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[G.R. No. 152766. June 20, 2003.]

As a matter of policy, the original jurisdiction of this Court to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should generally be
LILIA SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VICTORINO S. ALVARO as Presiding Judge, exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals or before constitutional or other tribunals or
RTC-Br. 120, Caloocan City, and VIRGINIA TERIA, Respondents. agencies the acts of which for some reason or other are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of
the extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court, it is either of
This is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul and set aside the Decision of these courts that the specific action for the procurement of the writ must be presented. However, this Court must be
the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2001 as well as its Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182. convinced thoroughly that two (2) grounds exist before it gives due course to a certiorari petition under Rule 65: (a) The
Tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
Lilia Sanchez, Petitioner, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was jurisdiction; and (b) There is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
registered under TCT No. 263624 with the following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn
Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to Despite the procedural lapses present in this case, we are giving due course to this petition as there are matters that
Fernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez. 1 On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No 289216 in the name require immediate resolution on the merits to effect substantial justice.
of private respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June
1995 2 by all six (6) co-owners in her favor. 3 Petitioner claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document and The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order to promote their object of securing a just, speedy and
subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting private respondent Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding. 4
possession of the aforesaid lot with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City sometime in September 1995,
subsequently raffled to Br. 49 of that court.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts in the speedy, just and inexpensive
determination of the cases before them. Liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to
On 12 February 1998, the MeTC-Br. 49 of Caloocan City ruled in favor of private respondent declaring that the sale was effect substantial justice. 5 Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on mere
valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and the other 1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of her technicalities. 6
signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having been established as a forgery.
Verily, the negligence of petitioner’s counsel cannot be deemed as negligence of petitioner herself in the case at bar. A
Petitioner then elevated her appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, subsequently assigned to Br. 120, which notice to a lawyer who appears to have been unconscionably irresponsible cannot be considered as notice to his client. 7
ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda of appeal. Counsel for petitioner did not comply with this order, Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, it appears from the records that the counsel was negligent in not
nor even inform her of the developments in her case. Petitioner not having filed any pleading with the RTC of Caloocan adequately protecting his client’s interest, which necessarily calls for a liberal construction of the Rules.chanrob1es
City, the trial court affirmed the 27 July 1998 decision of the MeTC. virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of private respondent The rationale for this approach is explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals — 8
Virginia Teria, buyer of the property. On 4 November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the sheriff
upon petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice. This Court may suspend its own rules or exempt a case from its operation where the appellate court failed to obtain
jurisdiction over the case owing to appellant’s failure to perfect an appeal. Hence, with more reason would this Court
On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioner’s house without any special permit of demolition suspend its own rules in cases where the appellate court has already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case. This
from the court. prerogative to relax procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance, such as the period to
appeal has been invoked and granted in a considerable number of cases . . .
Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999 petitioner was forced to inhabit the portion of the
premises that used to serve as the house’s toilet and laundry area. Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment with the RTC on the ground that she was not substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or
bound by the inaction of her counsel who failed to submit petitioner’s appeal memorandum. However the RTC denied even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared
the Petition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case . . .

On 14 June 2000 petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and
on the part of the court a quo. just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently
held that rules Must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.
On 23 May 2001 the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On 18 June 2001 petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the motion in its Resolution of 8 January 2002. Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the Rules of the most
character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower court’s findings of fact, the other elements
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the that should be considered are the following: (a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the
challenged case before it.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (d)

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a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly common because his right over thing is represented by quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication. 19
prejudiced thereby. 9
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and bounds of petitioner’s lot has not been
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural infirmity was not entirely attributable to the designated As she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her right
fault or negligence of petitioner. Besides, substantial justice requires that we go into the merits of the case to resolve the to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be effected to protect her right to her definite share and
present controversy that was brought about by the absence of any partition agreement among the parties who were co- determine the boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private
owners of the subject to Hence, giving due course to the instant petition shall the dispute on the property held in respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.
common.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of appeals dated 23 May 2001 as well as its
In People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Tiongco 10 we held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. A survey of the questioned
lot with TCT No. 289216 (formerly TCT No. 263624) by a duly licensed geodetic engineer and the PARTITION of the
There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally notice to counsel is notice to parties, and that such aforesaid lot are ORDERED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
doctrine has beneficent effects upon the prompt dispensation of justice. Its application to a given case, however, should
be looked into and adopted, according to the surrounding circumstances; otherwise, in the court’s desire to make short- Let the records of this case be REMANDED to MeTC-Br. 49, Caloocan City to effect the aforementioned survey and
cut of the proceedings, it might foster, wittingly or unwittingly, dangerous collusions to the detriment of justice. It would partition, as well as segregate the 1/6 portion appertaining to petitioner Lilia Sanchez.
be then be easy for one lawyer to sell one’s rights down the river, by just alleging that he just forgot every process of the
court affecting his clients, because he was so busy. Under this circumstance, one should not insist that a notice to such The Deed of Absolute Sale by the other co-owners to Virginia Teria shall be RESPECTED insofar as the other undivided
irresponsible lawyer is also a notice to his clients. 5/6 portion of the property is concerned.

Thus, we now look into the merits of the petition. SO ORDERED.

This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil law: co-ownership. Throughout the proceedings from the
MeTC to the Court of Appeals, the notion of co-ownership 11 was not sufficiently dealt with. We attempt to address this
controversy in the interest of substantial justice. Certiorari should granted to cure this grave abuse of discretion. G.R. No. L-4656            November 18, 1912

Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as "the right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a spiritual RICARDO PARDELL Y CRUZ and
part of a thing, not materially or physically divide. 12 Manresa defines it as the "manifestation of the private right of VICENTA ORTIZ Y FELIN DE PARDELL, plaintiffs-appellees,
ownership, which instead of being exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over the things subject to it, is vs.
exercised by two or more owners and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and the same." 13 GASPAR DE BARTOLOME Y ESCRIBANO and
MATILDE ORTIZ Y FELIN DE BARTOLOME, defendants-appellants.
The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material
indivision, which means that there is a single object which is not materially divided, and which is the element which
This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, from the judgment of October 5, 1907, whereby the Honorable Dionisio Chanco,
binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights and obligations of the co-owners.
judge, absolved the defendants from the complaint, and the plaintiff from a counterclaim, without special finding as to
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costs.
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute. Whether
established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial Counsel for the spouses Ricardo y Cruz and Vicente Ortiz y Felin de Pardell, the first of whom, absent in Spain by reason
nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to of his employment, conferred upon the second sufficient and ample powers to appear before the courts of justice, on June
the interest of his co-owners. 15 8, 1905, in his written complaint, alleged that the plaintiff, Vicente Ortiz, and the defendant, Matilde Ortiz, are the duly
recognized natural daughters of the spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin y Paula who died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownership is to create an express trust among the 1875 and 1882, respectively; that Calixta Felin, prior to her death, executed on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative will in
heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others. 16 Vigan whereby she made her four children, named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her
sole and universal heirs of all her property; that, of the persons enumerated, Manuel died before his mother and Francisca
Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion a few years after her death, leaving no heirs by force of law, and therefore the only existing heirs of the said testatrix are
thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota proportionate share in the entire land or thing. 17 the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz and the defendant Matilde Ortiz; that, aside from some personal property and jewelry already
divided among the heirs, the testatrix possessed, at the time of the execution of her will, and left at her death the real
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and dispose properties which, with their respective cash values, are as follows:
of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of the others
co-owners. 18 But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in

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were delivered to the plaintiffs with other larger amounts, in 1891, and from the property on Calle Washington, called La
1. A house of strong material, with the lot on which it is built, situated on Escolta Street, Vigan,
P6,000.00 Quinta, 990.95 pesos, which proceeds, added together, made a total of 1,278.95 pesos, saving error or omission; that,
and valued at
between the years abovementioned, Escolta, and that on Calle Washington, La Quinta, 376.33, which made a total of
2. A house of mixed material, with the lot on which it stands, at No. 88 Washington Street, 1,141.71, saving error or omission; that, in 1897, the work of reconstruction was begun of the house on Calle Escolta,
1,500.00 which been destroyed by an earthquake, which work was not finished until 1903 and required an expenditure on the part
Vigan; valued at
of the defendant Matilde Ortiz, of 5,091.52 pesos; that all the collections made up to August 1, 1905, including the rent
3. A lot on Magallanes Street, Vigan; valued at 100.00 from the stores, amounted to only P3,654.15, and the expenses, to P6,252.32, there being, consequently, a balance of
P2,598.17, which divided between the sisters, the plaintiff and the defendant, would make the latter's share P1,299.08;
4. A parcel of rice land, situated in the barrio of San Julian, Vigan; valued at 60.00 that, as shown by the papers kept by the plaintiffs, in the year 1891 the defendant Bartolome presented to the plaintiffs a
statement in settlements of accounts, and delivered to the person duly authorized by the latter for the purpose, the sum of
5. A parcel of rice land in the pueblo of Santa Lucia; valued at 86.00 P2,606.29, which the said settlement showed was owing his principals, from various sources; that, the defendant
6. Three parcels of land in the pueblo of Candon; valued at 150.00 Bartolome having been the administrator of the undivided property claimed by the plaintiffs, the latter were owing the
former legal remuneration of the percentage allowed by law for administration; and that the defendants were willing to
Total 7,896.00 pay the sum of P3,948, one-half of the total value of the said properties, deducting therefrom the amount found to be
owing them by the plaintiffs, and asked that judgment be rendered in their favor to enable them to recover from the latter
that amount, together with the costs and expenses of the suit.
That, on or about the first months of the year 1888, the defendants, without judicial authorization, nor friendly or
extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the administration and enjoyment of the said properties and collected the The defendants, in their counter claim, repeated each and all of the allegations contained in each of the paragraphs of
rents, fruits, and products thereof, to the serious detriment of the plaintiffs' interest; that, notwithstanding the different section 10 of their answer; that the plaintiffs were obliged to pay to the administrator of the said property the
and repeated demands extrajudicially made upon Matilde Ortiz to divide the aforementioned properties with the plaintiff remuneration allowed him by law; that, as the revenues collected by the defendants amounted to no more than P3,654.15
Vicente and to deliver to the latter the one-half thereof, together with one-half of the fruits and rents collected therefrom, and the expenditures incurred by them, to P6,252.32, it followed that the plaintiffs owed the defendants P1,299.08, that is
the said defendant and her husband, the self-styled administrator of the properties mentioned, had been delaying the one-half of the difference between the amount collected from and that extended on the properties, and asked that
partition and delivery of the said properties by means of unkept promises and other excuses; and that the plaintiffs, on judgment be therefore rendered in their behalf to enable them to collect this sum from the plaintiffs, Ricardo Pardell and
account of the extraordinary delay in the delivery of one-half of said properties, or their value in cash, as the case might Vicenta Ortiz, with legal interest thereon from December 7, 1904, the date when the accounts were rendered, together
be, had suffered losses and damages in the sum of P8,000. Said counsel for the plaintiffs therefore asked that judgment be with the sums to which the defendant Bartolome was entitled for the administration of the undivided properties in
rendered by sentencing the defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome, and Matilde Ortiz Felin de Bartolome, to restore and question.
deliver to the plaintiffs one-half of the total value in cash, according to appraisal, of the undivided property specified,
which one-half amounted approximately to P3,948, or if deemed proper, to recognize the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz to be
vested with the full and absolute right of ownership to the said undivided one-half of the properties in question, as By a written motion of August 21, 1905, counsel for the plaintiffs requested permission to amend the complaint by
universal testamentary heir thereof together with the defendant Matilde Ortiz, to indemnify the plaintiffs in the sum of inserting immediately after the words "or respective appraisal," fifth line of paragraph 5, the phrase "in cash in
P8,000, for losses and damages, and to pay the costs. accordance with the assessed value," and likewise further to amend the same, in paragraph 6 thereof, by substituting the
following word in lieu of the petition for the remedy sought: "By reason of all the foregoing, I beg the court to be pleased
to render the judgment by sentencing the defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome and Matilde Ortiz Felin de Bartolome, to
Counsel for the defendants, in his answer denied the facts alleged in paragraphs 1, 4, 6, 7, and 8 thereof, inasmuch as, restore and deliver to the plaintiffs an exact one-half of the total vale of the undivided properties described in the
upon the death of the litigating sister's brother Manuel, their mother, who was still living, was his heir by force of law, complaint, such value to be ascertained by the expert appraisal of two competent persons, one of whom shall be
and the defendants had never refused to give to the plaintiff Vicente Ortiz her share of the said properties; and stated that appointed by the plaintiffs and the other by the defendants, and, in case of disagreement between these two appointees
he admitted the facts alleged in paragraph 2, provided it be understood, however, that the surname of the defendant's such value shall be determined by a third expert appraiser appointed by the court, or, in a proper case, by the price
mother was Felin, and not Feliu, and that Miguel Ortiz died in Spain, and not in Vigan; that he also admitted paragraph 3 offered at public auction; or, in lieu thereof, it is requested that the court recognize the plaintiff, Vicenta Ortiz, to be
of the complaint, with the difference that the said surname should be Felin, and likewise paragraph 5, except the part vested with a full and absolute right to an undivided one-half of the said properties; furthermore, it is prayed that the
thereof relating to the personal property and the jewelry, since the latter had not yet been divided; that the said jewelry plaintiffs be awarded an indemnity of P8,000 for losses and damages, and the costs." Notwithstanding the opposition of
was in the possession of the plaintiffs and consisted of: one Lozada gold chronometer watch with a chain in the form of a the defendants, the said amendment was admitted by the court and counsel for the defendants were allowed to a period of
bridle curb and a watch charm consisting of the engraving of a postage stamp on a stone mounted in gold and bearing the three days within which to present a new answer. An exception was taken to this ruling.
initials M. O., a pair of cuff buttons made of gold coins, four small gold buttons, two finger rings, another with the
initials M. O., and a gold bracelet; and that the defendants were willing to deliver to the plaintiffs, in conformity with
their petitions, one-half of the total value in cash, according to appraisement, of the undivided real properties specified in The proper proceedings were had with reference to the valuation of the properties concerned in the division sought and
paragraph 5, which half amounted to P3,948. incidental issues were raised relative to the partition of some of them and their award to one or the other of the parties.
Due consideration was taken of the averments and statements of both parties who agreed between themselves, before the
court, that any of them might at any time acquire, at the valuation fixed by the expert judicial appraiser, any of the
In a special defense said counsel alleged that the defendants had never refused to divide the said property and had in fact properties in question, there being none in existence excluded by the litigants. The court, therefore, by order of December
several years before solicited the partition of the same; that, from 1886 to 1901, inclusive, there was collected from the 28, 1905, ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to acquire, at the valuation determined by the said expert appraiser, the
property on Calle Escolta the sum of 288 pesos, besides a few other small amounts derived from other sources, which
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building known as La Quinta, the lot on which it stands and the warehouses and other improvements comprised within the defendants had been living for several years in the Calle Escolta house, which was pro indiviso property of joint
the inclosed land, and the seeds lands situated in the pueblos of Vigan and Santa Lucia; and that the defendants were ownership.
likewise entitled to acquire the house on Calle Escolta, the lot on Calle Magallanes, and the three parcels of land situated
in the pueblo of Candon. By this finding absolving the defendants from the complaint, and which was acquiesced in by the plaintiffs who made no
appeal therefrom, the first issue has been decided which was raised by the plaintiffs, concerning the indemnity for losses
After this partition had been made counsel for the defendants, by a writing of March 8, 1906, set forth: That, having and damages, wherein are comprised the rents which should have been obtained from the upper story of the said house
petitioned for the appraisement of the properties in question for the purpose of their partition, it was not to be understood during the time it was occupied by the defendants, Matilde Ortiz and her husband, Gaspar de Bartolome.
that he desired from the exception duly entered to the ruling made in the matter of the amendment to the complaint; that
the properties retained by the defendants were valued at P9,310, and those retained by the plaintiffs, at P2,885, one-half Notwithstanding the acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs, assenting to the said finding whereby the defendants were
of which amounts each party had to deliver to the other, as they were pro indiviso properties; that, therefore, the
absolved from the complaint, yet, as such absolution is based on the compensation established in the judgment of the trial
defendants had to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P3,212.50, after deducting the amount which the plaintiffs were obliged to court, between the amounts which each party is entitled to claim from the other, it is imperative to determine whether the
deliver to the defendants, as one-half of the price of the properties retained by the former; that, notwithstanding that the
defendant Matilde Ortiz, as coowner of the house on Calle Escolta, was entitled, with her husband, to reside therein,
amount of the counterclaim for the expenses incurred in the reconstruction of the pro indiviso property should be without paying to her coowner, Vicenta Ortiz, who, during the greater part of the time, lived with her husband abroad,
deducted from the sum which the defendants had to pay the plaintiffs, the former, for the purpose of bringing the matter
one-half of the rents which the upper story would have produced, had it been rented to a stranger.
of the partition to a close, would deliver to the latter, immediately upon the signing of the instrument of purchase and
sale, the sum of P3,212.50, which was one-half of the value of the properties alloted to the defendants; such delivery,
however, was not to be understood as a renouncement of the said counterclaim, but only as a means for the final Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:
termination of the pro indiviso status of the property.
Each coowner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance with their object
The case having been heard, the court on October 5, 1907, rendered judgment holding that the revenues and the expenses and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the coowners from utilizing
were compensated by the residence enjoyed by the defendant party, that no losses or damages were either caused or them according to their rights.
suffered, nor likewise any other expense besides those aforementioned, and absolved the defendants from the complaint
and the plaintiffs from the counterclaim, with no special finding as to costs. An exception was taken to this judgment by Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in the house of joint ownership;
counsel for the defendants who moved for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented did not warrant the but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interest of the
judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. This motion was denied, exception whereto was taken by said community property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her rights.
counsel, who filed the proper bill of exceptions, and the same was approved and forwarded to the clerk of this court, with It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented and accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.
a transcript of the evidence.

