Napoleon acquired ownership of Lot 2¬A in good faith and for value.
______________________________________________________________________________

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs of Napoleon has a right on the property

RULING:

The heirs of Napoleon has no right over the property.

______________________________________________________________________________
A homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a
Torrens Title.
______________________________________________________________________________

Respondents’ parents, Vicente and Felisa, owned Lots 2 and 3 by virtue of a homestead patent.

Felomina had no right over Lot 2.

______________________________________________________________________________

Reconstitution is simply the restoration of a lost or destroyed instrument or title to its original form and
condition. Felomina had nothing to reconstitute as no certificate of title was ever issued to her over Lot
2. Luis, from whom Napoleon purchased Lot 2¬A, was just as guilty as his aunt Felomina in defrauding
respondents.
______________________________________________________________________________

Luis was definitely not a buyer in good faith. Respondents were still in possession of Lot 2 when Luis
supposedly purchased the lot from Felomina and when Luis had the lot subdivided and the subdivided
lots titled.
______________________________________________________________________________

The only way for the heirs of Napoleon to validly claim Lot 2¬A is to prove that Napoleon purchased Lot
2¬A in good faith.

______________________________________________________________________________

The trial and appellate courts ruled that Napoleon was not a purchaser in good faith. We agree with the
two courts.
______________________________________________________________________________

The trial and appellate courts pointed out that as early as 1966, there was already a brewing dispute
between respondents and Luis over Lot 2.Maria, Napoleon’s widow, testified that she was with
Napoleon when Luis sold to them Lot 2¬ A. Maria asserted that she was familiar with the history of Lot
2¬A and the supposed previous owners Luis and Felomina. It was thus impossible for Napoleon and
Maria not to have known of the Bureau of Lands’ pending investigation at the time Luis sold to them Lot
2¬A.

______________________________________________________________________________

The controversy between respondents and Luis should have prompted Napoleon to inquire into the
status of Luis’ title over Lot 2¬A. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts that should put a reasonable
man on his guard and still claim that he acted in good faith.

A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law.
______________________________________________________________________________

Assuming that Napoleon was unaware of the conflict over Lot 2¬A at the time of the execution of the
deed of sale, Napoleon was, however, already charged with knowledge of the flaw in Luis’ title at the
time of the registration of the sale. Inscriptions of an adverse claim dated 23 November 1970 and lis
pendens dated 14 September 1971 were already annotated on Luis’ title over Lot 2¬A when Napoleon
registered the Deed of Sale on 16 December 1971.
The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in
litigation. The inscription serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over litigated property
does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the property. By
disregarding the inscriptions and pursuing the registration of the sale, Napoleon assumed the risk of
losing Lot 2¬A to respondents. Napoleon’s heirs, being merely the juridical continuation of his
personality, hold Lot 2¬A in trust for respondents.

109 People vs RTC 178 SCRA 299 10/4/1989 Caratiquit, Reyville

FACTS:

Private respondents sold several parcels of land located in Dasmariñas, Cavite, in favor of Ricardo
Silverio. These parcels were at that time registered in the names of the private respondents. One of the
parcels is the subject matter of a litigation between the private respondents and Pedro Caragao and his
co-owners for reconveyance and cancellation of title and damages before Branch XVIII of the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite in Tagaytay City. Pedro Caragao then caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens at the back of the original of the Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T.) of the parcel of land under
litigation, on file in the Register of Deeds for the province of Cavite, without the knowledge of the
private respondents. Hence,the private respondents’ copy of the title in question did not bear any
annotation of such notice of lis pendens. When the private respondents sold the two parcels of land to
Silverio, including the one under litigation for reconveyance between Caragao and the private
respondents, they warranted that the properties are “free from all liens and encumbrances
whatsoever.” On the basis of this express warranty vis-à-vis the notice of lis pendens duly annotated at
the back of the original of the Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T.110942) on file in the Registry of Deeds
for the Province of Cavite, Assistant Fiscal Napoleon V. Dilao of the City of Manila filed an information
for “Falsification of Public Document” against the private respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether notice of lis pendens is a lien or encumbrance within the contemplation of criminal law, in
particular, the crime of falsification of public document.

