Soumitra Sen Judge

PREFACE
17 August, 2011 was a historic day in the Rajya Sabha. On this day, for the
first time in the history of Rajya Sabha and only the second case in the history
of Indian Parliament, a Motion for the removal of a Judge of High Court was
formally moved, discussed and finally voted on 18 August, 2011.
The removal proceedings against a Judge of the High Court or Supreme Court
is, no doubt, a very serious matter. The constitutional scheme of separation
of powers between the Legislature, the Judiciary and the Executive envisages
autonomy of these three organs of the State. However, there are provisions in
the Constitution which enable the Parliament to exercise its constitutional
mandate to remove a Judge of the High Court or Supreme Court from his office
on the grounds of proven misbehaviour or incapacity.
The process of removal of a judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court is

quite laborious and lengthy. The constitutional and statutory safeguards ensure
that Judges discharge their duties without fear or favour in pursuit of delivery
of justice. The present compilation aims at making the readers fully acquainted
not only with the process for the removal of Judge of the High Court/Supreme
Court but also with the nitty-gritty of issues involved in the case.
It is hoped that the compilation will be useful to the readers interested in this
particular field of knowledge.
NEW DELHI; V. K. AGNIHOTRI

October, 2011. Secretary-General
Rajya Sabha
CONTENTS
PAGE NO.
1. Chronology of Events in Justice Soumitra Sen’s Case 1-2
2. Notice of Motion 3-8
3. Names of Members of Rajya Sabha who were signatories to 9-11

the Notice of Motion
4. Rajya Sabha Bulletin Part-II regarding admittance of the Motion 12

by the Chairman, Rajya Sabha
5. Notifications regarding constitution/reconstitution of Inquiry 13-15

Committee appointed by the Chairman under section 3(2)
of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968
6. Report of the Judges Inquiry Committee (Vol. I) 17-59
7. Report of the Judges Inquiry Committee (Vol. II) 61-168
8. Item for List of Business, Rajya Sabha dated the 169

10 November, 2010 regarding Laying of the Report of
the Judges Inquiry Committee
9. Reply of Mr. Justice Soumitra Sen to the Report 171-298
10. Rajya Sabha Bulletin Part-II dated 9 August, 2011 regarding 299
Motion for Consideration of the Report of the Judges
Inquiry Committee
11. Item for List of Business, Rajya Sabha dated 17 August, 2011 300-301
regarding Motions and Address to the President praying for
removal of Mr. Justice Soumitra Sen
12. Proceedings of the Rajya Sabha dated the 17 August, 2011 303-419
and 18 August, 2011
13. Relevant extracts from the Constitution and Statutory

Provisions
I. Constitution of India 423-426
II. The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 427-431
III. The Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969 432-440

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN JUSTICE
SOUMITRA SEN’S CASE
1. Notice of motion given by Shri Sitaram Yechury and : 20.02.2009

other Members (total 57)
2. Admission of motion by the Chairman, Rajya Sabha : 27.02.2009
3. Date of constitution of ‘Inquiry Committee’ by Hon’ble : 20.03.2009

Chairman & date of Notification in the Gazette
The Committee comprised:
(i) Justice D.K. Jain, Judge, Supreme Court of India
(ii) Justice T.S. Thakur, Chief Justice, Punjab &

Haryana High Court
(iii) Shri Fali S. Nariman, distinguished jurist and

Sr. Advocate, Supreme Court of India
4. First reconstitution of the Committee due to the : 25.06.2009

resignation of Justice D.K. Jain, Judge, Supreme
Court of India. Justice B. Sudarshan Reddy was
nominated in his place
5. Second reconstitution of the Committee due to : 16.12.2009

elevation of Justice T.S. Thakur to the Supreme Court
of India. Justice Mukul Mudgal, Chief Justice, Punjab
& Haryana High Court was nominated in his place
6. Forwarding of draft Charges and draft statement of : 05.02.1010

grounds to Justice Soumitra Sen by the Committee
7. *Issue of Statutory notice by the Committee to Justice : 04.03.2010

Soumitra Sen
8. Presentation of Report by the Committee to the : 10.09.2010

Chairman, Rajya Sabha
*As per the Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969, the Committee was required to submit its
report within 3 months after issuance of statutory notice, i.e. upto 4 June, 2010.
However, the Committee sought two extension, first upto 5 August, 2010 and second,
upto 5 October, 2010 to submit its report to the Chairman, Rajya Sabha.
9. Laying of Report (Vol. I & Vol. II) along with copy of : 10.11.2010
evidence tendered before the Committee and
documents exhibited before the Committee, in Rajya
Sabha and in Lok Sabha
10. Forwarding a copy of the Report of the Committee to : 11.11.2010

Justice Sen
11. Reply of Justice Sen on finding of the Report of the : 18.01.2011

Committee
12. Circulation of reply of Justice Sen to all Members of : 21.02.2011

Rajya Sabha
13. Letter sent to Justice Soumitra Sen regarding his : 09.08.2011

appearance before the House
14. Bulletin Part II regarding admittance of Motion : 11.08.2011

regarding consideration of the Report of the Inquiry
Committee
15. Issue of items for List of Business for 17 August, 2011 : 12.08.2011
16. Consideration of Motions and the Address to the : 17 and 18

President August, 2011
17. Adoption of the Motion and the Address to the : 18.08.2011

President
18. Result of Division : Ayes: 189

No: 16
19. Justice tendered his resignation to the President : 01.09.2011
20. Listing of Motions and the Address to the President : 05.09.2011

in Lok Sabha (Not taken up
in view of the
resignation of
Justice Sen)
NOTICE OF MOTION
To
The Chairman
Rajya Sabha
New Delhi
Dated the 20th February, 2009
Dear Sir,
Sub: Motion for the removal of Justice Soumitra Sen of the Calcutta High
Court under Art. 217 read with Art. 124 of the Constitution of India.
This House resolves to pass the motion for the impeachment of Justice
Soumitra Sen of the Calcutta High Court on the following two grounds of
misconduct:
1. Misappropriation of large sums of money which he received in

his capacity as receiver appointed by the High Court of Calcutta.
2. Misrepresented facts with regard to the misappropriation of

money before the High Court of Calcutta.
A copy of the letter by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India addressed to the Prime
Minister of India, recommending his impeachment is annexed herewith.
Signed by:
1. Sitaram Yechury
2. ............................
3. ............................
.
.
.
.
57. ............................
4 Motion for Removal of Mr. Justice Soumitra Sen
ANNEXURE
The text of the letter written by Chief Justice of India, K.G. Balakrishnan
to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recommending removal of Mr. Justice
Soumitra Sen, Judge of the Calcutta High Court.
Dated: 4 August, 2008
Dear Prime Minister,
I write this to recommend that the proceedings contemplated by Article 217(1)

read with Article 124(4) of the Constitution be initiated for removal of Mr. Justice
Soumitra Sen, Judge, Calcutta High Court.
2. Mr. Justice Soumitra Sen was a practising advocate of Calcutta High Court
before he was appointed as a Judge of that High Court, with effect from
December 3, 2003. In Civil Suit No. 8 of 1983, filed by Steel Authority of India
Limited against Shipping Corporation of India Limited and Ors., Calcutta High
Court vide order dated April 30, 1984 appointed him as a Receiver to make an
inventory of certain goods which had been imported and then rejected by Steel
Authority of India Limited and to sell those goods and hold the sale proceeds
to the credit of the Suit. After preparation of inventory and sale of the goods,
the Receiver was directed to deduct 5% of the sale price towards his
remuneration, keep the balance in a separate bank account in a bank of his
choice and to hold the same free from lien or encumbrances, subject to further
orders of the Court.
3. Justice Soumitra Sen was also appointed as a Special Officer by Calcutta

High Court in another case (an Appeal arising out of C.P. No. 226 of 1996). In
that case (C.P. No. 226 of 1996), the High Court had directed payment of
Rs. 70,00,000/- to the workers of Calcutta Fans, a company in liquidation and
Mr. Justice Soumitra Sen, then a practising Advocate, was appointed as a
Special Officer to disburse that amount to the workers, S.B. Account No.
01SLP0013400 was opened by him for that purpose and the amount of
Rs. 70,00,000/- meant for disbursement for workers was deposited in that
account on February 7, 1997. A sum of Rs. 25,00,000/- from Special Officer’s
account was invested by Justice Soumitra Sen with a company M/s. Lynx India
Ltd., which, later on went into liquidation.
4. On March 7, 2002, Steel Authority of India Limited (Plaintiff) wrote a letter

to the Receiver asking him to furnish information and detailed particulars about
the sale proceeds received by him and the amount of interest which had
accrued thereon. The Receiver did not supply the information sought by the
Plaintiff. Thereupon, the Plaintiffs filed an application (GA No. 875/2003) for
Notice of Motion 5
direction to the Receiver to handover the sale proceeds and render true and
faithful account of all the moneys held by him. No affidavit was, however, filed
by the Receiver inspite of the notice being served on him. When the application
came-up for hearing before a Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court, the
Receiver, who, by that time been elevated to the Calcutta High Court, did not
come forward to assist the Court either by filing an affidavit or by giving
information through any lawyer or recognised agent, despite service of the copy
of the application on him.
5. The High Court, then proceeded to summon the purchaser of goods as

