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 POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY
IN GHANA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

Proceedings of a Seminar Organized In/ the

Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon
on 2nd and 3rd July, 1992

Edited by

K w am e A Ninsin

and
F. K. Drah

INSTITUTE
Of
DeVROPMF~
STUDIES
LIBRARY'

WOELI PUBLISHING SERVICES

ACCRA
1993
 Published bx/
Woeli Publishing Services
P.O. Box K601
Accra New Town

© Department of Political Science, Legon 1993

ISBN 9964-978-14-6

Cover artwork S. A. Adom

Designed and typeset by Woeli Publishing Services
Printed and bound by Assemblies of God Literature Centre, Accra
 T A B LE O F C O N T EN T S

Preface and Acknowledgements...........................................................vii

OPENING REMARKS

1. Democratization in Black Africa Viewed from

Westminister (Donald Anderson) ................................................3

Parti
BASIS OF DEMOCRACY

2. Political Parties and the Machinery of Democratic

Government (K. G. P oison)..........................................................12
3. Legislation on Political Parties (Kofi Kumado) .............................. 35
4. The Constitutional Framework of Democracy
(Kofi K u m ado)................................................................................. 53

Part II
SOCIETY AND POLITICAL PARTIES

5. The Socio-Cultural Context of Multi-Party

Constitutionalism in Ghana (Kumi Ansah - Koi) ...................63
6. Civil Society and the Transition to Pluralist Democracy
(F .K .D ra h )......................................................................................72
7. The Party System and Democracy in Ghana
(YawManu) ....................................................... 11
8. Political Parties and Social Representation: The Case
of Women ( J. Sandra Pepera) ................................................. 133

Part III
POLITICAL PARTIES, REPRESENTATION
AND DEMOCRACY

9. Political Parties, Representation and Democracy

(Donald A n derson )....................................................................... 149
10. Democracy Without Political Parties: The Case of
District Assemblies (Mike O qu aye)........................................154
11. The Electoral System, Elections and Democracy
in Ghana (Kzuame A. Ninsiti) ...................................................... 175
12. The Democratic Ethos and Internal Party Democracy:
The Case of Parties in the Fourth Republic
(A. Essuman - John son )............................................................... 192

Part IV
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS
OF PARTY POLITICS

13. The Opposition in Democratic Government: Reflections

on the Ghanaian Experience (G. K. Bluivey) ...................... 207
14. Political Parties and Prospects for National Stability
(K.Boafo Arthur) ....................................................................... 224
15. Financing Political Parties in Ghana: An Exploratory
Study (Joseph R.A. Ayee) .......................................................... 246

List of C ontributors............................................................................258

LIST OF TABLES

1. Results of the 1978 E lectio n s.......................................................... 161

2. Percentage of Votes Cast Against Registered
Voters in Three Elections ........................................................ 163
3. Occupational Distribution of Assembly Members ..................167
4. Occupational Distribution of Assembly Members
(% B reakd o w n )..........................................................................169

vi
 PR EFA C E AND A C K N O W LED G EM EN T S

Once again the Department of Political Science, in pursuit of its outreach

programme, has the pleasure to make available to the general public in
book form the proceedings of a two-day seminar held at the Christ the
King Hall in Accra on 2 and 3 July, 1992, on the theme "Political Parties
and Democracy in the Fourth Republic"; and, as was the case with the
one held on 21 June, 1991, on Ghana's transition to constitutional rule, the
seminar was organized in collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert Foun­
dation of Germany. Significantly, that a seminar on such a theme could
be conceived and organized at all is because the ban on overt party
political activities had been mercifully, if belatedly, lifted on 18 May
1992.
The theme was discussed under the following broad heads:
(i) The Constitutional and Legal Basis of Democracy; (ii) Society and
Political Parties; (iii) Political Parties, Representation and Democracy;
and (iv) The Institutional Mechanisms of Party Politics. Papers were
presented by sixteen resource persons including a representative of the
British government, Mr. Donald Anderson, a Labour Opposition Front
Bench Spokesman on Africa. For some technical reasons, two of the
papers could not appear in this volume.
It may be noticed that the present work is, in a significant sense, a
sequel to our recent publication, Ghana's Transition to Constitutional Rule
published in 1991. For, although each has a specific focus, both works are
essentially concerned with the problems and prospects of Ghana's
transition to constitutional-democratic rule. It is also worth emphasizing
that the revised papers had already been submitted to the publisher
before the presidential and parliamentary elections of November and
December, 1992, respectively; and this is why it was not possible to
update the material where necessary. Even so we believe that this does
not detract, to any appreciable degree, from the major thrust and
significance of the book as a whole. It is our fervent hope that the valuable
lessons contained in this volume will inspire, warn and guide us in our
fourth attempt at evolving a free, just and stable pluralist democracy in
Ghana.
At this juncture, the Department wishes to place on record its debt
of gratitude to a number of people. These include, first, Prof. D.A.
Akyeampong, then the Pro - Vice Chancellor, University of Ghana,

vii
 Legon, who gave the keynote address in lieu of Prof. G. Benneh, the Vice-
Chancellor; secondly, the chairmen of the various sessions — Mr. S. Y.
Bimpong-Buta, Director,GhanaLawSchool,Mr.JusticeGeorgeLamptey,
Appeal Court Judge, and Prof. G.K. Nukunya, then Head, Department
of Sociology, now Pro-Vice Chancellor, Legon; thirdly, the seminar
participants, including representatives of some of the newly formed
political parties, for their lively and invaluable contributions to the
discussions; and, fourthly, the Department's secretarial staff — espe­
cially Mr. Godfried Mantey, Ms. Selina Odame and Mr. Daniel Nii Noi,
for helping with the organization of the seminar and preparing the
typescripts for this volume.
While very grateful to all these people, the Department in all
honesty must acknowledge its profoundest gratitude to the Friedrich
Ebert Foundation and its Director in Ghana, Dr. G. Schirra — an
indefatigable champion of constitutional democracy — ably supported
by the Programmes Officer, Mr. E. Biriku-Boadu, and other staff mem­
bers. Fully aware of the crucial importance of a healthy and vibrant
competitive party system for the emergence and thriving of constitu­
tional democracy, Dr. Schirra readily accepted the Department7s pro­
posal for the seminar and then — as he did in 1991 — successfully
convinced the Foundation headquarters to provide ample funds for not
only organizing it but also publishing its proceedings. We have no doubt
whatsoever that, wherever he will be after his tour of duty in Ghana, he
will continue to aid the cause of constitutional democracy through such
contributions as these. In the same vein, the Department is most grateful
to the Overseas Development Agency (ODA) of the UK for supporting
the participation of Mr. Donald Anderson.
Finally, we would like to state that the responsibility for the views
expressed in this volume lies strictly with the individual contributors
only, and not with the Department of Political Science, the Friedrich
Ebert Foundation nor the publisher.

F.K. DRAH
K.A. NINSIN
Department of Political Science
University of Ghana
Legon
 Part I

Basis of Democracy
 Chapter 1

D EM O C R A TIZA TIO N IN BLA CK A FR IC A

V IEW ED FRO M W EST M IN ST ER

Donald Anderson

Introduction

When I was invited to participate in this seminar, I asked m yself a

simple question: "W hat is it from my background and experience
that I can contribute?" I am not steeped in the academic literature on
the subject. I am a journeyman, national politician of some experi­
ence, who counts myself as a friend of Africa and 1shall speak in that
light.
I am equipped to give the perspective of a British and European
Parliamentarian to the dramatic and welcome democratic advance in
Africa. I hope to have the humility not to parachute into Ghana and give
prescriptive solutions. Hence this is a personal approach of a busy
politician unsullied by Foreign Office duties! I stress a "British and
European Parliamentarian" because British foreign policy will increas­
ingly be influenced by our membership of the evolving European
Community. The Maastricht Treaty seeks to establish "a common
foreign and security policy based on co-operation between the member
states." Such co-operation already exists at all levels. Individual
member states will be lead countries in respect of states or regions with
which they have a special interest or expertise, perhaps because of a past
colonial relationship.
One further word of disclaimer: I see my role as a frank friend. I
am confident that you will not shoot this messenger from Europe even
if his message is not always what you wish to hear. It would be wrong
for Africans immersed in the heady events of their democratic transition,
to imagine that events here are of constant and deep concern in Europe.
Later, I shall argue, as I look at events in Africa, from the other end of
the telescope, that Africa as a whole, for reasons good and bad, slipped
lower down the agenda of concern and that Africa and its friends must
struggle and shout much louder than in the past to gain proper attention.
The starting point is undisputably that there is a wave of democra­

3
tization in Africa, which is most welcome. There are obviously excep­
tions to the in-coming tideof democracy— Mauritania, La Cote d'Ivoire,1
Central African Republic and Burkina Faso. Zimbabwe and Zaire are
marking time. Chad, Liberia, Ethiopia and Somalia give an unclear or
contrary signal. But the picture is of real progress in the Cape Verde
Islands, Sao Tome and Principe, Zambia and in Benin, Niger, Madagas­
car and Mali. Togo and the Congo exhibit special problems of transition;
whilst there are real signs of hope in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania,
Kenya, The Gambia, Cameroon, Angola, Guinea Bissau, Burundi,
Rwanda — and, of course, here in Ghana.
Clearly, these developments predated the "six months that shook
the world" in 1989, from the free Polish election in June 1989, via the
opening of the Berlin Wall in November, to the violent overthrow of
Ceaucescu in December. But events in Africa were influenced and
accelerated by the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the end of
the Second Cold War. The evidence for re - dating is charted by Professor
Samuel Decalo.2 President Bongo of Gabon later spoke of "the wind
from the east that is shaking the coconut trees,"3and Decalo exaggerates,
but has a point, when he writes of the consequent "devaluation" of
Africa — "African states were transferred from Cold War pawns into
irrelevant international clutter."41 had personal experience of this on 9
November, 1989. I was flying overnight from Namibia to the United
Kingdom, having been an international monitor at the pre- indepen­
dence elections. I had a great story to tell of the peaceful birth of a new
African democracy. Here was a happy model for all of Southern Africa
and beyond. Yet, overnight the Western press switched off their interest;
because that night the Berlin Wall was opened. Western powers are
quick to respond that no aid has been diverted from Africa to Eastern
and Central Europe. The truth is that attention across the board has been
focused there for the past two years or so for understandable reasons of
interdependence, proximity, more attractive markets and perceived
danger from refugees and nuclear proliferation.
This process has come on top of a certain irritation with Africa over
the past decade. Few British newspapers have regular articles on Africa,
save the traumas of South Africa. The exceptions are the Finaticial Times
(Michael Holman) and the Independent (Richard Dowden). The latter
wrote a rather gloomy think-piece inferring that, apart from South
Africa, the main factor behind the West's attention to Africa was
humanitarian. This does, however, underline that Africa now has to seek
attention in a harsher world context and with increased competition.

4
There is also the question of aid fatigue and its offshoot: conditionality
and insistence on "good governance." The World Bank in its Report of
1989 stated: "... political legitimacy and consensus are a precondition for
sustainable development.... Underlying the litany of Africa's problems
is a crisis of governance."5 Douglas Hurd and Lynda Chalker spokeand
wrote on the same theme in Britain as did President Mitterand to the
assembled Francophone leaders in France. The Commonwealth Heads
of Government Meeting (CHOC.M) issued its Harare Declaration last
October on the theme of democratic principles. (See the House of
Commons Library Note on Good Government.)
Some of these criticisms were unfair. There were factors such as
drought and the adverse terms of trade behind the crisis. Europeans
forget the phenomenon of Hitler and their continental tragedy of
Yugoslavia. But much could not be blamed on external factors and
convenient scapegoats such as "neo - colonialism." There was Mengistu.
There was a decade of mismanagement and decline in the 1980s.
The courtesy of a guest only prevents me from looking at the history of
Ghana since independence when it had a flying start, and the subsequent
waste of resources and talent and erosion of civil liberties.
The memory of the misallocation of resources on the continent of
Africa still poisons the international atmosphere. The recollection of
false dawns of democratic advance blotted out by subsequent military
coups, makes W estern opinion slow to recognize and respond to the real
progress now being made, symbolized by the dignified change of
government in Zambia. Add to this an increased parochialism among
Western politicians (fewcurrent British MPs have worked overseas), the
ending of East-West rivalries, and Africa faces an uphill task.
How, then, can Western countries and politicians work with
Africans in building democracy on sure and lasting foundations? One
way, of course, is to seek means of underpinning the economies of the
African countries. In an interview in New Africa, President Museveni
stated: "W e have postponed elections because of sheer logistical prob­
lems. We don't have paper for school children to write on, let alone
for voters."6 To discuss this would lead me to consider the terms of
trade, protectionism and GATT — a fascinating study, but not for this
chapter. Let us at least agree that without economic recovery on a
sound and lasting basis, it will be much more difficult for democracy
to be established, to survive and to prosper. That said, it is true that
assistance to states in establishing democracies is now high on the
agenda of international organizations, to the extent that there are

5
dangers arising from lack of co-ordination. Let me give examples of
practical work by organizations of which I have some direct personal
experience — irrespective of that done directly by governments and
inter-govemmental organizations.
The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) has sent teamsof Parliamentar­
ians to monitor elections. I went to Namibia in 1989. The Conference at
Yaounde in April was at a most opportune time in that country's
democratic advance. The Westminster Foundation for Democracy was es­
tablished in March 1992 to provide assistance in building and strength­
ening pluralistic institutions overseas, following consultations between
the British Government and the British political parties.
The annual budget this year is one million pounds.The Common­
wealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), internationally and the indi­
vidual national branches, help in election monitoring, run seminars and
courses for Parliamentarians and help by placements in training those
involved in the machinery of Parliaments. The Parliamentarians for Global
Action (PGA) established in 1991 a special African task force which, for
example, visited Togo during the political crises in December 1991 and
June 1992, when I led the delegation.A WEPAA, founded in 1984 to
mobilize European Parliamentarians in the struggle against apartheid,
is now re-focusing its activities to act as a lobby in Europe for African
(particularly Southern African) development and democratization.
There is a recognition of the danger of over-enthusiastically seek­
ing to transplant Western models into different soils, but there are
universal principles and aspirations. Sharing experience and providing
training can only assist the welcome process now under way.
My judgement is that, although opinion in the West has been
soured by bad images of the past, there is now an increasing recognition
of the well - based and important progress to wards democracy in Africa.
The way forward will not always be straight; there will inevitably be
some reverses, but on the basis of mutual respect, we can share experi­
ences and help those travelling along the road to an ideal goal which is
always relevant but can never be totally attained.

House of Commons Library Note on Good Government

UK policy on "good government" was first adumbrated in a speech by
the Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, to the Overseas Development
Institute on 6 June 1990:

6
 Nobody believes that good govemmentalonecan perform miracles
where natural resources are inadequate. But too many of Africa's
resources have been dissipated by war, bad management and in
some countries, by corruption. Economic success depends to a
very large extent on effective, honest government and political
pluralism. (I would add, observance or the rule of law, freer and
more open economies.)
These are choices for Africans, not for us to make. But aid
donors can help where the will is there by pro viding assistance and
training to strengthen legal, financial and other institutions which
help form the fabric of a healthy society. And they should consider
potential recipients of aid in the light of certain criteria. Countries
which tend towards pluralism, public accountability, respect for
the rule of law, human rights, market principles, should be encour­
aged. Governments which persist witn repressive policies, corrupt
management, wasteful, discredited economic systems should not
expect us to support their folly with scarce aid resources which
could be used better elsewhere.
This is not a doctrine for Africa. There is no justice, no point in
singularizing, picking out one continent. These are exactly the
tests which we are applying in Eastern Europe at the present time.
We want to see these tests more widely accepted not because they
are Western, but because where they are accepted, they are effec­
tive and beneficial. That is to say, no one has actually found out a
better set of principles for government and effective policy by
which to live.

The concept of "good government" was further amplified in an

article by Lynda Chalker in the Sunday Times of 18 August 1991:

Errant regimes can no longer cloak their authoritarian tendencies

in Marxist jargon or look to a superpower to bail them out. Not that
good government necessarily means replicating Westminster-
style institutions. National traditions and circumstances differ
radically. I believe "good government" can best be judged by
reference to three guiaing principles: Sound economic ana social
policies which allow free rein to market forces. Governments
should not take on tasks best left to others. Greater prosperity
should enable poverty, illiteracy and disease to be tackled and
opportunities to be created for popular participation. Arms spend­
ing should not exceed what is needed for legitimate self-defence.
The second fundamental is the competence and accountability of
government institutions. Ineffective policies and corruption can
J J * r nments are accountable through the
Bad government can result from
inexperience as well as evil intent. So apart from penalizing
authoritarian regimes, we should share expertise in areas such as
7
 training civil servants, the organization of political parties and the
mechanics of running free elections.
The third key aspect of good government must be respect for
human rights and the rule of law. Entrepreneurs will not start
businesses, nor outsiders invest, if there is no redress against
arbitrary confiscation or corruption. These principles are neither
the sole invention of the West nor the only product of the collapse
of socialism in Eastern Europe. There has also been a growing
realization in many developing countries that the key to prosperity
lies largely in their own hands. No amount of aid or central control
can produce the investment in productive economic activity on
which advancement depends.
In Africa, some countries such as Botswana have followed such
policies since independence. They tend now to be among the most
prosperous and stable countries on the continent. Not all develop­
ing countries have yet embraced good government with the same
enthusiasm. Some have set their faces against change. In such
circumstances our aid cannot be unaffected. We are looking for at
least a trend towards better government.

It should be noted that at no point does HMG specify that multi­

party ism is an essential component of "good government." Mrs. Chalker
stated that HMG was to spend 50 million pounds on "good govern­
ment" over the next year. The money will go to areas such as reforming
the structures of procedures of government, assistance in drafting
legislation, training for police, customs and civil servants, election
monitoring, support for the media, human rights groups and other
NGOs and improving accountancy standards (ODA News Release 63/
91, 19 July 1991).
The UK is a party to the Fourth Lome Convention, as signed in
December 1989 by the states of the European Economic Community and
the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, which includes all the
states of Sub-Saharan Africa. In both the preamble and Article Five of
Chapter One ("Objectives and Principles of Co-operation") the Conven­
tion establishes a clear link between development and human rights.
The EEC has increasingly explicitly shaped not just its development
policies but also its aid policies in the context of this link (Africa Confiden­
tial, 20 December 1991).
At the Commonwealth Summit in Harare in October 1991, the UK
was active in ensuring that issues of democracy and human rights were
high on the summit agenda. The Harare Declaration of 20 October 1991
included a pledge that all member-states would "work with renewed

8
vigour" to implement the principles embodied in the 1971 Declaration of
Commonwealth Principles, concentrating especially in the following
areas:

(i) the protection and promotion of the fundamental political

values of the Commonwealth:
- democracy, democratic processes and institutions which
reflect national circumstances, the rule of law and the
independence of the judiciary, just and honest govern­
ment;
- fundamental human rights, including equal rights and
opportunities for all citizens regardless of race, colour,
creed or political belief;

(ii) equality for women, so that they may exercise their full and
equal rights;

(iii) provision of universal access to education for the population

of our countries;

(iv) continuing action to bring about the end of apartheid and the
establishment of a free, democratic, non-racial and prosper­
ous South Africa;

(v) the promotion of sustainable development and the alleviation

of poverty in the countries of the Commonwealth through:
- a stable international economic framework within which
growth can be achieved;
- sound economic management recognizing the central
role of the market economy;
- effective population policies and programmes;
- sound management of technological change;
- the freest possible flow of multilateral trade on terms fair
and equitable to all, taking account of the special require­
ments of developing countries;
- an adequate flow of resources from the developed to
developing countries, and action to alleviate the debt
burdens of developing countries most in need;
- the development of human resources, in particular
through education, training, health, culture, sport, and

9
 programmes for strengthening family and community sup
port, paying special attention to the needs of women, youth
and children;
- effective and increasing programmes of bilateral and multi­
lateral co-operation aimed at raising living standards;

(vi) extending the benefits of development within a framework

and respect for human rights;

(vii) the protection of the environment through respect for the

principles of sustainable development which we enunciated
atLangkawi;

(viii) action to combat drug trafficking and abuse and communi­

cable diseases;

(ix) help for small Commonwealth states in tackling their particu­

lar economic and security problems;

(x) support of the United Nations and other international institu­

tions in the world's search for peace, disarmament and effec­
tive arms control; and in the promotion of international
consensus on major global political, economic and social
issues.

To give weight and effectiveness to our commitments, we intend to

focus and improve Commonwealth co-operation in these areas. This
would include strengthening the capacity of the Commonwealth to
respond to requests from members for assistance in entrenching the
practices of democracy, accountable administration and the rule of law
(paras 9 and 10).
The UK has been accused at points of turning a blind eye to the
misbehaviour of certain Sub-Saharan African signatory-states where
economic or strategic interests dictate, above all, Kenya and Malawi. For
most of 1990 and 1991 there appeared to some critics to be a reluctance
on the part of HMG to use its not inconsiderable leverage to pressure
President Daniel arap Moi to cease the harassment of his political
opponents and to restore a multi-party system to Kenya. The US seemed
much more willing to challenge the Kenyan authorities. But the UK's
willingness to pressurize such governments appears to have increased

10
since the benchmark Harare Declaration. On 25-26 November 1991 the
UK agreed to a decision at a meeting of the Consultative Group of
Kenya's aid donors to suspend a decision on future aid to Kenya for six
months pending moves there towards economic and political reform.
Within days of this decision, President Moi announced that Kenya
would return to multi-partyism.
The UK has been accused of a similar reluctance to put pressure on
Malawi. But the level of UK pressure on President Banda is increasing.

We have already cut our programme aid to Malawi this year from
ten million pounds to five million pounds because of lack of
progress on human rights and good government. The Malawi
fcovemment is aware tnat we will place increasing emphasis on
adherence to these principles in determining future aid levels.
(HL Debate Vol. 532 c65W, 20.11.91)7

NOTES

1. La Cote d' Ivoire now has a semblance of multi-party democracy.

2. S. Decalo, "The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in
Africa." in African Affairs 91,1992, pp. 7-35.
3. President Bongo reported in West Africa, 9 April, 1990.
4. S. Decalo, ibid.., p. 17.
5. World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa : From Crisis to Sustaimble Growth . Wash­
ington EXT, 1989, p.34.
6. Neiv Africa, July 1991, p.14.
7. For a discussion of US policy on promoting democracy and human rights
in Sub-Saharan Africa, see Africa Confidential, 6 December,! 991.

11
 Chapter 2

PO LITIC A L PA RTIES A N D TH E M A C H IN ER Y
O F D EM O C R A TIC G O V ER N M EN T

Kweku G. Folson

Introduction

Since 1984 the people of Ghana have expressed on three separate

occasions their preference for a liberal-democratic polity. On the last
occasion, that is, on 28 April, 1992 they decisively opted for a constitution
that was crafted to ensure such a polity.1 The Draft Constitution of the
Republic of Ghana. 1992, provides a machinery for running a liberal-
democratic form of government. The constitution provides for a net­
work of institutions which is a set of checks and balances. The power of
Parliament to legislate is hedged around with "countervailing powers"
that are exercised by the National House of Chiefs, the President, the
Council of State, the Supreme Court and a number of Independent
Commissions. Similarly, the powers of the President are hedged in with
countervailing powers belonging to Parliament, the Council of State, a
host of independent Commissions (including the National Security
Council) and the Supreme Court. This network has been designed to
ensure that the main institutions of government will exercise only
limited powers and in prescribed ways, thus yielding a liberal-demo­
cratic polity. The constitution-makers, however, were not satisfied
with this arrangement of offices.
In addition, the Preamble to the Constitution also proclaims that
on adopting the constitution, the constitution-makers affirmed their
commitment to "freedom, justice ... the principle that all powers of
Government spring from the sovereign will of the people; The Principle
of Universal Adult Suffrage; The Rule of Law; and the Protection and
preservation of fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms." The
purpose of this chapter is to explore the role political parties in the
Fourth Republic can play within this machinery to promote the goal
of democratic government.
There is a dialectical relationship between political institutions
and human behaviour such that political institutions shape the
12
behaviour of those who work them whilst the institutions in their turn
are shaped by the behaviour of the political actors. This point was
forcefully made by John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century.
Reflecting on representative government in 1861, he wrote:

political institutions (however the proposition may be at times

ignored) are the work of men; owe their origin ana their whole
existence to human will. Men did not wake on a summer morning
and find them sprung up. Neither do they resemble trees, which,
once planted, 'are aye growing' while men 'are sleeping.' In every
stage of their existence they are made what they are Dy human
voluntary agency. Like all things, therefore, which are made by
men, they may be either well- or ill- made; judgement and skill may
have been exercised in their production, or the reverse of these.
And again, if a people have omitted, or from outward pressure
have not had it in their power, to give themselves a constitution by the
tentative process of applying a corrective to each evil as it arose, or as the
sufferers gained strength to resist it, this retardation of political
progress is no doubt a great disadvantage to them, but it aoes not
prove that what has been found good for others would not have
been good also for them, and will not be so still when they think fit
to adopt it.
On the other hand, it is also to be borne in mind that political
machinery does not act of itself. As it is first made, so it has to be
worked, by men, and even by ordinary men. It needs, not their
simple acquiescence, but their active participation; and must be
adjusted to the capacities and qualities of such men as are available.
This implies three conditions. The people for whom the form of
government is intended must be willing to accept it; or at least not
so unwilling as to oppose an insurmountable obstacle to its
estalishment. They must be willing and able to do what is necessary
to keep it standing. And they must be willing and able to do what
it reauires of them to enable it to fulfil its purposes. The word 'do'
is to oe understood as including forbearances as well as acts. They
must be capable of fulfilling the conditions of action, and the
conditions of self-restraint, wnich are necessary either for keeping
the established policy in existence, or for enabling it to achieve the
ends, its condudveness to which forms its recommendation."2

Thus a constitution made to promote democratic government

will encourage democratic behaviour, but the behaviour of the people
must also sustain the democratic ethos of the constitution if the
objective of democratic governance is to be realized. A constitution with
pronounced undemocratic features cannot promote democratic gover­
nance, and behaviour that runs contrary to the democratic ethos can

13
only smother the democratic features of a constitution.
No better way of determining the political behaviour of a people
exists in the modern world than observing the behaviour of the
people's political parties; for political parties are the institutions that
directly link society, social groups and individuals in a natural associa­
tion with government. The manner in which political parties will
operate the machinery of government provided by the Draft Constitu­
tion 1992 will thus have a lot to do with whether democracy will
flourish or not in the Fourth Republic.

The Modified Presidential System and Its Possibilities

In broad outline, the machinery provided by the Draft Constitution 1992

is a modified version of the American system of executive presidency.
The main modification is the bridge between the executive and the
legislature provided by the requirements that (i) a majority of Ministers
must be Members of Parliament3 and (ii) that Parliament can pass a
vote of censure against Ministers, in which case the President may
dismiss them .4These are important variations on the American system
that offer ample opportunities for both mischief-making and construc­
tive governance. The convention of the American political system
which keeps the executive and the legislature apart from each other5
has been found obstructive of good governance, and attempts have been
made, particularly through the party system, and other dubious meth­
ods, to overcome the separation.
The provision in the Draft Constitution that some of the Ministers
must come from Parliament provides an opportunity for Ministers to
interact on a continuous basis with the leaders of the party or parties in
a majority in Parliament, if the President's party does not have such a
majority. In a liberal-democratic system of government, political
parties have many responsibilities to discharge. In both the British-type
parliamentary system and the American congressional system, parties
operate at all levels of government. They mobilize voters and opinion in
a competitive race for or against the government of the day. This they
do through rallies, campaigns and party conferences, and in Africa
sometimes by enlisting the support of or taking over, non-political
organizations such as trade unions, co-operative organizations, youth
and women's associations and even social clubs.6 The political parties
are also the principal actors on the parliamentary stage. Finally, they

14
control the executive or administrative machinery. In all these spheres
and at the various levels in the Fourth Republic, the political parties will
have a heavy responsibility to ensure that the democratic machinery
works. When party politics started in African countries in the late fifties
and early sixties, it was not uncommon for political parties engaged in
competitive bidding for support among the electorate to carry out this
particular function to the accompaniment of violence. Over the years
this penchant for violence has decreased, though there are recurring
situations which are always in danger of regression into violence. At the
level where violence does occur, it is the supporters and very junior
officials of the party at the grassroots who are usually involved. In the
Fourth Republic, it will be the duty of the regional and national officers
of the parties to keep the temperature of political debate low and to
restrain their supporters so that the temptation to violence can be held
in check, and democratic stability encouraged. Experience in the
Second and Third Republics suggests that, provided there is goodwill
and there are no inflammable political issues extant, it should be easy to
maintain at the grassroots level the conditions of democratic stability.
It should also be relatively easy for political parties to maintain the
conditions of democratic stability on the executive level. Here there is
no party competition. The executive by its very nature is unitary and
different parties do not share it at one and the same time; they normally
alternate in a liberal-democratic system in controlling it. Here, then, all
that is required of political parties is not to abuse their power. In a liberal-
democratic political system, it is vital that the administrative machi­
nery of the state remain neutral as between the political parties so that
any of the parties that wins an election can count on the loyalty of the
machinery in implementing the party's policies. It is therefore incum­
bent on the party in power not to subvert the loyalties of the officials in
the administration or to fill the administrative machinery with its
supporters. This, of course, goes for the party or parties in opposition
also. The governing party must not have grounds to complain that the
opposition is subverting the officials in the administration and that it
cannot be sure its policies are being faithfully executed.
The temptation to subvert the loyalties of public officials is particu­
larly strong for highly ideological parties and parties that tend to see
society in terms of sharp cleavages. Current political conditions in the
country and the world generally are not likely to encourage parties to
develop along such lines and to that extent the forces pushing parties
into undemocratic practices will be relatively weak in the Fourth

15
Republic. It will still be necessary, though, for party leaders to bring
pressure to bear on the more youthful and radical of their followers to
ensure that moderation prevails. It takes only one major party to
embrace an extremist ideology for the whole democratic structure to
come tumbling down, as happened in Germany in the inter-war period.
Keeping the political temperature cool at the grassroots and keep­
ing hands off public officials will thus be essential if political parties are
to run the machinery of government in such a way as to promote
democracy. The parliamentary stage, however, appears to hold the key
to the maintenance of a democratic machinery of government. It is here
that government policy is finally hammered into law. It is here also that
there is a direct and intense clash between parties as they seek to fashion
society according to their ideal images or to apportion resources to
interests within society. Moreover the very manner in which legisla­
tures proceed with their business is highly conducive to conflict. Here,
there are channels which the opposition can use to frustrate the imple­
mentation of government policy and here too are opportunities the
government can use to muzzle the opposition. Above all, some of the
most powerful of the party leaders are in the legislature and therefore
have the opportunity to hammer out consensus on policy before it is
embodied in legislation.
The political parties in the legislature in the Fourth Republic, if they
are to promote democracy, will have to co-operate, through "the usual
channels"7to ensure that the wheels of legislation and policy-making are
smooth, that there is cross-fertilization of ideas and that, in this way,
consensus gains over conflict. By such behaviour, the political parties
can surely make a powerful contribution to democratic stability. This,
of course, does not necessarily flow from the mere presence of political
leaders in Parliament; for in the past, opposition parties in the country
have had occasion to complain in a way that suggests that the presence
of Ministers in Parliament did not induce collaboration between the
government and the opposition. But this only suggests that there are
other forces which help to shape the behaviour of political parties
towards one another. What this means is that the presence of opposition
leaders and Ministers in Parliament presents an opportunity missing
from the pure executive Presidency for legislature — executive cross
fertilization which can be exploited to promote the public good. It is up
to the parties to take up the opportunity. Few people realize the extent
to which successful parliamentary democracy depends on the co­
operation between opposing political parties inside the legislature, but

16
the maintenance of liberal democracy depends to a great extent on this.
If for one reason or another (say, tribal antipathy or personal
animosity), the parliamentary leaders of the opposing parties cannot get
on, Parliament will grind to a halt or obstructive opposition will generate
incoherent policies. Moreover, the right to pass a vote of censure against
Ministers could present great temptations. In a pure executive presi­
dency/the farthest Parliament can go in embarrassing the executive is
to turn down executive proposals made to parliament, or to hold up
appointments. These measures come to parliament from the President,
and even if they are defeated the administration can carry on whilst
modifications are worked out. The one power in this system that can
be employed by parliament to completely cripple executive action is the
power to approve the appointment of Ministers. If Parliament refuses
to approve the appointment of a Minister, to that extent the relevant
Ministry is crippled. In the modified executive presidency provided for
in the constitution for the Fourth Republic, a vote of censure against a
Minister has the same effect politically, if not legally, and where the
leaders of the parties are not in a mood to co-operate, the whole
administration could be crippled in this way.
The bridge provided in the Draft Constitution by the presence of
Ministers in Parliament therefore is either an opportunity the political
parties can exploit to build confidence between the executive and the
legislature so as to ensure that executive policy is suffused with the
thinking of Parliament, thus promoting smooth administration and
development, or it can be exploited to obstruct the machinery of
government and thus promote instability.

Conception of Opposition and Behaviour of Political Parties

In early nineteen century British Parliament, before the idea of opposi­

tion had been refined, a leader of the Opposition claimed that it was the
duty of the Opposition to oppose everything done by the government
and to turn out the government.8 No Opposition in a Ghana Parliament
has ever adopted such a crude view of its function. Ghanaian opposi­
tion parties have however often operated on the assumption that it is
the duty of the government to accept what the Opposition says, and the
refusal of governments to accept criticisms by the Opposition has led
to a certain desperation among the Opposition. Such desperation can
easily lead an opposition party in control of Parliament under the

17
Constitution of the Fourth Republic to adopt obstructionist tactics, using
in part the power to pass votes of censure. It is important, then, for
opposition parties to understand that in a representative system, it is not
incumbent upon the government to accept criticisms by the Opposition.
In the cabinet system, a desperate or frustrated Opposition can
disrupt parliamentary business and thus make it difficult, if not impos­
sible, for the government to govern, as the Irish nationalists demon­
strated in the British Parliament in the 1880s and 1890s. In the final
analysis, however, the Government in the cabinet system can have its
way because it has a majority in Parliament. The danger under the
modified presidential system provided for by the Draft Constitution is
that the President may not have a majority in parliament, and the
Opposition, with its majority in parliament, would then have complete
freedom to totally cripple the government. This suggests that successful
democratic government under the Fourth Republic will make a special
demand on the statesmanship of the leaders of political parties in
parliament; it will place a great premium on the capacity on all sides for
compromise and on the ability of the government to take criticism
without construing it into ill-will, lack of patriotism or treason, a
practice that is all too common on the African continent, and is
nurtured by a jaundiced perception of aspects of our culture.
A good example of this jaundiced perception of aspects of our
culture on which modem authoritarianism feeds is the claim that
there is not a word in any African or Ghanaian language for the English
word "opposition/' But what is necessary for a modern institution or
practice to take root in a new society is not the existence of indigenous
words corresponding in a one-to-one relationship to certain modem
words, but traditional practices which serve the same purpose as
particular modem practices. From this perspective, it is false to claim
that there were no practices in African traditional political systems
which served the function of a modem opposition. There was in the
Akan political system an institution which was very similar to an
"opposition" in a modem liberal-democratic political system. This was
the institution of Nhvankuxm among the Asante. The expression is
synonym ous with another Akan word mmerante which means
"youth." Essentially the Nkwankivaa comprised the free citizens who
were neither members of the chief s council nor "elders." It is because
of this that Busia called them "commoners."9
The Nkwankioaa constituted an unofficial unit recognized with a
right to publicly express their opinion on matters concerning the

18
society, and this they did through an association of their own. The
Nkivankivaa even had a recognized leader, the Nkivankivaahene (i.e.
Nkioankicm chief) whose title was, unlike other ahenfo (chiefs), not a
hereditary one. He was chosen by the Nkivankwaa themselves for his
bravery and eloquence and he articulated their views before the elders.
In essence the position of the Nhvankioaa was that of the opposition in
a modern liberal-democratic system. It stood outside the ch iefs
government and had the right to criticize it. Indeed it is significant that
whereas an elder ran the danger of being suspected of disloyalty or
even treason if he criticized the chief, the Nkivaiihvaahene faced no
such danger for discharging this function. The elder was part of the
government, a cabinet Minister, if you like, and had no more right to
publicly criticize the chief than a modem cabinet minister has to
criticize his/her Prime Minister. On the other hand, theNkivankivaahene
stood outside the Government, and had the same right as the modem
"leader of the Opposition" to marshall public criticism of the Govern­
ment.
In the early part of the century, as the traditional political system
reeled under the impact of "modern forces," theNhvankwaa be­
came such an effective focus of anti-chief sentiments that the Asante
Confederacy abolished the institution of Nkivankivaahene. The institu­
tion of Nhmnkivaa was highly developed in Ashanti, but under the
name of Asafo, it was also to be found among both the Akan and non-
Akan ethnic groups along the coast. Inability to tolerate criticism or
opposition cannot therefore be ascribed to the culture nurtured by the
traditional system of government. The political parties thus face no
cultural barrier in developing the habits of responsible opposition and
of acceptance of criticism.
It is crucial, however, to the success of democracy in the Fourth
Republic to understand that governments come into power in democra­
cies with their own programmes and that they come into power in an
executive presidency such as is provided for under the Draft Constitu­
tion for a definite period during which they are under a political
obligation to implement their programme. The government of the day
may choose to modify its programme only if it is convinced by the
arguments of the Opposition (a rather rare occurrence), by the turn of
events, or by a change in public opinion.
But it is no part of democratic theory that the government must
accept the criticisms of the Opposition; an Opposition that wants the
government to accept its criticisms and change its policy as a result,

19
must rely for this on a change in public opinion. Opposition criticisms
must therefore be responsible and well-informed.
An irresponsible and uninformed or ill-informed opposition is
likely to expose itself as a merely fractious opposition out to discredit the
government just so that it can gain office and the perquisites that go with
it. In debates in the legislature an ill-informed opposition is likely to be
worsted by the Government. On both counts the Opposition is unlikely
to convince the public to return it to power. It is therefore important that
the party or parties in opposition keep themselves well-informed if the
alternation of political parties in power, a practice which keeps the
hberal-democratic body politic so healthy, is to operate in the Fourth
Republic. Political parties in opposition can keep themselves well
informed by having their own research units and policy committees
into which sympathetic experts are drawn. Even in developed coun­
tries political parties in Government which can indirectly rely on the
expert services of bureaucrats and technocrats in government find it
necessary to have such research units and policy committees, for they
cannot assume ideological affinity with such officials.
Another condition of responsible and effective opposition is a free
press. Without a press that ferrets out information, especially informa­
tion that is inconvenient to the authorities, the party in opposition is
bound to miss a lot of information that can give bite and solidity to its
criticism, and the Government party is also bound to miss a lot of
information that can make it effective and enlightened. Thus, it will be
necessary early in the life of the Fourth Republic for the political parties
to put their heads together to put flesh on the right to information
guaranteed in theory by the new Constitution. (The Constitution only
guarantees "the right to... information, subject to such qualifications and
laws as are necessary in a democratic society.")10 This can be done by
passing a Freedom of Information Act which will compel officials to
make available, at least to accredited journalists and bona fide research­
ers, any official information that is not legally and expressly classified as
being confidential or secret, the Act narrowly defining what is confiden­
tial and what is secret. In this way the constitutional "right to informa­
tion, subject to such qualifications and laws as are necessary in a
democratic society" can be fleshed out and concretized so that journal­
ists can in practice have access to official information11 without having
first to genuflect before officials or to subject themselves to threats and
abuse. It is particularly important that journalists know in concrete
detail what the 'law s (and) qualifications necessary in a democratic

20
society" are.
Another way of ensuring that political parties will be effective,
particularly in Parliament and in controlling the bureaucracy is via
specialist committees in Parliament. Largely as a result of our British
inheritance of cabinet government, we have not (i.e. until the Third
Republic) made use of specialist committees in Parliament. Because of
the fear of destroying or diluting cabinet control of policy and the
collective responsibility of cabinet to Parliament, the British House of
Commons has relied predominantly on "generalist" committees and
shied away from specialist or select committees.12The generalist com­
mittees do not allow the legislature to develop that expert insight into
administrative processes which it needs to be able to subject executive
policy to informed and therefore effective criticisms. This is the justifi­
cation of the strictures of the 1968 (Akuffo Addo) Constitutional Com­
mission in respect of the ability of members of modem legislatures to
cope with legislation:

Legislative work in modem states has tended to increase in volume

and to cover very complex subjects. Owing to the vast volume of
legislation that has to be dealt with and the complex nature of the
subject matter involved, even the most assiduous of legislators
have found themselves unable to understand most of the legisla­
tion which have to be churned out.13

Up to this point in the history of Ghana, Parliament had satisfied

itself with generalist committees in carrying out its functions except for
those committees that related to the internal organization of Parliament
itself i.e. Public Accounts, Administrative and Rules Committees. The
1968 Constitutional Commission recommended that in addition to the
generalist committees, specialist committees should also be appointed
and given extensive powers to "investigate and inquire into the acti­
vities and administration, (including legislative proposals) of Ministers
or Departments assigned to them." 14The Commission failed to consider
the implications of this recommendation for the cabinet system of
government it recommended. It is not surprising that the 1969 Constitu­
ent Assembly declined to accept this recommendation.15It was not until
the 1979 Constitution provided for an executive presidency that Parlia­
ment felt free to set up specialist committees even though such commit­
tees were not mandated by that constitution, and they performed
admirably the responsibilities of being watch dogs over their ministries.
The collective responsibility of the cabinet to the legislature for

21
executive policy as a whole, which makes specialist committees prob­
lematic, is no part of the Constitution of the Fourth Republic. Parliament
will therefore have every incentive to take up the constitutional power
to set up specialist committees with extensive powers to undertake "the
investigation and inquiries into the activities and administration of
ministries and departments (which) may extend to proposals for legis­
lation." 16 Political parties having representation in the first Parliament
of the Fourth Republic will do well to set up such committees from the
very beginning. The committees must have the authority to call for both
witnesses, examine them on oath or affirmation, and compel production
of documents. 17 In this way the committees will be able to bring to
bear on the proceedings of Parliament informed considerations. Parlia­
ment in its turn will be able to scrutinize executive policy more effec­
tively. Policy will gain thereby and so will development. The reputation
of Parliament is bound to be favourably affected, and stability will
thereby be promoted.

Political Parties and the Public

Thus far we have argued that political parties need information for
effective performance of their functions and they need a press with bite
as well as specialist committees in the legislature for this condition to be
fulfilled. We have suggested further that political parties themselves
could help the press to do its work by getting a Freedom of Information
Act passed early in the life of the Fourth Republic. The press will thereby
be enabled to ferret out vital information which should enable Parlia­
ment and the political parties generally also to be effective. In the final
analysis, however, the controlling authority in a liberal-democratic
polity is the electorate. If the electorate is ill-informed, the political
parties themselves cannot be encouraged to be well-informed, and
policy, as laid down either by the legislature or the executive, is bound
to be inadequate. No doubt this has been at least partly responsible for
the inappropriate policies which have done Ghana and most African
countries so much harm. Here the political parties have a peculiar
responsibility.
In their dealings with the press, they can help it to generate reliable
information to help raise the standard of knowledge and of the intelli­
gence of the electorate. This they can do by appointing spokesmen on
various topics whom the press can tap for informed positions of the

22
parlies and specialist contributions to public debate. Such spokesmen
doubtless have to be members of the party committees in their field. If
they are members of Parliament they would also have to be members
of the relevant specialist Parliamentary Committees. In this way politi­
cal parties will lead a creditable campaign of public education, raise the
tone of public discussion and improve the quality of public policy. The
demagogue would increasingly be exposed for what he is, and an
important prop of military ad venturism would thereby be removed. No
doubt it would be essential to ensure that a political party does not have
a spokesman on a particular subject for which there is also a parliamen­
tary spokesman and that members of party committees are not substan­
tially different from their party members of the corresponding specia­
list parliamentary committee. Without ensuring this, the larger ques­
tion of the relationship between the party in parliament and the party
outside would arise. This is a question that has plagued many a
representative legislature in their early life. Early in the century, the
question arose in several European countries among "democratic"
(mostly socialist or labour) parties whether the parties in parliament
should be answerable to the party outside which worked for their
election.
In Britain as late as the 1960s, this problem was highlighted by the
repudiation of the nuclear policy of the Labour Parliamentary Party by
the Labour conference in 1961. In Ghana it arose in another form in the
Third Republic when the leader of the Parliamentary Opposition clashed
with the leader of the whole party, the Popular Front Party (PFP) who
was not in parliament and the former had to be changed. The basic
question raised here is whether the party can be said to owe more
allegiance to the party machinery in the whole country or broadly to the
electorate itself. When and if this question arises during the Fourth
Republic, a common sense solution would seem to be best. Both the
national party machinery and the party inside parliament should be
responsible to the electorate. The two are not independent of each
other and cannot act as such. Some machinery must therefore be found
for the two wings of the party to decide policy issues together. Thus the
party specialists in parliament and those outside will have to co-operate
in order partly not to confuse the public and partly to enrich general
policy. Such co-operation will ensure that when a political party takes
over the reins of government after an election, there will be people ready
to take over the Ministries instantly and give informed direction to them.
In their new position, the Ministers may not be in a position to

23
relate to the public to the same extent as when they were in opposition.
Here it would be useful to develop a cadre of public relations officers
who would liaise with the public and keep it fully informed. The
President would be well-advised to follow the American practice of
having spokesmen to liaise with the press. All this would be conducive
to good policy-making.
A free press is thus essential to responsible opposition. The Draft
Constitution makes provision for this, and it is incumbent on the poli­
tical parties to ensure that the free press is upheld in the Fourth Republic.
The press ensures that information about public affairs is in the public
domain. But it is now becoming increasingly clear that information that
is kept in official files may be equally or even be more important for
responsible and well-informed criticisms than information gathered
from the public at large, and this has given rise to freedom of infor­
mation laws in some countries.
The responsibility of political parties does not end here. If political
parties exist to serve the electorate, and in pursuit of this they have to
ensure that journalists have unfettered access to information on public
matters, then it is surely their duty also to ensure that their internal
activities as far as possible are not hidden from the public. In parti­
cular, the process of formulation of vital public policy and the election
of party officers should be open to the public. Here too the public is
bound to be represented by the media and other political parties; these
should be in a position to detect and expose shady activities. It should
not be possible in a democratic polity for a handful of individuals to
pick a presidential candidate and impose him on a whole party without
protest from the press and/or other political parties. Such an eventua­
lity would corrupt the Fourth Republic ab initio. . The belief that this is
how the leadership of the People's National Party (PNP) was chosen
under the Third Republic did much to undermine the leadership of the
state and to eventually lead to its overthrow. It would seem to follow
that political parties should be open to the public. Apart from activites
which clearly needs confidentiality, all other activites of political parties
should be open to the public at any rate through the press. All internal
party elections should be monitored by the press and forums where
public policies are hammered out should also be monitored by the press.
The Political Parties Law has made it mandatory for the Electoral
Commission to supervise intra-party elections. The intention behind
this provision may be praiseworthy; it may be an attempt to ensure that
openness of political parties that is necessary to an "open" society. But

24
it can be an unwelcome intrusion into theaffairs of political parties by the
state. Though the Electoral Commission is designed by the Constitution
to be independent of the Government, it is always difficult for institu­
tions sourced by the state to be completely independent of the Govern­
ment since the latter acts most of the time for the former and in any case
it is the President who appoints members of the Commission, even if
"in consultation with the Council of State."18 For this and other reasons
there is a question mark against the independence of the Electoral
Commission. Only the Chairman of the Commission and his Deputies
enjoy the conditions of service of the Court of Appeal and the High
Court respectively, leaving the position of the four other members
highly exposed. The latter can indeed claim other public offices. I
would therefore put the onus for ensuring the openness of political
parties on the parties themselves.
The provision of the Political Parties Law that the Electoral Com­
mission should supervise elections within political parties is, then, at
best a dubious provision. No doubt it was provided in pursuit of the
provision of the Draft Constitution 1992 that "the internal organization
of a political party shall conform to democratic principles." 19 But this
constitutional provision itself is dubious partly because of the
ambiguity of the expression "democratic principles" and partly because
I believe that the operation of "inner party democracy" in this century
has proved perfectly compatible with the existence of anti-democratic
oligarchical tendencies within political parties; the "iron law of oligar­
c h / ' enunciated by Robert Michels some eighty years ago has been
largely borne out by the history of the erstwhile communist party of the
Soviet Union,20 "the radical revolutionary" parties of the Third World21
and the works of such scholars as Seymour Martin Lipset22 and Robert
T. Mckenzie.23 Oligarchies are a mortal enemy of democracy, and
nothing defeats them more than publicity.
It is worth noting that the informal links previously referred to are
not confined to political parties in a democratic system of government.
In a democratic polity there are also informal links, in addition to
whatever formal ones there may be, between the political parties and
non-political associations and social groups. There are the interest and
pressure groups "which provide for the aggregation, articulation and
transmission of group demands when these demands are made through
or upon governments."24 Executive policy and parliamentary and
subordinate legislation affect a range of groups and associations with
whom policy and legislation need to be discussed in a pluralist demo­

25
cracy. Some of these groups and associations are so powerful that
they may be by-passed only at the risk of instability. There may be,
there indeed usually are, official committees through which such pow­
erful groups as trade unions, employers' and professional associations,
students' unions and chiefs may formally be consulted at the stage
where formal decisions are being made in the governm ental
machinery.
The political parties need to sustain these in the Fourth Republic.
But long before this stage is reached, ideas are formulated which
ultimately serve as the basis of policy and legislation. At this stage the
formal machinery is not of much use, and informal links have to be
exploited to the full. It is essential therefore that political parties in the
Fourth Republic develop their informal links with social groups and
associations as much as possible, for these are the avenues through
which most of the inputs society as such makes into the political
system are channelled. In the final analysis a political system exists to
process the demands of society into policy outputs. This is only a
technical way of expressing what Edmund Burke said in the eighteenth
century, that a constitution is a contrivance of the human mind to satisfy
human wants. Indeed, as Robert McKenzie said more than thirty years
ago, "pressure groups, taken together, are a far more important channel
of communication than parties for the transmission of political ideas
from the mass of the citizenry to their rulers."25 If political stability in the
Fourth Republic is to have a reasonable chance of survival, the political
parties must ensure that they are in constant dialogue with these
interest and pressure groups, using the avenues of informal as well as
formal links, to ensure that legislation and policies are not simply
imposed but are the result of genuine consensus.

Political Parties and "Non-Political" Offices

So far the discussion has centred on the more "political" sphere of the
machinery of government. It has steered clear of the "administrative"
machinery and the judiciary. In a liberal-democratic system, political
parties in control of the executive branch of the state do lose elections
and give way to other parties ever so often. The administration is
expected to serve whichever party is put in charge of the executive by
the electorate. For this reason the administration or the public service
is normally expected to be neutral as between political parties, and the

26
political parties in return are expected not to have links with the public
service other than what necessarily flows from their control of the
executive upon winning elections. This is all that the neutrality of the
civil service boils down to and is completely different from the larger
question whether the Civil Service is neutral as between classes. But
this limited position has not always been accepted in this country.
During the First Republic it was maintained that the civil service should
not be independent of the party in power and that it had to be
brought into line with the "socialist aspirations" of the Convention
People's Party (CPP).26
It must be recognized that Nkrumah was not a believer in liberal-
democracy, and after 1962 the CPP was wholly antagonistic to the
ideology.27 Moreover the 1960 constitution was hardly liberal-demo­
cratic. Now the Constitution of the Fourth Republic is thoroughly
liberal-democratic and seems to beacceptable to all the emerging parties,
including those in theCPP-PNP tradition. In such a political atmosphere
it would be going against the grain for any political party to seek to tie
the Civil Service in particular or the Public Service generally to its
apron strings either structurally or ideologically.
All political parties need to bear in mind that any attack on the
political neutrality of the public services, as explained above, would
constitute an attack on the democratic system of the Fourth Republic.
And this will be so whether the attack consists of seizure of power to
appoint and dismiss public servants or indoctrination of public servants,
for any such attempt would ultimately violate the Constitution.28 There
is hardly any act permitted by the Constitution which cannot be done
without first indoctrinating public servants or gaining absolute control
over the public services. This is a crucial point that needs careful
exploration, for it is sometimes argued that parliamentary institutions
cannot be used to implement socialist principles. But to implement
socialist principles which, for example, constitute an attack on the right
to private property, it would only be necessary, under the Fourth
Republic, to amend the constitution as it would be necessary if trade
unions were to be abolished to facilitate the operations of market
mechanisms. Thus the Constitution provides a way out of a seeming
quandary.29 So even a radical socialist party bent on a "revolutionary"
reconstruction of Ghanaian society need not threaten democratic
stability in the Fourth Republic, provided it is prepared to submit to the
considered and expressed opinion of the electorate on matters of funda­
mental social importance.

27
 It must be admitted that if such a party is not prepared to abide by
the results of a referendum on a question that touches on the fundamen­
tal democratic rights guaranteed by the Fourth Republic, then the party
is an anti-democratic one and hence anti-Fourth Republic. The other
democratic parties will then have an obligation to isolate it, as both the
communists and the Gaullists were isolated in the Fourth French
Republic. This argument does not apply to only "revolutionary" attacks
on the Constitution. Political parties need to be on their guard against
any general doctrines that are incompatible with theconstitutional order
of which the Draft Constitution forms the core. The Constitution
outlaws any attempt "to impose on the people of Ghana a common
programme or a set of objectives of a religious or political nature,"30 or
the establishment of a one-party state or any attempt to "suppress the
lawful political activity" of Ghanaians.31 But it will not be politic to wait
until a political party reaches fora constitutional instrument of political
subversion before the other political parties act. As soon as a political
party bares its unconstitutional or totalitarian teeth in the normal
political fight, the democratic parties must team up to treat it like a
pariah, thus denying it the opportunity of translating its ideas into
executive policy. This will be no attack on the constitutional rights of the
party under attack. Under the Constitution a political party onlyTias a
right "to participate in shaping the political will of the people, to
disseminate information on political ideas, social and economic
programmes ... and sponsor candidates for elections to any public
office."32 The Constitution does not guarantee the right to hold office or
to be in power; that is the prerogative of the electorate, as represented
by parties in parliament.
In the broadest sense, the judiciary is part of the machinery of
government since the maintenance of law, order and justice is the first
responsibility of the State on whose behalf the Government acts. Nev­
ertheless it is inconceivable that any political party that forms the
government in a liberal-democratic state and hence in the Fourth
Republic could attempt to either establish its control over the judiciary
or work out an organic relationship with it.
Control of a political party over the judiciary is one of the marks of
totalitarian rule which the Constitution of the Fourth Republic is de­
signed to exorcise in the first place, and any attempt to institute it would
be a signal that the party attempting it has designs on the Constitution
itself and is eligible for the status of a pariah, thus attracting the stem
attentions of the other parties as suggested above. The independence

28
of the judiciary and its neutrality in political conflicts are vital to the
maintenance of a liberal-democratic polity. A party that controls the
judiciary is well on the way to using it as an instrument of political
conflict; by such control a party acquires a formidable instrument
to suppress other parties.
T he argument that no party should attempt to control either the
administrative machinery or the judiciary is only one concrete aspect
of a general philosophy. Liberal democracy can only survive on the vital
hypothesis that the machinery of the state is neutral both as between
parties and as between classes. The latter aspect of the hypothesis is a
vast topic that would take us far afield. In this chapter we must confine
ourselves to the neutrality of the state machinery as between political
parties. Liberal democracy substitutes peaceful resolution of political
conflicts, however acute they may be, for violent resolution which
plagued European states before they took to liberal democracy whilst
at the same time involving the mass of the people in the affairs of state.
Peaceful resolution of social conflicts is not possible unless those
who are thrown up in the political process can rely on the state machin­
ery to implement the resolution that for the moment is acceptable to
those in control. To attack the neutrality of the state machinery is thus
to suggest that some political forces cannot implement their preferred
resolution of social conflicts, no matter what the verdict of the political
process is. It is this very claim by Marxists which makes Marxism
incompatible with liberal democracy. As we have pointed out above, the
Marxist denial of the neutrality of the state is premised on the irreconcil­
ability of class conflicts. But it is not only the Marxist argument which
represents a threat to liberal democracy. Every attempt to strip the state
machinery of its neutrality, whether founded on inordinate ambition,
short-sightedness or prejudice represents such a threat; and it is incum­
bent on political parties in the Fourth Republic to be on the look-out for
the signs of attack, whether direct or indirect, on the neutrality of the
state. The old saying that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance is thus
particularly germane to the preservation of representative democracy
in the Fourth Republic.
It must thus be recognized that the demand that is occasionally
made that the "revolutionary organs" should be retained under the
Fourth Republican Constitution could pose a problem. No one has so
far authoritatively identified the revolutionary organs. They may,
however, be said to be those political organs that either have suppor­
ted the regime that was launched on 31st December 1981 or were called

29
 into being as part of that regime. Of these the June Fourth Movement
is the best known, but there are also the New Democratic Movement,
the People's Revolutionary League of Ghana, the African Youth Com­
mand and the Pan-African Youth Movement. Of the second category of
revolutionary organs (those called into being as part of the regime), the
only surviving ones are the Committees for the Defence of the Revolu­
tion (CDRs). One of the distinguishing characteristics of the CDRs, at
any rate during the period of militancy, i.e., the period, January -
November 1982, was their hostility to the judiciary. Of late the CDRs
have been quiescent but that appears to be tactical. There is the
possibility that they may merge with a political party in the Fourth
Republic, as the June Four Movement has already done, and press on
with their hostility to the traditional judiciary. In so far as the rule of
law is one of the indispensable pillars of the liberal-democratic system,
such an eventuality would pose a threat to the democratic stability of
the Fourth Republic. All political parties committed to the liberal-
democratic system thus have an obligation to avoid harbouring the
CDRs.
Cries for "continuity7' in the Fourth Republic that are constantly
being made by certain political forces in the country sometimes seem
to suggest that the "revolutionary" organs themselves should be re­
tained. This is a call that may or may not destabilize the Fourth Repu­
blic, depending on how the political parties react to them. The Public
Tribunals are the only part of the state machinery that was called into
being as a result of the "revolution" of 31st December 1981. The Public
Tribunals have, however, been incorporated in the regular judiciary.
Thus, these particular "revolutionary" organs have been retained; and
since their retention has been done in such a way as not to threaten the
rule of law, the Regional Tribunals under the Constitution are fully
subject to the supervision of the Court of Appeal33 and they will not be
in a position to undermine the liberal-democratic system. The only other
revolutionary organs left that are or purport to be part of the state
machinery are the CDRs. Will their retention pose a threat to the poli­
tical system of the Fourth Republic? The CDRs are not in reality part of
the state machinery; they came into being in January 1982 in response to
a call by the Chairman of the PNDC for "popular" support for the 31st
December "Revolution." They have, therefore, provided a basis of
support for the PNDC and are expected to perform essentially political
functions such as checking corruption and detecting acts that can
retard production. They have also been expected to ensure support for

30
the regime by "conscientizing" the people in defence of "the Revolu­
tion."
In the Fourth Republic one would expect the Government to rely
on the regular security services to check corruption and the ordinary
citizen to detect acts that retard production, thereby leaving only the
function of conscientizing the people to the CDRs. For all that, however,
theCDRs are in fact political bodies which should be able to co-exist with
the Fourth Republic, provided they do not advocate the forcible over­
throw of the Republic or subvert it. If they do not subvert the Fourth
Republic or advocate its forcible overthrow, it should be legitimate for
any political party to work with them or even absorb them. The fact that
they came into existence to defend the 31 st December Revolution should
not make their continued existence incompatible with democratic stabil­
ity. It is, of course, highly probable that theCDRs will advocate doctrines
which, if accepted by the public, will undermine the liberal-democratic
system. But this is a classic dilemma of liberal democracy which can be
resolved in conformity with the liberal-democratic principle of freedom
of speech by persuading the public by word and by deed to repudiate
those doctrines. In the final analysis liberal-democracy can only survive
by demonstrating its superiority over authoritarianism and dictatorship
in satisfying the material and spiritual needs of society as a whole.
Nevertheless, if the CDRs were to advocate such doctrines, it would be
incumbent upon the political parties committed to liberal democracy to
shun them, as already advocated. To shun them would encourage the
public also to repudiate their anti-democratic doctrines.
It is not only the CDRs that constitute a threat to the liberal-
democratic system of the Fourth Republic. In so far as the "31st
December Revolution" has had a consistent ideology, (it is hostile to
liberal-democratic politics, and all the revolutionary organs have shared
this ideology) it is, to say the least, risky for any political party
committed to the political system of the Fourth Republic to embrace
such organs.
The whole question of what to do with these revolutionary organs
in the Fourth Republic touches fundamentally on the freedom of
political parties in the Republic. The Draft Constitution forbids compul­
sory membership of a political party or movement. Subject to this
limitation, political parties are free to develop links with interest and
pressure groups; and indeed all citizens are guaranteed the right and
the freedom to form or join political parties of their choice. If political
parties arise which (whether as a result of merging with revolutionary

31
organs or by virtue of their own ideology) turn out to be antagonistic to
the liberal-democratic political system and in particular to articles 55(16)
and 56 of the Draft Constitution, such political parties can only be said
to be dysfunctional to the machinery of government of the Fourth
Republic, and the country would be thrown back to 1963-66 during
which the country became a one-party state.