HELD:

No. Lis pendens is a Latin term which literally means a pending suit or a pending litigation while a notice
of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation,
serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over the said property does so at his own risk, or
that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the said property. It is but a signal to the intending
buyer or mortgagee to take care or beware and to investigate the prospect or non-prospect of the
litigation succeeding before he forks down his money. Notice of lis pendens has been conceived and,
more often than not, availed of, to protect the real rights of the registrant while the case involving such
rights is pending resolution or decision. With the notice of lis pendens duly recorded, and remains
uncancelled, he could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it during the
litigation. “[T]he doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and necessity, the
purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the Court until the
judgment or the decree shall have been entered; otherwise, by successive alienations pending the
litigation, its judgment or decree shall be rendered abortive and impossible of execution.” The lower
court is therefore correct in ruling that a notice of lis pendens being a mere cautionary notice to a
prospective buyer or mortgagee of a parcel of land under litigation, then it imposes no obligation on the
owner, but on the prospective buyer. It cannot conceivably be the “lien or encumbrance” contemplated
by law.

110 Villanueva vs CA 281 SCRA 298 11/5/1997 Castillo, Frinz Lemwel

Facts:

Records show that TCT Nos. 262631; 273873 and 2777938 [sic] were issued in the name of Valiant
Realty and Development Corporation and Filipinas Textile Mills, Inc. and the same were mortgaged in
favor of Equitable Banking Corp. Upon failure of the mortgagors to comply with the terms and
conditions of the mortgage, the bank foreclosed the mortgaged properties [and] sold the same to the
Equitable Banking Corp. as the highest bidder at public auction sale. After the expiration of the
redemption period, mortgagors did not exercise the right of redemption and as a consequence thereof,
the mortgagee sold all its rights, interests and participation of said properties to the herein oppositor,
Oo Kian Tiok.

Issue:

May the Register of Deeds refuse to register an application for a notice of lis pendens on the ground that
the applicant does not have any title or right of possession over the subject properties?

Held:

The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in
litigation, and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his
own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.[13] The registration of a
notice of lis pendens is governed by Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court:[14]

Sec. 24. Notice of lis pendens. In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property,
the plaintiff, at the time of filing the complaint, and the defendant, at the time of filing his answer, when
affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, or at any time afterwards, may record in the office of the
registrar of deeds of province in which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the action,
containing the names of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the
property in that province affected thereby. From the time only of filing such notice for record shall a
purchaser, or incumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of
the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against parties designated by their real names.

The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after
proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.

TO REQUIRE THAT AN APPLICANT MUST PROVE HIS OWNERSHIP OR HIS INTEREST OVER THE PROPERTY
SOUGHT TO BE AFFECTED WITH THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS WILL UNDULY RESTRICT THE SCOPE OF
THE RULE. IN SUCH CASE, A PARTY QUESTIONING THE OWNERSHIP OF THE REGISTERED OWNER WILL
LITIGATE HIS OR HER CASE WITHOUT AN ASSURANCE THAT THE PROPERTY WILL BE PROTECTED FROM
UNWANTED ALIENATION DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE ACTION, THEREBY DEFEATING THE VERY
PURPOSE AND RATIONALE OF THE REGISTRATION.KYLE
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED. THE ASSAILED DECISION IS REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS HEREBY ORDERED TO ANNOTATE THE APPLICATION FOR A
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS IN TCT NOS. 262631, 273873 AND 277938. NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED

111 SLOC vs CA 449 SCRA 99 1/21/2005 Castillo, Kaycelle

112 Magdalena vs CA 184 SCRA 325 4/17/1990 Castillo, Rio Star

Facts:

MEI donated certain part of the lot to the City Government for use as parks and playgrounds;
and the donation was ratified by the City Council. An area within this lot, was subsequently conveyed to
the DBP by way of dacion en pago. The rest were sold to third parties who thereafter constructed
houses. Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc., believed that the act of the Quezon City Government
of authorizing the release of said as open space, after it had been so declared and earlier dedicated as
such—and its substitution by another portion of the subdivision—was beyond the City Government’s
authority. MHA brought suit against MEI for the recovery of said Lot as “open space” for public use of
the residents of the subdivision. While the case was pending, notices of lis pendens were inscribed by
the Register of Deeds.

Trial court dismissed the case. While the case was pending adjudgment in CA, MEI and DBP filed
separate motions with the Court of Appeals praying for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens
annotated on the titles

Issue:

Whether or not the notice of lis pendens annotated on the titles may be cancelled

Ruling:

Yes.

According to Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and Section 76 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, a notice of lis pendens is proper in the following cases, viz.:

(a) An action to recover possession of real estate;

b) An action to quiet title thereto;

c) An action to remove clouds thereon;

d) An action for partition; and

e) Any other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the title to the land or the use or
occupation thereof or the buildings thereon. The notice of lis pendens—i.e., that real property is
involved in an action—is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the
action is pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It
does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all
 people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever
rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of
the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined
and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere
incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given
time. And its continuance or removal—like the continuance or removal of a preliminary
attachment or injunction—is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action,
and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.