Each coowner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same
Both of the litigating sisters assented to a partition by halves of the property left in her will by their mother at her death; with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his coowners, for the reason that, until a division be
in fact, during the course of this suit, proceedings were had, in accordance with the agreement made, for the division made, the respective part of each holder can not be determined and every one of the coowners exercises, together with his
between them of the said hereditary property of common ownership, which division was recognized and approved in the other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
findings of the trial court, as shown by the judgment appealed from.

As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz, plaintiff, and Matilde Ortiz,
The issues raised by the parties, aside from said division made during the trial, and which have been submitted to this defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and were in the care of the last named, assisted by her husband,
court for decision, concern: (1) The indemnity claimed for losses and damages, which the plaintiffs allege amount to while the plaintiff Vicenta with her husband was residing outside of the said province the greater part of the time between
P8,000, in addition to the rents which should have been derived from the house on Calle Escolta, Vigan; (2) the payment 1885 and 1905, when she left these Islands for Spain, it is not at all strange that delays and difficulties should have
by the plaintiffs to the defendants of the sum of P1,299.08, demanded by way of counterclaim, together with legal attended the efforts made to collect the rents and proceeds from the property held in common and to obtain a partition of
interest thereon from December 7, 1904; (3) the payment to the husband of the defendant Matilde Ortiz, of a percentage the latter, especially during several years when, owing to the insurrection, the country was in a turmoil; and for this
claimed to be due him as the administrator of the property of common ownership; (4) the division of certain jewelry in reason, aside from that founded on the right of coownership of the defendants, who took upon themselves the
the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz; and (5) the petition that the amendment be held to have been improperly administration and care of the properties of joint tenancy for purposes of their preservation and improvement, these latter
admitted, which was made by the plaintiffs in their written motion of August 21, 1905, against the opposition of the are not obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the rents which might have been derived from the upper of the
defendants, through which admission the latter were obliged to pay the former P910.50.lawphil.net story of the said house on Calle Escolta, and, much less, because one of the living rooms and the storeroom thereof were
used for the storage of some belongings and effects of common ownership between the litigants. The defendant Matilde,
Before entering upon an explanation of the propriety or impropriety of the claims made by both parties, it is therefore, in occupying with her husband the upper floor of the said house, did not injure the interests of her coowner, her
indispensable to state that the trial judge, in absolving the defendants from the complaint, held that they had not caused sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the latter from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her
losses and damages to the plaintiffs, and that the revenues and the expenses were compensated, in view of the fact that as coowner of the property.

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Notwithstanding the above statements relative to the joint-ownership rights which entitled the defendants to live in the his wife who held it in joint tenancy, with his sister-in-law, and the law does not allow him any compensation as such
upper story of the said house, yet in view of the fact that the record shows it to have been proved that the defendant voluntary administrator. He is merely entitled to a reimbursement for such actual and necessary expenditures as he may
Matilde's husband, Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a room or a part of the lower floor of the same house on have made on the undivided properties and an indemnity for the damages he may have suffered while acting in that
Calle Escolta, using it as an office for the justice of the peace, a position which he held in the capital of that province, capacity, since at all events it was his duty to care for and preserve the said property, half of which belonged to his wife;
strict justice, requires that he pay his sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one half of the monthly rent which the said quarters could and in exchange for the trouble occasioned him by the administration of his sister-in-law's half of the said property, he
have produced, had they been leased to another person. The amount of such monthly rental is fixed at P16 in accordance with his wife resided in the upper story of the house aforementioned, without payment of one-half of the rents said
with the evidence shown in the record. This conclusion as to Bartolome's liability results from the fact that, even as the quarters might have produced had they been leased to another person.
husband of the defendant coowner of the property, he had no right to occupy and use gratuitously the said part of the
lower floor of the house in question, where he lived with his wife, to the detriment of the plaintiff Vicenta who did not
With respect to the division of certain jewelry, petitioned for by the defendants and appellants only in their brief in this
receive one-half of the rent which those quarters could and should have produced, had they been occupied by a stranger, appeal, the record of the proceedings in the lower court does not show that the allegation made by the plaintiff Vicenta is
in the same manner that rent was obtained from the rooms on the lower floor that were used as stores. Therefore, the
not true, to the effect that the deceased mother of the litigant sisters disposed of this jewelry during her lifetime, because,
defendant Bartolome must pay to the plaintiff Vicenta P384, that is, one-half of P768, the total amount of the rents which had she not done so, the will made by the said deceased would have been exhibited in which the said jewelry would have
should have been obtained during four years from the quarters occupied as an office by the justice of the peace of Vigan.
been mentioned, at least it would have been proved that the articles in question came into the possession of the plaintiff
Vicenta without the expressed desire and the consent of the deceased mother of the said sisters, for the gift of this jewelry
With respect to the second question submitted for decision to this court, relative to the payment of the sum demanded as was previously assailed in the courts, without success; therefore, and in view of its inconsiderable value, there is no
a counterclaim, it was admitted and proved in the present case that, as a result of a serious earthquake on August 15, reason for holding that the said gift was not made.
1897, the said house on Calle Escolta was left in ruins and uninhabitable, and that, for its reconstruction or repair, the
defendants had to expend the sum of P6,252.32. This expenditure, notwithstanding that it was impugned, during the trial,
As regards the collection of the sum of P910.50, which is the difference between the assessed value of the undivided real
by the plaintiffs, was duly proved by the evidence presented by the defendants. Evidence, unsuccessfully rebutted, was properties and the price of the same as determined by the judicial expert appraiser, it is shown by the record that the
also introduced which proved that the rents produced by all the rural and urban properties of common ownership
ruling of the trial judge admitting the amendment to the original complaint, is in accord with the law and principles of
amounted, up to August 1, 1905, to the sum of P3,654.15 which, being applied toward the cost of the repair work on the justice, for the reason that any of the coowners of a pro indiviso property, subject to division or sale, is entitled to petition
said house, leaves a balance of P2,598.17, the amount actually advanced by the defendants, for the rents collected by
for its valuation by competent expert appraisers. Such valuation is not prejudicial to any of the joint owners, but is
them were not sufficient for the termination of all the work undertaken on the said building, necessary for its complete beneficial to their interests, considering that, as a general rule, the assessed value of a building or a parcel of realty is less
repair and to replace it in a habitable condition. It is therefore lawful and just that the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz, who was
than the actual real value of the property, and this being appraiser to determine, in conjunction with the one selected by
willing to sell to her sister Matilde for P1,500, her share in the house in question, when it was in a ruinous state, should the plaintiffs, the value of the properties of joint ownership. These two experts took part in the latter proceedings of the
pay the defendants one-half of the amount expanded in the said repair work, since the building after reconstruction was
suit until finally, and during the course of the latter, the litigating parties agreed to an amicable division of the pro
worth P9,000, according to expert appraisal. Consequently, the counterclaim made by the defendants for the payment to indiviso hereditary property, in accordance with the price fixed by the judicial expert appraiser appointed as a third party,
them of the sum of P1,299.08, is a proper demand, though from this sum a reduction must be made of P384, the amount
in view of the disagreement between and nonconformity of the appraisers chosen by the litigants. Therefore it is improper
of one-half of the rents which should have been collected for the use of the quarters occupied by the justice of the peace, now to claim a right to the collection of the said sum, the difference between the assessed value and that fixed by the
the payment of which is incumbent upon the husband of the defendant Matilde, as aforesaid, and the balance remaining,
judicial expert appraiser, for the reason that the increase in price, as determined by this latter appraisal, redounded to the
P915.08, is the amount which the plaintiff Vicenta must pay to the defendants. benefit of both parties.

The defendants claim to be entitled to the collection of legal interest on the amount of the counterclaim, from December
In consideration of the foregoing, whereby the errors assigned to the lower court have been duly refuted, it is our opinion
7, 1904. This contention can not be sustained, inasmuch as, until this suit is finally decided, it could not be known that, with a partial reversal of the judgment appealed from, in so far as it absolves the plaintiffs from the counterclaim
whether the plaintiffs would or would not be obliged to pay the sum whatever in reimbursement of expenses incurred by
presented by the defendants, we should and hereby do sentence the plaintiffs to the payment of the sum of P915.08, the
the plaintiffs in the repair work on the said house on Calle Escolta, whether or not the defendants, in turn, were entitled to balance of the sum claimed by the defendants as a balance of the one-half of the amount which the defendants advanced
collect any such amount, and, finally, what the net sum would be which the plaintiff's might have to pay as
for the reconstruction or repair of the Calle Escolta house, after deducting from the total of such sum claimed by the latter
reimbursement for one-half of the expenditure made by the defendants. Until final disposal of the case, no such net sum the amount of P384 which Gaspar de Bartolome, the husband of the defendant Matilde, should have paid as one-half of
can be determined, nor until then can the debtor be deemed to be in arrears. In order that there be an obligation to pay
the rents due for his occupation of the quarters on the lower floor of the said house as an office for the justice of the peace
legal interest in connection with a matter at issue between the parties, it must be declared in a judicial decision from what court of Vigan; and we further find: (1) That the defendants are not obliged to pay one-half of the rents which could have
date the interest will be due on the principal concerned in the suit. This rule has been established by the decisions of the
been obtained from the upper story of the said house; (2) that the plaintiffs can not be compelled to pay the legal interest
supreme court of Spain, in reference to articles 1108, 1109, and 1110 of the Civil Code, reference on April 24, 1867, from December 7, 1904, on the sum expanded in the reconstruction of the aforementioned house, but only the interest
November 19, 1869, and February 22, 1901.
fixed by law, at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, from the date of the judgment to be rendered in accordance with this
decision; (3) that the husband of the defendant Matilde Ortiz is not entitled to any remuneration for the administration of
With regard to the percentage, as remuneration claimed by the husband of the defendant Matilde for his administration of the pro indiviso property belonging to both parties; (4) that, neither is he entitled to collect from the plaintiffs the sum of
the property of common ownership, inasmuch as no stipulation whatever was made in the matter by and between him and P910.50, the difference between the assessed valuation and the price set by the expert appraisal solicited by the plaintiffs
his sister-in-law, the said defendant, the claimant is not entitled to the payment of any remuneration whatsoever. Of his in their amendment to the complaint; and, (5) that no participation shall be made of jewelry aforementioned now in the
own accord and as an officious manager, he administered the said pro indiviso property, one-half of which belonged to possession of the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz. The said judgment, as relates to the points appealed, is affirmed, in so far as its

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findings agree with those of this decision, and is reversed, in so far as they do not. No special finding is made regarding Mrs. Castro came back to Puerto Princess without having realized her mission. In the same year she went back to Manila
the costs of both instances. So ordered. with Federico Valdez, Jr., and Mr. Gregorio Quicho. The deed was executed for the amount of P2,200.00 which was
given by Mr. Gregorio Quicho, as payment for back rentals and payment for the purchase of that portion of lot No. 18
which he was renting and occupying. In executing the deed of sale, EXHIBIT "I" , the name of Federico Valdez, Jr.
G.R. No. L-22571 May 25, 1973 appeared as the only vendee. This was done pursuant to the wishes of Mr. Quicho who advanced the money, in order that
he could facilitate the deed of sale between him and the Valdezes, with the understanding that Federico Valdez, Jr. will
JOSEFINA VALDEZ, JAIME VALDEZ, ROGELIO ALMONTE, RAQUEL ALMONTE and RAUL hold the same in trust for his other brother and sisters (Testimony of Mrs. Castro).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
ALMONTE, the latter two minors, represented in this action by their father, FRANCISCO ALMONTE, plaintiffs- virtual law library
appellees, vs. TEOFILA OLORGA, by herself and in representation of minor CARMEN VALDEZ and RENATO
OLORGA, Defendants-Appellants. When Federico Valdez, Jr. was still living, he never attempted to exclude the herein plaintiffs from ownership of the land
in question. Said plaintiffs have been in open continuous and uninterrupted possession of the premises they are
The present appeal was taken by the defendants directly to this Court by record on appeal filed way back in 1964. The occupying inside the lot in question long before the execution of the deed of sale (Exh. "I"). It was only after the death of
case, however, was submitted for decision only on September 4, 1970. In a motion dated April 25, 1973, the defendants Federico Valdez, Jr. that the widow Teofila Olorga tried to eject the plaintiffs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
appellants prayed that decision herein be expedited.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library virtual law library

