EN BANC

[G.R. No. 139622. July 31, 2001.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . PEDRO

PERRERAS @ PEPOT and BOY FERNANDEZ (at large) , accused,

PEDRO PERRERAS @ PEPOT , accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Baltazar V. Servito for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

On appeal is the decision of the trial court convicting accused-appellant Pedro

Perreras of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. In his
appeal before the Court, appellant maintained that the lower court committed a grievous
error in lending weight to the testimony of prosecution witness Leonardo Salazar. He
pointed out supposed "inconsistencies" in Salazar's testimony in an attempt to impugn his
credibility. First, the ocular inspection of the area which revealed that the victim's house
was east of the shed was inconsistent with Salazar's testimony that he was facing west
when the incident transpired. Second, the location of the electric post which illuminated
the vicinity was not twenty (20) meters in front of the house, as Salazar claimed, but on its
southern direction 100 meters away. Third, it was impossible for him to have asked
directions to the house of Manoling Pastoral because he personally knew Pastoral as well
as the location of his house.
The Supreme Court a rmed the decision of the trial court convicting appellant of
murder. The Court, however, reduced the penalty of death imposed by the trial court to
reclusion perpetua. According to the Court, the death penalty cannot be imposed on
accused-appellant in light of the Court's recent rulings in People v. Arrojado and People v.
Gano where Secs. 8 and 9 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure were given
retroactive application favorable to the accused. The Rules now require that every
complaint or information shall state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating
circumstances, otherwise the same cannot be properly appreciated. Since dwelling was
not alleged in the information, it cannot be considered to raise the penalty to death. The
Court considered the alleged discrepancy as to the distance between the electric post and
the victim's house a minor inconsistency that cannot affect the credibility of the witness'
testimony. The Court also gave weight and credence to the facts obtained by the trial court
when it conducted an ocular inspection, which settled all doubts regarding the relative
positions of the houses, electric lights, basketball court, etc. Said ndings are entitled to
great weight because no amount of textual description, recitation of measurements, and
diagrams could even approximate the actual subjection of the crime scene to the trial
judge's acute senses.

SYLLABUS

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 1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; NOT AFFECTED BY
MINOR INCONSISTENCIES. — We agree with the court a quo that the discrepancy as to the
distance between the electric post and the victim's house is a minor inconsistency that
cannot affect the credibility of the witness' testimony. As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies
in the testimonies of witnesses which refer only to minor details and collateral matters do
not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in
relating the principal occurrence and the positive identi cation of the assailants. Slight
contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove
that their testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even
improbabilities, unusual for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses. ADCEaH

2. ID.; ID.; FACTS OBTAINED DURING AN OCULAR INSPECTION ARE ENTITLED

TO GREAT WEIGHT ON APPEAL. — It is a hornbook doctrine that ndings of fact of the
trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for
strong and valid reasons because of the trial court's unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses rsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling
examination. In the same vein, questions regarding the locus criminis, the distances and
positions of the landmarks, and the credibility of the witnesses relative thereto, are best
left to the trial court, especially when it had conducted an ocular inspection. No amount of
textual description, recitation of measurements, and diagrams could even approximate the
actual subjection of the crime scene to the trial judge's acute senses.
3. ID.; ID.; DEFENSE OF ALIBI; REJECTED. — In the face of the prosecution's
mounting evidence, accused-appellant invokes alibi for his defense. But positive
identi cation, if categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of
the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence not
worthy of weight in law. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that accused-
appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed but it must likewise be
demonstrated that he was far away that he could not have been physically present at the
place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. The lower court
took judicial notice of the fact that a trip from Isabela to Dagupan City takes a mere eight
(8) to nine (9) hours and therefore it was not impossible for accused-appellant to have
been in Dagupan City on the night in question and returned to Isabela immediately after.
For this reason, the defense of alibi must fall.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; PRESENT
WHERE VICTIM WAS UNAWARE OF THE ATTEMPT ON HIS LIFE, AND WAS NOT IN A
POSITION TO DEFEND HIMSELF. — In qualifying the crime to murder, the trial court
correctly appreciated the circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. For treachery to be
considered, two (2) elements must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution that
give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and, (b) the means
of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. In this case, the victim was in the
comforts of his own home, enjoying a televised basketball game. He was shot in the head
from the back, with the gunman even having all the time in the world to roll up his sleeves
and take careful aim. The victim was unaware of the attempt on his life, and was not in the
position to defend himself. Clearly, treachery was present in this killing.
5. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; DWELLING; PRESENT IN CASE AT
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 BAR. — Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime was committed in the dwelling of the
offended party if the latter has not given provocation or if the victim was killed inside his
house. Dwelling is considered aggravating primarily because of the sanctity of privacy the
law accords to human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong
is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. Although accused-appellant was
outside of the house when he red, the victim was inside his house. For the circumstance
of dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused should have actually
entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim was
attacked inside his own house, although the assailant might have devised means to
perpetrate the assault from the outside.
6. ID.; PENALTIES; DEATH PENALTY; CANNOT BE IMPOSED IN CASES WHERE
THE QUALIFYING AND AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION. — However, the death penalty cannot be imposed on accused-appellant in
light of our recent rulings in People v. Arrojado and People v. Gano where Secs. 8 and 9 of
The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure were given retroactive application where
favorable to the accused. The Rules now require that every complaint or information state
not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances, otherwise the same cannot
be properly appreciated. Since dwelling was not alleged in the Information, it cannot be
considered to raise the penalty to death. Consequently, there being no more modifying
circumstances to be appreciated, the penalty for this murder is reclusion perpetua,
pursuant to Art. 63 in relation to Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
7659. CcaASE