well as various bank officials and vide order dated April 10, 2006 noted that
the Receiver had collected in all, a sum of Rs. 33,22,800/- from the purchaser
of goods and the amount thus collected had been kept by the Receiver in
S.B. A/c No. 01SLP0632800 with Standard & Chartered Bank (erstwhile ANZ
Grindlays Bank) and Account No. 9902 with Allahabad Bank, Stephen House
Branch, Calcutta and was later on withdrawn and diverted by him. Drafts
amounting to Rs. 28,72,800/- were encashed in Account No. 01SLP0632800
with Standard & Chartered Bank and drafts of Rs. 4,50,000/- were encashed
in Account No. 9902 of Allahabad Bank. The High Court found that Demand
Drafts amounting to Rs. 28,72,800/- were encashed in S.B. Account No.
01SLP0632800 with Standard Chartered Bank. On April 19, 1995 and May 6,
1995 a sum of Rs. 8,73,968/- was withdrawn from S.B. Account No.
01SLP0632800 to invest in an FDR, which, later on, along with accrued interest
(total amounting to Rs. 10,91,011.49) was brought back by encashment on
May 22, 1997. Another sum of Rs. 11,92,909.92 was also brought back in
that account on May 22, 1997. A sum of Rs. 22,83,000/- was transferred, on
the instructions of the Receiver, from that account to S.B. A/c No.
01SLP0813400 (the account opened by him as Special Officer in case of
Calcutta Fans) in the same bank on May 22, 1997.
6. The entire amount in the bank accounts was gradually withdrawn by the
Receiver so as to reduce the balance to Rs. 811.56 in S.B. A/c No.
01SLP0813400 and Rs. 2,340.08 in S.B. A/c No. 01SLP0632800 as on
May 31, 1999. Both the Accounts were closed on March 22, 2000 and
May 21, 2002 respectively.
7. The learned Single Judge of Calcutta High Court concluded that the Receiver
had converted and appropriated, prima facie, the said amount, lying in his
custody, without authority of the Court and the act & conduct of the erstwhile
Receiver was nothing short of criminal misappropriation. The learned Judge noted
that the Receiver having been entrusted with the money by the Court and being
an Officer of the Court, was required to keep it in a S.B. Account and ought not
to have withdrawn the same without specific leave of the Court. The Court felt
that the Receiver had betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him by the
Court and therefore had to make good of the losses suffered for his act.
8. The learned Judge, after adjustment of the amount deposited by the Receiver
during the pendency of the application, directed him to deposit
Rs. 52,46,454/- which included interest on the amount appropriated by him.
Pursuant to the above-referred order of Calcutta High Court, Justice Soumitra
Sen (the erstwhile Receiver) deposited money in terms of the Order of the
Court. In all, a total sum of Rs. 57,65,204/- was deposited by him.
9. Reports appeared in newspapers concerning the conduct of Justice

Soumitra Sen in the above-noted matter. The then Chief Justice of Calcutta
High Court withdrew judicial work from him and wrote a letter dated
November 25, 2006 to my learned predecessor bringing the matter to his notice
for appropriate action.
10. On July 1, 2007 I sought a comprehensive report from the Chief Justice of
Calcutta High Court along with his views about Justice Soumitra Sen. On
July 12, 2007 Justice Soumitra Sen called on me, on advice of his Chief Justice
and verbally explained his conduct. He sent his report to me on
August 20, 2007.
11. After depositing the money, Justice Soumitra Sen filed an application bearing
No. GA 3763 of 2006 praying for recalling/withdrawing/deleting the observations
made against him in the order dated April 10, 2006. The application was
dismissed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide order dated
July 31, 2007. An Appeal was filed by the mother of Justice Soumitra Sen
challenging the order of the learned Single Judge dated July 31, 2007. Vide order
dated September 25, 2007 a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court noted that
the erstwhile Receiver had complied with direction of the Court by depositing
the entire amount, besides a substantial amount towards interest. The Division
Bench felt that the scope and ambit of the application No. GA 875/2003, filed
by Steel Authority of India Limited, did not contemplate any enquiry into the
personal accounts of erstwhile Receiver. The Division Bench noted that the parties
to the Suit never made any allegation of misappropriation by the Receiver and
that the Receiver had never refused to discharge his obligation to refund the money
held by him. The Division Bench did not find any material to say that the erstwhile
Receiver utilised any amount for his personal gain and felt that the observations/
remarks against the erstwhile Receiver were uncalled for and unwarranted. The
Division Bench was of the view that the learned Single Judge had travelled beyond
the scope and ambit of the application filed by the Plaintiff. The Division Bench
directed the Department to delete all the observations made against the erstwhile
Receiver in the order passed by the learned Single Judge on April 10, 2006.
Notice of Motion 7
12. On 10 September, 2007 I had asked Justice Soumitra Sen to furnish his
fresh and final response to the judicial observations made against him. After
seeking more time for this purpose he furnished his response on
28 September, 2007 requesting that he may be allowed to resume duties in
view of the order of the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court.
13. Since I felt that a deeper probe was required to be made into the allegations
made against Justice Soumitra Sen, to bring the matter to a logical conclusion,
I constituted a three Member Committee consisting of Justice A.P. Shah (Chief
Justice, Madras High Court), Justice A.K. Patnaik (Chief Justice, High Court of
Madhya Pradesh) and Justice R.M. Lodha (Judge, Rajasthan High Court), as
envisaged in the ‘In-House Procedure’ adopted by Supreme Court and various
High Courts, to conduct a fact finding enquiry, wherein the Judge concerned
would be entitled to appear and have his say in the proceedings.
14. The Committee submitted its report dated 1 February, 2008, after calling
for relevant records and considering the submission made by Justice Soumitra
Sen, who appeared in-person before the Committee. The Committee inter-alia
concluded that:
(a) Shri Soumitra Sen did not have honest intention right from the year
1993 since he mixed the money received as a Receiver and his
personal money and converted Receiver’s money to his own use:
(b) There has been misappropriation (at least temporary) of the sale
proceeds since:
(i) he received Rs. 24,57,000/- between 25 February, 1993 to

10 January, 1995 but the balance in the Account No.
01SLPO632800 on 28 February, 1995 was only
Rs. 8,83,963.05.
(ii) a sum of Rs. 22,83,000/- was transferred by him from that

account to Account No. 01SLPO813400 and, thereafter,
almost entire amount was withdrawn in a couple of months
reducing the balance to the bare minimum of Rs. 811.56, thus,
diverting the entire sale proceeds for his own use and with
dishonest intention.
(c) he gave false explanation to the Court that an amount of

Rs. 25,00,000/- was invested from the account where the
sale proceeds were kept, whereas, in fact, the amount of
Rs. 25,00,000/- was withdrawn from Special Officer’s Account No.
01SLPO813400 and not from 01SLPO632800, in which the sale
proceeds were deposited;
(d) mere monetary recompense under the compulsion of judicial order
does not obliterate breach of trust and misappropriation of
Receiver’s funds for his personal gain;
(e) the conduct of Shri Soumitra Sen had brought disrepute to the high
judicial office and dishonour to the institution of judiciary,
undermining the faith and confidence reposed by the public in the
administration of justice.
In the opinion of the Committee misconduct disclosed is so serious that it calls

for initiation of proceedings for his removal.
15. A copy of the Report dated 6 February, 2008 of the Committee was
forwarded by me to Justice Soumitra Sen and in terms of the In-House
procedure, he was advised to resign or seek voluntary retirement. Thereupon,
Justice Soumitra Sen made a detailed representation dated 25 February, 2008
seeking reconsideration of the decision of his removal and sought a personal
hearing. On 16 March, 2008 a Collegium consisting of myself, Justice B.N.
Agrawal and Justice Ashok Bhan (Seniormost Judges of Supreme Court) gave
a hearing to Justice Soumitra Sen and reiterated the advice given to him to
submit his resignation or seek voluntary retirement on or before
2 April, 2008. However, vide his letter dated 26 March, 2008 Justice Soumitra
Sen expressed his inability to tender resignation or seek voluntary retirement.
In view of the foregoing, it is requested that proceedings for removal of Justice

Soumitra Sen be initiated in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the
Constitution.
With warm regards,
Yours sincerely
-Sd/-
(K.G. Balakrishnan)
Hon’ble Dr. Manmohan Singh,

Prime Minister of India,
7, Race Course Road,
New Delhi-110011.
NAMES OF MEMBERS OF RAJYA SABHA WHO WERE
SIGNATORIES TO THE NOTICE OF MOTION
Sl. No. Name of Member

1 2
1. Shri Sitaram Yechury
2. Shri Mohammed Amin
3. Shri Prasanta Chatterjee
4. Smt. Brinda Karat
5. Shri Matilal Sarkar
6. Shri T.K. Rangarajan
7. Shri Tapan Kumar Sen
8. Shri Tarini Kanta Roy
9. Shri Moinul Hassan
10. Shri Penumalli Madhu
11. Shri K. Chandran Pillai
12. Shri Saman Pathak
13. Shri Shyamal Chakraborty
14. Shri Satish Chandra Misra
15. Shri Brijesh Pathak
16. Shri Munquad Ali
17. Shri D. Raja
18. Shri R.C. Singh
19. Shri Syed Azeez Pasha
20. Dr. Barun Mukherji

