NĀGĀRJUNA’S ŚŪNYATĀ: BEYOND BEING AND

NOTHINGNESS

Ananda Mishra

Abstract: Śūnyatā has been one of the most misunderstood terms in the history of
philosophy. It has been conceived sometimes as an Absolute and sometimes as pure
nothingness. Often it has been identified with truth and most often it has been
understood as falsity. Traditionalists insist that it is beyond all the categories. On the
other hand the same people would say that Śūnyatā is not a transcendent reality. It is
just the relativity of all phenomena, the emptiness of all entities. My purpose in the
present paper is to ascertain the true import of Śūnyatā. My view is that Śūnyatā is
neither Being nor Nothingness. It is beyond all the dichotomies of real and unreal,
being and non-being. This does not mean that Nāgārjuna is presenting a new
revolutionary ontology quite different from the traditional logic or metaphysics. In
fact Logic and Metaphysics are the last concern of the Buddha. Nāgārjuna neither
refutes any metaphysics nor presents any new one. He just puts everything as it is
and evokes us to be just in tuned with it. By proving all the dharmas (phenomena)
empty of their own independent existence and essence he calls us to enter the realm
of Dharmatā and Tathatā.

ŚŪNYATĀ sarvadṛṣṭīnām proktā niḥsaraṇam jinaiḥ Yesām tu śūnyatā dṛṣṭitānasādhyān

babhāṣire.

The emptiness was taught by the Buddhas in order to do away with all philosophical
views. Thereforethose who make a philosophical view out of “emptiness” are indeed
lost. Nāgārjuna, Madhyamakaśāstra, 13/8. No other philosophical concepts have been
so differently interpreted in the history of philosophy as the concept of Śūnyatā.
Nāgārjuna is a Śūnyavādain. However, what the Śūnyavāda means is not still
undisputed. For some scholars if Nāgārjuna is an absolutist, others will urge that he is a
nihilist. Some others will like to argue that the metaphysics is the last thing which
concerns Nāgārjuna. In fact he has nothing to do with metaphysics; rather we should say
that he is against any sort of metaphysics. There are a number of scholars who would
like to argue that Nāgārjuna is not a dialectician. He is through and through analyst. His
Madhyamakaśāstra is a treatise of meta-philosophy. The aim of Nāgārjuna is not to
posit anything. He just analyzes all the positions and finds that all attempts to have a
conceptualized grip over reality is doomed to be failure. Some others will like to say that
Nāgārjuna is a spiritualist. His aim is to enlighten the masses and make them aware of
their essential Buddhahood. Some others would like to go farther and would say that the
very language of Nāgārjuna is of a mystic one. Nāgārjuna is a mystic and from him
begins the chapter of esoteric Buddhism. That is why Nāgārjuna enjoys so much respect


ANANDA MISHRA, Professor, Department of Philosophy & Religion, Banaras Hindu
University, India. Email: anandaphil@gmail.com.

