Pakistan Studies Assignment: TOPIC: Role of Quaid-e-Azam in The Movement of
Pakistan Studies Assignment: TOPIC: Role of Quaid-e-Azam in The Movement of
Pakistan Studies Assignment: TOPIC: Role of Quaid-e-Azam in The Movement of
Assignment
Institute of Chemical Engineering & Technology
University of the Punjab, Lahore
Submitted By:
Ahmad Ghazi RP-15-PG10
Submitted To:
Sir Syed Ali Raza
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Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 3
Origins and Development of the Pakistan Movement ................................................................... 4
Early Life of Quaid ........................................................................................................................... 6
Political Career ................................................................................................................................ 6
Constitutional Struggle ................................................................................................................... 8
Lucknow Pact .................................................................................................................................. 9
Jinnah, Muslim League, and Political Strategy for the Achievement of Pakistan ........................ 10
Fourteen Points of Jinnah ............................................................................................................. 11
Muslim League Reorganized ......................................................................................................... 13
The New Awakening ..................................................................................................................... 14
Demand for Pakistan..................................................................................................................... 15
THE PAKISTAN RESOLUTION (1940) .............................................................................................. 15
1941-1947 (THE TRANSFER OF POWER) ....................................................................................... 17
2nd World War and August Offer .................................................................................................. 17
H.V.Hodson (d. 2000)’s The Great Divide (1969) .......................................................................... 18
Cripps Scheme............................................................................................................................... 19
Partition Plan................................................................................................................................. 20
Leader of a Free Nation ................................................................................................................ 20
The Quaid’s last Message ............................................................................................................. 21
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Introduction
The partition of India is etched in the history of the Indian subcontinent. The tragedy that
unfolded with the mass expedition of people from different areas to the newly created states of
India and Pakistan has been the subject of various movies, books and poetry. Many scholars have
focused on the political progression that directed to the division of India, the creation of Pakistan,
and the associated violence. Numerous people have attempted to find out who was the guilty
and how far mutual ideas had made inroads into secular parties and sensibilities. But the main
objective is to reveal the personality of Muhammad Ali Jinnah who played an important role in
drawing boundaries between India and Pakistan. Jinnah had visualized that Pakistan would be a
homeland for the Muslims of India without knowing that partition would give a free lead to
genocide, mass migration and untold sufferings on millions.
Father of the Nation Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s achievement as the founder of
Pakistan, dominates everything else he did in his long and illustrious public life spanning some 42
years. Yet, by any standard, his was an eventful life, his personality multidimensional and his
achievements in other fields were many, if not equally great. Indeed, several were the roles he
had played with distinction: at one time or another, he was one of the greatest legal luminaries
India had produced during the first half of the century, an `ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity, a
great constitutionalist, a distinguished parliamentarian, a top-notch politician, an indefatigable
freedom-fighter, a dynamic Muslim leader, a political strategist and, above all one of the great
nation-builders of modern times.
What, however, makes him so remarkable is the fact that while similar other leaders assumed
the leadership of traditionally well-defined nations and espoused their cause, or led them to
freedom, he created a nation out of an inchoate and down-trodden minority and established a
cultural and national home for it. And all that within a decade. For over three decades before the
successful culmination in 1947, of the Muslim struggle for freedom in the South-Asian
subcontinent, Jinnah had provided political leadership to the Indian Muslims: initially as one of
the leaders, but later, since 1947, as the only prominent leader- the Quaid-i-Azam. For over thirty
years, he had guided their affairs; he had given expression, coherence and direction to their
legitimate aspirations and cherished dreams; he had formulated these into concrete demands;
and, above all, he had striven all the while to get them conceded by both the ruling British and
the numerous Hindus the dominant segment of India’s population. And for over thirty years he
had fought, relentlessly and inexorably, for the inherent rights of the Muslims for an honorable
existence in the subcontinent. Indeed, his life story constitutes, as it were, the story of the rebirth
of the Muslims of the subcontinent and their spectacular rise to nationhood, phoenixlike.