A reading of the brief of the appellants shows that most of the arguments advanced therein challenge the findings of fact As clearly stated in the memorandum for the plaintiffs the following facts are undisputed:chanrobles virtual law library
made by the court a quo. As pointed out by the plaintiffs-appellees, such findings are no longer reviewable by this Court,
its jurisdiction being limited to deciding purely legal questions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library (1) That the land in question Lot No. 18 of the Puerto Princesa Cadastre, was originally purchased by the spouses
Federico Valdez, Sr. and Juanita Batul from Dolores M. de Gutierrez for P500.00;chanrobles virtual law library
The following facts as stated in the decision appealed from may therefore be considered established:
(2) That the parties herein, plaintiffs and defendants alike, are all successors-in-interest of the spouses Federico Valdez,
This is an action for partition filed by the living children and grandchildren of the late spouses Federico Valdez, Sr. and Sr., and Juanita Batul, either as forced or compulsory heirs or in representation thereof;chanrobles virtual law library
Juanita Batul against the heir and widow of Federico Valdez, Jr. The action concerns Lot No. 18, of Puerto Princesa
Cadastre, covered by T.C.T. No. T-94 in the name of Federico Valdez, Jr.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual (3) That the above-named spouses had been in open, public, peaceful and uninterrupted occupation and possession of Lot
law library No. 18, the property in question, since the year 1930 or 1933;chanrobles virtual law library

Federico Valdez, Sr. died in Manila in the year 1931 and his wife, Juanita Batul, died in 1939. The spouses left the (4) That in 1939, Mr. Gregorio Quicho rented a portion of the lot in question from Juanita Batul;chanrobles virtual law
following children as their heirs: (1) Avelina Olorga, who died in 1941, leaving as her heir co-defendant Renato Olorga; library
(2) Elisa Valdez-Almonte, who died in 1947, leaving Rogelio, Raquel and Raul, all surnamed Almonte, as her heirs; (3)
the plaintiff Josefina Valdez; (4) Federico Valdez, Jr., who died in September, 1960, leaving as his heirs defendants
Teofila Olorga, his wife, and Carmen Valdez, his daughter; and (5) Jaime Valdez, co-plaintiff herein. In 1924, the (5) That Mr. Quicho advanced the amount of P2,200.00 partly as purchase price of the portion purchased by him, in the
spouses Federico Valdez, Sr. and Juanita Batul, bought Lot No. 18, the property now in dispute, from Dolores M. de final execution of the deed of sale, Exhibit "I"; andchanrobles virtual law library
Gutierrez for P500.00. In 1930, the old Valdez family, as vendees, occupied and lived in the premises of Lot No. 18.
After the death of Federico Valdez, Sr., Juanita Batul, in the year 1936, executed a contract of lease over a portion of Lot (6) That a part of the property in question, Lot 18-B, is still registered in the name of Federico Valdez, Jr., under T.C.T.
No. 18 in favor of the protestant church of Puerto Princesa, Exhibit "A". The same Juanita Batul leased in 1939 a portion No. T-634, cancelling T.C.T. No. 75.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
of Lot No. 18 to Mr. Gregorio Quicho.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The following facts, although not admitted by the defendants, were not disputed:chanrobles virtual law library
The transfer of the lot in the name of Federico, Sr., was never done because the owner's original certificate of title was
lost.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
(1) That the Valdez Family, in 1930 or 1933, entered into, possessed and occupied Lot 18, the property in
question;chanrobles virtual law library
Josefina Valdez and Federico Valdez, Jr. commissioned their cousin Concepcion Castro to negotiate with the Gutierrez
family (Exhibit "C") in 1948 in order that the property in question may be transferred to them. It turned out that the
Gutierrez family was asking for an additional amount of P2,500.00 (Exh. "D").chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles (2) That Juanita Batul, in 1936, entered into a contract of lease (Exh. "A") with the Baptist Church of Puerto Princesa
virtual law library over a portion of Lot 18;chanrobles virtual law library

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(3) That in 1947, upon discovering that the land in question had not been transferred in the name of their parents, Josefina Federico Valdez, Jr. in 1948 and the Transfer Certificate of Title, so he alleges, was issued in his name in 1950, the
Valdez made efforts to have the said land transferred to them, and commissioned Mrs. Castro, together with Federico action had already prescribed when it was filed more than ten (10) years thereafter, or in 1962; that furthermore, from the
Valdez, Jr., to negotiate with the Gutierrez family for the purpose, which culminated in the execution of the deed of sale, date of the sale up to the time his death in 1960 he exercised exclusive ownership of the land. In other words the
Exhibit "I";chanrobles virtual law library appellants claim both extinctive and acquisitive prescription.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

(4) That in the course of said negotiation undertaken by Mrs. Castro, Federico Valdez, Jr, was brought to Manila where Both claims are belied by the facts as found by the court a quo, which held: (1.) that when the deed of sale was executed
the deed of sale was finally placed in his name alone, with the express understanding that he will hold the same in trust and the name of Federico Valdez, Jr. was made to appear therein as the only vendee, "this was done pursuant to the
for his other brother and sisters;chanrobles virtual law library wishes of Mr. Quicho who advanced the money, in order that he could facilitate the deed of sale between him and the
Valdezes, With the understanding that Federico Valdez, Jr. will hold the same in, trust for his other brother and sisters;"
and (2) that when 'Federico Valdez, Jr. was still living, "he never attempted to exclude the herein plaintiffs from
(5) That the placing of the deed of sale in the name of Federico Valdez, Jr. alone, instead of the "Heirs of Federico
Valdez, Sr." or "Heirs of Juanita Batul" was done through the suggestion of Mr. Quicho who wanted to facilitate his own ownership of the land in question, (and) said plaintiffs have been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the
premises they are occupying inside the lot in question long before the execution of the deed of sale (Exh. "I"), (and) it
deed of sale over the portion that he purchased;chanrobles virtual law library
was only after the death of Federico Valdez, Jr. (in 1960) that the widow, Teofila Olorga, tried to eject the
plaintiffs."chanrobles virtual law library
(6) That at the time of the execution of the deed of sale (Exh. "I"), Valdez, Jr. was barely 21 years old, a sophomore
student in the high school, and he, together with his wife, were without any lucrative trade or calling;chanrobles virtual
law library Given the antecedents of the property and the fact that its acquisition by Federico Valdez, Jr. was for the benefit not of
himself alone but also of his brother and sisters, although for purposes of convenience he was made to appear as the sole
vendee, the juridical relation that arose among them was one of co-ownership, with the plaintiffs-appellees actually in
(7) That Josefina Valdez and her co-plaintiffs had been in continuous, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession and possession of a portion of the property. Under Article 494 of the Civil Code, "No prescription shall run in favor of a co-
occupation of the premises in question long before the death of Valdez, Jr.;chanrobles virtual law library owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
Insofar as the aspect of extinctive prescription referred to in this article is concerned, it is but a restatement of Article
(8) That Valdez, Jr. never asserted, nor attempted to assert, during his lifetime, sole and exclusive ownership of the 1965 of the Spanish Civil Code, which provides: "As between co-heirs, co-owners, or proprietors of adjacent estates, the
premises in question, against the herein plaintiffs; andchanrobles virtual law library action to demand the partition of the inheritance or of the thing held in common, or the survey of the adjacent properties,
does not prescribe." And from the standpoint of acquisitive prescription, or prescription of ownership, this Court has held
in numerous decisions involving fiduciary relations such as those occupied by a trustee with respect to the cestui que
(9) That during the lifetime of Valdez, Jr. he sold a portion of the land in question and leased other portions thereof to trust that as a general-rule the former's possession is not adverse and therefore cannot ripen into a title by prescription.
private parties, but he did so with the consent and approval of her elder sister, Josefina Adverse possession in such a case requires, the concurrence of the following-circumstances: (a) that the trustee has
Valdez.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) that such, positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust and (c) that the evidence thereon should be clear and
In this connection we have to consider also the offer of evidence by the plaintiffs as matters to be testified by Mr. conclusive. * These circumstances are not present in this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Gregorio Quicho were he present and able to testify and which were admitted by the defendants, such that the
presentation of Mr. Quicho was waived by the plaintiffs. The testimony of Mr. Quicho which would have been given by In view of the foregoing considerations the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. With costs.
him if he were presented and which were admitted by the defendants are as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
(1) That a deed of sale for a consideration of P500.00 was executed by the spouses Gutierrez in favor of the spouses
Federico Valdez, Sr. and Juanita Batul, over Lot 18 of Puerto Princesa Cadastre, the very lot in question, in the year
1924;chanrobles virtual law library

(2) That Mr. Quicho rented and occupied since 1939, a portion of Lot 18, the lot in question, from Juanita
Batul;chanrobles virtual law library

(3) That the amount of P2,200.00 which was paid to Dolores M. Gutierrez for the execution of the deed of sale, Exhibit
"I", was delivered by Mr. Gregorio Quicho, for payment of unpaid back rentals and as advances for the purchase of the
portion of Lot 18 which he finally acquired;chanrobles virtual law library

(4) That Mr. Quicho was instrumental in having the deed of sale executed in the name of Federico Valdez, Jr. the portion
which he wanted to acquire.The legal point raised by the appellants is that since the land in question was sold to the late
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[G.R. No. L-22621. September 29, 1967.]

to determine whether the property is susceptible of partition, and submit a plan therefor, if feasible, as well as to report
JOSE MARIA RAMIREZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, RITA D. RAMIREZ, BELEN T. thereon. Subsequently, the commissioners submitted their individual reports with their respective plans for the
RAMIREZ, DAVID MARGOLIES, MANUEL UY & SONS, INC., BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, in segregation of plaintiff’s share.
its capacity as judicial administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Jose Vivencio Ramirez, defendants-
appellants, ANGELA M. BUTTE, Defendant-Appellee. After due hearing, the Court rendered a decision declaring that plaintiff is entitled to the segregation of his share, and
directing that the property be partitioned in accordance with the plan submitted by commissioner Valencia, and that the
expenses incident thereto be paid by both parties proportionately. Hence, this appeal by the defendants, except Mrs.
Butte. Appellants maintain that the lower court has erred: 1) in holding that said property is legally susceptible of
physical division; 2) in accepting the recommendation of commissioner Valencia, instead of that of commissioner
SYLLABUS Cuervo, or a proposal made by the very plaintiff; and 3) in not ordering that the incidental expenses be borne exclusively
by him.

1. CIVIL LAW; CO-OWNERSHIP PROPERTY; WHERE DIVISION THEREOF IS PROPER. — Where, as in this We find no merit in the appeal.
case, no evidence was introduced in support of the claim that a physical division of the property will cause inestimable
damage to the interest of the co-owners thereof, a court order requiring its division was proper. With respect to the first alleged error, it is urged that a physical division of the property will cause "inestimable damage"
to the interest of the co-owners. No evidence, however, has been introduced, or sought to be introduced, in support of this
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXPENSES OF DIVISION TO BE DEFRAYED BY PARTIES BENEFITED. — Since the segregation allegation. Moreover, the same is predicated upon the assumption that a real estate suitable for commercial purposes —
of the property in question inured to the benefit, not only of plaintiff, but also of defendants, both parties must defray the such as the one herein sought to be partitioned — is likely to suffer a proportionately great diminution in value when its
incidental expenses. area becomes too small. But, then, if plaintiff’s share of 260.26 square meters were segregated from the property in
question, there would still remain a lot of 1,301.34 square meters for appellants herein and Mrs. Butte. A real estate of
this size, in the very heart of Manila, is not, however, inconsequential, in comparison to that of the present property of the
DECISION community. In other words, we do not believe that its value would be impaired, on account of the segregation of
plaintiff’s share, to such an extent as to warrant the conclusion that the property is indivisible.

CONCEPCION, C.J.: Appellants argue that, instead of making the aforementioned segregation, plaintiffs share should be sold to them. In
support of this pretense, they cite the provision of Article 495 of our Civil Code, to the effect that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the co-owners cannot demand a physical division of the
Appeal by the defendants from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
thing owned in common, when to do so would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended. But the co-
ownership may be terminated in accordance with article 498."cralaw virtua1aw library
Plaintiff, Jose Maria Ramirez, brought this action 1 against defendants Jose Eugenio Ramirez, Rita D. Ramirez, Belen T.
Ramirez, David Margolies, Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc., the Estate of the late Jose Vivencio Ramirez, represented by its
They apparently assume, once again, that the alleged "inestimable damage" to be suffered by the property, if plaintiff’s
judicial administrator, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, and Angela M. Butte — hereinafter referred to collectively as
share were segregated, is equivalent to rendering it "unserviceable for the use for which it is intended." Independently of
defendants — for the partition of a parcel of land situated at the Northwestern corner of Escolta street and Plaza Sta.
the fact that the minor premise of this syllogism — the alleged "inestimable damage" — has not been established, the
Cruz, Manila — otherwise known as Lot 1 of Block 2120 of the Cadastral Survey of Manila and more particularly
conclusion drawn by appellants does not follow necessarily. Indeed, the record shows that there are two (2) buildings on
described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 53946 of the Register of Deeds for said City — and belonging pro indiviso
the land in question, namely: 1) a two-storey commercial building — known as "Sta. Cruz Building" — abutting, on the
to both parties, one sixth (1/6) to the plaintiff and five-sixths (5/6) to the defendants.
one (1) side, 2 on the Escolta, and, on the other, 3 on Plaza Santa Cruz; and 2) a small two-storey residential building, on
the Northwestern end of the lot and behind the first building, adjoining the Estero de la Reina, which constitutes the
Manuel Uy & Sons expressed its conformity to the partition, "if the same can be done without great prejudice to the
Southwestern boundary of the property. There is nothing to show that, after segregating plaintiff’s share, the buildings
interests of the parties." Defendant Butte agreed to the partition prayed for. The other defendants objected to the physical
left on the remaining 1,301.34 square meters, representing defendants’ share, would be unserviceable, either for
partition of the property in question, upon the theory that said partition is "materially and legally" impossible and "would
commercial or for residential purposes. On the contrary, it seems obvious that plaintiff would not insist upon the partition
work great harm and prejudice to the co-owners." By agreement of the parties the lower Court referred the matter to a
prayed for, if his share 4 were unserviceable for either — particularly the commercial — purpose. In fact, every one of
Commission composed of:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
the aforementioned commissioners, including the one representing defendants herein, recommended the segregation of
plaintiff’s share. The commissioners merely failed to agree on the precise configuration thereof.
(1) Delfin Gawaran, Deputy Clerk of said court, as Chairman,
This brings us to the second issue raised by appellants: whether the lower court should have adopted the plan submitted
(2) Artemio U. Valencia, President of the Manila Board of Realtors as commissioner for plaintiff, and
by their own commissioner, or "in not taking into consideration," at least, a proposal made by plaintiff herein. In this
connection, it appears that said commissioner 5 recommended that plaintiff’s share be given a frontage of 6.14 lineal
(3) Ramon F. Cuervo, President of the Perpetual Investment Corporation, Inc., as commissioner for defendants.
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meters at Plaza Sta. Cruz, whereas the commissioner for the Court 6 favored a frontage of 12.66 square meters at said occupied, cultivated, and possessed continuously, openly, peacefully, and exclusively the two parcels of land. He then
Plaza; that defendants’ main objection to the plan recommended by commissioner Valencia 7 and adopted by the lower prayed that he be declared the absolute owner of 8/9 of the lots in question.1
court, is that it left, behind the portion awarded to plaintiff, a lot of 169 square meters, which would have to be divided
among the defendants, should they later wish to have their individual shares segregated; and that, in order to offset this On 8 October 1976, the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the late Alipio Yabo2 lodged with the same court a
objection, plaintiff had expressed — in one of the pre-trials held in the lower court and in order to "facilitate early
complaint for partition and quieting of title with damages,3 docketed as Civil Case No. 5174, against Pastor Makibalo,
termination" of the case — the willingness "to buy from the other co-owners the remaining portion of the land behind his Enecia Cristal, and the spouses Eulogio and Remedies Salvador. They alleged that Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 are
lot at P1,000 per square meter."cralaw virtua1aw library
the common property of the heirs of Alipio Yabo, namely, the plaintiffs, defendant Enecia Cristal, Maria Yabo and Jose
Yabo, whose share had been sold to Alberto Yabo; that after Alipio's death, the spouses Pastor and Maria Makibalo,
The record does not show that this offer of the plaintiff had not been "taken into consideration" by the lower court.
Enecia Cristal and Jose Yabo became the de facto administrators of the said properties; and that much to their surprise,
Moreover, defendants had not accepted it. And neither do they accept it now, for they would want the plaintiff to pay a they discovered that the Salvador spouses, who were strangers to the family, have been harvesting coconuts from the lots,
price higher than that offered by him. Upon the other hand, the disadvantage resulting to the defendants from the
which act as a cloud on the plaintiffs' title over the lots.
existence of said lot of 169 square meters, behind that awarded to the plaintiff, is offset by the fact that the remaining
portion of the land in question — representing defendants’ collective shares — has, in addition to a frontage of around 40
meters on Plaza Santa Cruz, a frontage of 24.13 meters on Escolta Street, which apart from being, admittedly, the most The plaintiffs then prayed that (a) they, as well as defendant Pastor Makibalo, in representation of his wife, and Enecia
valuable one, is totally denied to the plaintiff. Then, again, the Cuervo plan giving plaintiff a 6.14 meters frontage of Cristal, in representation of Gaudencia, be declared as the owners of the lots; (b) the Salvador spouses be declared as
Plaza Sta. Cruz, goes all the way down to the Western end of the property, the Estero de la Reina, and would require a having no rights thereto except as possible assignees of their co-defendants, Pastor Makibalo and Enecia Cristal; (c) the
partition of the residential building, on that part of the property in question, which the very plaintiff says is indivisible, lots be partitioned according to law among the aforementioned co-owners; and (d) the defendants be made to pay for the
because it would render said building "unserviceable for the purpose for which it is intended." 8 value of the fruits they harvested from the lots and for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, expenses of the
litigation, and costs of the suit.
As regards the last alleged error, it is obvious that the segregation of plaintiff’s share inures to the benefit not only to the
plaintiff, but, also, of the defendants, and that both should, consequently, defray the incidental expenses. The two cases were consolidated and jointly heard by Branch 5 of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan de Oro City.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against herein defendants-
appellants. It is so ordered. By evidence, Pastor, Makibalo sought to prove the following allegations:

He was married to Maria Yabo who died on 17 March 1962.4 In August 1949, Jose and Victoriano, both surnamed Yabo,
sold their respective shares in the disputed lots to one Pedro Ebarat, and in 1952 the latter sold both shares to Pastor
G.R. No. 109910 April 5, 1995 Makibalo.5 Ebarat formalized this conveyance by executing an Affidavit of Waiver and Quitclaim dated 30 May 1969 in
favor of Pastor.6
REMEDIOS G. SALVADOR and GRACIA G. SALVADOR, petitioners,
vs. On 16 January 1951, the heirs of the late Lope Yabo sold Lope's shares in the litigated properties to one Dominador
COURT OF APPEALS, ALBERTO and ELPIA YABO, FRANCISCA YABO, et al., respondents. Canomon,7 who, in turn, sold the same to Pastor.8 Canomon afterwards executed an Affidavit of Waiver and Quitclaim
in favor of the latter.9
Assailed in this petition is the legal determination made by the Court of Appeals on the issues of which portion of Lot
No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 formed part of the conjugal assets of the spouses Pastor Makibalo and Maria Yabo, and of Pastor Makibalo likewise purchased the shares of Baseliza in the two lots in 1942, of Procopio in 1957, of Francisca in
whether or not the rights of Pastor's co-heirs in the estate of Maria Yabo were extinguished through prescription or 1958, and of Pelagia in 1967. The only share he did not buy was that of Gaudencia. After every purchase, he took
laches. possession of the portions bought and harvested the products thereof.10

Alipio Yabo was the owner of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 situated in Barrio Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City, containing In 1966, Pastor sold back to Alberto a portion of Lot No. 6180 which was formerly the share of Alberto's father,
an area of 1,267 and 3,816 square meters, respectively. Title thereto devolved upon his nine children, namely, Victoriano, Procopio. 11
Procopio, Lope, Jose, Pelagia, Baseliza, Francisca, Maria, and Gaudencia, upon his death sometime before or during the
second world war.
In December 1968, Pastor mortgaged the two lots to the spouses Eulogio and Remedios Salvador. 12 On 26 September
1978, he executed a document denominated as a "Confirmation and Quitclaim" whereby he waived all his rights,
On 28 April 1976, Pastor Makibalo, who is the husband of Maria Yabo, one of Alipio's children, filed with the then interests, and participation in the lots in favor of the Salvador spouses. 13
Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5000, against the spouses Alberto
and Elpia Yabo for "Quieting of Title, Annulment of Documents, and Damages." In the complaint, he alleged that he
owned a total of eight shares of the subject lots, having purchased the shares of seven of Alipio's children and inherited
the share of his wife, Maria, and that except for the portion corresponding to Gaudencia's share which he did not buy, he
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On the other hand, by their evidence, l4 the spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo tried to prove that they had repurchased those of his brothers and sisters are of no avail, for if they were not the ones who affixed those
from Pastor Makibalo the share of Procopio, which was previously sold to Pastor, and had bought the shares of Jose and signatures and so they did not sell the shares of their father Lope Yabo, why did they not then take
Maria. 15 possession of said shares — they remained silent from 1951 to September 16, 1976 a period of 25
years. They are now [e]stopped by laches.
Filoteo Yabo denied having sold the share of his father, Lope Yabo, in the contested lots and disowned his signature and
those of his mother, brothers, and sisters appearing at the back of Exhibit "C". 16 And as regards the shares of Baseliza, Francisca and Pelagia, there is no evidence presented to
effectively rebut the testimony of Pastor Makibalo that he acquired the shares of Baseliza Yabo in
1942 by changing it with a buffalo; that he bought the shares of Francisca Yabo in 1958 and that he
Ignacio Yabo testified that his father, Victoriano Yabo, did not know how to write and sign his name. He further declared
that he had no knowledge that his father affixed his thumbmark in the document marked as Exhibit "A" purporting to bought the shares of Pelagia Yabo in 1967; Pastor Makibalo had been in possession of these shares
from the time he acquired them, continuously, adversely, openly, and peacefully, as owner up to the
alienate his father's share in the disputed lots. l7
time he sold his rights and interest therein to the spouses Eulogio and Remedies Salvador. The heirs
of Baseliza, Francisca and Pelagia have not taken any step to protect their rights over those shares
On 15 January 1983, the trial court rendered its decision 18 holding as follows: for over 40 years in the case of Baseliza's share, for about 20 years in the case of Francisca's share,
and for more than 10 years in the case of Pelagia's share. Laches, likewise has rendered their rights
Assuming that the thumbmark on the typewritten name "Jose Yabo" in Exh. 3 was that of Jose stale.
Yabo, Alberto Yabo and Elpia R. Yabo purchased the share of Jose Yabo in bad faith because they
knew before and up to the execution of Exh. 3 on October 24, 1972 that Jose Yabo was no longer On March 10, 1966 Pastor Makibalo sold back to Alberto Yabo the share of Procopio Yabo in Lot
the owner of that area because from the documents she borrowed from Mrs. Salvador they came to 6180 (Exh. 1 and 2), but there is nothing to show that. Pastor Makibalo also sold back Procopio's
know that Jose Yabo had sold his shares to Pedro Ebarat, and they have seen that Pastor Makibalo share in Lot 6080.
has been in possession of those shares together with the seven others exclusively as owner, he
having mortgaged them to Mrs. Salvador.
So then, by purchase, Pastor Makibalo and Maria Yabo acquired the shares of Baseliza, Victoriano,
Jose, Lope, Procopio and Francisca, or six (6) shares from Lots 6080 and 6180. These belonged to
As Jose Yabo was no longer the owner of the one-ninth (1/9) shares which he sold to Alberto Yabo the conjugal partnership of Pastor Makibalo and Maria Yabo. Maria Yabo had also a share from
and Elpia Yabo under Exh. 3, the sale is null and void, and Alberto and Elpia acquired nothing Lots 6080 and 6180, and Pastor Makibalo acquired the shares of Pelagia Yabo in both Lots 6080
because Jose Yabo had no more title, right or interest to dispose of. and 6180. All in all; Pastor Makibalo acquired eight shares in both Lot 6080 and 6180.

... While Maria Yabo died on March 17, 1962, and so one-fourth (1/4) of the shares of Baseliza,
Victoriano, Jose, Lope, and Francisca, or one-fourth of five-ninth (5/9) of both lots and one-fourth
Pastor Makibalo had been in possession of Jose Yabo's share since 1949 after purchasing it from (1/4) of Lot 6080 should go to the children of the brothers and sisters of Maria Yabo by virtue of the
Ebarat, and has been in possession thereof up to September 26, 1978 when he sold it to the spouses provisions of Article 1001 of the New Civil Code, the latter have lost their rights thereto by laches
Eulogio Salvador and Remedios Salvador, who are now in possession of the same. for their inaction for a very long period and their rights have become stale. On the other hand, Pastor
Makibalo who had been in possession of the whole of the eight shares in both Lots 6080 and 6180,
enjoying the fruits thereof exclusively, uninterruptedly, publicly, peacefully, and continuously from
Exh. A, evidencing the sale of Victoriano Yabo's share to Pedro Ebarat was identified by the latter the death of Maria Yabo up to the filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. 5174 on October 8,
who testified that he sold it to Pastor Makibalo in 1951. Exh. A is an ancient document — 1949 1976, or a period of 14 years, had acquired title to the whole of the eight shares in Lot 6080 and
when the document came to existence up to now is more than 30 years, and the document had been seven shares in Lot 6180 (the share of Procopio in Lot 6180 had been sold back to Alberto Yabo).
in the possession of Pastor Makibalo, then Remedios Salvador who had interest in its preservation.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered finding Pastor Makibalo, now
As regards the shares of Lope Yabo, the same had been sold by his surviving spouse Juana Legaspi, Eulogio Salvador and Remedios Salvador the owner of eight (8) shares, equivalent to eight-ninth
and his children Filoteo, Andresa, Jovita, Bonifacio, and Rundino for P105.00 on January 16, 1951 (8/9) of Lot No. 6080, and of seven (7) shares, equivalent to seven-ninth (7/9) of Lot No. 6180, and
to Dominador Conomon (Exh. C and C-1), who in turn sold it to Pastor Makibalo in 1952, therefore, ordering the partition of Lot 6080 so that the one-ninth (1/9) alloted to Gaudencia Yabo
executing a formal Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim on May 30, 1969 will go to her heirs or their assigns, and the remaining eight-ninth (8/9) will go to the spouses
(Exh. D). Eulogio Salvador and Remedios Salvador, as successor of Pastor Makibalo, and the partition of Lot
6180 so that the seven-ninth (7/9) portion which formerly belonged to Baseliza, Victoriano, Jose,
Exh. C is an ancient document, being more than 30 years old and has been in the possession of Lope, Maria, Francisca, and Pelagia will go to the spouses Eulogio and Remedios Salvador, the one-
Pastor Makibalo and then the spouses Eulogio and Remedios Salvador — who had an interest in its ninth (1/9) which formerly belonged to Procopio, will go to Alberto Yabo, and the remaining one-
preservation. The claim of Filoteo Yabo that the signatures appearing in Exh. C are not his and ninth (1/9) which formerly belonged to Gaudencia, will go to Gaudencia's heirs or their assigns.

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Doc. No. 720, recorded on page 28 of Notarial Register No. VII, and acknowledged before Notary the husband of Maria and, therefore, an uncle in-law of appellants. In our culture, a demand by an
Public Isidro S. Baculio (Exh. E) [purportedly executed by Maria Yabo and Pastor Makibalo] is heir or heirs for partition immediately upon the death of a relative is more often taken not as a
hereby declared null and void, and so the Office of the City Fiscal is directed to cause an legitimate assertion of a right but of something else, like greed. It must also be noted that the
investigation of this matter to find out the person or persons responsible for the falsification of the spouses, the appellee Pastor Makibalo and his deceased wife Maria, were childless and, therefore,
said document, and if the evidence warrants, to file the corresponding criminal action in court. The appellants and the other children of the brothers and sisters of Maria must have felt that at any rate
Office of the City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City is, likewise, directed to cause the cancellation the property would go to them in the course of time. This probably explains why appellants started
of Tax Declarations Nos. 33553, marked as Exh. H-3, 33557, marked as Exh. H-2, both in the name asserting their right over the property only after appellee Pastor Makibalo sold the same to the
of Alberto Yabo, for having been issued on the basis of a falsified document. Let copies of this spouses Eulogio and Remedios Salvador. Besides, Lots 6080 and 6180 have a combined area only
decision be furnished the Offices of the City Fiscal and City Assessor, both of Cagayan de Oro City. of 5,083 square meters and before the development of Northern Mindanao, and even in 1962 when
Maria Yabo died, were not that valuable. This is shown by the fact that each heir sold his other
share only for P110.00.
No pronouncement as to damages, attorney's fees and costs.

SO ORDERED. 19 As we have said not time alone. In the early case of Cortes v. Oliva, 33 Phil. 480, it was held
that"(o)rdinarily, possession by one joint owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others, but
will, as a rule, be held to be for the benefit of all. Much stronger evidence is required to show an
The defendants in Civil Case No. 5000 and the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5174 appealed from the decision to the Court adverse holding by one of several joint owners than by a stranger; and in such cases, to sustain a
of Appeals on 19 August 1983. 20 plea of prescription, it must always clearly appear that one who was originally a joint owner has
repudiated the claims of his co-owners, and that his co-owners were apprised or should have been
In its decision of 3 February 1993, 21 the Court of Appeals held that (a) Maria Yabo did not sell her share to Alberto and apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership before the alleged prescription began to
Elpia Yabo; (b) prescription and laches have not run against the private respondents with respect to the 1/9 share of run (at page 484). This ruling on prescription should apply with equal force to laches.
Maria Yabo in the estate of her father and to her conjugal share in the portions acquired from her brothers and sisters; and
(c) Procopio never sold his share in Lot No. 6080 to Pastor Makibalo. More specifically it stated: The third assignment of error challenges the finding of the lower court that "there is nothing to show
that Pastor Makibalo also sold back Procopio's share in Lot 6080" (Decision, p. 16; Records, Vol.
Exh. E is the document found by the lower court to be a falsification. This finding appellants do not 2,p. 158).
dispute and have not raised an error.
Exhibits 1 and 2 cover only Procopio's share in Lot 6180. In other words, Exhibits 1 and. 2
... conveyed back to Alberto Yabo only his father, Procopio's share in Lot 6180.