1 2
21. Shri Abani Roy
22. Dr. V. Maitreyan
23. Shri Digvijay Singh
24. Shri S. Anbalagan
25. Dr. K. Malaisamy
26. Shri N.R. Govindarajar
27. Shri N. Balaganga
28. Shri A. Elavarasan
29. Shri P.R. Rajan
30. Shri Sharad Yadav
31. Dr. Ejaz Ali
32. Shri Shivanand Tiwari
33. Shri Ali Anwar Ansari
34. Shri Mahendra Sahni
35. Shri M.V. Mysura Reddy
36. Shri K.E. Ismail
37. Dr. Bimal Jalan
38. Shri Kumar Deepak Das
39. Shri Birendra Prasad Baishya
40. Shri A. Vijayaraghavan
41. Shri Manohar Joshi
42. Shri Bharatkumar Raut

Names of Members of Rajya Sabha who were signatories to the Notice of Motion 11
1 2
43. Shri Arun Jaitley
44. Shri Tariq Anwar
45. Dr. Janardhan Waghmare
46. Shri Ahmad Sayeed Malihabadi
47. Smt. Sushma Swaraj
48. Shri S.S. Ahluwalia
49. Shri Jaswant Singh
50. Shri Bhagat Singh Koshyari
51. Shri Rajiv Pratap Rudy
52. Shri Raghunandan Sharma
53. Shri Prabhat Jha
54. Shri Suryakantbhai Acharya
55. Shri Shreegopal Vyas
56. Shri Bhagirathi Majhi
57. Shri Krishan Lal Balmiki

RAJYA SABHA
PARLIAMENTARY BULLETIN
Part II
Nos.: 45898-45900] Friday, February 27, 2009
No.: 45898 Legislative Section
Motion received under article 217 read with article 124 (4) of the
Constitution
The Chairman has, under Section 3 of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968,
admitted the following Motion received from Shri Sitaram Yechury and other
Members (total fifty-seven) the notice of which was given under article 217
read with article 124 (4) of the Constitution of India:
“This House resolves that an address be presented to the President

for removal from office of Justice Soumitra Sen of the Calcutta High
Court on the following two grounds of misconduct:
(i) Misappropriation of large sums of money, which he received in his

capacity as receiver appointed by the High Court of Calcutta; and
(ii) Misrepresented facts with regard to the misappropriation of money

before the High Court of Calcutta.”
The Motion shall be kept pending till further action prescribed in the
Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 and the rules made thereunder is taken.
REPORT OF THE JUDGES INQUIRY
COMMITTEE (VOL. I)
REPORT OF THE INQUIRY COMMITTEE CONSTITUTED
UNDER SUB-SECTION (2) OF SECTION 3 OF THE JUDGES
INQUIRY ACT, 1968
I. Introduction:
Having concluded its investigation into the grounds on which the removal of
Justice Soumitra Sen of the Calcutta High Court had been sought, the Inquiry
Committee - as (re)constituted by Rajya Sabha Notification dated 16.12.2009
- submits its Report under Section 4(2) of the Judges (Inquiries) Act, 1968 (“the
1968 Act”). Section 4(2) of the 1968 Act reads as follows:
“At the conclusion of the investigation, the Committee

shall submit its report to the Speaker or, as the case may be,
to the Chairman, or where the Committee has been
constituted jointly by the Speaker and the Chairman, to both
of them, stating therein its findings on each of the charges
separately with such observations on the whole case as it
thinks fit.”
This Report contains the Committee’s observations on the whole case, a brief
account of the proceedings of the Inquiry Committee, and a detailed
assessment of the facts investigated, along with the findings on each of the
two definite charges framed.
II. Inquiry Committee’s Observations on the whole case:
The general observations of the Committee that go to the heart of the entire
case: are in respect of two matters:
(1) The submission that during the investigation into the conduct
of Justice Soumitra Sen, he had the right to remain silent.
(2) Whether the grounds of misconduct with which Justice

Soumitra Sen has been charged; would if proved, amount to
“misbehaviour” under Article 124(4) read with Article 217(1)
proviso (b).
Re: (1) the submission that during the investigation into the conduct of Justice
Soumitra Sen, he had the right to remain silent.
The investigation has raised at the threshold a significant question in relation

to inquiries directed to be made into the conduct of a Judge under the 1968
Act: viz. as to whether a Judge whose conduct is under investigation under the
1968 Act (pursuant to a motion admitted in one of the two Houses of Parliament)
has the right to remain silent.
Justice Soumitra Sen was served with definite charges on the basis of which
the investigation into the two acts of misconduct (set out in the Motion) were
proposed to be held viz.
“1. Misappropriation of large sums of money, which he had received

in his capacity as Receiver appointed by the High Court of Calcutta;
and
2. Misrepresented facts with regard to the misappropriation of money

He entered appearance through advocates, and filed a written statement

defending on merits the definite charges framed; advocates were engaged by
him to appear and argue his case before the Inquiry Committee both on facts
and law. It was his contention (in the current investigation into his conduct)
that the moneys that he had received (Rs. 33,22,800) as sale-proceeds of the
goods of which he had been appointed Receiver (by the Calcutta High Court)
- in Suit 8 of 1983 (Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs. Shipping Corporation of
India and others) - had been “entirely invested” in a company called Lynx India
Ltd. which had later gone into liquidation, and that no part of the amount had
been misappropriated by him; after he was appointed a Judge of the Calcutta
High Court on 3 December, 2003 he went about covering up his defalcations:
first, by not co-operating at all with the Court that was making inquiries about
the whereabouts of the sale-proceeds (Rs. 33,22,800) of which he had been
appointed a Receiver; then adamantly refusing to furnish information, though
requested by the Court; refraining from attendances at hearings, even through
a representative or Advocate; and when, after a couple of years the Single
Judge investigating into the matter (at the instance of the plaintiff in Suit 8 of
1983) made unfavourable remarks against him and directed him (Justice
Soumitra Sen) to pay up the entire amount received by way of sale-proceeds
with interest, paying up the same in instalments, without demur and without
protest; it was only after the full amount was repaid that Justice Soumitra Sen
applied to the Calcutta High Court for deletion of the remarks made against
him by the Single Judge (in his order dated 10 April, 2006) supporting this
application with an affidavit filed on his behalf by his mother as constituted
attorney; in this affidavit he falsely represented to the Calcutta High Court that
the money received by way of sale proceeds of goods (Rs. 33,22,800) had
been invested (to earn more interest) in a company called Lynx India Ltd. which
had gone into liquidation in the year 1999-2000, and attributed this reason for
Report of the Judges Inquiry Committee (Vol. I) 21
the loss of moneys. This reason - proven in the present proceedings to be untrue
and false - influenced a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court
(in its judgment dated 25 September, 2007) to expunge the Single Judge’s
remarks against Justice Soumitra Sen. When queried in this investigation about
the contradictions as disclosed in the documentary evidence led in the case
and the assertions made in the Written Statement of Defence, it was submitted
on behalf of Justice Soumitra Sen (who chose to remain personally absent
throughout the proceedings) - that he had the right to remain silent, that the
specific charges as framed had to be “proved to the hilt” and “proved without
any reasonable doubt”.
In the considered view of the Inquiry Committee the submission that Justice
Soumitra Sen had the right to remain silent (in the facts and circumstances of
the present case) is untenable and fallacious: for the following reasons:
(a) The proceedings for the investigation into the conduct of a Judge
under the 1968 Act (and the 1969 Rules) are not criminal
proceedings against the concerned Judge; the Judge whose
conduct is under inquiry is not a person who is to be visited either
with conviction, sentence or fine; nor is the Inquiry Committee,
appointed under the 1968 Act empowered to make any such
recommendation. Besides, the Judge in respect of whose conduct
an inquiry is ordered under the 1968 Act is not a person “accused
of any offence”, and no fundamental right of his under Article 20(3)
of the Constitution of India would be infringed by his giving evidence
during an investigation into his conduct. On the contrary, the 1969
Rules (Rule 4(1)) contemplate the Inquiry Committee giving to the
Judge whose conduct is under investigation “an opportunity of
adducing evidence ...”
(b) The Notice to be issued in Form-I of the 1969 Rules (framed under
the 1968 Act) is similar to the notice prescribed in Form-I in
Appendix B to the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (summons for
disposal of a civil suit). Contrasted with this Notice is the summons
to an accused person prescribed under the Code of Criminal
Procedure 1973. Form-I in the Second Schedule of the 1973 Code
describes the noticee as the “accused”, he is required to attend and
answer to “the offence charged”, in person or by pleader as the case
may be, before the concerned Magistrate.
(c) Unlike a criminal trial, under the 1968 Act (and 1969 Rules), the
Judge into whose conduct an investigation is directed is to be given
an opportunity of filing his Written Statement of Defence - something

not heard of or permitted in a criminal trial. Whereas the right to
silence in a criminal trial protects the person “accused” from giving
any evidence on his own behalf, that may incriminate him, in the
statutory notice (in Form-I) prescribed under the 1969 Rules, the
Judge concerned is required to produce “all the witnesses upon
whose evidence and all the documents upon which, he intends to
rely in support of his defence.”
(d) In proceedings for offences under the Penal Code unless an

accused person appears - pleading guilty or not guilty - he cannot
be tried. But under Rule 8 of the 1969 Rules - if the Judge does
not appear, (before the Inquiry Committee) on proof of service on
him of the notice referred to in rule 5, the Inquiry Committee is
empowered to proceed with the inquiry in the absence of the Judge:
this is because the concerned Judge in a proceeding under the
Judge’s Inquiry Act 1968 is not regarded as a person who is
accused of any offence.
(e) The proceedings before an Inquiry Committee appointed under the