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Origins and Development of the Pakistan
Movement
Although writers have suggested a number of starting points on the road to Pakistan, ranging
from the Arab conquest of Sind (now Sindh) in 711 to the ‘War of Independence’ in 1857, it is
plausible and empirically testable to argue that the Pakistan Movement really started with the
proceedings and ultimate adoption of the Lahore Resolution in the now famous session of the
All-India Muslim League held on 22-24 March 1940. In his presidential address on 22 March to an
enthusiastic, responsive gathering of thousands of Muslims drawn from all parts of India, Quaid-
i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, after highlighting the Muslim sufferings and difficulties in the
recent years, declared that the only way the Indian Muslims could get out of their distressful
situation and could indeed free themselves both from the British and the now imminent Hindu
rule was to have their own “homelands, their territory and their state”.
They could not accept any system of government which must necessarily result in a Hindu-
majority government. The differences between the Hindus and the Muslims, he stressed, were
“fundamental and deep-rooted”, and thus there was no way the two communities could “at any
time be expected to transform themselves into one nation merely by means of subjecting them
to a democratic constitution and holding them forcibly together by unnatural and artificial
methods of British Parliamentary Statute”.
The experience of the past clearly showed that it was “inconceivable that the fiat of the writ of a
government so constituted can ever command a willing and loyal obedience throughout the
subcontinent by various nationalities except by means of armed force behind it”. Jinnah thus
went on to claim that the problem in India was not “intercommunal” but an “international”
problem, involving two ‘nations’ – Hindus and Muslims. The Muslims were not a “minority”. They
were “a nation, according to any definition of a nation”, and thus, like all other nations, had the
right to self-determination. The difficulty with the Hindu leaders, he lamented, was that they “fail
to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism”. The two were so “different and distinct”.
As he explained: They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different
and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a
common nationality... The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies,
social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry nor interline together and, indeed, they
belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions.
Their aspects on life and of life are different.
It is quite clear that Hindus and Musalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of
history. They have different epics, different heroes, and different episodes. Very often the hero
of one is a foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together
two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority,
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must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for
the government of such a state.
The only way out of this predicament, Jinnah suggested, was the partition of India. In the process,
he hoped, the perennial conflict between the Hindus and the Muslims would be resolved, leading
ultimately to the cherished goal of peace and freedom for all. The Muslim League leaders
endorsed the call on 23 March, and in a resolution adopted on 24 March, the League demanded
‘Independent States’ in Muslim-majority areas of India. This demand had an irresistible appeal
for the Muslim masses. Facing agony and frustration at the hands of Hindus, the promise of their
own separate homeland, named Pakistan soon after, not only provided them “a reassuring
anchor” in a climate of turbulence and uncertainty but also, more importantly, gave them “a
sense of purpose and worth”and power, political power, which they were fast losing in the face
of India’s advance towards self-government and freedom, with its inherent bias towards the
majority community. They will be safe and secure too. The Muslims rallied in their thousands of
thousands to support the demand and the resultant movement for Pakistan. Thus, this
movement was not an ordinary movement. Nor was it a movement started in a fit of anger or in
a flurry of excitement. It was a well-founded movement, based on religion, culture, history, and
political aspirations, all formulating Muslim nationhood, and sought a separate homeland of
Pakistan for the Muslims to enable them to live their lives in their own way with freedom, power,
and security. The sense of urgency was of course provided by the distressful situation of Muslim
India which, in turn, was both a cause and consequence of a host of factors affecting the Muslim
politics in India in general and the Muslims in particular.
How did the movement for Pakistan start? What was its rationale? Why did the Muslims who had
lived with the Hindus for centuries in India felt compelled to charter their own separate course,
leading ultimately to the creation of a separate state of Pakistan? Who were the principal leaders
of the Muslims? How did they struggle to protect and secure Muslim interests in India before
they got convinced that the only way, they could save the Muslims from their present
predicament was to have their own separate state of Pakistan? What was the Hindu majority
community’s attitude towards the Muslims and their interests? How did the system of
representative government introduced by the British in India affect the Muslim interests? How
did the Muslims respond to it, and how did the system ultimately fail to satisfy their demands
and interests? How did Jinnah and Allama Muhammad Iqbal break from ‘Indian nationalism’ and
emerge as the fiercest champions of Muslim nationalism? How did Jinnah mobilize and organize
the Muslims under the banner of the Muslims League? How did he finally wrest the initiative
from the British (and the Hindus) and force them to concede Pakistan if they did not wish to leave
India in a civil war and bloodshed? These, and many related issues are the subject matter of
discussion here. The historical setting is provided by the cataclysmic events of 1857 affirming the
fall of Mughal Empire and ascendancy of the British rule in India. The Muslims found themselves
in a very difficult situation. The defeat in the ‘War of Independence’ made them villains. The
British came to regard them as their arch enemies, who had converted a “sepoy mutiny” into a
“political conspiracy aimed at the extinction of the British’’.