In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the plaintiffs’ appeal. It therefore had power to deal with and
resolve any incident in connection with the action subject of the appeal, even before final judgment. The
rule that no questions may be raised for the first time on appeal have reference only to those affecting
the merits of the action, and not to mere incidents thereof, e.g., cancellation of notices of lis pendens or,
to repeat, the grant or dissolution of provisional remedies. Now, a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled upon order of the court, “after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting
the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
recorded.”

113 Lagula vs Casimiro 98 Phil. 102 12/17/1955 Castro, Floricel

FACTS:

Lagula, et al., filed a petition praying that a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 4250 be subdivided in
accordance with the subdivision plan and technical description attached to the petition and that, a new
transfer certificate be issued in the name of petitioners. The Chief of the General Land Registration
Office recommended the approval of the request. Petitioners then filed an amended petition wherein
they included the heirs of Felipe Lagula and Apolinario Casimiro. The court approved the petition as
amended and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel TCT No. 4250 and issue transfer certificates of
title in the name of petitioners.

Heirs of the late Apolinario Casimiro, a co-owner of the land, filed a motion for reconsideration praying
that the order directing the cancellation of TCT No. 4250 and the issuance of new transfer certificates of
titles in the name of petitioners, be set aside on the ground that they have not agreed to the subdivision
plan as submitted to the court nor were they notified of the petition as required by law.

ISSUE:

Whether the court could acquire jurisdiction to hear the petition for the subdivision of the land without
need of a previous notice to the movants.

HELD:

YES. It is not disputed that appellants were never notified of the petition which initiated these
proceedings although they were mentioned therein as co-owners of the land to be subdivided. The
court, however, expressed the opinion that such notice was not necessary because the purpose of the
petition was merely to subdivide a parcel of land which is already covered by a certificate of title among
its new owners and that this can be done by merely filing with the Chief of the General Land Registratin
Office a subdivision plan and that, once the plan is approved, the Register of Deeds may issue new
certificates of title in pursuance of section 44 of Act No. 496, as amended by Republic Act No. 440. The
court expressed the view that notice of hearing is only necessary if there are streets or passageways
included in the subdivision in which case a petition shall be filed by the registered owner and the court
shall not act thereon "after notice and hearing as required by law. In the present case, the court
intimated, no such street or passageway is involved and so notice of hearing is unnecessary.

114 Rojas vs Tagaytay 106 Phil. 512 11/24/1959 Chua, Christian

Edmund
Facts:

Rojas sold a property ("Lot No. 1") to the City of Tagaytay. The City of Tagaytay filed for an original
registration of Lot No. 1 and plan Psu-103196-Amd with the Court of First Instance. The Court of First
approved the registration. However, Rojas (same person who sold the Lot No. 1 to the City of Tagaytay)
and other respondents filed a petition on the same proceeding to set aside the decision. They argued
that Lot No. 1 was part of a bigger land already decreed in previous land registration case and covered
by an original certificate of title. In this case, there were two survey plan, Psu-103196 which was
previously registered and Psu-103196-Amd which was made by the City of Tagaytay and shows the
division of bigger property into four lots, including Lot No. 1.

Issue:

Whether the CIty of Tagaytay can file an original registration on a property already covered by an
original certificate of title.

Held:

No. The previous decree and the certificate of title duly registered are binding upon all, including the
City of Tagaytay. The remedy for the City of Tagaytay is to secure first the Court's approval of the
subdivision plan segregating Lot No. 1. Then, have the deed of purchase registered and secure the
transfer certificate of title.

115 Republic vs Abrille 71 SCRA 575/7/1976 De Vera, Queenie

FACTS: Defendant (Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille) is the owner of a parcel of land containing an area of more
or less 525,652 sqm. Deceased Abrille during her lifetime caused the subdivision of the said parcel of
land into two lots. Under the Subdivision plan, Lot 1 contains an area of 30, 100 sqm while Lot 2 contains
an area of 577,679 sqm or a total area of 607,779 sqm, which is 82,127 sqm more than the original area.
After the approval of the Land Registration Commissioner, Abrille was able to secure and order from the
CFI directing the Register of Deeds to correct the area and thereafter to cancel the Certificate of Title.
The Register of Deeds registered Lot 1 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrile and Lot 2 in the name of Luisa
Villa‐Abrille. The registration of Lot 2, which includes the excess area was not in accordance with law for
lack of the required notice and publication as prescribed in Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as
the Land Registration Law. The excess area as a result of the approval of the subdivision survey was
formerly a portion of the Davao River which dried up by reason of the change of course of the said river;
hence a land belonging to the public domain. And, as a consequence thereof TCT of Lot 2 wherein the
excess area of land belonging to the public domain is null and void ab initio.