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48 ANANDA MISHRA

among Tibetan Buddhists. My purpose in this present paper is to asses all these
conflicting interpretations of the concept of Śūnyatā. However, I shall mainly confine
myself to the nihilistic and absolutistic interpretations. My contention is that Nāgārjuna
can not be called an absolutist one. In this regard scholars are tempted to distinguish
between Advaitavāda and Advyavāda. These scholars maintain that Nāgārjuna is an
Advyavādin. My view is that the distinction between these two terms is not justified one.
Nāgārjuna is neither an Advaitin nor Advyavādin. Buddhism is not a philosophy of
Being. This does not mean that it is a philosophy of Nothingness . A philosophy which
is based on the enlightenment of the Buddha and a philosophy which teaches the
doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā and Mahākaruṇā can not be called a Nihilistic either. Then
what is the true import of Śūnyatā? If Śūnyatā is neither Being nor Nothingness, then
what it is ? The answer to the above question lies in the silence of Buddha. What we can
best say about the Śūnyatā is that it is unspeakable. The whole of Madhyamakaśāstra is
an attempt within the purview of speech to show this unspeakability of the unspoken
Śūnyatā. This very attempt involves a contradictory goal before itself. That is why one
can find Madhyamakaśāstra having full of contradictions.
Even a cursory study of Nāgārjuna would suggest that Mādhyamika philosophy is
neither absolutism nor nihilism . It is neither a philosophy of Being nor a philosophy of
Non - being. But notwithstanding the above we find that a number of scholars have
found Nāgārjuna's Śūnyatā as Absolute Being while others have equated it with
Absolute nothingness. It would be injustice to these scholars if we say that they were
not acquainted with the basic doctrine which Nāgārjuna repeatedly announces that
Śūnyatā is neither Being nor Non-being. They were well aware that for Nāgārjuna
Śūnyatā is beyond the all categories--categories of Being, of Non-being, of Both, of
Neither. In fact the way Nāgārjuna has elaborated his concept of Śūnyatā, there ever
remains a possibility of understanding it in so many mutually-conflicting ways. In fact
Nāgārjuna himself has used the terms Śūnyatā, Pratityasamutpāda etc.in so many senses
that it would be very folly to out rightly reject any of the interpretations of Nāgārjuna's
Śūnyatā. I, therefore, would aim in my present paper to find out which of the prevalent
interpretations is more consistent to the spirit of Nāgārjuna in particular and Buddhism
in general. The most prevalent view regarding Śūnyavāda is that it is nihilism rather
than absolutism. This view is supported by the ancient classics from within the system
and outside the Buddhist system. Almost all the orthodox Hindu philosophers find the
Mādhyamikas propagating the doctrine of sheer nothingness. They take it granted that
Nāgārjuna is through and through nihilist who does not accept any thing real and who
believes that everything is illusory and even illusions have no positive ground. That is
why the Mādhyamika theory of illusion is known as Asatkhyātivāda. This interpretation
is accepted to the Yogācāra Idealists, the Jainas, the Advaitins and other orthodox
Hindu philosophers. So far as modern scholars are concerned , Western scholars like
Burnouf, H.Kern, M.Walleser, Jacobi, A.B.Keith and Wach hold the view that
Mādhyamika philosophy is "complete and pure nihilism" and that Mādhyamika
philosophy is "absolute nothingness". 1 Among the Indian scholars, besides others ,

1
For a brief sketch of nihilistic interpretations of Śūnyavāda, see--Harsh Narayana, The
Mādhyamika Mind, Motilal Banarsidas Publishers Private Limited, Delhi, 1997.
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 NĀGĀRJUNA’S ŚŪNYATĀ 49

S.N.Dasgupta, M.Hyriyanna, Harha Narayana and Yashdeva Shalya are of the view that
Mādhyamika philosophy is a rank nihilism. Nāgārjuna is of the view that nothing is
absolute, all is relative. Everything is relative, essenceless and hence viod. All dharmas
whether they are sanskṛta or asanskṛta are unreal. There is nothing real in the world
.There is a famous Buddhavacana declaring that all comes out of nothing and merges
into nothing. Mādhyamika does not " believe in the reality of things, external as well as
internal and declare them empty (śūnya) of both existence and essence(svabhāva)."
(Narayana, 1997: 89) According to Prajñāpāramitā Texts, all dharmas, as well as the
soul, are non-existent. Everything is illusory and dream-like. Even Buddha, Buddhhood
and Nirvāṇa are illusory. And Subhüti goes to such extent that he declares" Sons of
gods! Even Nirvāṇa I declare illusory and dream-like, let alone other dharma!----and if
anything is more superior to Nirvāṇa, this too, I would declare illusory and dream-like."
(Vaidya, 1960: 20) Criticizing the nihilistic interpretation of Śūnyavāda, Murti says that
most of the critics of this system have not gone beyond awe-inspiring term "Śūnya" or
"Void". They forget that if affirmative predicates (sat, bhāva) have been denied of the
Absolute, negative predicates (asat, abhāva) have been equally denied. We are
repeatedly warned not to take Śūnyatā as abhāva-dṛṣṭi. (Murti, 1998: 312) Chandrakīrti
finds him incurable who clings to Śūnyatā itself as an "ism". He clearly says that
Śūnyatā should be understood as Pratītyasamutpāda. He categorically rejects the view
that Śūnyatā is non-being. (Chandrakīrti, 1989) 2 The major objection against the
nihilistic interpretation of Śūnyavāda is that it is against the spirit of Mādhyamika
"doctrine of no doctrines" .Śūnyavāda is for destruction of all the doctrines (dṛṣṭi).It is
not one of the doctrines (dṛṣṭi) itself. 3 The other thing is that we should make a
distinction between "Śūnya" and "Śūnyatā".Really speaking Mādhyamika philosophy is
philosophy of "Śūnyatā" and not of "Śūnya". Furthermore, Mādhyamika's approach is
anti-metaphysical and hence it should not be interpreted as a metaphysical theory of
"void".
On the other hand scholars like D.T.Suzuki, Stcherbatsky, Gopinath Kaviraja,
T.R.V.Murti and C.D.Sharma vehemently refute the view that the Mādhyamika is a
nihilistic philosophy. They find Śūnyavāda as Absolutism. Contrary to the prevalent
interpretation, Stcherbatsky goes to such an extent that he says "in Mahayana all parts
or elements are unreal (śūnya), and only the whole, i.e. the whole of wholes (Dharmatā
= dharmakāya) is real." (Stcherbatsky, 2004: 48) The universe viewed as a whole is the
Absolute, viewed as a process it is the phenomenal. 4 However, the most profound