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Early Life of Quaid
Born on December 25, 1876, in a prominent mercantile family in Karachi and educated at the
Sindh Madrassat-ul-Islam and the Christian Mission School at his birth place, Jinnah joined the
Lincoln’s Inn in 1893 to become the youngest Indian to be called to the Bar, three years later.
Starting out in the legal profession with nothing to fall back upon except his native ability and
determination, young Jinnah rose to prominence and became Bombay’s most successful lawyer,
as few did, within a few years.
Once he was firmly established in the legal profession, Jinnah formally entered politics in 1905
from the platform of the Indian National Congress. He went to England in that year along with
Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866-1915), as a member of a Congress delegation to plead the cause of
Indian self-government during the British elections. A year later, he served as Secretary to
Dadabhai Noaroji (1825-1917), the then Indian National Congress President, which was
considered a great honor for a budding politician. Here, at the Calcutta Congress session
(December 1906), he also made his first political speech in support of the resolution on self-
government.
Political Career
Jinnah as a staunch supporter of Hindu Muslim and Indian unity started his political career with
Indian National Congress in 1906. To bring closer all the Indian communities he even “bitterly
opposed the introduction of separate electorate in the district boards and municipalities” at the
Congress session of 1910.
Jinnah started his parliamentary career in 1910 and on January 4, elected as member of Imperial
Legislative Council from Bombay. On the insistence of Sayyid Wazir Hasan and Mohamed Ali,
”Jinnah became a member of the League on October 10, 1913”Jinnah was instrumental in
persuading the All India Muslim League to amend its constitution by adding a suitable self-
government under British Crown. In October 1917, he joined the Home Rule League founded by
Annie Besant to further the cause of attainment of self-rule for India. On the internment of Annie
Besant, he became President of the Home Rule League of Bombay on 17th June 1918. He used
his position to organize public meetings throughout the Bombay Presidency, mobilized
propaganda and publicity campaigns.
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In 1918, he held a vigorous campaign against the farewell party in honor of the Governor of
Bombay, Lord Willingdon. “In the company of hundreds of his supporters present on the
occasion, Jinnah told Willingdon to his face that the people of Bombay were not party to
commemorating or approving his services as Governor”.The efforts of Jinnah were applauded
and Jinnah Memorial Hall was constructed as a tribute to him from the people of Bombay.
Another landmark of Jinnah’s political struggle, to bring closer the Hindus and Muslims, was
Lucknow Pact. In December 1916, AIML and Congress met in Lucknow. It was due to untiring
efforts of Jinnah that the Congress “agreed to separate electorate, for the first and the last
time”.5 To applaud these efforts of Jinnah, he was given the title of ‘Ambassador of Hindu-
Muslim unity’ by Sarojni Naidu.
To counter the secret and revolutionary activities during the World War I, an Act was introduced
by the British Government known as Rowlatt Act. Jinnah opposed the Act as it was against all the
fundamental notions of law and justice. He “resigned from Imperial Legislative Council as a
protest”.
For survival of the Ottoman Empire in Turkey, Khilafat Movement started in India in 1919.
Congress participated in the movement and M.K. Gandhi “was elected President of the Khilafat
Conference at Delhi”.This was followed by the Non-Cooperation Movement which triggered
violence in India. Jinnah was against Gandhi’s Non-Cooperation Movement so much so that he
remained away from it. ”He had a feeling that the League was being overshadowed by Gandhi’s
ideologies, so he distanced himself from Khilafat Movement”.
The dream of Hindu-Muslim unity seemed collapsing, but it was Jinnah who stepped forward and
presented his Delhi Muslim Proposals in 1927. For the sake of Hindu-Muslim unity, the Muslim
League was ready to forego the demand, which was cry of the Muslim India, the ‘separate
electorate’. The Delhi-Muslim Proposals “reflected his intentions and revealed his views about
Hindu-Muslim Unity”.These efforts were undone by the Nehru Report. Jinnah opposed it tooth
and nail. “The Nehru Report of 1928 made no concession at all and was rejected by all shades of
Muslim opinion”.