ISSUE:
Whether the TCTs which cover the increased area in question totaling 82,125 sqm shall be cancelled.

HELD:

YES. The increased area in question, which is not a registered land but formerly a river bed, is so big as
to give allowance for a mere mistake in area of the original registration of the tracts of land of the
defendant‐appellant formerly belonging to and registered in the name of their grandfather. In order to
bring this increase in area, which the parties admitted to have been a former riverbed of the Davao
River, under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration Law, Act 496, proceedings in
registration of land title should have been filed instead of an ordinary approval of subdivision plan.
Under Sec. 44 of Act 496, which the predecessor‐in‐interest of the herein defendant‐appellant took, is
good only insofar as it covers previously registered lands. In this case, part of the tracts of the land,
particularly the area of 82,127 sqm, has not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens
System. Worse still, the approval of the subdivision plans was without the notice to all parties in
interest, more particularly the Director of Lands. For an applicant to have his imperfect or incomplete
title or claim to a land to be originally registered Act 496 provided certain requisites to be satisfied and
in this case, the said requisites were not complied with. Thus, the judgment appealed is affirmed.

116 Ong Cung Po vs CA 239 SCRA 341 Dimao, Sittee Junaira

DOCTRINE: The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or
hold landa of the public domain. The 1935 constitution reserved the right to participate in the
“disposition, exploitation, development and utiization” of all “lands of the public domain and other
natural resoutces of the Philippines” for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the
capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals, corporatioon, have been
disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private
lands.

FACTS

On July 23, 1947, Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of land to private respondent Soledad Parian, wife of Ong
Yee. Ong Yee is the brother of petitioner Ong Ching Po.The sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of
Sale and subsequently registered with the register of Deeds of Manila of which transfer of certificate of
Title was issued to the private respondent. According to the private respondent, she entrusted the
administration of the lot and building to petitioner Ong Ching Po when she and her husband settled in
Iloilo. When her husband died, she demanded the lot be vacated because she was going to sell it.
Unfortunately, Ong Ching Po refuses to vacate the land.

On March 19, 1981, the private respondent filed a case for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila.The inferior court dismissed the case. The dismissal was both affirmed by the
Regional trial court and the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners ,on the other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1949, Ong Ching Po bought the parcel of Land
from Ong Joi Jong evidenced by a photo copy of a Deed of Sale conveying therewith the he is acceding
to the request of Mr. Ong Ching Po to sign another document in favor of Soledad Parian forthe purpose
of facilitating the issuance of the new title by the Register of Deeds and for the reason that he is not yet
a Filipino.
On December 12, 1985, petitioners Ong Ching Po and his children filed an action for re conveyance and
damages against private respondent in the RTC of Manila.

On July 26, 1986, private respondent filed an action for quieting of title against Ong Ching Po. Upon the
motion, the case was consolidated and on May 30, 1990, the TC rendered a decision in favor of private
respondent. On appeal by the petitioners to the CA, the court affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence
the petition to the SC.

ISSUE

1) Whether or not Ong Ching Po as a Chinese citizen can validly acquire the land executed under
the Deed of Sale.

2) Whether or not the private respondent took possession of the property.

HELD/RATIO

1) No. An Alien is disqualified from acquiring lands in the Philippines. The Supreme Court did not
go along with the claim of the petitioner that Ong Ching Po merely used the private respondent as a
dummy to have the title over the parcel of land registered in her name because being an alien he was
disqualified to own real property in the Philippines. To sustain such contention is a violation of the
nationalization laws. Assuming that the Deed of sale is in existence and was duly executed, still the
petitioner cannot claim ownership of the land by virtue of Section 5 Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
which provides that “ save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations qualifies to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain the Philippines,” this was further reiterated in the Section 14 Article XIV of
the 1973 Constitution and adopted in the 1987 Constitution, Section 7, Article XII which further states
that “save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public domain of the
Philippines”.