2
Yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ sūnyatām tām pracakṣmahe / Sā prajñaptirupādāya pratipatsaiva
madhyamā // Nāgārjuna, Madhyamakaśāstra, 24/18; "Evam pratītyasamutpādaśabdasya yo'rthaḥ,
sa eva sūnyatāśabdasyārthaḥ, na punarabhāvaśabdasya yo'rthaḥ sa sūnyatāśabdasyārthaḥ /
Abhāvaśabdārthanca sūnyatārthamityadhyāropya bhavānasmānupālabhate // " Chandrakīrti,
Prasannapadā on Madhyamakaśāstra, ed. Swami Dvarikadas Shastri, Baudha Bharati, Varanasi,
1989.
3
Śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭīnām proktāḥ niḥsaraṇam jinaiḥ / Yesām tu śūnyatā dṛṣṭistānasādhyān
babhāṣire / / Madhyamakaśāstra ,13/8.
4
Ya ājavamjavībhāva upādāya pratītya vā / So'pratītyanupādāya irvāṇamupadiśyate //
Madhyamakaśāstra , 25/9.
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50 ANANDA MISHRA

support for the absolutistic interpretation of the Mādhyamika Śūnyatā comes from
T.R.V.Murti and C.D.Sharma. Here it should be noted that before these scholars
Gopinath Kaviraja, in his introduction to Brahmasūtra-Śānkarabhāṣya-Ratnaprabhā
ṭīkā, has dealt in details with the different forms of Advaitism .He has shown there that
Mādhyamika Śūnyavāda, Yogācara idealism, Kashmir Śivādvaita and Bhartṛhari's
Śabdādvaita are some other forms of Advaita. 5 T.R.V.Murti in his monumental work
"The Central Philosophy of Buddhism" comes with the conclusion that the Mādhyamika
philosophy is neither nihilistic nor positivistic one. It is a most consistent form of
absolutism like its other counterparts Yogācara Idealism and Advaita Vedānta. He is of
the view that Advaitism, Yogācara Idealism and the Mādhyamika Śūnyavāda are
different forms of Absolutism. All these philosophies speak about one transcendent
absolute reality which is devoid of any duality, conceptualization, determination and
difference. All these philosophies make difference between "noumenon" and'"
phemenona" and they come with the supportive doctrine of Avidyā. Though all these
philosophies (Advaitism, Yogācara Idealism and the Mādhyamika) do proclaim about
the non-duality of the Absolute, yet regarding the nature of the absolute and regarding
to the approach towards it they differ. Murti says "Brahman is Absolute of pure Being;
and the method of approach is from the standpoint of knowledge. Vijñaptimātratā is
Pure Act (Transcendental Ideation), and the approach is from the standpoint of the will
consciousness. Śūnyatā is Prajñā, non-dual intuition, and the approach is from the
philosophical reflection of criticism. It is that contentless and positionless awareness
itself". (Murti, 1998: 48)
In order to substantiate his arguments in favor of his absolutistic interpretation
Murti fancies an interesting distinction between Advaitavāda and Advyavāda. He is of
the view that while Advaitism is a doctrine of Advaita, the non-duality of Being,
Mādhyamika Śūnyavāda is a doctrine of Advaya, the non-differentiated nature of
experience. However, if Murti is keen to find out the differences among the various
forms of absolutism and to find out the criteria for distinguishing between the Vedāntic
Advaitism and the Mādhyamika Advyavāda, C.D.Sharma goes to such extent in his
Vedāntization of Buddhism that he hardly finds any difference between Mādhyamika's
Śūnya and Śankara's Brahman. He is of the view that Śūnyavāda represents the earlier
stage while Vedānta represents the later stage of the development of the same thought.
He is of the view that Śūnyavādains maintain that "Reality is immanent in appearances
and yet it transcends them all.--Reality is the Non-dual Absolute, Blissful and beyond
intellect where all plurality is merged." (Sharma, 2003: 94) From the above description
it really becomes hard to see whether the learned scholar is talking about the Advaita-
Vedānta or about the Mādhyamika.
Similarities of Mādhyamika with Advaitism tempt scholars to interpret the
Mādhyamika as an absolutistic philosophy. As we know, both these philosophies talk
about the levels of truth, distinction between appearance and reality, illusoriness of the
world and the incommensurability and indescribability of the real. The real is beyond