DECISION

BELLOSILLO , J : p

ACCUSED-APPELLANT PEDRO PERRERAS alias "Pepot" was found guilty by the

court a quo of murder for the killing of Estanislao Salo and sentenced to death. He was
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P75,000.00 for civil indemnity, P91,803.59 for actual
and compensatory damages, P1,728,000.00 for lost earnings and P100,000.00 for moral
damages. His conviction is now the subject of this automatic review. 1
Meanwhile, his co-accused BOY FERNANDEZ has remained at large, hence is not
included in this Decision.
On the night of 21 July 1998 in Bacayao Norte, Dagupan City, accused-appellant
Pedro Perreras, a former resident of the barangay, and Boy Fernandez, his nephew,
approached Leonardo Salazar who was engaged in idle banter with some barriomates at
the neighborhood waiting shed. Pedro asked Leonardo if Manoling Pastoral was home.
When Leonardo nodded, Pedro asked for directions to go to Manoling's house. Feeling
almost suffocated in the crowded waiting shed, Leonardo excused himself and walked
towards the house of Estanislao Salo ten (10) meters away for some refreshing air. 2 Soon
after Pedro and Boy followed, each holding a bottle of beer. The two (2) approached the
son of Estanislao by the name of Joel and asked him also for Manoling's house.
Accused-appellant then stopped by the window of the Estanislao's house which was
just adjacent to the house of Manoling. The place was lighted by a mercury lamp about
twelve (12) meters from the house of Estanislao. As soon as accused-appellant saw
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 Estanislao, he rolled up his sleeves, drew a gun from his waist, and red at Estanislao,
hitting him on the head. 3 Leonardo had a clear view of Estanislao sitting on a chair and
watching TV when red upon as he was only about ten (10) meters away from the shooter
and the victim. Fearing for his life, Leonardo hid behind a chair.
Leonora Salo, Estanislao's wife, was washing dishes in the kitchen when she heard
the gunshot. She rushed to the living room and saw her husband slumped on the oor. She
looked out the window and saw accused-appellant Pedro Perreras alias "Pepot" holding a
gun staring at her husband's body. 4 Upon seeing Leonora, Pedro ed with Boy trailing him
some twenty (20) meters behind. Shocked and senseless, Leonora cradled her dying
husband in her arms and shouted his name as if to will him back into consciousness. After
Pedro and Boy left, Leonardo Salazar ran to the house of Saturnino Maramba, a barangay
councilor, and reported to him, in between gasps, the shooting and narrated the details of
what he had witnessed. Both then went to the house of SPO2 Dacanay for assistance.
Estanislao was rushed to the Villa or Hospital for treatment but it was too late. He
died at 5:30 the following morning, 22 July 1998.
Dr. Benjamin Bautista, Rural Health Physician of Dagupan City, conducted the
autopsy on the cadaver of Estanislao. It was in a state of rigor mortis, with "gunshot
wound, POE, 2 cm., left, Parietal area, penetrating, perforating, gunpowder tattooing
marking, less dense, collar abrasion, depress fracture skull." Internal ndings showed
"intercranial hemorrhage, moderate; skull depress fracture; penetrating and perforating
brain tissue damage." Cause of death was "Hypovolemic shock, Hemorrhage, moderate,