Reaction to Nehru Report was the famous Fourteen Points of Jinnah. These Fourteen Points
clearly reflected the demands, sentiments and aspirations of the Muslims”.The Congress did not
give any importance to these points and instead determined to oppose them.
In order to discuss the political deadlock and reach some constitutional settlement of British
India, Round Table Conferences were held in London from 1930-1932. Jinnah “played a vital role
on Federal Structure Sub-Committee”.The Round Table Conference proved that the two main
communities of India held bipolar and contradicting views on Indian constitutional progress.
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To end the stalemate British Government announced Communal Award on 16 August 1932
leading to the enactment of Government of India Act 1935. The Act was neither held by the
Muslim League nor by the Congress. But this Act became the basis for the future constitutions of
India and Pakistan.
Constitutional Struggle
In subsequent years, however, he felt dismayed at the injection of violence into politics. Since
Jinnah stood for “ordered progress”, moderation, gradualism and constitutionalism, he felt that
political violence was not the pathway to national liberation but, the dark alley to disaster and
destruction.
In the ever-growing frustration among the masses caused by colonial rule, there was ample cause
for extremism. But, Gandhi’s doctrine of non-cooperation, Jinnah felt, even as Rabindranath
Tagore(1861-1941) did also feel, was at best one of negation and despair: it might lead to the
building up of resentment, but nothing constructive. Hence, he opposed tooth and nail the tactics
adopted by Gandhi to exploit the Khilafat and wrongful tactics in the Punjab in the early twenties.
On the eve of its adoption of the Gandhian programmed, Jinnah warned the Nagpur Congress
Session (1920): “you are making a declaration (of Swaraj within a year) and committing the Indian
National Congress to a programme, which you will not be able to carry out”. He felt that there
was no short-cut to independence and that any extra-constitutional methods could only lead to
political violence, lawlessness and chaos, without bringing India nearer to the threshold of
freedom.
The future course of events was not only to confirm Jinnah’s worst fears, but also to prove him
right. Although Jinnah left the Congress soon thereafter, he continued his efforts towards
bringing about a Hindu-Muslim entente, which he rightly considered “the most vital condition of
Swaraj”. However, because of the deep distrust between the two communities as evidenced by
the country-wide communal riots, and because the Hindus failed to meet the genuine demands
of the Muslims, his efforts came to naught. One such effort was the formulation of the Delhi
Muslim Proposals in March, 1927. In order to bridge Hindu-Muslim differences on the
constitutional plan, these proposals even waived the Muslim right to separate electorate, the
most basic Muslim demand since 1906, which though recognized by the Congress in the
Luckhnow Pact, had again become a source of friction between the two communities. surprisingly
though, the Nehru Report (1928), which represented the Congress-sponsored proposals for the
future constitution of India, negated the minimum Muslim demands embodied in the Delhi
Muslim Proposals.
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In vain Jinnah argued at the National Convention of Congress in 1928 that “What we want is that
Hindus and Mussalmans should march together until our objective is achieved…These two
communities have got to be reconciled and united and made to feel that their interests are
common”. The Convention’s blank refusal to accept Muslim demands represented the most
devastating setback to Jinnah’s life-long efforts to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity, it meant “the
last straw” for the Muslims, and “the parting of the ways” for him, as he confessed to a Parsee
friend at that time. Jinnah’s disillusionment at the course of politics in the subcontinent
prompted him to migrate and settle down in London in the early thirties. He was, however, to
return to India in 1934, at the pleadings of his co-religionists, and assume their leadership. But
the Muslims presented a sad spectacle at that time. They were a mass of disgruntled and
demoralized men and women, politically disorganized and destitute of a clear-cut political
programme.
Lucknow Pact
The Lucknow Pact was an agreement that reached between the Indian National Congress and the
Muslim League at the joint session of both the parties held in Lucknow in December 1916.
Through the pact, the two parties agreed to allow overrepresentation to religious minorities in
the provincial legislatures. The Muslim League leaders agreed to coin the Congress movement
demanding Indian autonomy. Scholars cite this as an example of a consociationalism practice in
Indian politics .Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Mahatma Gandhi also participated in this event.
The Lucknow Pact was a beacon of hope for Hindu–Muslim unity. It was the first time that the
Hindus and Muslims had made a joint demand for political reform to the British. It led to a
growing belief in British India that Home Rule (self-government) was a real possibility. The pact
also marked the high-water mark of Hindu-Muslim unity. It established cordial relations between
the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress. Before the pact, both parties were viewed
as rivals who opposed each other and worked in their own interests. However, the pact brought
a change in that view.