1968 Act are not at all comparable to electoral offences under the
provisions of election laws; and the ratio laid down in cases decided
under election laws do not apply to cases under the Judges Inquiry
Act 1968: simply because proceedings for removal of Judges are
“sui generis and are not civil or criminal in nature”1; since their
purpose is to inquire into judicial conduct in order to maintain and
uphold proper standards of judicial behaviour. In some Judgments
of the Supreme Court of India,2 proceedings that are not strictly
criminal in nature (such as electoral offences and offences in the
nature of contempt of court) have been regarded as “quasi-criminal”.
Even if proceedings for removal of a Judge under the 1968 Act be
so characterised, the adverb “quasi” means “as if: almost as if it
were; analogous to”. In legal phraseology the term “quasi” is used
to indicate that one subject resembles another, with which it is
compared, but only “in certain characteristics, though there are
intrinsic and material differences between them”3. The phrase
“quasi-criminal” is not to be equated with “criminal”: the material
difference in an inquiry into the conduct of a Judge under the 1969
Act (and the 1969 Rules) is that when he, the Judge, files a Written
Statement of Defence he is in the same position as a defendant in
a civil suit except that the charge framed against him must be
“proved” - not on a balance of probabilities but beyond reasonable

doubt.
(f) That in an inquiry under the 1968 Act, the specific charges framed
have to be “proved to the hilt” (or “proved beyond reasonable doubt”)
does not lead to the inference that the Judge concerned has the
right to remain silent: A fact is said to be proved - when the
investigating authority either believes it to exist or considers its
existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the
circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition
that it exists. As to when and how a fact is said to be proved
depends on the circumstances of the case and the entirety of the
evidence, both positive and negative.
During the present investigation the documentary evidence (both positive and
negative) has clearly revealed the following:
(i) that the Receiver’s two accounts (with ANZ Grindlays Bank Church
Lane Branch, Kolkata and Allahabad Bank Stephen House Branch,
Kolkata) which were in the name of Soumitra Sen, were opened
and operated by him alone; it was in these two accounts that the
sale proceeds of goods of which Soumitra Sen was appointed
Receiver (viz. the aggregate sum of Rs. 33,22,800) had been
deposited;
(ii) that from neither of these two Bank accounts any monies have been
shown to be withdrawn in order to be invested with Lynx India Ltd;
on the contrary, it was from a third Bank account opened with ANZ
Grindlays Bank Church Lane Branch, by Soumitra Sen (also in his
name) that a sum of Rs. 25 lacs is shown as transferred to Lynx
India Ltd. on 27 February, 1997 from out of separate funds (viz.
Rs.70 lacs) entrusted to Soumitra Sen in an entirely different
proceeding (in the Calcutta High Court) in respect of an entirely
different Company in liquidation (viz. Calcutta Fans (1995) Pvt. Ltd.);
the said sum of Rs. 70 lacs being entrusted to Soumitra Sen by
orders of the Calcutta High Court for payment of dues to workers
of Calcutta Fans (1995) Pvt. Ltd. in liquidation. It has been also
proved that the cheque no. 624079 for Rs. 25 lacs drawn by
Soumitra Sen was from this third account, and paid to M/s. Lynx
India Ltd. - and not paid from out of either of the Receiver’s two
accounts;
(iii) on 22 May, 1997, pursuant to letters written by Soumitra Sen

(handwritten letters dated 22.5.1997) to the Bank Manager of ANZ
Grindlays Bank a request was made for transfer of a sum of “about

Rs. 22 lacs” (from out of the ANZ Grindlays Bank Receiver’s Account)
into this third account of Soumitra Sen in the same Bank, which was
avowedly in violation of the orders of the Calcutta High Court
appointing Soumitra Sen as Receiver: monies representing sale
proceeds (Rs. 33,22,800/-) deposited in the two bank accounts were
to be held and not parted with or disposed of without permission of
the Calcutta High Court. After the transfer of the sum of “about Rs.
22 lacs” was effected pursuant to Soumitra Sen’s written request to
the Bank, the funds so transferred into this third account were utilised
by Soumitra Sen for making large disbursements by way of cheques
drawn by Soumitra Sen, including a large number of bearer cheques
in favour of individuals, who have never been identified, in the present
proceedings as “workers” of Calcutta Fans (1995) Pvt., Ltd.;
(iv) that from the Receiver’s account in the Allahabad Bank Stephen
House Branch (as also from the ANZ Grindlays Bank Receiver’s
Account) there have been shown large disbursements by way of
cheques - including a large number of bearer/self-drawn cheques
- all issued and signed by Soumitra Sen: for what purpose has not
been explained;
(v) that no permission was sought or taken by Soumitra Sen from the
Court which appointed him as Receiver for withdrawal of monies
from either of the Receiver’s two Accounts, nor were any accounts
filed by Soumitra Sen as Receiver in the Calcutta High Court
(despite half-yearly accounts being required to be filed under original
side Rules (Chapter 21) of Calcutta High Court and specifically
directed to be so filed by order dated 30 April, 1984) - no accounts
were filed with the Court either before or at any time after Soumitra
Sen was appointed a Judge;
(vi) in the Allahabad Bank Receiver’s Account the Balance on

29 March, 1994 was Rs. 3215, and at the end of 2008/2009 the
balance was ‘NIL’. The ANZ Grindlay’s Receiver’s Account was
closed on 22 March, 2000 with a nil balance.
Obviously, this alarming state of affairs called for an explanation: The

only explanation on record was in Justice Soumitra Sen’s signed (but
not sworn) Written Statement of Defence in which he had asserted
that the entire sum of Rs. 33,22,800 had been invested by him with
a company called “Lynx India Ltd” which went into liquidation in

1999-2000: an assertion disproved by evidence, oral and documentary,
brought on record. Justice Soumitra Sen chose not to personally
attend any part of the proceedings of the Inquiry Committee, his
counsel maintaining that he had “a right to remain silent”; Counsel
appearing for him could not offer (on his behalf) any explanation for
the depletion of funds in the Receiver’s two accounts. In the opinion
of the Inquiry Committee, neither in law, nor in the facts and
circumstances of this case, does Justice Soumitra Sen have the right
to remain silent, as was claimed on his behalf. And the inescapable
inference from the want of any explanation whatever about the
whereabouts of the sum of Rs. 33,22,800 (or any part thereof) is that
Justice Soumitra Sen had no convincing explanation to give.
Conclusion
A Judge charged with misconduct amounting to “misbehaviour” may choose not

to appear at all before the Inquiry Committee; the Committee may then proceed
with the inquiry (under Rule 8 of the 1969 Rules) in the absence of the Judge.
But once the Judge expresses his intention to participate in the Inquiry
proceedings (as in the present case) by asking for time, seeking adjournments,
filing a written statement of defence and engaging Advocates to appear and argue
the case on his behalf, the Judge (particularly because he is in the position of
a Judge) has a duty to cooperate in the inquiry, and to remain present for
questioning (not necessarily on oath) whether by Advocates appointed to assist
the Committee or by the Inquiry Committee itself. This in no way detracts from
duty of the Inquiry Committee to hold him guilty of the definite charges framed
only if such charges are proved beyond reasonable doubt, by oral and/or
documentary evidence brought on record.
Re: (2) Whether the grounds of misconduct with which Justice Soumitra Sen
has been charged; would if proved, amount to “misbehaviour” under
Article 124(4) read with Article 217( 1) proviso (b).
In the opinion of the Inquiry Committee the grounds of misconduct as set

out in the Motion, when proved, would amount to “misbehaviour” under
Article 124(4) read with Proviso (b) to Article 217(1).
The word “misbehaviour”, in the context of Judges of the High Courts in India,
was first introduced in proviso (b) to Section 200(2) of the Government of India
Act, 1935. Under the 1935 Act it was initially the Privy Council and later, the
Federal Court of India that had to report to India’s Governor-General when

charges were made of “misbehaviour” against a Judge of a High Court. In the
report of the Federal Court in respect of Charges made against Justice S.P.
Sinha a Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, one of the charges
made by the Governor-General against that Judge were: “that Mr. Justice S.P.
Sinha has been guilty of conduct outside the Court which is unworthy of and
unbecoming of the holder of such a High Office”, which was then particularised.
Since this charge was not substantiated against that Judge by evidence, it was
held to have been not established.4 But the charge, as there framed, has tersely
but correctly described the scope and ambit of the word “misbehaviour” viz. guilty
of such conduct whether inside or outside the Court that is “unworthy of and
unbecoming of the holder of such a High Office”. The same word “misbehaviour”
now occurs in the Constitution of India 1950 in Article 124(4) - when read in the
context of Proviso (b) to Article 217(1) - These provisions state that a Judge of
the High Court shall not be removed from his office except on the grounds of
“proved-misbehaviour”. The prefix “proved” only means proved to the satisfaction
of the requisite majority of the appropriate House of Parliament, if so
recommended by the Inquiry Committee. The words “proved misbehaviour” in
Article 124(4) have not been defined. Advisedly so: because the phrase “proved
misbehaviour” means such “behaviour” which, when proved, is not befitting of a
Judge of the High Court. A Judge of the High Court is placed on a higher pedestal
in our Constitution simply because Judges of High Courts (like Judges of the
Supreme Court) have functions and wield powers of life and death over citizens
and inhabitants of this country, such as are not wielded by any other public
body or authority. It is a power coupled with a duty, on the part of the Judge, to
act honourably at all times whether in court or out of court. Citation of case-law
is superfluous, because the categories of “misbehaviour” are never closed.
In interpreting Articles 124(4) and (5) and the provisions of the Judges (Inquiry)
Act 1968 and when considering any question relating to the removal of a Judge
of the Higher Judiciary from his office, it must not be forgotten that it was to
secure to the people of India a fearless arid independent judiciary that the
Judges of the Superior Courts were granted a special position in the
Constitution with complete immunity from premature removal from office except
by the cumbersome process prescribed in Articles 124(4) and (5), read with
the law enacted by Parliament (the Judge’s Inquiry Act 1968).
The very vastness of the powers vested in the Higher Judiciary and the
extraordinary immunity granted to Judges of the High Courts (and of the
Supreme Court) require, that Judges should be fearless and independent and
that they should adopt a high standard of rectitude so as to inspire confidence
in members of the public who seek redress before them. While it is necessary
to protect the Judges from motivated and malicious attacks it is also necessary
to protect the fair image of the institution of the Judiciary from such of those
Judges who choose to conduct themselves in a manner that would tarnish
this image. The word “misbehaviour” after all is, the antithesis of “good
behaviour”: it is a breach of the condition subsequent, upon which the
guarantee of a fixed judicial tenure rests. High Judicial office is essentially a
public trust, and it is the right of the people (through its representatives in
Parliament) to revoke this trust - but only when there is “proved misbehaviour”.
The conduct of Justice Soumitra Sen as a Receiver when he was an Advocate,