Conclusion

The existence of several political parties per se is not a requirement of

democracy. What in this respect is a requirement of democracy is
freedom of speech and association, and the existence of political parties
is the inevitable consequence of this. It is perfectly possible to have a
dominant one-party system asa result of the repeated choice of one party
in free and fair elections by the electorate, as in India and as contemplated
for the United Kingdom by Samuel H. Beer in the early Sixties.35 Hence
the Draft Constitution is right in guaranteeing "the right (of Ghanaians)
to form political parties" and the freedom of parties "to participate in
shaping the political will of the people....," and forbidding compulsory
party membership. This properly implies that there may be other
groups and associations which may also participate in shaping the
political will. These groups and associations are the interest and
pressure groups mentioned above. I have suggested above that to create
a really stable democratic social fabric, it is necessary for both formal and
informal links to be maintained between political parties and these
groups. It is through these links that "the political will" of the society is
shaped in a democratic system. The formal links, I have also suggested,
come into play at the stage when executive policy is being formulated or
laws are being enacted. These links are thus vital to democratic stability.
But perhaps even more vital are the informal links, for these enable the
groups to make inputs into the formulation of basic ideas and attitudes
of political parties which underlie much official policy.
In Ghana some of the more important groups with which links have
to be established are the trade unions, the employers associations, the
National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS); professional associations,
youth associations, and religious associations. Of late there have come
into existence associations of queen mothers which seem intent on
making inputs into the political system. This innovation should remind
us that if political parties are to strike roots deep into the Ghanaian
society, they will have also to think of their links with the more tradi­

32
tional sectors of the society. In the past political parties have tended to
operate mainly in the modem political system, leaving the traditional
political systems to operate side by side with them and only exploiting
traditional grievances and levying "taxes" on the political power of
chiefs. Now that the Draft Constitution has forbidden chiefs to partici­
pate in' partisan politics and the queen mothers are rather asserting
themselves, it is perhaps time for political parties to strike direct roots
into the traditional social structures. At the very least, the opportunities
for cross fertilization that will be opened up are likely to bind the
traditional and more modem political systems in such a way as to impart
some of the stability of the traditional system to the more modem
system. The stability of the modem political system in Africa has been
at such a discount that no opportunity should be missed for increasing
its salience.

NOTES
1. Preamble to the Draft Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992.
2. J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government London: M.J.
Dent and Sons Ltd., 1954, p. 177.
3. Art. 78 of the (i) the Draft Constitution, 1992.
4. Ibid., Art 82 (i) and (5).
5. I say "convention" because the American Constitution does not prohibit
congressmen from being Secretaries nor Secretaries from serving
in Congress.
6. Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties . Penguin, 1961 p.73.
7. See Ivor Jennings, Parliament. CUP, 2nd ed. 1957 pp.151-152.
8. Ivor Jennings, Ibid. , p. 167.
9. The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashant Frank Cass,
1968, orginally published in 1951, p.9. (The account ofNkwankivaa:
given here is based on this work esp. pp.9.ff.)
10. Draft Constitution I992LArt. 21 (f).
11. See "G.J.A. Calls for Law Granting Access to Information" People's Daily
Graphic, Saturday, June 27,1992, p.l.
12. See A.H. Hanson and H.V. Wiseman, "The Use of Committees by the
House of Commons" Public Law, 1959, reprinted in Benewick and
Dowse Readings in British Politics and Government, London Univversity
of London Press, 1968 esp. pp.261-264.
13. The Proposals of the Constitutional Commission for a Constitution for Ghana,
1968 Memorandum par. 453.
11. Ibid.., pars 455458; see also the Proposed Constitution: Art. 81 (2) and (3).
T See The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1969 Art, 81(2) and(3).
33
16. See Art.l03(3) of Draft Constitution of the Republic of Charm, 1992.
17. Ibid., Art. 103(6).
18. See Art. 43(1) of the Draft Constitution, 1992.
19. See Robert Michels Political Parties, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949.
20. See Rupert Emerson, "Political Modernization: The Single-Party
System" in C. Macridis, ed. Political Parties, Contemporary Trends and
Ideas Harper Torchbooks, 1967.
21. S. M. Lipset, Political Man, The Social Bases of Politics. London: Heinemann,
1960, esp. chap. III.
22. S. M. Lipset, ibid.
23. R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties; London: Heinemann, 1955. The
much earlier work of M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of
Political Parties. London: Macmillan, 1902, is also instructive.
24. R.T. McKenzie, "Pressure Groups and the British Political Parties" in
Benewick and Dowse, eds., op. cit., p.144.
25. R.T. McKenzie, British Political Partiest p.42.
26. See Programme of the Convention People's Partyfor Work and Happiness Accra:
The Central Committee of the Party, 1962., Section 129, and Kwame
Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite. London: Heinemann, 1963, p.84.
27. B.D.G. Folson, "The Development of Socialist Ideology in Ghana/'Ghana
Social Science ]ourrml Vol.l, Nos: 1 and 2 and the Programme for Work and
Happiness.
28. Indoctrination would violate "freedom of thought, conscience and belief"
guaranteed by Art. 21(b) of the Draft Constitution 1992 and power to
appoint and dismiss public servants would violate Arts. 191 and 195(1).
29. The quandary is very real for those operating in a country where there is
no written constitution which provides the avenue of constitutional
amendment and where therefore a radical socialist surgery can be
legitimately regarded as an outrageous attack on the right to private
property. This is the point such writers as Ralph Miliband miss. See
his Parliamentary Socialism London , 1961 and The State in Capitalist
Society. London, 1969.
30. Draft Constitution 1992, Art. 56.
31. Ibid., Art. 3.
32. Ibid., Art. 55(3).
33. Ibid., Art. 137.
34. Ibid., Art.55 (16) and Art. 56.
35. S.H. Beer "Democratic One-Party Government for Britain" in The Political
Quarterly, 1961, reproduced in R. Benewick and R. Dowse, op. cit.,
pp.22-32.

34
 Chapter 3

LEG ISLA TIO N ON PO LITICAL PA RTIES

Kofi Kumado

Introduction

While the question of their nature, role and funding remains controver­
sial, political parties have been recognized as part and parcel of the
foundations and the machinery of constitutional democracy. It was,
therefore, not surprising that at a time when official attitude to political
parties was decidedly hostile, a report on the government-sponsored
forums on the future governance of Ghana was compelled to admit that
the vast majority of Ghanaians were not opposed to them. That report
by the National Commission on Democracy (NCD) ensured that, what­
ever the official misgivings about them may be, political parties would
feature in the machinery established for the governance of the country
in the Fourth Republic. This chapter discusses the current legislation on
the formation and operation of political parties.1
Historically, legislation on political parties in Ghana has sought to
achieve four basic objectives. Firstly and, most importantly, the legisla­
ture has tried to prevent the formation of sectional parties. Thus shortly
after independence, the Avoidance of Discrimination Act was passed to
prohibit organizations based on tribal, racial, religious or local affilia­
tions from being formed to contest elections. Given the heterogeneous
nature of the country, the pursuit of this objective is not surprising,
though one must admit this particular legislation was later abused.
Secondly, legislation has been aimed at establishing the machinery and
the modalities for examining the sources of income of political parties.
Thirdly, the legislature has sought to control and regulate the powers of
the parties and to ensure that, as crucial participants in a democratic
process, they are run along democratic lines. Lastly, legislation has been
used to keep out of the political process persons deemed to be ineligible
to hold public office by the governm ent in pow er. As w e shall see
later in this chapter, current legislation pursues these and other
objectives.

35
Legislative Sources

Before proceeding to a detailed discussion of the rules, it will be helpful,

at the outset, to draw attention to the relevant sources. The major sources
of the current rules are (i) the Constitution prepared by the Consultative
Assembly and approved at referendum by the people in April 1992;
(ii) Public and Political Party Office Holders (Declaration of Assets and
Eligibility) Law, 1992 (PNDCL 280) requiring the national executive
members of a political party to declare their assets as a condition for
being eligible to hold office in the party; (iii) Political Parties Law, 1992,
(PNDCL 281) as amended by Law 281 being the principal legislation on
the subject of this paper; (iv) Public Order Decree, 1972 (NRCD 68) in so
far as it relates to the holding of meetings, rallies, protest marches and
other demonstrations; (v) Income Tax Decree, 1975 (SMCD 5) as vari­
ously amended, in view of the provisions relating to the declaration of
assets by principal office holders of political parties and the general rules
for the financing of the parties to be found in the existing law; and
(vi) Interim National Electoral Commission Law, 1991 (PNDCL 271)
establishing the Commission (hereinafter referred to as INEC) as the
principal state organ for the administration of elections and general
oversight of the electoral process. While this chapter concentrates on the
Political Parties Law and the Constitutional provisions, references will
be made to the other sources whenever appropriate.

Constitutional Provisions

The inclusion of rules on the organization and control of political parties

in constitutional documents is of fairly recent origin. Political parties
being in substance just social organizations reflecting the exercise by the
people of their freedom of association, constitution-makers did not feel
it necessary to single them apart from other politically-oriented volun­
tary associations. By the mid-fifties, however, the fact that the nature of
their mandate and raison d'etre went beyond that of purely private
organizations and therefore requiring some regulation within the basic
law of the land had become accepted. By including provisions relating
to them in the constitution, political parties were recognized as constitu­
tional organs of state for securing popular input into government.
Therefore it should not be considered surprising that the 1992 Constitu­
tion contains provisions on political parties. Indeed the 1979 Constitu-

36
tion had set the precedent.
The relevant provisions in the 1992 Constitution are Articles 21 (3),
55, 56 and 248, and we will now consider them seriatim. Clause 3 of
Article 21 preserves the associational rights of the citizen, including the
right to form political parties.
The principal provision in the Constitution on the subject, how­
ever, is Article 55. This Article guarantees the right to form political
parties for the purpose, inter alia, of shaping the political will of the
people, disseminating information on political ideas and sponsoring
candidates for election to any public office. The provision requires that
political parties shall have a national character. Accordingly, parties
based solely on ethnic, religious, regional or other sectional consider­
ations are proscribed. Thus the national executive committee and the
founding members of a political party must come from all regions. In
the case of founding members the rule is that there must be at least one
from each district of the country. At the moment, there are 110 districts.
Besides, a political party is not allowed to have a name, emblem, colour,
motto or other symbol that has sectional connotations. Interesting
questions arise relating to the pursuit of parochial ideologies. But
perhaps once these are practised through programmes which are
national in character, they would not fall foul of the Article.
While thus providing for political parties, Article 55, in its clause 10,
preserves the right of the citizen to participate as an individual both in
the general political process and in the contest for elections. An interest­
ing provision in this regard is clause 16. This clause provides that a
member of an organization or interest group shall not, by virtue of such
membership, be compelled to join a particular political party. An
example may clarify the purport of this clause. The Trades Union
Congress executive may choose to align the Congress with a particular
political party. But it cannot compel the individual union members as
union members to join that party. One may question whether attempts
to compel members of certain social groups to join the government-
sponsored National Democratic Congress are not inconsistent with this
provision.
Article 55 also requires equal access to the public media for all
political parties. Finally, non-nationals are not allowed to make financial
contribution or donation to a political party. Article 56 merits full
quotation. It reads:

Parliament shall have no power to enact a law to establish or

37
 authorize the establishment of a body or movement with the right
or power to impose on the people of Ghana a common programme
or set of objectives of a religious or political nature.

This is an expanded version of provisions in the 1969 and 1979

Constitutions prohibiting Parliament from establishing a single-party
state as had been done by Parliament under the Nkrumah regime. It has
to be remembered, though, that the Nkrumah regime achieved that
result after receiving the mandate from the people at a referendum as
prescribed by the 1960 Constitution. By placing the limitation on
parliament, the framers are hoping obviously to deny the procedural
means by which a one-party state can be declared even if the people
approved of it. However, nothing is provided to stop an amendment
which removes the prohibition on parliament.
What is not clear from the text above is whether a body established
to educate the citizenry on desirable goals or ideas such as democracy,
constitutionalism and the rule of law will also fall foul of this provision.
Indeed, at the moment, we have in existence the NCD established by law
one of whose objectives is to educate us on democracy and other civic
issues. Would it have to be disbanded after the Constitution comes into
force? And if its existence, strictly speaking, is incompatible with the
Constitution, should we dismantle it no was we make the transition from
military rule to constitutional government? The key to a proper under­
standing of Article 56 would seem to be in the phrase “with the right or
power to impose/' It may be argued that a body established to educate
people does not have the right or pozver to impose the ideas embodied
in the educational programmes on the people. Ultimately the people
decide what to do with those ideas to which they have been exposed.
However, one may note in passing that the history of mankind and
politics in the Third World shows that it is a short step from believing
in a set of ideas as desirable to the inclination to take the necessary steps
to put in place the machinery for realizing those ideas. On that reading,
the issue raised in this paragraph becomes not so easy to resolve.
Finally, Article 240 excludes political parties from local govern­
ment elections, and candidates in such elections are not allowed to use
the symbols or machinery of political parties. This is a continuation of
the no-party philosophy which is central to the local government
reforms introduced by the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC)
government. While it may have made sense under a military govern­
ment in which party political activity was a crime, the advisability of this

38
provision in a constitution that recognizes political parties explicitly and
guarantees the freedom of association as well is difficult to fathom.
Besides, a close reading of the constitutional document as a whole and
a composite view of the complementarity of the different levels of
government would suggest that this Article would be creating a lot of
problems for governance in the Fourth Republic. Perhaps other ways
should have been found to achieve the objective of establishing local
government units as true autonomous zones by wrenching them from
the apron-strings of central government which was the basic philosophy
underpinning the PNDC reforms in this area. As it is, we now have a
situation where political parties would try to influence local government
by indirect means, creating a sort of charade. It is the contention of this
chapter that this unhealthy situation merely creates a fertile area for
invidious litigation in the Fourth Republic.
The extensive treatment the chapter gives to the provisions of the
1992 Constitution necessarily compels an examination of the question
whether that Constitution is at present in force, in view of the fact that,
later, it will be argued that certain statutory provisions do not accord
with its letter or spirit. The view of the PNDC government and lawyers
of the strict constructionist school is that the Constitution will come into
force in January 1993according to the government7s declared programme.
Until then its provisions are of no consequence. This view has the
support of at least one High Court Judge who used it as a basis for
declining jurisdiction in a case in which some litigants sought to overturn
aspects of the electoral laws on the ground of incompatibility with the
Constitution. Others have argued to the contrary based on the accep­
tance of the document by the people in a referendum, common sense and
judicial precedent.
Indeed the controversy has produced startling public disagree­
ment among senior judges. This in turn prompted an obviously
bewildered reader to ask in a letter to one of the daily newspapers the
age-old question whether constitutional construction depends on some
neutral principles or the predilections of individual judges.
This chapter supports those who argue that whether the constitu­
tion is in force now is a non-issue. It is a dry legal issue. We should not
conduct elections using rules which are not compatible with the provi­
sions of the constitution under which the people to be elected would be
working. The chapter is emboldened in its view by the fact that a booklet
published by INEC for the public7s guidance treats relevant provisions
of the Constitution as applicable to its work.

39
Statutory Provisions

This section will highlight the main elements in the Political Parties Law,
1992 (PNDCL 281) in relation to some basic assumptions about political
parties in contemporary constitutional theory. The treatment will be in
four sub-divisions namely (a) definition of political parties, (b) general
provisions, (c) registration rules, (d) financial provisions. The next two
sections will then be devoted to an examination of the machinery
established for the administration, control and regulation, and oversight
of the political parties and the electoral process as well as general issues
arising from the statutory provisions.
At the outset, we may note here that discussions of the Political
Parties Law have been haunted by two basic factors. Firstly, the apparent
lack of neutrality on the part of the PNDC government arising from the
declared interest and suspicions about the political ambitions of key
members of the PNDC, including its Chairman. Secondly, the lack of
consultation with identifiable interests and political groups which re­
flects the irritating philosopher-king attitude and paternalism with
which the PNDC has run the affairs of state since coming into power on
31st December, 1992. Thus the fear that the PNDC is trying to be player
and referee in the political process is one which animates the reactions
of others to the rules provided for playing the political game. Besides,
Law 281 has been formulated in a cavalier fashion. It is wide in its sweep
and range. And its impact on historically recognized rights of the people
is demonstrably and unduly restrictive. It is as if the government loathes
the fact that it has been compelled to allow political parties to operate and
it has decided to make the process so burdensome and expensive as to
make it unattractive and uninviting.

Definition of a Political Party

The 1992 Constitution does not define a political party though it recog­
nizes the party, unlike the 1979 Constitution which provided a definition
in its Article 42(7). But section 33 of Law 281 defines a political party in
more or less the same terms as the 1979 Constitution. Section 33, in
language which is clearly not exhaustive, defines a political party as:

[including] any free association or organization of persons (whether

corporate or un-incorporated) one of whose objects is to bring
about the election of its candidates to public office or to strive for
power by the electoral process and by this means to control or
40
 influence the actions of Government.

Thus political parties, by this definition, are differentiated from other

voluntary social organizations by the fact that they seek to achieve their
aims through the electoral process. Conversely, a body which does not
seek to attain its ends through the electoral process is not a political party
according to this definition. Presumably, this will still be the case even if
a social organization seeks to influence those who employ the electoral
process consciously to control or influence government. On this reading,
it will be interesting to determine whether a religious organization
which continuously advises its members to vote for a particular candi­
date (whether a member of the organization or not) thereby becomes a
political party. The point is given added urgency by the fact that section
7, echoing Article 55(10) of the Constitution, gives every citizen of voting
age (i.e. 18 years) the right to participate in political activity intended to
influence the composition and policies of government. Section 7 also
makes an offence any attempt to suppress this lawful political activity
of an individual citizen.
Another issue which arises is the suggestion in the definition that
an un-incorporated body can be a political party. This is because section
3(3) stipulates that a political party, registered, under Law 281, shall be
a corporate body with perpetual succession and may sue or be sued in
its corporate name. This means at the least that an un-incorporated body
will not qualify to be registered under Law 281 as a political party. There
is a difficulty here which may have to be resolved by the courts at the
earliest opportunity, especially since it is an offence to operate as a
political party without being registered under Law 281.

General Provisions

The Law allows every citizen of voting age to form or join a political party
for the attainment of lawful ends. The right to form a political party is
more explicitly stated here than in Article 55(1) & 2 of the Constitution.
It thus restores the position originally approved by the Consultative
Assembly but which was curiously changed into a general guarantee in
the printed version of the Constitution.
As was provided in the Constitution, the Law prohibits sectional
political parties as well as the use of symbols, slogans and words which
smack of sectionalism. The rule against sectionalism is violated if the
membership or leadership of a political party is restricted to members of

41
a particular community, region, ethnic group, profession or religious
faith; the same applies if its structure and mode of operation are not
national in character.
Under Law 281, a person is not qualified to be a leader, a founding
member or a member of the executive of a political party if (a) he is not
qualified to hold a public office, or (b) he is otherwise disqualified from
being a parliamentarian by reason, for example, of being a chief or
belonging to the category of public officers debarred from elective office
by Article 94(3)(b); in addition, such a person must satisfy the assets
declaration law. A difficulty which arises here is the level of executive
officials covered. Does this include national, regional, district and other
levels of executive officials of a political party or is this confined to the
national executive only? Neither s.33 of Law 281 in its definition of
"executive officers of a political party" nor section 10 of Law 280 in its
definition of "principal office holders of a political party" would seem to
put the matter beyond doubt. Pragmatism would suggest that the
disability should attach only to the national executive while principle
will argue for an all-embracing conception. Only practice and time can
perhaps resolve this issue.
While the 1992 Constitution merely prohibits non-nationals from
making a contribution or donation to a political party, Law 281 prohibits
them from membership and holding of any office altogether. These
limitations on the political rights of aliens within the jurisdiction of the
country would seem to run counter to the grain of understanding under
the international human rights instruments in general and in particular
the jurisprudence under the International Bill of Rights and the African
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, whatever their justifications
may be.
In line with the 1992 Constitution, under Law 281 the internal
organization of a political party must be democratic. It is arguably in
pursuance of this principle that INEC is to supervise the election of the
regional and national executive officers of the political parties. This
requirement, which reflects a similar one under the 1969 and 1979
Constitutions, is to be welcomed. As has been argued elsewhere in this
chapter, political parties are good for the establishment of a vigorous
and vital democracy. Their existence exploits the idea that in unity lies
strength. They ensure that the people are not afraid to defend a
constitutional democracy by mobilizing them to action. It is thus
essential for the survival and flourishing of political pluralism in a state
that political parties are organized, in relation to their own internal set­

42
up and practice, in conformity with democratic principles. This will
bring the additional benefit of helping to mould a democratic culture
within the society. Three misgivings that may be expressed here relate
to the role of INEC in the election of regional and national executive
officers, the absence of a definition of democracy in either the La w or the
Constitution and the debarring of chiefs. INEC's role gives the state an
unnecessarily intrusive responsibility. It is a role that has the seeds to
embarrass the agency, given its other general oversight responsibilities
to be considered later. Th ° rule debarring the chiefs places an unjustifi­
able limitation on their freedom of association.

Registration Rules

There is a general requirement of registration for all political parties. The

registration must be with INEC. In this connection, it is to be noted that
it is an offence (a) to operate a political party, 0?) to put forward a
candidate or campaign for votes for a political party, which has not been
registered. In view of the conditions for registration stipulated in the
Law, one would have thought that the pre-registration steps necessary
for satisfying those conditions would be allowed by the Law. This is not
so. The result is that these aspects of the Law have been honoured more
in the breach than in the observance and with impunity. The legislature
here could have taken a leaf from corporate law and practice which
permits pre-incorporation measures and makes them binding on the
corporate entity once it comes into existence. Clearly a legal requirement
which is incapable of compliance with by the most law-abiding citizen
does a disservice to society, is subversive of respect for law and thus
undermines the rule of law. It is to be hoped that this aspect of the Law
will be given an early review.
An application for registration must satisfy the general conditions
noted earlier in this Section. In addition, it must comply with the specific
modalities and conditions stipulated in sections 8 to 11 of Law 281.
Briefly, a political party must have a constitution which is in conformity
with the 1992 Constitution. The application must be accompanied with
two copies of the constitution. The party must show evidence that (a) at
least one of its founding members is ordinarily resident or registered as
a voter in each of the districts of Ghana; (b) it has branches in all the
political regions of Ghana; and (c) it is organized in at least two thirds of
the districts in each region. No doubt, mathematicians will be kept busy.
In its application, a political party must show that its name,

43
emblem, colour, motto or other symbol does not offend against the rule
prohibiting sectionalism nor closely resembles that of the Republic of
Ghana nor that of a political party in existence or which was in existence
in the First, Second or Third Republics. On the question of names, it may
not use a name whose abbreviations are the same as those of a proscribed
political party. The requirement relating to names, symbols and slogans
has released the creative talents of Ghanaians as they endeavour to coin
the acceptable and seems, from the burst of creativity it has engendered,
not to pose a difficulty for the sponsors of political parties.
Further, a political party must have had its national chairman,
leader, general secretary, national treasurer and the other members of its
national executive committee elected under the supervision of INEC in
accordance with section 17 of Law 281. And it must show that it is not
otherwise in breach of the Law.
In addition, the application must be accompanied with (a) a list of
the full names and addresses of at least one founding member from each
district of Ghana; (b) a full description of its symbols, slogans and
colours; and (c) the fee prescribed by INEC as well as any other
reasonable particulars INEC may require. It is obvious that the require­
ments relating to the founding members and the symbols, slogans, etc.
are intended to underpin the rule prohibiting sectionalism and the
revival of proscribed political parties.
Registration is a two-stage process. Within seven days of the
receipt of the application, INEC must issue the party with a provisional
certificate. INEC will then cause a notice of the application to be
published in the Gazette.2 This is to enable any person with an objection
to the application to do so. The objection may concern the p a rt/s
constitution, name, aims, objects, symbols, slogans or colours. INEC
itself may commission enquiries to be made relating to any of the
particulars submitted. The Law provides a thirty-day period for objec­
tions.
At the expiry of thirty days after the publication in the Gazette,
if there are no objections or such objections as have been raised are dealt
with by the party and INEC is satisfied that all the registration require­
ments have been complied with, then the party must be registered. A
party whose application for registration is turned down by INEC may
apply to the agency to reconsider its decision. If, within fourteen days
after such an application, the party is still not registered, it can appeal to
the Court of Appeal whose decision shall be final. There is no time limit
within which such an appeal may be lodged.

44
 Once a political party has been registered, INEC must issue it with
a final certificate. This acts as evidence that all the registration require­
ments have been satisfied by the party.
But there is one important flaw in the Law which can delay the
process of registration. This is to be found in section 8(2). This subsection
expects INEC to publish the fact of an application for registration in the
Gazette only as soon as practicable but seems to leave the determination
of the practicability to INEC.
Finally section 6(3) is such a curiosity that it merits full quotation.
It reads:

A political party shall not be registered under this Law unless it has
on its national executive Committee or secretariat a member ordinarily
resident or registered as a voter in each region.

It is difficult to determine the rationale for this particular provision.

Given the fact that there are ten regions, this requirement means that the
national executive committee will consist at least of ten persons, assum­
ing that the officers are chosen from within that group. In practice this
is unlikely to be the case. Leaving the national executive committee aside
for a moment, why is a political party required to have a national
secretariat with a minimum of ten persons? To put it mildly, this is a
surprising requirement in a cost-conscious age. Other provisions would
seem to cater for the legitimate state interest in preventing sectional
parties.
A key element in the conception of an effective multi-party system
as the foundation for modem constitutionalism embraces the idea that
political parties should have proper and adequate economic resources
for financing their operations, including elections. Legislation should
thus be designed to assist and encourage political parties to be cost
effective. They should not be burdened with avoidable administrative
expenses. This last comment sets the stage for the discussion in the next
sub-section.

Financial Provisions

By far the most controversial and burdensome of the provisions of Law

281 are those relating to the finances of the political parties and the
disclosures required of them. They are also the most intrusive. They
exceed by far what can justifiably be claimed to arise from the ground

45
rules contained in the Constitution. A summary of these requirements
is necessary if the above opening comments are to be fully appreciated.
Firstly, within sixty days of the issue to it of a final certificate, a
political party must furnish INEC with the following: (a) a detailed
declaration of all its assets and expenditures including contributions,
donations or pledges (in cash or kind) to its initial assets by its founding
members; (b) the declaration must state the sources of all funds and
assets; (c) satisfactory evidence of the location of its district, regional and
national offices, indicating the street, road or avenue as well as the area
of the location of the premises housing these offices; (d) information on
the nature of the interest or estate it has acquired in these premises as well
as the names, addresses and nationalities of their owners; (e) the names,
titles and addresses of its district, regional, national and constituency
officers; and (f) the name and address of the auditor approved for it by
INEC. INEC is to publish this information within 30 days of its receipt
in the Gazette.
Secondly, every political party must submit a statement of its assets
and liabilities to INEC within twenty-one days before every public
election. And forty days after every election in which it has participated,
it must provide INEC with a detailed statement of expenditure on each
of its candidates and indicate therein how the money was spent.
All the financial statements and declarations required to be submit­
ted to INEC must be supported by a statutory declaration signed by the
party's national secretary and national treasurer.
Thirdly, a political party is required to keep the following record at
its head or national office: (a) a list of members; (b) contributions by
founding members; (c) a statement of accounts showing sources of its
funds, names of contributors, membership dues, donations (cash or
kind) and financial transactions executed through that office;
(d) properties of the party, indicating time and mode of acquisition
thereof; and (e) any other particulars required by INEC.
Fourthly, citizens cannot contribute in excess of a sum to be
determined by INEC in any one year to the coffers of a political party.3
However, contributions by founding members to the initial assets of the
party are excluded from this limitation.
Fifthly, no company, partnership, firm or business enterprise can
contribute in cash or in kind to the funds of a political party. A question
which arises here is whether it is lawful for such an entity to spend its
money on its own steam and without reference to a political party but for
the purpose of canvassing for the election of that party's candidates or

46
furthering its objectives. And why not? one may ask. Why should a
business entity not expend money to support a party whose policies and
programmes it deems will create a congenial atmosphere for the economy
in general and business in particular?
Sixthly, no alien can make a contribution or a donation directly or
indirectly or give a loan to a political party; neither may a political party
accept such a contribution. But may a business entity give a loan to a
political party? And may either a business entity or an alien support an
independent candidate financially?
And lastly, but by no means the least, there is a requirement that the
accounts of the political party be audited yearly by the auditor approved
by INEC. A copy of the audited accounts must be filed with INEC, which
may also order an audit at any time. Further, any person, whether a
member or not, may inspect the accounts at the offices of INEC and, upon
the payment of the prescribed fee, take a copy.
Finally, it must be noted that non-compliance with any of these
obligations outlined above entitles INEC to cancel a political p a r t/s
registration. However a political party whose registration is so cancelled
can appeal to the Court of Appeal.
Several issues arise from the above financial provisions. They form
the subject of the discussion in the next section.

Implications of Financial Provisions4

It is fair to begin our comments here by noting one important truism.

That is the electoral process is the process which gives birth to the
government itself in a constitutional democracy. It is therefore crucial
that political parties as the key players in the electoral process are as free
and unobstructed as possible. They should in principle not be subjected
to greater intrusion by the state than other organizations. Legislation
designed to regulate their operations should both facilitate those opera­
tions and encourage the citizenry, both the timid and the audacious, to
seek to play an active part in those operations. In a constitutional
democracy, it must be stated, time and again, that such legislation must
be aimed at fostering the formation of a vibrant and genuine multi-
partyism so that political representation in the organs of government
would be founded on the true will of the people.
The limitations on contributions and the financial and property
disclosure requirements can be said to be aimed at achieving a number

47
 of legitimate state objectives. First, the limitations prevent the emer­
gence only of political parties supported by the affluent sections of the
community. Given the average levels of income of Ghanaian families,
both rural and urban, the 1 million limitation in any one year may even
be said to be overly generous and defeatist of the objective.
Secondly, the elimination of the disproportionate influence of
moneyed and propertied interests on the political process gives a sort of
boost to the principle of equality and equal opportunity for all citizens
enshrined in the Constitution.
Thirdly, by deterring the '"buying" of elections and minimizing the
influence of the large contributor, the legislature hopes to save elective
public office holders from becoming hostage to those interests. This will
ensure that the office holders are relatively free to pursue the national
interest without the fear of the sort of blackmail which could threaten
their survival.
The objective of the disclosure requirements is presumably the
belief that by promoting full disclosure of finances and financial trans­
actions of political parties, the purity and open-ness of the electoral
process will be maintained. The justification here is clearly the govern­
ment interest in limiting corruption and the appearance of corruption.
Disclosure, no doubt, is an effective way of revealing the type of political
support that is sometimes coupled with expectations of special favours
or rewards. Disclosure also serves an informational purpose. It is
intended to help the voters to define their candidates more. Here the
interest being served is the public right to know as much as it can about
those vying for power in the society.
But comparative law and politics teaches us that limitations on
political contributions and disclosure requirements need to be carefully
crafted. Otherwise they have the adverse reverse effect of being invidi­
ous and rather chilling effective citizen participation in the political
process; and this for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the limitations may well discourage participation by some
citizens in the political process. Secondly, the limitations affect the
citizens' important twin political rights of freedom of speech and
association in ways that are not clearly supportable by a close reading of
the Constitution's provisions on fundamental human rights. Thirdly,
they unfairly discriminate against political parties in relation to other
groups which have the same or even more capacity to impact on the
government and the political process than political parties. Why, we
may ask, is the citizen free to contribute limitless amounts to his Church

48
groups which in this country have the potential to influence the political
process at least in the short term more than political parties but be
limited in what he can give to the party of his choice?
The disclosure requirements may serve the interests noted above
but there are serious negative sides to this coin which ultimately
outweigh the benefits. First, quite often contribution to a political party
is a form of speech ie. symbolic speech. It helps to leave one in no doubt
as to where a person stands in the political spectrum and what his
political convictions are. But fear of reprisal may deter contributions,
especially in a repressive regime like the PNDC.
Freedom may be a hazardous ideal to pursue but the disclosure
requirements are worse. It is as if political parties are being treated as
pariahs. They are not.
Thirdly the public's right to know is not absolute. It should never
be treated so, especially where its exercise will reveal other people's
private political convictions. It must be carefully balanced against
privacy rights. As Chief Justice Burger of the US Supreme Court said in
the case of BUCKLEY v. VALEO, secrecy,like privacy, is not per se
criminal. Hence one of the greatest pillars of democracy invented in our
contemporary times has been the secret ballot. In this connection, it must
be said that the stringent disclosure requirements in Law 281 will have
the same chilling effect that the abandonment of the secret ballot system
in Kenya and Nigeria is reported to have had.
Fourthly, for a country making a transition from eleven years of
military dictatorship to civilian constitutional rule, the administrative
costs which the requirements saddle political parties with are stagger­
ing. These alone are enough to prevent the formation of small parties to
prosecute minority interests and unpopular causes. The ultimate aim is
the creation of a rich and competitive political process. Paradoxically its
effect will be to give a disproportionate influence to those with money
who are therefore able to make large contributions to the initial assets of
a political party. They will put their money only where the chances of
rewards are real. The Law clearly overplays the feet that political parties
have public functions within the political process.

Administration of the Political Process

The main agency established for the administration, regulation, control

and oversight of the political and electoral process in general and

49
political parties in particular is the Interim National Electoral Commis­
sion (INEC). It was created by Law 271. But to determine the full
extent of its powers, we have to read Laws 271 and 281 together. It
has a potential membership of eleven persons, all of them to be ap­
pointed by the PNDC. Again the issue of neutrality and independence
arises here. How can an agency whose members are appointed by the
PNDC in its sole discretion and without reference to any other author­
ity be impartial and independent of the PNDC which is sponsoring
a political party and whose Chairman's political ambition, a common
secret? It must be noted here that in the 1992 Constitution, although
the members of the Electoral Commission are to be appointed by the
President, he is required to act on the advice of the Council of State,
a formulation which binds him to the advice proffered by the Council
of State. In the transitional period, an acceptable compromise would
have been for the PNDC to consult with other political groupings or
even the Consultative Assembly which formulated the Constitution.
But this was not done.
Be that as it may, INEC is the authority responsible for registering
political parties under Law 281. For this purpose, it has extensive rule-
making, enforcement, investigative and adjudicating powers. But it
is not the final arbiter in the matters over which it presides. For its
decisions are appealable to the Court of Appeal in all cases. In relation
to its decision to cancel the registration of a political party, it may even
be argued, from the language of section 16 of Law 281 as compared
with section 12, that there is a further appeal possible to the Supreme
Court.
INEC also serves as the national clearing-house for information
on elections and political parties. For it is the principal repository of
the numerous reports, statements and declarations which political
parties are required to file in respect of their sponsors, officials, mem­
bers and finances. It thus has record-keeping and disclosure functions
as well. It is given the power to make these records available to the
public.
When INEC prohibits a political party, Law 281 gives the Attor­
ney-General power to apply to the High Court for the winding up,
dissolution and disposal of that party's assets, rights and liabilities as
appear to the Court just and equitable.
The initial indications are that INEC is going to have a rocky ride.
But some of its members, especially the Chairman, have exhibited
commendable capacity to be independent of government. Commend­

50
able too is INEC's willingness to consult with the emerging political
groupings and forces to deal with the Issues arising from the draconian
legislation that it is operating under. One only hopes that INEC
members will soon get over the temptation to make too many public
speeches, some of which even betray a lack of proper appreciation of
the legislation the agency is operating under.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the current legislation on political parties
provides a comprehensive but oppressive code of rules defining politi­
cal parties, their constitutional role and legal principles relating to their
internal organization and governance. It also establishes the legal rights
and duties of individual party members as well as the general public.
The chapter argues further that the legislation is too intrusive, errs too
much in favour of a misguided view of the public interest. In the end it
creates a stranglehold over political parties which can ultimately be
dysfunctional to the political process. Some of the observations made
in here have been made by others in the public media. A government
responsive to the views of the people would have by now set in motion
a major review of the rules. Given the philosopher-king attitude of the
PNDC, however, this type of sensitivity is perhaps too much to expect.
We hope and pray that the baby which the current unsatisfactory
legislation delivers is able to sustain democracy in the Fourth Republic.

NOTES

1. Legislation is used liberally in this chapter to refer compendiously to

statutory provisions as well as relevant parts of the Constitu­
tion adopted in a referendum in April, 1992.
2. INEC may also publish information required to be published in the
Gazette, in the national daily newspapers, on the radio and
National Television.
3. At the time of writing this chapter, INEC had fixed the ceiling at tfl
million - see PNDCL 283.
4. See generally the discussion in the following cases:
- Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 US 290
(1981);
- Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US1;
51
- National Citizens Coalition and Colin Brown v. Attorney-
General, Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, reported in
McWhinney. Supreme Courts and Judicial Law-Making: Constitu­
tional Tribunals and Constitutional Review. (Dordrecht: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1986) pp.19-208;
- See also German electoral law controversies discussed therein
at pp.l 94-208.

52
 Chapter 4

C O N STITU TIO N A L FRA M EW O RK O F D EM O C R A C Y

Kofi Kumado

Introduction

We live in exciting times. The fall of the Berlin Wall is now part of history.
The two Germanies have united. And the bankruptcy of communism
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is now clearly beyond
redemption. It is not, perhaps, that communism as an intellectual ideal
has no more appeal. Rather communism as a framework for satisfying
the complex needs of human beings has lost its legitimacy. So has been
its economic twin of central control of the national economy. Though the
transition in the political field from communism to constitutional de­
mocracy and, in the economic field, from central control to market forces
is by no means out of the woods yet, truly may we say with Francis
Fukuyama that one epoch of human history has come to an end.1
The democratization wave has not passed us by here in Ghana.
External and internal factors have ensured that, whatever the personal
ambivalence of the Chairman of the Provisional National Defence
Council (PNDC) may be, personal autocratic rule will give way to
pluralist democracy. The military factor remains an unknown quantity
in all these calculations but that reflects more nervousness about the
ambitions of the PNDC Chairman than fears about the ambitions of the
armed forces as an institution.
This chapter examines the framework which has been devised for
the democratic game in the Fourth Republic. But before looking at the
structures and ideas on which our democracy in the Fourth Republic is
founded, a few preliminary observations are necessary.

Constitutional Democracy

W ithout attempting a comprehensive definition of the term "demoracy,"

it may be stated at the outset that, from a close study of the process of
transition to the Fourth Republic, what we want is not just democracy

53
but constitutional democracy. Democracy, as a concept, basically connotes
government by the will and consent of a sovereign people. There are
structures and mechanisms for the distillation of the will of the people.
And because the people are a dynamic force, the system provides for
periodic renewal of their consent. The opportunity for periodic renewal
of the mandate of the people makes democracy su perior to other systems
of governance for the simple reason that it provides an internal self­
correction mechanism. But democracy means more than the undiffer­
entiated will of the majority of the people.
In our contemporary society, it means constitutional democracy.
That is, the system of government in which the power-wielders are
subject to clearly defined and pre-determined rules which place appro­
priate brakes on the aggrandizing nature of power. Constitutional
democracy ensures that minority interests are safeguarded. And it
keeps open the processes which permit the formation, in the polity, of
majorities according to different issues.
Our decision to go for constitutional democracy is good for one
important reason, namely, the heterogeneous nature of our society. An
examination of the demographic profile of the Ghanaian society shows
that the pure application of the democratic principle, for instance, of one
person one vote will always produce a government which is unrepre­
sentative of the major ethnic interests and whose legitimacy will, there­
fore, be constantly subjected to attack. By constitutionalizing our
government, we are enabled to compel the formation of political alli­
ances across ethnic lines and other sectional interests.
But constitutional democracy is a difficult system because of its
reliance on deliberation and its positive utilization of dissent and
opposition. It flourishes only if there exists within the ethos of the society
belief in the idea that power and its exercise should be subject to
limitations. Fortunately for us, our traditional political systems are
founded on this belief. It is part of our cultures. The acute student of our
chieftaincy systems will realize that, even though access to the highest
political office (that of the chief) is based on the hereditary principle, our
traditional political leaders who pretend to tyrannical power do not last.
This point bears reminding ourselves of as we move from a period which
glorified the aggressive use of power based on an extreme positivistic
view of law.
Given its complexity, it is not surprising that some in even the most
advanced democracies are not always able to keep the faith. I will like
to refer to two recent matters to drive this point home. The first relates

54
to the Danish vote on the Maastricht treaty. By a slim majority, Danish
voters rejected that treaty which is designed to foster greater union of the
European Community nations. An important principle on which the
treaty was negotiated was that of unanimity. Strictly speaking, there­
fore, the Danish rejection scuppered the process. And yet there have
been suggestions from other parts of the community, including Britain's
John Major, that the results of the Danish vote would not lead to a re­
negotiation of the treaty. Secondly, in the June 15 issue of the American
weekly magazine, Newsweek there is a feature article on Ghana. The
writer all but states that the prospect of democracy for Ghana is bad news
for the World Bank-sponsored economic strategy pursued by thePNDC.
The writer fails to note that the absence of genuine open debate about the
structural adjustment programme has resulted in a lukewarm attitude
on the part of the populace, visible signs of progress notwithstanding.
This in turn has denied the programme the local productivity and
initiative needed to solidify its gains. Well indeed might it be said that
for some Western capitalist interests dictatorship in the third world is a
friend while democracy is an enemy. This attitude is unfortunate. For
society's tried and tested way of instituting enduring development has
been through the democratization and taming of its politics and politi­
cians.
The machinery of constitutional government is expensive. Just
think of the monies spent on elections, referendums, peoples' initiatives,
parliaments, etc. It requires a literate and well informed citizenry,
actively participating in the process. For it is not a game for just
professional politicians and intellectuals. This need gives additional
importance to education at all levels of the society. But it need not be
foolishly expensive.
Constitutional democracy requires agreement on the major ground
rules (at least some of them), hence a formal constitutional document has
been found to be a good and indispensable midwife. But the proper
functioning of the document depends in turn on the existence of a bold,
competent and far-sighted judiciary able to operate as the conscience of
the people — a sort of continuing consultative assembly: the kind of
judicial statesmanship exhibited by Chief Justice Marshall of the US
Supreme Court in the famous case of MARBURY v. MADISON.2It bears
reminding ourselves of this fact as we make the transition from a decade
of military dictatorship in which the judiciary have lost practice and
individual judges in any case may have been chosen more for their
inability to hurt the dictatorship than for being able to take a long term

55
view of the society's values.
In a constitutional democracy, the opposition is a respectable part
of government. The campaign to unseat the government does not end
with the elections. Rather the campaign to win the minds and hearts of
the electorate at the next election begins immediately with the post
mortem. In this respect, we may run into a cultural block. Under our
traditional constitutional systems, open campaign and opposition would
seem to end with the selection and enstoolment of one of the contestants.
Ultimately, then, it can be said that the key elements of a constitu­
tional democracy are the rule of law, government by consent, separation
of powers or the absence of an accumulation of power in one person or
body of persons, judicial review and human rights — a marvel of
compromise and balance. Let us now examine the 1992 Constitution in
the light of what has been said in the preceding paragraphs.

The 1992 Constitution

On April 28,1992, the people approved the 1992 Constitution at a nation­

wide referendum. The document which provides the framework for
democracy in the Fourth Republic was the work of a Consultative
Assembly instituted by the PNDC. The Consultative Assembly7s work
was based on the earlier constitutional documents of 1957,1960,1969
and 1979 as well as the report of the Committee of Experts appointed by
the PNDC to formulate a draft. While the document contains some new
and interesting ideas, a casual reading of it reveals that it substantially
reflects the 1979 Constitution. The Constitution comes into force on 7
January, 1993.
The Constitution provides for the traditional triad of the executive,
legislative and judicial organs of state. But new centres of power
expressly provided for in Ghanaian constitutions since 1969 have been
retained. This refers to political parties and buffer institutions such as the
Council of State, the Auditor-General and the Ombudsman now re­
named the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice.
The structural arrangements of the Constitution contain elements
of both the parliamentary and presidential systems of government.
Thus though the President is not answerable to Parliament, yet he is
required to select the majority of his ministers from Parliament. The
parliamentarians appointed as ministers by the President retain their
seats in Parliament. Further, questions of what other kinds of paid work

56
a minister is able to engage in are to be resolved curiously not by the
President but by the Speaker of Parliament, even for those ministers
chosen from outside Parliament.
The relationship envisaged between the legislature and the execu­
tive under the constitutional arrangements betray the deep-rooted grip
which the parliamentary system has had on the political psyche of
Ghanaians. The requirement that the majority of ministers should be
parliamentarians carries with it some dangers. Prof. Folson, in his
chapter, has discussed some of the benefits and dangers of this arrange­
ment. In addition, two more potential dangers may be noted. First, there
is the question of the additional cost to the nation of the governmental
machinery if it is decided to appoint parliamentary secretaries to assist
those ministers with their constituency work. Secondly, unless good
sense prevails, unhealthy rivalry may develop between those ministers
who are parliamentarians and those who are not. This is not an idle
observation if we take into consideration the rivalry which has devel­
oped in the District Assemblies between appointed and elected mem­
bers. The adverse consequences of such rivalry and the retardation of
government business which it will give rise to can only give constitu­
tional government a bad name. I take the view that whatever the benefits
may be, the arrangement under the 1979 Constitution by which there
was strict separation of personnel between the legislature and the
executive but with mutual access given to the members of both institu­
tions was superior to the present arrangements.
In two areas, the PNDC has clearly got its way. First is the
integration of certain levels of the public tribunal system into the pre-31 st
December 1981 judicial system provided for in Chapter Eleven of the
Constitution; second is the provision debarring political parties from
local government elections. Whether this will be good for democracy in
the Fourth Republic only time can tell.3
There is some confusion in functions under the Constitution. The
responsibilities given to the Commission for Human Rights and Admin­
istrative Justice and the National Commission for Civic Education may
be cited in this connection. Further the respective roles of the Commis­
sion for Human Rights and Justice and the High Court with respect to the
protection of human rights have not been defined with sufficient clarity.
Besides, one is not sure about the advisability of establishing the
National Commission for Civic Education. There are not enough
safeguards in the Constitution to prevent it from being manipulated and
used as an ideological tool by the government in power. This institution

57
clearly contains the seeds for undermining the rationale behind Article
56 which prohibits Parliament from establishing a movement with the
right or power to impose a common programme, or a set of objectives of
a religious or political nature on the people of Ghana.
By far the biggest problem Is whether the Courts, especially the
Superior Courts, will be able to play their role as constitutional arbiters
in the Fourth Republic. As noted elsewhere in this chapter, constitu­
tional democracy will flourish in the Fourth Republic only if our judges
using the power of judicial review under the 1992 Constitution do their
work conscientiously. The early signs do not give one much to hope for.
First, it took a High Court judge ten days to decide whether he had
jurisdiction in an important public law litigation. Then the judge
decided that he had no jurisdiction in a matter in which it was alleged by
one side that the rules relating to an important element in the political
process, namely, the formation of political parties, were unfair. The
decision of the High Court judge in this case must have come as a shock
to all who have been brought up to know that, in the common law
tradition, the High Court of Justice always has in addition to its statutory
powers, inherent jurisdiction to do justice. Secondly, in the trial of the
journalist, George Naykene, the Circuit Court judge failed to appreciate
and therefore to consider the public law implications of thecriminal libel
charge brought against the accused. The implications and effect of his
decision on the societal interest in freedom of speech and of the press
seemed completely lost on the learned judge. As a result, in a matter in
which the inadequacy of a civil action for damages by those who felt
defamed by the offending publication was not demonstrated at all, a
journalist was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment. In a consti­
tutional democracy, it behoves the judiciary to constantly keep in mind
the fact that every aspect of the law has constitutional implications in the
short or long term for the society.
There are three other matters which are worth discussing as we
contemplate the fortunes of constitutional democracy under the 1992
Constitution in the Fourth Republic. The first relates to the legitimacy of
the Constitution itself. As noted earlier, the principal architect of the
Constitution lias been the Consultative Assembly established by the
PNDC. Candour will make us admit that there are many Ghanaians
who were suspicious of the motives of the PNDC at the beginning and
who therefore did not participate in the work of the Assembly. Though
the final document was better than had been feared, the haste with which
the referendum was held revived old fears and suspicions entertained

58
by a not-insignificant section of the population. It is not an exaggeration
to state that there are many Ghanaians who believe that a major surgery
would have to be made on the Constitution in the early years of the
Fourth Republic if it is to achieve nation-wide legitimacy.
The second issue relates to the disqualification of chiefs. It is an
observable fact that a majority of chiefs are unhappy about this provi­
sion; not so much because they entertain ambitions to plunge into the
political arena but because of its discriminatory nature in spite of the
avowedly good intentions with which it was made. It has to be noted that
throughout our chequered national constitutional history, chiefs have
remained a major stabilizing force. It will be unfortunate therefore if this
disqualification were to alienate them completely from the national
political process.
Thirdly, and undoubtedly, the most explosive and controversial
issues relate to the Transitional Provisions contained in Sections 34,35
and 37 of the First Schedule to the Constitution. These sections pose the
gravest threats to constitutional democracy in the Fourth Republic. They
stick out as an unnatural growth in the constitutional document. No one
can deny their potential for rocking the very foundations of the society.
How will the courts handle the issues involved here particularly in the
light of the Supreme Court decision in the KWAKYE CASE4where the
majority of the august CQurt faced with similar provisions in the 1979
Constitution declared itself impotent in certain circumstances? Again
only time can tell.
But this chapter can and must end on a cheerful note. It is clearly
an observable fact, throughout the length and breadth of this country,
that Ghanaians are looking forward to a democratic future. Perhaps, a
little too eagerly, one may say. But the goodwill to make our democratic
experiment succeed this time round is great. The Preamble to the 1992
Constitution accurately captures and reflects the basic ideals embodied
in constitutional democracy. Where there is a will, there is always a way,
so the old adage goes. While the signs in the transition period may not
give too much hope for the future, there is no doubt that the overwhelm­
ing desire of the people to live in freedom will ensure that democracy
will flourish, with its usual ups and downs, in the Fourth Republic.

59
 NOTES

1. Francis Fukuyama,"The End of History" in The National Interest, Vol.16

(1989), pp.3-18.
2. I Cranch 137 (1803).
3. See the chapter on "Legislation on Political Parties" for discussion of
this provision.
4. (1981) G.L.R. 644.
 Part II

Society and Political Parties

 Chapter 5

T H E SO C IO -C U LT U R A L M A TR IX A N D M U L T I-P A R T Y

PO LIT IC S IN G H A N A : O B SER V A T IO N S A N D

PR O SPEC T S

Kumi Ansah-Koi

Introduction

Students and observers of politics have long noted the salience of

cultural factors and the socio-cultural matrix for political behaviour.
Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture 2 ,S.E. Liner's The Man on
Horseback2, and Ali A. Mazrui's Cultural Forces in World Politics3 are
three outstanding scholarly efforts which attempt, with varying
degrees of success, to explain political phenomena on the basis of
cultural variables.4
For Ghana, Maxwell Owusu's Uses and Abuses o f Political Power:
A Case Study of Continuity And Change in The Politics of Ghana f Victor
T. Le Vine's Political Corruption: The Case of Ghana; 6 and the Final Report
of the Commission on Bribery and Corruption 7 appropriately take
cognisance of the socio-cultural matrix in their respective concerns.
Historically, each of Ghana's three attempts at multi- party consti­
tutional rule highlighted and focused on institutional/structural and.
procedural issues to the utmost exclusion of the socio-cul tural matrix.
With independent Ghana's first attempt at multi-party constitutional
rule which was inaugurated under the 1957 Independence Constitution,
for example, the Westminster model of government, with a few notable
innovations like the Regional Assemblies, was transplanted on to the
Ghanaian sodal context without much effort at effecting any attitudinal
or cultural change. In the case of the 1969 Second Republican Constitu­
tion, the effort was generally geared towards the institution o f a consti­
tutional matrix which would well-nigh make a repeat of dicta torial rule
impossible in Ghana. The 1979 Third Republican Constitution on the

63
 other hand was more of a cross between the American and Westminster
models of constitutionalism than an innovative formulation particu­
larly tailored to suit the Ghanaian cultural matrix.
In each of these instances, the constitution was to a large extent
perceived, so to speak, as an end in itself. Considerable efforts went into
the formulation of a supposedly appropriate and perfect constitutional
arrangement on the assumption that such an accomplishment would
ensure a democratic and stable multi-party regime in the country.
As is well-known, those expectations were never met; because
military intervention, deriving from a complexity of factors, ultimately
abrogated each of those constitutional experiments. The lapses that
characterized previous attempts at constitution-making applies today
as, Ghana, through the on-going efforts and processes geared towards
the envisaged Fourth Republic, works towards the establishment of
multi-party constitutional rule scheduled for early 1993.
The present chapter is based on the axiomatic assumption that the
disregard of cultural factors constitutes the prime causatory and ex­
planatory factor for the ultimate collapse of Ghana's First, Second and
Third Republics. It focuses on Ghana's cultural variables in relation to
the restoration of multi-party constitutionalism in the Fourth Republic.
Impressionistic and documentary sources are scientifically utilized to
identify pertinent aspects of (political) culture in Ghana which could
have an adverse effect one way or the other, on the goal of establishing
durable, multi-party constitutional rule in Ghana. In this regard it is
important to recall that the Ghanaian state, as at present constituted, is
certainly a "young" one. It has existed in such a centralized form for
barely a hundred years. Even more significantly, it has existed as an
independent entity for less than four decades.
The state itself is largely the creation of European colonialism; and
it comprises various ethnic groups with their own peculiar — if not
widely varyi ng subcultures. The present chapter however focuses on
the emergent (and still unfolding) national (political) culture which
exists over a nd above (and notwithstanding) those various subcultures.
Narrower s ill, the chapter does not concern itself with the entirety of
theemergoj itnational political culture in thecountry. The focus is strictly
confined t.< an identification and discussion of those aspects of the
nation's p c Jitical culture which do not augur well for the practice and
survival o' multi-party constitutionalism in Ghana. The point of such
narrowed rocus is to enable in-depth and thorough discussion of those
negative « spects with a view to coming up with concrete proposals

64
which, if put in place, would serve as a remedies and help make Ghana's
on-going attemptatdurableconstitutional rule turn out successfully this
time round.
A discussion of the methodology adopted here should be apposite.
There has been no stratified sampling oftheGhanaian population for our
present purposes. Close observation (both participant and non-partici­
pant) spanning over slightly four years has been a major methodological
option. That apart, reliance has of course been placed on my professional
acquaintance with certain societal and political manifestations over
about a decade. I have also used the relevant material on the subject.
It should be noted, however, that the trends noted in the work
constitute a pioneering account that draws on personal basis of observa­
tions, unstructured and random interviews, and a close scrutiny of
various relevant press and other documentary evidence on national
issues. The reader's columns of the Ghanaian print media have been
particularly scrutinized, as they have manifested public opinion on
various national issues.
The present work aims at presenting, in fairly broad but accurate
strokes, the emergent national political culture in Ghana in so far as they
negatively impinge on Ghana's long-held democratic aspirations.
Sequels to the work should properly aim at formulating hypotheses out
of the stated trends and observations with a view to subjecting such
hypotheses to rigorous empirical tests and analysis.