due to gunshot wound POE (L) parietal area, brain tissue damage." 5 Dr. Bautista explained
in court that the victim was shot in the left side of the top portion of the head but there
was no exit wound; the shot was red at close range, from four (4) to six (6) feet, and from
a low caliber pistol; and, from the position of the bullet wound, the victim could have been
shot while seated. 6
On 22 August 1998 accused-appellant was arrested while in hiding in Echague,
Isabela. According to SPO4 Alfredo Flores, accused-appellant admitted to him that he
killed Estanislao Salo and voluntarily signed the warrant of arrest 7 on the left margin
thereof. 8 But, Boy Fernandez was nowhere to be found.
Accused-appellant however subsequently denied the charges against him. He
claimed that he had been in Isabela since 11 July 1998 and returned to Dagupan only upon
his arrest. He also denied that he admitted to SPO4 Flores that he murdered Estanislao
Salo, claiming that did not know how to write and his captors forced him to a x his
signature on the warrant. He also testi ed that he was mauled by Estanislao Salo's two (2)
sons and nephew while he was detained in the Dagupan police station. Furthermore, he
asserted that Boy Fernandez, his alleged companion during the murder, had been dead for
three (3) years, and even presented a Death Certi cate 9 of one Rodolfo Geminiano
Fernandez who died on 23 May 1994.
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented two (2) other witnesses, Orlando and Pepito
Capua, both residents of Bacayao Norte, to testify that they knew Boy Fernandez and that
he was still alive. They further testi ed that the Rodolfo Geminiano Fernandez who died in
1994 was the father of Boy Fernandez.
Accused-appellant now maintains that the lower court committed a grievous error in
lending weight to the testimony of prosecution witness Leonardo Salazar. He pointed out
supposed "inconsistencies" in Salazar's testimony in an attempt to impugn his credibility.
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 First, the ocular inspection of the area which revealed that the victim's house was east of
the shed was inconsistent with Salazar's testimony that he was facing west when the
incident transpired. Second, the location of the electric post which illuminated the vicinity
was not twenty (20) meters in front of the house, as Salazar claimed, but on its southern
direction 100 meters away. Third, it was impossible for him to have asked directions to the
house of Manoling Pastoral because he personally knew Pastoral as well as the location of
his house.
As regards the first perceived "inconsistency," accused-appellant argues —
From the testimony of the said witness itself it was well established that
he was at that shed near the electric post where the improvised basketball court
was located, and the said shed was facing the three (3) meters concrete road. On
this point alone it was already very clear that witness Leonardo Salazar,
assuming arguendo to be present, could never see the house of the victim
because he was then at the time facing the three (3) meters concrete road, hence,
facing west but the house of the victim during the ocular inspection was found to
be located in the eastern direction in relation to the said shed or electric post and
improvised basketball court was located. aCIHAD