and his series of acts and omissions, as well as his conduct, after he was
appointed a Judge: such as giving of false explanations to cover up his
completely unauthorised withdrawals from the Receiver’s two accounts,
swearing of an affidavit in Court (through his constituted attorney, his mother)
as to that which he knew to be false and which he (Justice Sen) never believed
to be true - are matters that bring dishonour and disrepute to the Higher
Judiciary; they are such as to shake the faith and confidence which the public
reposes in the Higher Judiciary. Monetary recompense or restitution does not
render an act or omission any the less “misbehaviour” especially when
restitution was made (as in the present case) only when the Judge had been
found out, and after he was directed by the Court that appointed him Receiver
to repay the entire amount of the sale-proceeds received by him together with
interest.
III. Appointment of the present Inquiry Committee and a brief account of

the proceedings:
(1) On 20 February, 2009, 58 Members of the Rajya Sabha gave Notice to

the Hon’ble Chairman of a Motion for the removal of Justice Soumitra Sen,
(a Judge of the Calcutta High Court), under Article 217 (1) (c) - read with
Article 124 (4) - of the Constitution of India 1950 - on the following two grounds
namely:
1. Misappropriation of large sums of money, which he received in his

2. Misrepresented facts with regard to the misappropriation of money

before the High Court of Calcutta.
(2) On the said motion being admitted under Section 3(2) of the 1968 Act, the
Chairman, Rajya Sabha constituted a Committee - “for the purpose of making

an investigation into the grounds on which the removal of Justice Soumitra Sen
of the Calcutta High Court is prayed for” - The Committee as then constituted
consisted of the following: viz. Hon’ble Justice D.K. Jain, Supreme Court of India,
Hon’ble Justice T.S. Thakur, Chief Justice of the Punjab & Haryana High Court
and Shri Fali S. Nariman, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India, (Rajya Sabha
Notification dated 20 March, 2009): the Committee constituted under Section
3(2) of the 1968 Act has been described in the Judges Inquiry 1969 Rules (“the
1969 Rules”) as “the Inquiry Committee”.
(3) On 25 June, 2009, in partial modification of the Notification dated

20 March, 2009 under sub-Section 2 of Section 3 of the 1968 Act, the
Chairman, Rajya Sabha, reconstituted the Inquiry Committee by appointing
(i) Hon’ble Justice B. Sudershan Reddy, Supreme Court of India; (ii) Hon’ble
Justice T.S. Thakur, Chief Justice of the Punjab and Haryana High Court; and
(iii) Shri Fali S. Nariman, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court (Rajya Sabha
Notification dated 25 June, 2009). Being the member chosen under clause
(a) of subsection (2) of section 3 of the 1968 Act, Justice B. Sudershan Reddy
was, and has continued thereafter to act as, “Presiding Officer of the Inquiry
Committee” (Rule 3 of the 1969 Rules).
(4) By Notification dated 11 August, 2009 the Hon’ble Chairman, Rajya Sabha
appointed Shri Ajoy Sinha, retired Member (Legal) Authority for Advance
Rulings (Income Tax), as Secretary to the Inquiry Committee constituted under
Section 3 of the 1968 Act. The Government of India by Notification dated
26 October, 2009 appointed Mr. Sidharth Luthra, Senior Advocate and
Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal, Jr. Advocate to “assist the Committee” (i.e. “to conduct
the case against the Judge” as mentioned in Section 3(9) of the 1968 Act).
(5) One of the members of the Inquiry Committee (Justice T.S. Thakur), was
appointed a Judge of the Supreme Court of India on 17 November, 2009, and
the Committee had to be reconstituted once again: by Rajya Sabha Notification
dated 16 December, 2009 the name of “Hon’ble Justice Mukul Mudgal, Chief
Justice of Punjab and Haryana High Court” was substituted for the name of
“Hon’ble Mr. Justice T.S. Thakur”.
(6) Upon considering its Terms of Reference, the Inquiry Committee, as finally
re-constituted, framed draft charges along with a draft statement of grounds.
On 5 February, 2010 it forwarded them to Justice Soumitra Sen, in order to
enable him to have an opportunity (if he so wished) to object to the framing of
definite charges. But, by his Advocate’s letter dated 23 February, 2010, the Judge
contended that under the 1968 Act, no investigation was called for before definite
charges were framed, and before a reasonable opportunity was given to him of
presenting a Written Statement of Defence.
(7) Hence the following Notice (dated 4 March, 2010) - a notice prescribed in
statutory Form-I of the 1969 Rules - was then issued by the Presiding Officer,
of the Inquiry Committee - It is reproduced below in full:
“Dated 4th March 2010
To
Shri Soumitra Sen,

Judge, High Court of Calcutta at Kolkata,
High Court of Calcutta,
Kolkata.
Whereas a motion for presenting an address to the President praying for your
removal from your office as a Judge of the High Court of Calcutta at Kolkata
has been admitted by the Chairman of the Council of States;
And whereas the Chairman has constituted an Inquiry Committee with me, a
Judge of the Supreme Court of India, as the presiding officer thereof for the
purpose of making an investigation into the grounds on which your removal
has been prayed for;
And whereas the Inquiry Committee has framed charges against you on the
basis of which investigation is proposed to be held;
You are hereby requested to appear before the said Committee in person, or
by a pleader duly instructed and able to answer all material questions relating
to the Inquiry, on the 25th day of March, 2010 at 4.30 ‘O’ clock in the afternoon
to answer the charges;
As the day fixed for your appearance is appointed for the final disposal of the
charges levelled against you, you are requested to produce on that day all
the witnesses upon whose evidence and all the documents upon which you
intend to rely in support of your defence.
Please take notice that in the event of any default in your appearance on the
day aforementioned, the investigation into the grounds on which your removal
has been prayed for shall be made in your absence.

Given under my hand this 4th day of March 2010.
(____sd/-________)
(Signature)
Presiding Officer
Inquiry Committee
Enclosures:
1. A copy of the charges framed under sub-section (2) of section 3 of
the Act.
2. Statement of grounds on which each charge is based.”
The charges with particulars along with a statement of the grounds in support,
were got served on Justice Soumitra Sen alongwith the Notice dated 4 March,
2010. Documents in support of the charges and the grounds were also
forwarded to Justice Soumitra Sen. In Charge I (“Misappropriation”) - after
setting out the particulars of that charge (in paragraphs 1 to 12), it was finally
stated in paragraph 13 as follows:
“13. You have committed misappropriation of property,

and the same constitutes ‘Misbehaviour’ under Article 124(4)
r/w Art. 217 of the Constitution of India.”
In Charge II (“Making false statements”) after setting out particulars of that

charge (in paragraphs 14 to 24), it was stated, in paragraph 25, as follows:
“You, during a judicial proceeding while holding the