Identification

Stemming from the above concerns, the following may be identified as

salient features of the emergent national political culture in Ghana which
have potentially negative implications for the nation's aspiration to­
wards durable multi-party constitutionalism in Ghana. The first of
these is the prevalence of a definitely non-confrontational, submissive,
and compliant attitude towards authority. This behavioural disposi­
tion is generally manifested towards all forms of authority — parental,
social, political, religious, and so on. There is extreme reluctance to
publicly question, ridicule, or diverge from official standpoint. The
exercise of authority — whether by elder siblings, parental figures,
traditional office-holders, and other public officials — rarely draws
challenging or divergent responses. The tendency is for people to
comply; or at least refrain from public and open challenge, disputation,
contestation or confrontation.

65
 Closely related to this tendency is a widespread perception of
divergence from and challenge of the authorities' standpoints — and
indeed non-conformity with the common stance — as marks of
disloyalty and of subversive intent. Such challenges and divergences
are commonly regarded in most cases as unnecessarily confrontational
and somehow improper. Consensus is much prized; and such diver­
gence from the consensual stance is seen as a stubborn and arrogant
insistence on individuality and a concomitant failure to submerge
individuality in the consensual pool.
Indeed there is an intense dislike of, and serious misgivings and
apprehension about, open/public disputation and argumentation.
There is a marked preference for unanimity on public issues; and
indeed both open and subtle pressures are often brought to bear in
efforts towards achieving such consensus. Open divergences and
long-standing controversies (whether academic or general) are
particularly frowned upon.
Another feature of the emergent political culture in Ghana which
has possible negative import for durable multi-party constitutional rule
in the country is that national politics hinges basically on personalities
rather than on principles, ideas, or issues. A close examination of media
coverage of electoral contests in Ghana and of the campaign strategies
and ploys of individual and group contestants at elections in Ghana,
clearly illustrate the rather low significance of abstract ideas and obtuse
principles in such contests. Symbolic, sentimental and metaphysical
influences, as opposed to ideas and principles per s e , would seem to
be far more salient. Mike Oquaye illustrates this point in his Politics in
Ghana 1972-1979:

Some PNP campaigners employed the element of the mysterious

and the supernatural which had proved very successful in
Nkrumah's days. Even though it was not officially claimed by the
party, its supporters repeatedly propagated tire news that Presi­
dent Nkruman's spirit had been consulted and that he had chosen
the name, emblems and colours of the party assuring them that the
palm-tree would lead the party to a victory, and if the party failed,
that would lead to the total ruination of the country. It was further
said that Nkrumah had put a curse on Ghana ana that this would
be removed, upon Ghanaians voting for the PNP. These utterances
were quite meaningful if one considers the fact that Ghanaians
believe in the supernatural and secondly, that Ghana had actually
sunk and continued to sink since Nkrumah left the political scene.8

66
Hence, very few Ghanaians, even among the educated, can carry on
sustained meaningful discourse on the manifesto of their preferred
political parties.
A further feature is the prevalence of a highly cynical and an
extremely economical-instrumentalist perception of politics. The state
and national politics, are widely seen as a gold mine to be exploited for
personal and / or group gain and for social mobility. Concomitant to this,
there is a cynical attitude towards representation of politics as an
avenue for selfless public service. Apparently very few believe in the
reality of (or even approve of) altruistic public service through the
political arena. Appointees to top political positions who are unable to
"feather their nests" whilst in office and leave such office poor, or
poorer than they were prior to their taking up such high-level political
appointments, are commonly regarded as being stupid.
Yet another feature is a widespread tendency to veer away, as far
as possible, from such activist political manifestations as demonstra­
tions, civil disorder, and critical public debates.
There is also a generally fatalistic, resignatory attitude towards
political issues in particular and public issues in general. This tendency
would seem to derive its support from a widespread belief that issues
would somehow sort themselves out with time. Common street
expressions which manifest this attitude include such sayings and
responsesas "alavanyo"9; "ebaahi'10; "ebeyeyie"11; "Nyamebekyere"12;
"Nyame ndae"13; and "ehuru a ebedwo"14. What all these features
have in common is that they constitute aspects of the emergent
national political culture in Ghana which neither augurs well for, nor
will enhance the practice and prospects of, a stable multi-party constitu­
tionalism in Ghana.
This does not mean, however, that the emergent political culture
is entirely negative as regards the national aspiration for multi-party
constitutionalism. There certainly are positive aspects of it. (For ex­
ample, there is a marked dislike of political violence under virtually all
conditions.) The positive aspects, however, do not constitute the
concern of the present chapter. As indicated above, our focus is on the
identification and discussion of the negative aspects of national
political culture and its bearing on the national quest for stable multi­
party constitutionalism.
The mere identification and presentation of these negative aspects
ana's emergent political culture is however inadequate. Some
lly pertinent issues still remain. For example: how is that reality to

67
be accounted for? What factors shaped or determined the emergent
political culture outlined above?

Sources

Major sources of such a national political culture are the various tradi­
tional cultural norms of Ghana's ethnic groupings which, incidentally,
have considerably much in common despite their various differences
and diversity. Traditional customary practice, for example, virtually
frowned upon confronting legitimate authority unless absolutely neces­
sary and critical. The preference was clearly in the direction of submis­
sion, obedience, consensus and unanimity. Prolonged and sustained
debate over public policy, and criticism particularly after a decision of
some sort had been made, were certainly frowned upon. Such custom­
ary attitudes and norms have been transmitted over the years through
the processes of socialization, and ha ve become a feature of the emergent
national political culture.
Another source is the historical experience of colonialism in
Ghana. Colonialism did not spawn a democratic culture. If any thing, it
heightened and stultified the undemocratic aspects of the traditional
heritage. The institution of chieftaincy, for example, was under
colonialism freed of some of its in-built checks and balances which kept
it off dictatorship. Also the Provincial and District Commissioners,
through their position in the Crown Colony's administrative set-up, did
nothing to encourage a democratic ethos among the colonized popula­
tion and their traditional rulers. On the contrary, their modus operandi
did a lot to enhance and sustain a political legacy of conspiratorial and
elitist policy formulation which operated without much reference to,
and without much input by, the colonized masses.
Colonialism thus encouraged an alienated and a paternalistic
framework of government which did not facilitate the democratic
practice of open discussion, fairly unfettered criticism of public policy,
and mass involvement in public policy formulation.The well-known
dictatorial and authoritarian tendencies of successive governments
since the attainment of independence have also reinforced these nega­
tive aspects of political culture in Ghana.15
Furthermore, the prevailing situations like the massive scale of
adult illiteracy, the high school drop-out rate, the adoption of English
(a foreign language) as the official language, and severe deprivation and

68
poverty have also contributed significantly towards the emergence of
the negative aspects of Ghana's political culture that I have just
discussed.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Democracy cannot thrive for long if the socio-cultural matrix is not

conducive to the perpetuation of democratic rule! In this regard it is
inadequate, as the tendency has so far been in Ghana, to focus almost
exclusively on institutional and legal frameworks in the bid to establish
democratic governance. Certainly the rule of law and those constitu­
tional and legal pillars are indispensable for democratic governance.
Appropriate and well-functioning institutions and structures are a
sine qua non for stable democratic rule as well. However, the socio­
cultural matrix is no less important and therefore should not be ignored.
There is certainly a pressing need for public education to get the
general public to imbibe, appreciate, and defend the democratic ethos
way of social organization and national existence. Admittedly some
efforts in that direction have been made in the past. The Centre for
Civic Education established by the National Liberation Council, which
continued into the Second Republic, is an example of such efforts.
Earlier, the Extra-Mural Studies programme of the then University
College of the Gold Coast had served a similar purpose. For now,
however, no specific national institution exists to carry out this
function. It must be said in passing that over the years, the initiative
of various regimes in establishing bodies devoted to public political
education has often incurred suspicion, misgivings and animosity. In
the light of this record, it would seem most appropriate to leave the
important task of national political education to a time-tested body like
the Institute of Adult Education of the University of Ghana. The body
has certainly exhibited, over the years, evidence of impartiality, inde­
pendence from governmental control and effectiveness.
To ensure adequate financial provision for the performance of the
task, one per cent of each year's defence budget should be offered to
that Institute to carry out the task of civic education.
Furthermore, sustained and well-conceived programmes must be
put in place to reduce the massive scale of public alienation from policy
formulation. In this regard there should be strenuous efforts to:

69
(i) reduce the unfortunately high level of adult illiteracy;

(ii) overcome the English language barrier which excludes a signifi­

cant majority of citizens from active participation in national
affairs;

(iii) ensure the involvement of all social segments in policy affairs;

(iv) incorporate civic education much more significantly in school

curricula; and

(v) reduce the undemocratic and anachronistic features of traditional

culture.

It is only when these have been achieved that a durable multi­

party constitutional rule could thrive in Ghana.

NOTES

1. Gabriel Abraham Almond and Sodmeu Verba, The Civic CulturePolitical

Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Princeton, N.J., Princeton:
University Press, 1963.
2. S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, London: Macmillan, London, 1962.
3. Ali A. Mazrui, Cultural Forces in World Politics, James Curey (London),
Heinemann (Kenya and New Hampshire), 1990. Ali A. Mazrui's work,
perhaps the least known among the three, argues that cultural differ­
ences are at the bottom of global problems and socio-economic dispari­
ties. Ali Mazrui is not one to t>e daunted by controversy!
4. For a succinct and concise discussion of the concept of political culture, see
Dennis Kavanagh's Political Culture, (Studies in Comparative Politics),
London and Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1972.
5. Maxwell Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Poiver: A Case Study of
Continuity and Change in the Politics of Ghana. Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press, 1970.
6. Victor T. le Vine, Political Corruption: The Ghana Case, Hoover Institution
Publication 138, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975.
7. Final Report of the Commission on Bribery and Corruption, Accra, 1974.
Membership of the Commission comprised Justice P.D. Anin (Chair­
man), Dr. Ephraim Amu, Rt. Rev. G.K. Sintim-Misa, Prof. K.E. de Graft-
Johnson, Lt. Col. K.A. Buckman, Kwame Afreh, and P.A. Dako.

70
8. Mike Oquaye, Politics in Ghana 1972-79, Accra: Tornado Publications
1980; p. 173.
9. Ewe dialect for "all will be well."
10. Ga dialect which also translates into English as "all will be well."
11. Akan expression also meaning "all will turn out well."
12. Akan for "God would ultimately decide or provide."
13. Akan for "God is not asleep."
14. Akan for "it cannot be boiling perpetually; it would certainly
cool!."
15. The historiography of Ghana is replete with works indicating such
tendencies. For two examples, see Naomi Chazan's and Mike
Oquaye's works, already cited above. An Anatomy of Ghanaian
Politics. Managing Political Recession, 1969-1982, Boulder:
Westview Press, 1983; and Mike Oquaye, Politics in Ghana 1972-
79, op. cit.

71
 Chapter 6

CIV IL SO CIETY A N D TH E T R A N SIT IO N TO

PLU R A LIST D EM O C R A C Y

F.K. Drah

Introduction

In the light of the acceptance of the Draft Constitution in the referendum

held on 28 April, 1992, and the subsequent hectic preparations towards
the inauguration of the Fourth Republic on 7 January, 1993, it may be
assumed reasonably that Ghanaians as a whole have resolved to make
yet another attempt at evolving a pluralist democracy. It may be recalled
that the three previous attempts made in 1957-1960,1969-1972 and 1979-
1981 were aborted for a number of reasons. As the platitude goes, "a
country deserves the type of government it has" — that is, in normal
times. Little wonder that a number of social scientists have observed that
the character of a country's social structure has a great deal to do with
the emergence and thriving of pluralist democracy.
This chapter, then, is a modest attempt at exploring the issue of
whether or not Ghana does have the type of dvil society that will
facilitate the transition to, and help to ensure the thriving of, pluralist
democracy in the Fourth Republic. For the sake of convenience the rest
of the chapter falls into four parts. In part one the terms pluralist
democracy and civil society are broadly delineated; in part two is offered
an overview of the chequered history of civil society in the post -
independence periodupto 31 December, 1981; part three deals broadly
with civil society during the Provisional National Defence Council
(PNDC) era; while part four contains the conclusion and recommenda­
tions.

Pluralist Democracy and Civil Society Explained

Briefly, pluralist democracy is characterized by the following key ele­

ments: the existence and protection of civil and political rights, including
the right to form relatively independent associations/organizations like
72
political parties and pressure groups resulting in a competitive party
system; free and fair elections; limitations on the powers of government;
the rule of law and an independent judiciary; a free press; accountability;
local self-government; tolerance of diverse opinions; political compro­
mise; acceptance of decisions by majority procedure and respect for
minority views; peaceful resolution of differences; and supremacy of
civil authority over military and other security institutions. Thus
broadly delineated, pluralist democracy is not different from constitu­
tional or liberal or multiparty democracy -1
Historically speaking, civil society was narrowly conceived and
equated with the economy.2 Nowadays, it is broadly conceived and
located in the general society which includes the economy. Hence,
broadly speaking, civil society denotes the presence of a cluster of
intermediary organizations/associations that operate between the pri­
mary units of society (like individuals,nuclear and extended families,
clans, ethnic groups and village units) and the state. These intermediary
groupings include the following: labour unions and associations of
professionals, farmers, fishermen, women, youth and students; reli­
gious and business organizations; cultural and recreational clubs; as
well as political parties.
However, in the literature on the subject competing models of civil
society have been identified. The major ones are the "corporatist" and
"pluralist" models. In the former the intermediary organizations are
sponsored and often sustained by, and dependent on, the state. Mem­
bership of such organizations is usually involuntary or semi-voluntary.
A typical example is the medieval European guild. A person was bom
into it as a son of a guild member; otherwise he had to join it if he was
to have any opportunity to practise his occupation in the first place. It is
important to note, though, that the "corporatist" model, which emerged
within the liberal-democratic context, must not be confused with the
Fascist notion of the "corporate state." The major thrust of the advocates
of the "corporatist" model is that increasing state intervention in some
established liberal democracies, particularly in the sphere of the man­
agement of the national economy, has made it necessary for the state to
seek the advice and co-operation of certain strategically placed groups
like business and labour. And this has led to the incorporation of such
g psin the decision-making process. In the event, the state has gained
r social control in return for giving functional representation to
roups. For us here, however, the danger is that the "corporatist"
not carefully applied, can lead to totalitarian dictatorship.3

73
 In the "pluralist" model a variety of organizations emerge volun­
tarily to compete with one another in pursuit of their own interests
without, however, ignoring cross-cutting interests. In their operations
they may be likened to market forces. Civil societies which approximate
the "corporatist" and "pluralist" models are to be found, for example, in
Switzerland, Germany, Austria as well as the Scandinavian countries,
and the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States of America,
respectively4.
It would appear from historical experience that the "pluralist"
model of civil society is better and more easily able to facilitate the
transition to, and help to sustain, pluralist democracy5— despite some
weaknesses associated with this model like unequal distribution of
economic power and the threat of extreme particularism embedded in
it. But if a civil society of this kind is to play its role in the process of
democratization, then a number of conditions must be met.
First, as many of the social forces and interests that find organized
expression in groups should see themselves as constituting relatively
autonomous and counter-vailing centres of economic and political
power in relation not only to the state and its agencies but also to the
primary units of society.6 Secondly, these intermediary organizations
(or subunits of civil society) must be characterized by organizational
continuity in a large measure; while their rights and entitlements on
which their very corporate existence rests must be accepted, respected
and protected by the state. For, in the modem era especially, there is no
civil society without the state; that is why there is also the need for co­
operation between the state and civil society without prejudice to the
tetter's autonomy. Thirdly, it is imperative that these sub-units are
tolerant of one another in pursuing their interests. But this will be
impeded to a large extent if there exist gross inequalities based, for
instance, on either the distribution of material rewards or traditional
distinctions of tribe, caste or race within the society.7 Fourthly, they must
develop a capacity for democratic self-governance. Leaders should be
periodically and democratically elected to ensure accountability for
their stewardship; while deliberation about group action must be free,
open, tolerant and fair. Finally, these subunits must cultivate what has
been termed the "civic spirit"8 which broadly means conscientious
respect for the rights of all (including actual or potential competitors) and
keen concern for the welfare of the larger community.
The emergence of a variety of intermediary organizations in a
society must be highly appreciated and encouraged rather than de­

74
plored— particularly in the light of the tragic consequences of the
severe constriction of civil society under communist rule in the former
Soviet Union and elsewhere. For even their mere existence diversifies
and enriches the institutional environment. Thereby, citizens are given
ample opportunity to choose which organizations to affiliate with; and
choice, it may be noted, is very crucial to the successful operation of
pluralist democracy.
Besides, as already indicated, these subunits of civil society fill a
great many roles which are not considered as falling within the
province of the state. And they provide the social space in which citizens
can explore both the possibilities of freedom and the responsibilities of
self-governance, free from the potentially oppressive arm of the state.9
At this stage, it is appropriate that the relationship between political
parties and other segments of civil society is tackled, but only briefly
since it is amply discussed by Prof. Folson in another chapter. Of all the
subunits of civil society, it is political parties which are most manifestly
political in their objectives and operations. They seek, above all, to attain
or retain political power, normally through elections, in order to form
the government of the country either alone or in concert with other
parties.10 Failing that, they may go into opposition and try to influence
the government in many ways.
Admittedly, most of the other subunits such as single-issue pres­
sure groups may present or support candidates for election to the
legislature to promote their cause. Occasionally, a subunit or a section
of it may itself form a political party as the leadership of the Ghana Trades
Union Congress (TUC) did in 1979; or it may forge very close ties with
a political party as the American Federation of Labour-Congress of
Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO) has done with the Democratic Party
of the USA, and the Roman Catholic Church with the Christian Demo­
cratic Parties in Germany and Italy. Many of these subunits may prefer
to lobby the government and its agencies in order to influence them on
certain issues and policy decisions; and thereby, seek to make the
authorities responsive to the wishes of the citizens, and accountable for
their policies and actions.
On the whole, however, these other subunits of civil society
te the building blocks of political parties. They provide many of
(ht mbers and sympathisers of these parties. Moreover, political
ire the vehicle whereby the various interests and concerns
d 1j individuals and the other subunits are "aggregated" into
<ages", usually expressed in "party platforms" or party

75
manifestoes. Thus, even though their conflict-minimizing (and hence
unifying) role is usually overlooked by "no-party" advocates, political
parties in fact play a significant role in reducing conflict and bridging the
wide gaps between different alternative sets of preferences.11 That is
why a democracy could degenerate into "anomic violence" in the
absence of genuine parties. It is in these and other respects that political
parties, as a subset of civil society, are very crucial to the successful
operation of pluralist democracy.

Historical Overview

1957-196612

Although colonial rule in Ghana was on the whole autocratic, it did not,
paradoxically, obstruct the emergence of voluntary organizations of
many kinds - especially from the end of World War I onwards. The
colonial authorities even encouraged and guided the growth of the
labour and co-operative movements. What they did not and were
unwilling to do was to encourage the growth of an indigenous, self-
sufficient and autonomous entrepreneurial capitalist class;13 just as until
1951 they allowed only token popular participation in government.
Even so it is no exaggeration to observe that independent Ghana
inherited a nascent civil society which was potentially vibrant. For there
clearly existed a variety of social forces which had voluntarily estab­
lished organizations to pursue, inter alia, occupational, social, self-help,
religious, recreational and political goals; some of them were pressure
groups as well.
Among these intermediary organizations were the following: the
National Farmers' Union, Asante Farmers' Union, United Ghana Farm­
ers' Council and Alliance of Co - operatives; the Chambers of Commerce
and Mines, Ghana Employers' Association, Ghana Manufacturers'
Association, and Women Traders' Associations in some of the main
towns; the trade unions of which the largest and most important were
the United Africa Company Employees' and Mine Workers' Unions,
and over which a Trades Union Congress uneasily presided; the Ghana
Bar Association, Ghana Medical Association and Ghana Mid wives' and
Nurses' Associations; the Christian Council of Churches, National
Catholic Secretariat and Ghana Muslim Council.
There were also sports clubs, self-help associations (like credit

76
unions), literary dubs, as well as old boys' and old girls' assodations,
espedally of the major second cyde educational institutions, all of which
established networks for social interaction, debate and support. And last
but not least were the politically oriented assodations— the Convention
People's Party (CPP), National Liberation Movement (NLM), Togoland
Congress (TC), Northern People's Party (NPP), and Muslim Assodation
Party (MAP) — which aggregated and canalized the diverse interests
and demands of their constituents in sodety. A great number of these
voluntary intermediary organizations were ethnically cross-cutting in
membership.14
At independence, then, there was no question that what may be
termed the voluntary, pluralist basis of sodal and political action had
emerged - however fragile it was.15 And at the party political level, the
numerical weakness of the parliamentary opposition (33 against the
C P Fs 71) belied the sizeable eledoral support it mustered in the 1956
general elections (the last before independence)16 It was the expectation
that dvil society would develop further to serve as the engine to propel
the first constitutional-democratic enterprise to success.
To some people, one of the grounds for such expectation was the
magnificent speech17Nkrumah delivered on 12 November, 1956 in the
Legislative Assembly in which he extolled, and promised to uphold, the
cardinal tenets of liberal democracy. Only the main points will be
highlighted here.
First, he acknowledged the immense value of constitutional oppo­
sition, the competitive party system, free and fair elections based on an
'accurate register of voters" and supervised by an independent and
impartial eledoral commission, as well as the independence of the
judiciary. Secondly, he expressed his belief in and resped for the rights
of regional minorities. According to him, it was the government's duty
to ensure that "in the various regions of Ghana any minority party'
was accorded "fair consideration in the regional machinery of govern­
ment."18 Thirdly, Nkrumah underscored "the equal importance of the
rights of individuals." These included: (i) "freedom from arbitrary
arrest"; (ii) the inviolability of the individual's home, and freedom from
arbitrary search; (iii) freedom from arbitrary confiscation of property;
and (iv) freedoms of speech, thought, consdence — and of association:
"the Government believes that any individual should be entitled to join
any trade union, political party or other associations of his choice" (thus
ac iowledging the relevance and importance of a pluralist civil society
for liberal democracy).

77
 But that all this was mere rhetoric — part of "tactical action" —
calculated to conciliate the NLM-dominated opposition and convince
the British government to fulfil its promise of granting independence to
the country after the 1956 elections,19 is confirmed by Nkrumah's
revealing remark in the preface to his Autobiography. According to him,
in the post-independence period it might be necessary to support even
a political system founded on social justice and a liberal-democratic
constitution with emergency measures of a totalitarian kind.20
The motivation for this remark is not explained entirely by the
lessons Nkrumah may have drawn from the bitter CPP-NLM conflict
during 1954-1956. The plain fact is that, ideologically, Nkrumah was a
fierce advocate of "developmental dictatorship" of a socialist kind.21 In
his view the economic and social development of Ghana must be "jet-
propelled" to enable it catch up with the developed countries. Hence he
did not see why the government's efforts at development should be
hampered by constitutional limitations of the kind enshrined in the
Independence Constitution. Besides, he was aware that developmental
dictatorship is, generally speaking, incompatible with a strong civil
society which will restrict its autonomy. Hence he sought to arrest its
development in Ghana. Before discussing the steps he took in this
direction, it is necessary to outline some of the major changes that were
made to the constitutional-political structure in the period.
Soon after independence there occurred certain events which the
CPP and the government adroitly exploited to great political advantage.
These included: the Alavanyo riots in the Volta Region involving the
Togoland Congress (TC); the Ga Shifimo Kpee protest movement in
Accra; and the alleged assassination attempt by some opposition
elements on Nkrumah's life in December, 1957.72 The government then
em barked on a system atic dism antling of the Independence
Constititution, the ultimate purpose of which was revealed by Kofi
Baako, a Ministerial Secretary and an ardent disciple of Nkrumah, when
hesaidinjuly 1958 in the National Assembly: "W e shall never allow the
Opposition to unseat us. The CPP shall always sit here as the Govern­
ment."23
The Constitution (Repeal of Restrictions) Act, 1958 removed all the
special provisions on constitutional amendments and cleared the way
for the amendment of the Independence Constitution in many other
respects. The regional assemblies, which had been elected in 1958, were
dissolved under the Regional Assemblies (Amendment) Act, 1959.
Amendments affecting the judiciary, the constitutional provisions on

78
which had been entrenched, were effected by ordinary legislation. The
most significant of such amendments dissolved the judicial service
commission which was devised to ensure fairness in the appointment of
superior court judges in particular.
The Independence Constitution was eventually replaced by the
1960 Constitution under which Ghana became a republic on 1 July, 1960.
Nkrumah, who became the first President (as Head of State and Govern­
ment), was vested with enormous powers— as exemplified by article 55
and his power to appoint, without reference to any other authority, all
superior court judges. He could also dismiss the chief justice at will and
at any time. The other superior court judges enjoyed security of tenure
since they could be removed only through a special procedure. How­
ever, by the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1964, the President could
dismiss such judges also "at any time for reasons which to him appear
sufficient." Nkrumah's control over the judiciary was total.
In the immediate post-independence period, the government also
devised what Harvey24has aptly called the legal instruments of political
monopoly. These included: the Deportation Act, 1957 under which
some people, alleged to have been foreigners but were opposition
supporters, were deported; State Council Ordinances which were
aimed at undermining the authority of some paramount chiefs and
weakening their position as opposition supporters; and the Avoidance
of Discrimination Act, 1957 which made illegal political parties based on
tribe, region or religion. In anticipation of this enactment the opposition
parties which would have been affected by it came together and formed
the United Party (UP). But realizing that by these measures the opposi­
tion had not been completely eliminated, and impatient with the com­
plexities and the slow pace of due process of law, the government
enacted the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) in July 1958. Under this
enactment hundreds of people, including not a few of CPP members
who hailed it because they thought it was aimed at the opposition only,
were detained without trial.25
In the republican era the Criminal Code (Amendment) Act, 1961
made it an offence to publish anything considered defamatory or
insulting to the President. Since Nkrumah, the President, had by this
time become an autocrat and occupied the centre stage in almost every
aspect of Ghana's political life, this law severely limited political debate
and discussion. The Newspaper Licencing Act, 1963, which enjaired the
government's complete control of newspaper publication, added the
coup de grace, it crippled press freedom.

79
 Besides all these legal measures, a number of political measures
were taken to strengthen the C P Ps hold on the country. Such measures
included: (i) the re-structuring of the party which involved the appoint­
ment of party faithfuls — rather than civil servants — as district and
regional commissioners to control the local institutions and population
espedally; and (ii) the absorption of trade unions, farmers' co-opera­
tives, and womens' and youth organizations — which could thwart the
C P P s efforts at domination— as "integral wings" or "composite parts"
of the party. Such bodies were the Trades Union Congress (TUC), United
Ghana Farmers' Co-operative Council (UGFCC), National Coundl of
Ghana Women (NCGW), Builders' (later Workers') Brigade, Ghana
Young Pioneers (GYP), and all other bodies involved in the training of
the youth.
It must be noted, however, that the CPP leadership did not have an
easy time of absorbing the trade unions and farmers' co-operatives, for
instance. It is, therefore, appropriate to narrate, if only rapidly, the
history of their struggle against government and party control.
It is no foreshortening of history to observe that the country7s
labour movement came into political limelight in January 1950 when the
Gold Coast Trades Union Congress (GCTUC) called a general strike in
support of Nkrumah's declaration of "positive action."26 The direct
consequence of this strike and its suppression by the colonial govern­
ment was the collapse of the GCTUG In January 1951 it was revived
under the guidance and encouragement of the Labour Department. Its
leadership included such non-political moderates as D.K. Foevie and S.
Larbi-Odam, the leaders of the Mine Workers' and UAC Employees'
Unions respectively. After the C P Ps electoral victory in February 1951,
Nkrumah and some union leaders, who had been imprisoned as a result
of "positive action" and the general strike, were released. Some of these
union leaders formed a rival central labour organization called the
Ghana Trades Union Congress (GTUC). In 1953 there was a merger
between the GCTUC and GTUC under the former's name; but the
leadership was drawn from both bodies.
The period 1953-1958 witnessed an interesting struggle within the
labour movement involving three groups. The first group comprised
the relatively well-established unions; for example, the Railway, UAC,
and Mine Workers' Unions. These sought to maintain the independence
of the labour movement. The second group consisted of union leaders
who supported the CPP; and prominent among them was J.K. Tettegah
who considered that their control of the labour movement would pave

80
the way for eventually attaining strategic positions in the CPP. The third
group was the CPP itself which hankered after control of the labour
movement for its own purposes.
In this period the CPP cou Id not impose itself on the unions not only
because it lacked the resources to do so but also because such a step
would have served partly as a convenient pretext for the British govern­
ment to delay independence. And this, coupled with the very pre -
disposition of the first group, dictated caution on the C P P s part.
On the other hand, the first group itself had to tread warily because
it could hardly afford, nor did it seek, an all-out confrontation which
might estrange a party that was most likely to assume state-power at
independence. The CPP supporters in the unions also had to be cautious
in their approach for two main reasons. First, since they did not have
their own unions, they lacked a strong support-base in the labour
movement.27 Secondly, they had both friends and enemies in the
government; and Tettegah particularly was considered a potentially
serious potential threat to the CPP leadership.
But there was one factor which apparently favoured the Tettegah
faction. This was the disenchantment of many unionists with the
fragmentation of the labour movement into a great number of small
unions with meagre financial resources. According to the annual report
of the Ministry of Labour, in 1957 there were approximately 130 regis­
tered unions with a total membership of nearly 80,000. Of these unions
21 had less than 50 members each, 31 had between 50 and 250 each, and
16 had between 250 and 1000 each.28 The Tettegah faction could well
have exploited this disenchantment by convincing the smaller unions to
regroup themselves into bigger unions, while authority would be
centralized in the TUC.
It is true to say that under its constitution of 195619, for instance, the
GCTUC had extensive powers over the affairs of the affiliated unions.
These included the powers of intervention in all industrial disputes, of
investigation into union misconduct, and of expulsion. In reality,
however, the T U C s control of the unions was anything but effective, as
evidenced by the financial arrangements it had with them. The consti­
tution enjoined every union to contribute 3d per member annually; this
was nearly two per cent of membership dues. And yet the unions only
tonally made even this meagre contribution to the TUC.
Oespite such problems confronting the labour movement, the
ah group made continued, but futile, efforts to dominate it.
s came to a head in September 1955 when the non-political group

81
broke with the GCTUC and established the Congress of Free Trade
Unions (CFTU), only to return to the GCTUC a year later. But the group
still resisted all attempts to centralize authority in the GCTUC until after
independence; and even then some unions were still unyielding.
At its 14th annual conference in January 1958 the TUC, under the
leadership of Tettegah as Secretary-General, was widely expected to
adopt a proposal for a new structure of the labour movement. Its main
thrust was the creation of a centralized trade union organization — as
had all along been advocated by the Tettegah group. Although it was
adopted in principle, the proposal was fiercely opposed by some unions,
notably the powerful UAC and Ghana Railway Employees' unions.
They insisted on retaining their independent and separate existence.
But since the CPP was then the governing party in an independent
Ghana, and since it was determined to control the labour movement at
all costs, the government took the bull by the horns and enacted in 1958
the Industrial Relations Act which spelt out the new structure. Because
of continued opposition by some unions, much sterner measures — in
the form of amendments to the 1958 Act in 1959 and 1960 — were
adopted. Briefly, through these laws authority was centralized in the
TUC; all unions were merged, first into 24 and later reduced to 10; union
dues were deducted at source; and all non-unionized workers including
civil servants automatically became unionized, meaning that their right
to choose to join or not to join a trade union was eliminated.30
By 1960, then, there was not the slightest hint of any possible
autonomy for the unions. The democratic election of union leaders,
especially of the TUC, rarely occurred. Indeed, they were accountable
not to the rank and file, but to the government and party (in effect to
Nkrumah) since, as already noted, the TUC was incorporated in the CPP.
And the Secretary-General of the TUC, J.K. Tettegah, became a Minister
Plenipotentiary and an Ambassador Extraordinary.31 Thus was
achieved government and party control of the labour movement, but
not without opposition from some unions.
The co-operative movement, of which the farmers' co-operatives
were a part, was also brought under government and party control. But
the movement resisted such control until 1961.
The co-operative movement began in the 1920s. By 1945 it had
grown into a vital social force. After a drawn-out struggle with the
colonial government, under whose encouragement and guidance it
flourished, the co-operative movement won a large measure of au­
tonomy from government control which it jealously guarded32 It also

82
cherished the general co-operative principle of political neutrality.
Accordingly, it is in order to outline broadly the structure of the
movement existing before the CPP's intrusion in 1952.33
The co-operative movement comprised registered primary, village
produce marketing societies, secondary or district unions, and national
or apex unions. These bodies as a whole were fairly democratic in
structure and operation.
The affairs of a primary society, for example, were managed by an
elected management committee. The latter entrusted the society's daily
affairs to its chief executive who was subject to such directives as the
committee might give in accordance with the society's bye-laws. The
general meeting of the society's members was the final authority.
The district unions consisted of not less than two registerd primary
societies which dealt in the same produce/crop or engaged in a similar
business venture and operated in the same district. These unions
enabled the primary societies to market their produce collectively, and
provided them with finance and storage facilities. The unions com­
prised representatives of the primary societies who at periodic meetings
exchanged views and took decisions on common problems. The powers
of a union were derived from the primary societies. Its affairs were
managed by a committee elected from members on "an equal vote
basis." Final authority lay with the general nembership, and was
exercised through votings at periodic meetings. Each union had a staff
headed by a secretary experienced in co-operative affairs.
By 1952 there were three national bodies within the co-operative
movement, namely, the Ghana Co-operative Marketing Association, the
Ghana Co-operative Bank, and the Alliance of Ghana Co-operatives.
The Marketing Association, originally called the Gold Coast Co-opera­
tive Federation, was formed in December 1944. Its major task was to
arrange the most economic co-operative marketing of cocoa for the
societies and unions that dealt in cocoa and were known as Cocoa
Farmers' Marketing Co-operatives. The Association was under a man­
agement committee composed of one elected representative of each
union. Shares in the Association were held by the unions.
The Co-operative Bank emerged in October 1946 to serve as a
im for financing co -operative activities. Its membership was open
io all registered co-operatives at all levels; and all of them were also
ialders. The Bank's management committee consisted of elected
-entatives of all the members.
T\e Department of Co-operatives (established in April 1944) under

83
the Registrar of Co-operatives was solely responsible for co-operative
education, promotion, and publicity. However, the co-operative move­
ment came to feel that an independent body should perform these tasks.
Hence the formation of the Alliance of Ghana Co-operatives in
December 1951. All the registered societies and unions as well as the
Marketing Association and the Co-operative Bank were members, and
shareholders as well. A committee of representatives of the members
managed the Alliance's affairs; while ultimate authority rested with the
general membership. Unlike the two other national bodies, the Alliance
was non-commercial. Therefore, it relied on the financial support of its
members (who were its owners) for its continued existence.
It must be emphasized that the co-operative movement, prior to its
forcible absorption by the CPP, was financially autonomous. Its units
were primarily self-financing through entrance fees, share subscrip­
tions, donations, and annual levies on members. As the Omaboe
Committee on the re-organization of the co-operative movement put it
in 1964: "Member investment formed one of the solid foundations of the
(old) co-operative movement.'34 Interestingly, all management commit­
tees, including office-holders, served the societies without remuneration
other than refund of transport and subsistence expenses incurred while
travelling on business for the societies. The only exception was the
treasurer who normally was paid a fixed allowance. It was only later
that, as a result of the increased volume of activities, full-time, paid
Directors were appointed to head the committees on the national bodies.
Besides the Co-operative Bank, the most enterprising and success­
ful of the co-operatives were the cocoa farmers' marketing societies and
unions. It has correctly been observed that 1948-1961 was their "golden
age." Although they faced keen competition from UAC and Cadbury,
they were able, through the Marketing Association, to capture a sizeable
portion of the cocoa market: their share of the total cocoa purchases
increased from 10 per cent in 1948 to 30 per cent in 196135
The cocoa marketing co-operatives, which were strongest in Ashanti
and Brongland, were mostly dominated by the more entrepreneurial
wealthy farmers. They were politically neutral and almost indifferent to
the nationalist agitation for independence. Though Nkrumah, after the
C P P s formation in 1949, was not enthusiastic about them partly for this
reason, he shrewdly saw the cocoa marketing business as the key to the
cocoa sector. Its significance for building support for his party was not
lost on him: he could exploit to advantage the potential hostility of many
smaller cocoa farmers to the bigger, wealthier ones.36

84
 Little wonder that the government established in 1952 the Cocoa
Purchasing Company (CPC) as a cocoa buying agent and a subsidiary
of the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB). It soon became a centre of
patronage for the selective distribution of loans to CPP supporters in the
cocoa growing areas in particular. As such it was resented by many
Ashanti cocoa farmers and the Opposition.37
In 1953 the CPP established the United Ghana Farmers' Council
(UGFC) to replace the National Farmers' Union (an opposition group).
Initially a subsidiary of theCPC, the UGFC continued to operateafter the
collapse of the parent body. Democracy was virtually non-existent in
the structure and operations of the UGFC. Secretary-receivers were
appointed to run the village societies each of which had a three-
member village advisory committee comprising the chief farmer and
two other appointed representatives — all of whom were CPP mem­
bers. The Secretar-General was also a party appointee. The UGFC was
thus a bulwark of support for the CPP in the 1956 general elections.
In 1957 the government declared the UGFC the sole representative
and mouthpiece of all farmers in the country, and made it one of the
CMB's licensed cocoa buying agents. The government also directed the
CMB to pay the UGFC an annual subvention of £100,000; and decided
to build a £100,000 national headquarters for the Council into which it
moved in 1959. In 1958 the UGFC's marketing section was registered as
the Ghana Farmers Marketing Co-operative Ltd.
In cocoa marketing the UGFC encountered strong competition
from the independent African cocoa brokers, UAC and Cadbury, as well
as the Ghana Co-operative Marketing Association. To capture and
monopolize cocoa marketing, the CPP through the UGFC had to
remove these competitors. Eventually, the first two groups bowed out
without resistance. But the third group resisted strongly until 1961.
After all, the older established cocoa marketing co-operatives also had
allies among Opposition and CPP backbenchers in the National
Assembly.
In 1959 the government announced its plan to unify the co­
operative movement. The older co-operatives correctly saw it as an
attempt to bring them under government and party control through the
UGFC. The latter, they argued, had violated all co-operative principles
by being a CPP organ. Unfortunately, their united front was broken in
July 1960 when the Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, and Sefwi cocoa marketing
o operatives formed a separate body, the Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, and
Sefw Co-operative Organization (ABASCO). The break was appar­

85
ently due to fears of southern domination of the Marketing Association.
The UGFC and the CPP saw the break as an opportune moment to strike.
In late 1960 they negotiated the absorption of ABASCO into the UGFC.
The remnants of the Marketing Association were decreed out of exist­
ence, and their considerable assets seized, when in May 1961 the
government made the UGFC the sole lincensed buying agent of the
CMB; that is, the only body that should handle "the local marketing of
the whole cocoa crop of Ghana."38
Earlier in August 1959 the independent Alliance of Ghana Co­
operatives had been dissolved and the National Co-operative Council
(NCC) had been formed to perform its functions. The NCC, clearly a
government and party organ, was itself replaced in July 1962 by the
Central Co-operative Council (CCC). The CCC was a smaller, adminis­
trative unit within the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare "respon­
sible for publicity and international representation of the co-operative
m ovem ent."39
The flourishing and autonomous Co-operative Bank was also
dissolved in November 1960. The Omaboe Committee was so im­
pressed by the Bank's achievements that it wrote: "At the time of its
liquidation the Bank had assumed a very effective role in the develop­
ment of the Co-operatives. ... The Ghana Government guaranteed the
Co-operatives to borrow up to £G2.05 million from the Commercial
Banks for cocoa marketing and this sum was channelled through the
Bank and so efficiently managed by it that it was never necessary for the
Government to be called upon to honour its guarantee." Besides, "the
effects of its (liquidation) contributed in no small measure to the financial
plight (of) most of our present (co-operative) societies."40 The tone of this
assessment suggests that the Committee regretted the Bank's dissolu­
tion. For the government and the CPP, however, it was as well that
another autonomous centre of economic power had been eliminated.
The UGFC was renamed the United Ghana Farmers' Council Co­
operatives indicating its new character as an umbrella organization for
all the country's co-operative and non-co-operative farmers and fisher­
men. Interestingly, the Omaboe Committee considered the new name
untidy, and recommended instead the United Ghana Farmers' Co­
operatives Council (UGFCC), which was accepted.41
The UGFCC was, clearly, not a genuine co-operative organization,
but a government and party instrument for subduing the farmers and
fishermen who constituted a vital social force. For his contribution to this
end, Martin Appiah-Danquah, the UGFCC's Secretary-General, was

86
rewarded with the post of Minister Plenipotentiary and Ambassador
Extraordinary— like Tettegah. However, the resentment of the majority
of the Co-operative cocoa farmers arising from their elimination from
cocoa marketing and the high taxation of the cocoa sector, contributed
in no small measure to the general disaffection with the government
and the CPP during 1960-1966.
At this juncture we must look briefly at Nkrumah's approach to
Ghanaian private enterprise. Historically, it has been asserted, industri­
alization leading to transitions to pluralist democracies occurred on the
initiative of individuals and groups that were able to develop entrepre­
neurial activity separate from and largely independent of the state.42
However, it must be added, for individuals and groups of any modem
society to fill such a role, it is imperative that they cultivate the habits of
independence and self-reliance to enable them resist the state's monopo­
lization of all power. Thus qualified, the assertion generally holds. That
is, the availability of a strong, autonomous and self dependent
entreprenuerial class of people in civil society is one of the crucial
prerequisites for the transition to pluralist democracy — a point to be
taken on later.
As already noted, although the colonialists did not encourage the
growth of a Ghanaian capitalist class, at independence the material for
its emergence and development was available in the sizeable minority
of Ghanaian business people, besides the wealthy cocoa farmers. These
were very eager and ready to strike out on their own in industry,
commerce and finance. What was lacking was an enabling institutional
framework for harnessing indigenous ideas as well as human and
material resources.43
Truly enough, in the immediate post-independence period
Nkrumah himself, under W. Arthur Lewis's influence, recognized the
necessity of a mixed economy in which indigenous private enterprise
would play a significant role. But since his ultimate objective was the
Marxist-socialist transformation of the inherited colonial economy,
Nkrumah did not provide the needed framework for local business
people to expand and diversify their activities. Instead, he took certain
anti-capitalist measures which aimed at severely curtailing their activi­
ties in even the sphere allotted to them, namely, "small-scale Ghanaian
pr vate enterprises." The "Work and Happiness" programme of 1962,
eflected Nkrumah's "Left-tum" in 1961-62, emphasized the need
lop at an accelerated ratethe state and co-operative sectors. These
progressively replace all other economic structures and eventu­

87
ally play the dominant role in the economy.
The dissolution of the old, autonomous co-operatives has already
been noted. Their replacements under the UGFCC were highly regi­
mented. They eventually proved an unmitigated disaster, especially in
agricultural production and marketing.
A great number of state enterprises were established to supplant
indigenous private interests in industry, finance, and commerce. For­
eign private interests were directed to work with the state rather than
with their indigenous counterparts. The aim was to cripple the private
sector by breaking its links with foreign private interests. And, as the
Ollenu Commission on import licences revealed in 1967,44 Nkrumah
tried to cajole some successful Ghanaian industrialists-including the
young Robert Ocran, part-owner and managing director of Mankoadze
Fisheries - to abandon their private enterprises to assume management
positions in state enterprises. Besides the ideological factor, there was
another reason for Nkrumah's efforts at smothering the already fragile
bases of the indigenous private enterprise sector. Since wealth is power,
he knew that the emergence and development of a class of rich Ghanaian
capitalists, who would constitutecountervailing centres of power in civil
society, would gravely threaten his grip on state-power. Hence another
crucial social force was stunted.45
Having penetrated and captured the labour and co-operative
movements; and having suppressed the growth of domestic private
enterprise, Nkrumah and the CPP relentlessly tried to spread their
tentacles into other social institutions. Attempts were made to form CPP
branches in religious organizations and introduce the Young Pioneer
Movement in first and second cycle educational institutions but not
without opposition from some school and religious authorities. Leaders
were imposed on organizations like the Muslim Council and profes­
sional associations like the Association for the Advancement of M anage
ment. NorweretheuniversitiesatLegon,Kumasi (whichbore Nkrumah's
name), and Cape Coast spared. Chapters of the National Association of
Socialist Students' Organization (NASSO) were opened in all of them.
They were known as "study groups" devoted to the assimilation and
propagation of "Nkrumaism".46
Although Nkrumah was statutorily the nominal Chancellor of the
three universities, he was determined to direct and control academic
affairs, particularly staff appointments and programmes of instruction.
For example, he instituted what were called "Presidential" or "Osagyefo
State Professors of Law" to teach "socialist jurisprudence and legality/
among others, at the Legon Law Faculty. Such appointments were not
made through the normal academic procedures.
Then in November 1964 a committee was appointed to "work out
a system to ensure the removal of all publications which do not reflect the
ideology of the Party or are antagonistic to its ideas" — in plain words
to prescribe "socialist" textbooks for teachers and students, and pro­
scribe those considered "capitalist."47 Earlier in January 1964 a CPP mob
led by N.A. Welbeck, a Minister of State, descended on the Legon
campus, attacked a number of the staff and students, and caused
considerable damage to property — all in a bid to coerce the university
into submission to Nkrumah. Immediately after, six expatriate mem­
bers of the academic staff were deported. In spite of all these efforts,
Nkrumah could not completely penetrate and take over the universities,
secondary schools, Christian churches, and the Ghana Bar Association.
By 1964, however, Ghana had become a de facto one-party
dictatorhship. For, the numerical strength of the parliamentary opposi­
tion had been reduced to a trickle through the detention of some of its
members or through enforced carpet crossing or exile by others. It only
remained for the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1964 (enacted after the
managed referendum of that year) to regularize the situation. The Act
legalized the CPP as the only political party. In early 1965 the National
Assembly, elected in 1956, was dissolved. Then the C P F s central
committee (in effect Nkrumah, since as Life Chairman he appointed its
members) nominated and declared 165 people "elected" unopposed as
members of parliament.
Ghanaians as a whole were thus effectively disenfranchised and
disempowered. The real meaning of what Nkrumah called a "People's
Democracy" became clear power came from above and not from the
bottom up; and the expression "The CPP is Ghana and Ghana is the C P F '
in fact became "Nkrumah is Ghana and Ghana is Nkrumah."
The advent of a "People's Democracy" drastically affected the
relations of individuals and social groups (both primary and secondary)
to the state in many respects. First, political pluralism was effectively
eliminated and the great majority of Ghanaians were equally effectively
excluded from the political marketplace. For example, a vital mecha­
nism - the parliamentary opposition linking UP members and sympa-
t s to the state — was smashed. Recruitment into public office and
to state resources depended on personal or party connections
than on popular support or achievement. Citizen participation
edefined to mean solidarity with, and unflinching loyalty to,

89
Nkrumah and other party influentials. Hence the proliferation of
patron-client networks with the inevitable corrupt practices. Many
individuals and groups devised mechanisms for sheer survival outside
the state apparatus (a phenomenon that was to become most pro­
nounced years later during the Acheampong and Rawlings regimes,
especially).48 Some took refuge in religious worship, particularly in the
pentecostal churches; while others in the urban slums carved niches for
themselves in the growing informal economy; and still others simply
"voted with their feet."
In the first half of the 1960s, the "culture of fear" (induced by the
indiscriminate use of the PDA) notwithstanding, various individuals
and social groups including the trade unions, students, universities,
professionals, and the Christian churches voiced their disaffection with
the government and party. Religious leaders protested the deification of
Nkrumah. The trade unions, led by the Sekondi-Takoradi railway
workers, in 1961 embarked on the most serious of the industrial
actions that occurred in this period; it was ruthlessly suppressed.
A number of people, including Opposition leaders like Joe
Appiah, Victor Owusu, William Ofori-Atta, and J.B. Danquah, were
detained for allegedly instigating the strike. Danquah, who persis­
tently challenged the repressive laws in courts, was detained again
after his release from the first detention. He could not survive the
second. Meanwhile the underground political opposition was active;
Accra shook periodically with bomb explosions; and there were some
assassination attempts on Nkrumah's life.
The liberal-democratic experiment was aborted for two major
related reasons. Civil society was itself fragile and limited in scope
at independence. But since Nkrumah knowingly precluded pluralist
democracy from his political agenda, it only followed logically that
he would try to arrest the steady growth of the kind of civil society that
was capable of nurturing it. Consequently, civil society became even
more fragile and contracted than it was at independence. Yet not a
few of its subunits managed to hold their ground somehow. In the
event, civil society, together with a number of primary social groups
in the rural communities and urban slums, contributed in no small
way to the kind of situation that partly but significantly impelled some
sections of the armed forces and the police to topple the Nkrumah
autocracy.

90
1966-1972

The National Liberation Council (NLC) was subsequently established

with Major-General Gater Lt.-Gen. J. A. Ankrah as Chairman and Head
of State and Mr. J.W.K. Harlley, the police chief, as his vice. In nature
and design, the NLC was temporary and corrective. Its intention was
to clear the Nkrumah mess and hand over power to liberal-minded
and responsible people.
It valiantly tried to tackle the country's economic prob’ems like the
fast deteriorating balance of payments position, raging inflation and the
huge foreign indebtedness. It also sought to reduce the high level of state
intervention in the economy by, inter alia dismantling several state
enterprises and instituting measures for the sound management of the
remainder. Its economic policies were not wholly negative; for in 1968
it launched a two-year Development Plan which emphasized rural
development.
However, as was correctly observed in 1968: 'T h e NLC brought to
Ghana a freedom unknown for years ... for the vast majority of
Ghanaians ... this, and not its economic policies, was its chief justifica­
tion" 49 — despite the enormous economic difficulties that faced
Ghanaians. It restored the judiciary's independence, freedom of
expression including press freedom (though some form of press censor­
ship continued), and freedom of association (though party political
activity was banned).
Indeed, the NLC encouraged associational life resulting in the
resurgence of the subunits of civil society, reactivation of old ones
dissolved by the Nkrumah regime (like the Ghana National Farmers'
Union and Ghana Co-operative Farming and Marketing Association)
and the emergence of new ones (like the Eastern Region Transport
Co-operative Union and Ghana National Contractors' Association).
A1 though it was not always as much of a necessity as it should have
been for a civilian regime, the NLC made it a cardinal policy to create
channels of communication and consultation with the public on numer­
ous issues through these voluntary organizations, a number of which
were also pressure groups.50 For example, the NLC established a
k of ad visory committees and appointed many commissions and
ees of inquiry on a number of which representatives of some of
pational groups especially served.
( ourse, all was not rosy. The trade unions became dissatisfied
ow level of wages and other conditions of service which they

91
attributed to the close rapport between the government and private
sector employers who were mainly foreigners. They launched a series of
strikes in 1966-69. One of the most serious of these involved the mine
workers at the Ashanti Goldfields in Obuasi (which had been taken over
by Lonhro) three of whom the police shot dead. Nor did the NLC
actively encourage the re-organization of the revived co-operative
movement along pre-1961 lines as it did with the TUC under B.A.
Bentum — an attitude which the Busia administration also adopted. On
the whole, however, civil society came back to life during 1966-1969.
The NLC, finally, bequeathed to Ghanaians a liberal-democratic
constitution crafted by a Constitutional Commission and approved by
a Constituent Assembly on both of which significant segments of civil
society were represented.
Following keenly contested general elections in August 1969 in
which voter participation reached the high level of 63.2 per cent of
registered voters, the NLC on 1 October 1969 gave way to a civilian
government. The latter was formed by the Progress Party (PP) led by
K. A. Busia, with the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) led by K.A.
Gbedemah as the dominant opposition party. (The two were "revised
versions" of the UP and CPP respectively.)
The PP government assumed office on the tidal wave of strong and
widespread expectations that the foundations of pluralist democracy
would be laid gradually but firmly. After all, the party's leadership
made no secret of its great admiration for liberal democracy. It was also
hoped that civil society during NLC rule had fairly well recovered from
the shock it received from Nkrumah to lend its support to the second
democratic experiment. Indeed, the prevailing conditions favoured its
own growth and the fulfilment of the task thrust upon it.
First, under the Constitution, freedom of expression and associa­
tion was guaranteed; while preventive detention without trial and the
single-party state were outlawed. Secondly, there existed a freely elected
parliament comprising government and opposition members to serve
as a channel of communication between state and society. Thirdly, in
line with its preference for limited government and free enterprise, the
PP government confined its role to establishing an institutional frame­
work for individuals and social groups to promote and fulfil their goals.
The tasks of state agencies would be regulatory rather than intervention­
ist. The private enterprise sector would be reactivated with the emphasis
on agriculture and rural development. The government in fact estab­
lished a separate Ministry for Rural Development, and enacted the

92
Ghanaian Business Promotion Act to indigenize small - scale retail trade
and business. These and other policies and measures gave associational
life a new lease of life, and in a measure helped to widen the scope of civil
society. And yet the second democratic experiment lasted barely twenty-
seven months. This was due to many factors, a couple or so of which are
discussed briefly here.
First, the government antagonized, and in some cases alienated,
certain powerful social forces by some of its economic and political
measures. Its inefficient implementation of the Aliens Compliance
Order of 1969 resulted in the mass exodus of farmhands in the rural
areas where it had its bulk of support. Many big cocoa farmers were
affected and became dissatisfied. Moreover, in late 1971 its inability to
pay the cocoa farmers for their crops — as a result of the deepening
economic crisis — compounded their disaffection with government.
On account of the increasing disparity of income and wealth, the
workers became highly dissatisfied with the daily minimum wage of 75
pesewas. In its July 1971 budget, aimed at tackling the worsening
economic situation, the government refused to raise the minimum wage
but simultaneously imposed on all working people a National Develop­
ment Levy to raise funds for rural development projects. In August
many trade unions expressed their anger through wildcat strikes. To
forestall a possible nation-wide strike, the government made the work­
ers all the angrier by passing the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act,
1971 to enable "every union to be free and independent" but which in
effect dissolved the TUC and fragmented the labour movement.
The growing economic difficulties resulting in general restiveness
offered the remnants of Nkrumah's supporters the opportunity to
revive and brazenly propagate his ideas and policies. The government
rightly considered this development a serious threat to liberal democ­
racy. It, however, over-reacted in the most incompetent manner by
banning the display of Nkrumah's portraits and the use of CPP slogans
like "freedom" under the Criminal Code (Amendment) Act, 1971.
Ealier in 1970 the government had dismissed 568 civil servants (an
action popularly called "Apollo 568") under the transitional provisions
of the 1969 Constitution; this action was unpopular because it was
considered unfair. Even worse, the "SallahCase" that followed led Busia
conflict with the judiciary. Mr. Sallah, a public servant, challenged
gality of his dismissal in court. After the Supreme Court's decision
favour, Busia remarked in a radio and television speech that no
could compel the government to re - instate any dismissed public

93
servant Although legally justified, that remark was unnecessary. For
it gave the wrong impression that Busia of all people despised the rule
of law and the independence of the judiciary; an impression which has
persisted to this day.
The government also came into confrontation with the students,
led by the National Union of Ghana Students' (NUGS), with its intro­
duction of the Students Loan Scheme by which grants to students
would cover only tuition and examination fees. Furthermore, the stu­
dents angered the government by requesting all ministers of state to
declare their assets as the Constitution required, and by supporting the
call of ex-CPP supporters for an amnesty for all political exiles, includ­
ing Nkrumah.51 The student leaders were summoned before the bar
of parliament and severely reprimanded. There followed a rash of
student demonstrations and disturbances.
There was also the parliamentary Opposition to contend with. Its
numerical weakness (35 to the P P s 105) was compounded by the early
removal of its leader, K.A. Gbedemah, from parliament under the
disqualification law. This action made his supporters all the more bitter.
Perhaps, his removal, however legally justified, contributed in no
insignificant measure to the undermining of the second democratic
experiment. For, as one of the few opposition members with consider­
able parliamentary experience, he could have exerted a moderating
influence on his younger and inexperienced colleagues. As it happened,
the parliamentary Opposition most often adopted an uncompromising
stand in debates on many burning issues, including "Apollo 568," the
expulsion of aliens, dialogue with South Africa and the deteriorating
economic situation. By late 1971 the Opposition had become highly
distrustful of the government and virtually alienated from it.
Secondly, patron-dient networks with the attendant corruption
and nepotism persisted. The general belief was that such networks
benefitted only certain groups and individuals, implying that others had
been deliberately excluded from access to state resources. Not surpris­
ingly, the government's frequent calls on the general public to tighten
their belts — while government and party officials, for example, were
reportedly loosening theirs — were derided.
Thirdly, the government's not infrequent high-handed approach
to issues and the corresponding uncompromising reactions of some
groups, especially the parliamentary Opposition, showed to a large
degree that the liberal-democratic ethos was yet to strike deep roots in
the society as a whole. In January 1972 the very anti-democratic forces

94
in the society, which the Busia government tried in vain to contain,
conspired with a few of their counterparts in the armed forces to
overthrow it. They were not resisted mainly because they cleverly used
the generalized grievances (accentuated by the 44 per cent devaluation
of the cedi in December 1971) of various social groups as a pretext for
their action. But, as they discovered subsequently to their bitter cost,
certain vital elements of civil society had become fairly self-consciously
autonomous to tolerate for long any interference in their affairs
and dictatorship itself.