The Lucknow Pact also helped in establishing cordial relations between the two prominent
groups within the Indian National Congress – the extremist faction, known colloquially as the
garam dal or "hot faction," led by the Lal Bal Pal trio of Lala Lajpat Rai, Bal Gangadhar Tilak and
Bipin Chandra Pal, and the moderate faction, known as the naram dal, led by Gopal Krishna
Gokhale.
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Jinnah, Muslim League, and Political Strategy for
the Achievement of Pakistan
One needs to understand, for instance, how did Jinnah manage to inspire and lead the Muslim
masses when, according to some of his unrelenting critics: “A more improbable leader of Indian
Muslim masses could hardly be imagined”?How was it possible to obtain support in Muslim-
majority provinces of India where the Muslim League advance clashed with the interests of the
powerful provincial leaders? How did Jinnah succeed in transforming the League into a well-knit,
disciplined organization of the Muslims, indeed their only representative political party? How did
Jinnah appeal to the Muslim masses? How did Jinnah inspire the students, ulama, pir and
sajjadanashin, and women to play a critical role in mobilizing support for the League and
Pakistan? How did Jinnah influence the political behavior of social groups and classes such as,
industrial and commercial classes, laborer’s and farmers, and of course the general mass of the
Muslim youth in favor of Pakistan?
How did Jinnah take advantage of the War situation (Second World War) to build the League and
push the case of Pakistan with the British authorities? How did he eventually achieve Pakistan?
In this chapter, an attempt will be made to find answers to these and other related questions to
highlight Jinnah’s political strategy for building the League and, with its help, “achieving the state
of Pakistan”. Jinnah had of course started the task of organizing the League after he returned to
India in 1935 (from London) to save the Muslims from what he called ‘the greatest danger’ posed
to them in the wake of India’s advance towards self-government and freedom. His efforts did
make a considerable impression on the political scene right away as was evident from the
proceeding of the historic Lucknow session of the League in 1937. But it was only after the
adoption of Lahore Resolution in 1940 that he was confronted with the most difficult and
demanding task of his political career. He had to gain and secure support of all the Muslims from
all over India for the League and the demand for Pakistan now. In the estimate of the present
author, Jinnah developed a political strategy based on several tactical moves.
In the first instance, he ‘expanded’ the League to make room for the new social groups and
classes who were moved by the Pakistan idea, and thus were keen to join the League. So far, the
League, was “a dispersed weakly articulated and organized feudalistic traditional system”with
little capacity for new entrants. Jinnah made structural changes to ensure that the League would
be able to welcome and accommodate them. After going through the ‘expansion’ phase, he
brought the newly mobilized and the traditional groups into the League under a single, national
authority. He ‘concentrated’ power in the hands of the President of the League. He was already
holding this apex office. If the League were to become “the sole representative body of Muslim
India”, it was imperative that it must also have “sole representative” leader who could speak on
its behalf. To ensure mass support, Jinnah also launched a mass mobilization campaign to give
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the people a ‘cause’ to identify with, and thus help create their stakes in the success of the League
and its campaign for Pakistan. Finally, he exploited fully all opportunities of the on-going war,
particularly those provided by the British and the Congress (by default) to strengthen the League
and enhance the appeal of the Pakistan demand. These tactical moves of course did not come in
succession. Rather, they operated simultaneously, reinforcing one another in the process. Let us
examine each one of these moves in some detail. To begin with, ‘expansion’ of the League and
its help with the mobilization of the Muslims in the country. Jinnah initiated the task of expansion
of the League by giving it a new organizational set-up. Under the Constitution of 1940,Primary
Leagues were established at the grassroot level, each representing a ward or a mohalla within a
city. Representatives of the Primary Leagues were constituted into District/Tehsil Muslim
Leagues and were entrusted with the responsibility of looking after the affairs of the League
within their own areas.