office of Judge of the Court, intentionally gave false evidence,
which constitutes ‘Misbehaviour’ under Article 124(4) read with
Article 217 of the Constitution of India.”
(8) Subsequently a request was made by the Judge that the date mentioned
in the Notice for his appearance be postponed, and that four weeks more time
be given to him, after inspection of documents, to present his Written Statement
of Defence. This was granted but the Judge was informed (by letter dated
19 March, 2010) that he should appear before the Committee at 11.30 a.m.
on 17 April, 2010 and file his Written Statement of Defence by that date.
(9) Justice Soumitra Sen did not personally appear before the Inquiry
Committee on 17 April, 2010, but in a letter dated 26 March, 2010 he requested
for another extension of time for filing the written statement (of defence): “by
at least 8 weeks.” By letter dated 26 April, 2010 the Judge was informed that
unless his written statement of defence was filed positively by the extended
date 3 May, 2010 the Inquiry Committee would proceed further in the matter
“on the basis that you have nothing to say in respect of the specific charges
framed against you.”
(10) Meanwhile, after the Notice dated 4 March, 2010 had been served on
the Judge, along with definite charges, (and supporting grounds) some
additional documents were received from Allahabad Bank Stephen House
Branch Calcutta and from the Standard Chartered Bank Church Lane, Kolkata
(formerly ANZ Grindlays Bank Church Lane, Kolkata). Copies of the first set
of documents (relied upon by Advocates appointed to assist the Committee
under Section 3(9) of the 1968 Act) had already been forwarded to Justice
Soumitra Sen. All documents with the Committee were inspected by him and
copies of the additional documents received from Kolkata, were also forwarded
to Justice Soumitra Sen: The Judge was given inspection of these and all other
documents, viz. of the complete record with the Inquiry Committee.
Shri Subhash Bhattacharya Advocate for Justice Soumitra Sen, vide letter dated
20 April, 2010 addressed to the Secretary of the Inquiry Committee placed on
record that inspection of the documents had been completed, and that “fullest
cooperation has been given by your office.”
(11) Ultimately on 3 May, 2010 a document titled “Reply to the Charges” was
received by the Inquiry Committee - it was in the form of a signed letter
addressed by the Justice Soumitra Sen to the Presiding Officer of the Inquiry
Committee - which was taken on record as his Written Statement of Defence,
under section 3(4) of the 1968 Act, and the Judge was so informed by letter
dated 13 May, 2010. Since in his Written Statement of defence, Justice
Soumitra Sen denied that he was guilty of the misbehavior specified in the
charges framed under Section 3(3), the Inquiry Committee proceeded with the
inquiry in accordance with Rule 7(2) of the 1969 Rules.
(12) The venue for the recording of evidence was initially fixed in Kolkata,
where all witnesses were located. Witnesses had been summoned to produce
all relevant documents (including statements of accounts, banks drafts etc.)
with different Banks, and documents in the Registry of the Calcutta High Court,
and with other authorities. But on a specific written request made (on
19 May, 2010) on behalf of the Judge (by his Advocate) the Venue was shifted
to New Delhi for examination of witnesses, and for production and proof of all
relevant documents that had been summoned.
(13) By a communication dated 1 June, 2010, Justice Soumitra Sen was

provided with a list of witnesses (to be called by Advocates assisting the Inquiry
Committee) along with copy of a list of relevant documents to be produced/
proved by such witnesses; the Judge was informed that the venue for the hearings
would be at Vigyan Bhawan Annexe, New Delhi on 24 June,
25 June, and 26 June, 2010. Justice Soumitra Sen’s Advocate (by letter dated
4 June, 2010) then requested for yet another adjournment of the hearing “at
least till 5 July, 2010”. But this request was declined, and the Judge was
informed that the Inquiry Committee would adhere to dates previously intimated
(viz. 24, 25 and 26 June). The Judge was also informed (by letter dated
18 June, 2010) that if he wished to file a further written statement with regard
to the additional documents furnished to him, he could do so before
24 June, 2010. However no further or additional written statement was filed
by or on behalf of Justice Soumitra Sen.
(14) On the first day fixed for hearing of evidence at New Delhi (viz. 24 June,
2010) the appearances of Counsel were recorded: viz. (i) Mr. Sidharth Luthra,
Senior Advocate with Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal, Jr. Advocate appeared as
Advocates appointed to assist the Inquiry Committee (in terms of the
Notification dated 26 October, 2009) and (ii) Mr. Shekhar Naphade, Senior
Advocate, with Advocate Chinmoy Khaledkar (along with Advocates: Ms. Neha
S. Verma, Shri Manoj, Shri Subhasis Chakraborty, Shri Subhas Bhattacharyya,
Shri Soumik Ghoshal and Ms. Aparna Sinha), appeared as Advocates for
Justice Soumitra Sen: Justice Soumitra Sen did not personally attend the
hearing on 24 June, 2010. At the hearing on 24 June, 2010 five witnesses
mentioned in the list previously supplied to Justice Soumitra Sen (for producing/
proving the documents that had been previously summoned from various
bodies and authorities in Kolkata) were examined by Senior Advocate appointed
to assist Committee. The evidence of each of the witnesses examined by the
Inquiry Committee was taken down in writing under the personal directions
and superintendence of the Presiding Officer. After each of the witnesses were
so examined and their evidence on oath recorded, and relevant documents
exhibited, Senior Advocate for Justice Soumitra Sen asked each of them a
few questions in cross-examination but did not question the authenticity or
contents of any of the documents produced by any of them. At the hearing on
the afternoon of 24 June, 2010 Senior Advocate Mr. Shekhar Naphade
appearing for Justice Soumitra Sen stated (and this is so recorded in the
minutes) that:
“there was neither any evidence to be adduced nor any

documents to be produced on behalf of the Respondent” (i.e.
Justice Soumitra Sen).
On a specific query from the Inquiry Committee, Senior Advocate for Justice
Soumitra Sen (Respondent) also stated that he did not wish to examine “the
Respondent” (Justice Soumitra Sen) and record his statement. It was then
directed that the date and time of further proceedings in the matter (viz. oral
arguments) would be duly intimated to all concerned in due course. The further
hearings scheduled for 25 and 26 June, 2010 (for the purpose of taking of
evidence) were thus no longer necessary. The Judge was then informed (by
letter dated 7 July, 2010) that the dates fixed for oral arguments would be at
the same venue on Sunday 18 July, 2010 (for the whole day) and Monday
19 July, 2010 from 2 p.m. onwards thereafter till the arguments had concluded.
At the hearings on 18 and 19 July, 2010 (as at the previous hearing for
recording of evidence on 24 June, 2010) the same set of Advocates were
present and addressed oral arguments. Justice Soumitra Sen himself was not
personally present. About a week after the close of arguments, Advocates
appointed to assist the Committee and Advocates for Justice Soumitra Sen
submitted brief written arguments.
IV. The Facts: Investigation into the conduct of Soumitra Sen and an
assessment by the Inquiry Committee of the facts brought on the record
of this case:
The investigation by the Inquiry Committee into the entire conduct of Soumitra
Sen in relation to the two grounds of misconduct - viz. (i) of misappropriation
of large sums of money, which he had received as Receiver appointed by the
Calcutta High Court; and (ii) misrepresentation of facts before the Calcutta High
Court with regard to the misappropriation of money - covers a long period from
30 April, 1984 to December, 2006; in between, on 12 December, 2003,
Soumitra Sen, till then an Advocate of the Calcutta High Court, was appointed
a Judge of that Court. The relevant facts relating to this conduct as brought
on record of this investigation are for convenience (and only for convenience)
divided into two periods of time - although there is a common thread of
continuity between them: viz.
(1) Conduct of Soumitra Sen, Advocate between 30 April, 1984 upto

3 December, 2003; and
(2) Conduct of Soumitra Sen, Judge, after 3 December, 2003.
(1) Conduct of Soumitra Sen, Advocate between 30 April, 1984 upto

3 December, 2003
(a) In an interlocutory application for appointment of a Receiver in Suit

No. 8 of 1983 (Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs. Shipping Corporation
of India Ltd. and Others) an Order dated 30 April, 1984 was passed
by Justice R.N. Pyne of the Calcutta High Court. By this order
Mr. Soumitra Sen, Advocate was appointed as Receiver over “the
rejected goods lying in cover shed no. 1 of the Coke Oven Refractory
stores of Bokaro Steel Plant mentioned in paragraph 19 of the
petition”, with power to him to get in and collect the outstanding debts
and claims due in respect of the said goods, together with all the
powers provided for in Order XL Rule 1 Clause (d) of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908”5. It was further specifically ordered that the
Receiver should file, and submit for passing, his half yearly accounts
in the office of the Registrar of the High Court; Such accounts to be
made out as at the end of the months of June and December in every
year and be filed during the months of July and January next
respectively, and that the same when filed be passed before one of
the Judges of the High Court; It was also ordered inter alia that the
Receiver should sell the said goods either to the best purchaser or
purchasers that could be got for the same or by private treaty after
due advertisement being published about such sale. It was further
ordered inter alia that “the parties herein be at liberty to mention
before this court for fixation of final remuneration of the Receiver after
the sale was completed” and “for obtaining other directions for
appropriate investment of the sale proceeds”. By a later Order dated
11 July, 19856 it was clarified that Mr. Soumitra Sen was to act as
Receiver without furnishing security.
(b) Before 20 January, 1993, a substantial part of the goods were sold
by Mr. Soumitra Sen as Receiver appointed in Suit No. 8 of 1983.
By an order dated 20 January, 19937 passed by a Single Judge of
the Calcutta High Court (in Suit No. 8 of 1983) it was then ordered
that:
“as and when the purchase price is paid the learned

receiver shall therefrom deduct 5% thereof as his
remuneration and shall keep the balance in a separate
account in a bank of his choice and branch of his choice
and hold the same free from lien or encumbrances subject
to further orders of the Court. “ (Emphasis supplied).
(c) As acknowledged in his Written Statement of Defence (filed with

the Inquiry Committee on 3 May, 2010), Soumitra Sen had received,
between 1/4/1993 and 1/6/1995 as Receiver, a total sum of
Rs. 33,22,800/- being the sale proceeds of a large portion of the goods
of which he had been appointed as Receiver. But the obligation of
filing and passing of half yearly accounts that was imposed on him
by the order dated 30 April, 19848 - and under the Calcutta High Court
Original Side Rules - was at no time observed or complied with: neither

during the entire period when he remained an Advocate nor thereafter
after he was appointed Judge.
(d) Several documents from proper custody were brought on record by