1972-1981

The National Redemption Council (NRC) comprised six middle-level

military officers and one civilian with Colonel (later General) I.K.
Acheampong as Chairman and Head of State. In October 1975 the
NRC became a purely advisory organ to the Supreme Military Council
(SMCI) which replaced it as the ruling body. The SMCI comprised
the commanders of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Border Guards
as well as the Inspector-General of Police with Acheampong as head.
The Acheampong regime proclaimed the establishment of a social­
ist, self-reliant society through "capturing the commanding heights of
the economy" for Ghanaians as its ultimate goal. And in the first phase
of its rule (1972-75), the government's grand designs on dvil society
gradually unfolded. The government consciously avoided participa­
tory organs and sought to work out a grand alliance of the military,
bureaucracy, and traditional rulers. Obviously neo-corporate in charac­
ter, the alliance was designed to depolitidze public life.52
In the early phase the government made bold attempts to tackle
economic problems, notably in agriculture. The "Operation Feed Your­
self " programme, for example, was modestly successful; and popular
discontent was defused to some extent. But from 1975 on, there set in a
severe scarcity of "essential com modities," deterioration of the basic
physical and social infrastructure, smuggling, trade malpractices, in­
cluding "kalabule" (black-marketeering and excessive trade profiteer­
ing through dubious means), rampant corruption with the government
>e most notorious culprit, and sheer economic mismanagment. The
omy was in a shambles.
It was against such a background that various organizations like
ir Assocation and the Christian Churches demanded a return to

95
civilian, constitutional rule. This demand was backed up by a series of
protests and strikes by doctors, nurses, lawyers, students, university
teachers, and so on. The government responded with massive repres­
sion, including the use of armed force and detention without trial under
the Protective Custody decree.
Then, in a bid to defuse the very high political tension in the
country, Acheampong conceived the idea of a "new system of govern­
ment" which he termed "Union Government" (Unigov). Such a system
would take the form of a national government without political parties;
and it would include representatives of the armed forces, police, and the
civilian population (ATC). According to Acheampong, party politics in
Ghana had "brought division, nepotism, and other evils." On the
other hand, the inclusion of soldiers would end all coups!
An Ad-hoc Committee was appointed to collect and collate the
views of Ghanaians on Unigov. In its report the Committee recom­
mended the following, among others: a national government without
political parties, and without military or police participation either; an
Executive Presidency, a unicameral legislature, as well as a purely
advisory Council of State; and a national referendum on Unigov to be
held on 30 March, 1978.
Predictably, theSMCI launched an extensive propaganda machin­
ery to enlist support for Unigov. A number of government sponsored
pro-Unigov groups were formed. These included the Ghana Peace and
Solidarity Council, the Friends of Society, and National Charter Com­
mittees. The TUC leadership as a whole was pro-Unigov (and in fact
very pro-SMC), although the majority of wage earners were anti-
Unigov. The chiefs as a whole sided with the government as usual, and
so were strongly for Unigov.
In sum, Unigov, as Acheampong originally conceived it, was
meant to marginalize, and atomize for easy manipulation, civil society
in order to legitim ize his m ilitary dictatorship. Unigov was
neo-fascist in conception, design, and structure. But Acheampong's
efforts had the unintended consequence of inducing greater cohesion
and solidarity among a number of the subunits of civil society, and
fortifying their resolve to resist dictatorship. Notable among them were
professional associations like the Bar, Medical, and University Teach­
ers' Associations — which operated under the newly formed Associa­
tion of Recognized Professional Bodies (ARPB) — and the stu­
dents led by NUGS. There also emerged politically-oriented groups like
the People's Movement for Freedom and Justice (PM FJ) with

96
K. A. Gbedemah and General Afrifa among its leaders and the Front for
the Prevention of Dictatorship (FPD) led by Dr. Safo-Adu. These
organizations and a few others fiercely resisted the establishment of
Unigov which they correctly perceived as another form of military
dictatorship in a different garb. Acheampong in vain used massive
armed force to halt them in their tracks.
In the wake of the public anger that greeted the manipulated
referendum results, Acheampong's colleagues on the SMCI acted to
remove what they disingenuously called his "one-man show" by forc­
ing him into retirement. They reconstituted the ruling body which
came to be called SMCII with Lt.-Gen. F.W.K. Akuffo as the new
Chairman and Head of State. SMCII lasted barely a year when it was
overthrown on 4 June, 1979 by junior officers and other ranks.
Although civil society contributed significantly to the demise of
Acheampong's dictatorship, it suffered a degree of contraction under it.
To cope with the harsh economic situation in this period, numerous
groups and individuals adopted a variety of strategies for survival, and
became rather indifferent to the state and its agencies. These included
extensive smuggling, a complex and illegal parallel market, reversion to
subsistence agriculture, the mass exodus of trained and untrained
manpower, and extensive participation in the informal economy.53 It is
also indisputable that the Acheampong regime created the conditions
for the emergence of a culture of extreme left-wing radicalism and
violence in Ghanaian society and politics from 4 June, 1979 onwards.
The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) that was subse­
quently formed was headed by Flt-Lt. J.J. Rawlings. Earlier on 15 May,
1979 he had staged an abortive coup, which, according to him, would
have launched a Mengistu-style revolution in Ghana. The AFRC thus
embarked on what it called a "house-cleaning" exercise involving the
purging of the top brass of the armed forces; and a number of high-
ranking officers including three former heads of state were executed.
The exercise was extended to the larger society resulting in the most
callous brutalization of civilians including women traders, especially.
The scale of violence that occurred in this brief AFRC period was
i ^paralleled in Ghana's post-independence political and social experi-
e> before 4 June, 1979. It was to be surpassed during the greater part
era of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC).
he AFRC's project was to subvert what was perceived as the
lissible elitist bases of civil society, restructure social and political
ions along populist lines, and introduce probity, accountability and

97
social justice into public life. The project, which could not be completed
within this brief period, was to be continued by the PNDC.
The constitutionally elected government of the People's National
Party (PNP) under Dr. Hilla Limann was inaugurated on 24 September,
1979, thus apparently ending eight years of military, dictatorial misrule
of which Ghanaians as a whole had become tired. The tasks that faced
the new government were formidable, to put it mildly.
As a result of Acheampong's massive economic mismanagment
coupled with the AFRC's reckless and erratic economic measures, the
economy had ground almost to a halt. The level of stocks of goods in the
system was abysmally low; and the state coffers were virtually empty.
Politically, the new government had to contend with Rawlings' ominous
threat issued in his handing-over address that it was on probation; and
he was still visibly around to stir up anti-establishment sentiments
among the populace with his populist rhetorics. The PNP itself had
hardly settled down to the business of ruling when it began to be tom
apart by dissension among its leaders centred on power brokerage, the
distribution of patronage, and accusations and counter-accusations of
corrupt deals.
Fully aware that there was no magic formula for arresting the
deplorable economic situation, the government adopted a pragmatic
approach. It introduced a trade liberalization programme (for which
it was condemned by some Marxist-oriented radicals), initiated an
investment code to attract foreign capital, and eventually succeeded
in having the international economic blockade slapped on Ghana during
the AFRC period lifted. However, the liberalization programme re­
sulted in soaring prices; and by the end of 1981 the inflationary rate
had reached 116.5%. The production of cocoa, the country's major
foreign exchange earner, was on the decline; and even the reduced
quantity available was locked up on the farms. Th^ factories were
operating far below capacity, what with the inadequate supply of spare
parts and raw materials. It was evident that the PNP government
needed a much longer time to turn the economy around.
On the political front, there was freedom of expression; and the
mass media could publicize opposing views without fear — although
inept attempts to remove some editors of the state-owned newspapers,
like Elizabeth Ohene of the Daily Graphic, were unpardonable. But it is
to the credit of the government that it believed in political pluralism. No
wonder the political opposition was very vigorous, visible and outspo­
ken both within and outside parliament. And it was even able, with the

98
support of some PNP parliamentarians, to defeat a vital government
budget! Civil society, despite its vicissitudes under Acheampong and
the AFRC, had fairly well recovered and was vibrant. These were
healthy signs. It was, therefore, hoped that with time the third attempt
at pluralist democracy would succeed.
But some social forces were sceptical, if not downright cynical, and
impatient. The majority of workers in state employment, particularly in
the civil service and public corporations like the Ghana Industrial
Holding Corporation (GEHOC) and the Tema docks, resented the low
level of wages and the high price levels with the attendant drastic fall in
living standards. Consequently there were rampant wildcat strikes
culminating in the TUC-backed nation-wide strike in 1981. Salary
increases for parliamentarians further fuelled workers' discontent; and
some GIHOC workers, led by Amartey Kwei (a future PNDC member),
invaded parliament and damaged some property. Their alienation from
the system was almost total.
The students were another source of dissent and discontent. In
1980 there was a series of student demonstrations on the university
campuses due to the deteriorating conditions there; a number of stu­
dents were injured and one was killed, resulting in the closure of the
universities. In May 1981 the NUGS issued a statement deploring the
worsening economic situation and asking the government to take
stringent measures to arrest it. There again followed disturbances on
the campuses. Other educational institutions also had their fair share
of violent demonstrations and disturbances as happened, for instance,
at the Nkawkaw Secondary School and the Foso Training College in
April 1980.54 The impact of the violent AFRC interlude was being felt.
There emerged also certain radical left-wing and anti-establish­
ment groups which became self-appointed watchdogs over the
government's activities in order to protect the "gains" of June 4 and
promote its objectives. These included the June Fourth Movement
(JMF) supported by Rawlings, and the New Democratic Movement
(NDM). And within the PNP itself the Kwame Nkrumah Revolution­
ary Guards (KNRG), led by Johnny Hansen (a prospective PNDC
etary), called for a return to Nkrumah's version of Marxist-Leninist
scientific socialism.
was groups such as these — radical workers, students, intellec-
pined by radical soldiers and backed up to the hilt by Rawlings
id not give pluralist democracy the dog of a chance to thrive in
drd Repbulic. Like Nkrumah, their mentor, their political agenda

99
excluded it. And, thanks to the Limann government's undoubted
failings and ineptitude, the liberal-democratic forces of civil society,
represented notably by the professionals as a whole, were not suffi­
ciently strong to resist the onslaught.

The PNDC Era

Interestingly, it is arguable that the bulk of the population were not

expecting a violent, unconstitutional change of government — despite
their harsh living conditions during the Limann era. Hence, most
probably, the general public's initial lukewarm reaction to the coup of 31
December, 1981. Some PNP stalwarts reportedly even demonstrated
against the coup in the Upper Region. So, public demonstrations in
support of the coup had to be stage-managed by organizations like the
JMF and KNRG in the regional capitals besides Accra.55 In the early
phase the PNDC's support-base was mainly urban and derived from
workers, students, leftist intellectuals, the youth, as well as the urban
unemployed.
The PNDC led by J.J. Rawlings declared that its major aim was the
"revolutionary transformation of Ghana" which would involve the
complete "transfer of power from the group of power brokers to the
ordinary people of this country" to enable them participate effectively in
the decision - making process. The distinguishing features of the "new
participatory democracy" were said to be probity, accountability, and
the pursuit of social justice.
To make "the ordinary people's power" a reality certain popular
organs were established. These included People's and Workers' De­
fence Commitees (PDCs and WDCs) in the community and at work­
places respectively, public tribunals, the Citizens' Vetting Committee
(CVC), the National Investigations Committee (NIC) and Mobilization
Squads (Mobisquads). A repressive security apparatus emerged to back
up the PNDC: the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI), Civil Defence
Organisation (CDO), People's Militia, and Commandos etc. An equally
repressive set of "laws" like the Protective Custody and Habeas Corpus
(Amendment) laws appeared in the statute books.
The Interim National Co-ordinating Committee (INCC) and later
the National Defence Committee (NDC) which replaced the INCC were
formed to oversee the activities of the Defence Committees. Member­
ship of the latter was initially restricted to "the ordinary people" who

100
were sharply contrasted with "the citizens." The former encompassed
the underprivileged, disadvantaged, marginalized, downtrodden, and
the exploited; while the latter covered the social elites — professionals
like lawyers, judges, managers, doctors, bureaucrats, university teach­
ers; wealthy business people; top military and police officers, and so on.
'T h e citizens" were described as parasites who should be rooted
out of their privileged positions. Accordingly, they were targeted for
ridicule and attacks of all kinds, including murder-such as happened to
the three judges and retired army officer. Little wonder that the PNDC
era as a whole was marked by lawlessness and violence on an unprec­
edented scale in line with Rawlings' call for "the democratization of
violence." Therefore, the PDCs, WDCs and the'NDC were dissolved in
January 1984 and replaced with the Committees for the Defence of the
Revolution (CDRs) and a CDR Secretariat not so much because of their
violent activities as because they threatened to become the "parallel
government."
In creating these organs the PNDC sought to bypass the estab­
lished subunits of civil society and deal directly with the ordinary
people: no intermediary organizations of the "old older" should inter­
pose themselves between such people and the state.56 True citizen
participation was thus redefined to mean direct involvement of the
ordinary people in the revolutionary transformation of Ghana and the
struggle against "bourgeois decadence." The true citizen was the true
representative of the exploited majority. Whoever did not answer to
such a description could not become part of the revolutionary project.
The efforts at ignoring the major elements of civil society had the
serious consequence of depriving the state of the services of the very
people with the technocratic skills necessary for its efficient and effective
operation. Not surprisingly, then, in this populist phase of the PNDC the
state was in serious danger of falling apart in the face of many staggering
problems. There were severe food shortages due partly to the drought
and bush fires, and worsened by the return of about one million
Ghanaians expelled from Nigeria in January 1983; the physical infra­
structure was on the verge of collapse; social services were fast deterio­
rating; and the standard of living was far worse than it was during the
second half of Acheampong's dictatorship. Besides, Rawlings' own
r pulist rhetoric and policies compounded these problems by frighten-
vay potential Western donors and investors. Ghana's bargaining
on with the West was considerably weakened thereby.
Fortunately, Ghana's social and political life did not disintegrate

101
because people adopted certain survival strategies to cope with the
situation. These included emigration to other parts of West Africa,
Europe and North America (the "exit" option), the involvement of more
people in the informal sector resulting in its rapid growth; the prolifera­
tion of welfare societies, credit unions, artisan groups, and farmers' co -
operatives for mutual support; and the emergence of pentecostal and
charismatic groups in addition to the established muslim and orthodox
Christian organizations to offer spiritual and material succour to people
in the midst of great suffering.57
It was against this grim background that the PNDC made overtures
to the old social elites by drastically reviewing the original form and role
of the Defence Committees. In his famous broadcast of 6 March, 1983,
Rawlings accused the Defence Committees of "exercising power with­
out authority." And in a reconciliatory mood he invited "the profession­
als, men and women of religion, chiefs, the lodges and everyone to break
out of their insulating walls and shells and give the national effort a
push ." He then pleaded: 'The character and commitment of the
individual is more important than the class from which he or she comes
or the position one holds. " 58
Thus the revolutionary and class approach to citizenship was
discarded. Membership of the Defence Committees became open to all
classes of people; and the requirement of "revolutionary commitment"
was only a gloss. If the motto of the P/'WDCs was 'Tow er to the people",
that of the CDRs was: "Mobilize, Defend and Produce . " The CDRs
were to contribute to economic growth and improvement, and leave
politics alone.
The gearing of the CDRS towards production and productivity and
the harnessing of professional expertise were required for the successful
implementation of the harsh IMF/World Bank-sponsored Economic
Recovery Programe and later the Structural Adjustment Programme
(ERP/SAP); their harsh implementation by the PNDC alienated not
only most ordinary people but also a sizeable number of the social elites
many of whom still safely distanced themselves from the regime. And
its urban support base eroded considerably. It is arguable that the main
beneficiaries of the economic reforms were the rural dwellers, notably
the cash crop producers. But their support for the PNDC was rather
diffuse and unorganized. The establishment of the District Assemblies
was designed to canalize such a support.59 In spite of its radical review
of the populist notion of dtizensliip the PNDC still monopolized power,
averse as it was to power sharing. In fact, the Defence Committees in

102
their heydays did not even serve as channels of communication and
consultation between the PNDC and "the ordinary people": for ex­
ample, they were not consulted on a crucial issue like the negotiation
with the IMF/World Bank on the economic recovery programme.
We now turn to attempts made to penetrate, control or take over
business, labour, farmers', women's and religious organizations. Re­
garding the first two the initiative came from the Defence Committees;
while regarding the rest the PNDC acted on its own.
In January 1982 the WDC took over the Ghana Tobacco Company
(GTC) and appointed its own Managing Director. It was alleged that the
Interim Management Committee (IMC) which replaced the Managing
Director before the 31st December coup was "reactionary and hostile
to workers' interests." The Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority
(GHAPOHA) was taken over by the WDC in February 1982 for the
alleged corruption of the management. A five-member IMC was
appointed to run its affairs. In March 1982 the WDC took over the Subin
Timber Company Limited and appointed a twelve-member IMC to
manage the factory.60 These actions which contravened the Companies
Code of 1963 (Act 179) were legalized by the Interim Management
Committee (Public Boards and Corporations) Law,1982 (PNDCL 6). In
November 1982 a section of the workforce took over the Ghana Textiles
Printing (GTP) Limited at Tema, dismissed the management, and
appointed an IMC comprising workers' representatives. The PNDC
susbequently endorsed these actions.61
In April 1982 militant elements in the labour movement, not
without PNDC connivance, overthrew the existing TUC leadership
under the Acting Secretary- General, J.R. Baiden, and appointed IMCs to
run the TUC and the seventeen unions. The chairman of the TUC's IMC
was E.K. Aboagye. Before the 31st December coup, these radical
elements had constituted themselves into the Association of Local
Unions (ALU) with Amartey Kwei as a leading member. It is true to say
that most workers were disenchanted with the old TUC leadership
under A.M. Issifu for its collaboration with successive governments in
the 1970s and with its lack of concern for their welfare. However, it is
truer to say that the PNDC, through the ALU-WDC faction, sought to
replace real shop floor union organization with the WDCs.62 In January
1982 the Accra-Tema workers went on a stage-managed demonstration
1; pport of the PNDC at which Issifu was prevented from speaking.
C signed soon after this episode.) But Rawlings addressed the
ng and urged workers to decide for themselves whether or not

103
they would continue to obey the existing TUC leadership. Petitions for
abolishing the TUC were later published in the state-owned newspa­
pers.
After his ouster Baiden justifiably said: 'T h e PNDC is afraid to
tolerate the existence of legitimate, free and independent institutions
that might question some aspects of the Revolution ." 63 The labour
movement succeeded in resisting the take-over when the IMC was
thrown out with the election of a new TUC leadership headed by A.K.
Yankey as the Secretary-General. Given the type of repression that could
be deployed against it, the TUC leadership adopted a policy of collabo­
ration with the PNDC — although there were periodic protests against
some government policies and actions.
To penetrate farmers' organizations the PNDC actively encour­
aged the formation of the Ghana Federation of Agricultural Co-opera­
tives (GAFACOOPS) in 1982. The organization could not entice large
numbers of farmers into its fold for several reasons. First, among its
leadership were certain people, notably Martin Appiah-Danquah, who
were linked with the infamous CPP-controlled UGFCC. Secondly,
under the ERP/SAP the PNDC tended to rely more heavily on the
private sector for the distribution of agricultural items than on
GAFACOOPS. Thirdly, as a state-sponsored organization,GAFACOOPS
was not very strongly placed to negotiate producer price increases with
the government; a step which would have made it more attractive to
farmers. Finally, GAFACOOPS was afflicted with mismanagement,
corruption and struggle for power.64 It collapsed eventually and was
replaced by the equally state-sponsored National Council of Farmers
and Fishermen (NCFF) which was not enthusiastically patronized by
farmers.
Concerning the penetration of women's organizations the PNDC
has been rather successful with the 31st December Women's Movement
(DWM). It was founded in May 1982 by Nana Agyemang Rawlings
and a few others with the active support of her husband. To all intents
and purposes, it has been a state-sponsored, and not a non - governmen­
tal, organization. There is no doubt that, despite its laudable efforts in
other directions, its major purpose has been the mobilization of political
support for the PNDC and the "revolution" as its name shows. Al­
though it has enjoyed considerable PNDC logistical support, the DWM
has failed to supplant all women's voluntary organizations.
Besides numerous instances of harassment, intimidation and ridi­
cule, the PNDC sought to exercise control over religious organizations,

104
notably the orthodox Christian churches, through the Religious Bodies
(Registration) Law, 1989 (PNDCL 221). This law required all religious
bodies to apply for government approval through the National Com­
mission on Culture for their continued existence. A religious body
might be prohibited if the Commission was satisfied, inter alia, that
(i) its activities might lead to civil disobedience, constitute a public
nuisance, and be contrary to public order, interest or morality; (ii)
acceptable standards of decency were not observed at its meetings; and
(iii) there were any other reasonable grounds for doing so. The
Commission's decisions were final; and a prohibited religious body7s
assets could be forfeited to the state.
The law was clearly meant to cripple religious freedom, and assure
state control of religious organizations. The Christian Council, the
Catholic Bishops' Conference and other religious leaders opposed it on
these grounds. They argued further that the law was unnecessary
because adequate legal provisions already existed for dealing with all
types of misconduct enumerated in it. In a 17-point statement the
Catholic Bishops' Conference, for example, rightly observed that "the
law was setting a precedent which might be used to proscribe all forms
of religious expression in the future."65 It is to the eternal credit of the
orthodox Christian churches especially, that they refused to register
under this obnoxious law. After a series of futile mediation efforts, the
matter was quietly shelved. The churches successfully resisted the
PNDC's attempt to subdue them not only because they have been
centres of spiritual and economic power but also because of their strong
commitment to religious freedom. By so doing they struck a blow for
autonomy as such.
In spite of the culture of fear and silence induced by the regime of
repressive laws and actions, many individuals and social groups often
criticized and opposed certain policies and measures of the PNDC. The
society as a whole, led by the Association of Recognized Professional
Bodies (ARPB), Ghana Bar Association (GBA), Christian Council of
Ghana and Catholic Bishops' Conference, condemned the abduction
and murder of the three high court judges and a retired army officer in
'82. But for the public outcry, that tragic event would have been
nietly covered up. The government's violation of human rights,
c recovery package, education reform programme etc. were
aticized by many social groups. Many trade unions embarked
ries of strikes in reaction to the government's intransigent
o consider their just demands. The opposition of the churches

105
as a whole to the Religious Bodies Registration law has already been
mentioned. The GBA perceived very early the inherent defects of the
public tribunals and rejected them by disallowing its members to
appear before them.
Realizing that "nothing can beat" representative, pluralist democ­
racy, many social groups began as early as 1982 to demand a return to
constitutional rule.65 The GBA staged a strike from April to May 1983
and called for the immediate return to civilian rule. Encouraged by
developments in the former Soviet bloc and pressures from Western
donors from 1987 onwards, the domestic social forces intensified the
pressure on the PNDC until it finally caved in.66 Obviously, then, civil
society was not quiescent; and its bases were fairly well strengthened as
a result of certain developments that occurred during the implementa­
tion of the ERP/SAP.
A major unintended and paradoxical effect of ERP/SAP,that is
from the PNDC's view point, was the proliferation of voluntary associa­
tions (at the local and intermediate levels of society) covering occupa­
tional, sodal service, community, relgious and human rights interests.
Most of these groups began to accummulate resources and capital
independent of the state and establish their own autonomous spheres of
action. There emerged also a new generation of entrepreneurs who were
neither linked to the state nor dependent on its resources. More mobile
and better off than the salaried employees in the state and private sectors,
they joined the established elements of civil society to demand change.
These remarkable developments were due partly to the growing
informal sector where many small-scale industries had sprung up and
partly to the inflow of resources from abroad. The scope of civil society
thus expanded to some extent.67
But while such developments were occurring rather impercepti­
bly, the PNDC was simultaneously trying to obstruct the activities of
some established local entrepreneurs (like Dr. Safo-Adu and B.A.
Mensah) against the very logic of the ERP/SAP: namely, to give free
rein to market forces and energize private enterprise. Like Nkrumah,
Rawlings feared the emergence of a group of economically powerful
domestic entrepreneurs who might challenge the PNDC's monopoliza­
tion of power. The emergence of the new breed of Ghanaian entrepre­
neurs shovys that, for the sake of economic development at least, the
Rawlings strategy is in the long run unviable.
Although it reluctantly accepted the demand for a return to plural­
ist democracy, the PNDC was unprepared to share power with, much

106
less see it fall into the hands of, the pre-31 st December social and political
elites. This explains why the transitional programme was crafted
without consulting them. Probably, the vital elements of civil society
could have done much more in resisting not only this programme but
also the PNDC dictatorship itself. There is no mistaking the signs,
however, that, given the severe constraints in which it operated, civil
society has bounced back to life. The amazing rapidity with which the
so-called social clubs were formed just before the ban on party politics
was lifted in May 1992 attests to this. In this respect the private press,
whatever its defects, has played a crucial role in disseminating vital
information about certain government activities which otherwise
would have been shrouded in secrecy — as usual.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Since independence Ghana's civil society has alternated precariously

between contraction and expansion, depending on the nature of the
regime in power. Ghana's experience of pluralist democracy has been
intermittent and brief because the liberal-democratic culture has not
struck deep roots in the society as a whole; and yet a society is never
better than the individuals and groups that constitute it. On the other
hand, dictatorship has not persisted, over a very long period of, say, two
decades at one particular point in time because of the subtle resistance
and aversion to this type of government on the part of certain vital
subunits of civil society supported by some primary groups. Another
marked feature is that massive poisonous doses of violence, hatred,
bitterness and vindictiveness have been injected into our political cul­
ture by especially the AFRC and the PNDC.
Despite its vicissitudes, no dictatorship has succeeded in decree­
ing civil society out of existence. For some vital segments of civil
society— like the Bar Association, Catholic Bishops' Conference, Chris­
tian Council of Ghana, NUGS (in the greater part of its existence),
University Teachers Association of Ghana £UTAG), Registered Nurses'
Association, Medical Association, Traders' Associations and so on,
have over the years evolved a liberal culture of resistance to state
erence in their affairs. The pluralist ethos has also proved fairly
le in these intermediary organizations as well as in a number of
oups. On the whole, one may conclude that civil society has
seven more vibrant at present. But it is suggested that current

107
developments should not be taken for granted. If civil society is to
evolve further to provide an enabling environment for the continued
democratization of Ghana along pluralist lines, then a number of
conditions must be fulfilled. Failing that, civil society will be rather
weak to prevent yet another onslaught on our fourth attempt at plu­
ralist democracy.
First, the various subunits of civil society must be characterized by
the following, among others: (i) membership must be voluntary and
must cut across existing social cleavages; (ii) the groups must themselves
be capable of democratic governance since charity begins at home: i.e.
their internal structures must be democratic, thereby providing mean­
ingful participation for their members; and executive officers must be
held accountable to the entire membership and must be seen to be
transparent in their transactions; (iii) the spirit of initiative as well as
independence of mind and action must be religiously cultivated; they
must be autonomous both organizationally and financially to prevent
their becoming appendages to the government.
In these respects our farmers' and workers' organizations, for
example, have been woefully lacking; they have hung on the coat-tails
of successive governments for too long. Farmers must cultivate the
capacity, so spendidly displayed by earlier generations of farmers in the
colonial days, to form their own organizations without looking up to
government to do it for them. That way, they will be their own masters.
If in difficulty, they can enlist the services of the appropriate consultants.
Trade union leaders must change from the practice of "entrepreneurial
leadership", whereby the union is considered a business enterprise to
profit its "owner", to the practice of "bureaucratic leadership", whereby
the organization itself and one's professional career in it become the
over-riding concern.68
Secondly, it is important that as many social forces as are capable
become centres of economic power to enable them both to avoid
dependence on the state for survival and to resist its power-monopo­
lizing tendencies. Of course, as intimated earlier, the relationship
between economic power and the capacity to resist autocracy is very
complex. History is replete with examples of economically powerful
groups and individuals who were partly responsible for the rise of
autocracies, as exemplified by Hitler's case. A group of individuals,
who are slaves to the acquisitive instincts but have not cultivated the
habits of autonomy (being free from intentional interference and co­
ercion by others) and tolerance, are most unlikely to resist the impulses

108
of others to dominate society, if they themselves are able to strike it
rich. Until a significant number of social forces learn this lesson, no
amount of economic power will induce them to lend their support to
pluralist democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic; instead they are most
likely to aid the cause of anti-democratic, power-hungry adventurers
still in our midst who know no other instrument for deciding political
issues than fraud and violence.
In the post-independence era, business groupings, like those of
farmers, have so far not played a conspicuous role in the resistance to
dictatorship — although not a few business people in their individual
capacities have contributed as best they could. To enable business play
its expected role, the various business associations — like the Chamber
of Commerce, Manufacturers' and Employers' Associations — should
be strengthened organizationally, and brought together under one
umbrella organization similar to the Confederation of British Industries
(CBI), while simultaneously retaining their individual identities. In this
way, they will be able to counteract more effectively government
encroachment on their autonomy and become a more powerful social
force. It is hoped that the Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) will be
nurtured to fill such a role. The same applies to the scattered Trades
Associations of carpenters, masons, tailors, blacksmiths, goldsmiths,
bakers, hairdressers, auto-mechanics et al as well as to small-scale
business groupings. Their importance and relevance for the future
growth and health of civil society cannot be over-emphasized.
Thirdly, dvil society, for its own sake, must try to contain the
menace of ethnicity and eventually free itself from it as much as
possible — since ethnicity belongs to the category of primary units.
It is true to say that in independent Ghana ethnic conflict has so far
not resulted in separatist movements; but ethnicity has surfaced now
and again as a divisive factor in some districts and at the national
level. Since political support has derived mainly from the manipula­
tion of local issues and concerns, ethnic identification has not infre­
quently been very much pronounced, particularly during elections. It
is also evident in people's perceptions of the pattern of the distribution
of political and public service appointments as well as development
projects. Fourthly, and related to the third, the intermediary organi-
iions of civil society provide many of the building blocks for political
ies — as already noted. In Ghana it is imperative that if the
ging political parties are to be viable vehicles of national integra-
, then they must be genuinely ethnically cross-cutting by trying to

109
reach beyond their safe constituencies to forge informal links with
those constituencies they may regard as "enemy territory".
Fifthly, as many groups of civil society as possible should wake
up to the imperative of concerted action in the face of clear and present
danger to the safety and welfare of our dear republic. It is arguable
that hitherto, except on a few occasions, there has been a singular lack
of dialogue and collaboration among the various subunits for mutual
benefit. Almost all of them have appeared to be rather parochial in
pursuing their own interests, forgetting that united action - as and
when necessary - could make them formidable social forces to be
reckoned with by the managers of the state of whatever political
persuasion. The very limited success of the Alliance of Democratic
Forces (ADF) and its very brief existence throw into bold relief
the point being made here.
Finally, to facilitate the constant dialogue and united action just
mentioned, what we may call a constituent group of constitutional
democrats will have to emerge. It will comprise a sizeable minority
of the more active, vital and enlightened segments of the citizenry who
are committed to liberty and justice (in all its dimensions) and are
determined to institute, promote and sustain a just constitutional-
democratic polity, irrespective of the heavy odds stacked against
them. And they will serve as catalysts and inspirers to the rest of civil
society. It must be added that these are onerous responsiblities which
must be undertaken with the greatest sense of humility, tolerance, and
patriotism.

NOTES

1. There is the respectable view that what is better suited to Africa is a

variant of consociational democracy in a federal setting. The major
difference between it and pluralist democracy is that it is manifestly
ethnic-based, or, as in Switzerland, canton-based. For a powerful
argument for this position, although the term is not used, see W. Arthur
Lewis, Politics in West Africa. London: Allen and Unwin, 1965. For an
equally powerful, critical review of this book, see B.D.G. Folson, "Single
Parties, Tribes and Federalism" in The Economic Bulletin of Ghana, Vol. X
N o 2 ,1966. For an exposition of consociational democracy, see Arend
Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

110
2. See, e.g., E.Gellner, "Civil Society in historical Context'' in the International
Social Science Journal, 129, 1991. This writer is grateful for the brief
account of civil society given here to Gellner and P. Schmitter, "Society"
in The Transition to Democracy:Proceedings of a Workshop. Washington
D.C.: National Academy Press, 1991.
3. A.R. Ball, Modem Politics and Government. London: Macmillan, 1983,
pp. 102-3.
4. It must be noted that both are ideal types and coexist in these countries. See
P. Schmitter, ibid., p. 19.
5. Schmitter thinks, however, that the "corporatist" model may be better
suited to some developing countries, and cites Spain and Germany as
examples to be followed, ibid. p.25.
6. Freedom from primary units is particularly stressed by Gellner; and not
only from the state; ibid., p500.
7. Schmitter, ibid., p. 18.
8. For a more technical definition of "civic spirit", see Gellner, ibid.,
pp.500-1.
9. United States Information Agency (USIA): What is Democracy? 1991,
p.6.
10. Ball, op.cit., p.75.
11. D. Pirages, Managing Political Conflict. New York: Praeger, 1976, p.75, and
Ball, op. cit., p.77.
12. More space has been given to this period because it was supremely
critical for the emergent civil society. The structure and pattern of state-
civil society relations in the period largely shaped subsequent develop­
ments.
13. It was not in the interest of the colonial state to do so since that would
have undermined British industrial exports and British firms operating
in the colony.
14. Ethnic and other ascriptive groups and associations have been excluded
because they belong to the category of primary units. See Note 6 above.
But this is not to deny their crucial role in state-society confrontations in
the African context.
15. For an excellent discussion of this point, see Naomi Chazan, An
Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession, 1960-
1969. Boulder: Westview Press, 1983. ch. 2.
16. Total votes and percentage of total votes cast for the CPP were 398,141
(57%) and the non-CPP forces 299,116 (43%). See D. Austin, Politics in
Ghana, 1946-1960. London: Oxford University Press, 1964. p.354.
legislative Assembly Debates (LAD), Official Report - First Series, Vol.2,12
November, 1956, columns 30-31.
This assurance was necessitated by the general acceptance of
regional assemblies.

Ill
19. B.D.G.Folson, "The Development of Socialist Ideology in Ghana,
1949-58" in The Ghana Social Science Journal, Vol.I No.1,1971, p.7.
20. Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: the Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah.
Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1957, p.x.
21. For tactical reasons, this was not boldly stated during 1949-1956; but
there were intimations of it in, e.g., the Autobiography.
22. See D. Austin, op. cit., ch. VIH.
23. Parliamentary Debatest Official Report - First Series, Vol.II, 9 July, 1958,
Col335.
24. W.B. Harvey, Law and Social Change in Ghana. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966, ch. VIII.
25. The constitutionality of the PDA under the 1960 Republican Constitution
was challenged unsuccessfully by J.B. Danquah in court in the Baffour
Osei Akoto case in 1961. See Flarvey, op. cit., pp.285-90.
26. This account of government-trade union relations is based mainly on E.J.
Berg and J. Butler, 'Trade Unions" in J.S. Coleman and C.C.
Rosberg, Jr., eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical
Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964;and V.G. Damachi,
The Role of Trade Unions in the Development Process With a Case Study of
Ghana. New York: Praeger, 1974.
27. Berg and Butler in J.C. Coleman and C.C. Rosberg, (eds.), op. cit ., p.
350.
28. Ghana: Annual Report of the Ministry of Labour, 1957-1958. Accra, 1958.
29. The Gold Coast TUC Constitution... 1956. Accra. 1956.
30. Ghana: Industiral Relations Act, 1958; Industrial Relations (.Amendment) Act,
1959; and Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 1960. It is only fair to
add that on the recommendation of the International Labour Organiza­
tion (ILO) the Industrial Relations Act of 1958 with its 1959 and 1960
amendments was drastically amended in many respects in 1965 includ­
ing the restoration of the freedom to unionize; but in the prevailing
circumstances this freedom was only nominal, and the TUC still re­
mained an integral wing of the CPP. See Damachi, op. cit., p55.
31. Suspecting that Tettegah harboured inordinate political ambitions,
Nkrumah removed him from the TUC leadership and had him
elected the first Secretary-General of the All-African Trades Union
Federation (AATUF) in 1962. Damachi, op. d t pp51-52.
32. C. Young, N.P. Sherman and T. H. Rose,Co - operatives and Development:
Agricutlural Politics in Ghana and Uganda Madison: University of Wis­
consin Press, 1981,1981, pp. 176-182. See also Bjom Beckman, Organiz­
ing the Farmers: Cocoa Politics and National Development in Ghana.
Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute o f African Studies, 1976.
33. See the unpublished Report of the Cabinet Committee on the Reorganization of
the Co-operative Movement in Ghana dated 29 June, 1964, for an excellent

112
 brief account of the historical development of the co-operative move­
ment. The Committee's chairman was E.N. Omaboe, the Government
Statistician. HencetheCommitteeishereafterreferred toastheOmaboe
Committee in the main body of the chapter.
34. Report of the Cabinet Committee ... p.14, par. 40.
35. Young, Sherman and Rose, op. cit., p.183.
36. Young, Sherman and Rose, op. cit., pp.183-84.
37. In the wake of increasing allegations of scandalous corrupt practices,
the government in May 1956 appointed a Commission of Enquiry into
the affairs of the CPC chaired by Mr. Justice O. Jibowu of the Nigerian
SupremeCourt. InitsreporttheJibowuCommissionmferfl/w,found no
direct proof that CPC funds were used to finance the CPP but stated that
it could not be satisfied that "loans... might not have been used for other
purposes"; it found that corruption, bribery and extortion among a
number of officials existed, and that "the allegations that the CPP
controlled the CPC is justified". - pars 203-16.
38. Report of the Cabinet Committee... p.24, par. 69.
39. Report of the Cabinet Committee... pp.28-29 par. 85
40. Report of the Cabinet Committee... pp.11-12, par. 33 and p.34, par.
104.
41. Report of the Cabinet Committee... p.45 par.123.
42. K. De Schweinitz, Industrialization and Democracy. New York: Free
Press, 1963, p.10
43. T. Jones, Ghana's First Republic, 1960-1966. London: Methuen, 1976,
p.162.
44. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Irregularities and Malpractices in the
grant of Import Licences. Accra, 1967 (Ollenu Report) pp.77-79, pars. 367-
381.
45. Tony Killick, Development Economics in Action: A Study o f Economic
Policies in Ghana. London: Heinemann, 1978, p.37; and Ollenu
Report, p.10, par. 59-60.
46. Subsequently, the "study groups" were dissolved, and the NASSO
disbanded, when the "radical socialists" became too assertive for
Nkrumah's liking. See Kwame Nkrumah, Guide to Party Action
Accra, 1962.
47. The Ghanaian Times, 27 November, 1964. The Committee's chairman
was Prof. W. E. Abraham, head of the Philosophy Depaprtment,
and a year later Pro-Vice Chancellor, at Legon. See also H.L.
Bretton, The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah: A Study of Personal Rule in
Africa. London: Pall Mall, 1966, pp.89-90.
Naomi Chazan, Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics... pp.191-203, and Debora
Pellow and Naomi Chazan, Ghana.Coping with Uncertainty. Boulder:
Westview Press, 1986, pp.167-72.
113
49. West Africa, 27 January, 1968, p.86.
50. R. Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule, 1966-1969. London: Methuen,
1972, pp. 18-36.
51. The campaign for amnesty was spearheaded by the People's Popular Party
- an Nkrumaist party - led by J. Hansen who appeared to the govern­
ment to be the very embodiment of all that the PP was opposed to.
Indeed, that was exactly the government's reason for enacting the
Criminal Code (Amendment) Act. See Parliamentary Debates, Vol.8,23
August, 1971, cols 703 ff.
52. See Naomi Chazan, "Ghana: Problems of Governance and the Emergence
of Gvil Society" in L. Diamond, J.J. Linz, and S.M. Lipset, eds., Democ­
racy in Developing Countries: Africa (Vol.2). Boulder: Lynne Rienner,
1988, p. 107.
53. Naomi Chazan, "Citizenship, the State and Social Relations in Ghana:
Patterns and Trends". (Paper prepared for presentation at the 31
Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Chicago, 28-31
October, 1988), pp.10-1
54. People's Daily Graphic, issues of 1 and 15 April, 1980.
55. See, e.g., Zaya Yeebo, Ghana: The Struggle for Popular Power, Rawlings,
Saviour or Demagogue. London: New Beacon Books, 1991, pp.47-50.
56. Chazan, "Citizenship, the State and Social Relations in Ghana...", p.12.
57. Chazan, ibid., pp.13-14.
58. Ghanaian TimesL 8 March, 1983. See also Forging Ahead: Selected
Speeches of Fit. Lt. Jerry John Ralwings... January 1st 1983 -D ecem ber
31st 1983. (Vol.Two). Accra: Information Services Department,
n.d., p.10, and Guidelines for CDRs - The CDR Eagle Flies. Accra:
Nsamankow Press, 1986.
59. The point is not elaborated here; but for a contrary view, see K.A
Ninsin, "The PNDC and the Problem of Legitimacy" in Donald
Rothchild, ed., Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery. Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, 1991, pp.59-60.
60. Ghanaian Timest issues of 25 January, and 18 February, 1982; People's
Daily GraphicLissues of 5 and 6 March, 1982.
61. The topic is treated in some detail by Yao Graham, "From GTP to
Assene: Aspects of Industrial Working Class Struggles, 1982-1986" in E.
Hansen and K.A. Ninsin, eds., The State, Development and Politics in
Ghana. London: Codesria Book Series, 1989, pp52-53.
62. E. Hansen, "The State and Popular Struggles in Ghana, 1982-86," in
Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, ed., Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa.
London: Zed Books, 1987, p.179.
63. West Africa,, 17 May, 1982, p.12%.
64. See E. Gyimah-Boadi, "Economic Recovery and Politics in the
PNDC's Ghana" in The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative

114
 Politics, Vol.XXVlII No.3, November 1990, p.337.
65. See, e.g. the Association of Recognized Professional Bodies (ARPB) News
Bulletin Issue Vol.2 No.I, 20 July, 1982. The ARPB called on the
PNDC to step down for a government of national unity "to prepare the
country for an elective government by September 1983". Many other
organizations issued bold, public statements on this and other burning
issues.
66. It may be speculated that, but for Gorbachev's abandonment of the
"Breshnev doctrine" and embrace of "glasnot and perestroika"
which eventually resulted in the disintegration of the Soviet bloc
and the end (hopefully) of the second cold war (developments
which some third world dictators masquerading as national saviours
have bemoaned), the PNDC would have defied domestic and external
(mainly Western) pressures to democratize along the lines of political
pluralism. It would have used the "no-party"- based District Assem­
blies as electoral colleges for electing a national assembly which in turn
would elect a political executive. The beneficiaries would, of course,
have been the PNDC. Rawlings' persistent rejection of the multiparty
system lends powerful credence to this line of speculation.
67. Chazan, "The Political Transformation of Ghana under the PNDC" in
Rothchild, ed., op. cit., p.33.
68. See Margaret Peil, Consensus and Conflict in African Societies: Anlntroducticm
to Sociology. London: Longman, 1977, p.298.

115
 Chapter 7

T H E PA R T Y SYSTEM A N D D EM O C R A C Y IN G H A N A

Yaw Manu

Introduction

Signalling the beginning of the reforms was the Coussey Constitutional

Committee — an entirely African body charged with drawing up a
constitution for the country. Most importantly it proferred a legislature
that would be elected partially by universal adult suffrage fused with
some indirectly elected members. The implication was the introduction
of an electoral system — an obvious inducement to competitive politics.
Indeed, the Secretary of State for the colonies, commenting on the
Coussey Report, observed that for a parliamentary system to work
successfully, it would require a well tried party system.1
That political and ideological differences which prevailed in the
leadership of the UGCC suggested incipient partisan politics to be at
work. Considering himself as a Marxist, Dr. Nkrumah was pitted
against the generality of the leadership of the UGCC — whom he
regarded as conservatives — indeed reactionaries.2When he formed
his own party in June, 1949, he was giving vent to those ideological
differences.

The Convention Peoples' Party (CPP)

Seeking a society that would realize egalitarian principles, the Conven­

tion Peoples' Party (CPP) opted for a socialist state. In its revised
constitution of 1961, it claimed that its purpose was to organize the
common people "and lead the masses in the struggle for the attainment
of National Independence and Self-determination for the chiefs and
people."
But far more relevant to the common man was the promise "to
promote the political, social and economic emancipation of the people,

116
more particularly, those who depend directly upon their own exertions
by hand and by brain for the means of life ."3
Anticipating the Coussey Report which was submitted on October
26,1949, the CPP according to Padmore, was already well organized
with a network of branches throughout the colony area and Ashanti. It
later penetrated into the Northern Territories.4Elaborating a little more
on this organization, David Apter noted that the CPP was highly
organized; it could be likened both to a Communist party and to the
British Labour party: the latter allowed for more public latitude to
members than the former, while the former presented the structure of
democratic control.5 Possessing organizational unity, the party never­
theless allowed members holding differing views to participate effec­
tively. Accordingly, David Apter says that the party was far more
flexible than a communist party and was committed to the form and
discipline of unity than any particular dogma or party line.6

The Rival Political Parties

If the Coussey constitution provided the occasion for the exercise of

even partial suffrage, it unleashed a plethora of parties set to compete for
political power.
The various minor parties — the National Democratic Party led by
the well known lawyer — Nii Amaa Ollenu; the Gold Coast Liberal
Democratic Party, led by Nii Kwabena Bonne; the Peoples' Democratic
Party and the Freedom Defence Party, all appeared to be parties of the
right, advocating free enterprise economy. However, the National
Democratic Party was prepared to see the country undergo about
fifteen more years of British tutelage to equip the people further for
the proper management of their economy.
Bereft of its radical elements, the UGCC led by Dr. J.B. Danquah
was committed to liberal democracy and free enterprise. Its programme
aimed at ensuring that the optimum diffusion of private enterprise and
ownership of property would be developed alongside the maximum
attainment of personal liberties within the framework of the welfare
state.7Thus the programme of the UGCC was more enlightened than
at of the National Democratic Party.
Offered as an instalment in the constitutional evolution of the
*ntry, the limited adult suffrage was applicable in the cities — Accra,
lasi, Cape Coast and Sekondi-Takoradi. Elections in the rural

117
 areas was indirect, and through electoral colleges.
The outcome of these arrangements was that the ensuing elections
of 1951 failed to give a better picture of the national strength of the
political parties. TheCPPsecuredatotal of 36 out of 84 seats; theUGCC
obtained 4 seats, Independents 3 seats, chiefs and traditional rulers, 32
seats. Included in the legislature were to be representatives of special
interests: 2 ; and ex-officios: 3.8
This performance of the CPP assessed by some authorities at­
tribute to the CPP its appeal to the masses and a mastery in the
manipulation of the party's key symbols. "It had a clear-cut orientational
focus which (excited) the general public, giving general opportunity to
participate and serving to reassure and define for the public a programme
of progress in which self-respect and income would be provided.9

The Coalescing of the Opposition and The Elections of 1954

Contesting the election of 1951 and winning this election having led to
the formation of government, placed the CPP in a dilemma of having to
reconcile its slogan of 'Self-government Now" with a partial self-
government conceded and accepted by it. Although Dr. Nkrumah
claimed that the move was tactical, Basil Davidson says that there was
a minority in the CPP leadership — the minority radical wing closely
identified with the Positive Action of 1949 who were not "as delighted
as others ." For them, "tactical action had all the smell of defeat."10 Their
expulsion from the CPP only aided the augmenting of the opposition.
For the failure of the UGCC to make good showing in the elections of the
previous year seemed to occasion the formation of a new party — the
Ghana Congress Party (May 2nd), with Dr. K.A. Busia as its leader.
Determined to offer effective opposition to the CPP government,
the Congress which grouped previous oppositon members of the erst­
while minor parties as well as traditional rulers now embraced the
radical CPP elements expelled from their party.
The need to re-group, if it was designed to prevent the CPP
achieving full self-government under its leadership, must also have
been prompted by the impending elections under a new constitution—
the Nkrumah constitution negotiated by the latter with the British
government since 1951.
Other opposition groups making common cause with the Con­
gress Party included the Northern Peoples' Party (NPP), and the

118
Togoland Congress Party. The former, organized in April 1954 by some
leading educated men of the North, aimed at promoting the interests of
the North. Distrusting the people of the south, it objected to immediate
self-government — preferring self-government within a period of fif­
teen years. But the Togoland Congress, formed about 1951, while not
averse to self-government, desired that both British and French
Togolands be unified as an Ewe homeland. Its opposition to the CPP
was on grounds that the latter desired the integration of the British Trust
area with the Gold Coast. While the opposition of the NPP against the
CPP was not solely on grounds of time-table for independence but that
the CPP lacked respect for traditional rulers.
The Congress Party provided the needed parliamentary leader­
ship for these groups. When carefully assessed, however, the Congress
appeared to have difficulties of its own which would prevent it from
being viable. A major problem was the absence of internal unity —
caused by disputes among the leaders of the party. Furthermore, the
admission into its fold of radical ex - CPP elements made the Congress
a battleground between the CPP elements and those "whose education
and outlook led them genuinely to dislike the authoritarian ways of the
CPP " n
Notwithstanding liabilities of internal disputes and a record of
defeat in previous elections, the Congress was geared for the elections
of 1954. It promised cocoa farmers it would improve prices; and vowed
to rid the country of corruption. On the other hand, the CPP having
made the issue of self-government a plank in all its manifestoes and thus
seeming to have monopoly as chief advocate deprived the opposition
of any challenging programmes. And to its advantage it had a record of
electoral victories to entice voters to its side.
Within the parties, there were the competing claimants for nomi­
nation as party candidates which need not occupy us. But the elections,
democratically conducted, and on the basis of universal adult suffrage
and secret balloting, confirmed the CPP once more as the dominant
national party: Out of a legislature of 104, the CPP won 71 seats;
Independents 16 seats, the NPP 12 seats; the Togoland Congress 1 seat,
the Ghana Congress Party, 1 seat; and 1 each for 2 other smaller parties.
As for the significance of this particular election, the legislature it
produced consisted entirely of popularly elected representatives. But
' need to reflect the continuing British authority in the absence of
plete sovereignty was that three ex-officio British expatriates served
binet members, while the Governor could still apply the veto.

119
The outcome had considerable meaning for the opposition; they
foresaw an emerging sovereign state under a government with socialist
orientations and values which they were opposed to.

Politics on the Eve of Independence

The nature of politics on the eve of political independence (1951-1956)

was that it had the features of violence and the characteristics of
previous politics — persuasion and the canvassing of support. It was
uncompromising and militant, seeking direct political action — coer­
cion and sometimes the application of force to achieve consent.

The National Liberation Movement (NLM)

The probability was that the failure of the Congress Party to achieve
satisfactory results in the previous elections prompted a need for the
creation of a new body — a movement that was known as the National
Liberation Movement (NLM) in September 2,1954.
Embracing former opposition groups, the NLM could be described
as a new force emergent in the body-politic; seizing on a variety of issues
this strategy had the effect of further broadening the base of the move­
ment and making it more national than the oppositon groups of the past.
Most importantly, it demanded a federal form of constitution but
its other aims appear directed to safeguarding traditional systems and
values. An example was that it advocated loyalty and allegiance to
traditonal rulers and the obligation of the youths to show respect to age.
It was apparent that support for traditional rulers would be recip­
rocated. The movement drew support from traditional rulers. Indeed,
its founding and leading member — the Asantehene's linguist, was a
traditionalist — and the demand for federalism seemed to have been
made with the traditional rulers in view — to give them a place in the
new order of things. Be it as it may, it was necessary to wrestle power
from the CPP. The demand for federalism was diametrically opposed
to a unitary system and so created an impasse.
Here, it is necessary to explain that the condition under which
the colonial power (Britain) would concede independence was that
consensus should prevail among the people on the nature of the
constitution required. The necessity to make an impact on the electorate

120
and no less the British authorities, therefore, could not be lost to the
Movement.
In support of their demand, some of the arguments made were as
follows: That there were differences of ethnic and tribal cultures,
differences in the levels of development and the fact that the various
regions came under British jurisdiction at varying times. However,
that such arguments would not achieve the desired results made
violence necessary. Commenting on this phase of politics, Dr. Nkrumah
said that "with the failure of a purely political campaign, a campaign of
violence developed in Ashanti...." 12
Unable to break the deadlock through negotiations both the Gov­
ernment and the opposition were willing to go to the polls. And the
results of the elections held in April 1956 showed the CPP winning 71
seats; the NLM and its allies 31 seats.13
This victory of the CPP, the third of such electoral victories seemed
to entrench the CPP as an obviously dominant party. It had become a
de facto single party system.

The Single Party System

Commenting on the growth of the CPP, David Apter indicated earlier

on that it had a membership of over a million, and was the most effective
mass political organization in Africa.14Already we have referred to the
appeal it was able to make to the masses and its mastery in the
manipulation of the party's key symbols. These factors, no doubt
accounted for its repeated victories since 1951 so that by 1960 its
strength in a legislature of 114 was 98.
The party engaged in deliberate mobilization of the populace
into various units to constitute wings of the party; so that the CPP was
referred to as a big tree with several branches — the Young Pioneer
Movement, the Workers' Brigade, the Trades Union Congress, the
Ghana National Farmers Union, and the National Council of Ghana
Women. Looking at the long term impact of the party, it needs to be said
that its organizational methods which proved effective constituted a
model for future political parties.
The party had become a de facto one party system ; however
constituted the bedrock of this de facto one party system was the
olican constitution which by its nature entrenched the CPP for as
as it would be possible. However, with the referendum held in

121
1964 on constitutional change, the status of the party was raised to one
of de jure.
The party and its leadership, it will be recalled, subscribed to
socialism. And although it achieved electoral victories through demo­
cratically organized elections it continued to adhere to socialist norms.
The decision of the Central Committee of the party to constitute the
legislature of 1965 not by electoral processes but by selection of candi­
dates went against liberal democracy and provided the rational for the
military, coup d'etat of 1966.15

The Politics of the Second Republic

The Convention People's Party (CPP) — an ideological party — was

proscribed by law in 1966. Consequently, the beginning of the Second
Republic marked the beginning of the end of ideological politics. But the
organization of parties on mass basis did not cease for it had become a
model of political organization.

The Parties

In anticipation of the elections of August 1969, several parties were

formed. When examined, the most viable seemed to be the Progress
Party (PP) led by Dr. K. A. Busia. The National Alliance of Liberals(NAL)
led by Mr. K. A. Gbedemah, one-time Minister in the Nkrumah regime,
no doubt, also appeared to have great promise.
The other parties, seeming to lack substantial following, included
the United Nationalist Party under the chairmanship of Dr. Bannerman,
the All People's Republican Party led by Mr. P.K.K. Quaidoo and the
People's Action Party under Mr. Imoru Ayama. Indeed these parties
appear to have undergone some initial transformations. Sharing com­
mon goals,( which we shall examine soon,) political rivalry among them
was not based upon any particular ideological differences.

