People vs. Ibañez
People vs. Ibañez
People vs. Ibañez
IBAÑEZ
G.R. No. 174656
Facts:
Zaldy Ibanez y Francisco was charged with three counts of Rape under three informations, before the
RTC, Cavite, Branch 21. When Arraigned, appellant entered pleas of not guilty. Whereupon, trial on the
merits ensued. On the first charge of rape, AAA testified that she was in their home at XXX, Cavite in
June 1997. On the second charge of rape, AAA testified that appellant raped her eight times from January
to December 1998 in their home and she did not tell her mother because she was afraid of the appellant.
AAA testified that the third rape happened sometime in the morning of April 1999 in their house while her
mother is at work. Appellant denied raping his daughter. As alibi, he claimed that he was often away from
home and usually returned only four days after because he was hooked on gambling and drugs. He
would usually return home in the morning with his wife had hone to work to avoid quarrels. By then, AAA
would already be in school. He admitted being in a rehabilitation center for sometime, but continued to
take drugs upon his release. He also admitted that he would beat and threaten his wife if she did not give
him money for drugs. He testified further that in January 1999, he left the house, stayed in Pasig and
returned home only to steal his wife’s car. After trial, the lower court found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape in the first and last but was acquitted on the second.
According to Ibanez, the lower court erred in rendering the decision because the informations filed are not
explicit and certain as to the dates of the rape. Such uncertainties run afoul of the constitutionally
protected right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
Issue:
Should the precise dates of the commission of the rape be alleged in the information?
Held:
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omissions
constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of the crime
charged. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the
occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge
of a woman. The precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its commission. Therefore, it is
not essential that it be alleged in the information with ultimate precision. Also, it cannot be seriously
asserted that appellant was deprived of his constitutional rights to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him when the prosecution failed to state the exact date of the commission of the
offense. At any rate, it is not too late for appellant to question the sufficiency of the criminal informations
regarding the dates of the commission of the offense. Appellant could have filed a motion for a bill of
particulars before his arraignment or a motion to quash information on the ground that the informations
alleged erroneous dates prior to his entry of plea. However, he did not. Instead, he had himself arraigned
and entered a plea of not guilty to the crime of rape. Such being the case, appellant has waived his right
to object to the informations on the ground of an error as to the time of the alleged rape.