evidence of the witnesses called to produce them (viz. CW1 Assistant
Registrar, Calcutta High Court, Original Side, and CW2 Chief
Manager, State Bank of India (Service Branch), CW4 (Manager Credit
of Allahabad Bank, Stephen House Branch), and CW5 (Manager,
Internal Services, Standard Chartered Bank,
19, Netaji Subhas Road, Branch, (formerly ANZ Grindlays Bank).
(e) The evidence oral and documentary has established that not one
but two separate accounts, were opened by Soumitra Sen as
Receiver, each in his own name: viz. (i) firstly Savings Account No.
01SLP0632800 was got opened on 4 March, 1993 by Soumitra Sen,
with the ANZ Grindlays Bank, Church Lane Branch, Calcutta, (for
convenience and for ease of identity hereinafter referred to as “ANZ
Grindlays Bank Receiver’s Account”)9; (ii) secondly, Savings Account
No. 9902 was got opened on 24 March, 1993 by Soumitra Sen,
with the Allahabad Bank, Stephen House Branch, Calcutta.10 (for
convenience and for ease of identity hereinafter referred to as “the
Allahabad Bank Receiver’s Account”). Both these accounts, so
opened, were Accounts of Soumitra Sen as Receiver: they are
collectively referred to as “the Receiver’s two Accounts”.
(f) As disclosed in evidence, a total sum aggregating to Rs. 33,22,800,

being the sale proceeds of goods (of which Soumitra Sen was
appointed Receiver) were brought into the Receiver’s two Accounts
between 24 March, 1993 and 5 May, 1995 as stated below:
(i) in the ANZ Grindlays Bank Receiver’s account an aggregate

sum of Rs. 28,54,800 was got deposited: through the
proceeds of 18 original Demand Drafts issued in the name of
Soumitra Sen by the State Bank of India (at the instance of
the purchaser of the goods); the originals of these Demand
Drafts have been produced in evidence along with a statement
(deposed to CW2 Mr. Satyalal Mondal, Chief Manager, State
Bank of India, Service Branch, Kolkata), showing that the
proceeds of the 18 demand drafts were deposited into the ANZ
Grindlays Bank Receiver’s account.11
(ii) in the Allahabad Bank Receiver’s Account an aggregate sum

of Rs 4,68,000 was deposited in tranches of Rs 4,50,000 and

Rs. 18,000: the former amount by two Demand Drafts issued
in the name of Soumitra Sen by the State Bank of India and
latter by two Bankers cheques (by Bank of Madurai later taken
over by ICICI Bank) also in the name of Soumitra Sen12: as
evidenced by CW2 Chief Manager SBI, (Service Branch)
Kolkata and by the statement of account produced by witness
CW4 (Manager (Credit) of the Allahabad Bank Stephen House
Branch).
(g) In the Written Statement of Defence filed on May 3, 2010 signed

by “Justice Soumitra Sen” it was categorically asserted -
(i) “that there was no occasion to return the money

(Rs. 33,12,800) since......................................................
(d) the entire sale consideration was invested in Fixed Deposit

in Lynx India Private Limited which went into liquidation in the
year 1999-2000 long after the amount representing the sale
consideration was invested (paragraph 7(d))”; and
(ii) that “at no point of time any monies were ever used for
personal gains or were temporarily or permanently
misappropriated”. (Paragraph 5)
(h) If the aforesaid assertions made by Justice Soumitra Sen in his

Written Statement of Defence (filed with the Inquiry Committee on
3rd May 2010) had been corroborated by the documentary evidence
brought on record during the investigation, further investigation may
have become unnecessary: since, despite apparent non-
compliance, and positive infractions, of Court Orders - such as, not
keeping the amounts in one account but in two accounts, not
“holding” (i.e. keeping) the same in those accounts subject (only)
to orders of the Court, not taking permission of the Court for parting
with the sale-proceeds (Rs. 33,22,800), whether by way of
investment or otherwise - there would have been factually no
“wrongful appropriation” of moneys from the Receiver’s two
accounts.
(i) However the documentary evidence led before the Inquiry

Committee clearly reveals that: neither the entire nor any part of
the sale consideration received by Soumitra Sen for the sale of the
goods (i.e. a sum of Rs. 33,22,800) were invested by Soumitra Sen
(as Receiver) in Lynx India Limited; on the contrary the documentary

evidence brought on record13 shows that a sum of Rs. 25 lakhs was
deposited with Lynx India Ltd. - not from out of either of the
Receiver’s two Accounts (the “ANZ Grindlays Bank Receiver’s
Account or the Allahabad Bank Receiver’s Account), but from an
altogether different (third) Account which had been got opened by
Soumitra Sen in his own name (opened by him for the first time on
6 February, 1997)14 - also with the ANZ Grindlays Bank, Church
Lane Branch, Calcutta, (viz. Account No. 01SLP0813400: for
convenience and for ease of identification hereinafter referred to
as the “400 Account”). It was only from this “400 Account” (and not
from either of the Receiver’s two Accounts) that a sum of Rs. 25
lacs was deposited on 27 February, 1997 with Lynx India Ltd15; and
this amount of Rs. 25 lacs was paid out of separate funds (Rs. 70
lacs) received by Soumitra Sen - not from out of sale proceeds of
goods of which he had been appointed Receiver by order dated
30 April, 1984 - but received by him from a different source in an
entirely different capacity and in, an entirely different proceeding: a
proceeding in which he, Soumitra Sen, as Special Officer, had been
entrusted by separate orders passed by the Calcutta High Court in
a different proceeding with a specific sum of Rs. 70 lakhs by the
Official Liquidator of the High Court of Calcutta Fans (1995) Pvt.
Ltd., (in liquidation) “for distribution to workers”.16
(j) During the investigation, by the Inquiry Committee CW-3, authorised

representative of the Official liquidator of the Calcutta High Court
was summoned and produced an Application Form dated
27 February, 1997 signed by Soumitra Sen which gave the number
of the cheque - cheque No. 624079 - drawn by Soumitra Sen on
the 400 account of ANZ Grindlays Bank; the proceeds of this cheque
no:624079 were utilized for making five separate applications of
rupees five lakhs each in respect of which five separate fixed
deposits (bearing Nos. 11349, 11350, 11351, 11352 and 11353)17
were issued by Lynx India Ltd., in favour of “Soumitra Sen”: as
stated above Cheque No. 624079 for Rs. 25 lacs was drawn by
Soumitra Sen on the 400 Account of ANZ Grindlays Bank, not from
either of the Receiver’s two Accounts: as is evident from the Bank
statement of the 400 Account produced by the CW-5 - Manager,
Internal Service, Standard Chartered Bank (the successor of the
ANZ Grindlays Bank).
(k) Apart from the sum of Rs. 25 lacs shown as deposited with Lynx
India Ltd. from out of the 400 Account (non-Receiver account) no
further sum has been shown as deposited / invested with Lynx India
Ltd. from out of either of the Receiver’s two Accounts. The following
Bank Statements of the Receiver’s two Accounts have been
produced in evidence: viz. (i) Re: Account No. 9902, Allahabad
Bank, Stephen House Branch, in the name of Soumitra Sen from
its inception i.e. 24 March, 1993 till 2009; 18 there is no entry
showing any payment to Lynx India Ltd., and (ii) Account No:
01SLP0632800 in ANZ Grindlays Bank, Church Lane Branch, from
28 February, 1995 till the time the account is shown as closed on
22 March, 2000;19 there is no entry throughout this period (from
28 February, 1995 upto its closing) showing any payment to Lynx
India Ltd. As to the period prior to 28 February, 1995, there could
have been no payment to Lynx India Ltd. from out of this Receiver’s
Account No: 01SLP0632800 since it was the positive case of
Soumitra Sen that it was only after 30 April, 1995, (when amounts
were paid in by the purchaser of the goods sold by him as Receiver)
that fixed Deposits with Lynx were created - this was so stated in
Justice Sen’s letter dated 25 February, 2008 addressed to the Chief
Justice of India (put in as an annexure to Justice Soumitra Sen’s
Written Statement of Defence).
(l) There is thus abundant evidence brought on record of this

investigation which establishes that the assertion in the Written
Statement of Defence filed before the Inquiry Committee on
3 May, 2010 that “the entire sale consideration was invested in Fixed
Deposits with Lynx India Ltd...” is not true.
(m) Justice Soumitra Sen gave no evidence before the Inquiry

Committee, nor made any statement, nor even personally attended
any of the hearings to enable the Inquiry Committee to be assured
from Justice Soumitra Sen himself: as to how Rs. 33,22,800 was
actually invested and where and how this amount had been
expended; apparent and obvious contradictions between the Bank
Statements exhibited in the case and his (Soumitra Sen) previous
assertions in his Written Statement of Defence - viz. that the entire
sum of Rs. 33,22,800 had been invested in Lynx India Ltd., which
went into liquidation in the year 1999-2000 - did call for an
explanation: these were facts in Justice Soumitra Sen’s personal
and special knowledge - But by refusing to attend or personally
participate in the proceedings before the Inquiry Committee, he
Justice Soumitra Sen, denied himself the opportunity of giving an

explanation (if he had any). It is axiomatic, and an almost universal
rule of evidence (see for instance Section 106 of the Indian
Evidence Act 1872) that when any fact, is pre-eminently and
exceptionally within the knowledge of any person the burden of
proving that fact is upon him.20
(n) Absent any convincing explanation to the contrary, it stands

established from the documents brought on record in this
investigation that the investment with Lynx India Ltd., was not from
out of the funds of Rs. 33,22,800/- (being the sale consideration of
the goods of which Soumitra Sen was appointed Receiver) but from
out of a sum of Rs. 70 lakhs entrusted to Soumitra Sen as Special
Officer by the Official Liquidator of Calcutta Fans (1995) Pvt. Ltd.,
(in liquidation) - by orders of the Calcutta High Court dated
20 January, 1997 and 30 January, 199721 in an entirely different
proceeding viz. in Calcutta Fans Workers Employees Union vs.
Official Liquidator - “Appeal No:_____/1996 in C.P. No: 226/1996"
(in the Calcutta High Court).
(o) It now remains to consider whether the further assertion in Justice