Organization

The approach adopted by the National Alliance of Liberals to asssure

itself of permanence and continuity was the establishment of an organi­
zational structure of the party. While Mr. Gbedemah occupied the
122
leadership of the party, leaving the Chairmanship to Mr. Kobina, — a
Kumasi lawyer — a national executive was formed through electoral
processes. Constituencies in each region would meet so as to elect a
member of the party as the Regional representative of the party to the
national executive body.
Thus when the two hundred delegates from the twenty-two
constituencies of the Eastern Region met during the month of June in
Koforidua, they elected Mr. E.H. Boohene, a lecturer at the School of
Administration as the regional representative to the NAL national
executive.
National and regional party officers elected by national delegates
conferences and regional constituency conferences included organizing
secretaries, propaganda secretaries, campaign strategists and financial
secretaries.
On the other hand, the constitution of the Progress Party made
membership of the party open to all persons who were eighteen years
old and above. Such persons could apply for and return completed
application forms to the constituency secretary; the form was then
considered by the branch committee. The Progress Party was, thus, a
mass party and members paid dues to enable the party raise money for
its work.
Although Dr. Busia was the leader, the constitution called for
election of the leader who should also be the chairman. The elections
had to be conducted by elected delegates at an annual conference of the
party. The leader who should hold office for five years presided over
the Annual Conferences at the meetings of the National Executive. Each
region had a Vice-Chairman elected at a Regional Conference.
The important national officers of the party included the General
Secretary and a Treasurer appointed by the National Executive. The
Progress Party and the National Alliance of Liberals were equipped with
national, regional, constituency and district party organs which would
meet annually at national delegates conferences to assess work and
initiate new programmes.15 But although the All Peoples' Republican
Party and the Peoples' Action Party like the United Nationalist Party
were mass parties not enough evidence existed of the effectiveness of
their organization. And yet in the competitive politics designed to win
s pport these parties appear to have canvassed the electorate in nearly
all constituencies.16

123
The Issues and the Elections

To clarify issues and prescribe solutions seemed to constitute the essence

of political contest. Describing tribalism as a negative force, the leader
of NAL, Mr. K.A. Gbedemah promised that the NAL would work
towards a new nation devoid of tribalism and nepotism. Concerned
with other aspects of life such as employment, he assured the electorate
of more job opportunities and the intention to initiate an agricultural
policy that would enable the country to produce all her food require­
ments. And for the civil servants, ample security of office without
coercion or intimidation would be made so long as they were loyal
to the nation and to the government.17
Since there was absence of ideological differences (as already
noted); it is only natural that solutions and promises offered to the
electorate would overlap. The Progress Party, while promising a
nation that would be liberal democratic and pursuing a welfare system,
assured the nation it would support the farmers; it would improve
the quality of education, health, and housing, and provide job and
employment opportunities for the workers.
The United Nationalist Party (UNP) was committed to a New
Deal entailing respect for democratic principles and the pursuit of the
objectives of employment and equal opportunity for all. The party
would follow comprehensive and realistic economic policies, promote
agriculture, communications, health and education. The People's Action
Party of Mr. Imoru Ayama spoke in the same vein as the others except
that it hoped, when elected into office, to extend the railways to the
North.18
Upon examination, the manifestoes of the parties had similar
contents. A vital factor in determining the voters' choice therefore was
likely to be the differences in the personalities of the leaders. The
advantage to Dr. Busia was his identification with the Opposition that
constantly advocated liberal democracy. There could also be the factor
of tribalism , and the outcome of the elections of 1969 suggested this.
In his research, conducted in 1969, Professor Yaw Twumasi re­
vealed the following: That 63.5 per cent of those registered actually
voted. Of the total votes cast, the PP obtained 58.68 per cent; NAL
30.44 per cent; UNP 3.8 per cent; PAP 3.43 per cent; APRP 1.83 per
cent. Independents 1.82 per cent; each of the major parties contested
138 seats.19
Contesting the elections organized in the 140 single member

124
constituencies, the PP emerged with 105 seats and 29 seats for NAL. In
Ashanti, the PP won all the seats as it did in Brong-Ahafo and in the
Central Regions — all Akan-dominated areas.
The victory of the PP appeared to be a victory for its leader — Dr.
Busia — a long time advocate of liberal democracy. Therefore upon
taking office as the Prime Minister at the end of 1969, the challenge was
offered him to promote democracy. He had earlier said that "it is the
person operating the Fundamental Laws of the land that will determine"
the proper operation of the laws. And the people's best bet was him as
the leader of the Progress Party.20
In office, and faced with realities, however, he was said to have
defied court-ruling with the assertion: "No court; no court." He further
caused the dismissal of 568 civil servants without much reason. Never­
theless he was believed to have promoted democracy for no evidence
existed of arbitrary detention of persons without trial. He was neverthe­
less overthrown in a coup d'etat in February, 1972. But the re-
emergence of competitive politics in the Third Republic affirmed the
nation's abiding concern with the search for liberal democracy.

Politics of the Third Republic

In the preceding pages we observed that the political parties were

characteristically mass parties. Of the several reasons accounting for this
phenomenon,there was that of financial need (which was as important
as the desire to organize support). Careful scrutiny of the parties of the
Third Republic reveals that the parties retained the organizational
structures of those of the First and the Second Republics. Indeed, the
membership of these parties appears to be a carry-over of membership
from the erstwhile political parties. So that even though party designa­
tions had changed, the changes appear to be in name only.
Deviating from the trends noted above were some emergent
parties which tended to revolve closely around personalities and whose
potentialities seemed limited. Among these parties will be included the
United National Convention (U N O under its founder, William Ofori-
tt (Paa Willie); the Action Congress Party (ACP) led by its founder,
olonel F.G. Bemasko; and the Third Force Party, headed by its founder,
' m Bilson. But in a category of its own was the Social Democratic
(SDF) whose leader emerged from electoral processes. The
os of these parties will be examined subsequently. We now look at

125
the major parties — the People's National Party (PNP), and the Popular
Front Party (PFP), which represent continuity and change.

The People's National Party (PNP)

The antecedents of the PNP may be traced to the Convention People's

Party (CPP). Banned since 1966, the CPP nevertheless collectively
operated clandestinely as a social organization under the leadership of
Alhaji Imoru Egala, one time Minister in the Nkrumah regime. This
social organization — (Funeral Committee) was transformed into the
People's National Party (PNP) with Egala as its founder. The latter,
however, designated Dr. Hilla Limann, as the leader of theparty and was
confirmed subsequently by the Party Congress held in Kumasi in 1979.
Dr. Hilla Limann, apparently, set considerable store on the
heritage of the party. During the first post-election Congress held in
Kumasi in 1980, he asserted that "The People's National Party (was)
committed, within the law, to the pursuit of Nkrumah's ideas and the
consolidation of his good works ;"21 stressing that "that is why I have,
in recent times, had occasion to call for a return to the ideals and
aspirations of the founding fathers. ',22
The PNP appeared to be a replica of the CPP taking the organiza­
tional form of the erstwhile party, including its membership and ideas.
Indeed, its victory in the 1979 elections was believed to have resulted
from a unified front of Nkrumaists in support of the PNP.23
Launched in time to contest the elections of the year, and like the
CPP, it promised to "consolidate and maintain the independence and
sovereignty of the State of Ghana; promote national reconciliation and
unity and safeguard the freedom of the people." It sought to ensure that
the economy would operate in five separate sectors: State enterprises,
enterprises owned by foreign private interests, enterprises jointly owned
by State and private foreign entrepreneurs, co-operatives, and Ghanaian
private enterprises.24
Existing factors which aided the party's achievements shall be
examined below. A major problem, however, of the party was its
organizational structure. Did the party leaders in office have the
endorsement of the members? As the party prepared for its post­
election Congress, the press reported that "the youths were insisting
that for peace to be achieved in the party, all national officers in the
party must be elected: and these included, the chairman, the vice­

126
chairman, national treasurer, the general secretary and the national
organizer."25
This demand by the youth seemed to be the consensus of many
members of the party as parliamentarians and law students of the
University of Ghana, who were party members, made the same de­
mands. Also prevailing dissensions were reflected first in the dissolu­
tion of the Central Committee of the party and then in the indefinite
adjourning of the Congress in order to save the party from imminent
split26

The Popular Front Party (PFP)

The Popular Front Party (PFP) when examined, seemed endowed with
structures, organization and cohesion which were lacking in thePNP. In
several ways, the PFP left no one in doubt that it was a continuity of the
Progress Party (PP). An important deviation, however, concerns lead­
ership which had to be determined through a democratic process of
selection. Such election was never necessary in determining leadership
of the PP. With the founder, Dr. Busia, being the undisputed leader of the
party, no contest was necessary.
The organizational structure evolved by the Progress Party was
inherited by the PFP. The constitution of the PP made provision for the
election of national officers, regional officers, constituency, and district
officers. Following the constitutional provisions as prescribed by the PP
constitution, Mr. Victor Owusu was the democratically elected leader of
the PFP. It should be noted, however, that perhaps on account of
personal efficiency, the General Secretary of the PP, Mr. B.J. da Rocha, a
lawyer, maintained this post under the PFP — an obvious indication of
continuing membership in both parties.
The continuity of organizational form was coupled with member­
ship that spanned the two organizations. It can be assumed then that
the underlying values held by the Progress Party continued in the
PFP— the desire for personal liberties, freedom of the press, better
health for the people and greater security for the working people
ough better social security provisions.

127
The Other Parties

The United National Convention (UNO, briefly discussed earlier on

had some affinity with the Popular Front Party (PFP). The leader — Mr.
William Ofori-Atta (Paa Willie) was an executive member of the UGCC
and a relation of Dr. J.B. Danquah; he was the son of Nana Ofori-Atta I
of Akim Abuakwa and shared in the liberal values of that family. The
membership of the UNC more or less subscribed to the values of the PFP.
Indeed, it was always probable that these members may have been at
one time members of the Progress Party or of the United Gold Coast
Convention.
The UNC desired an administrationiree of corruption and sought
political reconciliation in the nation; it promised to provide health,
electricity and better education.
The aims of the Action Congress Party of Colonel Bemasko in­
cluded the promotion of better agriculture for the country by providing
farmers with adequate and proper inputs. This focus of the Congress
was different from those of the Social Democratic Front (SDF) and The
Third Force Party.
The SDF desired the promotion of the welfare of, most particu­
larly, the workers, even though it would also promote education,
national reconstruction and the development of a better economy. On
the other hand, the Third Force Party emphasized the need for better
leadership — a leadership which should be honest, dedicated, and bold.

The Elections of 1979

The aims and objectives of the parties have been stated already. And
there were the differences such as contained in the objectives of the
UNC, the ACP and the SDF. The Action Congress, like the SDF, had
definite clients they wanted to cater for, while not neglecting, the total
national interest. The policies of both the PNP and the PFP were
comprehensive; they covered about the same areas of life so that the
electorate did not seem to have clear-cut alternative choices. But the PNP
appeared advantaged; the achievements of the CPP in the past — such
as bringing independence to the people and the vast developments
such as the infrastructure that ensued were pointed to as their heritage
of achievements.
The Progress Party, which the PFP inherited, lacked the corre-

128
sponding record of achievements having been in power for only a
period of two years. When the electorate went to the polls they decided
for thePNP. It gained 71 seats while the PFP obtained 42 seats; UNC13
seats, ACP 10 seats and the SDF 3 seats. Concerning the Presidency,
Dr. Hilla Limann obtained 1,118305 votes and Mr. Victor Owusu
686,097 votes.27
The process of politics reflected in the politics of the Third Republic
in itself testified to the on-going search for liberal democracy. This search
continues into the Fourth Republic. What are the prospects for a liberal
democratic polity?

Conclusions: Prospects for Democracy in the Fourth Republic

Liberal democracy has been an ideal pursued but not yet realized. In
the First Republic the political process had been governed by the norms
and principles of liberal democracy. But given the ideology ofsocialism
to which the dominant political group (the CPP) subscribed the prin­
ciples and norms governing the process of politics came gradually to be
those of socialism. But neither did the interventions of the military
permit the perpetuation of liberal democracy.
As Ghana enters the Fourth Repbulic, it will seem to have armed
itself with certain constitutional provisions which are enforced
through specific laws.

The Constitutional Provisions

Guaranteeing the right of the people to organize political parties and

also advocating the freedom of such organized parties to participate in
shaping the will of the people, the constitution of the Fourth Republic
nevertheless imposes certain constraints thus:

Every political party shall have a national character and member­

ship snail not o e based on ethnic, religious, regional or other
sectional divisions .28

Iditionally, the provisions enjoin that "the internal organization of a

al party shall conform to the democratic principles and its actions
id purposes shall not contravene or be inconsistent with the constitu-
>n or any other law ."29

129
 In order to ensure compliance, however, the provisions forbid any
political party from operating as such unless it has been properly
registered with the Electoral Commissioner. The Commissioner, on the
other hand, has power under PNDC Law 281 of 1992, not to register a
party which does not meet the requirements.
That the following parties have been registered as qualified to
operate as political parties:

1. The National Patriotic Party (NPP)

2. The National Democratic Congress (NDC)
3. The People's National Convention (PNC)
4. The National Independence Party (NIP)
5. The People's Heritage Party (PHP)

The presidential candidates of these parties are:

1. Professor A. Adu-Boahen
2. Ht - Lt. J. J. Rawlings
3. Dr. Hilla Limann
4. Mr. Kwabena Darko
5. General Emmanuel Erskine

Concern exists that liberal democracy should triumph. The concern is

expressed in the Directive Principles of State Policy which stresses that
"Ghana shall be a democratic state dedicated to the realization of
freedom and justice..." 30 But against stipulated or stated desires,
authorities over conditions under which military interventions will be
weak are those where public attachment to civilian institutions is strong;
where civilian associations and parties are strong and numerous and
where the procedures for the transfer of power are orderly, and where
the location of supreme authority is not seriously challenged. What are
the prospects for a lasting democracy in Ghana? The political culture
has been changing and it is probable that Ghana presently fulfills the
stated conditions.

NOTES

1. Colonial Office despatch, No. 350, p.9.

2. Ghana, The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah p. 62

130
3. The Constitution of the Convention People's Party (Revised) 1961.
Part 1.
4. Padmore, George, The Gold Coast Revolution p.72.
5. Apter, David, The Gold Coast in Transition p.203
6. Ibid.
7. The Gold Coast in Transition p.172
8. The Transformation of Internal Political Power.
9. Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition pp. 203-4
10. Davidson, Basil, Life and Times of Nkrumah, p. 126
11. Austin, Government and Politics in Ghana, p. 181
12. Ghana, The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah p. 21
13. West Africa Review, Sept. 1956. p. 316.
14. Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition pp. 202
15. Achievement of the Progress Party.
16. The Birth of The Second Republic.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Austin, Dennis, Politics in Ghana p. 14.
20. Achievement of the Progress Party, p.31.
21. The Ghanaian Times, Jan. 7,1981.
22. Limann Speaks, The Way Ahead, p. 18.
23. The Ghanaian Times, Jan. 7,1981.
24. Manifesto of the PNP - p .7.
25. The Ghanaian Times, May 30,1980.
26. The Daily Graphic, Jan. 1,1980.
27. Mike Oquaye, Politics in Ghana, p. 164,171.
28. The Constitution of Ghana (1992) pp. 47-8.
29. The Constitution of Ghana (1992) pp. 48-49.
30. The Constitution of Ghana (1992) p. 35
31. S.E. Finer, Man on Horseback, p.21.

REFERENCES

Colonial Office Despatch No. 350.

Nkrumah, Kwame. Ghana, The Autobiography of Kwame NkrumahLThomas
Nelson Ltd. London, 1957.
admore, George, The Gold Coast Revolution. London, Dennis Dobson Ltd.
1950.
Apter, David, The Gold Coast in Transition Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton

131
 University Press. 1959
5. Davidson, Basil, The Life and Times of Kwame Nkrnmah, Clark, Double and
Brandson Ltd., Plymouth 1973.
6. Austin, Dennis, Government and Politics in Ghana.
7. "West Africa Review" Sept. 1956.
8. Achievements of the Progress Party, 1969-1971
9. The Birth of the Second Repnblict Editorial and Ghana Publishing Services,
Accra.
10. Austin, Dennis and Luckham, Robin, Politicians and Soldiers, Frank Cass,
London, 1975.
11. Finer, S.E., Man on Horseback, Pall Mall Press, 1959.
12. Oquaye, Mike, Politics in Ghana, 1972.
13. The Draft Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992.

132
 Chapter 8

PO LITICA L PA RTIES AND SO CIAL R EPR ESEN TA TIO N :

TH E CA SE OF W O M EN

J. Sandra Pepera

Introduction

The representation of women, and issues of concern to women in Ghana,

at government and at executive level, has remained depressingly low.
Depressing because (a) numerically women are slightly over 50% of the
population in Ghana, 0?) they have traditionally and consistently played
a central role in the struggle for national liberation from colonial rule and
post-Independence nation-building, and (c) of the massive contribution
they make to the socio-economic life of the nation.
The focus of this paper is to introduce the reader to some aspects of
the relationship between political parties and various social groups in
our society. For the purposes of this paper political parties are defined
in the Constitution of the 4th Republic as "freely formed organizations
of citizens" that are national in character and orientation.1 Further, a
political party is free to:

(i) participate in shaping the political will of the people;

(ii) propagate and pursue political ideas and social and economic
programmes of a national character; and
(iii) put up candidates for election to public office.2

Therefore, it seems clear that in a political system that is based

around the competition between differing political groups organized as
parties, citizens, in order to promote particular and sectional interests,
will seek a voice within these parties in order to project these interests to
the national level. Usually, we find that at least four, sometimes five, sub-
societal groups are specifically represented in the organizational struc-
ure of political parties. These are: women, the aged, the disabled, the
/outh, and sometimes separately from "the youth," students.
hana's political history, the major parties have always had at least
a "women's wing" and a "youth wing."

133
 In this chapter I will examine the way in which political parties
have in the past promoted and projected (and might in the future
promote and project) the particular interests of women in Ghana to the
highest levels of national life. I have concentrated on women, as they
represent the largest sub-group. In thisinstance “women" iscoterminous
with "female," which means that the concern is for the representation of
a group that numerically constitutes at least 50% of the total population
of Ghana, and, as mentioned in my introduction, contributes signifi­
cantly, (at times critically) to the political, social, and economic life of
this country. What seems beyond doubt is that women area major, semi­
organized, social group, that must be included in any attempt to
understand politics in Ghana.
It seems clear that whilst Ghanaian women — individually and
collectively — have actively participated in the politics of the anti­
colonial struggle and post-Independence national politics, the political
system has failed women.3 The importance of women's participation
has always been recognized, but this has brought little actual progress
or improvement in the condition of women in Ghana. The visible
representation of women in Ghana, is both quantitatively and quali­
tatively low, and has done nothing to remove the invisibility sur­
rounding women.
The status of women in Ghana can be statistically represented as
follows: women in Ghana are slightly over fifty per cent of the popula­
tion. Whilst 70% of the total population of Ghana live in the rural areas,
around 80% of the total female population lives in the rural areas. This
means that 50% of all rural workers in the farming sector are women,
but only 25% of those classed as "farmers" or "farm managers," are
women.4 Why? Because even though they are responsible for produc­
ing about 60% of our food, women are denied access to credit, find it
difficult to secure the ownership of land, and are by-passed by extension
officers who are geared towards the larger farms and agricultural units.
Ghana has a high incidence of maternal mortality in comparison to
other nations with similar birth rates, and 69% of women tested in
antenatal clinics in 1987, were shown to be anaemic due to malnutrition.
Now if the pregnant woman is malnourished, what hope is there for the
baby, and what might be happening to the children she already has at
home, and to the aged parent who is living with her, and so on.
In the "lean" season, 36% of women were found to be under­
weight, dropping to 19% during the rest of the year, but the equivalent
male rates are 23% in the "lean" season, and 3% otherwise. 32.5% of

134
the population of Ghana is literate, with 42% of all males classed as
such, yet only 23% of females, and the drop-out rate for young girls is far
higher than for boys, so the future female literacy rate does not look too
promising either.
Whilst the economy struggles to recover, and some of the tradi­
tional extended family ties are being strained to and past breaking point,
more women are being classified as the heads of their households
than before: 25%, 34%, and 26%, in Accra, other urban, and the rural
areas respectively.
Only 9% of persons serving on public bodies as government
administrators, managing directors of corporations or enterprises and
legislative bodies were female in 1984, and the numbers have not
improved significantly since then.5 With the high female school drop­
out rate, the prospects for increasing this number recedes as fewer
young women emerge from the educational system literate in the
language of business and government — English.
In the District Assemblies which were established in 1988 in each
of the 110 districts in Ghana, ostensibly to implement a radical decen­
tralization programme and increase popular participation in decision­
making at the community level, only 9.1% of their membership are
female, and the majority of these belong to the government appointed
one-third of the assemblies' membership, rather than to the directly
elected majority.
In the Consultative Assembly which drafted the 4th Republican
Constitution, there were only 25 women out of some 260 members, and
whilst the nine-person ruling Provisional National Defence Council
itself has always since 1983 had one woman member, there are
presently no women Secretaries of State, whilst a few have been and
are deputies. There are only two women ambassadors in Ghana's
diplomatic corps.
It seems that even as we continue the national search for represen­
tative government, there is still a school of thought that believes that
"women's issues" are somehow distinct and separate from the real
business of politics and government.
In an article written seventeen yearsago by Jean CXBarr, the author
stated that future "development" was likely to be more dependent on
he female population than on the male population for the present, near
! distant future. The statement is no less relevant today. Our national
lopment plans must increasingly target women and an improve-
in women's experience of education, life-style and employment, if

135
the overall picture for Ghana is to improve dramatically.

Ghanaian Women and National Politics: Representation

Politics in Ghana has traditionally focused on social groups. It is the

resilience of these groups that has maintained the interest of the popu­
lation in political activity, and the capacity of Ghanaians to swiftly
regroup and organize themselves politically at the national level.
The history of women's participation in Ghanaian politics, al­
though only sketchily drawn, shows conclusively that in the anti­
colonial struggle, when and where women perceived that their interests
were under direct threat from the actions of the colonial authorities (and
this was usually, though not exclusively, in relation to a policy or colonial
representative which attacked the political position which the majority
of Ghanaian, in fact African women derive from their economic role in
our subsistence societies) they were prepared to take positive action —
see the Cocoa boycotts etc.. And Nkrumah, the master party organizer
that he was, understood intimately the need to draw women into the
Convention People's Party (CPP), and advocated a role for them as
vanguard activists, and even in the clumsy and undemocratic attempt to
ensure women's representation in Parliament (the Representation of the
People(Women Members) Acts of 1959, and 1960), showed a genuine
commitment to propelling women on to the national political stage .6
Unfortunately, and perhaps reflecting the social and intellectual
basis of the Danquah-Busia tradition, their silence on the position of
women even within the party hierarchy has been deafening. In the
debate that surrounded the CPP government's 1959/60 proposal for the
election of 10 women Members to the National Assembly by electoral
colleges,7 the Opposition were vocal in their denunciation of the move
as "undemocratic and unconstitutional," which it was, without ad­
dressing the issue of how to overcome the societal barriers that pre­
vented women from successfully competing for seats in the Assembly.
The figures for the return of women to the legislature at each
general election, since 1954, when Miss Mabel Dove was the only
woman returned, were as follows: in 1956, no women were returned, in
1960, under the amended Representation of the People (Women Mem­
bers) Act, 1960,10 women, all CPP, were elected by the Assembly on a
regional basis,8 in 1965,19 women were returned to the Assembly-
Nine of these were those who had entered in 1960,10 were new, and of

136
course following the 1964 Referendum and the promulgation of a
one-party state in Ghana, all those returned in 1965 were members of the
CPP. The first woman to hold national office, Mrs S. Alhassan,
was made Minister of Social Welfare.9
The Second Republic, saw only a single woman returned to Parlia­
ment, at the general election, and she won a seat in the North, as a
representative of the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL). So insignifi­
cant was this victory, that the Legon Observer, did not even bother to
single it out in all its pages of post-election analysis and commentary
that continued virtually until the end of 1969! But even more interest­
ingly, the Progress Party (PP), which won the election by a massive
margin, only fielded one female out of a total of 138 candidates nation­
ally, whilst 2 women stood as Independents, NAL fielded 4 women, the
United Nationalist Party (UNP), 1 woman, and the All People's Repub­
lican Party (APRP), 1 woman .10
Whilst the PP's only mention of women in the preamble to their
Constitution read:

(to) 10. ENSURE that increasingly the control of the economy shall
be in the hands of Ghanaians (market-women and Ghanaian busi­
nessm en),11

Komla Gbedemah was busy announcing at the NAL Southern Region's

women's rally, that:

four women are being put up by the NAL as candidates in their

own right for the forthcoming elections.
As a mark of the seriousness which the Party attaches to the represen­
tation of women, it is my pleasure to record that in the Northern and Upper
Regions, two very eligible men stood down in order to make room for a
woman (my emphasis).12

In the 3rd Republic, 5 women were returned from a total of 20

candidates standing in 19 constituencies. Of these, 4 were from the
People's National Party (PNP), reflecting the CPP group's tradition in
the organization and promotion of women, and one from the Action
Congress Party (ACP). 2 of the PNP women were names from the past:
iss Victoria Nyame, who won Sunyani in 1979, had been one of the 10
women elected to the National Assembly by the Assembly in 1960,
list Miss Agatha Ama Awuah, who won Denkyira in 1979, had come
ird in the same seat in 1969, standing for the APRP. The total number
137
of women candidates fielded were: PNP, six ACP, three; Popular Front
Party (PFP), one; United National Convention (UNC), three; Third Force
Party (TFP), three; Social Democratic Front (SDF), four.11
Women have been and continue to be under-represented. But
even when they are represented, it seems that the benefits to women
as a group, when they do occur, are almost incidental to their presence.
This has much to do with a lack of awareness of women as a collectivity
with special needs and demands to make of the body politic. It is
possible, that women in Ghana will have to first develop a truly
national, truly non-partisan, truly classless, political movement or
pressure group, before effectively identifying their concerns, and
ensuring that these are carried up and down the corridors of power.
I suggest that the absence of such an independent body (an
important vacuum in the associational life of civil society in Ghana)
has contributed to the ability of those seeking the political heights, to
opportunistically latch on to "women's issues," and mobilize women
behind their actual priority: national political power and/or political
legitimacy.14

Ghanaian Women and National Politics: Policy

But, as has been said time and again, the problems of the body politic in
Ghana can hardly be laid at the door of democracy and /or party
politics, since we have enjoyed so little of both. More critically, neither
"regime" nor "revolutionary" politics as we have experienced them in
the greater part of our post-independence political history, has im­
proved either the representation or the position of women in Ghana.
We have already mentioned the C P F s initiative for ensuring
women Members of the National Assembly, but what did the Nkrumah/
CPP years specifically do for the position of women in Ghana?
Certainly, national programmes such as the extension of free
education and health services, would have benefitted some women
within the general population, and Nkrumah, perhaps following the
example of the progressive policies of the Eastern bloc, took personal
interest in the creation of a military Women's Auxiliary Corps, and
encouraged the same opportunities for training and advancement for
the female"members of the armed forces.
Under the law, women in Ghana seem to be equitably treated.
They have the right to engage in economic activity, and own property

138
absolutely. They may or may not get married, they can bear children
outside marriage with no loss of rights for these children and little
social stigma. Women can sue or be sued in their own name, lend
money to husbands and expect a refund. But even here, the picture
is incomplete without the mention of the regular eviction of a widow
and her children on the death of a spouse, or their inability to obtain
credit, official assistance and agricultural inputs, for their farming
activities, or the fact that in some areas women do not have equal access
to land and have lesser inheritance rights within families than male
members.15
The National Council on Women and Development (NCWD),
established by the Government of Ghana, in 1975, as a response to the
International Women's Year, and to ensure that the objectives of the
United Nations Decade for Women, are achieved in Ghana, has been
the most consistent and persistent watchdog of issues concerning women
in Ghana. Unfortunately, the NCWD has suffered in its ability to work
effectively for women in Ghana in two ways: first, because it is
essentially a bureaucratic arm of the state, it has been unable to take
up an aggressively political campaigning role; and secondly, in more
recent times, it has suffered political marginalization as the PNDC
established its own "women's wing" to mobilize the women of Ghana
behind its own programme — the 31st December Women's Movement
(31st DWM).
Ten years ago women traders were scapegoated by the regime
as the cause of the nation's political, economic and social crises. Those
early 'revolutionary times saw violent attacks on the economically
derived political position of women, and many women lost income
and assets through the destruction of their wares and markets. How­
ever, the regime soon realized the importance of mobilizing women
to its cause, and this has manifested itself in Nana Konadu Agyeman-
Rawlings' high profile role as the President of the 31st DWM.16 But
even those laws which have assumed the position of testaments to the
PNDC's commitment to the improvement of the status of women (the
Intestate Succession Law, and the Customary Marriages Registration
law), have been shown to be seriously flawed and are in need of
amendment.17
Furthermore, the representation of women at the level of PNDC
y and the essential policy-making levels has remained surpris-
Impressionistically, there appears to be a marked difference
a ndards applied to evaluating a woman's performance in high

139
office. It appears that the number of women District Secretaries to have
been removed or investigated for various alleged misdeeds, is dispro­
portionately large, given the total number of women in the position
of District Secretaries.
The managing boards of the state-owned press houses — Graphic
and New Times Corporations — were reconstituted earlier this year,
without a single woman on either. We should be surprised that this
omission happened at all, but also that no public outcry was raised by the
31st DWM, which claims to be the only national, non-governmental
women's organization, directed towards the political, social, and eco­
nomic liberation of Ghanaian women.

Ghanaian Women and National Politics: the 1992 Political Parties

In preparing for this paper, I looked at some of the constitutions of

the 1992 political parties. At least one such constitution made it
possible for the National Executive Committee of the party to be
entirely male, except for the ex-officio presence of the Director of the
Women's Section, which it was presumed would be a woman. For such
a constitution to be produced in 1992, does not suggest that some of
the new political parties seriously consider that the role of their women
members extends beyond the traditional roles of cheerleaders, praise
singers and refreshments providers.
It would seem that with the party constitutions as a starting point,
certain mechanisms could be inserted that would give women more
than a chance of playing a central role in the Party. It will be necessary
for the party leaders to practise positive discrimination in their internal
deliberations and election practices, as well as in their selection of
candidates to contest parliamentary seats. It will not be good enough
simply to say that women are free to stand, and any woman good
enough will make it through. The odds are stacked heavily against
them.18
The NAL solution of 1969, seems particularly useful: some male
candidates in the Ghanaian equivalent of "safe seats," should stand
down in favour of women candidates from the same party, so that
women will make it to the legislature.
Those women who do find themselves in Parliament in the 4th
Republic, whether in government or opposition, should form a cross­
party women's caucus. This caucus could then pool resources to be able

140
to effectively lobby the Assembly, initiate debate on issues of concern to
women, monitor legislation for gender bias, and follow-up on policy
implementation.
From Chapter Six of the 4th Republican Constitution, the Directive
Principles of State Policy, I have identified five gender-specific articles:
Art. 35, sections 3-6; Art. 36, section 6; Art. 37, section 4; Art. 38, section
3; and Art. 39, section 2. The Directive Principles are the broad guidelines
or the framework for government activity and policy-making, but they
are not the only articles with something to say on areas of national life
that deeply affect the position of women. However, I do not think it
would be too much to ask of the young political parties that, at least, in
the first instance, they address the issues raised in the Directive Prin­
ciples in their forthcoming manifestoes. Further, it should be possible for
us to monitor the policy/decision-making activities of the new govern­
ment against the Directive Principles, and the party manifestoes, for a
sincere commitment to setting an environment in which women in
Ghana are able to develop their full human resource potential.
G ause 22 in Chapter 5 of the Fourth Republican Constitution
entitled: "Property Rights of Spouses," is aimed at mitigating the
humiliating circumstances in which many women in Ghana find them­
selves on the dissolution of a marriage. In sections 2 and 3, it states:

(2) Parliament shall, as soon as practicable after the coming into

force of this Constitution, enact legislation regulating the
property rights of spouses.
(3) With a view to achieving the full realization of the rights
referred to in clause (2) of this article —
(a) spouses shall have equal access to property jointly
acquired during marriage;
(b) assets which are jointly acquired during marriage shall
be distributed equitably between the spouses upon
dissolution of the marriage.

Thus far the principles seem clear. But when it comes to law­
making, how is the issue of proving that any property in the marital
estate was "jointly acquired", to be resolved? Even now, the greatest
difficulty facing women confronted with the dissolution of their mar­
riage, is the burden of proof that any property acquired during the
marriage was jointly so. For example, a woman who has been a
omemaker and supporting partner for twenty years without any
^pendent income, is unlikely to be able to produce any receipts or
ocumentation as to her financial contribution to the acquisition of
141
property, although her non-financial contribution to the estate's growth,
would be quite substantial. Yet, and unfortunately, the idea that behind
every man is a woman, is not a legal concept!
How do we guarantee that the spirit of the Constitution becomes
the letter of the law with respect to the property rights of spouses?
Perhaps by the use of fixed proportions as a means of distribution;
perhaps by minimizing the space for interpretation by the Courts, where
judges, et cetera, are predominantly male. But, if there are no women,
let alone female spouses in Parliament, who is going to ensure that the
law as enacted will address their legitimate concerns?20
Political parties as political institutions will be at the centre of the
political system in the Fourth Republic. As associations representing the
concerns of specific social groups, and as vehicles for the promotion of
those concerns at the national level, political parties can act as a mecha­
nism for bringing women to centre stage in national politics. There
seems little doubt that if this is not done, Ghana's chances of national
development and growth are minimal.

NOTES

1. Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) booklet, A Guide to

Political Parties
2. Ibid.
3. Justice Mrs. Cecilia Koranteng-Addo, who had attained a senior position
as a member of the judiciary and a public servant, paid the ul timate price
at a time of political conflict and lawlessness.
4. All statistics in this section are taken from the ROG/UNICEF report -
Children and Women in Ghana: A Situation Analysis, 1990
5. Report by Government of Ghana to Committee monitoring the Conven­
tion on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women,
at the United Nations, 1991
6. The Representation of the People (Women Members) Act of 1959, (Act No.
72), provided for the election of not more than ten women as additional
Members of Parliament, by regional women's electoral colleges consti­
tuted of women elected from each of the districts of the region. The
allocation of these ten seats was as follows: three from the Northern
Region, two each from the Eastern and Western Regions, and one each
from Volta, Ashanti, and Brong-Ahafo. As tire necessary mechanisms
were not in place before the dedsion to make Ghana a Republic, the
Representation of the People (Women Members) Act of 1960, (Act No

142
 8), repealed the previous Act, and provided that the National Assembly
itself could elect ten women asadditional Members of Parliament, in the
same ratio as before. This was done, and ten women were sworn in
to Parliament on the eve of the Republic.
7. Parliamentary Hansards, 10th November 1959, Cols 292-318, and 7th June
1960, Cols 12-14.
8. Parliamentary Hansard, 27th June 1960, Col 210. The women were sworn
in on the 28th and the 29th June I960!.
9. Recorded in the Parliamentary Hansard, 1st Session of the 1st Republic of
Ghana, 10th June 1965.
10. The Legon Observer, 5th September 1969.
11. The Constitution of the Progress Party, 1969.
12. Speech made by Mr. K.A. Gbedemah, Leader of the National Alliance of
Liberals, at the Southern Region Women's Rally in Accra, 1969.
13. The Legon Observer, 27th July 1979.
14. See Tsikata, Women's Political Organizations, 1951-87
15. See Manuh, T. Women's Exercise of Power and the Law in Ghana
16. See Tsikata, above. Nana Konadu Agyeman-Rawlings is the wife of the
Chairman of the PNDC, Flt-Lt J.J. Rawlings.
17. For example, one intention of the Intestate Succession Law is presumably
to ensure that children, especially minors, are not deprived of the
benefits of their deceased parent's estate. But legal aid lawyers in Accra,
have recently been petitioned by a fifty-six year old man, for help in
acquiring his share of the nine-sixteenths of his late father's estate which
is allocated to all the recognized children of the deceased. The deceased's
spouse at the time of his death was a thirty - year old woman, and the
youngest siblings of the petitioner are both under eight years of age.
This is not an unusual situation. The sum total of the deceased's estate
is a very modest two-room house in central Accra. As the Law stands,
all the deceased's children from the youngest to the fifty-somethings are
entitled to a share of nine-sixteenths of his estate. The custom by which
the Law has been applied suggests that the "estate" will be liquidated
in order to distribute the entitlements, thereby leaving the widow and
two young children without a home. A classic example of the anomalies
that can occur when proposed legislation is not exposed to the widest
possible debate.
18. The deposit for Prospective Parliamentary Candidates is £100,000.00 (one
hundred thousand cedis), For Presidential Candidates the deposit is £2
million (two million cedis!) — a huge sum of money for most women
to find, and be prepared to lose. And this is quite apart from other
election expenses, and the cost of running a parliamentary office if she
wins.

143
 19. The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992.
20. For an "insider's" experience of this point see Dolphyne, The Emancipation
of Women, pages 47-49.

REFERENCES

Dolphyne, F.A.- The Emancipation of Women: An African^Perspective. Accra

Ghana Universities Press, 1991.
Tsikata, E. Women's Political Organizations 1951-1987, in Hansen, E. and
Ninsin, K.A. eds, The State, Development and Politics in Ghana. CODESRIA
1989.
Manuh, T. Women and their Organizations during the Convention Peoples'
Party Period, in Arhin, K. ed The Life and Work of Kwame Nkrumah. Sedco
Publishing Limited 1991.
"Women, State and Society under the PNDC," in Gyimah-Boadi, E. ed
Ghana under the PNDC. CODESRIA forthcoming.
"Women's Exercise of Power and the Law in Ghana." Paper delivered at
the African Studies Program, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA,
Spring Seminar Series on Women and Power in Africa, 1992.
Chazan, N. An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession,
1969-1982, Chapter 2. Westview Press 1983.
( O'BarrJ.F. Making the Invisible Visible: African Women in Politics and Policy,
in African Studies Review, Vol 18, No. 3, December 1975.
Rubin, L and Murray, P. The Constitution and Government of Ghana, Chapter 5.
Sweet and Maxwell 1961.
Osei, G.K. The Spirit and Structure of Nkrumah's CPP, Chapter 5. 1962.
Kakrabah-Quarshie, R. Achievements of the Progress Party 1969-71, The Consti­
tution of the PP. Accra 1971.
Gbedemah, K.A. Speech Delivered by the Leader of the National Alliance of
Liberals, at the Southern Region's Women Rally at Accra, 1969.
Republic of Ghana/UNICEF Children and Women of Ghana: A Situation Analysis.
Accra, 1990.
Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC):
A Guide to Political Parties, Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1992.
A Guide to the Candidate, Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1992.
United Nations Social Statistics and Indicators.Tte World's Women: Trends
and Statistics 1970-90. New York 1991.
The Constitution of the Convention People's Party (CPP).
Revised 1959.
Parliamentary Hansard:
10th November 1959, Cols 292-317.
7th June 1960, Cols 12-14.

144
 27th June I960, Col. 210.
Acts of Ghana
Representation of the People (Women Members):
Act 1959, No. 72..
Act 1960, No. 8.
The Legon Observer:
5th September 1969.
27th July 1979.
The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992..

145
 Part III

Political Parties,
Representation and
Democracy
 Chapter 9

PO LITICA L PA RTIES, R EPR ESEN TA TIO N

A N D D EM O C R A C Y

Donald Anderson

Introduction

I begin this chapter with the same disclaimer as in the previous one:
that is , I speak as a practitioner, and not as an academic expert. I speak
as someone convinced of the virtues of pluralistic democracy and the
role of opposition — but regretting the fact that my party latterly has
had too much experience of that role!
I recall one experience in the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)—
which accepts as members all countries which have institutions they call
"parliaments"— two or three years ago. At the final vote, country by
country, we heard the national votes announced: North Korea (unani­
mous) Zambia (unanimous) Canada (4 for, 4 against, 4 abstentions). The
Canadian announcement was greeted by laughter, but represented the
result of real debate and genuine differences. I wondered whether there
can really be such unanimity in any country.
For the former Soviets and their allies such unanimity arose from
the arrogant assumption, based on Marxist-Leninist ideology that the
single party knew and represented the real interests of the people,
whatever the people themselves misguidedly may have thought. Their
politics envisaged an ultimate happy state where all "contradictions"
would have ceased— a state of harmony, wholly unreal, and the search
for which leads to dictatorship.
In the case of newer countries the single party, which led the
struggle for independence, saw rapid development as so self-evidently
in the national interest that there was no case for multi-partyism, which
would create and encourage differences and divert scarce talent. Even
a benign autocracy, such as that of United National Independence Party
CUT IP) in Zambia with a lively internal opposition, was based on a
iction which can so often lead to corruption and croneyism.
In Western democracies, at times of war where there is a single
itional objective, party politics is suspended for the duration of the

149
emergency. The assumption is, however, that as soon as practicable,
politics will return to " n o r m a l A n d in Uganda, following the military
victory of the National Resistance Army (NRA) in 1985-6 there is no
party activity in Parliament, but leaders of the parties do take leading
Government portfolios, apparently on the assumption that this is a
transitional period.
I reject the Marxist illusion that there can be an ultimate state of
harmony. Political activity involves the clash and reconciliation of
interests. Such differences will always exist and to override or ignore
them will lead to differing forms of authoritarianism and civil strife. The
party system is one well tried mechanism to accommodate such differ­
ences. Multipartyismand the pluralism of interest groups competing for
attention is now the wave of the future around the world as communism
is seen to be the god that failed.
At the end of the 1970s Brezhnev could look back with satisfaction
at the advance of Soviet interests and allies in the developing world over
the decade. In 1981 he boasted to the 26th Party Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU): "In literally all fields
World Socialism is advancing steadily." A decade later communism is
dead, save in a few scattered dinosaur states: and democracy advances
as dictators fall to people's power. The second cold war came to an end
and the subsequent super-power co-operation has had profound effects
on the African political landscape.
One remarkable change was the breaking of the impasse over
Namibian independence. A consensus constitution was agreed which
represented not the absolute triumph of one party. New and old now
work together. The effects are seen elsewhere. Kenneth Kaunda, with
extreme dignity, acknowledged his defeat in the elections and now
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) and UNIP MPs represent
their country together at international conferences. In West Africa, there
are triumphs such as Benin, dangers of reversion such as Togo, and other
countries where the jury is still out
I stated that one tradition is that the party system is suspended on
the assumption that one day the immediate problem will be solved and
politics will return to "normal." This was the case in France in 1958 when
it appeared that only President de Gaulle, with authoritarian powers,
could solve the Algerian problem, which the traditional party system
could not. Will President Yeltsin have to revert to greater
authoritarianism to tackle Russia's econom ic problem s? Can
democratic regimes in Africa sell structural adjustment programmes

150
 to their electorates?
Significantly, even when party regimes are overturned by the
military, there is a return to the normality of party rule after a period
(Ghana in 1969 and 1979, Nigeria in 1979 and numerous examples in
Latin America and Asia).
I remain convinced that the best means of accommodating con­
flicting interests by peaceful means and of offering meaningful partici­
pation to the people and legitimacy to government lies in a multi-
party system. As Uwazurike has said: "Nearly universally the
single party system has degenerated into a form of oligarchic
patrimonialism that was even unknown in pre-colonial Africa."1
The dangers of multi-partyism are well rehearsed by critics.
Multi-partyism emphasizes diversity when national unity may be
deemed essential. It may give scope for regional, ethnic or religious
interests to prevail. It may fragment into an ungovernable chaos — see
the present problems in Poland or the large number of parties formed in
Togo. There are, however, tried constitutional devices to reduce these
dangers. In most circumstances parties can best bring together people
and government.
I concede that there are peculiar problems in the politics of transi­
tion. How can a smooth transition be encouraged? How should one deal
with representatives of the old regime, some of whom may be consid­
ered to be guilty of human rights abuses? Even with such a background
and with all the temptations, policies of national reconciliation are most
likely to lead to an enduring democratic system. A spirit of revenge will
simply build up the danger of future reprisals when the opportunity is
offered (we see the continued place of Pinochet in Chile, and the fact that
Ian Smith lives as a private citizen in Zimbabwe.) Nation building
demands a generosity of spirit. It is, however, infinitely more difficult at
a time of world recession. I recognize, as a comfortable Westener, I have
perhaps laid too much stress on political as opposed to social democracy.
The concept of an opposition may be difficult in some political
cultures. Chief Emeka Anyaoku, the Commonwealth Secretary-Gen­
eral and a Nigerian, said: "1 do not know of any African language whose
political lexicon includes the concept of a leader of the loyal opposition."
However, to insist on the concept of a political enemy too has its clear
(1angers. The British tradition has been that of consensus and accommo-
tion. An opposition is not regarded as subversive or destablizing.
Why? Because, ultimately, it is recognized by all sides that there is a
ional interest, that the will of the majority as freely expressed in

151
elections must prevail, and the rules of the game are well known and
normally respected. If the House of Commons is sometimes turbulent,
better the turbulence there than in the streets. Parties work together on
the allocation of committees and in a number of bi-partisan fora. The
spirit of dominance is dangerous. There is a degree of co-operation
across party, particularly in the field of foreign affairs. I have been a
strong critic of aspects of the British Government's African policy,
particularly in Southern Africa, yet I was invited by the Government to
attend this seminar.
What about countries with deep internal cleavages? If parties are
based on regions which are not in government, the whole region is
disenfranchised. Sharp social differences in Central America, with the
exception of Costa Rica and Belize, made the establishment of democ­
racy more difficult. The North-South divide in West Africa calls for an
effort of reconciliatory statesmanship on the part of leaders. On what
basis would different parties be formed in West Africa — traditional
party memories? Left versus right? Urban versus rural? Modernist
versus traditionalist?
If there are difficulties in achieving a national approach, there are
clearly well-tried devices for diffusing power and encouraging co­
operation — second chamber, federalism, blocking mechanisms and
entrenched clauses in constitutions, a Bill of Rights, minimum level of
electoral support before representation in Parliament, and so forth.
All these mechanisms will fail if there is no fundamental spirit of
give-and-take which can ultimately override all particular differences,
where no party believes that it has a monopoly of wisdom, and where
no party exercises the politics of exclusion. Cromwell said in despair,
"Think, ye may be mistaken." There spoke a true democrat. It is not
form which matters, but spirit. An election, however important, is only
the first step in establishing a vital democracy.
My firm conclusion from history and today's examples is that one
of the key elements which can encourage participation and ensure
political stability is the multiparty system. There is a strong wind of
democracy blowing in Africa. Adapted to particular circumstances and
with any necessary safeguards, the multiparty system will be an essen­
tial component of that democracy.

152
 REFERENCE

1. P. Chudi Uwazurike, "Confronting Potential Breakdown: The Nigerian

Redemocratization Process in Critical Perspective" in Journal of Modem
African Studies, 28,1990. p.67.
 Chapter 10

D E M O C R A C Y W ITH O U T PO LITICA L PA RTIES:

T H E C A SE O F D ISTRIC T A SSEM BLIES

M ike Oquaye

Introduction

The establishment of District Assemblies (D As) may be seen as a logical

sequence in the search of the Provisional National Defence Council
(PNDC) for a participatory, grassroots democracy. The PNDC was
of the view that previous governments had failed the people because
the system of representation resulted in governments that were remote
from the electorate, and numerically placed power in the hands of
a few rich and influential people.1
At all levels of political participation, from the localities to the
national level, a system of simple, direct representation without political
parties was envisaged by the PNDC. In setting up the (NCD), Rawlings
said that:

democracy is not realized merely by having a machinery for

registering voters and getting them to vote every four years, but
also by there being a machinery for identifying tfie needs of those
voters in between the election periods and monitoring the realiza­
tion these needs.2

Rawlings has expressed the view that democracy cannot be found

in the arsenal of political parties. Parties have no place in grassroots
democracy. He said:

rivalries and animosities among political parties sharpened as the

country grew older. These were not in the form of healthy
competition in which one party in power strove to do its best so that
the electorate might re-elect it. Ra trier, while bu ild ing its own funds
by some dubious means, a political party also bought support by
providing opportunities for bribery, theft, embezzlement and
trade malpractices. Gradually, these were becoming the vogue in
our political and social life, while the rewards for honesty turner
out to be a self-inflicted punishment.3
154
 Rawlings did not perceive democracy in terms of the ballot box but
in terms of a communalistic decision-making process in which every
individual would be involved from the local level on. Indeed, the formal
process of going to the polls must be avoided but if it cannot, then
political parties should not be part of the process, in any case. Rawlings
expressed the view that: "some regard democracy as the process of
choosing between a restricted group of people by means of the ballot
box. The process of this kind of democracy ends when the voter puts his
piece of paper inside the ballot box"4 Rawlings advocated a system
where "consultations and debates go on at the grassroots levels and
every individual has a greater opportunity than ever before to partici­
pate in the formulation of policies."5
In this connection, political parties are seen as the major obstacle to the
liberty of the individual to freely participate in local government.
This simple approach to politics is so vital that P.V. Obeng saw the
District Assembly concept unfettered by political parties as a logical
sequence in the PNDC's search for democracy. He said that:

the District Assembly concept seeks to fulfil two promises the

PNDC made when it first came to power: to bring the government
to the doorstep of the people and to ensure participatory democ­
racy.6

Of course, in Obeng's view, political parties constitute obstacles in

bringing local government to the doorstep of everyone.

The Blue Book and PNDC Law 207

In m id -1987, in a document popularly known as the "Blue Book", the

PNDC released its plans for DAs to unveil a further stage in the evolving
democratic process.7 It dealt with the number of DAs, their structure,
functions, nomination and election of members, their tenure and condi­
tions of office as well as duties. The modalities for the conduct of
elections were also dealt with. The Blue Book formed the basis of PNDC
Law 207 (The Local Government Law, 1988).
The emphasis was placed on the individual and not on political
organizations/parties which were eliminated altogether. To qualify to
stand for a DA election, a candidate should be a citizen of Ghana, aged
18 years and above, be of sound mind, must have fulfilled his tax and rate
obligations, and should be ordinarily resident in the district.8

155
 In the nomination of candidates, we observe the following:

(i) every person who is qualified to vote in the District has a right to be
proposed as a candidate;

(ii) candidates shall be nominated in their personal capacities by 25

individual qualified voters in the electoral area;

(iii) no candidate may be proposed in the name of an organization;

(iv) no person shall be disqualified from standing as a candidate by

reason only of his status, position, profession, religion, creed,
ethnic origin, race, occupation or traditional standing; and

(v) photographs of the nominated candidates shall be posted at van­

tage points in the electoral district. This will be accompanied by
a brief life history provided by the candidate.9

These provisions obviously underscored the emphasis being placed on

participation on an individual basis without the supposed trappings
of political parties.
District Election Committees (DECs) were provided for to effect
individual participation as follows:-

(i) The NCD shall establish a (5) five-member DEC from among
citizens who would have volunteered themselves for this pur­
pose;

(ii) the DEC shall, under the supervision of the NCD, create a platform
for the candidates to present themselves and their programmes
to the electorate and to respond to questions and queries;

(iii) the DEC shall verify the qualifications of the candidates and the
accuracy of their self-dedared life histories;

(iv) the DEC shall ensure that NO candidate will mount a public
platform other than that created by the NCD for presenting
himself, his programme or attempting to respond to questions
and queries.10

In order to ensure that the elected Assemblyman is personal ­

ise
responsible to his electorate as an individual and not as part of a party
machine, Law 207 provided that the mandate of an elected member of
a DA could be revoked by the electorate should he lose the confidence
of the electorate. The Assemblyman, who cannot hide behind a collec­
tive entity, to wit a political party, may be recalled on the grounds that:

(i) the member has abandoned the idea and programmes which he
personally presented to the people and for which he was elected
as an individual;

(ii) he has systematically neglected his duties;

(iii) he has committed acts incompatible with his office .as a

member of the District Assembly.11

Nomination and Campaign

In order to secure a candidature a person had to be nominated, not by a

political party, but by 25 registered voters in the District. After vetting,
the DEC had the power to prune the candidates to 2 or 3. The process
of pruning was bizarre since the DECs had absolute discretion to accept
or reject a candidate. Several persons complained that the process was
a closed shop in favour of persons favoured by District Secretaries and
the local Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs). In some
cases, candidates from the revolutionary organs were quickly pushed
forward to block certain unwanted candidates. Behind the scenes,
therefore, it appeared that the CDRs were doing the work of political
parties in a restricted fashion.
The non-party platforms made interesting study. Those who
supported the process argued that this manner of campaign was a
victory for grassroots participatory democracy in that by the single
platform system, no candidate had an edge over the other because of
financial and other considerations.
During the process, the DECs received various reports from the
public and conducted enquiries. These were used to disqualify some
candidates outright. Others were invited to appear in public, mount the
forms and face their accusers. In some cases, the candidates failed to
turn up thereafter.
For example, three candidates for the District Assembly election in
Mzerna East District, — Mr. Ben Matthew Baidoo of Gwira Eshiem

157
in the Ankobra River State electoral area, Mr. Ehimah Ebi of G wira Baso
electoral area and Mr. Thaddeus Lemane of Dominase electoral area, all
in theGwira traditional area, were reportedly disqualified "for various
electoral offences including, forgery and dishonesty."12TheChairman of
the Nzema East DEC, Mr. Joseph Mochiah, said that Mr. Baidoo, for
example, failed to report on the day a platform was mounted for him to
meet the people. Mr. Baidoo allegedly forged signaturesand thumbprints
of a number of his nominees while Mr. Ebi confessed, on being con­
fronted, that he had served a three-month jail term for theft while he
was an employee of the Prestea Goldfields Ltd. Mr. Lemane allegedly
forged a thumbprint of one Ndele Ebba as one of his nominees.13
In some cases, wild allegations were made which could not be
substantiated. At a platform at Akrofuom near Obuasi, the Adansi West
DEC faced a situation where some of the electorate called for the
disqualification of three candidates whom they accused of "bad
behaviour" over the years. Nothing concrete was advanced to support
this allegation and the members of the DEC reminded the people that
disqualification of candidates was the responsibility of the DEC who
would act only upon concrete evidenceand thorough investigations into
allegations. On this occasion, the DEC schooled the public on the laws
of libel and slander and cautioned them to be careful about their
utterances so that their newly-won right in participatory democracy
could be appropriately exercised.14
Notwithstanding the absence of political parties, the platforms
often became very dramatic as local people showed their enthusiasm.
For example in Mankessim, in the Central Region of Ghana, a candidate
was arrested just as he stepped down from the platform after presenta­
tion of his manifesto. The candidate, who was also a chief in the area, was
Nana Appah Kurankye VI, who was seeking election in Edumadze-
Twafo-Akyinim electoral area. He was alleged to have failed to re-pay
a loan of c57,245.00 which he had taken from the Aburaman Rural Bank.
It was alleged that in February 1988 the chief used his influence to obtain
the loan which he promised to repay in five days' time. He had not
repaid the loan by November 1988.15
In the Asutifi Ehstrict in the Brong-Ahafo Region, Mr. Evans
Oppong, a 38 year old candidate was accused of stealing a clock
belonging to a local postal agency when he was a postal agent several
years earlier After a hectic public quizzing by his accusers, Mr. Oppong
said he handed the dock over to the Town Development Committee
(TDC) before leaving for Nigeria. This response attracted the attention

158
of the Chairman of the TDC who instantly mounted the platform and on
behalf of theTDC denied that Oppong ever returned the clock. Oppong
reportedly disappeared from the scene. Earlier on, Oppong who had
promised to work towards the betterment of the people, was asked by
one questioner, how he could be trusted when he fled the country when
the going was tough in Ghana to seek greener pastures in Nigeria.16
In the Jasikan District in the Volta Region, one Mr. Emmanuel
Kumado, was winning applause as the most outstanding public speaker
among a number of candidates until he was exposed for being in the
habit of harvesting fish from other people's nets in the Volta Lake. Other
people appeared to give on-the-spot evidence to establish, inter alia,
that Mr. Kumado was caught in one such act in 1983. He had to admit
in public that he paid a fine of 10 bottles of akpeteshie (local gin) at a
traditional court presided over by Amega Xatsawotsope.17
In some cases, the system was apparently manipulated by some
members of the public, supposedly CDR men, who manufactured
allegations to discredit certain candidates. On Saturday, 11 February
1989, a platform was mounted in Accra Central by the DEC to introduce
three candidates who were contesting the elections to the electorate. The
rally, chaired by Mr. H.E. Golightly, Chairman of the Ashiedu-Keteke
DEC at Kokompe (a suburb spare parts area in Accra), had to be called
off at one stage.
The problem arose after a candidate, Mr. Jerry Nii Akwei Thomp­
son, a 43 year old accountant, had pledged to promote health, education
and sanitation in the area. Suddenly, a section of the public who were not
asking questions in an orderly manner that would invite answers,
started shouting and hooting that the candidate was corrupt and a man
of dubious character. There were wild allegations that the candidate had
embezzled funds belonging to "Eshee Nyomo Feemo Kpee" a benevo­
lent society in Accra in 1984.
Mr. Thompson was meticulous in answering his accusers factually
when he had the chance, showing that he had used his time and skill
sacrificially for the society and had only left the society because of
"certain anomalies" on the part of others. However, when the time
allotted Mr. Thompson was up, a section of the crowd raised a commo-
on and refused to allow other candidates to present their manifestoes,
is noteworthy that subsequently Mr. Thompson won the seat with
*78 votes against 1,356 votes polled by J onathan Jeff Adote a 50 year old
<nsioner and Mr. Daniel Nii Okai a 38 year old poultry farmer who
me a miserable third.18 It had become apparent that certain persons

159
had been procured to harass Mr. Thompson, an accountant, who stood
his grounds. Several professionals and businessmen did not seek
election because of the possibility of vituperations which the new system
apparently encouraged under the guise of personal merit and not party
affiliation.
Political parties present manifestoes stating their programmes and
plans. In the absence of political parties, individuals were asked to say
what they had to offer if they were elected. Candidates were asked
questions relating to problems in the localities to test whether they had
personally identified those problems and if they had identified those
problems how best they thought they could be solved.
In general, however, it appeared that in questioning candidates,
the public expected them to have some packages as panacea to their
maladies. Hence questions were asked, and every candidate's mani­
festo included promises to resolve issues of development, agriculture,
agro-industrialization, housing, education, health, good sanitation, health
centres and clinics, good water, electricity, child welfare etc.
Sweeping promises were made by several candidates throughout
the country. In the Asutifi district in the Brong Ahafo Region, for
exarnple, Mr. Yaw Amankwah, a 30 year old farmer promised to ensure
adequate sanitation by providing incinerators and KVIP systems if he
was elected. Mrs Cecilia Antwi, a 31 year old teacher noted that female
education in the area was discouraging and she would take steps to
correct this anomaly if elected.19
Mr. Yaw Mensah Aborampah, a 28 year old teacher said he would
work for the supply of electricity in the whole area. Mr. Kofi Nsiah a 30
year old former assured the electorate that he would ensure that levies
paid by the people were used for development projects. Mr. Kwabena
Amponsah Manu, a 42 year old farmer, said he would liaise with the
people to provide themselves with basic amenities such as treated water,
a health centre and KVIP system. Mr. A.W. Berko 49, and Mr. Maxwell
Anane, 32 (both teachers) promised to provide the town with water,
toilet and other facilities.20
It was noted that most candidates promised to provide various
amenities and undertake a wide variety of projects in a 'Tather Christ­
mas” fashion. When a questioner asked one candidate in Kumasi how
he proposed to finance his catalogue of promises, the answer was: with
your help and o f aban (meaning the central government) we shall do
it .” 21
The situation was often confusing but this was inevitable in >

16 0
 Table 1
RESULTS OF THE 1978 ELECTIONS
Number of Total Total Percentage Poll
Based on All Percentage
Regions District Registered Votes
Registered Voters Unopposed
Councils Voters Cast
Ashanti 10 814,620 203,171 24.9 19.4

Brong Ahafo 8 549,138 102,955 18.7 38.0

Central 8 528,609 117,324 22.2 19.4

Eastern 9 626,503 103,837 16.6 35.5

Greater Accra 3 525,834 53,416 10.2 25.0

Northern 7 445,538 80,939 18.2 42.7

Upper 7 487,614 78,669 16.1 51.1

Volta * 7 465,811 71,050 15.3 55.3

Western * * 5 367,834 75,929 20.6 27.4

Total 64 4,822,501 887,290 18.4 34.9

* The results did not indude one ward of Tongu District Coundl
* * Eleven wards in the Western Region refused to take part in the electionsfor not
being given a separate District Coundl.
Source : Oquaye, Mike. Politics in Ghana 1972 -1979
absence of political parties which would have provided viable, alterna­
tive manifestoes. The time given for platforms was too limited, and
meaningful discussions could not be held. Freedom of expression was
limited and generally not more than two platforms could be mounted in
any one electoral area. In the circumstances, it could be said that the
system might have restricted rather than broadened the perimeters of
participation.