Several District League representatives were grouped into a Provincial Muslim League,
representing a province. Provincial Muslim Leagues were given representation at the center in
the League Working Committee. The Working Committee, in turn, was placed at the ultimate and
effective control of the Council of the All-India Muslim League, stipulating clearly in the
constitution that all resolutions passed by the Working Committee would be subject to the
approval and ratification of the Council. The Council was to be elected by Provincial Leagues from
amongst its members. The President of the League was to be elected every year by the Council
from amongst the nominees of different branches of the Muslim League. Jinnah had refused to
become ‘life President’ of the Muslim League. “Let me come to you at the end of every year,” he
told the Leaguers, “and seek your vote and confidence. Let your President be on his good
behaviour.”The result of this carefully coordinated expansion of the League structure was to
open new avenues of association and participation within the League, attracting a host of Muslim
classes and groups.
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with the Indian National Congress in the future. The League leaders motivated Jinnah to revive
the Muslim League and give it direction. As a result, these points became the demands of the
Muslims and greatly influenced the Muslims' thinking for the next two decades till the
establishment of Pakistan in 1947.
1. The form of the future constitution should be federal, with the residuary powers vested
in the provinces;
2. A uniform measure of autonomy shall be guaranteed to all provinces;
3. All legislatures in the country and other elected bodies shall be constituted on the definite
principle of adequate and effective representation of minorities in every province
without reducing the majority in any province to a minority or even equality;
4. In the Central Legislature, Muslim representation shall not be less than one third;
5. Representation of communal groups shall continue to be by means of
separate electorate as at present: provided it shall be open to any community, at any time
to abandon its separate electorate in favor of a joint electorate.
6. Any territorial distribution that might at any time be necessary shall not in any way affect
the Muslim majority.
7. Full religious liberty, i.e. liberty of belief, worship and observance, propaganda,
association and education, shall be guaranteed to all communities.
8. No bill or resolution or any part thereof shall be passed in any legislature or any other
elected body if three fourths of the members of any community in that particular body
oppose it as being injurious to the interests of that community or in the alternative, such
other method is devised as may be found feasible and practicable to deal with such cases.
9. Sindh should be separated from the Bombay Presidency.
10. Reforms should be introduced in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan on
the same footing as in the other provinces.
11. Provision should be made in the constitution giving Muslims an adequate share, along
with the other Indians, in all the services of the state and in local self-governing bodies
having due regard to the requirements of efficiency.
12. The constitution should embody adequate safeguards for the protection of Muslim
culture and for the protection and promotion of Muslim education, language, religion,
personal laws and Muslim charitable institutions and for their due share in the grants-in-
aid given by the state and by local self-governing bodies.
13. No cabinet, either central or provincial, should be formed without there being a
proportion of at least one-third Muslim ministers.
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14. No change shall be made in the constitution by the Central Legislature except with the
concurrence of the States constituting of the Indian Federation.
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coalition idea and excluding Muslims as a political entity from the portals of power. In that year,
also, the Muslim League, under Jinnah’s dynamic leadership, was reorganized de novo,
transformed into a mass organization, and made the spokesman of Indian Muslims as never
before. Above all, in that momentous year were initiated certain trends in Indian politics, the
crystallization of which in subsequent years made the partition of the subcontinent inevitable.
The practical manifestation of the policy of the Congress which took office in July, 1937, in seven
out of eleven provinces, convinced Muslims that, in the Congress scheme of things, they could
live only on sufferance of Hindus and as “second class” citizens. The Congress provincial
governments, it may be remembered, had embarked upon a policy and launched a program me
in which Muslims felt that their religion, language and culture were not safe. This blatantly
aggressive Congress policy was seized upon by Jinnah to awaken the Muslims to a new
consciousness, organize them on all-India platform, and make them a power to be reckoned with.
He also gave coherence, direction and articulation to their innermost, yet vague, urges and
aspirations. Above all, he filled them with his indomitable will, his own unflinching faith in their
destiny.
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Demand for Pakistan
“We are a nation”, they claimed in the ever eloquent words of the Quaid-i-Azam- “We are a
nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and
architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of values and proportion, legal laws and moral
code, customs and calendar, history and tradition, aptitudes and ambitions; in short, we have
our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of international law, we are a nation”.
The formulation of the Muslim demand for Pakistan in 1940 had a tremendous impact on the
nature and course of Indian politics. On the one hand, it shattered forever the Hindu dreams of
a pseudo-Indian, in fact, Hindu empire on British exit from India: on the other, it heralded an era
of Islamic renaissance and creativity in which the Indian Muslims were to be active participants.
The Hindu reaction was quick, bitter, and malicious.