While acknowledging. that upon the death of Maria Yabo on March 17, 1962, one-half (1/2) of the There is indeed no evidence that Pastor Makibalo also sold back to Alberto, his father Procopio's
share of Maria Yabo in Lots 6080 and 6180 and one-half (1/2) of Maria Yabo's conjugal share in the share in Lot 6080.
portions bought from Basiliza, Victoriano, Jose, Lope, Pelagia and Francisca should go to the
children of the brothers and sisters of Maria in accordance with Article 1001 of the Civil Code, the But from the evidence it appears that Procopio Yabo never sold his share in Lot 6080 to Pastor
lower court rule that said children have lost their rights by laches "for their inaction for a very long Makibalo. So there was no need to convey back Procopio's share in Lot 6080.
period and their rights have become stale" (Decision, p. 16; Record, Vol. 2, p. 158).
This fact is evident from the Affidavit of Confirmation of Sale (Exh. M) dated April 22, 1970,
Appellants in their second assignment of error aver that this is an error. executed by Alberto Yabo, which is the very document relied upon by the lower court (Decision, p.
11; Record, Vol. 2, p. 153) in finding that "Alberto Yabo admitted that the share of his father
We agree that the lower court erred. Procopio Yabo was previously bought by Pastor Makibalo." A look at Exh. M, particularly par. 3
thereof, reveals that AlbertoYabo merely acknowledged or confirmed the sale of his father's share to
Pastor Makibalo in Lot 6180. In effect, it at the same time proves that Lot 6080 was never sold by
While between March 17, 1962 when Maria Yabo died and October 8, 1976, when Civil Case No. Procopio to appellee Pastor Makibalo; otherwise, it would have been included in the said Affidavit
5174 for partition was filed, was a period of more than fourteen (14) years, that alone to our mind of Confirmation of Sale. The Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. 2) subsequently executed by Pastor
would not suffice to establish laches or prescription. Upon the death of Maria Yabo, appellee Pastor Makibalo in favor of Alberto Yabo on April 23, 1970, further proves this point, since the latter
Makibalo and appellants and the other children of the brothers and sisters of Maria, by operation of merely bought back what was previously sold, his father's share in Lot 6180.22
law become co-owners of the one-ninth (1/9) share of Maria as heir of her father Alipio and the
conjugal share of Maria in the portions acquired from Basiliza, Victoriano, Jose, Lope, Pelagia and
Francisca. Time alone is not a decisive factor. Appellee Pastor Makibalo, it must be remembered, is The respondent court then concluded and held as follows:

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In summary, appellee Pastor Makibalo and his assigns, the spouses Eulogio and Remedios Salvador, Pastor; and (3) the 1/9 share of Pelagia which was acquired by Pastor in 1967 or five years after the death of his wife and
are entitled only to one-half (½) of the one-ninth (1/9) share of Maria and three-fourths (3/4) of the which was therefore his exclusive property.
six-ninth (6/9) shares acquired from Basiliza, Victoriano, Jose, Lope, Pelagia and Francisca.
Accordingly, the partition should be done as follows: There is, thus; merit in the petitioners' first assigned error. The Court of .Appeals should have excluded from the conjugal
partnership the share of Pelagia which Pastor had acquired after his wife's death.
(1) 1/9 of Lots 6080 end 6180 should be given to the heirs of Gaudencia Yabo
or their successors and assigns; Upon Maria's death in 1962, the conjugal partnership of gains was dissolved. 26 Half of the conjugal properties, together
with Maria's l/9 hereditary share in the disputed lots, constituted Maria's estate and should thus go to her surviving heirs.
(2) 1/9 of Lot 6180 should go to Alberto Yabo and his wife Elpia Yabo; 27 Under Article 1001 of the Civil Code, her heirs are her spouse, Pastor Makibalo, who shall be entitled to-one-half
(1/2) of her estate, her brother, Jose, and the children of her other brothers and sisters, who shall inherit the other half.
There having been no actual partition of the estate yet, the said heirs became co-owners thereof by operation of law. 28
(3) 1/9 of Lot 6080 should be given to the heirs of Procopio Yabo and their
successors end assigns, including Alberto Yabo;
We now determine whether prescription and laches can be applied against the co-heirs of Pastor Makibalo.
(4) The 1/9 share of Maria Yabo in Lots 6080 and 6180 should be partitioned:
One-half (1/2) for the surviving spouse Pastor Makibalo (now the spouses It has been said that Article 494 of the Civil Code which provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the
Eulogio Salvador and Remedios Salvador) and the other half for the children partition of the common property implies that an action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by
of the brothers and sisters of Maria Yabo in equal shares. laches. 29 The imprescriptibility of the action cannot, however, be invoked when one of the co-owners has possessed the
property as exclusive owner and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription. 30
(5) The remaining 6/9, one-half (1/2) of which is conjugal between Maria
Yabo and appellee Pastor Makibalo should be partitioned three-fourths (3/4) What needs to be addressed first is whether or not Pastor Makibalo has acquired by prescription the shares of his other
for Pastor Makibalo (now the spouses Eulogio Salvador and Remedios co-heirs or co-owners. Prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership requires a continuous, open, peaceful, public, and
Salvador) and one-fourth (1/4) for the children of the brothers and sisters of adverse possession for a period of time fixed by law.
Maria Yabo in equal shares.
This Court has held that the possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the
(6) Jose Yabo if he is still alive should participate in the partition as heir of other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to all of them. 31 Acts which may be considered adverse to strangers may not be
Maria otherwise he shall be represented by his children. considered adverse insofar as co-owners are concerned. A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents,
fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon, and the payment
WHEREFORE, premises considered, subject to the modification in the partition, as indicated above, of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he
exercised acts of possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-
the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs. The lower court is
directed if necessary to fully effect the partition, to conduct further hearings and determine whether owners. 32
Jose Yabo is still alive and who are the children of the brothers and sisters of Maria Yabo.23
Thus, in order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the
Unable to obtain a reconsideration of the said-decision, Remedios Salvador, together with her daughter, Ma. Gracia following elements must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
cestui que trust or the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que
Salvador, as one of the successors-in-interest of Eulogio M. Salvador who died during the pendency of the appeal, 24
elevated the case to this Court contending that the respondent court erred in ruling that: (1) the shares of Pelagia Yabo trust or the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. 33
should be included in the partition; (2) prescription and laches have not run against the private respondents in relation to
the 1/9 share of Maria Yabo in the estate of her father and to her ½ conjugal share in those acquired by purchase; (3) In Pangan vs. Court of Appeals, 34 this Court had occasion to lay down specific acts which are considered as acts of
Procopio Yabo never sold to Pastor Makibalo his share in Lot No. 6080; and(4) Jose Yabo should be allowed to repudiation:
participate as heir of Maria even as he had openly rejected this option by refusing to participate in both civil cases. 25
Filing by a trustee of an action in court against the trustor to quiet title to property, or for recovery
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, of ownership thereof, held in possession by the former, may constitute an act of repudiation of the
unless it be proved that it pertains .exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Since the shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope, trust reposed on him by the latter.
Baseliza, Procopio, and Francisca in Lot No. 6180 and Lot No. 6080 had been purchased by Pastor during his marriage
with Maria, and there is no proof that these were acquired with his exclusive money, the same are deemed conjugal
properties. Not forming part of the conjugal partnership are: (1) the 1/9 share inherited by Maria which remained as her
exclusive property pursuant to Article 146 (2) of the Civil Code; (2) the 1/9 share of Gaudencia which was not sold to
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The issuance of the certificate of title would constitute an open and clear repudiation of any trust, At this juncture, it is worthy to quote pertinent portions of the testimony of Pastor Makibalo:
and the lapse of more than 20 years, open and adverse possession as owner would certainly suffice
to vest title by prescription.
XXXXX

An action for the reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes within 10 XXXX
years. And it is from the date of the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse title
for purposes of the statute of limitation is counted.
The petitioners contend that the sales or conveyances made by Alipio's heirs were for their consolidated shares in the two
lots. If this was so, and the receipt which Procopio signed when he sold his consolidated share to Pastor was turned over
The prescriptive period may only be counted from the time petitioners repudiated the trust relation
to Alberto, the inevitable conclusion is that Alberto redeemed his father's share in both lots, not only in Lot: No. 6180.
in 1955 upon the filing of the complaint for recovery of possession against private respondents so This conclusion is further buttressed by the above-quoted testimony of Pastor that he bought the shares (consolidated) of
that the counterclaim of the private respondents contained in their amended answer wherein they
each of Alipio's heirs for P110.00 and that when he sold back to Alberto the former share of Procopio, Alberto paid him
asserted absolute ownership of the disputed realty by reason of the continuous and adverse the same amount of P110.00.
possession of the same is well within the l0-year prescriptive period.

However, since the share of Procopio in the two litigated parcels of land was purchased by Pastor during his marriage
There is clear repudiation of a trust when one who is an apparent administrator of property causes with Maria, the same became conjugal property, and half of it formed part of Maria's estate upon her death in 1962.
the cancellation of the title thereto in the name of the apparent beneficiaries and gets a new
Accordingly, Pastor's resale in favor of Alberto could only be valid with respect to Pastor's one-half (1/2) conjugal share
certificate of title in his own name. and one-fourth (1/4) hereditary share as heir of Maria. 38 The remaining one-fourth (1/4) should go to Pastor's co-heirs,
the private respondents herein.
It is only when the defendants, alleged co-owners of the property in question, executed a deed of
partition and on the strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of their Now on the fourth assigned error.
predecessor and the issuance of a new one wherein they appear as the new owners of a definite area
each, thereby in effect denying or repudiating the ownership of one of the plaintiffs over his alleged
share in the entire lot, that the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons interested in the land sought to be partitioned must be
instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and of their rights joined as defendants in the complaints. All co-owners and persons having an interest in the property are considered
thereunder. indispensable parties and an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of said persons. 39 It has been held that
the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the
complaint including the judgment. 40
The records do not show that Pastor Makibalo adjudicated to himself the whole estate of his wife by means of an
affidavit filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds as allowed under Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, or that
he caused the issuance of a certificate of title in his name or the cancellation of the tax declaration in Alipio's name and It must be recalled that in Civil Case No. 5174 the private respondents sought the partition of the two lots based on the
the issuance of a new one in his own name. The only act which may be deemed as a repudiation by Pastor of the co- co-ownership which arose from the right of succession to Alipio's estate. Since Jose Yabo confirmed, through his
ownership over the lots is his filing on 28 April 1976 of an action to quiet title (Civil Case No. 5000). The period of thumbmark in the verification of the complaint, that he had already parted with his share in Alipio's estate, he in effect
prescription started to run only from this repudiation. However, this was tolled when his co-heirs, the private respondents admitted that he had ceased to be a co-owner of the two lots which comprised his father's estate. Thus, his non-joinder as
herein, instituted on 8 October 1976 an action for partition (Civil Case No. 5174) of the lots. Hence, the adverse a party-plaintiff in the complaint would appear to be proper. He does not, as well, appear to be an indispensable party in
possession by Pastor being for only about six months would not vest in him exclusive ownership of his wife's estate, and Civil Case No. 5000.
absent acquisitive prescription of ownership, laches and prescription of the action for partition will not lie in favor of
Pastor. 35 As it turned out, however, the evidence and the issues which cropped up rendered imperative the determination of the
conjugal assets of Pastor Makibalo and Maria Yabo and the partition of the latter's estate among her heirs. Her estate
The issue presented by the petitioners in their third assigned error involves a question of fact. This Court is not ordinarily consists of one-half(½) of the conjugal properties, which should then be divided pursuant to Article 1001 of the Civil
a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to errors of law. Thus; the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are as a Code since the marriage produced no child; thus: one-half (½) to Pastor, and the other half to her brother Jose, and to her
rule deemed conclusive. However, when the findings of facts of the appellate court vary with those of the trial court, this nephews and nieces.
Court has to review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct findings. 36
Insofar as the partition of Maria Yabo's estate is concerned, Jose is an indispensable party. Strictly, the rule on
In the instant case, a conflict in the findings of facts of the lower courts exists. The trial court found that Pastor was the indispensable parties may bar a partition of Maria's estate. Considering, however, that such estate or its partition are but
owner of Procopio's share in Lot No. 6080, as there was nothing to show that he sold it back to Alberto Yabo. The incidents in Civil Case No. 5000 and Civil Case No. 5174, and the parties have not offered any objection to the propriety
respondent court on the other hand, held that Procopio Yabo never sold his share in Lot No. 6080 to pastor, thus, there of the determination and partition of her estate, then in the light of Section 11 of Rule 3 41 and Sections 1 and 5, Rule 10
was no need to convey it back to Procopio's son, Alberto. 42 of the Rules of Court, and following the rulings of this Court in the 1910 case of Alonso vs. Villamor 43 and the 1947

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case of Cuyugan vs. Dizon, 44 an amendment of the complaint in Civil Case No. 5174 to implead Jose Yabo as party (b) 1/4 for the other private respondents, including Jose Yabo or his heirs;
plaintiff would be in order.
(5) 5/9 shares which became the conjugal properties of Pastor Makibalo and Maria Yabo to be
In Alonso, it was held that under Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure — whose first paragraph is substantially the divided thus:
same as the aforesaid Section 1 of Rule 10 — and Section 503 thereof, this Court "has full power, apart from that power
and authority which is inherent, to amend the process, pleadings, proceedings, and decision in this case by substituting, as
(a) 3/4 for the petitioners (as successors-in-interest of Pastor Makibalo), and
party plaintiff, the real party in interest." Our ruling in Cuyugan states:

(b) ¼ for the private respondents, including Jose Yabo or his heirs.
We, however, do not believe that the case should be dismissed for plaintiff's failure to join her
husband. (Sec. 11, Rule 2, Rules of Court). Nor should the case be remanded to the court below and
a new trial ordered on this account. The complaint may and should be amended here, to cure the In sum, Lots Nos. 6180 anid 6080 should be partitioned as follows:
defect of party plaintiffs, after final decision is rendered. Section 11, Rule 2, and Section 2, Rule 17,
explicitly authorize such procedure. As this Court had occasion to say in Quison vs. Salud, (12 Phil., 1/9 or 4/36 — to Guadencia Yabo's heirs or successors-in-interest;
109, 116), "a second action would be but a repetition of the first and would involve both parties,
plaintiffs and defendant, in much additional expense and would cause much delay, in that way
defeating the purpose of the section, which is expressly stated to be "that the actual merits of the 3/4 of 1/9 or 3/36 — to the spouses Alberto and Elpina Yabo;
controversy may speedily be determined without regard to technicalities and in the most expeditious
and inexpensive manner." (See also Diaz vs. De la Rama, 73 Phil., 104) 8/36 — to the private respondents, including Jose Yabu or his heirs;