The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of
public domain. Private land maybe transferred or conveyed to individuals or entities “qualified to
acquire lands of the public domain.”The 1935 constitution reserved the right to participate in the
“disposition, exploitation, development and utilization” of all “lands of the public domain and other
natural resources of the Philippines” for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the
capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals, corporation, have been disqualified
from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.
Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen; therefore he was disqualified from acquiring and owning
real property. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of the Deed of sale has been
established, the same is null and void, it being contrary to law.

2) Yes. The private respondent took possession of the land. Under the law, possession is
transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance. Under Art 1498 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, “when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall
be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear
or cannot clearly be inferred. If what the petitioners meant was that the private respondent never lived
in the building constructed on said land, it was because her family had settled in Iloilo. It is markworthy
that all the tax receipts were in the name of private respondent and her husband. The rental receipts
were also in the name of her husband.

117 Lee vs Republic 360 SCRA 524 Fadera, Juna Carlo

Facts:

The Dinglasans (vendors) sold the subject property to Lee Liong (vendee), a Chinese citizen. Later on, the
vendors filed an action against the heirs of the vendee for the annulment of sale and recovery of the
land assailing the validity of the sale on the ground of the constitutional prohibition against aliens
acquiring ownership private or public land. The RTC, CA and SC ruled neither for the vendors and vendee
applying the principle of pari delicto. Another case was filed against the same defendants by the same
plaintiffs but this was barred by res judicata as decided by the SC. After the war, the widows, Elizabeth
Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu-Lee, of the heirs of Lee Liong, both Filipino Citizens, herein petitioners filed
with the RTC a petition for the reconstitution of title of the subject property and granted the same. The
Solicitor General filed a petition for annulment of judgment of reconstitution. OSG contended that the
petitioners were not the proper parties in the reconstitution of title, since their predecessor-in-interest
Lee Liong did not acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not
qualified to own the subject land. CA ruled in favor of the OSG. Hence, this petition.

Issue/s:

WON the successors-in-interest (petitioners) of an Aliens has the right to acquire the subject property.

Held/Ratio:

YES. The sale of the land was consummated in 1936, under the 1935 Constituion, aliens could not
acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession. Here, Alien Lee Liong is
disqualified to acquire the land however ownership of the land cannot revert to the original seller
because of the principle of pari delicto. Now, the subject land is in the hands of the petitioners, both
Filipinos. The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was
intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non Filipinos. In this case, however, there would
be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own
such land. “If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it
to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid.” Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be
impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional
provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

Petition GRANTED.

118 Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She 21 SCRA 52

Galicia, Monico King A.
FACTS:

Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property in Manila, as her sister died. Then already well
advanced in years, being at the time 90 years old, blind, crippled and an invalid, she was left with no
other relative to live with. She lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his
family in the restaurant. Wong had been a longtime lessee of a portion of the property. Wong himself
was the trusted man to whom she delivered various amounts for safekeeping, including rentals from her
property.

“In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the lessee to her,” Justina Santos executed a
contract of lease in favor of Wong, covering the entire property, including the portion on which the
house of Justina Santos stood.

She then executed another contract giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises. The option was
conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a petition for which was then pending in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal. It appears, however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn when
it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. In 1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his
children on the erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship. The error
was discovered and the proceedings were abandoned.

Later on, she executed two other contracts, one extending the term of the lease to 99 years, and
another fixing the term of the option of 50 years.

In two wills executed on, she bade her legatees to respect the contracts she had entered into with
Wong, but in a codicil of a later date she appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that the various
contracts were made by her because of machinations and inducements practised by him, she now
directed her executor to secure the annulment of the contracts. Action was filed, and the court was
asked to direct the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration of the contracts

Both parties died during the pendency of the action. Wong was substituted by his wife, Lui She, while
Justina Santos was substituted by the Philippine Banking Corporation.

ISSUE:

Whether an alien may validly acquire lease right and an option to buy a real property.

HELD/RATIO:

No.

A lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real
property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. As this Court said in Krivenko v. Register
of Deeds:

“[A]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential
purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary they may be granted temporary
rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to
remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not
impossible to acquire.”

But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which
the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it
becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests
himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus
abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of it (jus disponendi)—rights the sum total of which make up
ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow, the use, the next day, the
disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in
an alien. And yet this is just exactly what the parties in this case did within the space of one year, with
the result that Justina Santos’ ownership of her property was reduced to a hollow concept.

As this Court said in Krivenko:

“It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing
the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction
is to preclude where they may build aliens admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites
their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to
compromise it even in the name of amity or equity, xxx

“For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or
public agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed,
without costs.”