Equally hostile were the British to the Muslim demand, their hostility having stemmed from their
belief that the unity of India was their main achievement and their foremost contribution. The
irony was that both the Hindus and the British had not anticipated the astonishingly tremendous
response that the Pakistan demand had elicited from the Muslim masses. Above all, they failed
to realize how a hundred million people had suddenly become supremely conscious of their
distinct nationhood and their high destiny. In channeling the course of Muslim politics towards
Pakistan, no less than in directing it towards its consummation in the establishment of Pakistan
in 1947, none played a more decisive role than did Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. It was
his powerful advocacy of the case of Pakistan and his remarkable strategy in the delicate
negotiations that followed the formulation of the Pakistan demand, particularly in the post-war
period, that made Pakistan inevitable.
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The British had been compelled to recognize the Muslim League as the sole representative of the
Muslims of India by 1940 and Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah as its undisputed leader.
Time and Tide of London published an article by Jinnah on January 19, 1940 under the caption
"The Constitutional Future of India". He maintained that the democratic systems based on the
concept of a homogeneous nation such as England are very definitely not applicable to
heterogeneous countries such as India. He called the Hindus and the Muslims "two different
nations" with different religions and different social codes. It is obvious that by calling the Hindus
and the Muslims two nations, Jinnah had reached the threshold of partition, but he was still
reluctant to abandon his lifelong dream that Hindus and the Muslims would come to an
understanding and in unison make their common motherland one of the great countries of the
world.
The Quaid-i-Azam crossed the barrier at the Lahore session of the Muslim League in March 1940.
He traveled to Lahore from Delhi in a colorfully decorated train on which green flags were
mounted, bearing the emblem of the Muslim League: the crescent and star.
Jinnah decided to address a public gathering on the opening day. It was a huge gathering of the
Leaguers, the Khaksars and the Muslims at Minto Park (now Iqbal Park). Jinnah had expounded
the rationale of the resolution in his presidential address that lasted for hundred minutes and
frequently punctuated by thunderous applause. Though, most of his audience of over 100,000
did not know English, he held their attention and visibly touched their emotion. He asserted that
the Muslims were "a nation by any definition". In his historical address he laid the foundation of
a separate state for the Muslims of India:
"The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and
literature. They neither inter-marry, nor inter-dine together, and indeed they belong to two
different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects
on life and of use are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Muslims derive their inspirations
from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are different, and they
have different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, and likewise, their
victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a
numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and the final
destruction of any fabric that may be so built for the government of such a state."
The session began with Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan presenting the annual report on March 23,
1940. After the report, Maulana Fazlul Huq from Bengal, moved the famous Lahore Resolution,
better known as the Pakistan Resolution, "…the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a
majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute
'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."The
resolution was seconded by Choudhry Khaliquzzaman who gave a brief history of the causes
which led the Muslims to demand a separate state for themselves. Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Sardar
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Aurangzeb Khan, Sir Abdullah Haroon, Nawab Ismail Khan, Qazi Mohammad Isa and I.I Chundigar
supported it, among others.
The resolution passed in Lahore on March 23, created a scare in the minds of the Congress and
the Hindus. They could see that the Muslim League had now openly advocated the division of
India into "Independent States." The Quaid had anticipated the Hindu reaction and had taken
organizational steps to face the opposition of the Hindus.
He himself set an example of calm, courage and an iron determination to lead the Muslims to
their cherished goal of freedom. The Pakistan Resolution released the potential creative energies
of the Muslims and even the humblest amongst them made his contribution for the achievement
of Pakistan. The Quaid knew that without a well-defined goal that could be understood even by
the simplest Muslim, there could be no real awakening of the Muslims. The Pakistan Resolution
gave them a legible, objective and reachable goal: Pakistan.
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Cripps Scheme
While the British reaction to the Pakistan demand came in the form of the Cripps offer of April,
1942, which conceded the principle of self-determination to provinces on a territorial basis, the
Rajaji Formula (called after the eminent Congress leader Rajagopalachari, which became the
basis of prolonged Jinnah-Gandhi talks in September, 1944), represented the Congress
alternative to Pakistan. The Cripps offer was rejected because it did not concede the Muslim
demand the whole way, while the Rajaji Formula was found unacceptable since it offered a
“moth-eaten, mutilated” Pakistan and the too appended with a plethora of pre-conditions which
made its emergence in any shape remote, if not altogether impossible. Cabinet Mission, the most
delicate as well as the most tortuous negotiations, however, took place during 1946-47, after the
elections which showed that the country was sharply and somewhat evenly divided between two
parties- the Congress and the League- and that the central issue in Indian politics was Pakistan.