To avoid further delay in the disposition of this case, we declare Civil Case No. 5174 as thus duly amended. 21/36 — to the petitioners as successors-in-interest of Pastor Makibalo.
Consequently, Jose Yabo may participate in the partition of the estate of Maria Yabo. The fourth assigned error must then
be rejected.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals of 8 February 1993 in CA-G.R. CV No. 12839 is
AFFIRMED, subject to the modifications indicated above. Upon the finality of this decision, let this case be forthwith
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the appealed judgment should be modified as follows: (a) the former 1/9 share of remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings on the partition of Lots Nos. 6180 and 6080 in conformity with this
Pelagia Yabo in Lots No. 6180 and 6080 which she sold to Pastor should be treated as the latter's exclusive property decision. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
which should now pertain to the petitioners, his successors-in-interest; and (b) the former 1/9 share of Procopio Yabo in
both lots should be divided as follows: 3/4 (respondent Pastor's 1/2 conjugal share and 1/4 representing his share therein
as Maria's heir) for the spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo, and 1/4 (representing the share therein of Maria's collateral G.R. No. 95256             May 28, 1991
relatives as Maria's heirs) for the private respondents, including Alberto and Jose Yabo. The partition of the two lots in
controversy should therefore be made in this wise: MARIANO DISTRITO, LUISA DISTRITO, MARIANO CIMAFRANCA, EDUARDO DOMICIANO
DISTRITO, ELIZABETH DISTRITO and SEGUNDINO CATIPAY, petitioners,
(1) 1/9 share of Gaudencia Yabo should be allotted to her heirs or successors-in-interest; vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO MIQUIABAS, PACITA MIQUIABAS, and ENRIQUE
SAMSON, respondents.
(2) 1/9 share formerly belonging to Pelagia Yabo — to the petitioners as successors-in-interest of
Pastor Makibalo;
This petition involves the legal redemption of real property.
(3) 1/9 hereditary share of Maria Yabo to be divided as follows:
Private respondents seek to redeem as co-owners from petitioner petitioners a parcel of land more particularly described
as follows:
(a) 1/2 for the petitioners (as successors-in-interest of Pastor Makibalo), and

Lot No. 716-B-2 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, bounded of the North by Colon St., 13.75 meters; on the South
(b) 1/2 for the private respondents, including Jose Yabo or his heirs; by Lot 716-A, 14.76 meters; on the East by Cervantes St., and on the West by Lot No. 716-B, 19.09 meters,
containing an area of 374 square meters, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 0-2536, with assessed value at
(4) 1/9 share formerly belonging to Procopio Yabo to be divided thus: P11,664.1

(a) 3/4 for Spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo, and The evidence of the parties is concisely related by the respondent court as follows:
14
 15

Plaintiff-appellants evidence tend to establish that the property in question was originally owned by Simeona In a decision dated June 19, 1987, the Regional Trial Court at Dumaguete City, before which the action was originally
Amistad now deceased, their predecessor-in-interest. The heirs of the late Simeona Amistad are Eufrocina brought found that private respondents have lost their right of redemption so the complaint was dismissed with costs
Potenciana, Librada, Catalina, Gabina and Anecito all surnamed Villamil. The lot in question is within the against private respondents. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said judgment was reversed in a decision dated April
heart of the City of Dumaguete City [sic] and Librada's house was constructed thereat, where Librada's 26, 1990, the dispositive part of which reads:
husband and children are presently staying after Librada's death. Plaintiff Pacita Miquiabas-Samson who is
working in Dumaguete City together with her children who are studying also in Dumaguete City are also [sic] WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is
living in Librada's house. Pedro Miquiabas also stays in the house when he visits Dumaguete City coming
entered:
from the island of Siquijor.

(a) Declaring the consignation of the P4,588.85 made by the appellants properly made.
Appellant Pacita Miquiabas-Samson testified that she had bought the share of Librada Villamil and agreed
with the heirs of Gabina Villamil to buy their respective shares and would like to redeem the shares of Catalina
and Anecito both surnamed Villamil to preserve the family lot for sentimental reasons. (b) Declaring that the plaintiff-appellants can exercise the right of legal redemption to the portions sold pro-
indiviso by Catalina Villamil and Anecito Villamil to the defendant-appellees as evidenced by Exhibit 2;
Plaintiff-appellants claim that they only came to know about the sale of the lot in question in July 1984, when
Eduardo Distrito, one of the defendant-appellee [sic] notified them that the defendants were constructing a (c) Ordering all the appellees to accept the consigned price and to convey to the plaintiff-appellants the
building on the portion they bought from Catalina Villamil and Anecito Villamil. However, appellant Pacita undivided portion of the land in litigation, within 30 days from the time our decision becomes final; and
Miquiabas-Samson refused as the shares of Catalina Villamil and Anecito Villamil has [sic] not yet been
segregated as there was no partition over the lot in question. (d) Ordering the defendant-appellees to pay the proportionate costs.3

Plaintiffs-appellants offered to redeem the land in the amount of P4,566.00, but the defendants-appellees Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
refused.1âwphi1 Hence a tender of payment was made (Exh. B), with the court, and notice of consignation
was sent to the defendants-appellees. (Exhibit C).
Article 1623 of the Civil Code provides:
On the other hand, the evidence of the defendant-appellees tends to prove that the whole lot 716 of the
Dumaguete Cadastre was the subject of a civil case in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, and the Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from
said court adjudicated to the six (6 ) heirs of Simeona Amistad Lot No. 716-B-2, the land in litigation with the the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not
one sixth (1/6) pro-indiviso shares. be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given
written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
On April 16, 1976 the defendant-appellees acquired by purchase one-half (1/2) portion pro-indiviso of Lot No.
716-B-3, from Atty. Marcelo Flores which the latter acquired as payment of his attorney's fees in the Civil When a vendor sells real property, he must notify in writing his co- owners who may redeem the same within thirty (30)
Case. (Exhibit 3). days from notice. The deed of sale must be accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice
thereof to all possible redemptioners before it may be recorded in the Registry of Property.
Subsequently, upon representation of Plaintiff-Appellant Pedro Miquiabas, who acted as middle-man,
defendant-appellant bought the shares of Catalina and Anecito Villamil. On April 30, 1975, the instrument of This method was deemed as exclusive in a decision penned by then Justice J.B.L. Reyes.4 However, the law does not
sale was notarized by Juan A. Lapisan, Jr. who testified that Pedro Miquiabas accompanied Eduardo Distrito prescribe any particular form of written notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner.5 So long as the
and himself to Siaton, Negros Oriental where Catalina Villamil is living in order for the latter to sign the redemptioner was informed in writing he has no cause to complain. In De Conejero vs. Court of appeals6 this Court
document as Catalina was too old to travel to Dumaguete City. ruled that the furnishing of a copy of the disputed deed of sale to the redemptioner was equivalent to the giving of written
notice required by law. In the recent case of Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,7 this Court held that as an
exception to the general rule the co-heirs who lived with the purchasers in the same lot are deemed to have received
Appellant Pedro Miquiabas also offered to sell his share and that of his sister to the defendant-appellee but the actual notice of the sale.
latter hesitated.

In this case, it appears that private respondent Pedro Miquiabas acted as middleman and was present when the vendor
Appellee Eduardo Distrito testified that his co-defendant and himself also bought the share of Eusebio signed the deed of sale. It is obvious that he had actual knowledge of the sale. Thus, a written notice to him as required
Amistad who owns the adjoining lot through the representations of appellant Pedro Miquiabas. (Exh. 4).2 by Article No. 1623 of the Civil Code is not necessary. The only purpose of such written notice is to insure that all the
co-owners shall be actually notified of the sale and to remove all doubt as to the perfection of the sale.8
The lone issue is whether or not the private respondents are entitled to redeem the land in question.

15
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When as in this case the co-owner was actually present and was even an active intermediary in the consummation of the Julian’s brother Francisco died in 1960. He was survived by herein petitioners Manuel Correjado, Teresita C. Amarante,
sale of the property he is and must be considered to have had actual notice of the sale. A written notice is no longer Juanita Correjado, Rodolfo Correjado, and Jileta Peregrino.
necessary.
Julian’s brother Zacarias died in 1984. He was survived by the other petitioners herein, Aurora P. vda. de Correjado, Lilia
As to private respondent Pacita Miquiabas she was not present when the aforesaid sale of the property was Capitle, Artemio Correjado, Cecilia Correjado, Rogelia Correjado (Rogelia), Sofronio Correjado, Vicente Correjado and
undertaken.1âwphi1 There is no evidence that she was informed or that she ever learned about the sale soon thereafter. It Gloria vda. de Beduna.
was only in July, 1984 that she was notified by petitioners of their intention to construct a building on a portion of the
property in question which they bought. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, that is, on August 3, 1984, said private
On November 26, 1986, petitioners filed a complaint 11 for partition of the property and damages before the Regional
respondent filed a complaint for legal redemption in court and at the same time deposited the amount of P4,588.85 with Trial Court (RTC) of La Carlota City against respondents, alleging that Fabian contracted two marriages, the first with
the court as the purchase price.
Brigida Salenda who was the mother of Julian, and the subsequent one with Maria Catahay (Maria) who was the mother
of Zacarias, Manuel and Francisco; that the property remained undivided even after the death of Julian in 1950, his
As the law requires a written notice of such sale to the co-owners, such actual notice to private respondent Pacita children-herein respondents having arrogated unto themselves the use and enjoyment of the property, to the exclusion of
Miquiabas is not sufficient compliance with the requirement. Moreover, said respondent filed the complaint for legal petitioners; and that respondents refused to deliver petitioners’ share in the property despite demands therefor and for
redemption within thirty (30) days from the time she was verbally notified thereof by petitioners. Hence, her right to partition.
redeem the property as co-owner must be sustained.
To the Complaint respondents countered in their Answer 22 that in the proceedings in the intestate estate of their great
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the complaint is dismissed as to private respondent Pedro Miquiabas who had grandfather Santos Correjado, petitioners were not adjudicated any share in the property, for Maria, the mother of
lost his right to redeem, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. No pronouncement as to costs. petitioners’ respective fathers Francisco and Zacarias, was just a mistress of Fabian, hence, Francisco and Zacarias (as
well as Manuel) were illegitimate who were not entitled to inherit under the old Civil Code (Spanish Civil Code of 1889).
SO ORDERED.
By Decision of December 29, 1992,33 Branch 63 of the La Carlota City RTC dismissed the complaint upon the grounds
of prescription and laches.
G.R. No. 146890           June 8, 2004

On appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein petitioners raised as sole error of the trial court its dismissal of the complaint
LILIAN CAPITLE, SOFRONIO CORREJADO, ARTEMIO CORREJADO, VICENTE CORREJADO, “without basis in fact and in law,” the appellate court, by Decision of August 29, 2000, 44 dismissed the appeal and
CECILIA CORREJADO, GLORIA VDA. DE BEDUNA, ROGELIA CORREJADO, MANUEL CORREJADO, affirmed the decision of the trial court.
RODOLFO CORREJADO, TERESITA C. AMARANTE, JUANITA CORREJADO AND JULIETA C.
PEREGRINO, petitioners,
vs. In affirming the decision of the trial court, appellant passed upon the issue of legitimacy of the brothers Francisco and
JULIETA VDA. DE GABAN, JULIA CORREJADO AND HERMINIGILDO CORREJADO, respondents. Zacarias (as well as of their brother Manuel) in order to determine whether they co-owned the property with Julian,
illegitimate children not being entitled to inherit under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 55 which was in force when the
brothers’ father Fabian died in 1919.
DECISION

The appellate court found that respondents failed to discharge the onus of proving that Francisco and Zacarias were
Fabian Correjado (Fabian) inherited from his father Santos Correjado two parcels of land subject of the case at bar, Lot illegitimate. But it too found that petitioners also failed to prove that Zacarias and Francisco were legitimate.
No. 1782-B of the Pontevedra Cadastre and Lot No. 952 of the Hinigaran Cadastre containing 26,728 sq. m. and 55,591
sq. m., respectively.

Fabian died intestate in 1919. He was survived by four children, namely: Julian, Zacarias, Francisco and Manuel, all
1
surnamed Correjado.
2
After Fabian’s death in 1919, his son Julian occupied and cultivated the two subject parcels of land (the property) until
his death in 1950. He was survived by three children, namely, herein respondents Julieta vda. de Gaban (Julieta), Julia 3
Correjado (Julia) and Hermegildo Correjado.
4

5
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Upon the disputable presumption, however, that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have A 1980.
entered into a lawful contract of marriage,66 the appellate court presumed that Fabian and Maria were lawfully married,
hence, their children Zacarias and Francisco (as well as Manuel)-predecessors-in-interest of petitioners were legitimate
Q Previous to that, can you tell us if she was in possession of the said land?
children and, therefore, they co-owned with Julian the property.

A Yes, sir. She has been in possession of the said lot before 1980.
Its finding of co-ownership of the property by the predecessors-in-interest of the parties notwithstanding, the appellate
court held that, as did the trial court, prescription and laches had set in, ratiocinating as follows:
Q Was there a period of years that you have been in possession of the said land?
It is a hornbook doctrine that the possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to
the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to all of them so much so that each co-owner may demand at anytime the A No, sir. We have never been in possession of the said land.
partition of the common property and that this implies that an action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be
barred by laches (Salvador vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 23; De Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). xxx

While the right of action to demand partition does not prescribe, acquisitive prescription may set in where one of the co- Q Were you able to gather benefits from that land?
owners openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership (Cordova vs. Cordova, 102
Phil. 1182; Heirs of Segunda Manungding vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 601), The statute of limitations operates, as
in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property (Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 QA We never benefited.
Phil. 362; Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857).
Q Since when have you not benefited from that land?
The elements constituting adverse possession by a co-owner against another co-owner or cestui que trust are: (1) that he
has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners; (ii) that A Since 1919.
such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; and (iii) that the
evidence thereon must be clear and convincing (Salvador vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
xxx

Granting that appellants, as well as their predecessors-in-interest, were initially co-owners of the disputed property,
nevertheless, acquisitive prescription in favor of appellees had already set in. Appellees had performed unequivocal acts Q By the way, can you tell us since when you have been deprived of that land, from what year?
of repudiation. This is shown by the unrebutted testimony of [herein respondent] Julia who declared that her brother
Atilano (deceased) introduced improvements on the disputed property and the fact that appellees and their father Julian A From 1919 to 1990.” (TSN, January 9, 1990, pp. 51-55). (Underscoring supplied)77
paid the realty taxes thereon as exclusive owners thereof. Moreover, applicants admitted in paragraph 12 of the
Complaint that after Julian’s death (in 1950), appellees arrogated unto themselves the use and enjoyment of the disputed
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration88 of the appellate court’s decision upon the ground that “THIS CASE HAS
property, to the exclusion of appellants. This admission is bolstered by herein petitioner Rogelia’s testimony, as follows:
BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS, PARTICULARLY ART. 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE” which reads:

Q By the way you said that you are going to recover this 1/6 share from Julieta vda. de Gaban. Why, is she in
ART. 19. Every person, must be in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
possession of this land?
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, citing some cases in support thereof.

A Yes, sir.
Finding the invocation of Art. 19 misplaced, the appellate court, by Resolution of February 7, 2001, 99 denied the Motion
for Reconsideration, hence, the present petition 1010 proffering the following
Q She is presently in possession of the said lot?
7
A Yes, sir.
8
Q Can you tell us since when did she possess that land?
9

6 10
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ISSUES FOR RESOLUTION 2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
I
The widower or widow, natural children legally acknowledged, and the father or the mother of the latter, in the manner
WHETHER OR NOT RELIANCE ON ART. 19 OF THE CIVIL CODE ISMISPLACED. and to the extent established by Articles 834, 835, 836, 837, 840, 841, 842, and 846.