Voting and Participation

For the purpose of conducting the DA elections, thecountry was divided

into three zones. Zone One comprising Ashanti, Eastern, Central and
Western Regions voted in December 1988; zone two comprising Upper
East, Upper West and Northern Regions voted in January 1989 and zone
three which was made up of Greater Accra, Volta and Brong Ahafo
Regions voted in February 1989.
The NCD argued that this was to ensure optimum use of its limited
facilities from one zone to the other. Others argued that in the absence
of political parties to whip up enthusiasm, the PNDC wanted to trans­
port its zealous cadres from one zone to the other to ensure by all
means possible that there was a good turn-out.
Official figures gave the turn-out at the elections as 58.8% P2 This
compared most favourably with the District Council elections held in
November 1978, when only 18.4% of the eligible voters actually went to
the polls.23 Table 1 gives the details of the 1978 elections.
The details released by the NCD regarding the 1988/89 District
Level Elections on a comparative basis are shown in Table 2
The Ministry of Local Government published interesting details
about the high turn-out in the Ashanti, Central, Eastern and Western
Regions which give us the following picture: In Ashanti, the turn-out
was as high as 69% in Amansie East, Bosomtwi-Atwima-Kwanwoma.
It is notable that in 14 of the 18 electoral districts, 60% and above turn-out
was recorded. However, in Kumasi proper, the turn out was as low as
45% This was the lowest followed by Ejura-Sekyere-Dumasi (47%),
Asante Akim South (53%) and Afigya Sekyere (58%).
In the Central Region, Upper Denkyira topped with 70%. The
lowest recorded was in Cape Coast with 50%. Six out of 12 Districts in
the Central Region had a turn-out of 60% and above. In the Eastern
Region, the East Akim District topped with 71.6%.

162
 Table 2
PERCENTAGE OF VOTES CAST AGAINST REGISTERED VOTERS
IN THREE ELECTIONS

1978 District 1979 1988/89

Council Paliamentan/ District
Region Elections Level

% % %
Western 20.6 34.04 55.3
Central 22.2 33.34 59.3
Eastern 16.6 35.95 60.8
Volta 15.3 33.65 59.8
Ashanti 24.9 41.99 60.8
Brong Ahafo 18.7 33.16 60.2

Northern 18.2 32.09 60.6

Upper 16.8 32.82 64.7(Avg.)

Greater Accra 10.2 35.59 44.3

National Average 18.4% 35.25% 59%

 The lowest turn-out was in Manya-Krobo with 49.5%. 9 out of 15
Districts had a turn-out of 60% and above. In the Western Region, the
highest turn-out was Ahanta West with 63.72% The lowest turn-out was
in Shama Ahanta East with 50.12% Only three Districts recorded a turn
of 60% and above.24
Major disparities were noted between the turn-out in rural and
urban centres. In the capital, Accra (including Tema), the percentage
turn-out ranged from 34.4% to 46.29 % except in two rural districts where
the pattern was different. In Dangbe East the turn-out was 61.4% and
in Dangbe West, 50%. This contrasts sharply with the turn-out in
Ablekuma (37%) and Kpeshie (34%) in Accra.
This pattern pervaded the southern part of the country which is
generally more developed than the northern part. For example, apart
from Ho (Volta Region) and Koforidua (Eastern Region) all the districts
surrounding the Regional capitals in the Greater Accra, Central, Western
and Ashanti Regions had a comparatively lower turn-out. Even in the
Northern, Upper W e st, Upper East and Brong Ahafo Regions voter
turn- out diminished as you approached the capital though the turn-out
on the whole was higher in these areas.
In the Upper West Region, for example, the rural districts of
Nuduleand Sissala had 70% and 79% respectively— far higher than the
recorded figures in the capital, Wa. However, there was relatively low
turn-out in certain districts of the Northern Region where conditions
were similar but there was a far lower turn-out as follows — East
Mamprusi (53.5%) Tolon/Kumbugu (53.0%) and West Gonja (51.5%).
In the Brong Ahafo Region, the capital Sunyani recorded 58% in the
district while in the Kintampo district (a very developed area) the turn­
out was 53% despite the very high turn-out in other areas.
The working of political parties had usually shown more active
participation of the urban people contrasted with rural counterparts.
The reverse occurred in the DA elections. Several factors account for the
rural-urban disparity in the reverse order. In the first place, by 1987, the
PNDC had lost favour with the urban working class and had shifted
attention to the rural people who were being wooed consistently. With
the sharp emphasis on rural development, and the PNDC's presentation
of the District Assemblies as organs for local development, the rur
people saw the process as a unique opportunity to bridge the gap
between rural-urban development. The rural people were, therefore
anxious to vote without being prompted by political parties.
Secondly, the PNDC which had been against chiefs in the p

164
began to court the chiefs in a new policy of reconciliation. This policy
worked more effectively in the rural areas for two reasons — the rural
chiefs were more gullible whereas the urban chiefs were more wary of
the PNDC; furthermore even where the chiefs were willing to embrace
the new alliance, the influence of chiefs in mobilizing their people for the
purpose of voting in any election has always been more effective in the
rural than in the urban areas. In the capital, Accra, for example, the
influence of chiefs in this direction is virtually nil.
Thirdly, the urban dwellers could not conceive the possible impact
of the District Assemblies and how they could withstand the dominance
of the PNDC at the centre.
Fourthly, the lower turn-out in the urban areas could be seen in
terms of a protest vote against the PN DCs refusal to return the country
to constitutional rule. This protest movement, spearheaded by the
NUGS, GBA, TUC, KNRG etc. was more urban than rural.
In speaking of the high turn-out on the national scale, the first point
to note is the unique role of the revolutionary organs, including the
Defence Committees. They helped in vetting candidates and gave
credibility to the public platforms many of which would have been
empty without them. It is worthy of note, however, that most of these
cadres were unemployed young men who were drafted as paid ad hoc
political agitators by District Secretaries.
Secondly, the newly-created Districts which were more rural than
urban, had a high turn-out not necessarily because of the people's
interest in that particular election as such but the voters in these areas
wanted to vote to show their appreciation for being given their "own"
Districts and also to justify the creation of the new Districts. This was the
case in Sissala, for example. In Krachi the PNDC had given back a rich
area ceded from the District, upon a personal petition made by the
Krachi Wura (Chief) to Rawlings. The Krachi Wura made it his business
to organize public rallies and beat his gong-gong to mobilize support for
the elections.
Thirdly, the governmental machinery from the NCD to the PNDC
members and Secretaries, Regional and District Secretaries, took upon
themselves to tour the various Districts and influence a good turn-out
ith promises that the elections were going to ensure the devolution
of power to the people. In some cases, people were coerced to vote.
Accra, Mr. E.T. Mensah, chairman of the City C ouncil, closed all
cets including the famous Makola Market and posted home guards
ere. The impression was given that if you did not go to vote, you

165
would be noted and penalized.
Fourthly, the 31st December Women's Movement made a great
impact. The Movement has established a wide network embracing
every town and village in Ghana and helped in the establishment of
nurseries, bakeries, gari factories, garment dyeing and processing facto­
ries, farms etc. throughout the country. To many women, it has been a
source of inputs for their vocations and means of livelihood. The
Movement did not only encourage women to vote massively to ensure
that the right people were elected to protect the gains that women had
made under the auspices of the Movement, but also insisted that as many
women candidates as possible should actually stand for the elections
and be elected to the Assemblies. During this period, "T" shirts, caps,
cloth and other attractions were generously dished out by the Move­
ment to win support and ensure women's participation.
Fifthly, the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU) was
roped in by the government in an unprecedented alliance whereby
voters were transported free of charge from their towns, villages and
abodes to polling stations. Withthehootingvehiclesstandingbyandthe
invitation by cadres and officials to get on board, a mighty attraction was
created. Other transport organizations chipped in. In Berekum for
example, the Berekum branch of the Progressive Transport Owners
Association (PROTOA) released 30 vehicles to the Berekum DEC to help
in the District Assembly elections. The vehicles also conveyed polling
officers and ballot boxes to the various polling stations.
In the absence of political parties (they are essential to stimulate
political activity, and as I had argued previously, their absence contrib­
uted to the low turn-out in the Local Council elections in 1978Fthe
factors enumerated above were in effect responsible for the exceptional
situation that occurred in the 1988/89 District Level Elections.
It should be asked: should the PNDC be out of the scene together
with the organs which worked towards the large turn-out, what would
the picture be without the operation of political parties? The chances are
that such eltxrtions would be poorly patronized. The point is that there
were some powerful institutions, bodies and political personalities
behind the process, who were not only partisan in nature, but well-
endowed with governmental resources and power. The 31 st December
Women's Movement could be described in the circumstances as a
"national women's party. " Without such patronage, financed and
sustained by the military government to promote its own agenda, and
in the absence of political parties, the results in 1988/89 could well

166
 Tabic 3
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ASSEMBLY MEMBERS
i ' ■
--------------- -------------
■ . —
1—~—m ------------- r
Medical & Accounting Civil/ Self- Legal
Develop­ Religious
Region Agriculture ParaMedi­ Teaching and Public Employed Practi - Others Total
ment Leaders
cal Staff Banking Service tioners
Greater
Accra 61 7 77 18 14 82 44 6 4 26 339
Ashanti 459 25 360 13 15 94 112 11 4 87 1180
Western 165 5 180 5 10 38 42 — — 7 452

Eastern 346 19 241 14 1 129 116 14 3 77 960

Volta 209 7 281 7 17 95 78 7 3 36 740

Central 208 18 183 26 7 82 92 4 13 49 682

Upper
East 108 20 118 7 7 79 13 6 5 17 380
Brong
Ahafo 277 22 301 3 9 86 73 1 3 6 781
Upper
West 59 17 115 8 1 18 12 1 2 26 283
Northern 295 20 273 8 0 106 42 10 3 35 792
Total 2187 160 2129 109 81 839 624 60 40 360 6589
% 33.2 2.4 32.3 1.7 1.2 12.7 9.5 0.9 0.6 1.9 100

Source: Local Government Information Digest No . 7,1989 p.19

have been a repetition of the November 1978 fiasco. Acheampong's
"Society of Friends" etc were poorly organized and ineffective.

Background of Assemblymen

With regard to the social background of the candidates who came out
victorious, it is noted that they did not belong to the professional,
business, and intellectual groups in society. In the Western Region, a
conservancy labourer won a seat against a legal practitioner. Almost 65
per cent of all the Assembly members are farmers (even though some
unemployed persons described themselves as farmers) and the other 35
per cent comprised public servants (mainly clerical officers), traders,
artisans, elementary school teachers, fishermen, traditional rulers (of
lower status) health workers (mainly of the lower and middle level)
religious leaders (mainly of the spiritual and syncretic following), and a
few lawyers. See Tables 3 and 4 for occupational distribution of
Assembly members. This includes members nominated by government
which improved the qualitative character of the Assemblies to some
extent.
A sampling of the results shows that in the Upper East Region, an
illiterate farmer won against a businessman. Other victors in that area
included small scale farmers, 2 blacksmiths and nurses including one
male nurse. In the Volta Region, the Akatsi District revealed that out of
the 18 seats in the District, teachers won 8, farmers won 9 and a driver
won one. Mrs. Eugenia Abla Kumasa, a female teacher won the Torve
Electoral Area seat. In the Jasikan District, another female teacher Miss
Edith Mensah won the Baika-Somanya Electoral Area seat against two
male contenders. In the Hohoe District where 108 candidates vied for 48
seats, 9 were women, 48 were teachers and 40 were farmers. Two were
priests while the rest were civil servants, pensioners and members of
other vocations. In the Golokuati Electoral Area, four of the eight seats
were won by teachers, one by a pensioner, one by a Civil Defence
Organization (CDO) man, and one by a woman farmer, Mrs Elizabeth
Avege.
The conclusion drawn from these developments is that the simple
system of direct and individual participation without political parties
enabled people who would otherwise have been relegated to the
background, to become Assemblymen.

168
 Table 4
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ASSEMBLY MEMBERS (% BREAKDOWN)

Medical & Accounting Civil/ Self- Religious Legal

Develop­
Region Agriculture Para Medi­ Teaching and Public Employed Practi - Others
ment Leaders
cal Staff Banking Service tioners
Greater
Accra 17.9 2.0 22.7 5.3 4.1 24.1 12.9 1.7 1.1 7.6
Western 36.4 1.1 39.7 1.1 2.2 8.3 9.2 — -------
1.5
Central 29.7 2.5 26.1 3.7 1.0 11.7 13.1 1.8 0.7 9.2
Brong
Ahafo 33.4 2.7 36.3 0.3 1.1 10.4 8.8 0.5 0.3 4.8
Upper
West 20.8 6.0 40.6 2.8 0.3 16.9 4.2 0.3 0.7 7.0
Upper
East 28.4 5.2 31 1.8 1.8 20.7 3.4 1.5 1.3 4.4
Northern 38.9 2.6 36.0 1.05 0.0 13.9 5.5 1.3 0.3 4.5
Volta 28.2 0.9 37.9 0.9 2.2 12.3 10.5 0.9 0.4 1.4
Eastern 36.0 1.9 25.1 1.4 0.1 13.4 12.0 1.4 0.3 7.9
Ashanti 38.8 2.1 30.5 1.1 1.2 7.9 9.4 0.9 0.3 7.3

Source ; Local Government Information Digest No. 7, 1989 p. 21

Problems Encountered

Assemblymen have encountered several problems in the performance

of their duties including logistics, lack of funds, paucity of reliable
data etc. but it is apparent that some of these problems are inherent
in the feeling among several Assemblymen that they are their own
masters, have attained their status by individual merit and are not
subject to any visible party machinery. On the other hand, their interest
appears to have fizzled out suddenly.
One possible explanation for the waning of interest of Assem­
blymen in their work is the absence of the Party Whip to stir them
into action. Throughout 1991 and 1992, several DAs found it difficult
to obtain the requisite quorum to proceed with their business. In
this connection, the presiding member of the Tolon-Kumbungu DA,
Tolon, suggested to Mr. Ahwoi that the provision that two-thirds of
the Assembly must be present to elect a presiding member, should
be changed and construed in terms of a simple majority "because
according to what we read from the dailies, most Assemblies do not
find it easy to get a quorum for voting."26
In mid-1992, it was reported that the Bolgatanga DA had ad­
journed its first ordinary session for the fourth time because it had
persistently failed to obtain a quorum. For that reason a presiding
member could not be elected, either. In an exasperated editorial in
response to this development, The Ghanaian Times, echoed: "Recall
them all."27
Some Assemblymen assumed the posture of local overlords and
identified themselves personally with the Assembly, assuming personal
powers in the process. As the PNDC Secretary for Local Government
Mr. Kwamena Ahwoi himself observed,

according to reports reaching us, some individual Assemblymen

have printed their own letter heads ... and are using these to
intimidate public officers and also claim undeserved favours.28

The zeal to display their newly-acquired status of self-importance

led some Assemblymen to act ultra-vires. For example, the District
Secretary for Afigya Sekyere, Agona-Ashanti, Mr. Yaw Oppong
Kyekyeku, addressing the second meeting of the Afigya-Sekyere Dis­
trict Assembly, revealed that some members of the District Assembly
Town Development Committees (TDCs) and CDRs have entered into

170
unilateral agreements with timber contractors to fell trees in the area
without reference to the District Assembly. It had become apparent that
an assembly member had signed a whole agreement unilaterally.29
Some Assembly members understood the District and Local
Tribunals system to mean that they could set up their own courts.
Perhaps they wanted to continue with the People's Courts set up by
some Defence Committee chairmen at their pleasure. In Kade, for
example, the District Secretary for Kade, speaking for the Justice and
Security Sub-Committee of the Kwaebibirem District Assembly, warned
that no District Assemblyman / woman could constitute his or her own
court to try cases. He advised that if there should be the need for any
Tribunal, the Assembly could take a decision on it and the PNDC
Secretary responsible for Tribunals would be contacted for necessary
action to be taken.30
There was the report of an Assemblyman who had employed
the services of body-guards. Another report was made of a Presiding
Member who insisted he should be allocated an official bungalow
in accordance with his new status.31 As the Information Digest put
it, "such unnecessary show of power and unwarranted power struggle
divert attention from the real issues of development for which the
Assemblies have been set up."32 In no time some Assemblymen had
caused the Assemblies to issue them with special identity cards and
at least in one instance an Assemblyman had put a flag on the bonnet
of his car. The Ministry of Local Government had to issue a directive
stopping these practices."33
A confrontational attitude was also adopted in some cases towards
other government officials and PNDC appointees. Clashes occurred
and offensive letters were written. An example is the sordid con­
frontation between the Assin District Assembly and Mr. Ato Austin,
PNDC Secretary for the Central Region. Mr. Kwamena Ahwoi had
to be sent down from Accra to intervene whereafter, at the 2nd
ordinary meeting of the Assembly, members adopted a motion to
apologize to Mr. Austin for "misconducting themselves before him."
The Assembly also adopted a motion to withdraw a resolution calling
or the removal of the District Secretary. It further proceeded to
ithdraw the whole minutes of the previous meeting — which was the
rst meeting of the Assembly and in which several vituperations
id been recorded — as "full of errors and omissions."34
It was also common for Assembly members to get themselves
angled in various disputes which lowered the estimation of mem-

171
bers in the eyes of the populace. These disputes spilled over into
the Assemblies creating problems among members. In the Kwaebibirem
District, two members of the Assembly got actively involved in a land
dispute between the traditional authorities of Akyem Akwante and
settler farmers in the area, joining hands with one faction in the crisis.
When the crisis escalated, the Security Sub-Committee of the Assembly
which investigated the matter castigated the Assemblymen for en­
couraging factionalism which tended to ''worsen the already volatile
situation in the area."35 The Assemblymen named as Messrs Sowah
and Ayidah, according to the Committee, encouraged the settler farmers
to stay away from a meeting summoned by the Committee at Kade
to strike a compromise between the two parties. According to the
Committee, the Assemblymen ill-advised the farmers to engage in
a fruitless litigation, thus dissipating monies accruing from the sale
of their cocoa.
After the services of a surveyor had been engaged with the co­
operation of the High Court at Koforidua, to carry out a survey, it
became clear that the settler farmers had actually encroached upon
land belonging to the Akwante stool by cultivating 75 hectares in
excess of what their ancestors had bought in 1927. The security sub­
committee proceeded to settle the matter amicably.36
A struggle for power seemed to have characterized the activities
of the Assemblies. In August, 1989, Chairman Rawlings himself had
the occasion to deplore this tendency which he described as "unnec­
essary and irresponsible."37 Chairman Rawlings lamented that the
"negative and rather disturbing" action of some Assemblymen were
not only destroying the good image of other Assembly members but
also "the virtues of a novel democratic system".38 In the words of
the Chairman, there had been reports of Assemblymen dissolving
CDRs, conflicts between presiding members and District Secretaries
and some Assemblymen behaving like "tin gods" when entrusted with
power.39
There has been so much misunderstanding within the system
that, for example, at a rally held at Saltpond to introduce the Assem­
blymen for the area to the chiefs and people, the Central Regional
Organising Assistant for CDRs, Mr. E.K.T. Addo, told the Assembly­
men that they could not perform their duties properly if they did not
understand the spirit which motivated the 31st December Revolution
He decried reports that some Assemblymen had started to "question,
challenge and even undermine some of the political structures ai

172
concepts of the Revolution."40

Conclusion

After the inception of DAs, several critics saw them as another attempt
by the PNDC to buy time and avoid the inevitable— party politics. It is
noted that the expectation that non-party DAs would evolve into
Regional and National Assemblies without political parties has also
fizzled out.
Nevertheless, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana while endorsing
political parties at the national level, forbids them at the District level.
It is provided that (1) A candidate seeking election to a DA or any lower
local government unit shall present himself to the electorate as an
individual, and shall not use any symbol associated with any party.
(2) A political party shall not endorse, sponsor, offer a platform to or in
anyway campaign for or against a candidate seeking election to a DA
or any lower local government unit.41
It is submitted that if Ghanaians should learn the intricacies of
party politics, its attendant tolerance, compromise etc, the process
should begin at the local level. Furthermore, it is easy to perceive that
parties would be driven underground at the District Level yet control­
ling the process and thus honouring the constitutional provisions in the
breach. In the meantime, however, the PNDC has constitutionalized
non-party politics at the District level as a contribution to the nation's
political development.
Nevertheless, it is the prognosis of this paper that political parties
will soon take control of District Assemblies in Ghana. After all, as early
as 1858, the Mambii Party was formed in Accra to contest the first
municipal elections held in the Gold Goast by universal adult suffrage.
It may therefore be argued that the party system at the local level has
got pride of ancestry and cannot be killed.

NOTES

1. Ghana: The Search for True Democracy. Accra: Information Services

Department, 1982 p.l
Rawlings, J.J. A Revdutiomry Journey, Selected Speeches of Flt.-Lt. Jerry John
Raidings, Chairman of the PNDC. Information Services Department,
Accra. Volume One, 31st December 1981-31st December, 1982 p.2.
Rawlings, j.J. Forging Ahead. Selected Speeches of Flt.-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings,

173
 Chairman of the PNDC. Information Services Department, Accra.
January 1st 1983- December 31st 1983. Volume 2 p.7.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Peoples Daily Graphic, 2 March, 1989.
7. Ghana. District Political Authority and Modalities for District Level Elections.
Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1987.
8. District Political Authority and Modalities for District Level Elections. Accra.
Ghana Publishing Corporation.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. PNDC Law 207 Section 19.
12. People's Daily Graphic, 19 November 1988.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. The Ghanaian Times, 24 February, 1989.
17. People's Daily Graphic, 25 February, 1989.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Public platform at Kejetia, Kumasi.
22. NCD Report on District Assemblies Election Results, 1988.
23. Oquaye, Mike Politics in Ghana 1972-1979. Accra: Tornado
Publications, 1980 p.82.
24. Information Digest, Accra: Ministry of Local Government,Special Edition,
1989.
25. Oquaye, Mike op.cit pp. 81,82.
26. Inkmnation Digest, Local Government, vol.3, No.4,1990. p. 21.
27. The Ghanaian Times 22 May, 1992. p.1,2.
28. Information Digest Local Government No.6,1989 p.4.
29. People's Daily Graphic 29 June, 1989.
30. Ibid.
31. Information Digest Local Government. No.61989. p.16.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. People's Daily Graphic, 15 August, 1989.
35. People's Daily Graphic, 23 June, 1989.
36. Ibid.
37. The Ghanaian Times, 8 April, 1989.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. The Ghanaian Times, 28 February 1989.
41. Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992. Accra: Ghana
Publishing Corporation, 1992. Section 248 (1) and (2).

174
 Chapter 11

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM, ELECTIONS

AND DEM OCRACY IN GHANA

Kwame A. Ninsin

Elections do not amount to democracy:

they are merely a step towards democracy.

Introduction

In its report to the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), the

Committee of Experts (CE)1 postulated a direct relationship between
electoral systems and the type of government— democratic or undemo­
cratic. The Committee was, nonetheless, aware of the fact that such
relationship, if any, could not be logical. However, it dismissed the
majoritarian system as intrinsically undemocratic: because it tends to
confirm the incumbent regime in power, and does not ensure fair
representation of the nation as well as responsive and accountable
leadership. To avoid such weaknesses the Committee proposed that the
Consultative Assembly (CA) should consider the merit of a variant of the
system of proportional representation, in particular, the additional
member system (AMS) which is currently being practised in Germany.
When a motion was tabled before the house to provide for proportional
representation or its variant, the proposal was roundly rejected on
grounds that it would be a recipe for fragmentizing the party system and
weakening parliament.2 The vote against the motion was so massive that
one could hardly ignore its import — namely, that in the view of the
majority of its members the majoritarian system is best suited to the
circumstances of the country.
This chapter discusses the arguments of the CE in the context of
the country's quest for a stable democratic order. It argues that rep­
resentation is not necessarily democratic, and democracy is not about
representation alone. So the efficiency of a particular electoral system
in ensuring representation should be measured against other impera­
tives of the political order — such as the stability and effectiveness of
175
 regimes. In particular, the efficiency of any electoral system should not
be determined in isolation. Rather, it should accord with the prevailing
political culture of Ghanaian society.
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section one examines
the position of the CE in relation to the results of past elections, which
were based on the majoritarian electoral system, and discusses the
merits and demerits of its claims. Section two examines the significance
of elections as an instrument for achieving democratic representation.
It argues that the relationship between elections and democracy is
mainly theoretical and, at best, tenuous. In practice, elections — like
many other forms of political action — have different meanings to
different societies. In the light of this section three examines the meaning
that the Ghanaian electorate attaches to elections and to the notion of
representation. I argue on the basis of the evidence that for the Gha­
naian electorate voting or electing a representative has instrumentalist
meaning: it is intended to secure for the individual and the community
tangible developmental advantages. On the one hand, the represen­
tative is regarded as an agent of, especially, the community. On the
. other hand, the individual voter has no conception of himself as an
- autonomous political actor manifesting through his vote a bundle of
democratic rights. The fourth and final section summarizes the argu­
ments and derives a number of conclusions from them.

Ghanaian Elections: How Democratic or Representative?

Regrettably the Akuffo-Addo Constitutional Commission did not

attach much importance to the mode of choosing a representative as a
measure of democracy. In its view it was adequate to ensure that the
franchise was universal, elections would be free and fair, and the entire
electoral process would be supervised by an independent electoral
commission. These alone would guarantee the choice of a representative
body that could be considered democratic and "the authentic expression
of the national will."3 Accordingly, the Commission tacitly accepted the
majoritarian single member constituency electoral system as the means
for choosing members of the next parliament which lasted from Septem­
ber 1969 to January 1972.
Based on analyses of the 1969 elections, which were conducted
under free and fair conditions, the CE disagreed. In its view the 1969-7
parliament was neither representative nor democratic.4 On one har

176
the Progress Party (PP) which won 58.7% of the popular votes secured
75.0% (105) of parliamentary seats. On the other hand, the National
Alliance of Liberals (NAL) which received 30.4% of the popular votes
secured just 21 % (29) of the parliamentary seats. The minority parties
obtained 10.9% of popular votes and only 4.0% (6) of the parliamentary
seats. On the basis of the votes received therefore the parliamentary seats
were disproportionately distributed. In other words, representation in
parliament was not consistent with the preferences expressed at the polls
by the electorate: "If each vote had an equal weight... on the distribution
of parliamentary seats, the PP would have obtained 82 seats instead of
105; the NAL 43 seats instead of 29; and the other parties 15 seats
instead of 6." In the opinion of the CE it is only when various organized
electoral interests are as much as possible represented in the supreme
legislative organ of the nation that one could talk about democratic
representation. This is what the Committee described as "consensus
democracy." "The fact is that consensus democracy is inherently more
democratic as a result of its inclusive character."
A similar argument of disproportionate representation was
adduced against the outcome of the 1979 parliamentary elections. The
CE argues rather persuasively that the PNP won parliamentary seats on
the basis of 9,086 votes per seat; the PFP with 12,897 per seat; and the
UNC as much as 23,851 per seat."Put another way, while the PFP, UNC
and ACP together obtained 363,125 votes more than the PNP the three
parties combined received six fewer seats than the PNP." However
convincing the CE's argument may be, it is based on a static and
universalistic view of elections. In contemporary democracies the notion
that elections secure the representation of sovereign individuals equally
has long remained at the level of theory. In practice elections have
become a means by which the electorate is able to choose a common
authority that is invested with the legitimate power to manage the affairs
of society on behalf of its members. At any rate the principles underlying
elections may not bear the same meaning worldwide. Thus while in
Ghana an election may be seen as a mechanism for securing democratic
representation, in practice it serves a different purpose. Local conditions
td norms may impart an entirely different meaning to it. Before I dilate
i the meaning of elections to the Ghanaian electorate, let me touch
jfly on the relationship between elections, representation and democ-
scy as it is expected to be in theory.

177
Elections and Representation

Elections in democratic polities are based on the ancient maxim that the
people are sovereign. Universal sovereignty implies universal equality.
Elections merely enable the sovereign people to be democratically
represented5 on a centrally organized body. But does representation
necessarily lead to a democracy? For example, before the 1956 general
election a variety of systems of representation operated in the country.
Surely the legislative councils of the British colonial regime, which
emphasized commercial and mining interests, on one hand, and chief­
taincy, on the other, was derived from a certain notion of representation.
Similarly, the legislative bodies which were established on the bases of
the 1951 and 1954 elections must have been premised on different
principles of representation.
Undoubtedly these principles were different from the ones that
governed the 1956 and subsequent elections.6 For example, the classical
colonial paternalistic attitudes towards the colonized peoples denied the
latter of the right to self-government and upheld the principle of
representation for special interests to determine the composition of the
colonial legislature. Hence expatriate mining and commercial interests
were represented while their indigenous counterparts were not. For the
1951 legislature, property qualification or the ability to pay tax was
combined with the need to represent corporate interests like chieftaincy
and those engaged in commerce and mining to arrive at a certain system
of representation. It could be argued that the supreme principle that
underpinned representation before Ghana attained independence in
1957 was the assumed inequality of the interests which constituted
colonial society.
From 1957 onwards, the bases of representation and election have
changed. Equality became an important democratic principle on the
basis of which the electorate were made to choose their representatives.
The principle of equality was derived from the idea of the universal
franchise or the principle of "one man, one vote." It was assumed that
once every adult member of the country, who satisfied existing require­
ments, was able to vote there was a fair chance that his interests would
be represented in the legislative body alongside the interest of othe;
The political party became the mechanism for mediating and integrate
various interests as well as harmonizing conflicting claims and aspira
tions for the common purpose and also for efficient government. Seco i
the principle of equality of persons was derived from the principle of t

178
sovereign individual. These two constituted the claim to self-govern­
ment.7
The fact, however, is that modem democratic government is now
firmly anchored on indirect, as against, direct representation. The ques­
tion that has agitated radical democrats is the kind of mechanisms that
are available to the sovereign citizenry, or could be created by them, to
ensure that their representatives remain responsive and accountable to
them, and also to achieve greater equality and personal freedom for all.
They are not concerned about how various organized factions engaged
in the electoral politics would be fairly represented. In other words, the
most urgent problem facing the radical democrat is how to ensure that
democracy could be achieved under representative regimes rather than
securing democratic representation. This issue should be of paramount
interest, especially to the people of Ghana where extensive illiteracy,
pervasive superstition and persistent ancient myths and beliefs will
continue to hinder the growth of democratic consciousness and culture.
Even in old democracies like Britain it has long become an estab­
lished doctrine that the representative, once elected, is not a delegate.
Rather, he is as autonomous as those who elected him. Nor is "Parlia­
ment a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests;
...but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one
interest, that of the whole... You choose a member indeed; but when you
have chosen him, he is not a m em ber... (of your constituency), but he is
a member of parliament."8
An equally compelling factor that heightens the need to ensure
democracy outside the electoral process is the modem trend towards
oligarchy in democratic organizations and regimes. Robert Michels has
already drawn attention to the oligarchical tendency in modem democ­
racies9, just as Gaetano Mosca underscored the existence of a "political
class" — the core group of professional politicians that continues to
renew its ranks periodically.10
For us in Ghana, the problem posed by representative democracy
is further compounded not just by mass illiteracy, ignorance and super­
stition. It is also complicated by the fact that no representative body in the
short history of representative democracy in this country has ever
reflected the social composition of the electorate. Invariably members of
certain social classes or strata, who are not representative of the occupa-
ional or social composition of the country, dominate the elected bodies.
Analyses of Ghanaian parliaments of 1965,1969 and 1979 and the 1968
Constituent Assembly show that invariably members of the profes­

179
sional strata, and those in commerce, industry, and the public services as
well as big farmers have dominated the important organs of state.11It is
equally revealing that even thedistrict level elections (of 1988/89) which
were designed to produce grassroots representative assemblies suc­
ceeded merely in bringing into power the representatives of the middle
level elite who had been out of active politics since the PNDC came to
power. According to a Ministry of Local Government publication12,
56.9% of the assembly members were teachers, civil and public servants,
self-employed, and medical and para-medical staff. Agriculturalists,
and not peasant farmers, constitute the single largest group — 33.2%-
followed by teachers with 32.3%.
These fragments of evidence would seem to lend credence to the
existence, at least, of a political elite whose composition keeps changing
with social change; and that, in practice, the people do not govern
themselves: a tiny social minority governs on their behalf. The problem
of elections and democracy can therefore not be reduced to the equitable
or proportional representation either of factions engaged in electoral
politics or of disadvantaged social interests.13 After all, elections do not
amount to democracy. At best, they constitute a means towards the
attainment of democratic government. Therefore, it is important that in
our discussion of the link between elections and democracy we probe the
mind of the citizenry in order to grasp the sort of meaning they attach to
elections. Accordingly, the next issue I would like to examine is the
reason behind the electoral choices that the Ghanaian electorate makes.

Why Do Ghanaians Vote?

Why do Ghanaians vote? To answer this question, we should go beyond

the simple assumption that there is a logical relationship between
elections and democracy. We should explore the dynamic factors that
shape the electoral choices that Ghanaians are intermitently called upon
to make. For surely elections would not have the same significance in the
political life of Ghanaians as it does elsewhere. In what follows, I attempt
a concise review of studies of Ghanaian elections with a view to isolating
the key determinants of voting behaviour.
There appears to be overwhelming agreement among students of
Ghanaian elections that a broadly consistent range of factors have
determined electoral outcomes since the 1950s. In his pioneering stud
of Ghanaian politics, Austin14drew attention to the powerful influent

180
exercised by local or community conflict and issues as well as the critical
role played by local associations in mobilizing electoral support. Since
then his thesis has been collaborated by several other studies. Twumasi15,
for example, identified similar factors and the important role played by
voluntary grassroots development associations in mobilizing voter
support for the successful candidates in the 1969 parliamentary elec­
tions. As the case of the contest between Busia's PP and Gbedemah's
NAL shows, even where personality factors and past political record as
well as moral stature played a crucial role in determining the success of
Busia's party in the 1969 election, the fortune of individual candidates of
the two parties depended to a considerable extent on how successfully
such individuals could mobilize community issues and concerns. In­
deed, 'T h e real locus of campaign activity in 1969 was the local collec­
tivity. In each constituency different, specific, and traditional rivalries
were resurrected, support of indigene and strangers was courted,
various local leaders were wooed, and local conflicts were revived. This
pattern was repeated in 1978 and 1979 ..."16
Another set of local factors which has consistently influenced
voting behaviour include personal obligation to candidates, traditional
loyalty, ethnicity and other primordial considerations.17 Policies,
programmes (or manifestoes) and ideologies have usually played a
strikingly insignificant role in shaping voters' choices.18 After all, the
parties themselves have a record of carefully staying away from
programme, policy or issue oriented campaigns.19 It was under the
influence of such findings that Austin later concluded that so long as
Ghana remained a predominantly peasant and small town society,
"tradition as locality", communal and the personal relationships of the
community are bound to decisively influence voting behaviour. And,
therefore, issues of social inequality or class will continue to be less
salient.20
This conclusion would seem unequivocally to distinguish the
Ghanaian voter from his counterpart in the established democracies —
for example, Great Britain. Even though British voters are not considered
ideological, they are nonetheless influenced more or less by party
policies and programmes, pertinent social issues, and party affiliations.
Voters tend to be generally issue-oriented. Traditional party affiliations
merely combine with such concerns about policies and issues to deter­
mine the final choices that voters make. One could argue therefore that
in so far as issues and traditional party affiliation (i.e., Labour or
’onservati ve) affect voter choice, the British electorate would be equally

181
concerned about issues of social justice or class.21 By implication the
British voter is concerned about general issues of democratic rights and
liberties. The British electorate would therefore see the efficient function­
ing of democracy in the extent to which the institutions of state have
pursued, or promise to pursue, social justice as defined by the rights and
liberties of the individual as well as the group. For invariably the issues
of bread and butter, or work, taxation, the environment, etc are at the
very heart of the rights and liberties of the individual.22
In contrast with its British counterpart, the Ghanaian electorate is
influenced by the community's interest, which is always its need for
development. This seems to be the significance of the role played by
"tradition as locality" in Ghana's electoral politics. It would imply that
the Ghanaian electorate do not vote as sovereign individuals aiming to
implement certain democratic ideals or rights but as members of the
community aspiring to improve their material conditions. But even if
considerations of either abstract or concrete democratic rights do not
play an important role in shaping voter choices, the voters nonetheless
know that they need a representative and so do vote to choose one.23
Hence in Asunafo the people "elected a m an ... to stand for them in the
national tourney in which community struggled against community for
goods and evils which the central government distributes."24This raises
a question about the role of the representative as conceived by the
Ghanaian electorate. For naturally the role of the elected representative
in British politics as enunciated by Burke25cannot apply with equal force
to the elected representative in Ghanaian politics.
In trying to understand the Ghanaian voter's conception of his
elected representative, we should recall Owusu's thesis that political
action of the Ghanaian electorate is based on instrumentalist calcula­
tions.26 In concrete terms, the voters choose a representative, legislature,
or government expecting that this individual or body would mediate
between them and the state in the distribution or allocation of goods and
services. It could, therefore, be argued that the representative would be
perceived by his constituents as an economic broker mediating essen­
tially market or exchange relationships.27
I will argue that this instrumentalist orientation in Ghanaian
politics operates at two parallel levels, that is, at the level of the indi­
vidual and the community. The two are inter-related. Thus, while the
voter may be using his vote to create opportunities for material gain,
he is at the same time joining other voters of his community to choos<
an economic broker who would mediate between them as a comn \

182
nity and the state as the purveyor of development projects and other
services. I would therefore agree with Chazan28 that "Elections essen­
tially have to do with linkages: with the connection between state and
society, between the local community and the national arena, between
the economy and the polity, and between nonformal process and
formal institutions."
In the light of this economic conception of the role of the repre­
sentative, elections must assume a unique role in Ghanaian politics.
I would argue that elections should be seen as occasions when the
"little communities" comprising Ghanaian society constitute or recon­
stitute their relations with the state for the purpose of realizing eco­
nomic or developmental goals. The local community is the primary
unit within the relationship that is established with the state; and the
voter is one of several agents. It means that the electorate of any
community would choose or elect a representative according to their
assessment of the candidate's capacity to function effectively as an
economic broker for the community. Invariably the aspiring parlia­
mentarian should have demonstrated a commitment to local develop­
ment if his chances were to be really good. For, at the back of the minds
of each community in a constituency lurks the need to ensure the
community's smooth development. Hence in previous elections a close
relationship existed between the parliamentarian and the development
of the local community.29
In the light of the foregoing, we should conceptualize two comple­
mentary political imperatives operating in a typical electoral situation.
On one hand the electorate expects to have as its representative a
person who could effectively mediate between their community(ies)
and the state - somebody who could secure development projects for
them. On the other hand, the successful candidate should not only
demonstrate a commitment to local development. He should also
possess enough entrepreneurial political acumen to enable him to
mobilize, or capitalize on, local community issues for his election.
Accordingly, electoral politics were often nothing more than a contest
in which the competing candidates could make more convincing
promises, and back them up with effective mobilization of local groups
as well as communal and other issues to advantage. This is why
Ghanaian elections have been bereft of critical and sustained public
debates about alternative programmes and policies. Above all, since
he mainstream candidates of all major political parties shared similar
social or occupational background30 and ideas atx>ut the management

183
of the economy and society,31 the electorate was usually presented with
no real alternatives other than their communal self-interest — which
is the need for developing their "little communities" — as a guide for
rational choice. 'Election results in Ghana (therefore) reflect the voters'
judgement on competing elites and their patronage potential."32 Of
course, such electoral choices are rational; because as electoral out­
comes affected a community's prospects for development there was
always a keen collective sense of the need to back the winning party.33
In such a situation party identification was purely symbolic.34
The concern to back the winning party was always shared equally
by the candidate. It is the community's success in backing the winning
party that ensured that elections would perform their function of linking
local society to the state.
The economic underpinning of electoral choices seems to affect the
electorate's decision whether or not to come out on election day to vote.
A study of voter turn-out provides evidence which seems to suggest that
where the electorate is confident of the economic viability of the state, it
has shown greater interest in the linkage functions of elections and
consequently turned out heavily on election day to vote. When the state
experienced economic crisis so that its capacity and that of state-level
political elite for patronage diminished, voter turn-out also declined.
The following analysis of elections provides conclusive evidence to
support this postulate.35 The period following the 1966 coup d'etat and
the liberal economic policies of the regime improved the economic
situation quite well compared to the pre-1966 period. This appears to
have been reflected in voter response to the 1969 parliamentary election.
In that year's exercise 1,493371 registered voters (or 63.2% of a total of
2363,665) cast their vote. This turn-out was equal to 47.3% of the
estimated total electorate. Compared to data for the 1960 referendum,
voter participation in 1969 amounted to a massive growth of 30.0%.
By the close of the 1970s when the economic crisis was clearly
undermining the capacity of the state to perform its patronage func­
tions, the voter turn-out in the elections of that period also showed a
revealing decline. In the 1978 Union Government (Unigov) referen­
dum 1,983,698 (or 42.5% of the 4,668,875 registered voters) actually
voted. Those who voted formed just 35.4% of potential voters. Cor
pared to the 1969 voter turn-out, there was a fall of 20.7%. During 1
twelve months following this referendum a clear trend towards vo!
apathy and abstention from polls began to emerge. In the di
council election of that year only 18.4% registered voters tui 1

184
to vote while the parliamentary and presidential elections also of 1979
produced an equally low voter turnout of 35.3%.36
Surely one cannot explain voter apathy or abstention just by one
factor, namely, economic decline and the knowledge that the capacity of
state institutions and state-level political elite to mediate in the distribu­
tion of material benefits has also become suspect. A nu mber of factors —
including environmental, social, and psychological ones — could ad­
versely affect peoples' decision to either vote or not vote at any one time.
But it becomes difficult to adduce cogent reasons for non-voting after
sustained efforts have been made to mobilize the electorate to register as
well as vote. In 1978 the government had not only ensured a higher voter
registration (83.7% of the eligible voters, compared to 74.8% in 1969) but
in the referendum that followed both the government and opposition
groups had intensely mobilized the public to vote for their respective
positions. So the poor turn-out at the 1978 referendum, and more
especially in the two subsequent elections of 1979, could only be ex­
plained by the declining significance of elections in so far as people were
sure that the economic crisis had rendered state-society relations eco­
nomically less beneficial. On the basis of those results, it could be argued
that elections were gradually losing saliency as a means for organizing
or reconstituting state-society relations. Finally, in so far as the linkages
which were established between society and the state were intended to
achieve beneficial economic or material returns — for both the indi­
vidual and his community — the results also seem to show an objective
or rational assessment of the capacity of aspiring economic brokers to
deliver the goods.37

Summary & Conclusion: Consensus or Majoritarian Democracy?

If Ghanaians do not vote to express their sovereignty either as individu­

als or collectivities, then what is the need for preferring a version of
proportional representation over the simple majority or the first-past-
the post electoral system? The CE argues for consensus democracy on
grounds that it ensures a fair representation of the electorate through a
system of proportional representation. The basis of the CE's argument
is that the party with a winning majority does not always command a
!<iar majority nationwide; and so it is not representative of the majority
the voting public. The Committee believes that proportional represen-
i tion, especially its variant— the Add itional Member System (AMS)—

185
will ensure that all parties with sufficiently large support among the
electorate would be represented in parliament. It will, in addition, enable
a winning party to supplement its representation by bringing into
parliament people with exceptional skills or knowledge who would
otherwise not scramble for elected office. Others have argued that this
variety of PR would ensure representation for under-represented and
disadvantaged social groups like — women, the youth, etc.38
Such proposals ignore the underpinning rationality of Ghanaian
elections which I have discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Appar­
ently, the CE's proposal was inspired by the assumption that Ghana's
problem with forging a stable democracy arises from deep social divi­
sions or that version of pluralism which is known as tribalism. This
misconception enamoured the CE to LijphaiTs model of consociational
democracy39 which was derived from the experiences of societies with
a real problem of "profound social divisions and political differences."
But as Lijphart points out the societies under reference are industrialized
and their problem of pluralism emanates from the effect of industrializa­
tion and the social division of labour which accompanies it. The same
error of judgment was committed by Arthur Lewis whose proposals
about the appropriate structures for ensuring a stable democracy40also
influenced the conclusions and recommendations of the CE in this
particular respect.
Nor could it be strongly argued that the Burkean thesis — that
parliament is not a collection of constituency representatives but a
national institution embodying the democratic will or interests of the
nation - would adequately reflect the uniquely instrumentalist logic of
electoral choices in the country. If, on the other hand, parliament
becomes an autonomous national body once elected, then there is no
need to agitate for representation of particular interests, or for consen­
sual representation. Besides, Ghanaian electoral politics seems to sug­
gest that parliamentary democracy cannot be attained through one or
the other form of proportional representation but rather through the
representation of various communities and equitable access to the
nation's resources. Ghana's parliaments may therefore be best described
as coalitions of little community interests which are subsumed under
electoral constituencies. Because of this unique nature of Ghanaian
parliaments its members are expected to represent their respective
constituencies as a whole and, in particular, seek their interests when it
comes to the distribution of development works. In this regard there is
no distinction between the parliamentarian whose party won majority

186
seats and the one whose party is in the minority. Both have equal
responsibilities towards their constituents.
If the Ghanaian electorate has any understanding of democracy
through representative institutions at all, then it is the right of access to
the nation's resources which election, as a mechanism of democracy,
provides for individuals and communities. It is in this sense that Ghana's
state institutions like parliament, cabinet, etc. would differ decidedly
from their British counterparts. Thus a Ghanaian parliament, for in­
stance, is unambiguously an assembly of constituency representatives.
Given this ideology of representation, any version of proportional
representation is most likely to endanger national unity, regime stability,
and efficient government. It is likely to fragment the party system by
encouraging representation, inside parliament, of the variegated com­
munity interests that exist in any one electoral district. Undoubtedly, this
potential will easily encourage the emergence of parochial, sectional and
ethnic or tribal parties whose actions may jeopardize the unity of the
nation. The fragmentation of the party system will certainly be repro­
duced at the level of state institutions, especially in the form of a
balkanized parliament. A balkanized parliament is a weak parliament;
and is likely to have a disastrous effect on regime effectiveness and
stability.
Such a situation may jeopardize the dominant rationality of elec­
tions: namely, to establish exchange-based linkages between society and
the state. For, contrary to Austin's conclusion,41the dominant rationality
of Ghanaian elections subsumes a certain positive view of national
institutions. Indeed, participation in elections is legitimized by the
expectation that national-level state institutions like parliament, the
cabinet, etc. will not only prevail; but they will also be stable, strong and
economically viable so that they would be able to provide the necessary
economic or material resources which elected representatives are ex­
pected to assist in sharing for the benefit of their constituents. Hence the
electorate's response to the fiscal crisis, which has usually undermined
the state's ability to discharge its essentially patronage or distributive
functions, has been massive abstention from the polls. The decline in
voter turn-out during the 1978-79 period was due precisely to these
velopments viz., the endemic instability of national-level state insti-
ti ons, and the dwindling resource base of the state.
he challenge of building a stable democracy therefore does not lie
he introduction of a system or procedure that is bound to fragment
! weaken institutions that are conducive to the growth of democracy.

187
R< her it lies in whether the nation has the political capacity to initiate a
co xerted endeavour aimed at strengthening and consolidating the
lo; ic of institutional unity and stability which pervades the Ghanaian
state. Theexperienceof those nations that have practised the majoritarian
system compared to those that have practised various versions of the
proportional representation system, provides ample proof that the
majoritarian system promises to be supportive of the logic of institu­
tional unity and stability.
Finally, democracy means more than the right to choose a rep­
resentative. It also means the capacity to influence elected represen­
tatives and policy-makers operating within the state bureaucracy as
w°ll as the opportunity to exert such influence. These points are of
particular importance to us Ghanaians; because nowhere in the world's
successful democracies could we find that the people actually govern
themselves. The most important factor in a successful democracy is
what has been stated by V. O. Key Jr. namely, the right and freedom
exercised by the citizenry occasionally to assert their sovereignty. In
his own words, "The people may not really govern themselves, but
they can stir up a deafening commotion if they dislike the way they
are governed."42 Therefore, to realize a successful and stable parlia­
mentary or representative democracy would require building and
strengthening a network of mass democratic institutions (like political
parties and other non-state political organizations) by which the rank
and file of Ghanaians could periodically assert their sovereignty against
arbitrary actions and dictatorial regimes. Ultimately, an election, how­
ever important, is only the first step towards the establishment of a
democratic order.

NOTES

1. Republic of Ghana. Report of the Committee of Experts (Constitution on

Proposals for a Draft Constitution of Ghana ) presented to the PNDC.
Accra: July 31 1991.
2. The motion stood in the name of Dr. Abubakar Alhassan, a government
appointee, and others. Among the leading opponents of that motion
was this author.
3. The Proposals of the Constitutional Commission for a Constitution for Ghana
Accra, 1968, p.76.
4. Report of the Committee of Experts, op cit. pp. 94-96.

188
5. In the wordsof Aristotle. "In democratic states the people is sovereign." See
The Politics of Aristotle (Translated with introduction and appendix by
Ernest Barker) London: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 128.
6. The colonial idea of representation was a product of the paternalistic views
of the dominant power that government of the colonies was for uncivi­
lized and inferior people. From 1951 on, the colonial power was forced
by the nationalists to concede partial citizenship to Ghanaians. By 1957
Ghanaian citizenship had been fully conceded. It was only at this
juncture that the right to self-government, and therefore the franchise,
was extended to every adult without qualifications.
7. See especially the classical natural rights arguments forcefully canvassed
by Thomas Paine in his The Rights of Man. See Basic Writings of Thomas
Paine. New York: Willey Book Company, 1942.
8. This statement is attributed to Edmund Burke in a letter to the electors of
Bristol. See P. G. J. Pulzer, Political Representation and Elections. London:
George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1967, p. 22.
9. Political Parties .A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modem
Democracy. (Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul, with introduction by
Seymour M. Lipset) New York: Collier Books, 1962.
10. For a general discussion of this problem, see T. B. Bottomore, Elites and
Sodefy.London: C. A. Watts & Co, 1964.
11. See, for example, Yaw Twumasi, "The 1969 Election" in Dennis Austin
and Robin Luckham, Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana 1969-1972.
London: Frank Cass, 1975, p 144.
12. Ministry of Local Government,Information Digests. November / December
1989 Vol. 7, p. 19. See also Ghana Consultative Assembly Register 1991-
1992. Accra, 1992 for more current examples of this contradiction
between democratic theory and practice.
13. Refer, for example, to the thrust of the arguments by J. Sandra Pepera,
"Political Parties and Social Representation: The Case of Women" in this
volume.
14. Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana 1946-1960. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1970.
15. Twumasi, "The 1969 Election."
16. Naomi Chazan, "Anomalies of Continuity: Perspectives on Ghanaian
Elections Since Independence" in Fred M Hayward (ed) Elections in
Independent Africa. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.
17. John Dunn, "Politics in Asunafo" in Austin and Luckham, Politicians_and
Soldiers in Ghana.
18. Dunn. Ibid. Also Richard Jefferies, "The Ghanaian Elections of 1979" in
African Affairs . Vol. 79 No. 318 July 1980. pp. 407-414.
19. Twumasi, "The 1969 Election" p.142; and Jefferies, "The Ghanaian Elec­
tion of 1979" p. 401.

189
 20. Austin, D. "Introduction" in Austin and Luckham, Pditiciaris and Soldiers
in Ghana, p. 10.
21. For analyses of the determinants of voter behaviour in Britain, see Richard
Rose ed., Do Parties Make a Difference? London: MacMillan Press, 1989.
22. The changing meaning of human rights from abstract political rights to
economic, social and cultural rights are discussed in Norman P. Barry,
An Introduction to Modem Political Theory. London: MacMillan Publish­
ers Ltd, 1985, pp.182-199.
23. Dunn "Politics in Asunafo" in Austin and Luckham, Politicians and Soldiers
in Ghana, pp. 199-208.
24. Ibid. p. 208
25. That is, the representative as part of an autonomous national institution
rather than a representative of the constituency that elected him. See
note 8 supra.
26. Maxwell Owusu, Uses and Abuses ofPozver, Chicago Chicago University
Press, 1970; "Politics in Swedru" in Austin and Luckham, Politicians
and Soldiers in Ghana.
27. Austin. D. "Introduction" in Austin and Luckham, Politicians and
Soldiers in Ghana, p. 7.
28. Chazan, "Anomalies of Continuity..." p. 62.
29. Twumasi, "The 1969 Election," pp. 144-145.
30. Ibid.
31. Dunn, "Politics in Asunafo" p. 191.
32. Chazan, "Anomalies of Continuity..." p. 69.
33. Twumasi, "The 1969 Election", pp. 156-159; Chazan, ibid., pp. 69-70.
34. Dunn, "Politics in Asunafo" p. 191.
35. The analysis is based on Chazan, Ibid. pp. 75-80.
36. The figures for voter turn-out for the district elections and the parliamen­
tary/presidential elections of 1979 were taken from Ministry of Local
Government, Information Digest (Special Edition), 1988. p. 4.
37. We could use this thesis to analyze quite neatly changes in voter turnout
at the district elections of 1987-88 and the constitutional referendum of
April 1992.
38. This point was passionately canvassed by John Ndebugre, representing
the People's National Convention, at the seminar on "Political Parties
and Democracy in Ghana's 4th Republic" at which this paper was
presented.
39. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
40. See his Politics in West Africa London: Allen & Unwin, 1965.
41. Austin's conclusion is that the tendency among Ghana's electorate to vo i
for a broker "reflects) not only the poverty of trust in national instit >
tions {whether parties or parliaments or trades unions) but the persis

190
 tence of "poliarchies"— of semi-autonomous concentrations of power,
still largely territorial, in what was once a colonial artifact." Dennis
Austin, Introduction' in Austin and Luckham, Politicians and Soldiers,
p. 7.
42. V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups. New York: Thomas Y.
Cromwell Company, 1964, p. 6. The whole of Chapter 1 of this classic
treatise is worth reading.

191
 Chapter 12

TH E DEM OCRATIC ETHOS AND INTERNAL PARTY

DEM OCRACY:THE CASE OF PARTIES IN THE FOURTH
REPUBLIC

A. Essuman-J ohnson

Introduction

When the PNDC took over power in 1981, even though it had used
undemocratic means to gain political power, the regime showed by
its actions that it was convinced about democracy. This was done in
the establishment of the National Commission for Democracy. The
functions of the Commission as elaborated in the PNDC (Establish­
ment) Proclamation law 1982, PNDCL 42, Section 32 were, among
others:

(i) to disseminate within the society awareness of the objectives

of the revolutionary transformation of the society being em­
barked upon by the Council in the interest of real democracy;
(ii) to assess for the inform ation of the G overnm ent the
limitations to the achievement of true democracy arising
from the existing inequalities between different strata of the
population and make recommendations for redressing these
inequalities;
(iii) to formulate for the consideration of Government a programme
for a more effective realization of a true democracy in Ghana.1

From this concern of the PNDC it was clear that from the very begin­
ning of the revolution the Government was very concerned about
democracy. The NCD was to work towards realizing the objectives
of democracy. The NCD therefore set out to collect and collate views
on the political aspirations of the people and their notions of demo;
racy. One pertinent issue that the NCD raised for the consideration ot
the Consultative Assembly that was set up to draft the new Consti
tution for the Fourth Republic was the development of a democrat

192
ethos. This was:

The development of democratic political culture-democracy within

institutions of state, private organizations, voluntary organiza­
tions, professional associations and traditional institutions
as learning grounds for the development of a democratic national
political culture, the NCD as the institutional framework for pro­
moting this.2

The essence of the PNDC setting up the NCD is to see how to make the
ideals of democracy become part and parcel of the Ghanaian way of
doing things i.e. to develop a democratic political culture. This chapter
looks at the ideals of democracy and the extent to which they are
manifested itself in the internal organization of the political parties that
have sprung up to contest the elections to the Fourth Republic.