These negotiations began with the arrival, in March 1946, of a three-member British Cabinet
Mission. The crucial task with which the Cabinet Mission was entrusted was that of devising in
consultation with the various political parties, constitution-making machinery, and of setting up
a popular interim government. But, because the Congress-League gulf could not be bridged,
despite the Mission’s (and the Viceroy’s) prolonged efforts, the Mission had to make its own
proposals in May, 1946. Known as the Cabinet Mission Plan, these proposals stipulated a limited
center, supreme only in foreign affairs, defense and communications and three autonomous
groups of provinces. Two of these groups were to have Muslim majorities in the north-west and
the north-east of the subcontinent, while the third one, comprising the Indian mainland, was to
have a Hindu majority. A consummate statesman that he was, Jinnah saw his chance. He
interpreted the clauses relating to a limited center and the grouping as “the foundation of
Pakistan”, and induced the Muslim League Council to accept the Plan in June 1946; and this he
did much against the calculations of the Congress and to its utter dismay.
Tragically though, the League’s acceptance was put down to its supposed weakness and the
Congress put up a posture of defiance, designed to swamp the League into submitting to its
dictates and its interpretations of the plan. Faced thus, what alternative had Jinnah and the
League but to rescind their earlier acceptance, reiterate and reaffirm their original stance, and
decide to launch direct action (if need be) to wrest Pakistan. The way Jinnah maneuvered to turn
the tide of events at a time when all seemed lost indicated, above all, his masterly grasp of the
situation and his adeptness at making strategic and tactical move.
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Partition Plan
Partition Plan By the close of 1946, the communal riots had flared up to murderous heights,
engulfing almost the entire subcontinent. The two peoples, it seemed, were engaged in a fight
to the finish. The time for a peaceful transfer of power was fast running out. Realizing the gravity
of the situation. His Majesty’s Government sent down to India a new Viceroy- Lord Mountbatten.
His protracted negotiations with the various political leaders resulted in 3 June (1947) Plan by
which the British decided to partition the subcontinent, and hand over power to two successor
States on 15 August, 1947. The plan was duly accepted by the three Indian parties to the dispute-
the Congress the League and the Akali Dal (representing the Sikhs).
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yet carried the heaviest part of the burden in that first crucial year. He laid down the policies of
the new state, called attention to the immediate problems confronting the nation and told the
members of the Constituent Assembly, the civil servants and the Armed Forces what to do and
what the nation expected of them. He saw to it that law and order was maintained at all costs,
despite the provocation that the large-scale riots in north India had provided. He moved from
Karachi to Lahore for a while and supervised the immediate refugee problem in the Punjab. In a
time of fierce excitement, he remained sober, cool and steady. He advised his excited audience
in Lahore to concentrate on helping the refugees, to avoid retaliation, exercise restraint and
protect the minorities. He assured the minorities of a fair deal, assuaged their inured sentiments,
and gave them hope and comfort. He toured the various provinces, attended to their problems
and instilled in the people a sense of belonging. He reversed the British policy in the North-West
Frontier and ordered the withdrawal of the troops from the tribal territory of Waziristan, thereby
making the Pathans feel themselves an integral part of Pakistan’s body-politics. He created a new
Ministry of States and Frontier Regions and assumed responsibility for ushering in a new era in
Baluchistan. He settled the controversial question of the states of Karachi, secured the accession
of States, especially of Kalat which seemed problematical and carried on negotiations with Lord
Mountbatten for the settlement of the Kashmir Issue.
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“great loss” to the entire world of Islam. It was, however, given to Surat Chandra Bose, leader of
the Forward Bloc wing of the Indian National Congress, to sum up succinctly his personal and
political achievements. “Mr. Jinnah” he said on his death in 1948, “was great as a lawyer, once
great as a Congressman, great as a leader of Muslims, great as a world politician and diplomat,
and greatest of all as a man of action. By Mr. Jinnah’s passing away, the world has lost one of the
greatest statesmen and Pakistan its life-giver, philosopher and guide”. Such was Quaid-i-Azam
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the man and his mission, such the range of his accomplishments and
achievements.
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