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    Core 2008

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    مكتئب سينغ
    This document discusses how theories of justice have rarely addressed gender. It notes that historically, innate characteristics like sex have been used to justify unequal rights and restrictions for women. While legal discrimination has decreased, social norms and traditions still reinforce gender roles that are unequal. The author argues that major works in political thought, including those of Aristotle and liberal theorists, assumed a patriarchal social structure and excluded women from considerations of justice. This has contributed to a widespread belief that discussions of justice do not apply to women or the family.

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    Core 2008

    Uploaded by

    مكتئب سينغ
    20 views1 page
    This document discusses how theories of justice have rarely addressed gender. It notes that historically, innate characteristics like sex have been used to justify unequal rights and restrictions for women. While legal discrimination has decreased, social norms and traditions still reinforce gender roles that are unequal. The author argues that major works in political thought, including those of Aristotle and liberal theorists, assumed a patriarchal social structure and excluded women from considerations of justice. This has contributed to a widespread belief that discussions of justice do not apply to women or the family.

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    core2008

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    This document discusses how theories of justice have rarely addressed gender. It notes that historically, innate characteristics like sex have been used to justify unequal rights and restrictions for women. While legal discrimination has decreased, social norms and traditions still reinforce gender roles that are unequal. The author argues that major works in political thought, including those of Aristotle and liberal theorists, assumed a patriarchal social structure and excluded women from considerations of justice. This has contributed to a widespread belief that discussions of justice do not apply to women or the family.

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    20 views1 page

    Core 2008

    Uploaded by

    مكتئب سينغ
    This document discusses how theories of justice have rarely addressed gender. It notes that historically, innate characteristics like sex have been used to justify unequal rights and restrictions for women. While legal discrimination has decreased, social norms and traditions still reinforce gender roles that are unequal. The author argues that major works in political thought, including those of Aristotle and liberal theorists, assumed a patriarchal social structure and excluded women from considerations of justice. This has contributed to a widespread belief that discussions of justice do not apply to women or the family.

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    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
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    of 1

    Justice and GenderAuthor(s): Susan Moller OkinSource: Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 16, No.

    1
    (Winter, 1987), pp. 42-72Published by: Blackwell PublishingStable URL:
    http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265205Accessed

    Theories of justice are centrally concerned with whether, how, and why persons should be treated
    differently from each other. Which initial or acquired characteristics or positions in society, they ask,
    legitimize dif-ferential treatment of persons by social institutions, laws, and customs? In particular, how
    should beginnings affect outcomes? The division of humanity into two sexes would seem to provide an
    obvious subject for such inquiries. We live in a society in whose past the innate characteristic of sex has
    been regarded as one of the clearest legitimizers of different rights and restrictions, both formal and
    informal. While the legal sanc-tions that uphold male dominance have been to some extent eroded
    within the past century, and more rapidly in the last twenty years, the heavy weight of tradition,
    combined with the effects of socialization broadly defined, still work powerfully to reinforce roles for the
    two sexes that are commonly regarded as of unequal prestige and worth.' The sexual di-vision of labor
    within the family, in particular, is not only a fundamental part of the marriage contract, but so deeply
    influences us in our most formative years that feminists of both sexes who try to reject it find
    themselves struggling against it with varying degrees of ambivalence. Based on this linchpin, the
    deeply entrenched social institutionalization of sex difference, which I will refer to as "the gender
    system" or simply "gender," still permeates our society. This gender system has rarely been subjected
    to the tests of justice. When we turn to the great tradition of Western political thought with questions
    about the justice of gender in mind, it is to little avail. Bold feminists like Mary Astell, Mary
    Wollstonecraft, Harriet Taylor, and George Bernard Shaw have occasionally challenged the tradition,
    often using its own premises and arguments to overturn its justification of the unequal treatment of
    women. But John Stuart Mill is a rare exception to the rule that those who hold central positions in
    the tradition almost never questioned the justice of the subordination and oppression of women. This
    phenomenon is undoubtedly due in part to the fact that Aristotle, whose theory of justice has been so
    influential, relegated women and slaves to a realm of "household justice," whose participants are not
    fundamentally equal to the free men who participate in political justice, but inferiors whose natural
    function is to serve those who are more fully human. The liberal tradition, despite its supposed
    foundation of individual rights and human equality, is more Aristotelian in this respect than is
    generally acknowledged.2 In one way or another, liberals have assumed that the "individual"w ho is
    the basic subject of their theories is the male head of a patriarchal household.3 Thus the application
    of principles of justice to relations between the sexes, or within the household, has fre-quently been
    ruled out from the start. Other assumptions, too, contribute to the widespread belief that neither
    women nor the family are appropriates ubjects for discussions of justice. One is that women, whether
    because of their essential disorderliness, their enslavement to nature, their private and particularist
    inclinations, or their oedipal development, are incapable of developing a sense of jus-tice. This notion
    can be found-sometimes briefly suggested, sometimes

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