A History of Democracy

Democracy was first organized and clearly discussed in the Greek city
states of the 5th century BC, especially Athens. That was the era of
direct democracy in which all free men in the Greek city states went
to the acropolis to take part in the discussion and decision-making on
all issues that affected the city states. But the democracy of the Greek
city states has gone through a good deal of changes and challenges
over the years to the present. In some circles democracy was seen as
a revolutionary challenge to established authority and old interests.
Others have seen democracy as a symbol of defiance, protest and
liberation as well as an attack on privilege and class rule.
Democratic institutions and ideals have however gone through
quite a struggle. After a long period of "non-use" democracy came
into prominence in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries and contin­
ued to grow in the 19th century. In the 20th century it emerged on
the winning side of the first and second world wars. Opponents of
democracy have included the aristocrats and oligarchs (a few who held
the ruling power in the city states of the ancient world). Its opponents
aave also included the nobility of Europe in the medieval era between
ihe 6th and 15th centuries as well as the absolute monarchs of the 16th
nd 17th centuries, the merchant princes in virtually all the eras when
'he power of the people threatened their riches, the majority of the
eaders of organized religion, the commanders of almost every army

193
in the past and most of them in the present, and the 20th century
dictators.
One important thing to keep in mind when discussing democracy
is that no two democracies look exactly alike. There is a large number
of contrasting institutions and procedures all of which may justly be
called democratic; and the degree to which things are done democrati­
cally may differ from country to country. Among the institutions and
procedures are: the basic structure of the government, the functioning
of the party system, the meaning and priorities assigned to the different
ideals and philosophies. There are also the relation between the citizens
and their officials, and the character of the social and economic order
with which the political order is mingled.

The Democratic Ethos

To guide our discussion of internal party democracy we need to be

dear in our minds about what the democratic ethos is. The democratic
ethos consists of all those essential traits of democracy: i.e., the char­
acteristic spirit, moral values, ideals or beliefs of democracy. As dis­
cussed earlier, the foundations of democracy were laid in ancient
Greece. The word democracy is Greek, and the system it denotes
developed first among the Greeks and matured between the 6th and
4th century BC in the dty state of Athens in particular. The Athenians
became very much involved in a vigorous debate about the prindples
of a good sodety and their application. This process of continual
discussion became the core of their political life. This open discussion
of issues has educated generations down to the present and it has
become one of the cardinal aspects of the democratic way of doing
things.
In his work Herodotus3 describes democracy as supreme power
of the state in the hands of the many as opposed to its being in the
hands of one person (Monarchy) and in the hands of a few (Aristoc­
racy). He identified three prindples of democracy as equality in the
application of the laws, participation by the dtizenry in the making
and administration of the laws and equality (freedom) of speech.
Another Greek historian, Thucydides, chronicles the struggles between
Athens and Sparta in his work on the Peloponnesian Wars.4 He dte
Perides' famous speech in 431 BC spelling out the essentials of Athe­
nian democracy. In the speech, Pericles identifies democracy as a

194
government by the many instead of the few. In private disagreements,
the laws provide equality of the rights for all. But in the affairs of the
state, however poor a man might be, he is not prevented from par­
ticipating in the government of public affairs if he has anything good
to contribute. In general, Greek philosophers detected in a democracy
three broad ideals. First, there is the social context which involves the
elimination of debt, slavery, and property qualifications for political
office, and opportunity for the individual regardless of family status
or wealth. Secondly, there is the governmental system i.e. public
deliberation and decision-making by all citizens resulting in majority
rule. Thirdly, there are the philosophical ideals, namely, equality,
freedom of speech, adaptability, and obedience to the authority of laws
and of public officials.

Modem Democracy

Modem democracy is radically different from the direct democracy of

the Greek city states. Modem developments have made it difficult to
practise direct democracy. Modem democratic practice has adapted
to the long strides that society has made from the early days of ancient
Greece. Modem democracy is representative rather than direct due
to population growth and the development of towns and cities. Now
democracy has to be practised in a country larger than a city state.
Furthermore there is mass participation in politics as opposed to the
practice of the Greek dty states where participation was limited to free
men only, while slaves and women were kept out. The characteriza­
tion of a modem democracy pre-supposes the following (a) the people
should hold ultimate power through universal adult suffrage with
each citizen having one vote i.e. one person, one vote; (b) a minimum
of two political parties to offer a choice of candidates and programmes
to the electorate in free elections at reasonable intervals; (c) a consti­
tutional guarantee of civil liberties of citizens like the freedom to speak,
publish and associate with others; (d) the need for a free press (e) the
existence of an independent judiciary; and (f) tolerance of opposing
views and the ability to compromise.
One fundamental aspect of democracy is that it is a system in
hich the people are considered the ultimate holders of power and the
government is established to serve their needs. The people's role in
politics is more related to their right to vote. The essence of government

195
by the people is that the adult population of the country have the right
to decide on who rules them and what policies are to be pursued through
their right to vote. A community lacks democracy to the extent that a
large number of adults are denied the right to vote. The right to vote is
closely bound up with political decision-making and the party system.
The NCD report however drew attention to what they considered to be
the essence of democracy for the consideration of the Consultative
Assembly. To the NCD, democracy represents the embodiment and
achievement of the aspirations of all for a better life, dignified and free
and that it is characterized by a system of representation that reflects the
true and purposeful wishes of the people. Democracy contains that
body of principles, attitudes, ideas and orientations which grant human
and economic rights and bestows freedom and justice.
The question centres on a belief system that is the basis of democ­
racy because it articulates the needs of the entire society. It also outlines
the political, spiritual and economic rights of the members of the society
which guarantee a truly democratic system of government. Any work­
able democracy should deal with every unique experience. It ought to,
in our peculiar historical condition, begin by decolonizing the mind. Our
political parties of the past only gave the appearance of democracy.
Indeed, they were weapons for waging economnic wars on behalf of
specific interest groups. Elections organized along party lines remained
political festivals which made available to the elite community the
nominal consent of the majority. They succeeded in strengthening the
privileges of only the rich who were party founders.5 To what extent
thendoes political parties capture the essence ofdemocracy for a society?

Political Parties and Democracy

One of the pillars on which democratic governance rests is political

parties. It is the parties that help the people to choose a government to
run the affairs of the state and also to choose a parliament where the
representatives of the people will debate and discuss national issues and
act on behalf of the people in authorizing policies and making laws. Tht
parties play a central role in democratic politics because everything tha
is politically important, be it social, institutional or ideological, come
alive in the party. The parties serve as a bridge uniting various sections
of the society and the state. The party is, therefore, influenced by both tl
society and the state.

196
 From the society, the parties derive much of their substance and
from the state much of their form. The mobilization of diverse interests
in groups, their opposition or shared goals, provide the basic material
out of which parties can grow and formulate their political philoso­
phies. The mobilization of the people by political parties statisfies a
very important aspect of modem democracy. This is the requirement
of the need for the mass of the citizens to participate in periodic and
honest elections. At these elections the people are offered a genuine
choice between candidates and programmes. It is for this purpose, and
the wish to win political power, that political parties mobilize the
people, aggregate their diverse interests into national party programmes
that a im at the public good.
The parties engage in a political contest in which they campaign
to influence the electorate to accept their programmes by voting them
into power. They also engage in the education of the electorate on
political and economic issues. A political party organizes the people
to participate in politics on the assumption that all other parties are
playing the political game within a democratic environment. The
parties are therefore eagle-eyed to kick against anything which they
consider undemocratic. For this reason they want to see to it that
national elections are free and fair, there is freedom of speech, there
is a free press that allows the free discussion of all issues, and there
is an independent judiciary.
The assumption here is that if the political parties expect to operate
within a national democratic environment, then the parties themselves
must be democratic, i.e. the parties must conduct their internal affairs
in a democratic manner. It is the position of this paper that it is only
a party that conducts its internal affairs democratically that can be
relied upon to operate the national democratic process when it wins
the people's consent to form the government of the Fourth Republic.
It might be argued’that even if a party is undemocratic internally it
has no choice but to operate the national institutions democratically
if it wins power because it will be operating within a democratic
constitutional framework. The point being made here is that even if
the national democratic institutions set out by the Constitution make
it difficult for the government to behave undemocratically, if the party
itself is used to an undemocratic internal structure and way of doing
things, it will, in its own time, find ways and means to subvert the
national democratic ways of doings things.

197
Internal Party Structures and Democracy

One good measure of a democratic internal structure of a political party

is how the party's leaders are chosen to contest national office and to
run the party's own affairs. The best example is the US presidential
elections. The US system uses the power of elections at the party level
to select the presidential candidates to contest national elections. The
election process is one supreme event in which the people speak for
themselves. It enables citizens, who are subject to law, to affirm
themselves as the masters of those who make the law, i.e. the legis­
lators. During elections in a democratic system the citizens are asked
to declare, individually and collectively, what they want. Much, there­
fore, depends on the ways in which elections are conducted. If the
process of election fails, democracy also fails.
In the US presidential elections, the impact of elections as a demo­
cratic requirement is felt in the internal mechanisms of the parties in the
process of selecting presidential candidates. This is very much so in the
US primary elections for the November presidential elections. That
process literally tears each of the two US political parties apart into a kind
of multi-party system in which candidates representing various view­
points within the same political party are allowed to compete against one
another for the votes of the party faithfuls as the presidential candidate.
This primary election culminates in the national party convention at
which the delegates vote for one of the candidates as their presidential
candidate. The US primaries enable the parties to display openly their
internal differences to the greatest possible extent. After the nomination
has been made, all emphasis is placed on party unity without which the
electoral college majority cannot be won. This is a system that ensures
that even within the parties no one group monopolizes the opportunity
to be the presidential candidate; and this reinforces democracy at the
national level as well.
The US system might be the most open democratic system of
choosing leaders; and we might point out that the degree of democracy
that a country exhibits with regard to the selection of its leaders, may
differ from country to country even within the Western liberal democ­
racies. For example given the way the British elect their prime ministers
one would say the US system of selecting leaders is more open and
democratic than that of the British. For this reason one would not expeU
the same level of democracy in a third world political environment \, ith
regard to the selection of leaders of political parties to contest na lui U

198
elections. All the same one expects to see a semblance of the democratic
way of doing things within the parties if the future of democratic politics
is to be guaranteed at the national level.

Democracy and Ghanaian Political Parties

The party system and the Ghanaian political sytem has been character­
ized as a corrupt machine which has not been allowed to grow. The
NCD, pointing this out noted that:

The pitfalls of political parties, corruption and general mismanage­

ment, have been attributed to the fact that independence in Ghana
was so rushed that the political parties hardly had time to take
roots. The idea of a multiparty system is inherently good, but this
system has been abused in Ghana and not been given the opportu­
nity to grow as a result of military interventions.6

We would now examine the crop of political parties that have sprung up
to see how they measure up to the changes noted above and the broader
issue of internal democracy.
The 1992 Constitution of Ghana is the country's fourth attempt at
having a political system that operates on democratic principles We
have noted the vital role that political parties play in the democratic way
of doing things, and the equally important role that the electorate play
in the election of representatives and the government to run the affairs
of state. First we will turn attention to the issue of democracy within the
political parties that are aspiring to contest the forthcoming presidential
and parliamentary elections in November and December. The discus­
sion here is based on the assumption that to the extent that there is cause
to doubt the practice of democracy within the political parties, the future
of the operation of a democratic national political system is most likely
to be undermined.
Since the ban on party political activity was lifted on May 18,1992,
a number of groups aspiring to form political parties have sprung up.
The main groupings prior to the lifting of the ban were the Kwame
Nkrumah Welfare Society, the Danquah-Busia Club, and the Eagle Club
and the Heritage Club. Ghanaian party politics seem to now group
around three broad traditions. The National Commission for Democ­
racy (NCD) report7 had drawn attention to the fact that even though for
a long time the country has seen two political traditions — the Conven­

199
tion People's Party (CPP) and United Party (UP), with the June 4th and
31st December revolutions, there has evolved a third tradition consti­
tuted by the PNDC and its organs. This has been borne out by the
emerging political parties. The political parties that have emerged have
been broadly either CPP, or PP or PNDC. The parties are as follows:
The CPP groups — National Convention Party (NCP), National Inde­
pendence Party (NIP), People's Heritage Party (PHP) The UP group -
National Patriotic Party (NPP); and the PNDC group — National
Democratic Congress (NDC) and Eagle (sic) Party. The formation of
these parties has been a good omen for democratic national politics. At
the national level, it looks like all the ingredients of a democratic political
system are in place, namely: the lifting of the ban on party politics, an
independent body — the Interim National Election Committee (INEC)
to oversee free and fair elections, a referendum on the proposed consti­
tution, a free press — especially the emergence of the independent
tabloids that has allowed a fairly free discussion of national issues
outside the two national dailies that are government-controlled, and an
independent judiciary under the 1992 Constitution. It seems therefore
that at the national level all has been laid out for a national democratic
political system.
What seems to be missing in these national democratic arrange­
ments is the existence of a mechanism to ensure democracy within the
political parties. This is what this chapter sees as the danger to the
national democratic political system envisaged in the 4th Republic. As
far as the parties are concerned they have been largely left to conduct
their affairs as they deem fit. To the extent that if there is any requirement
on them at all it is what this writer sees as an exhortation. According to
the political parties law the internal organization of a political party
should conform to democratic principles; and its actions and purposes
should not contravene or be inconsistent with any other law. The law
does not set out what is meant by democratic principles. Despite the
good intentions of those who drafted the political parties law it cannot
be taken for granted that all the political parties would conduct their
internal affairs in the democratic tradition. This is being borne out by
developments within the political parties since they were formed
in May 1992.
In the first place, no mechanism is in place — despite what the
political parties law says — to ensure that democratic principles are
pursued within the parties to choose their leaders. One evidence is the
number of political parties springing up as a result of splits. This is

200
 particularly so in the CPP and the PNDC parties. Splits, when they occur,
suggest the lack of democratic principles like tolerance and compromise.
The CPP front has split into four main parties, namely, the PNC, the NIP,
the PHP and the NCP. The leader of the PNC - Dr. Hilla Limann left the
CPP fold to form his own party on realizing that he might not get the
leadership if he stayed in the fold. The rumblings and various reasons
being given for not staying together in the CPP fold smacks of an internal
party machine being manned by people whose minds have been made
upon who should be the presidential candidate, and of the lack of a spirit
of compromise.
The situation suggests that many Ghanaians want to be presiden­
tial candidates; and when they see no meaningful internal mechanism
in their party to ensure that they ha ve a fair chance of being elected as the
presidential candidate, they move out to form a new political party in
which, presumably, there will be no challenger to their leadership. So far
it has been only the NPP that has adopted a democratic mechanism for
choosing its presidential candidate. On realizing that as many as seven
members of the party were interested in being the presidential candi­
date, the party asked all the candidates to tour the country to canvass the
Danquah-Busia supporters. A party congress was arranged with del­
egates from all the constituencies in the country and they voted one of
them as the party's presidential candidate. This is the closest that any of
the political parties has come to the US primary presidential elections;
and it is the most democratic way to ensure that within the party, the rank
and file will have a say in the selection of the party leaders. The PNDC
camp is showing how intolerant they can be, given the rivalry going on
between the Eagle Party and the NDC. The two parties have claimed that
they would continue the work of the PNDC and would draft the PNDC
chairman — J.J. Rawlings— as their presidential candidate. Following
he formation of the NDC and the unwillingness of the Eagle Party to join
the NDC, the leadership of the Eagle Party were set upon and beaten by
a group led by a leading member of the NDC who is also a secretary of
state in the PNDC government. Later the houses of the leaders of the
-gle party were searched for arms — a quantity of which was found
in the house of one of the leaders by state security agencies.
What the CPP and PNDC group of parties have exhibited so for is
clear lack of democratic principles within the parties. There is lack of
!erance and a spirit of compromise within them. The party congresses
« groups were non-congresses. The PNC went to congress to more
?ess approve Dr. Limann as their candidate with a feeble challenge.

201
The NIP Congress was a showcase for one man, Mr. Kwabena Darko,
who won hands down. The PHP ended up having no contest as the two
challengers to General Erskine all stood down for him. The best case of
lack of internal party democracy was the NCP. The party went to
Congress and elected a new leader who, in his acceptance speech,
encouraged the splintered CPP groups to come together. The party
leader Mr. K. N. Ackaah, a few days later made an about turn and joined
the NDC without a democratic party decision. The result of this was that
the party is split. The NCP leader has become the running mate of the
NDC presidential candidate— Fit -Lt. Jerry John Rawlings and the rank
and file have joined other parties. The NDC and Eagle parties went to
congress just to affirm their confidence in — Flt-Lt. Rawlings as their
presidential candidate. The Eagle party has since joined the N IX!
together with part of the former leaders of the NCP.
It is the view of this writer that despite all the concerns of the NCD
and the political parties law to ensure democracy within the parties, it
has not been possible for anybody to ensure that democratic principles
prevailed in the parties. The Interim National Electoral Commission
(INEC) was only to supervise the election of party leaders at the
congresses. There was no way INEC could also ensure there is no
corruption within the party machine. The law only requires the parties
to submit within twenty-one days before the elections to INEC, a
statement of their assets, liabilities and expenditures. The conduct of the
NDC in the use of government vehicles for its political campaigns
forced the INEC Chairman to call a press conference to condemn it. That
is a very good example of corruption by a political party.
Given this inability of the system set up to deal with the twin issues
of corruption and internal party democracy, it is the view of this writer
that the lack of internal party democracy is likely to throw up presiden­
tial candidates who have benefitted from an autocratic selection process
within their parties. Such candidates and their parties, if they win the
elections, are most likely to subvert the national democratic institutions,
because they might try to replicate at the national level what went on at
the party level. In which case that President and his party will put the
4th Republican democratic politics in danger.

Conclusion
After looking at the developments on the political parties front in the
run-up to the 4th Republic, it is the position of this chapter that a serious

202
look should be taken at the internal structures of the political parties
with regard to their process for selecting their leaders. A review should
be made aimed at adopting the USA primary presidential election
process or a modified version of it. This would be one positive way of
ensuring that the parties do not pay lip service to the democratic way
of doing things. Simply put, if the parties are aspiring to win power to
run a democratic 4th Repbulic then, they must, themselves, be seen to
be democratic in the way they select their leaders. If it can be shown that
tolerance and compromise can be practised within the parties them­
selves, then one can expect that in their dealings with one another at the
national level these parties will equally be tolerant and capable of
compromise. It looks like those who framed the constitution of the 4th
Repbulic did not reckon with the fact that so many Ghanaians would
want to be president, and so only exhorted the parties to be democratic
in their internal structures and operations.
The picture presented by some of the parties has been near anarchy
as a result of the fierce struggle among contenders for nomination as their
party's presidential candidate. It is not enough to ask INEC to supervise
the elections within the parties. The parties went to congress but where
no elections were held, as the case was with the NDC, Eagle Party and
the PHP, there was no way INEC could have any idea about how
internally democratic the parties were. Even where elections were held
that did not show how internally democratic the parties are. It is the view
of this writer that the political parties law has woefully failed to ensure
internal party democracy and prevent party corruption. It is possible a
party may not even convene a congress. INEC could be asked to take a
second look at the internal selection process of the parties with a view to
recommending changes along the lines of the U S. system. That would
be helping the parties come to terms with electing their leaders
democratically in the future.

NOTE?

1. NCD: Evdving a True Democracy Accra, March 1991 pax

2. Ibid. p5
3 Herodotus: The Histories.
ucydides: The Peloponnesian Wars.
5. NCD: op. cit pp. 55.
6. Ibid. p57.

203
7. Ibid. p.6.
8. Political Parties Law, 1992 PNDCL 281 Section 11 (17).

FURTHER READING

1. Ehrmann, H.W. (ed) Democracy in a Changing Society. Bombay:

Vakils Feffer and Simons. Private Ltd., 1963.
2. Lipson, Leslie The Deinocratic Civilisation .New York: O.U. P. 1964.

204
 Part IV

Institutional Mechanisms
of Party Politics
 Chapter 13

THE O P P O S m O N IN A M ULTI-PARTY GOVERM ENT:

REFLECTIONS ON THE GHANAIAN EXPERIENCE

Gilbert Keith Bluwey

Introduction

The impending transition from military rule to a multi-party consti­

tutional order implies the re-instatement of formal opposition as an
integral part of our system of government. On the one hand, it is
implicit in multi-party politics that one party (or a coalition of parties)
would win the competition for the occupancy of the Castle while the
other party (or group of parties) would lose. On the other hand, the
bulk of the losers would remain in their camp to taunt, jeer and
generally query the winners on every major issue till the next general
elections. Moreover, the Constitution itself recognizes this latent
adversary phenomenon and provides for the orderly conduct of
government and opposition relations.
The record, however, shows that three of the six regimes (which
also have held power much longer than the other three)1 had not only
rejected the idea of an organized opposition but had also treated the
opposition as a canker in the political system rather than as part of its
normal processes. Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention Peoples'
Party (CPP) haunted and harrassed the Opposition and drove it into
extinction before proscribing it in 1964. The military regime of General
Acheampong openly denounced multi-party politics and by implica­
tion, the existence of organized opposition to the government. The
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) has never seriously
been adverse to multi-party politics. Under its guidance, elections into
local government bodies (1988/89) were conducted without political
parties. Its abhorrence of organized opposition may also be discerned
from the schedule of the elections meant to usher in the executive and
legislature for the Fourth Republic. By staggering the elections, with
the presidential elections taking place before the parliamentary, the
schedule ensures the emergence of a very weak parliamentary oppo-

207
 sition. It is obvious that parliamentary candidates of the elected
president's party would benefit from the bandwagon effect of the
tetter's victory. The president's party would therefore emerge with a
majority which would relegate the parliamentary opposition to a state
of microscopic significance. The PNDC has signalled a hardtime for an
organized opposition in the Fourth Republic in two other major ways.
First, the PNDC has indicated an intention not only to succeed itself in
the Castle but also to go into the Fourth Republic with the entire band
of revolutionary organizations.2 Second, the PNDC has ignored calls
by prom inent politically neutral social groups to create a free
political climate before the elections.3
Another point of serious concern about the opposition in the
next dispensation is the apparent lack of appreciation by non-PNDC
political groups about these threats to the survival of an organized
opposition. The Ghana Bar Association and the National Union of
Ghana Students (NUGS) had boycotted the Consultative Assembly
for very good reasons. But they have both succumbed to PNDC
covert infiltration of their ranks and have therefore looked away as
the latter forces its own programme down the throats of Ghanaians.
The emerging political groups have also concerned themselves mainly
with preparations for the campaign battle — en route to the Castle.
They have so far done nothing to compel the PNDC to liberalize the
political climate for a genuine democratic transition.
The sum of all these is that formal opposition as an integral part
of government in the Fourth Republic has only very bleak prospects.
Yet, the Ghanaian, as indeed world-wide experience shows, believes
that accountability, mass participation, rule of law and respect for
human rights and market economic principles flourish only where
an alternative government lurks in waiting for the peaceful replace­
ment of an unpopular government.
This paper will first attempt to update our knowledge of the
roles played by classical opposition in the established democracies
along with the benefits for such political systems. Second, it will
recapitulate the lot of the opposition in Ghanaian politics. Finally, the
paper will review existing attitudes towards opposition in the next
political dispensation and recommend measures to guarantee the
survival of a formal, vibrant opposition in Ghana. The thesis of this
paper is that classical opposition is a sine qua non of liberal
democracy and market principles and can thrive in Ghana in spite of
the apparent fragmentary cultural base.

208
The Nature, Roles and Benefits of Classical Opposition

The established democracies of Europe, Canada and the United States

consider political opposition as a logical extension of the cherished
freedoms of association and expression. The opposition is, therefore,
given formal recognition in the scheme of government. Material
rewards such as special emoluments, official residence and commen­
surate secretarial, administrative and even propaganda logistics are
provided for opposition leaders. In countries such as the United
Kingdom and Canada where state media organizations exist, the
opposition enjoys equal access to them and has equal representation
with the government on the governing boards. Both government and
opposition groups meet the same police requirements for holding
public meetings and rallies. The police, by tradition, are generally
fair to both sides. The courts also courageously uphold the rights of
opposition groups to exist, speak and take actions within the law to
promote their own political fortunes. In short, political practice and
constitutional provisions guarantee organized opposition as an inte­
gral part of the governing processes in the established democracies.
Classical theorists are generally agreed that organized opposition
confers three main benefits on the political system, namely: representa­
tion of minority interests and values; provision of rare or restricted
information both to government and the public; and the exercise of
surveillance and control over the policies and actions of the govern­
ment.4 In sum, the opposition tells the government what the public
cannot stand and motivates the populace to take steps which would
compel the government to rule largely in accordance with the spirit and
letter of the Constitution.
For more than two decades after independence, most new nations
rejected the idea of an organized opposition as a necessary complement
of government. In a statement which has since been accepted as seminal
on the question of formal opposition, Kwame Nkrumah and the CPP
had said:

Independent African States are faced with urgent and pressing

problems of reconstruction, for the solution of which all tne avail­
able national resources, both human and otherwise, must be
mobilized. This situation is almost analogous to a state of war and
national emergency which is always met in the older established
countries by the formation of national or coalition governments.
Moreover, a multi-party system is entirely alien to the traditional

209
 concept of government in African society.... A one party system
(therefore) provides the best answer for (sic) the problem of
government in Africa.5

The generality of African leaders until 1990, shared in the Nkrumah

declaration. To them, democracy did not require a two- or a multi­
party system, with an organized opposition and periodic elections.
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania was among the foremost opponents of
formal opposition.6 In several writings, he argued persistently that for
the Greeks — the originators of democratic thought and practice —
democracy simply meant government by equals who discussed issues
until they reached agreement. He drew clear similarities between the
Greek practice and the African traditional system and concluded that
organized opposition was neither theoretically and historically ten­
able, nor practically desirable in the new states of Africa. Nyerere,
along with several other African leaders, held that the new states
needed national unity for rapid socio-economic development. The
unity could be achieved through national mobilization in a single
mass-party organized along Leninist lines. Organized opposition, he
concluded, was a luxury for rich nations which the poor, struggling
African states could ill-afford.
The anti-opposition posture of African leaders found amazing
sympathy with several empirical analysts. David Apter, for example,
wrote in 1962 thus:

The role of a political opposition has proved ambiguous in most

newly independent nations. ... There are many reasons why
this is so. Most new nations have come into being after a
prolonged period of struggle with colonial authorities which has
caused nationalist leaders to monopolize loyalties. Also, oppo­
sition groups, having themselves been associated with nation­
alism at some stage of their existence, often have an anti-gov­
ernment reflex. ... Indeed, many opposition leaders in new
nations regard the new governments much as they did their
colonial predecessors, i.e., as basically illegitimate/

David Apter and the intellectual apologists of the anti-opposition

stance of African leaders forget that the opposition leaders were also
nationalists whose concerns for socio-economic development were no
less than those in government. Indeed, it was quite clear even in those
murky days that the theories of one-party rule in Africa were mere
rationalizations of the unbridled ambitions of the leaders to become

210
life-presidents. The indulgence of these rather numerous intellectual
apologists of one-party rule contributed in no small measure to its
spread throughout Africa. In the long run, it engendered the massive
repression, corruption and graft that have characterized African politi­
cal behaviour. It is also partly responsible for the spate of military
coups that engulfed the continent over the past two decades.8

The Opposition in Ghana

The break in the united nationalist front in 1949 marks the beginning
of opposition politics in Ghana. In a sense, the desertion of the United
Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) by Nkrumah and the radical youth
was a natural parting of ways by two ideologically opposed groups
that had maintained an uneasy co-existence under one umbrella.
Regardless of the actual events leading to the break-up and the
motives of the leading actors in the scenario therefore, the founding
of the CPP on June 12, 1949 marks the introduction of multi-party
politics into Ghana. In the subsequent eighteen months, the Gold
Coast benefitted from the alternative strategies of outright confron­
tation and active collaboration with the colonial regime advocated
respectively by the CPP and the UGCC.
While the application of positive action (demonstrations, strikes
and boycotts) resulted in the appointment of the Coussey Commis­
sion, the advocates of collaboration sat in conference with the emis­
saries of the colonial administration to draw up the Coussey Consti­
tution. In spite of its rather numerous deficiencies, the Coussey
Constitution provided a framework of representation and govern­
ment which was amenable to a peaceful transition to responsible
government. The Coussey Constitution ran its course and was
peacefully replaced by the 1954 Constitution. Proceedings of the
Legislative Assembly (1951-1954) clearly show that classical opposi-
;on of the Westminster variety prevailed.
The relatively peaceful tenor of Ghanaian politics turned rather
tenly into a spate of violent confrontations between government
1opposition groups following the founding of the National Libera-
on Movement (NLM) in 1956. Sanity deserted both groups of
icians and statesmanship became a scarce commodity. Organized
violence resulting in arson, street fights and brutal assassination of
Political rivals blurred the substance of the issues in dispute.

211
The Government lost its head and the Opposition lost the leitmotiv
of its existence.9
Barely a year after the attainment of independence, the govern­
ment embarked upon measures to liquidate the opposition — "to
show the opposition where power lies ."10The Avoidance of Discrimi­
nation Act (1958) proscribed all existing parties founded by regional,
ethnic and religious groups and forbade the formation of any such
group in the future. This forced the myriad of opposition parties to
regroup under a grand political umbrella called the United Party.11
In July 1958, the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) was passed. Under
it, the Minister of the Interior could order the imprisonment without
trial of any Ghanaian for five years. Several other pieces of punitive
legislation were passed between 1959 and 1962 to restrict the liberties
of individual Ghanaians and to mop up the opposition out of exist­
ence.12 Professor Kofi Abrefa Busia, the parliamentary leader of the
Opposition had fled into exile early in 1959. Dr. J.B. Danquah, the
doyen of Gold Coast politics and his nephew William Ofori-Atta had
been in and out of jail until the former died in the Nsawam Prisons
in February, 1965. Several other leaders of the Opposition were either
in jail or in exile by the close of 1962. Finally, in 1964, the CPP majority
in parliament passed an Act proscribing all political parties and
establishing the CPP as the sole party in the country. Henceforth,
it was a treasonable offence punishable with the death penalty to
attempt to form or join a political party in Ghana other than the CPP.
The intolerant attitude and punitive measures of the CPP drove
the Opposition underground to engage the CPP in terrorist warfare.
The culmination of the Opposition's efforts was the military coup
d'etat which overthrew Nkrumah and the CPP on February 24,1966.
Thus, between 1958 and 1966 Ghana operated a parliamentary sys­
tem of government in which organized opposition was missing. The
CPP did not recognize the existence of minority views. Under its
socialist persuasions, the nation was one body of peasants and the
proletariat. A homogeneity of interests and a system of universally
shared values were assumed. The philosophical framework for
political participation, interest articulation and aggregation was the
Leninist prescription of democratic centralism. Information was the
preserve of the top echelons of society who filtered directives to those
below an assumed hierarchical structure. The arena of political
participation thus shrank as everybody was reduced to the status of
a servile tool of:

212
 His High Messianic Dedication, Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah;
the Fount of Honour; Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces;
General Secretary of the Party and President of the Republic of
G hana.13

But if Nkrumah's towering dominance over the state was puz­

zling, the absolute absence of resistance by such prominent private
power wielders as the chiefs and the business elite was both horri­
fying and shocking. Nkrumah had never been on good terms with
the chiefs who however had enormous influence over their subjects.
Although the state occupied the centre-stage in the Ghanaian economy,
independent tycoons existed who could have challenged government
with effect. Certainly, discontent and resentment against Nkrumah's
policies and methods were widespread. The puzzle therefore was
that no centre of private power did anything positive to challenge the
government or call a halt to the reign of terror mounted by Nkrumah
and the CPP. It takes a whole nation to fight tyranny, and for that
matter, to preserve democracy. The Ghanaian elite failed to defend
the right of "the other person." to say what he had to say even if every
other person disagreed with him.
The lot of the Opposition in the Second Republic (1969-1972)
was a mixed blessing. The Constitution recognized the office of the
Leader of the Opposition. Following the Westminster parliamentary
example, the Opposition was accorded formal representation on stra­
tegic statutory bodies. Besides these constitutional concessions, the
lot of the Opposition was in no way enviable. The police would not
freely grant permit for Opposition rallies; private organizations such
as the Ghana Trades Union Congress and the NUGS which showed
leanings towards Opposition views were haunted by perpetual se­
curity surveillance. Individual government leaders exhibited arro­
gance and contempt towards Opposition leaders. The political tem­
perature rose steeply and it was no surprise that the army once again
stepped in to reduce the steadily mounting tension between rival
civilian political groups.14
Once again, the chiefs, religious leaders and other prominent
voices failed to defend the Opposition. But the more unsettling fact
he inability of the Council of State to do its constitutional duty
ng to moderate the actions of the government. The ceremonial
ient who also had the constitutional duty of protecting the
won <er side against the stronger, provided no evidence of action.

213
 The capitulation of the Third Republic to the PNDC on 31st
December 1981 was in no way attributable to the failure of the Oppo­
sition. Indeed, the Third Republic saw the emergence of an Opposition
that was simply up to its constitutional tasks. Led by the Popular Front
Party (PFP) the Opposition demonstrated towering commitment to the
constitution and the political survival of the Republic. The Peoples'
National Party (PNP) also saw the need for the Opposition as an
integral part of the governing processes of the state. There was
therefore mutual respect where hitherto mutual suspicion prevailed.
The government showed no inclination to mobilize its absolute parlia­
mentary majority rigidly behind every piece of proposed legislation.
The Opposition picked up that as a signal for co-operation and consen­
sus-building — more useful than joining in a coalition government of
allparties. It responded with objective and a political assessment of
government proposals ranging from the nomination of candidates for
ministerial and other high state offices to debates on the annual budget.
The government of President Hilla Limann showed considerable tole­
rance of the Opposition which the latter duly reciprocated.15
But neither the Council of State, nor the National House of
Chiefs, nor any other private pressure group was responsible for the
co-operation which existed between government and Opposition in
the Third Republic. Much perhaps, was owed to the political con­
science of President Hilla Limann. It has been widely rumoured
(sometimes with derision) that President Limann went to bed with the
Constitution under his pillow. Whatever the case, President Limann
was clearly a man wedded to the spirit and letter of the Constitution.
He accepted the cardinal principle of multi-party politics that the
government is formed by one political party which must permit and
guarantee the existence of other political parties. The Opposition also
signalled its willingness to co-operate and to play by the rules when its
presidential candidate accepted defeat and graciously congratulated
his victorious opponent very early in the counting of the votes. Thus,
unlike the joy and spontaneous acclamation which greeted the collapse
of the First Republic and the partial rejoicing in oppositon camps at the
fall of the Second Republic, the PNDC intervention was greeted with
no measure of enthusiasm. Even at that early stage, many felt that the
intervention was unnecessary and it was a stab in the back of democ­
racy. It was thus due more to a lack of courage than to disenchantment
with constitutional rule that the pepole did not resist the PNDC
intervention.

214
 It is perhaps necessary to mention in passing that Opposition
neither thrived nor showed its head under any of the three military
regimes in Ghana. In fact, under each of these regimes, private political
activity (outside the framework provided by the regime) was legally
proscribed. The few individuals and groups that tried to offer alterna­
tives to junta policies were swiftly bundled away into the cooler. In any
case, since military regimes are invariably bom out of force, they
depended on force to survive. Private views opposed to their positions
therefore have had no place.

The Opposition in the Fourth Republic

We have already noted that the existence of a formal Opposition is

implied by the idea of multi-party politics. As in 1969 and 1979, the
Constitution of the 4th Republic recognizes this fact and provides for
Opposition representation on all major statutory and constitutional
bodies. The Opposition has been given representation on the Council
of State, the National Development Commission, the National Security
Council and on several such strategic bodies. It will also play a key
role in the vetting and confirmation of nominees for cabinet and other
high positions in the State. The Directive Principles of State Policy are
dear on the rights to free association, speech and assembly. In fact,
the paper guarantees for the existence of organized Opposition are
adequate. However, given the experience of the past and the PN DCs
determination to hand over power only on its own terms, even the
most optimistic observer would exercise a great deal of caution in
holding any high expectations for a free rein for the Opposition in the
4th Republic.
There are indeed several bottlenecks in the way of organized
Opposition in the next political dispensation. Among these are: the
inhibitions posed by the cultural environment; deficiencies in some
structures created by the constitution; and the anti-democratic nature
of the transitional process.
Ghana is still some distance away from attaining a state of inte­
grated democratic culture. That is to say, certain basic traditional
on is of behaviour which do not promote democratic behaviour are
lerished in important social circles. The prime example is the
that protects the person of anyone in a leadership position
st open criticism. Although the traditional system permits indi­

215
viduals to question the judgment of the leaders of society, it does not
tolerate organized opposition as an alternative to the leadership.
Indeed, in the traditional setting, leadership is a life-time trust subject
only to good conduct. A permanent group of opponents pledged to
unseat the leadership is therefore a taboo which carries the death
penalty — or in modem times, such heavy fines as would send the
party or parties into exile. The striking point is that it is not only at
the point of political leadership that the norm prescribing respect and
servility towards leadership prevails. Even in such places as the
university, the dvil service and in the school system as a whole, those
in leadership positions evoke the primacy of office to dictate terms
and expect passive acceptance of their dictates. The same tendency
is evident in the manoeuvers that are currently taking place within
the emergent political parties.
There are also, several prominent voices which are not only
against multi-party mle but also against the idea of an organized
opposition as an integral part of government. In these groups (which
have no links whatsoever with the proponents of the one-party re­
gimes of yester-years) are voices calling for a sort of a "national"
government. They seem to agree that individuals and parties could
contest the elections; they could even retain their private political
organizations. But the victorious party should invite every such
identifiable group to accept some cabinet and other high positions of
state. A national, bi-partisan programme for development should be
worked out by the "national" cabinet and the entire nation should
support it under the leadership of the "national" cabinet.
The philosophical underpinning of this posture is that a people
elects a representative to help mle the country and bring development
into its area and not to oppose — to become an enemy of the gov­
ernment. This thinking, in consonance with the traditional norm,
considers the notion of an alternative government an evil. It also, by
implication, accepts a government clamp down on the opposition as
at least natural — a natural act of self-defence. Thus, as in the past,
a government denial of social amenities to areas that voted for the
Opposition, would be considered natural, legitimate and probable.
The cultural environment, therefore, appears to pose an enormous
obstacle to the emergence and survival of formal opposition.
Some aspects of the cultural inhibitions to spirited government-
opposition politics find expression in the constitution. The apparent
national aversion to political convulsion has left a deep imprint on the

216
 national psyche which is not likely to disappear too soon. The idea that
neutral arbiters play very fruitful roles in maintaining peace and
stability has found expression in an institutional form. Since 1969, the
nation's constitution writers have found pleasure in prescribing an
advisory body for the Chief Executive of State. Christened the Council
of State, this body has been designed for persons of "experience" and
presumed statesmanship, and who have shown no open support for
any political group within the country. The primary function of the
Council of State has been to advise the Chief Executive in secret and to
urge him to observe basic principles of morality and humaneness in all
his actions. The bulk of the membership of the Council have no real
expertise on specific areas of public policy. Certainly, such members as
a former Chief Justice, a former Chief of Defence Staff and a former
Inspector-General of Police, would have professional advice to tender
on specific issues. Others such as regional representatives and the
President of the National House of Chiefs would only give general
political advice probably based on moral grounds. The 1992 Constitu­
tion, for example, requires the Chief Executive to appoint as many as
eleven members (more than 40% of the entire membership) of the
Council. It omits the leadership of the Opposition. And although the
President must seek the consent of the legislature in the nomination of
the eleven members, that provision gives an unfair representation on
the Council to the President alone.
As already noted, the idea of a Council of State derives from the
belief that it is necessary to counter the ambitions of an elected executive
with the sober reflections of experts, moralists and humanitarians who
act behind the scenes. It is, perhaps derived also from the British concept
of a second legislative chamber composed of experts and others who,
because of birth into distinguished families, are assumed to be more
British than those of ordinary birth.16The deficiencies of such a legis­
lature acting either with Parallel authority or less with an elected one,
have been demonstrated by academic as well as practical public voices
in Britain against the House of Lords. There is therefore no real reason
why Ghana should not have opted for the United States example of an
elet ted second chamber. Among other things, an elected second cham­
ber would be in consonance with the tenets of republicanism and
representative government. Its meetings would be open to public
and the people would hold the legislators directly responsible
latever position each takes on every issue,
ieyond the obvious and oft-quoted advantages of an elected

217
legislature, there are basic deficiencies in the composition of the
Council of State for the 4th Republic. These deficiencies are not likely
to enhance the lot of the opposition. First, the President has a free
hand in selecting who among the several past Chief Justices, Chiefs
of Defence Staff and Inspectors-General of Police would be invited
to serve on the Council of State. Second, in the absence of any
criterion by which the eleven special members would be selected, the
President virtually has a free hand in loading the Council with servile
persons. Third, since the Council would convene in secret, the
government has a free hand in evoking the authority of the Council
in support of controversial decisions. This is possible because the
Council has no constitutional right to issue public rejoinders to gov­
ernment decisions. And in any case, the large presence of govern­
ment nominees would mean that a majority disclaimer would invari­
ably emerge against any rejoinder to a government pronouncement.
In sum, the Council of State is more likely to become a major instru­
ment for winning public support for government decisions than an
impartial arbiter between government and opposition groups. The
Opposition would then be seriously handicapped in its efforts to
restrain the Government.
The third obvious threat to the emergence of a viable formal
opposition in the next Republic is the content of the transition process
designed and decreed by the PNDC. In addition to the points noted
above is the cardinal fact that the PNDC has refused to see itself as
a regime that came into office outside the rules and through the barrel
of the gun. The refusal to admit to its essential origins has led to a
further misconception that the youth it has put into uniform and
armed with light weapons, as well as its own sponsored 31st Decem­
ber Women's Movement are the legitimate representations of a
homegeneous national movement towards the re-introduction of
another version of a peoples' democracy in Ghana. That these and
the Police Ladies Association, which are openly the campaign fronts
for the PNDC chairman, are directly supported from state funds
means that the Opposition would bear a fundamental grudge ag ainst
these state agencies if the PNDC and its allies win the electio n s.
Besides, the elections would lose the flair of a fair contest. And w h ile
the Opposition would naturally seek avenues as equally ille g itim a te
as the unfair use of public funds by the PNDC to fiiel its ca m p a ig n ,
the PNDC in government would, in turn, seek to block the O p p o ­
sition. The future is indeed bleak for healthy g o v e m m e n t-o p p o sitio n

218
relations in the next Republic.

Conclusion

This paper has shown that formal opposition as an integral part of the
governing processes of Ghana is necessary for the survival of democ­
racy. It has also demonstrated that at least three conditions exist in the
Ghanaian society which would inhibit the growth of formal opposition
in the next Republic. In this part of the paper, we will consider steps that
could be taken to at least, limit the impact of the inhibiting conditions on
the survival of opposition (and of multi-party politics) in Ghana.
It is of primary importance that the transition process be governed
by the democratic principles of equal opportunity for all competing
groups and the total exclusion of coercion and use of state agencies for
the benefit of some groups in the campaign for the Castle. Since the
courts have shown no courage to defend the rights of vulnerable
groups,17 such prominent groups as the Trades Union Congress, the
National House of Chiefs, the Association of Registered Professional
Bodies of Ghana and religious leaders should step up the call to the
PNDC to submit scrupulously to the tenets of fair-play. In addition, the
Western democracies and all the International Financial Institutions
should announce prominently that they would not recognize any
government which emerges out of a truncated, undemocratic transi­
tional process. There is need for a combined internal and external
pressure on the PNDC to respect democratic norms. A government
conceived and delivered by populist dictators in an equally populist
environment is not likely to be a government that places the individual
at the centre of state actions. Adolf Hitler conducted fairly free elections
in 1933 but his government turned out to be anything but democratic.
That was possible because the national socialist party swept away every
private centre of power under the guise of a national economic emer­
gency. The involvement of external powers is important because of the
monopolization of absolute powers by the PNDC.
The joint voices of the internal and external powers should demand
immediate demobilization of the personal security forces of the
1NDC. Foreign governments, especially those of France, Germany and
United States should cease to give cash and other forms of aid to the
December Women's Movement and the Police Ladies Association,
lly, these neutral voices should demand the grant of general and

219
unconditional amnesty to all Ghanaians either in exile or in jail for their
political views. The press should also be liberated from the current tight
control wielded over it by the PNDC through the Castle Information
Bureau and the Ministry of Information. Journalists should be
emboldened to investigate and publish (even if they err occasionally)
the facts. In this connection, the decree which prohibits public criticism
of the PNDC, its members and functionaries should be abrogated.
These would, all together, engender a liberal political atmosphere to
prepare the nation for democratic partisan politics.
There must also be an atmosphere tolerant of the Opposition in
the post-transition era. This imposes enormous tasks on the Judiciary,
the National Assembly and private influential groups. The Judiciary
invariably plays a crucial role in democratic presidential systems such
as we intend to have under the Fourth Republic. In anticipation of this
role, the Constitution amply guarantees the independence of the
judiciary. However, unless the judges are courageous enough and
possess the perspicacity to perceive the long-term effects of their
pronouncements on the body politic of Ghana, these guarantees would
be of less worth than the ordinary paper on which they are written.
Judicial courage to defend the individual against the state should be
cultivated and developed.18
A lot also depends on the National Assembly. Its rule of conduct
should place the Opposition firmly in the centre of its control systems.
That is to say, the Opposition should be given ample room — not
necessarily a dominant room — to pronounce on all major issues
especially on the appointment and conduct of high officers of state.
The National Assembly should also give formal recognition to the
Leader of the Opposition and the Shadow Cabinet by providing for
material rewards such as special emoluments, official residence or
subsidized residence, secretarial and propaganda logistics and a
respectable position on the national order of precedence. It must also
ensure that the security services, particularly the police, respect the
free movement, speech and assembly of opposition leaders. Where
the police have good reason to refuse an Opposition permit to hold
a public meeting, this should be referred to a speedy hearing and
determination by the local magistrate grade one court.
Finally, such statutory as well as private institutions as the National
House of Chiefs, the Ghana Bar Association and the Trades Union
Congress should see the survival and vibrant activism of the Oppo­
sition as an important guarantee of the survival of the democratic

220
enterprise in Ghana. No effort should be spared to protect journalists
from any obstructions to free practice of their trade. In this connection,
public demonstrations of support through prominent denunciations
against government persecution of journalists should be forthcoming.
This chapter recognizes the need to nurture democratic culture
in Ghana. However, it rejects the idea of state-sponsored institutions
for the political education of the people. I hold as do such eminent
empirical observers of political behaviour as Ali A. Mazrui, Karl W.
Deutsch, Robert A. Dahl, David E. Apter and Bingham Powell and
Gabriel Almond — among several others, that democratic political
culture is a function of acquired habits gained through practice and not
one that comes through formal, rigid instructions. You can teach a
person mathematics or the English language through formal instruc­
tion. But the habit of governing himself, he must learn through a process
of trial and error brought to him by exposure to the challenges of living
as a civilized political animal.
In sum, it is important that public opinion recognizes the im­
mense contributions of formal Opposition to the survival of democ­
racy. It must rally to its defence against the Castle even if it occa­
sionally exceeds its bounds. The National Assembly, the Judiciary
and all private centres of power must act to assure the Opposition
that its role as an integral part of government is as noble and
desirable as that of the group in the Castle.

NOTES

1. The CPP (1957 -1966), the NRC/Supreme Military Coundl I and II (1972
-1979) and the PNDC since January 1982 have together held office for
about 80% of the entire life of the Republic of Ghana.
2. I am refering to the CDRs, the Commandos, the Militia and the 31 st DWM.
3. They indude the Catholic Bishops' Conference, the Christian Council of
Ghana and distinguished individuals such as former Chief Justice F.K.
Apaloo and retired General Ashley-Larsen. Each has called for the
dissolution of the armed CDRs, Mobisquads and Commandos and the
integration of the personnel into appropriate state organs; the grant of
unconditional amnesty to all exiled and imprisoned opponents of the
PNDC; the abrogation of press control decrees and other decrees meant
to protect PNDC members and appointees against public criticism; free
access to state newspapers, radio and television by all political groups;
and an end to the use of state resources by the PNDC, its chairman and
front political organizations in their campaign for the Castle.
221
4. For a detailed discussion of the functions of the opposition in democratic
states refer to any basic work on political science or government. In
particular, see D. G. Kansculas (1974), Karl W. Deutsch (1976), Robert A.
Dahl (1976), Rodee, Anderson, Cristol (1976) and Alan A. Ball (1978)
among others.
5. The CPP Programme for Work and Happiness. Accra: 1964, sections 10-
12 .
6. Nyerere, Julius K., Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism. London: Oxford University
Press, 1968, and
Uhuru na Ujamaa: Freedom and Socialism: A Selection from Writings and
Speeches, 1965 -1967. London: Oxford University Press, 1973.
7. David E. Apter, "Some Reflections on the Role of Political Opposition in
New Nations," reprinted in Irving L. Markovitz, ed., African Politics and
Society. New York: The Free Press, 1970, pp. 226 - 241.
8. The late General A. A. Afrifa had said that once the government abolished
the civilian opposition, it automatically made the military its sole
political opponent. See his work on, The Ghana Coup, 1966. London:
Frank Cass, 1966.
9. For details of the NLM era in Ghana, see Denis Austin, Politics in Ghana:
1946-60 .London: Oxford University Press, 1964, and David E. Apter,
Ghana in Transition .Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
10. Attributed to Krobo Edusei who, as Minister of the Interior, was respon­
sible for the operation of the PDA.
11. The parties merging into the United Party were: the Ghana Congress Party;
the Northern Peoples' Party; the Muslim Association Party; theTogoland
Congress and the Anlo Youth Association.
12. Among these were: (a) The Investigations of Crimes Act (1958) which
broadened the Attomey-General's authority to compel any person to
supply information where crimes against the state were involved; (b)
The Offences Against the State Act (1959) which gave judges the
authority to sentence up to 15 years persons convicted of making false
reports about Ghana; and (c) The Criminal Procedures Act (1960)
provided for special courts to enact the death penalty for political crimes
without trial by the jury.
13. This long title was used on most State occasions.
14. This should in no way suggest a justification for the overthrow of the 1969
Constitution. The personal ambitions and grievances of the key players
in the coup were clearly dominant over any presumed concerns for
democracy.
15. The PNP government upheld opposition objections to several cabinet
appointments including tlie appointment of a Regional Minister for the
Volta Region. The PNP parliamentarians joined forces with those from
the ranks of the PFP to reject the budget proposals for the 1980/81 year.

222
16. The British House of Lords has come under severe criticism in recent times.
Several Britons would now like to have a mixture of elected represen­
tatives and men of experience in the House of Lords.
17. A recent High Court decision on an action by 29 prominent politicians
against the Interim National Electoral Commission shocked public
opinion. See People's Daily Graphic and The Ghanaian Times issues of May
18,1992.
18. In this regard the advice tendered to the Gold Coast Governor by the late
J.B. Danquah on the appointment of judges to the superior courts need
to be canvassed by the Bar Association. The late doyen of Gold Coast
politics had advised that appointments to the Bench should be made
from among prominent private legal practioners rather than as a
promotion for judges of interior courts.

REFERENCES

1. Nkrumah, Kwame. The Party Programme for Work and Happiness . Accra:
CPP Headquarters, 1964.
2. Nyerere, Julius K. Ujamaa: Essays cm Socialism (London: Oxford University
Press, 1968).
3. A Selection from Writings and Speeches, 1965-1967 (London: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1973)
4. Apter, David E. "Some Reflections on the Role of Political Opposition in
New Nations" in Irving L. Markovitz, ed., African Politics and Society.
New York: The Free Press, 1970.
5. Afrifa, General A.A.: The Gham Coup, 1966 . London: Frank Cass, 1966.
6. Austin, Denis. Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960 . London, Oxford University
Press, 1964.
7. Constitutions of the Republic of Ghana 1960,1969,1979 and 1992
Accra: Government Printer.
8. West Africa magazine — selected issues since 1960.
9. Daily Graphic and Ghanaian Tones — issues since 1960.

223
 Chapter 14

PO LITIC A L PA RTIES A N D TH E PR O SPEC T S

FO R N A TIO N A L STA BILITY

Kwame Boafo-Arthur

Introduction

Civilian regime changes in Ghana have always been violent. There

has been no single instance where a democratically elected govern­
ment handed over power to an opposition group. The military shot
themselves to power in 1966, 1972, and 1981 on the crest wave of
perceived mass discontent with civilian administrators. However, the
military regimes that emerged after the various coups also had to
contend with various forms of instability. For instance, the National
Liberation Council (NLC) that ruled from 1966-1969 had to contend
among others, with an abortive coup d'etat that led to the death of
CoL E.K.Kotoka, one of the architects of the 1966 coup. The National
Redemption Council/Supreme Military Council (NRC/SMC) that
came to power in 1972 was also violently overthrown by the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in 1979.
The ruling Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) has
been contending with various forms of destabilization, especially
abortive coups, since 1982. Some form of political instability had
always preceded military interventions in the country. It could be
argued therefore that political instability engendered by coups, counter
coups, ethnic warfare, civilian and military maladministration has
been a permanent feature of Ghanaian politics since independence.
What then are the main features and components of stable and
unstable polities? Webster's New World Dictionary defines political
stability as "having a definite governmental organization that is not
likely to break down, fall apart or give way." For political sociolo­
gists, a society could be either integrated or disunited, culturally
homogeneous or fragmented — surviving commonly on accepted
societal norms or values or not.1 Nations are composed of many
societies and given the differing ethnic and cultural backgrounds of

224
such societies, instability seems to be endemic in most political sys­
tems.
Unstable political systems have certain distinguishing features.
These include frequent shifts from one type of regime to another, eg,
monarchy to republic, from civilian dictatorship to military rule or
from one democratic framework to a different one; frequent changes
in the personnel of the state; and recurring violence in the form of
riots, demonstrations, revolts, ethnic warfare, coups and counter coups.
On the other hand, political stability has certain distinctive com­
ponents. David Roth and Frank Wilson, identify them as legitimacy,
management of conflict, and durability.2 A political system is stable
where the public perceives its institutions and leaders as legitimate.
That is, the means for attaining political power and the established
institutions through which power is exercised must enjoy general or
mass support. A legitimate government has the capacity to com­
mand obedience without using coercive tactics.
Coercion and other extra legal measures are instruments nor­
mally utilized by unstable and feeble regimes to command obedience
and acceptance. At times, and even in stable polities, a legitimate
government may lose its support through ineffective policies. Such
a situation might lead to a call for fresh elections (as it happened in
Britain last April 1992), aimed at winning back the mandate of the
electorate. In most developing countries, however, perception by the
government of lack of support and disenchantment with the system
by the citizenry might be the harbinger of more repression or military
intervention.
Max Weber3 identified three kinds of legitimacy: traditional,
charismatic, and rational-legal. Traditional authority subsists on
accepted beliefs in the sanctity of tradition, historical institutions and
individual occupants of traditional positions of authority. Charis­
matic authority is characterized by the public acceptance of a ruler/
individual with exceptional powers or authority. Such exceptional
leaders always emerge in crisis situations. Rational-legal authority
is based on the acceptance of the legality of established rules and of
the right to govern of those who come to power in observance of these
rules.
A regime's claim to authority may be based on any or a com-
nation of these Weberian sources of authority. It must, however,
>e stressed that military intervention and rule is now a common
urce of political authority in developing countries. Where a regime

225
attains power outside the Weberian sources of authority, it normally
adopts several measures, including intimidation and coercion etc, to
either legitimize itself or put opposition in line. Even if power is
attained through the identified Weberian sources, such a legitimate
government risks its support if it subverts the civil liberties of the
people and fail to fulfill their expectations. For instance, during
the first republic, the regime's legitimacy was compromised on
account of the flagrant disregard for the basic norms of democratic
governance. Instability was created as a result and this con­
tributed to the military intervention of 1966.
The second component of stability is management of conflict. Political
systems face various conflicting situations emanating from several
competing sectors within nations. The system's capability in mediat­
ing demands made by ethnic, religious, socio-economic and other
cleavages helps in ensuring stability. Whether this intra-state
competition will culminate in violence or engender stability, will
depend on the following; the level of development of the political
system; the capabilities of policy makers; and the political maturity of
the leaders of the various competing groups. However, where intran­
sigence, arrogance, and lack of respect for democratic rules of gover­
nance reign supreme, resolutions of various conflicts become difficult.
Furthermore, where institutional weakness persists, resolution of
competitive demands becomes unnecessarily tasking. Conflict is a
recurrent phenomenon in any political system and the cost of unre­
solved conflict is political instability and loss of legitimacy by the
government.
The durability of the political system over time is the third
component of political stability. Successful crisis resolution enhances
a regime's ability to overcome future crises. Sheer luck may, how­
ever, enable a system to persist by muddling through crises with little
effort at managing them. A regime's durability will be attained
where consensual politics is the norm and mechanisms for crisis
resolution or management are efficient.
On the basis of the foregoing, the paper gives a brief overview
of the negative politics of the government and the opposition during
the first three republics. By negative politics, we imply the use of such
methods of governance that invariably undermine the constitutional
legitimacy of regimes, create instability and thereby make military
intervention an easy task as a result of the ready support it gets
from the people. Next, the sources of stability and instability in

226
the general African context are examined to serve as the bases for
analyzing the future prospects for political stability in Ghana.

Political Parties and Stability in the Earlier Republics

Political parties are formed for various reasons. However, by nature,

parties are organizations that seek to control the government by
nominating candidates for office and winning power through the
election process. Parties aim to acquire power and to retain such
power once it has been won. This objective could be attained only
when the ruling party meets the aspirations of the majority of the
people.
The existence of parties further implies acceptance of the idea
that the people must be taken into consideration in the orga­
nization and administration of the polity .4 In our Ghanaian
context, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) and its radical
offshoot, the Convention Peoples'Party (CPP), emerged to lay claim
to self-government and ipso facto the right to participate in the
governance of the country.
Even though parties formulate policies to win election, some
emerged in the past for clearly defined regional or ethnic reasons. For
instance, whereas the UGCC and the CPP emerged in reaction to
colonialism that deprived citizens of the right to participation in the
political process, and for broader national objectives, others like
the Ga Shifimo Kpee, The Togoland Congress, The Northern Peoples'
Party and the Muslim Association Party, emerged for ethnic or
regional and religious reasons.
The erroneous conception that multi-partyism is the harbinger
of conflict and instability owes its origins to the sharp differences and
conflicts between the perspectives, goals, and aspirations of political
parties as well as the methods adopted by such religious, regional
and ethnic based parties to attain their political objectives in the past.
Such parties perceived the party system as a means to defend
regional or ethnic political and economic interests. Their irreconcil-
ble positions and the uncertainty over the political future of such
hnic groups in the immediate pre-independence period partly
explain the spate of violence that became a feature of pre-
id ependence politics.
The CPP faced an onerous task in the face of a polity divided

227
along ethnic and religious lines. The stability of the nation depended
on how the ruling party approached the problems of nation building
and especially the issue of political opposition.