5
See Gopinath Kaviraj, Introduction to Brahmasūtra-Śānkarabhāsya-Ratnaprabhā ṭīkā, Achyuta
Granthmala, Kashi, samvat, 1993.

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 NĀGĀRJUNA’S ŚŪNYATĀ 51

linguistic determination and categories of thought. It is such an awareness which is

devoid of differentiation, duality, linguistic determination. And this is the final destiny
which for the Vedāntins is the Mokṣa and for the Buddhists the Nirvāṇa. In spite of the
above similarities between them, one should not overlook the basic difference between
them. Though the world is illusory, unreal and Māyika to both, the Śūnyavādains and
the Advaitins but whereas for the Advaitins and even for the Yogācara Idealists,
appearance is grounded in reality, the Mādhyamika does not accept any ultimate reality
which grounds this phenomenal world and underlies it, and of which this world is an
appearance. In fact Mādhyamika does not accept a reality behind the unreal
appearances. That is why scholars like S. N. Dasgupta finds Mādhyamika as a sheer
form of blank phenomenolism. (Dasgupta, 1962: 79) In fact, the Mādhyamika illusion is
groundless and supportless.
The major drawback which I find with the absolutistic interpretation of
Mādhyamika Śūnyatā is that the advocate of this view forgets to note the point that a
doctrine like Absolutism is a metaphysical doctrine of being. Absolutism is always an
absolutism of being. There are no alternative forms of absolutes or of absolutism as
proposed by scholars like K.C.Bhattacharya and others. As we know that there are a
number of scholars led by K.C.Bhattacharya who believe that Absolute of Being is not
the only Absolute. There are other alternative forms of Absolute, viz. Absolute of
Knowledge, Absolute of Will etc. Besides K.C. Bhattacharya , the other scholars who
have shared and further developed this notion of alternative forms of Absolutes are
T.R.V.Murti, K.D.Bhattacharya and A. K. Chatterjee. Now in the legacy of the tradition
of K.C.Bhattacharya, Murti comes with his doctrine that Advaitic type of Absolutism
need not be the only form of Absolutism. As noted above he is of the view that
Yogācara idealism and Mādhyamika philosophy also are different forms of Absolutism.
Where Advaitic form of absolutism is absolutism of being, Mādhyamika form of
absolutism is absolutism of awareness or knowledge, while Vijñānavāda is an
absolutism of Will. Interestingly taking cue from Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya and
Gopinath Kaviraja, Murti makes a distinction between Advaitavāda and Advyavāda.
Where Advaitavāda is a doctrine of non-duality of being, Advyavāda, according to him,
is a doctrine of non-differentiated nature of intuition or awareness. Where Advaitavāda
is a doctrine of being, Advyavāda is of knowledge, Former is ontological while later is
epistemological. Here I would like to say that Murti's insistence is not legitimate one.
Absolutism is a theory of metaphysics--metaphysics which is science of being qua
being.
The non-differentiative nature of Prajñāpāramitā and its being beyond the duality
of subject-object or knower-known distinction does not make it an Absolute.
Mādhyamika philosophy can never be called an Absolutistic philosophy, nor the
Mādhyamika Śūnyatā has any affinity with philosopher's Absolute. It is true that
Mādhyamika distinguishes between Paramārtha Satya and Samvṛti Satya but this does
not mean that Mādhyamika position should be termed as Absolutism. The ultimate
reality is of Śūnyatā, but this Śūnyatā should not be taken as a non-dual Absolute which
appears in the form of phenomenal world. The distinction between "paramārtha satya"
and "Samvṛti satya" should not be read as the distinction between "a transcendental
reality" and "a phenomenal world". G.C.Nayak rightly remarks "Paramārtha here in
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52 ANANDA MISHRA