ART. 939, Spanish Civil Code of 1889,

II

WHETHER IN RESOLVING CASES, THE ISSUE OF MORALITY OF THE ACT DOES NOT COME INTO PLAY. ART. 939. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, the natural children legally acknowledged and those
legitimated by royal concession shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.

III
With respect to prescription

WHETHER OR NOT LACHES IS APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.1111

Art. 1134, New Civil Code

Petitioners contend that “[t]here is such a thing as morality that comes into play,” as after all, the appellate court found
the parties to be first cousins and, therefore, following Art. 19 of the Civil Code, petitioners should get their share in the ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through
possession of ten years.
property.

Petitioners further contend that “laches is not strictly applied when it comes to close relations,” citing Gallardo v. IAC, Art. 1137, New Civil Code
155 SCRA 248.
ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession
The petition fails. thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

Assuming arguendo that petitioners’ respective fathers Francisco and Zacarias were legitimate and, therefore, were co-
Article 19 of the Civil Code in Chapter 2 on Human Relations is a statement of principle that supplements but does not
supplant a specific provision of law. owners of the property: From the moment co-owner Julian occupied in 1919 and claimed to be the absolute and exclusive
owner of the property and denied his brothers any share therein up to the time of his death in 1950, the question involved
is no longer one of partition but of ownership in which case imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be
With respect to rights to the inheritance of a person who died before the effectivity on August 30, 1950 of the Civil Code invoked. The adverse possession by Julian and his successors-in-interest- herein respondents as exclusive owner of the
like Fabian who died in 1919: property having entailed a period of about 67 years at the time of the filing of the case at bar in 1986, ownership by
prescription had vested in them.1212
Art. 2263, New Civil Code
As for estoppel by laches which is a creation of equity,1313 since laches cannot interfere with the running of the period of
ART. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, prescription, absent any conduct of the parties operating as estoppel, 1414 in light of the prescription of petitioners’ action,
shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court. x x x discussion thereof is dispensed with. Suffice it to state that while laches may not be strictly applied between near
relatives, under the facts and circumstances of the case, especially the uncontroverted claim of respondents that their
father Julian, and the documented claim of respondent Julieta, had paid realty taxes on the property as exclusive owner,
ART. 807, Spanish Civil Code of 1889 as well as the admission of petitioner Rogelia that, as quoted above, she and her co-petitioners “never benefited” or were
“deprived” of any benefits from the property since 1919 up to the time of the filing of the case in 1986 before the RTC or
ART 807. The following are forced heirs:
12
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
13

11 14
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for a period of 67 years, despite demands therefor, even an extremely liberal application of laches would bar the filing of heard on April 26, 1988 was thereafter issued by the NLTDRA.
the case.
On June 1, 1988, an order of general default was issued by respondent Court. Exempted from the order was one Annie
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Jimenez who filed an opposition to the application. On June 22, 1988, private respondent Solid Homes, Inc. filed its
opposition stating that a land registered in its name under the Torrens System and covered by then TCT No. N-7873 is
almost identical to the property subject of the application by petitioner. The opposition was not admitted considering that
SO ORDERED. no motion to set aside the order of general default was filed by private Respondent.

[G.R. No. 98328. October 9, 1997.] On June 28, 1988, private respondent filed a motion to lift the order of general default and to admit its opposition on the
ground that its right would be adversely affected by the application. Acting on the motion and in order to avoid duplicity,
JUAN C. CARVAJAL, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and SOLID HOMES, INC., Respondents. the NLTDRA was directed to make the plotting of the relative position of the property covered by LRC Psd-245998 and
embraced in TCT No. N-7873 and to submit its plotting to the Court for its guidance. In the same order dated July 1,
1988, respondent Court in the interest of justice set aside the order of general default in so far as private respondent was
concerned and admitted private respondent’s opposition.
Is there denial of due process if an applicant for land registration is unable to testify? May a land registration court, after
it is convinced that the property subject of an application for registration under the torrens system is already covered by
On January 10, 1989, petitioner filed a motion praying that the opposition of private respondent be dismissed for the
an existing certificate, dismiss such application and thus ignore petitioner’s insistence on submitting further evidence of
reason that the order issued by respondent court directing the NLRTDA [sic] to make a plotting of the land in question on
his alleged title? What constitutes sufficient evidence to show identity of the land applied for with the land already titled
the basis of the title submitted by the Registry of Deeds of Marikina Branch Manila released the private respondent from
in favor of private respondent?
the duty and obligation of presenting evidence to prove that the land applied for is private and that there is apparent lack
of interest on the part of private respondent to pursue its claim on account of its non-appearance despite the lapse of more
The Case than six months or to introduce evidence that will show that the land in question is covered by the alleged torrens
certificate of title.

These are the main questions raised in this petition for review assailing the November 29, 1990 Decision 1 of the Court During the hearings conducted on September 13, 1988, September 27, 1988, October 4, 1988, October 11, 1988, October
of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 18318, the dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph 18, 1988, November 22, 1988, December 6, 1988, petitioner presented his evidence on the question as to whether or not
he had a registrable right over the land in question.
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this petition be as it is hereby DISMISSED." 3
Pursuant to the court order dated July 1, 1988 directing the NLTDRA to make the plotting of the relative position of the
This petition also impugns the April 25, 1991 Court of Appeals Resolution 4 which denied reconsideration. property covered by LRC Psd-245998 and embraced in TCT No. N-7873, the Land Registration Authority submitted a
report dated December 22, 1986 [should be 1988] recommending that, after due hearing, the application for registration
The Facts of petitioner be dismissed. The application was thus dismissed by respondent court in an order dated January 2, 1989.
Considering, however, that the recommendation is [sic] for dismissal after due hearing, respondent judge issued an order
dated January 10, 1989 setting for hearing on January 24, 1989 the ‘Report’ submitted by the Land Registration
The facts found by public respondent are as follows: 5 Authority. The hearing proceeded on February 8, 1989 with Engr. Silvero G. Perez, Chief, Department on Registration,
Land Registration Authority being presented in connection with his ‘Report’ recommending the dismissal of the
"Petitioner is the applicant in a land registration case filed with Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial application after due hearing. On February 28, 1989, the petitioner’s application for registration was dismissed.
Region stationed in Antipolo, Rizal. Sought to be brought by petitioner under the operation of the Land Registration Act
(Act No. 496) is a 96,470 square meter lot denominated as Lots 6846-A, 6846-B, 6846-C and 6846-D. Copies of the On March 13, 1989, petitioner filed his motion to reconsider the February 28, 1989 dismissal of the application for
application were ordered by respondent Court to be furnished (to) the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration registration to which private respondent filed an opposition dated March 20, 1989. The motion for reconsideration was
Administration (NLTDRA) which on March 18, 1987 submitted a report recommending that applicant be order[ed] to denied in an order dated March 4, 1989.
amend his petition by including the names and complete postal addresses of the adjoining owners and correcting the
discrepancy regarding the boundary lot number along line 2-3 of Lot 6846-D on plan Csd-04-005516-D. On order of On May 2, 1989 petitioner filed a second motion to reconsider the dismissal of his petition. On May 8, 1989, respondent
respondent Court (trial court), the petition was accordingly amended. judge issued an order requiring the parties as well as the engineers from the Land Registration Commission and the
DENR to appear before respondent Court on June 5, 1989. The engineer from the Land Registration Commission was
After the NLTDRA was notified that the case is [sic] initially set for hearing on December 7, 1987, the Acting Chief, likewise directed to inform the court whether the property applied for by petitioner is indeed inside the titled property of
Docket Division of the NLRDRA [sic] submitted another report recommending that petitioner be ordered to refer to the private Respondent.
Bureau of Lands for corrections of the discrepancy existing in the directional bearing and area of Lot 6846-D, Csd-04-
005516-D. The technical descriptions as corrected by the Bureau of Lands was [sic] submitted and the application was After the Land Registration Authority submitted a report showing that there was indeed an overlapping of the four (4)
initially set for hearing an April 26, 1988. The ‘Notice of Initial Hearing’ stating that the application was set forbe [sic] parcels of land applied for by petitioner and the properties of Solid Homes under TCT 7873 and considering that the

19
 20

properties applied for are [sic] within the titled property and could not be the subject of an application for registration, the Anent the allegation that private respondent Solid Homes did not actively participate in the trials conducted to hear his
second motion to reconsider the dismissal of the application for registration was denied in an order dated July 5, evidence, suffice it to state that it is counsel’s prerogative to determine how he intends to pursue his case."
1989."cralaw virtua1aw library chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the application for registration, and denied the The Court’s Ruling
subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this recourse to this Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Issues The petition has no merit.

First Issue: Identity of the Property Applied For

Petitioner submits the following issues: 6
We are not persuaded that the land petitioner applied for was not identical to private respondent’s land which was already
"1. Whether or not an actual ground verification survey is required to establish the identity of the two parcels of land or covered by a torrens certificate of title. The two reports prepared by the Land Registration Authority and the DENR
whether TCT No. 7873 under Plan FP-1540 of Solid Homes Inc., situated in Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal is Survey Division clearly showed that there was an overlapping between the two properties. Because the futility of
identical or similar to Lots 6846-A to 6846-D inclusive Cad. 585, Lungsod Silangan, Cadastre, situated in Mambogan, petitioner’s application was apparent, the trial court deemed it unnecessary to hear further evidence. We agree.
Antipolo, Rizal applied for under LRC Case No. 414 (-A), LRC Record No. N-60084;
At the outset, we stress that there was nothing irregular in the order given by the trial court to the Land Registration
2. Whether or not the petitioner was given (the) chance and the opportunity to be heard or allowed to fully introduce his Authority and the Survey Division of the DENR to submit reports on the location of the land covered by petitioner’s
evidence in the (proceeding) for Land Registration and to rest (his) case; application and private respondent’s certificate of title. The authority of the land registration court to require the filing of
additional papers to aid it in its determination of the propriety of the application was based on Section 21 of PD 1529: 10
3. Whether the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals is reversible."cralaw virtua1aw library
"SEC. 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection. — The court may require facts to be stated in
Petitioner alleges that the "table survey" made by the Land Registration Authority and the geodetic engineer of the Land the application in addition to those prescribed by this Decree not inconsistent therewith and may require the filing of any
Management Bureau cannot serve as basis "for identifying" his land. "On the other hand, petitioner was able to establish additional papers. It may also conduct an ocular inspection, if necessary."cralaw virtua1aw library
the identity" of the land he applied for by "actual ground survey which was approved by the Director of Lands and
reprocessed by the Land Registration Authority." He claims that if said land is "covered by private respondent’s title, the From the above provision, it is also clear that ocular inspection of the property applied for was only discretionary, not
Director of Lands and/or Regional Director will no(t) approve the survey." Petitioner also argues that the land in question mandatory. Likewise, the land registration court was not obliged to order the survey of the contested lot, especially when
is situated in "Mambogan, Antipolo, Rizal" while that of private respondent is in "Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal." Survey another government agency had already submitted a report finding that the contested lot was identical with that described
Plan "FP-1540," which served as basis of private respondent’s certificate of title, cannot be found; hence, according to in private respondent’s certificate of title and recommending the dismissal of the application for registration.
petitioner, the "table survey" was anomalous. Petitioner adds that the "matter entirely wanting in this case (is) the identity
or similarity of the realties." 7 Petitioner concludes that the trial court should have ordered "actual ocular inspection and Further, the order of the land registration court for the LRA and DENR to submit reports was in accordance with the
ground verification survey" of the properties involved. purposes of the Land Registration Law: 11

Petitioner further maintains that he was denied due process when he, as an applicant in a land registration case, was not "The purposes of the land registration law, in general, are: ‘to ascertain once and for all the absolute title over a given
able to take the witness stand. According to petitioner, even his counsel hardly participated in the proceeding except to landed property; to make, so far as it is possible, a certificate of title issued by the court to the owner of the land absolute
propound classificatory questions during the examination of Engineer Silverio Perez of the Land Registration Authority. proof of such title; to quiet title to the land and to put a stop forever to any question of legality to a title; and to decree
8 that land title to be final, irrevocable and, undisputable. (citing Benen v. Tuason, L-26127, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA
531.)’
Public respondent justified its dismissal of the appeal in this wise: 9
It is true that a court of first instance acting as a land registration court has limited and special jurisdiction. It can not be
"Land already decreed and registered in an ordinary registration proceeding cannot again be subject of adjudication or denied, however, that when the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the necessary
settlement in a subsequent conducted proceeding (Land Titles and Deeds by Noblejas, 1968 Revised Edition, page 96). powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective. (citing Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388, 391.) The purpose of
The ‘Report’ submitted by the Land Registration Authority (Annex ‘B’) and the Survey Division of the DENR (Annex the applicant is to prove that he has an absolute or simple title over the property sought to be registered, otherwise his
‘RR’) both indicate an overlapping of the lot applied for by petitioner and the lot covered by TCT N-7873 owned by application will be denied. An absolute oppositor claims a dominical right totally adverse to that of the applicant. If
private respondent Solid Homes, Inc. Even if petitioner were allowed to continue with the presentation of his evidence, successful, registration will be decreed in favor of the oppositor. As to whether or not private respondents have absolute
the end result would still be the dismissal of his application for registration. Respondent Judge was therefore justified in or fee simple title over the property sought to be registered necessarily requires a resolution of the question as to whether
cutting short the proceeding as the time to be spent in hearing petitioner’s application could be used disposing the other or not the oppositors had a dominical right totally adverse to that of the applicants. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
cases pending with respondent court.
Based on the reports submitted, the land registration court correctly dismissed the application for original land