The First Republic

The stability of the first republic was gravely undermined by the method
of governance adopted by the ruling CPP. Dr. Nkrumah had earlier
identified ethnicity as a potentially destabilizing factor in the country.
In 1954, he warned the Legislative Assembly that any toleration of the
formation of political parties on regional, sectional or religious bases
was bound to lead to political chaos and worse still, sow the seeds of
the destruction of our national existence.5 So far as Nkrumah was
concerned, the opposition was not to be tolerated because of its regional,
ethnic or religious biases. The fact that the opposition groups merged
to form the United Party after independence, and thus could no longer
be said to be ethnically or regionally based, did not matter to the CPP.
Ironically, both Dr. Nkrumah, the Prime Minister and Dr. Busia who
was the leader of the Opposition group in parliament called for mutual
co - operation from the Government and the Opposition to guarantee
the greater happiness, progress, success and greatness of the country.6
This was not to be. The notion of an Opposition ready to subject its
policies to criticisms most probably rankled the CPP leadership. The
method of governance adopted therefore had the long term objective
of dealing once and for all with all shades of organized and unorganized
political opposition.
The promulgation of the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) in
1958 which led to the detention without trial of many opposition
members; the "profound dislike by Nkrumah of any open criticism of his
rule"7; the imposition of one party state in 1964 etc, contributed immea­
surably to the systematic erosion of the civil liberties of Ghanaians.
Theoretically therefore, the CPP lost its constitutional legitimacy
on account of the obnoxious methods of governance it adopted.
More significantly, the adoption of one party rule demonstrated
the government7s unwillingness to share power with other groups. It
was assumed that one party ism would bring about national unity and
rapid development. This proved to be illusory. In fact, the elimination
of the opposition was the culmination of various acts that fly in the face
of good governance. The legislature pandered to the whims of the

228
executive under the one party system. Even before the adoption
of one party government, the CPP sought to curtail the judiciary's
independence. This was done when Nkrumah brazenly dismissed Sir
Arku Korsah as Chief Justice on December 11,1963. His offence was
the acquittal of Tawia Adamafio, Ako Adjei and Coffie Crabbe in the
Kulungugu bomb incident trial. On December 23, 1963, the Law of
Criminal Procedure (Amendment no.2) Act which empowered
Nkrumah to quash any decision of the Special Court was passed.
Consequently, on December 25, the president declared Sir Arku
Korsah's professional judgement null and void.
Most of the measures adopted by the CPP to ensure its continued
stay in office had the effect of creating political instability. The
measures were reacted to by the Opposition through assassination
attempts on the life of Dr. Nkrumah. Since Nkrumah broadened the
scope of his autocratic control to cover the judiciary, one can argue that
the invocation of national unity and development as pretexts for the
establishment of one party government was just one of the means to
ensure his personalized rule. It was not surprising, therefore, that by
the end of 1964 the country was manifestly unstable. According to
Denis Austin, the CPP government was in total disarray, the state
itself mortally damaged by governmental attacks on the judiciary,
police, the civil service and the universities.8
In a nutshell, while the ruling party did everything in its power
to perpetuate its rule through the PDA, the establishment of one
party state and elimination of the opposition party, electoral fraud,
suppression of the judiciary etc, the Opposition, anxious to partici­
pate in the political process and unwilling (naturally) to accept the
unlawful prohibition of its operations, adopted several measures,
including subversive activities, to topple the government. An envi­
ronment of chronic instability was therefore created for the military
to intervene. It is arguable that the situation and perhaps the history
of the nation would have been different if the avenues for a peaceful
and democratic change of government had not been completely
blocked by the ruling party.
In any political system, opposition members who are treated as
ical pariahs and hunted like animals "can be easily pushed to
ss infelicity"9 and be compelled to resort to desperate mea-
We need to accept the truism that any government (no matter
ectoral advantage) which fails to realize the essence of the
ition, either by omission or commission endangers national

229
stability, unity and security. Competitive party systems can only
emerge where parties are pragmatic and realistic enough to accept
the legitimacy of political dissent and opposition. It becomes easy
for national leaders to resolve societal conflicts and thereby ensure
stability when this fundamental truth is accepted. Unfortunately,
the CPP failed to accept this fundamental political principle and
resorted to measures that eventually led to its overthrow.

The Second Republic

The second republic took off in 1969 after three years of military rule.
However, the seeds of instability were apparently sown even before
the take off of the second republic. First, in 1969, just as in 1956,
political campaigns quickly degenerated into what one analyst termed
"virulent effusions of bad taste" characterized by "insulting jour­
nalistic activities that thrived on personality digging,"10 rather than
the presentation of alternative goals and means of attaining these
goals. Secondly, in spite of the lopsided electoral victory of the
Progress Party (winning 105 out of the 140 parliamentary seats) some
people were not happy with the measures taken by the NLC to
deprive some people of their rights as citizens. For instance, apart
from the banning of the Peoples' Popular Party (PPP) which was
alleged to have had links with the CPP, Mr. K.A. Gbedemah was
disqualified from being a member of the National Assembly by
the controversial article 71 clause 2, paragraph(b) (ii) of the 1969
constitution.
The Progress Party (PP) government could be faulted on three
grounds; inability to cope with the economic situation; poor relations
with principal social groupings; and suspected level of commitment
to the precepts of liberal democracy.
The major economic problems faced by the PP were; rising prices,
escalating unemployment, rising taxation which was opposed by a
broad spectrum of social groupings, stagnating agricultural output,
falling commodity prices, etc. The attempt to resuscitate the economy
compelled the PP government to implement certain economic mea­
sures. These included a national development levy to finance rural
development; the Aliens Compliance Order of 1969, and the Business
Promotion Act designed to alleviate unemployment and to transfer
certain foreign-owned enterprises to Ghanaians; import controls; and

230
44% devaluation of the national currency. These measures backfired
because they were unpopular. David Goldworthy opines that:

almost all the regime's economic orthodoxies were unpopular,

none more so than the final stroke of devaluation and no amount
of rational explanation in terms of the international financial crisis
andthe worla-wide demand-slump for agricultural produce could
save Dr. Busia himself from the major share of the opprobrium.11

The government's persistent attempts to gain relief from external

creditors and obtain enough funding from external sources were not
successful. Ronald Libby points out that the policies adopted by
external donors such as the World Bank and the IMF "were cata­
strophic" for Ghana, "and destroyed what remained of the democratic
government's public support. This dramatic change in public climate
made the government fatally vulnerable to a military coup d'etat."12
Furthermore, the government's relations with major social groupings,
and commitment to democratic governance became questionable in
some respects.
For instance, in September 1971, the government froze the assets
of the TUC and a new Industrial Relations Bill aimed at abolishing the
TUC and distributing its assets among member unions to make them
autonomous was rushed through parliament. But this was miscon­
strued and was not well received by the rank and file of the TUC. The
issue of declaration of assets raised by Lt. General Ocran, a member of
the Presidential Commission led to his public vilification. The students
in higher institutions were equally disenchanted by the introduction of
a loan scheme. Dr. Busia himself showed little regard for the judiciary
in the famous Sallah case. Nonetheless, he never reversed the decision
taken by the court as it happened during the First Republic.
It must be stressed that no government can rule without a solid
support base, but this was precisely what was undermined by the
policies adopted by the government. On this, Dennis Austin aptly notes
that, "with remarkable fortitude...the Progress government engaged in
battle with each section of its supporters."13Thus by the time of the coup,
vario11s segments of the Ghanaian society ranging from students, trades
uni organization, the judiciary, and the army had been disenchanted
to some extent by Busia's methods of governance.
rious problem which was not the making of the PP government
itcome of ethnic cleavages was the polarization of parliament
alo ethnic lines. The Opposition in Parliament was predominantly

231
Ewe, while the PP was predominantly Akan. The merger of the
opposition parties to form the Justice Party did not in any way affect
the polarization of parliament along ethnic lines due to the overwhelm­
ing majority of the PP in parliament. The irony of the situation was
that before the elections, both Dr. Busia and Mr. K. A. Gbedemah, like
Dr. Nkrumah before them, decried the ethnic sentiments being ex­
pressed during the transition period. Dr. Busia warned the country in
1969 that the magnitude of tribal associations in the country posed a
serious threat to the smooth organization of party activities. Mr. K A.
Gbedemah also referred to the ethnic sentiments being expressed during
the campaign as a "dreadful tragedy" and implored Ghanaians "to
remove the stain of tribal nepotism ,"14
The clear division in parliament in 1969 underlined the dangers
of Ghanaian proclivity towards ethnic exclusiveness. The Opposition
apparently saw nothing good in any policy decision put forward by
the ruling party. Its method of walk-outs from parliamentary debates
made parliamentary work difficult. Maybe, it wrongly perceived its
duty in parliament as merely to oppose whatever the government
stood for irrespective of its merits. The Opposition therefore contrib­
uted in undermining the durability of the fledgling democracy.
Nevertheless, the country in comparative terms, enjoyed free­
dom of speech, press and other individual liberties during the Second
Republic. For sure, the party system was a great improvement on that
of the First Republic. In spite of the ethnic-based Opposition in Par­
liament, the stability of the nation was not under any serious threat
as a result of the operation of the party system. The major problem
was the poor economy. The economic predicament of the nation, in
the words of Goldworthy, "tightly constrained decision-making and
ensured m any unpopular policies"15 which underm ined the
government's constitutional legitimacy and public support.
It could be hypothesized that with time the ruling party could
have resolved the socio-political and economic contradictions. The
PNDC's first two and half years in office attest to the fact that two and
half years is too short a time for any meaningful assessment of the
economic performance of a regime that was not ruling by fiat. What
must be underlined is the ingrained Ghanaian impatience with liberal-
democratic regimes. The national expectations of what Max Assimeng
terms "all kinds of political and economic cornucopia"16 within a very
short time makes the appearance of self-proclaimed redeemers, libera­
tors, and revolutionaries appear timely and desirable. So long as

232
Ghanaians look for short cuts to economic cornucopia, we shall
continue to wander in the political wilderness; and be ruled by
self-serving and self-appointed people who parade under revolution­
ary and other populist banners.

The Third Republic

Dr.Limann's PNP came to power in 1979 with impressive victories in

both the parliamentary and presidential elections. In the parliamentary
elections, the party won 71 out of the 140 seats while the main rival —
the Popular Front Party (PFP) — won 42 seats. The opposition parties
together had 69 seats in parliament. Dr. Limann won the presidential
election in a second ballot defeating the PFP candidate, Mr. Victor
Owusu. The stage was therefore well set for a competitive party system
in the country. Unfortunately, the PNP assumed power at a time almost
everything had gone wrong politically and economically in Ghana. It
was also a time that public expectations were at a fever pitch due
partly to the '"house cleaning" exercise embarked upon by the AFRC and
the electoral promises made by the winning party. Politically, the
country was unstable after the brief intervention of the AFRC. It is trite
to note that the AFRC rule clearly brutalized the military command
structure, unleashed an unprecedented indiscipline in the army and
seemed to have created enmity between the NCOs and the officers. This
created an aura of psychological insecurity that most probably
affected government performance.
Economically, the situation was chaotic after the seven years of
economic mismanagement by the SMC. The situation was worsened by
the ill-advised AFRC-sponsored sale at ridiculous prices of almost
everything in the stores and warehouses. By the time the PNP assumed
power, there was scarcity of consumer items of every imaginable kind.
The nation was virtually bankrupt.
The party system, however, appeared to be the best for the
country. The run off for the presidency was an indication that an
alternative group could easily dislodge the ruling party in any fair
elections if the incumbent failed to perform. Given the in-fighting
within the ruling government, the proposed merger of the opposition
to form the All Peoples' Party (APP), and the slim parliamentary
majority of the PNP, the government could have en defeated by
the opposition in the next elections. The political c sate engendered

233
by the party system during the Third Republic was, therefore, more
propitious for competitive politics than the earlier republics. For
instance, the opposition group cut across the ethnic spectrum unlike
under the Second Republic, and most members were seasoned poli­
ticians who were presumably well aware of the demands of respon­
sible opposition. It was a credit to the party system of the Third
Republic that for the first time in the political history of the country
the budget of the ruling government was rejected by parliament and
had to be modified to be accepted. To all intents and purposes, the
stage was set for responsible governance, responsible opposition,
com petitive party system , developm ent of dem ocratic
loyalties and the strengthening of democratic institutions.
Ironically, the life of the democratically elected government was
again truncated by the military. For sure, the public had substantial
expectations which were contributed to by the various promises "of
short and long-term economic prosperity7'17 during the electioneering
campaign. Public disappointment led to indirect pressure on the
government and created problems for the PNP. The pressures for good
performance were heightened by the warning given by Rawlings that
the "politicians were on probation."18 The PNP contributed to its
problems further by their internal wrangling and jockeying for posi­
tions. The government appeared impotent also in the face of serious
economic and social crises brought about by low productivity in various
sectors of the economy. To be brunt, the PNP needed to do more at the
economic front to check inflation, unemployment, low productivity etc,
than the "muddling through" approach it apparently adopted. The
economic crisis obviously affected the support base of the regime. As
pointed out by Hanson:

The poor performance of the government tended to undermine its

constitutional legitimacy. In Ghana, as in many developing coun­
tries, the legitimacy of the political order is not a settlea issue.
Important as constitutional legitimacy is, it is not enough to sustain
a government. It needs a material base to breathe life and meaning
into it and it was in this that many people saw that the regime had
failed.19

The fact that there was no immediate spontaneous supportive reac­

tion to the coup of December 1981 was indicative of the apprehension
people were in. Was another military intervention the panacea to our
economic woes? Were Rawlings and his followers motivated by

234
blind personal ambitions or genuine concern for the plight of the
nation? Answers to these questions are obviously beyond the scope
of this paper. It suffices to say that we are all witnesses to what has
transpired in the almost eleven years of PNDC rule.20 Even though
the Second and Third Republics were faced with daunting socio­
economic problems, the situations were not so desperate to warrant
military interventions. To be sure, the life spans of the republics were
too short; the legitimacy of the regimes were not in serious doubt,
and their capabilities at conflict management were not allowed by the
military to be fully tested.
It seems, therefore, that the military interventions were propelled
by considerations other than manifest instability. It is, therefore, neces­
sary for us to highlight some sources of stability and instability in
general terms in order to project the prospects for stable democratic
governance during the 4th Republic.

Sources of Stability and Instability

The sources of political stability and instability are varied and are
influenced by different circumstances. We can identify at least four
major sources, namely, ethnic or cultural differences, socio-economic
conditions, type of political institutions, and international influences.
An important source of political instability, especially in Africa, is
ethnic cleavages and, or cultural differences. Attempts at nation build­
ing in thedeveloping world have been constrained because in most cases
countries are divided internally as a result of distinctive differences of
language, religion, race, and region of resident.21 Sudan offers a classic
example where Arabs and black Africans are divided by geography,
religion and language. This has resulted in bitter conflicts and struggles
for the control of the state. Jackson and Rosberg note that, political
tensions and conflicts emanating from ethnic divisions can seriously
undermine political stability and the ability of any government to
control its territory.22 In Ghana, the Nanumba-Konkomba, and the
Gonja-Nawuri ethnic conflicts have been lingering for a long time. Even
though the conflicts are regionalized, they have very serious implica­
tions for national stability. As noted, parliamentary work during the
<ond Republic was burdened by the fact that the Opposition was
dominantly ethnic based. This had the potential of undermining
itional cohesion and instability.

235
 Extreme ethnic cleavages has led to a series of conflicts in many
parts of Africa. For instance, ethnic conflicts contributed to the at­
tempted secession of Biafra and a devastating civil war in Nigeria from
1967-1970. The on-going civil war in Somalia after the fall of Siad
Barre is traceable, among other causes, to divisive ethnic rivalries.
Togo, Rwanda, Kenya, Liberia etc., have at one time or another
witnessed the vicious nature of ethnic intolerance. It must be empha­
sized that in all cases, serious civil conflict develops where ethnic
differences have been unduly politicized.
Cultural and ethnic conflicts are not the characteristics of polities
in only the developing countries. In Canada, cultural or linguistic
differences between Quebec and the rest of the country have persisted
over the years. As at now, some parts of Europe are in the throes of
ethnic wars. Ethnic differences have contributed to a virtual disintegra­
tion of Yugoslavia and has led to a brutal civil war between Serbians
and Croatians. Ethnic intolerance and a devastating civil war have
afflicted Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Commonwealth of Indepen­
dent States (CIS). These are pointers to the fact that ethnicity and the
instability it creates is world wide. It is a socio-political canker that
negatively affects economic development not only in Africa but in
other parts of the world. In short, ethnicity has the potential of
destabilizing any political system unless it is handled with circumspec­
tion by those in authority.
Secondly, the political stability of any nation is affected by the
prevailing socio-economic conditions. The continuous decline in the
standards of living in most African countries account for various levels
of instability on the continent For instance, the late Samuel Doe of
Liberia capitalized on the "rice riots" of 1980 to overthrow the Tolbert
regime. Rothchild and Gyimah-Boadi note that, "Ghanaian hopes for
economic prosperity at independence were replaced by a mood of
disillusionment in the mid-1960s as the Nkrumah policies brought
consumer scarcities and mounting inflation."23 The cumulative impact
of deteriorating economic conditions contributed to the fall of the earlier
republics and the military regime of General Acheampong. According
to the World Bank, between 1970 and 1982, Ghana's income per capita
fell by 30% and real wages by 80%; import volume fell by two-thirds; net
export earning fell by one-half, and the ratio of Ghana's exports to Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) dropped from 21 to 4 per cent. In addition, the
domestic savings rate fell from 12 to 3 per cent of GDP.24
In all cases, socio-economic problems lead to frustrations and

236
generate political instability. Philip Cutright opines that economic
development and the wealth it generates, industrialization, efficient
communications and education contribute to stable democracy. In his
view, well-to-do nations have greater chances of sustaining democ­
racy25 and ipso facto, stability. By implication, wealthy nations are
more stable than poor nations. Even though not all relatively well-to-
do nations are stable, (e.g. Israel and Iraq), there is little doubt that a
close correlation exist between political stability and the economic
well-being of a state. In actual fact, stable political systems are often
the more highly developed.26 Maxwell Owusu also notes that "na­
tional political cohesion will continue to depend largely on ... rapid
economic progress."27
Whereas improved socio-economic conditions augurs well for
political stability, there are cases such as Tanzania, Zambia and
Malawi in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s where in absence of wealth,
stability became the hall mark of their political systems. The most
plausible reason for this might be the type of political system operated
during the periods. In situations where totalitarian, personalized one
party rule is the norm, stability is attained through the manipulations of
the political systems, intimidations of real and imaginary political
opponents and general deprivations of individual rights. Under such
conditions a semblance of stability is attained but it happens to be
stability with very shaky foundations and which confers very little
lasting developmental benefits on the nations concerned.
Thirdly, the type of political institutions also influence political
stability. In the view of Samuel Huntington, a nation can avoid instabil­
ity if it develops adaptable, complex and coherent political institutions
capable of responding to citizen demands.28 The tragedy of most Sub-
Saharan African countries is that frequent military interventions in the
democratic process have stunted the growth or development of capable
political institutions. Not until the military realizes the long term harm
its frequent forays into civilian administrations do to institutional build­
ing and capabilities, most African countries will continue to bear the
cross of weak institutions and political instability.
A related argument for stability is about political culture which
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba term the civic culture. They define
political culture in terms of political orientations and attitudes held by
nd ividua Is in relation to their political systems. This includes orien-
ations that favour both active political participation and passive
ct. eptance; rationality and traditionality; and consensus and cleavage.

237
These could characterize both the nation and individuals.29
For Maxwell Owusu, political culture encompasses "the total
environment of ideas, beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, values, judgments,
sentiments and expectations that shape, define and sustain the relation­
ship between leaders and the led, politicians and the constituents."30 In
Ghana, due to the complete absence of civic responsibility borne out of
overwhelming political commitment to societal norms capable of stabi­
lizing the polity,31 the political system easily crumbles any time serious
economic, social and political difficulties arise. We need to stress that
democratic political culture which is conducive to national stability
could be acquired through consistent adherence to democratic system of
governance. The longevity of democratic governance will promote
loyalties which will help citizens to counteract any threat to the estab­
lished order. On this, Martin Grondzins avers that national loyalties in
democratic systems are largely by - products of participation in volun­
tary groups. Such loyalties are not borne out of manipulation from
above. As such, they are not submissive, are more studied, and less
emotional.32 To sustain such loyalties, democratic governments must
ensure economic satisfaction, civil liberties, judicial independence, etc.
Finally, political instability may be created by external circum­
stances. For instance, the regime of Salvadore Allende of Chile was
destabilized by the American CIA. The conditions were created for
general chaos brought about by economic hardships and this paved the
way for the military to overthrow the socialist regime in 1973. In
Southern Africa, the apartheid government of South Africa carried out
a series of incursions into Botswana, Lesotho and Angola in alleged
pursuits of ANC guerrillas, thus destabilizing such countries. Until quite
recently, South Africa was funding REN AMO to wage guerrilla attacks
on the legitimate government of Mozambique. The impact of these
destabilization measures cannot be gainsaid. The PNP government of
Dr. Limann had cause to warn Libya, and later broke off Ghana's
diplomatic relations with Libya for allegedly subverting his govern­
ment. In the mid-1980s, the PNDC accused USA of covert subversion
aimed at destabilizing the government.
Indisputably, international influences both direct and indirect,
manifested through economic, cultural, political and military mediation
can either help to stabilize or destabilize a country. It must be added that
the attitude of the ruling party or group toward the opposition either
enhances stability or generates instability. Where the ruling party fails
to appreciate the worth of the opposition in a democratic setting, serious

238
problems capable of undermining national stability crop up.
Ghita Ionescu and Isabel de Madariaga see political opposition as
the most advanced and institutionalized form of political conflict.33The
essence of political opposition lies in its provision of a democratic basis
for a competitive struggle for power. Effective political competition
through legitimate channels such as the political system decreases the
likelihood of violence and ensures stability. On the other hand,
violence and confrontation become ready tools for the opposition in a
situation where the ruling party or political system deprives those in
opposition of the channels for effective political participation in the
affairs of the state. This was precisely what occurred during the First
Republic. The CPP operated the party system in such a manner which
made it impossible for the Opposition to contribute to national discus­
sions; in fact, all democratic means to effect a regime change or ensure
meaningful participation by those with contrary views were blocked.
A related factor which is very relevant to our current situation is
the mode of transition from one system of governance to another. In
post-colonial Africa, regime changes have in most cases been either
from one party civilian dictatorship to authoritarian military rule
through coup d'etat or from military authoritarianism to civilian
constitutional rule. If transitions are not handled circumspectly, those
leaving might feel aggrieved and might find means to undermine the
process. It must be stated unequivocally, however, that instability has
been the lot of countries where the military dictatorships have sought
to perpetuate their rule by constitutional means. The on-going political
melodrama with its disastrous effects on Zaire and Togo are classic
examples. The civil war in Liberia was caused by the late Samuel Doe's
electoral gerrymandering that transformed him from a military dicta­
tor to a civilian head of state. Any time dictators (whether civilian or
military) overstay their welcome, their countries are plunged into
chaos.
It is a truism that the military has dominated the political life of
Ghanaians for a long time. It is also a fact that the party systems, as
operated by the earlier republics, gave cause for concern, and to a large
extent engendered instability in various forms. At the same time it will
be foolhardy for us to ignore the underlying factors of military
adventurism and personal ambitions of some of the coup makers. The
important issue is that the country is at the threshold of yet another
constitutional order. In the light of our past experiences and the various
sources of stability and instability discussed above, one is tempted to

239
 ask what the prospects for political stability are in the 4th Republic.

Prospects for the Future

The political system has been under military siege since 1966. The
country is, therefore, yet to get the best out of political parties. Conse­
quently, predicting the political future of the next constitutional govern­
ment is an exceptionally difficult task. We can only take consolation
from the fact that there has been a qualitative improvement in civilian
regime performance since the ouster of the First Republic especially
with regard to the rule of law and respect for civil liberties. One cannot
say the same for military regimes the country has had. The more
matured civilian administrations prove to be over the years, the more
repressive and dictatorial military regimes become.
Frequent military interventions have negatively affected the de­
velopment of strong party traditions in the country. It seems therefore
that the long term stability of the nation and the ability of the party
system to play any meaningful role in the country in future will depend
among other variables, on the level of military support for the political
system. Will the military (which is now highly politicized) readily
consign itself to its traditional role after many years of ruling this
country? It suffices to state categorically that the fundamental duty of
the military is to defend the country and its governmental institutions
but not to subvert them through interventions. It is not likely that the
spate of instability, with particular reference to military interventions,
would change very much if the military is not prepared to play its
traditional role. However, since the military capitalize on general
discontent to intervene in national politics, it behoves the next consti­
tutional government to provide able and transparent leadership and
thus avoid creating the conditions for interventions.
Another salient issue is that many civilian and "military politi­
cians" have made their careers since 1966 under military regimes. These
people must realize by now that both military and civilian regimes have
their failings. They must, therefore, stop instigating the military to ride
on their shoulders to attain what they will normally fail to attain under
democratic civilian governments. Simply put, the military must stop
vetoing the will of the people only to satisfy another batch of civiliai i and
ntilitaiy-politicians who benefit from every military intervention.
Deteriorating socio-economic conditions have been major sources

240
of instability in Ghana. The prospects for stability are therefore, bleak
if Ghanaians in general fail to realize the enormous socio-economic
problems facing the nation at the moment. The PNDC's success in
pursuing draconian economic measures was due to the absence of
constitutional limitations. If the measures had been pursued under a
democratic party system, the government in power would have most
probably been ousted. If the party system is to succeed in ensuring
stability Ghanaians must accept the restrictions imposed by constitu­
tionalism on the range of policy options that could be pursued. Our
ability to appreciate what it takes to reach a consensus under demo­
cratic governments will minimize the pressures we unduly put on
civilian regimes. Such pressures from various social groups even
before the government gets stabilized tend to undermine the constitu­
tional legitimacy of governments and induce the military to intervene.
That is, our preparedness to respect the cultural milieu of democratic
governance will greatly enhance the party system and thereby ensure
national stability and development.
Finally, a lot will depend on how the party system is operated by
the ruling and opposition parties. These two groups should not fail to
note the tremendous responsibilities that will be imposed on them after
7 January 1993. Apart from sheer military adventurism and personal
ambitions of most coup leaders, it could be argued that the ruling party
and the opposition often facilitate military coups through their modes of
operating and playing the political game. The opposition, for instance,
has over the years proved to be the most effective factor in mobilizing
popular discontent against any regime. The alacrity with which
opposition members accept political appointments dangled by military
regimes strengthens one's suspicions that parliamentary opposition
members and their supporters outside parliament indirectly entice
the military to intervene. It shows further that the Opposition has, over
the years, contributed immensely to political instability. The Opposition's
presence and worth must be made through meaningful, constructive
and intelligent contributions to debate on national issues in parliament
rather than the utilization of negative and anachronistic weapons
such as boycotts or walkouts and name calling. A responsible opposi­
tion normally co-operates with the ruling party to find lasting solutions
o serious national problems through healthy parliamentary debates.
By so doing, the legitimacy of the democratic system is assured, its
apabilities at conflict management enhanced and its durability
uaranteed. Simply, we need to develop a culture of healthy

241
democratic debates in order to promote political stability.
It must be underscored that no ruling party can meaningfully
satisfy all constituents. At the same time a ruling government must
prove its commitment to democratic ethos of governance to enhance
political stability. Where a government goes out of its way to incarcer­
ate or detain imaginary or real political opponents on trumped-up
charges as it happened during the First Republic; antagonizes sensitive
social groups and ipso facto its support base, as in the Second Republic;
or proves to be impotent in the face of avoidable and disruptive political
in-fighting, as in the Third Republic etc., instability is created
and democracy is greatly imperiled.
As noted, competitive demands are endemic in any political
system. In a system such as ours with a disabling unemployment rate,
poor standards of living, chronic debt burden, fluctuating external
earnings, high levels of illiteracy etc., it is natural to expect demands
from various national or social groups to be sharper and be more
violently expressed in future. Unlike dictatorial, single party or mili­
tary regimes, democratic governments cannot readily and easily resort
to unorthodox means to contain citizen demands. Nevertheless, na­
tional stability will be greatly influenced by the measures that will be
adopted to tackle not only demands from various social and articulate
groups but more significantly, the fundamental problem of the eco­
nomic well-being of the generality of the people. As David Levine
aptly notes, "a political order that recognizes these needs and perspec­
tives as legitimate and provides a place for their free expression is likely
to be more durable, stable, and secure..."34 This is the challenge that
faces the ruling and opposition parties in the 4th Republic.
In our present Ghanaian situation, however, a lot will depend on
how the ruling PNDC ushers the country into the 4th Republic. Unless
the government amply demonstrates its good faith by ensuring fairness
in the run up to elections, it will be difficult to guarantee the future
stability of the nation. The emerging parties are genuinely worried about
many things. These include the PNDC's lack of neutrality in the transi­
tion process; the arbitrary imposition of the transition process without
dueconsultation with the opposing democratic forces; insensitiveness to
demands for changes to the electoral register; the plan to conduct the
presidential and parliamentary elections on different days in the face of
grave financial problems, as well as misgivings expressed about the
possible bandwagon effects of the presidential on the parliamentary
elections; failure or unwillingness to dissolve the paramilitary organs

242
such as the CDOs, militia and commandos in order to ensure an
atmosphere devoid of intimidation of political opponents; failure to
grant general and unconditional amnesty to political exiles etc.
The best way the PNDC can help to stabilize the 4th republic is to
heed popular demands and thereby eliminate the dangerously grow­
ing mass disenchantment with the transition process. Continued
disregard for the wishes of the people and especially the clearly
disadvantaged political parties is a recipe for national instability and
disaster.

Conclusion

It is clear from the above discussions that instability as a result of frequent

military interventions, civilian government's inability, at times, to
conform to democratic ethos of governance, political in-fighting
among leading party members at the expense of national issues of
importance, both military and civilian government's failure to find
lasting solutions to pressing economic problems etc, have been recur­
ring themes in the political history of Ghana. Thus, the major bane of
political stability has been the negative politics of both the government
and the opposition as well as the unfettered ambitions of some military
personnel.
Given our past experiences, it is apt to conclude that national
stability will depend, among others, on the following; the responsive­
ness of the govemment-to-be, to the needs of the majority of the people;
creation of general national awareness on the seriousness of the socio­
economic and political challenges in the coming years through sus­
tained political education; governmental adherence to constitutional­
ism; the level of maturity that will be exhibited by both the government
and the opposition when dilating on issues of national concern; avoid­
ing sentiments and policies that tend to incite ethnic exclusiveness and
enmity; facilitating effective collaboration between the government
and the opposition through regular seminars or workshops; and the
extent to which the military will succeed in exorcizing itself of its
arbiter mentality.
While the nature of the economy will be crucial to stability, it
is expected that the pursuit of viable economic policies, capable of
positively affecting the well-being of the ordinary man, will make it
possible for Ghanaians to accept the realities of the moment.

243
 NOTES

1. See Jackson R.H. and Rosberg, C.G. "Why Africa's Weak States Persist:
The Empirical and Juridical in Statehood" in Robert Matthews et al,
International Conflict and Conflict Management, Prentice-Hall of Canada,
Scarborough, 1984, p. 196
2. Roth, David and Wilson, Frank The Comparative Study of Politics, Houghton
Mifflin Co. Boston,1976, p.440.
3. Weber, Max The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, New York, Free
Press, 1947, pp.324-429, cited in Roth and Wilson, op.cit.p.440
4. Landes, Roland G. The Canadian Polity, Prentice Hall, Canada Inc.
Scarborough, 1983, p.254.
5. Austin, Dennis Politics in Ghana:1946-1960, Oxford University Press, 1970,
p.252.
6. Ibid. p.357.
7. Ibid. p.371.
8. Ibid. p.395.
9. Legon Observer, 5 September, 1969, p.2.
10. Legon Observer, 15 September, 1969, p.4.
11. Gold worthy, "Ghana's Second Republic: A Post-Mortem," African
Affairs, 72,1973, p. 11
12. See Ronald Libby "External Co-optation of a Less Developed Country's
Policy Making: The Case of Ghana 1969-72 " World Politics, 1:10,1976,
p.67.
13. Cited in Goldworthy, op.cit. p.12.
14. See Legon Observer, 15 September, 1969, p.2.
15. Gold worthy, op.cit. p. 19.
16. Legon Observer, 27 August, 1969, p.6.
17. Rothchild and Gyimah-Boadi, op.cit. p.14.
18. See West Africa, 4 Feb., 1980, p.189.
19. Hanson, Emmanuel "The State and Popular Struggles in Ghana;l982-86
in Peter Anyang'Nyongo ed. Popidar Struggles for Democracy in Africa,
UNU, Zed Books Ltd., London, 1987, p. 172.
20. The PNDC has proved to be the most repressive of the post-colonial
regimes Ghana has had. It has had very poor human rights record. Even
though some economic growth has been recorded through the ERP/
SAP, the living conditions of the people have fallen and the nation is
saddled with the highest rates of foreign debts and unemployment
since independence.
21. Jackson and Rosbcrg, op.cit. p.197
22. Ibid.
23. Rothchild, Donald and Gyimah-Boadi, E. "Ghana's Return to Civil
Rule," Africa Today, October 1,1981,p.4.

244
24. The World Bank, Ghana: Policies and Program for Adjustment (Washington,
D.C.) 1989, p.17.
25. Cited in Roth and Wilson, op.cit. p.442.
26. Ibid.
27. Ovvusu Maxwell,Uses and Abuses of Power, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1970, p.332.
28. Cited in Roth and Wilson, op.cit. p.443.
29. Ibid.
30. Owusu Maxwell, "The Search for Solvency: Background to the fall of
Ghana'sSecond Republic: \969-\972,” Africa Today, vol.19, no.l, Winter
1972, p.114.
31. Ibid.
32. Grondzins Morton, "The Basis of National Loyalty"Romano Romani edv
The International Political System, John Wiley & Sons Inc., New York,
1972, p.114.
33. Cited in Ronald Landes, op.cit. p300.
34. Levine Daniel H, "Venezuela: The Nature, Sources, and Prospects of
Democracy" in Larry Diamond et al, Democracy in DevelopingCountries:
Latin America, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1989,
p.284.

245
 Chapter 15

FINANCING OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN GHANA:

AN EXPLORATORY STUDY

Joseph R.A. Ayee

Introduction

The role of finance in party politics cannot be overemphasized. Indeed,

it can be postulated that finance is the"oil that greases the engine"
of party politics.1 An enormous amount of money must be spent to
reach the electorate — to break down public inertia and secure political
activity. Radio and television time, newspaper space, printing of
campaign literature, campaign vehicles and payment of staff emolu­
ments are phenomenally costly. Despite the crucial role that finance
plays in politics, little or no attention has been given to the subject
by scholars on Ghanaian politics.2 This dearth of literature on party
financing may be attributed largely to the fact that the extent of
contributions and the identity of the donors have remained a closely-
guarded secret. This paper sets out to do three things. First, it traces
the history of party financing during the post-colonial period in
Ghana. Second, it identifies and discusses the main features of laws
regulating the funding of parties. Third, it recommends measures
aimed at improving the financial position of political parties. Because
of the paucity of information on financing parties in Ghana, the
paper is exploratory.

The History of Financing Parties in Ghana

Party financing in Ghana is often associated with corrupt practices. The

genesis of this link between party financing and corruption may be
traced to the period of Kwame Nkrumah's Convention People's Party
(CPP). The 1956 Jibowu Commission Report found that the Cocoa
Purchasing Company (CPC), a subsidiary of the Cocoa Marketing Board
(CMB) and established in 1952, instead of being one of the agencies

246
through which loans should be issued to farmers, rather became the
outlet for loans which were channelled to finance the activities of the
CPP and its supporters.3 The Commission emphasized that it was
unable to

dismiss as mere rumour the allegation that the funds of the Cocoa
Purchasing Company had been used either directly or indirectly
for the purposes of the C P P .4

The liquidation of the CPC was followed by the establishment of the

National Development Company (NADECO) as a limited liability
company inJanuary 1958 to finance the CPP, because Nkrumah "thought
that it was unfair to finance the party from public funds." 5 NADECCKs
role as an avenue to finance the CPP is further buttressed by a resolution
of the NADECO Board of Directors on 26 September 1962:

Resolved that in view of the support of the CPP on the question of

African Unity and for its policy of total independence of the
African continent economically, socially and politically, the Com­
pany, being a non-profit making Organization, should support
financially the said CPP by allocating funds which would
otherwise be declared as bonuses to its shareholders or such sums
as it can conveniently allocate without impairing its status,
financial standing or in any way hinder its progress. 6

The A.G. Leventis deal of 1962 which earned Nkrumah and the CPP
$ 2.4 million as a result of the inflated price of the properties of
Leventis and the Sargall transaction were all conducted through
NADECO. It must be pointed out that although NADECO did a
certain amount of legitimate insurance business it became the "av­
enue through which commissions, bribes and other moneys were
collected to finance the CPP. Huge sums of money amounting to
£G588,404 13s 2d were transferred at various dates into the coffers
of the CPP from the funds of NADECO. " 7 In the words of the
Azu Crabbe Commission which probed the affairs of NADECO Ltd
'NADECO was not only the principal prop of the CPP but also the
clearing house for bribes paid either to the CPP or to Nkrumah. " 8
One other method which was used during the Nkrumah period,
o finance the CPP, was the payment of bribes as a condition for the
ward of government contracts. Contractors who refused to pay bribes
vere blacklisted. Extortions of moneys from building contractors no

247
doubt resulted in inflation of contract prices which were paid by the
Ghanaian taxpayer.9
Similar practices prevailed under subsequent civilian regimes.
For example, during the period of the People's National Party (PNP)
there was the Chiavelli affair. It was in connection with this that 5
prominent members of the Party were sentenced in 1982 to various
terms of imprisonment for obtaining a loan, (which they shared among
themselves) to finance the PNP from the Italian businessman, Chiavelli.
This contravened the 1979 Political Parties Decree which stipulated
that no political party should be financed from foreign sources.
Although there was no big scandal with respect to party
financing under the Progress Party (PP) regime, it is tempting to say
that office holders seem to have become important source of financial
support for the party. It would appear that it was because of this that
ministers of the PP were allowed to hold profit-making positions in
private companies and public corporations, contrary to constitutional
stipulations, so long as their motives were deemed "pure, laudable
and public spirited."10
The brief history of party financing reveals that campaign and
organization funds of most of the parties were not raised by contribu­
tions from the rank and file of their supporters but rather from substan­
tial contributions from business interests, legitimate or otherwise, and
from men of means who often but by no means always, expect some­
thing in return. The experience of party funding during 1952-1966 and
1979-1981 shows that the ruling parties were funded from illegal sources,
which promoted corruption. The promulgation of the 1992 Political
Parties Law (PNDCL 208) is, therefore, an attempt to neutralize the
"excesses" of party financing during the First and Third Republics.

Regulation of Party Finance

The 1979 Political Parties Decree (SMCD 229) and the Political Parties
Law of 1992 (PNDCL 208) purport to limit the size of individual
contributions, to prohibit certain types of contributions and to require
political parties to declare their assets, liabilities, expenditure and au­
dited accounts.11The 1979 Decree and the 1992Law mandatorily require
the publication of the size of contributions, the names of contributors,
assets, liabilities and the nature of expenditures before and after elec­
tions. The 1992 Political Parties Law, for instance, stipulates that:

248
 every political party shall within 60 days after the issue to it of a
final certificate or registration submit to the Interim National
Electoral Commission (INEC) — a written declaration giving
details of all its assets and expenditure, — including all contribu­
tions or declarations whether in cash or in kind made or to be
made to the initial assets of the party by its founding members in
respect of the first year of its existence.12

The Law further enjoins a political party to submit to the INEC within
40 days after a public election in which it participated a "detailed
statement — of all expenditure incurred in respect of each candidate
put up or supported by that political party specifying the manner in
which any money involved was spent. " 13 Any political party which
refuses or neglects to comply with the provision or makes a false
declaration will have its registration cancelled.
The assumption behind the requirement to declare assets,
liabilities and expenditures in relation to elections is that the secrecy
surrounding party financing facilitated corruption. In other words,
the requirement is to ensure transparency and accountability in the
operations of political parties.

Limitation on Sources of Funds

The 1979 and 1992 Political Parties Law prohibit or limit contributions
from certain types of sources. Aliens, companies, partnerships, firms or
business enterprises are all barred from contributing to the funds of
political parties. The basic explanation for this limitation is that large
contributions by aliens and business interests are made in expectation
of something in return, for example, the granting of licenses and
award of contracts. Corrupt practices which the granting of licences
and award of contracts promote have serious implications for the
building of a democratic society. Corruption, as Price has pointed out,
undermines the dependability of government organizations and re­
duces the government's capacity to respond to and control its environ­
ment.14 In this way corruption "impedes political development and
negatively affects the attainment of modernization goals."15 Corrup­
tion also undermines the stability of regimes. Indeed, one of the main
reasons offered by coup makers to explain the overthrow of regimes is
corruption.16
Perhaps the most debilitating effect of corruption on a demo­

249
cratic society is its link to the "softness of the State."17 In the words
of Myrdal

the general setting of the soft state makes corruption possible, and
in turn the prevalence of corruption is a mighty influence keeping
these countries as soft States.18

The state is often an artificial entity. The disregard of its rules bears little
social stigma and rules are largely disregarded where the political
overseers exhibit weak leadership.19
On the other hand, the issue of limiting the size of individual
contributions to parties is a vexed one. While some argue that one
cannot run a political party without money, others assert that large
contributions carry the risk that individual donors would unjustly
influence, dominate and manipulate political parties and their lead­
ers.20
In 1979 citizens of Ghana could not contribute more than c l,000
per annum to party funds. This was found to be meagre. A Bill was
to be initiated in Parliament by the PNP to raise the contribution to
*100,000 when the PNP was overthrown by the Provisional National
Defence Council (PNDC). The 1992 Political Parties Law, on the other
hand, originally pegged the amount of contribution to party funds
at *200,000. This generated a lot of heated debate and controversy
among political groupings, who claimed the initial level of contribu­
tion failed to take into account the cost of living and the inflation and
exchange rate in the country. The Law was subsequently amended
by the PNDC to empower the INEC to set the limit of individual
contributions. After consultations with potential party leaders the
INEC fixed *1 million in cash or in kind as the limit that any indi­
vidual can contribute to a political party fund within a year. Again,
this level of contribution did not satisfy most political groups, who
pointed out that at a meeting with INEC on 12 June 1992 they
suggested levels of contributions ranging from *10 million to *20
million.
The controversy over the limit on contributions by individuals
cannot be discussed adequately without identifying the sources of
funding of political parties vis-a-vis the requirements which a party
has to meet before being issued a certificate of registration. The
main sources of party financing in Ghana are supposed to be the
sale of party cards or what is called membership dues; sale of party "T "
shirts; fund raising rallies; and individual donations. Of these ind

250
vidual contributions from well-to-do persons by and large remain
the mainstay of party finance. This has been the case because the
other sources of funding are grossly inadequate in view of the
requirements which a party has to satisfy before registration. Some of
the requirements include the following:

(i) that there is in each district of Ghana a founding member of the

party who is ordinarily resident in the district or is a registered
voter in the district;
(ii) that the party has branches in all the regions of Ghana and is, in
addition organized in not less than two-thirds of the districts in
each region;
(iii) that the party has on its national executive committee or secre­
tariat a member ordinarily resident or registered as a voter in
each region;
(iv) a list of full names and addresses of at least one founding
member of the political party from each district;
(v) a full description of the identifying symbols, slogans and
colours, if any, of the political party; and
(vi) payment of a registration fee to the Interim National Electoral
Commission.21

One of these requirements, which has financial implications, is

that a party must have branches in all the regions of Ghana and not less
than two-thirds of the districts in each region.22 The logistics involved
in this requirement, operating at the ward, branch, constituency,
district, regional and national levels, runs into billions of cedis, which
membership dues, sale of "T" shirts and fund raising rallies per se
cannot adequately take care of. Political parties do not, therefore, have
any choice but rely extensively on individual contributions. This
situation buttresses the view that the high cost of campaigning is one
of the major unsolved problems in politics.
Three major deficiencies are, however, associated with indi­
vidual contributions. First, contributions may affect policy-making
by making parties alter their policies and administrative decisions to
fit the interest or demands of the big donors. In other words, indi­
vidual donations may lead to corruption, whereby the huge finan­
ciers may demand their "pound of flesh" in the form of award of
contracts and appointment of persons of their choice to top govern­
ment positions, and granting of import licenses. Second, control over

251
 party funds by a few people may affect the internal power structure
of power within a political party. The party leadership is controlled
by those who have funded the party. Policies, which are not in line
with the interests of party members, emanate from the "sponsors"
of the party rather than the leadership. Sometimes the few rich
people in the party manoeuvre to either get themselves or their
incompetent favourites appointed to top positions in the party,
where they could influence decisions directly. The consequences of
"hijacking" the adm inistration of the party by big donors
may result in the party leadership becoming stooges and thereby
losing interest in members as well as ceasing to canvass for new
members.23
Third, the high cost of campaigning may give undue influence
over political recruitment to the big donors. For example, if two men
in a party organization are seeking nomination for either an elective
or appointive political position, and if one has the resources to pay
his own campaign bills whereas the other has not, the chances are
that the wealthier aspirant will win out. In short, if it is expensive
to stand for Parliament, for example, men and women without finan­
cial resources may be prevented from putting themselves forward.24
Truman had the above dangers in mind when he argued that the
central objective of contributions is "access to the power of the elected
officials" rather than a donation which "is purely a matter of personal
friendship."25 The result is that those who help out a politician in his
time of need can receive favoured treatment when they have problems
of their own. What is ironic is how inexpensive such an investment can
be. For a gift of say c5 million an individual may gain, in return, the
"intercession" of a minister or parliamentarian that will get him
government contract or an import licence that will ultimately net him
or his business about c500 million.
One reason for this favoured treatment is that so few citizens
contribute at all. The dominant access to politicians by a few wealthy
contributors to political party campaigns in Ghana is largely the apathy
of millions of voters who could contribute to the campaign funds of
political parties but abstain from it ostensibly because Ghanaians
allegedly do not have the habit of "political giving."26 They make
annual donations to their churches; but very few send money to their
local party organizations or to the candidates.

252
Measures to Improve Financial Standing of Political Parties

How does one resolve the paucity of funds available to political parties
in Ghana and their heavy reliance, therefore, on individual contribu­
tions? First, the political parties themselves must make some effort to
broaden the base of contributors. Scholars of party finance27 recognize
that the development of a flow of regular contribution from large
numbers of relatively small contributors would free parties from the
//importunities,, of those who give large sums when the party coffer is
empty and also permit more orderly planning and conduct of party
activities. In this connection, the decentralization of the structure and
machinery of political parties should be vigorously pursued to ensure
transparency and accountability. Like the national government, the
structure of parties in Ghana over the years had been centralized to the
point that the parties did not find "grassroots" fund raising drives
profitable as a means of whipping up political enthusiasm. Decentrali­
zation of the structure of the parties will also promote political education
of the "grassroots" to pay their membership subscriptions, which will
broaden the base of party funding.
Second, the possibility of state financial subsidies to the parties
in the form of block grants should be explored. State subvention to
parties and the cost of electoral campaigns have been successfully
introduced in about two dozen countries, including, Germany and
Puerto Rico.28 State subsidies may not only minimize corruption but
may also enable the parties to concentrate upon the recruitment of
new members and on political education rather than the time-wast­
ing task of fun-raising. State subsidies however are not only expen­
sive but also make the parties bureaucratic and unresponsive to the
demands and interests of members. It is also likely that state sub­
sidies will deter the collection of membership subscriptions by party
organizations. Short of direct state subsidies for general campaign
purposes, the provision of "free" (or more accurately paid-for-out-
of government funds) time for political parties on radio and
television may be considered. This will enable all parties to have
equal access to the media.
A national foundation may be established by the state to raise
funds both internally and externally for distribution to the parties,
his foundation should be a corporate entity and independent of the
government of the day. The justification for such a foundation is to
;reatly reduce the financial gap between the parties. State income tax

253
laws may also be amended to grant tax incentives for political parties.
For instance, a tax credit of up to £14 million may be granted on a
political party's contributions returns with no "itemization of deduc­
tions," while an income deduction of up to £6 million be permitted on
returns with "itemized deductions." Tax incentives are, however
worthless unless the parties have an effective machine for solicitation.29
The merit behind this proposal is not only to aid the efforts of parties
to lift themselves from financial difficulties but also to allow for
deductions of "charitable" contributions and operating costs of the
parties.30

Conclusion

What conclusions can we draw about the financing of political parties in

Ghana? First, the cynical view that contribution to the funds of a
political party is equivalent to a bribe at times matches the facts. Yet the
significance of money in politics can be appreciated only by a view that
places party finance in the total context of the political process. It is
probably fair enough to say that men of wealth on the whole use money
in politics to protect what they regard as their interests. Their votes are
few in a regime of popular government and they build their "political
defences" by the use of money. (Key, 1964; Heard 1960 Alexander 1961).
Such statements about the concern of moneyed interests
in politics may be generally correct. That the unbridled dominance of
money would run counter to the tenets of a democratic order may also
be indisputable. But the pragmatic question about the power of money
in politics may come down to one of how much power and how that
power is used. The abuse of such power may go unchecked if account­
ability is not part of the political process. In other words, money has its
power in politics but this power has its limits.
Furthermore, the role of contributors in influencing policies and
actions of government must be regarded in a larger context than that of
a contributor always buying a specific action or wanting something in
return. Businessmen, for instance, may contribute to a party on the
assumption that its general policy orientation will turn out to be sympa­
thetic to them. In effect, persons with political concerns give to their
friends. When the chips are down on specific questions they hope to be
treated favourably. Thus the pattern of contributions may be just one
dimension of the variety of interest cluster around political parties.

254
 All these, however, are not to deny the fact that contributions to
political parties in Ghana are mostly meant to purchase specific actions.
A party or a candidate that encounters great difficulty in raising the
money absolutely necessary to meet campaign expenses may be under
an exceptionally strong pressure to make concrete commitments in
exchange for financial support. The Ghanaian experience of financing
political parties has shown that parties or candidates put themselves
under obligation to do specific favours for contributors somewhat
beyond the fringe of respectability. Finally, the way in which parties
raise and spend money may also have a potentially adverse affect on
political life in a number of ways. Unfortunately, political scientists
have not found any agreed way to assess its actual impacts and there is
much disagreement and confusion about the topic. The problem arises
mainly because it is difficult to separate the influence of money from
politics.

NOTES

1. Hilne, R..S. "Philippine and Malaysian Fund-Raising and Expenditure

Practices in the Southeast Asian Context" in A. Heidenheimer (ed).
Comparative Political Finance. Lexington, D.C.: Heath, 1970, p.143.
2. Apter, David Ghana in Transition rev. ed. New York: Atheneum, 1963;
Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana .London: Oxford University Press, 1964;
Dennis Austin and Robin Luckham (eds) Politicians and Soldiers in
Ghana: 1966-72 . London: Frank Cass, 1975; and Naomi Chazan, An
Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession, 1969-1982 .
Boulder, Co: Westview, 1983 are some of the major works that have paid
little or no attention to party financing in Ghana.
3. See Gold Coast, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Affairs of
the Cocoa Purchasing Company, 1956 (Jibowu Commission Report);
Peter T. Omari, KwameNkrumah: The_Anatomyof an African Dictatorship.
Accra: Moxon Paperbacks, 1970.
4. Gold Coast, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Affairs of the
Cocoa Purchasing Company, op. cit. p.3.
5. Republic of Ghana, Report of the Commission Appointed under the
Commissions of Enquiry Act 1964 (Act 250) to Enquire into the Affairs
of NADECO Ltd. Accra-Tema; State Publishing Corporation, 1966)
Chairman Samuel Azu Crabbe. p.5.
6. Ibid. p.13.
7. Ibid. p.21.

255
8. Ibid. p.23.
9. See Victor LeVine. Political Corruption: The Ghana Case. Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1974); Herbert Werlin, "The Roots of Corruption:
The Ghanaian Enquiry7'. Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. XNo.2,
(1972), pp.247-266.
10. Daily Graphic, January 7,1972.
11. See Republic of Ghana, The Political Parties Decree, 1979 (SMCD 229).
Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1979; Republic of Ghana, Politi­
cal Parties Law (PNDCL 281) Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation,
1992.
12. Republic of Ghana, Political Parties Law, 1992, Section 13, p.7.
13. Ibid. para. 14 (2) p.8.
14. Robert Price. Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Ghana. (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1975, pp.142-143.
15. Ibid. p.145.
16. See Austin and Luckham (eds)Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana. A. A. Afri-
fa. The Ghana Coup: 24th February, 1966 . London: Frank Cass, 1967;
David Goldsworthy. "Ghana's Second Republic : A Post Mortem"
African Affairs LXXII No.286 (1973), pp.8-25.
17. Gunnar Myrdal. The Challenge of World Poverty. London: Penguin, 1970
p.208. The soft state is one where all the various types of social
indiscipline manifest themselves in the form of deficiencies in legisla­
tion and in the observance and enforcement of law. Moreover, there is
widespread disobedience by public officials, on various levels, to rules
and directives and much collusion with powerful individuals and
groups whose conduct they should regulate.
18. Myrdal. The Challenge of World Poverty, p.208.
19. Ibid. p.209.
20. See Robert Dodoo. "Financing Political Parties" People's Daily Graphic 13
June, 1992; K.A. Osei, "Matching Funds for Parties" People's Daily
Graphic 19 June, 1992.
21. Republic of Ghana, Political Parties Law, 1992. p.4-6.
22. Ibid.
23. V.O. Key Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups. 5th edn. New York:
Crowell Company, 1964, pp.510-514.
24. See Ewing. The Funding of Political Parties in Britain. Cambridge: Cam­
bridge University Press, 1987; Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, "Funding
Political Parties since 1945" in Anthony Seldon (ed) United Kingdom
Parties since 1945. London: Philip Allan, 1990; A. Heidenheimer (ed)
Comparative Political Finance_. Lexington, DC: Heath, 1970.
25. Truman David. The Governmental Process. New York: Atheneum, 1951,
p.309.
26. For extensive comments on "political giving7' see H. Wells. Government

256
 Financing of Political Parties in Puerto Rico. Princeton: Citizens' Research
Foundation, 1961; H. Valenand D. Katz, Political Parties in Norway. Oslo:
Universities Press, 1964; H.E. Alexander "Financing the Parties and
Campaigns", in P.T. David (ed). The Presidential Election and Transition,
1960-1961. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1966.
27. See Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups^ J. La Palombara and Mr.
Weiner (eds). Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1966 J.B. Shannon. Money and Politics. New
York: Random House, 1959; A. Heard. The Costs of Democracy. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960; E.S. Redford et. al Politics
and Government in the United States. New York: Harcourt, 1965.
28. Wells .Government Financing of Political Parties in Puerto Rico; Anthony
Seldon (ed). United Kingdom Political Parties since 1945. London: Philip
Allan, 1990.
29. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups pp.516-518; Seldon, United King­
dom Political Parties Since 1945, pp.10-11.
30. John L. Mikesell. Fiscal Administration: Analysis and Applicationsfor the Public
Sector. 2nd ed. California: Brooks & Cole, 1986. pp.284-285.

257
 LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Anderson, Donald Labour Front Bench Spokesman on Africa, former

diplomat and lecturer in Political Science.

Ansah-Koi, Kumi Senior Lecturer in Political Science, University of

Ghana.

Ayee, J. R. A. Senior Lecturer in Political Science, University of

Ghana.

Bluwey, Gilbert K Senior Lecturer in Political Science, University of

Ghana

Boa fo -Arthur, K. Lecturer in Political Science, University o f Ghana.

Drah, Francis K. Senior Lecturer in Political Science, University of

Ghanai

Essuman-Johnson, A. Lecturer in Political Science, University of Ghana.

Folson, Kweku G. Professor of Political Science & Director, Institute

of Statistical, Economic and Social Research,
University o f Ghana.

Kumado, Kofi Senior Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Law, University

of Ghana

Manu, Yaw Associate Professor of Political Science, University

ofGhana.

Ninsin, Kwame A. Associate Professor & Head o f the Department of

Political Science, University o f Ghana.

Oquaye, Mike Lecturer in Political Science, University ofGhana.

Pepera,J. Sandra Lecturer in Political Science, University ofGhana.

258
 *
The papers which appear in this book were presented at
a national seminar organized by the Department of Political
Science in collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert Founda­
tion. They address various aspects of the daunting problem
of successfully building a democratic society in Ghana as
well! as the role of political parties, the law and constitution,
socio-political forces, culture, practices and processes in
implementing this challenging national agenda.
The analyses are incisive, frank and compelling. This
book should be read by all and sundry.

A, f
•

KWAME A. NINSIN is Associate Professor of Political

Science and Head of the Department of Political Science,
University of Ghana. FRANCIS K. DRAH is Senior Lec­
turer in Political Science at the Department of Political
Science, University of Ghana. They have researched and
written extensively on Ghanaian politics, and are
Co-Editors of The Search for Democracy in Ghana (Accra:
Asempa Publishers, 1987) and Ghana's Transition to Con­
stitutional Rule (Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 1991).

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