A close scrutiny of the records reveals that nowhere in Leonardo's testimony did he
ever state that he was facing west when the shooting occurred. He only said that the
waiting shed where he was standing before he went to breath some fresh air was facing
the newly constructed concrete road. The map of the area drawn by the court researcher
1 0 reveals that this road was indeed to the west of the shed. However, Leonardo did not
claim to have witnessed the shooting from there. He left that shed to go to the front of the
victim's house for some fresh air. It was from there, and not from the shed, that he saw the
killing. As the lower court correctly pointed out —
It was counsel for the defense who was apparently confused when he
predicated almost all his questions during the cross-examination of Leonardo
Salazar on the place where the witness was refreshing himself when actually
counsel for the defense wanted to refer to the waiting shed where the witness was
conversing with the people around and where the accused asked him where the
house of Manoling Pastoral is and if the latter was in his house. The place where
the waiting shed is located is actually different from the place where the witness
went to refresh himself near the house of the victim as borne out by the transcript
of the testimony of the witness. 1 1

We agree with the trial court and the Solicitor General that considering that accused-
appellant had been in Isabela from 1975 to 1997, it would not be far-fetched that he lost
his familiarity with the barangay so that it was not unlikely that he had to ask for directions
to the house of Manoling Pastoral, or at least verify his recollection with someone more
familiar with the place.
Also, we agree with the court a quo that the discrepancy as to the distance between
the electric post and the victim's house is a minor inconsistency that cannot affect the
credibility of the witness' testimony. As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses which refer only to minor details and collateral matters do not
affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating
the principal occurrence and the positive identi cation of the assailants. Slight
contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove
that their testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even
improbabilities, unusual for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses. 1 2
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 At any rate, all doubts regarding the relative positions of the houses, electric lights
and basketball court have been soundly put to rest, and aptly so, by the trial court —
During the ocular inspection it was learned that there was a vacant space
in front of the house of Salo as the area was not yet fenced at the time of the
incident with a hollow block wall on the southwestern side of the vacant lot was a
mercury lamp . . . which could very well light the house of Estanislao Salo,
including that portion where a window existed through which Estanislao Salo was
shot . . . Although the electric post was not located immediately on the side of the
road as it was inside the kitchen wall of a house under it, same was of a height
su cient enough to make the electric bulb attached to it to light the front of the
house of Estanislao Salo without any obstruction and when the witness said that
he went in front of the house of Salo he was within the vicinity of the said electric
post, not on the waiting shed near which another electric post was located where
the defense argued the witness was at the time of the incident. From any place in
front of the house of Salo, anyone could see the place where the accused was
supposed to be standing when Estanislao Salo was shot. 1 3

It is a hornbook doctrine that ndings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great
weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons because
of the trial court's unique opportunity to observe the witnesses rsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. 1 4 In the same vein, questions
regarding the locus criminis, the distances and positions of the landmarks, and the
credibility of the witnesses relative thereto, are best left to the trial court, especially when it
had conducted an ocular inspection. No amount of textual description, recitation of
measurements, and diagrams could even approximate the actual subjection of the crime
scene to the trial judge's acute senses.
Moreover, Leonardo Salazar's testimony was corroborated by Leonora Salo, the wife
of the victim, and Dr. Benjamin Bautista, the examining physician. Leonora's testimony that
she saw accused-appellant holding a gun and staring at her unconscious husband through
the window con rms the gunman's identity. Dr. Bautista's ndings that the victim was shot
at close range with a small rearm while sitting down 1 5 are also consistent with
Leonardo's account.
In the face of the prosecution's mounting evidence, accused-appellant invokes alibi
for his defense. But positive identi cation, if categorical and consistent, without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over
alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative
and self-serving evidence not worthy of weight in law. 1 6 For alibi to prosper, it is not
enough to prove that accused-appellant was somewhere else when the crime was
committed but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was far away that he could not
have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time
of its commission. 1 7 The lower court took judicial notice of the fact that a trip from
Isabela to Dagupan City takes a mere eight (8) to nine (9) hours and therefore it was not
impossible for accused-appellant to have been in Dagupan City on the night in question
and returned to Isabela immediately after. For this reason, the defense of alibi must fall.
In qualifying the crime to murder, the trial court correctly appreciated the
circumstance of treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
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 specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. 1 8 For treachery to be considered, two (2) elements must
concur: (a) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and, (b) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted. 1 9 In this case, the victim was in the comforts of his
own home, enjoying a televised basketball game. He was shot in the head from the back,
with the gunman even having all the time in the world to roll up his sleeves and take careful
aim. The victim was unaware of the attempt on his life, and was not in the position to
defend himself. Clearly, treachery was present in this killing.
In imposing the death penalty, the trial court ruled that the murder was aggravated
by dwelling. We agree, but not to the imposition of the supreme penalty as shown
hereunder. aIDHET

Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime was committed in the dwelling of the
offended party if the latter has not given provocation or if the victim was killed inside his
house. 2 0 Dwelling is considered aggravating primarily because of the sanctity of privacy
the law accords to human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him
wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. 2 1 Although accused-appellant
was outside of the house when he red, the victim was inside his house. For the
circumstance of dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused should
have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the
victim was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant might have devised
means to perpetrate the assault from the outside. 2 2
However, the death penalty cannot be imposed on accused-appellant in light of our
recent rulings in People v. Arrojado 2 3 and People v. Gano 2 4 where Secs. 8 and 9 of The
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure 2 5 were given retroactive application where favorable
to the accused. The Rules now require that every complaint or information state not only
the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances, otherwise the same cannot be
properly appreciated. Since dwelling was not alleged in the Information, it cannot be
considered to raise the penalty to death. Consequently, there being no more modifying
circumstances to be appreciated, the penalty for this murder is reclusion perpetua,
pursuant to Art. 63 in relation to Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
7659.
Of the amount of P91,803.59 awarded for actual damages, only P61,813.15 may be
granted as only so much for medical and burial expenses are supported by the evidence on
record. 2 6 Actual damages must be substantiated by documentary evidence, such as
receipts, in order to prove expenses incurred as a result of the death of the victim. 2 7
The heirs of the deceased may recover damages for loss of earning capacity.
Although the prosecution did not present documentary evidence to support this claim,
testimonial evidence is su cient to establish a basis for which the court can make a fair
and reasonable estimate of damages for loss of earning capacity, 2 8 and the unrebutted
testimony of Leonora Salo is su cient basis for the award. She testi ed that the victim
was fty (50) years old at the time of his death and earned a basic salary of P130.00 a day
but including tips as waiter in a restaurant he was earning a total average of P9,000.00 per
month. Under the American Expectancy Table of Mortality adopted by this Court in several
cases, 2 9 loss of earning capacity is computed according to the following formula:
Net Earning Capacity (X) = Life Expectancy x Gross
Annual Income - Living Expenses
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 (50% of Gross Annual Income)
where life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 - [age of deceased]);
and
Gross Annual Income = Monthly Earnings x number of
months (12)
Therefore,
X = 2/3 (80-50) x [(P9,000.00 x 12) -
[P9,000.00 x 12) 50%]
X = 2/3 (30) x [P108,000.00 - P54,000.00]
X = 20 x P54,000.00
X = P1,080,000.00

The award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is reduced to P50,000.00 since murder

was not quali ed by any circumstance under which the death penalty is authorized. The
testimony of Leonora that she suffered sleepless nights and mental anxiety as a result of
her husband's murder su ciently justi es moral damages, 3 0 although the award of
P100,000.00 may be considered excessive hence must be lowered to P50,000.00 to
conform with current jurisprudence. 3 1
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Crim. Case No. 98-02303-D
nding accused-appellant PEDRO PERRERAS alias "Pepot" guilty of murder, imposing on
him the death penalty and ordering him to pay the heirs of ESTANISLAO SALO P75,000.00
as civil indemnity, P91,803.59 in actual and compensatory damages, P1,728,000.00 in lost
earnings, and P100,000.00 in moral damages is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant PEDRO
PERRERAS is found guilty of murder and sentenced instead to reclusion perpetua and to
pay the heirs of ESTANISLAO SALO P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P61,813.15 as actual
damages, P1,080,000.00 in lost earnings and P50,000.00 as moral damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED. cESDCa

Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-

Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Panganiban, Buena and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., are abroad on
official business.

Footnotes
1. Decision penned by Judge Luis M. Fontanilla, RTC-Br. 42, Dagupan City, prom. 4 June
1999.
2. TSN, 12 October 1998, p. 19.
3. Id., p. 23.
4. TSN, 14 December 1998, p. 20.

5. Exh. "A," Original Records, p. 73.

6. TSN, 12 October 1998, p. 15.
7. Exh. "C," Original Records, p. 44.
8. Exh. "C-1," id.

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 9. Exh. 3, id.
10. Exh. 1, Original Records, p. 124.
11. Rollo, p. 27.
12. People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 116239, 29 November 2000.
13. Rollo, pp. 26-27.
14. People v. Gemoya, G.R. No. 132633, 4 October 2000.
15. TSN, 10 December 1998, p. 15.
16. People v. Panado, G.R. No. 133439, 26 December 2000.
17. Ibid.
18. People v. Amazan, G.R. Nos. 136251, 138606-7, 16 January 2001; People v. Bato, G.R.
No. 127843, 15 December 2000.
19. Ibid.
20. People v. Paraiso, G.R. No. 127840, 29 November 1999, 319 SCRA 422.
21. Ibid.
22. People v. Dacibar, G.R. No. 111286, 17 February 2000, 325 SCRA 725.
23. G.R. No. 130492, 31 January 2001.
24. G.R. No. 134373, 28 February 2001.
25. Sec. 8. Designation of the Offense. — The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting
the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the
statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances
and for the court to pronounce judgment.
26. Exhs. "E"-"E-4," "F"-"F-2," and "H."
27. See People v. Galo, G.R. No. 132025, 16 January 2001.
28. People v. Bangcado, G.R. No. 132330, 28 November 2000.
29. People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 134004, 15 December 2000; People v. Langit, G.R. Nos.
134757-58, 4 August 2000.

30. TSN, 14 December 1998, p. 15.

31. People v. Amazan, see Note 18.

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