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registration. An application for registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title. It improvements should be demolished should first have been conducted by the private Respondent. . .
behooves a land registration court to determine the veracity of any and all adverse claims, bearing in mind Section 46 of .chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Act No. 496 which provides that" (n)o title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession." The trial court’s order to the LRA and DENR was a mere cautionary But private respondent’s title (OCT No. 4050) indicates that the property is located in Barangay Lagundi. Likewise, the
measure in cognizance of the well-settled rule that a torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. In other words, the title certification issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer at Morong, Rizal stated that petitioner was occupying a
may be challenged only in a proceeding for that purpose, not in an application for registration of a land already registered landholding at Barangay Lagundi.
in the name of another person. After one year from its registration, the title is incontrovertible and is no longer open to
review. The remedy of the landowner, whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name, For our purposes, a survey is not necessary. A certificate of title is conclusive evidence not only of ownership of the land
is to institute an ordinary action for reconveyance or — if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser referred but also its location. The subject of these proceedings is the land covered by OCT No. 4050. Accordingly,
for value — for damages. 12 In view of the nature of a torrens title, a land registration court has the duty to determine petitioners required to demolish only whatever is constructed within its boundaries." (Emphasis supplied.)
whether the issuance of a new certificate alters a valid and existing certificate of title.
The old case of Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby 18 explains the nature of a torrens certificate of title, as
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the approval by the assistant chief the Bureau of Lands Survey Division of the survey follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
conducted on the land applied for by petitioner did not prove that the said land was not covered by any title. It merely
showed that such land has been surveyed and its boundaries have been determined. ". . . The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already
have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration
Also noteworthy is the finding of public respondent that "the same order (issued by the land registration court) [which accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The
set] aside the order (of) general default insofar as private respondent Solid Homes, Inc. was concerned, directed the certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once
NLTDRA to make the plotting of the relative position of the property covered by LRC Psd-245998 and [that which was] registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or
embraced in TCT No. N-7873." 13 The intention of the land registration court was to avoid "duplicity," 14 that is, to rule diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A
out the possibility that the land he sought to register was already covered by a certificate of title. In this case, the land he registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct
applied for was found to be within the land described in private respondent’s transfer certificate of title. proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioner also alleges that the land he applied for was located in Barangay Mambogan, while the registered land of All in all, the land registration court did not err in relying on the certificate of title instead of the survey plan; likewise,
private respondent was in Barangay Mayamot. In his reply filed with public respondent, however, he himself admitted the appellate court did not commit any reversible error in affirming the trial court’s decision.
that "Barangay Mambogan is a part of Barangay Mayamot [which is] a bigger barrio in Antipolo, Rizal, and Mayamot
covers a big parcel of land running from Antipolo up to Marikina." 15 In view of petitioner’s declaration, it was not Second Issue: Denial of Due Process
impossible for the land owned by private respondent to be located in Barangay Mayamot and in Barangay Mambogan. At
any rate, whether the two lands are located in Mambogan or Mayamot or both is a factual question, and its resolution by Petitioner claims that he was denied due process because he was unable to take the witness stand. We disagree. The
the trial and the appellate courts is binding on this Court. Petitioner failed to provide a reason, let alone an adequate one, essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. It is the denial of this opportunity that is repugnant to due process.
to justify the reversal of such finding of the lower courts. 19 In this case, petitioner was afforded an opportunity to present witnesses, and he did present three. However, petitioner
did not invoke his right to take the witness stand even when the trial court ordered the submission of the parties’
Petitioner also argues that the plotting made by NLTDRA was "anomalous" because Survey Plan FP-1540, on which memoranda which signified the termination of the proceedings. Because he acquiesced to the termination of the case, he
private respondent’s title was based, could not be located. This argument lacks merit. The law does not require resorting forfeited his right to take the witness stand.
to a survey plan to prove the true boundaries of a land covered by a valid certificate of title; the title itself is the
conclusive proof of the realty’s metes and bounds. Section 47 of the Land Registration Act, or Act No. 496, provides Likewise, we are not persuaded by his allegation that his own counsel hardly participated in the proceedings. The records
that" (t)he original certificates in the registration book, any copy thereof duly certified under the signature of the clerk, or show that said counsel did cross-examine Engineer Silverio Perez by propounding clarificatory questions to the latter. In
of the register of deeds of the province or city where the land is situated, and the seal of the court, and also the owner’s any event, the client is generally bound by the acts of his counsel. Petitioner has not shown at all that his previous
duplicate certificate, shall be received as evidence in all the courts of the Philippine Islands and shall be conclusive as to counsel had acted in such grossly negligent manner as to deprive him of effective representation, or of due process. 20
all matters contained therein except so far as otherwise provided in this Act." It has been held that a certificate of title is
conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein and other matters which can be litigated In support of his contention, petitioner cites Tirona v. Nañawa 21 which held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
and decided in land registration proceedings. 16 Thus, this Court in Odsigue v. Court of Appeals 17
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "We hold the view, however that respondent Judge erred when he ordered the dismissal of the registration case over the
objection of the oppositors; and when he refused to reconsider the order of dismissal and reinstate the case he had
". . . Petitioner contends that private respondents have not identified the property sought to be recovered as required by neglected to perform an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, and had thereby deprived the
Art. 434, of the Civil Code. He alleges that Sitio Aduas, where the land in question is located, is at the boundary of oppositors of a right to which they are entitled."cralaw virtua1aw library
Barangay May-Iba, Teresa, Rizal, and Barangay Lagundi, Morong, Rizal. On the other hand, petitioner maintains, the
parcel of land he is occupying is located in Barangay May-Iba. He claims that the technical description in the title does Such ailing finds no application to the present case, because neither Respondent Mariano Raymundo (the applicant in the
not sufficiently identify the property of private respondent and that a geodetic survey to determine which of his land registration case) nor Petitioner Constantino Tirona (the oppositor in the cited case) was a holder of any certificate

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of title over the land intended for registration. Such being the case, the land registration court was ordered to act in between shareholders of the corporation." the motion for reconsideration thereof having been denied, the petitioner,
accordance with Section 37 of Act No. 496 22 either by dismissing the application if none of the litigants succeeded in alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge, filed the instant petition for certiorari praying that the
showing a proper title, or by entering a decree awarding the land applied for to the person entitled thereto. said orders be set aside.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
G.R. NO. 52524
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED. The petitioner filed its amended complaint dated July 16, 1979 docketed as Civil Case No. 14127 of Branch I of the City
Court of Pasay City for the collection of overdue accounts on assessments and insurance premiums and the interest
thereon amounting to P6,168 06 as of March 31, 1979 against the private respondent Lim Siu Leng 5 to whom was
G.R. No. L-52361 April 27, 1981 assigned on July 11, 1977 a unit called "Alegria" of the Sunset. View Condominium Project by Alfonso Uy 6 who had
entered into a "Contract to Buy and Sell" with Tower Builders, Inc. over the said unit on installment basis. 7
SUNSET VIEW CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleging that the amount sought to
THE HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR. OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, BRANCH XXX, PASAY CITY be collected is an assessment. The correctness and validity of which is certain to involve a dispute between her and the
and AGUILAR-BERNARES REALTY, respondents. petitioner corporation; that she has automatically become, as a purchaser of the condominium unit, a stockholder of the
petitioner pursuant to Section 2 of the Condominium Act, Republic Act No. 4726; that the dispute is intra-corporate and
G.R. No. L-52524 April 27, 1981 is consequently under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities & Exchange Commission as provided in Section 5 of
P.D. No. 902-A. 8
SUNSET VIEW CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. The petitioner filed its opposition thereto, alleging that the private respondent who had not fully paid for the unit was not
THE HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, BRANCH the owner thereof, consequently was not the holder of a separate interest which would make her a stockholder, and that
XXX, PASAY CITY, and LIM SIU LENG, respondents. hence the case was not an intra-corporate dispute. 9

These two cases which involve similar facts and raise Identical questions of law were ordered consolidated by resolution After the private respondent had filed her answer to the opposition to the motion to dismiss 10 of the petitioner, the trial
of this Court dated March 17, 1980. 1 court issued an order dated August 13, 1979 denying the motion to dismiss. 11 The private respondent's motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied by the trial court in its Order dated September 19, 1979. 12
The petitioner, Sunset View Condominium Corporation, in both cases, is a condominium corporation within the meaning
of Republic Act No. 4726 in relation to a duly registered Amended Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of the The private respondent then appealed pursuant to Section 10 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court to the Court of First
Sunset View Condominium Project located at 2230 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City of which said petitioner is the Instance, where the appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. 7530P. The petitioner filed its "Motion to Dismiss Appeal" on
Management Body holding title to all the common and limited common areas. 2 the ground that the order of the trial court appealed from is interlocutory. 13

G.R. NO. 52361 The motion to dismiss the appeal was denied and the parties were ordered to submit their respective memorandum on the
issue raised before the trial court and on the disputed order of the trial judge. 14 After the parties had submitted their
respective memoranda on the matter, the respondent Judge issued an order dated December 14, 1979 in which he directed
The private respondent, Aguilar-Bernares Realty, a sole proprietorship with business name registered with the Bureau of that "the appeal is hereby dismissed and d the judgment of the lower court is reversed. The case is dismissed and the
Commerce, owned and operated by the spouses Emmanuel G. Aguilar and Zenaida B. Aguilar, is the assignee of a unit, parties are directed to ventilate their controversy with the Securities & Exchange Commission. 15 The petitioner's motion
"Solana", in the Sunset View Condominium Project with La Perla Commercial, Incorporated, as assignor. 3 The La Perla for reconsideration thereof was denied in an order dated January 14, 1980. 16 Hence this petition for certiorari, alleging
Commercial, Incorporated bought the "Solana" unit on installment from the Tower Builders, Inc. 4 The petitioner, Sunset grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge.
View Condominium Corporation, filed for the collection of assessments levied on the unit against Aguilar-Bernares
Realty, private respondent herein, a complaint dated June 22, 1979 docketed as Civil Case No. 7303-P of the Court of
First Instance of Pasay City, Branch XXX. The private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the Issues Common to Both Cases
grounds (1) that the complaint does not state a cause of action: (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject or
nature other action; and (3) that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. The It is admitted that the private respondents in both cases have not yet fully paid the purchase price of their units. The
petitioner filed its opposition thereto. The motion to dismiss was granted on December 11, 1979 by the respondent Judge Identical issues raised in both petitions are the following:
who opined that the private respondent is, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4726, a "holder of a separate
interest" and consequently, a shareholder of the plaintiff condominium corporation; and that "the case should be properly
filed with the Securities & Exchange Commission which has exclusive original jurisdiction on controversies arising
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1. Is a purchaser of a condominium unit in the condominium project managed by the petitioner, who has not yet fully COMMON AREAS as provided in Section 6 (b) above. Said shares allocated are mere
paid the purchase price thereof, automaticaly a ,stockholder of the petitioner Condominium Corporation appurtenances of each unit, and therefore, the same cannot be transferred, conveyed, encumbered or
otherwise disposed of separately from the Unit ... 18
2. Is it the regular court or the Securities & Exchange Commission that has jurisdiction over cases for collection of
assessments assessed by the Condominium Corporation on condominium units the full purchase price of which has not It is clear from the above-quoted provisions of the Master Deeds that the shareholding in the Condominium Corporation
been paid? is inseparable from the unit to which it is only an appurtenant and that only the owner of a unit is a shareholder in the
Condominium Corporation.
The private respondents in both cases argue that every purchaser of a condominium unit, regardless of whether or not he
has fully paid the purchase price, is a "holder of a separate interest" mentioned in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4726, Subparagraph (a) of Part 1, Section 6, of the Master Deeds determines when and under what conditions ownership of a
otherwise known as "The Condominium Act" and is automatically a shareholder of the condominium corporation. unit is acquired by a purchaser thus:

The contention has no merit. Section 5 of the Condominium Act expressly provides that the shareholding in the (a) The purchaser of a unit shall acquire title or ownership of such Unit, subject to the terms and
Condominium Corporation will be conveyed only in a proper case. Said Section 5 provides: conditions of the instrument conveying the unit to such purchaser and to the terms and conditions of
any subsequent conveyance under which the purchaser takes title to the Unit, and subject further to
Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an apartment, office or other space therein, shall include the this MASTER DEED ... 19
transfer or conveyance of the undivided interests in the common areas or, in a proper case, the
membership or shareholding in the condominium corporation ... The instrument conveying the unit "Solana" in G.R. NO. 52361 is the "Contract to Buy and Sell" dated September 13,
1977, Annex "D", while that conveying the unit "Alegria" in G.R. NO. 52524 is the "Contract to Buy and Sell" dated
May 12, 1976, Annex "C". In both deeds of conveyance, it is provided:
It is clear then that not every purchaser of a condominium unit is a shareholder of the condominium corporation. The
Condominium Act leaves to the Master Deed the determination of when the shareholding will be transferred to the
purchaser of a unit. Thus, Section 4 of said Act provides: 4. Upon full payment by the BUYER of the total purchase price and full compliance by the BUYER
of an its obligations herein, the SELLER will convey unto the BUYER, as soon as practicable after
The provisions of this Act shall apply to property divided or to be divided into condominium only if completion of the construction, full and absolute title in and to the subject unit, to the shares of stock
pertaining thereto and to an rights and interests in connection therewith ... 20
there shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds of the province or city in which the property lies
and duly annotated in the corresponding certificate of title of the land ... an enabling or master deed
which shall contain, among others, the following: The share of stock appurtenant to the unit win be transferred accordingly to the purchaser of the unit only upon full
payment of the purchase price at which time he will also become the owner of the unit. Consequently, even under the
xxx xxx xxx contract, it is only the owner of a unit who is a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation. Inasmuch as owners is
conveyed only upon full payment of the purchase price, it necessarily follows that a purchaser of a unit who has not paid
the full purchase price thereof is not The owner of the unit and consequently is not a shareholder of the Condominium
(d) Astatement of the exact nature of the interest acquired or to be acquired by the purchaser in the Corporation.
separate units and in the common areas of the condominium project ...
That only the owner of a unit is a stockholder of the Condominium Corporation is inferred from Section 10 of the
The Amended Master Deeds in these cases, which were duly registered in the Register of Deeds, and which contain, by Condominium Act which reads:
mandate of Section 4, a statement of the exact nature of the interest acquired by a purchaser of a unit, provide in Section
6 of Part 1:
SEC. 10. ... Membership in a condominium corporation, regardless of whether it is a stock or non-
stock corporation, shall not be transferable separately from the condominium unit of which it is an
(d) Each Unit owner shall, as an essential condition to such ownership, acquire stockholding in the appurtenance When a member or stockholder ceases is to own a unit in the project in which the
Condominium Corporation herein below provided ... 17 condominium corporation owns or holds the common areas, he shall automatically cease to be a
member or stockholder of the condominium corporation.
The Amended Master Deeds likewise provide in Section 7 (b), thus.
Pursuant to the above statutory provision, ownership of a unit is a condition sine qua non to being a shareholder in the
(b) All unit owners shall of necessity become stockholders of the Condominium Corporation. condominium corporation. It follows that a purchaser of a unit who is not yet the owner thereof for not having fully paid
TOWER shall acquire all the shares of stock of SUNSET VIEW and shall allocate the said shares to the full purchase price, is not a shareholder By necessary implication, the "separate interest" in a condominium, which
the units in proportion to the appurtenant interest in the COMMON AREAS and LIMITED entitles the holder to become automatically a share holder in the condominium corporation, as provided in Section 2 of

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the Condominium Act, can be no other than ownership of a unit. This is so because nobody can be a shareholder unless
he is the owner of a unit and when he ceases to be the owner, he also ceases automatically to be a shareholder.

The private respondents, therefore, who have not fully paid the purchase price of their units and are consequently not
owners of their units are not members or shareholders of the petitioner condominium corporation,

Inasmuch as the private respondents are not shareholders of the petitioner condominium corporation, the instant case for
collection cannot be a "controversy arising out of intracorporate or partnership relations between and among
stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which
they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively" which controversies are under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Securities & Exchange Commission, pursuant to Section 5 (b) of P.D. No. 902- A. The subject matters
of the instant cases according to the allegations of the complaints are under the jurisdiction of the regular courts: that of
G.R. NO. 52361, which is for the collection of P8,335.38 with interest plus attorney's fees equivalent to the principal or a
total of more than P10,000.00 is under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance; and that of G.R. NO. 52524, which
is for the collection of P6,168-06 is within the jurisdiction of the City Court.

In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to resolve the issue raised in G.R. NO. 52524 of whether an order of
the City Court denying a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction can be appealed to the Court of First
Instance.

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders of the respondent Judge dated December 11, 1979 and January 4, 1980 in Civil
Case No. 7303-P, subject matter of the Petition in G.R. No. 52361, are set aside and said Judge is ordered to try the case
on the merits. The orders dated December 14, 1979 and January 14, 1980 in Civil Case No. 7530-P, subject matter of the
petition in G.R. No. 52524 are set aside and the case is ordered remanded to the court a quo, City Court of Pasay City, for
trial on the merits, with costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

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