Mādhyamika context does not refer to any transcendent reality but to the ultimate truth,
the highest good, the summum bonum". (Nayak, 2001: 38) It is true that there are some
passages where Nāgārjuna does try to define the terms like "Tattva" and "Svabhāva" 6
Now this attempt of Nāgārjuna has been used by supporters of absolutistic thesis that
Nāgārjuna does accept Tattva or Svabhāva . But as Harsh Narayana writes"so, when he
defines Tattva, or Svabhāva, he does not mean to suggest that there is a reality
confirming to his definition". (Narayana, 1997: 125) Then what Śūnyatā is? Śūnyatā is
the ultimate relativity of things, their essencelessness, and hence utter emptiness. From
the above discussion it is clear that Śūnyatā is not a transcendent entity. It does not refer
to any transcendent reality. It is the real nature of things, their ultimate truth. Śūnyatā
and the awareness of Śūnyatā cannot be distinguished. That is why ultimately Śūnyatā
is Prajñā par excellence, the Prajñāpāramitā. It is Tathatā, Dharmatā, Bhūtakoṭi, the
reality of whatever so-called is or not is. It is Buddhakāya, Dharmakāya or Nirvāṇa.
Śūnyatā is neither Being nor Nothingness. It is beyond all dichotomies, beyond Being
and Nothingness.
Śūnyatā i.e. emptiness of all phenomena is the ultimate truth (paramārtha satya)
for Nāgārjuna. It is the highest and final meaning (nītārtha) of all Buddhist texts.
Nagarjuna's project was to unravel the true import of Buddha's teaching. He found in
Śūnyatā that teaching of Buddha. It was just another name of the previous doctrine of
no-soul(anātmavāda). One can say that Nāgārjuna extended this no-soul theory to all
entities. Similarly the doctrine of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) and of
dependent designation (upādāya prajñapti) only suggested him that finally all
phenomena are empty of independent existence and essence. In fact the real meaning of
all the major Buddhist doctrines - doctrines of dependent origination, of dependent
designation and of middle way (madhyamā pratipat) was ascertained as Śūnyatā.
Nāgārjuna says in his Madhyamakasāstra, 24.18 that what we call Śūnyatā is dependent
origination,, it is the dependent designation and it itself is the middle way. Though
Nāgārjuna was firm/ unhesitant of his understanding of Buddha's teaching, the major
task before him was how to interpret the preceding dominant Abhidhārmic
trend/tradition of Buddhism. That task was felt really challenging when it was found
that the realistic and pluralistic philosophy of Abhidharma was well supported by our
day-today worldly life. Consequently the doctrine of two truths and two-fold meaning
of the texts was conceived. Through these two devices he could now well explain our
day-today worldly life and the significant role of the preceding Abhidhārmic
philosophy. Thus the real value of the doctrine of Śūnyatā is that it does not reject
anything. It is true that Nāgārjuna does not accept any Absolute whether in the world of
facts or in the world of ideas. But that does not mean that he rejects everything. In fact
he does not reject anything. All entities and ideas have their own value in their world of
relations. It is true that they lack ultimate and absolute value. Much has been said
regarding Nāgārjunian hermeneutics and rhetorics. Śūnyatā is often conceived as an

6
Aparapratyayam śāntam prapancairaprapancitam/ Nirvikalpamanānārthametattattvasya
lakṣaṇam // Madhyamakaśāstra , 18/9; Svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ katham /
Akṛtrmaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca // Madhyamakaśāstra , 15/2.

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 NĀGĀRJUNA’S ŚŪNYATĀ 53

outcome of these. However, the true meaning of Śūnyatā can never be grasped by mere
textual exegesis, rhetorics, dialectics or analytical and discursive reasoning. It is
something to be realized and felt within. Each one has to realize it by own. It is not
something to be studied, taught or communicated. Similarly ontology or epistemology
was not the real concern of the Mādhyamikas. Nāgārjuna's philosophy was basically a
soteriological one. Buddhism is and has been through and through a soteria. Thus the
true meaning of Śūnyatā can only be grasped by Sādhanā. Practice of pāramitās and
especially of Śamatha and Vipaśyanā lead us to that realization par excellence which is
called Śūnyatā. Ultimately everything is perceived as empty, nothing is exception to
this. But the question is which type of experience is this highest realization.
Mādhyamikas would unanimously deny that it is a self-conscious experience. They
would repeatedly insist that ultimately this experience of Śūnyatā too is śūnya.
However, the later Buddhists like Yogācara and the Vedāntin Hindus would say that
self-conscious experience of Śūnyatā is the highest truth.

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Journal of East-West Thought