Soumitra Sen’s Written Statement of Defence22 viz. that “at no point
of time any monies were ever used for personal gains or were
temporarily or permanently misappropriated” is true or false. The
investigation into this assertion reveals not only that there have been
transfers of large sums from the Receiver’s two accounts; first to
the 400 Account (non-Receiver Account) - without any authority or
permission of the Court appointing Soumitra Sen as Receiver - and
then disbursements therefrom of several lacs of rupees from out
of the 400 account (again without any authority or permission of
the Court appointing Soumitra Sen as Receiver) Particulars of this
diversion are, briefly set out below :
(i) on 6 March, 1995 Soumitra Sen got issued a Term Deposit

issued (in his own name from out of funds in the ANZ
Grindlays Bank Receiver’s Account for a principal sum of
Rs. 8,73,968/-, and on 4 December, 1995 out of the same
ANZ Grindlays Bank Receiver’s account Soumitra Sen got
issued (again in his own name), a second Term Deposit for a
principal sum of Rs. 9,80,000/-. The term-deposit sheets for
each of these two Term Deposit Receipts (brought on record
in these proceedings) show that each of the said two amounts
of Rs. 8,73,968 and Rs. 9,80,000 had, by May 1997, stood

increased (as a result of accumulated interest) to
(i) Rs. 10,91,011.49p23 (i.e. Rs. 8,73,968 plus interest) and
(ii) Rs. 11,32,999.92. 24 (i.e. Rs. 9 ,80,000 plus interest):
aggregating in all to Rs. 22,24,011.41.
(ii) the documents brought on record, through witnesses from the

Banks, also reveal that by a handwritten letter bearing date
22 May, 1997,25 on the printed letter head of “Soumitra Sen”,
and signed by him (addressed to the Manager, ANZ Grindlays
Bank) a request was made to encash the “approximate sum
of Rs. 22 lakhs” and to deposit the same “in my other account”,
“as I need this money urgently as lot of payments will have to
be disbursed very soon”. The said documents brought
on record also show that by another letter also dated
22 May, 199726 addressed to the ANZ Grindlays Bank - (and
also signed by Soumitra Sen) - the Manager was requested
to debit the ANZ Grindlays Bank Receiver Account and to
transfer “a sum of 22,93,000 to my ANZ Saving 400 Account27
(which was a non-receiver account). Since the total available
balance in the ANZ Grindlays Bank Receiver’s Account was
only Rs. 22,84,000/- (the figure noted at the foot of the letter
dated 22 May, 1997 addressed by Soumitra Sen to the Bank
Manager) the Bank debited the account with a sum of only
Rs. 22,83,000 and credited Rs. 22,83,000 to the “400 Account”
which was the non-Receiver’s account in the name of
Soumitra Sen.
(iii) witness CW5 being Manager, Internal Services, Standard

Chartered Bank, Kolkata (successor to ANZ Grindlays’s Bank)
produced the transfer entries so made, which had been
requested in Justice Soumitra Sen’s two letters dated 22 May,
1997 (exhibited in this proceedings)28. In Cross-Examination
of CW-5 Counsel for Justice Soumitra Sen did not suggest to
the witness that the two letters were not written or signed by
Soumitra Sen nor did Counsel dispute in cross-examination
the authenticity of either of these letters nor the transfer entries
in the bank accounts nor the vouchers / transfer instructions.29
(iv) the stated need for “this money (Rs. 22,83,000) urgently as
lot of payments will have to be disbursed very soon” (so stated
in Soumitra Sen’s handwritten letter of 22 May, 199730 to the
Bank Manager) itself shows that part of the sale-proceeds of

goods (Rs. 33,22,800) was utilised for purposes other than
those contemplated in the orders appointing Soumitra Sen as
Receiver - If money was urgently required for payment to
workers in connection with a different case: that of Calcutta
Fans (1995) Pvt. Ltd. (in liquidation) (as the letter dated
22/5/1997 headed “Re: 01SLP/063/800” suggests), and funds
from the Receiver’s account were got transferred for that
purpose, then this itself showed a misapplication of funds held
by Soumitra Sen as Receiver of the sale proceeds of the
goods in Suit No. 8 of 1983. He (Soumitra Sen) was not
authorised, nor did he even seek permission of the Court, to
utilise monies held in either of the Receiver’s two Accounts
for purposes of paying workers of Calcutta Fan Ltd. Soumitra
Sen had been appointed by a separate order31 of the Calcutta
Court in a distinct and separate proceeding as “Special Officer”
and as such Special Officer he had been specifically entrusted
with a separate sum of Rs. 70 lacs for the specific purpose
(of paying workers).
(v) but this is not all. After the transfer of a sum of

Rs. 22,83,800/- from out of the ANZ Grindlays Bank Receiver’s
account (which admittedly represented part of the sale
proceeds (Rs. 33,22,000) of the goods (and interest there on)
being the subject matter of Suit 8 No: 1983) - into the 400
Account (non-Receiver Account in the name of Soumitra Sen),
there are large disbursements (from out of the 400 account)
from 22 May, 1997 to 01 July, 1997: effected by issuing and
getting encashed in all 45 cheques,32 each of them signed by
Soumitra Sen (each of the cheques are exhibited in evidence):
18 33 of such cheques are shown to be bearer cheques
aggregating to Rs. 9.57 lakhs (app.) - i.e. cheques bearing the
legend “Pay to ____ or Bearer”. In his signed - but unsworn -
Written Statement of Defence Soumitra Sen’s explanation (in
paragraph 47) is that these disbursements were towards
payment of worker’s dues .... pursuant to a Division Bench
order dated 20-01-1997.” But this particular Division Bench
Order (of 20.01.1997)34 was passed not in Suit No. 8 of 1983
or in any interlocutory application in that Suit, but in an entirely
different proceeding viz. in CP No. 226/1996 Calcutta Fan
Worker’s Employees Union and Others Vs. Official Liquidator
and Others, which had no connection whatever with Suit 8
of 1983; worker’s dues were to be paid from out of the

Rs. 70 lacs got credited by the Official Liquidator (from
separate funds in his hands) in the non-Receiver’s account -
the 400 account - for that specific purpose.
Besides, in the course of this investigation, there was no list

of “workers” produced (by or on behalf of Justice Soumitra
Sen) to whom cheques (Exhibits C-219 to 233, Exhibit C-258
to Exhibit C-262) could be said to have been issued, so as to
establish even prima-facie (by comparison with the names on
the cheques brought on record and exhibited) that the names
tallied with the names of “identified workmen”.
(vi) all of which clearly shows a diversion from out of the ANZ
Grindlays Bank Receiver’s Account of a sum as large as
Rs. 22,83,000 - first on 22 May, 1997 to the “400 Account (the
non-Receiver’s Account (opened by Soumitra Sen in his own
name), and then by disbursements made from, out of this sum
of Rs. 22,83,000 deposited in the non-Receiver’s Account (the
400 Account) to various persons and parties, which include
an aggregate sum of Rs. 9.57 lakhs (app.) representing the
proceeds of 1835 bearer cheques (in different names) all
signed by Soumitra Sen and showing on the face of each such
cheque a Bank Stamp - with the endorsement of “Date” “Cash
paid” and address of the Branch of the bank from which “cash”
was paid.
(vii) in the Allahabad Bank Receivers Account also between

24 March, 1993 and 29 March, 1994 a sum of Rs. 4,68,000
of Receiver’s funds are shown to be withdrawn and disbursed,
withdrawals were through cheques signed by Soumitra Sen:
so that on 29 March, 1994 only Rs. 3215 remained in this
account. Five cheques (4 bearer cheques and one A/c Payee
cheque)36 aggregating to Rs. 1,39,514 which are exhibited and
shown as signed by Soumitra Sen: are in the name of third
parties from out of Receivers Funds: [unexplained by (or on
behalf of) Soumitra Sen]. Similarly in the ANZ Grindlays Bank
Receivers Account the statement of account as from
28 February, 1995 shows a sum of only Rs. 8,83,963.05p. (on
28 February, 1995) although by that date an aggregate sum
as large as Rs. 19,89,000, out of sale consideration of the
goods of which Sen was appointed Receiver, had been already
deposited in this account. This difference too has not been

explained or accounted for. Even after 28 February, 1995 till
5 May, 1995 sums aggregating to Rs. 8,65,000 were
deposited. Later on, eleven self-withdrawal-cheques (i.e.
withdrawals by Soumitra Sen) and two payments (by cheque)
to “S.C. Sarkar & Sons” and three payments towards some
credit card dues were made.37 There is no explanation about
any of these entries. Ultimately in the Allahabad Bank
Receiver’s Account - the balance as on 31 May, 2008 is shown
as “nil”;38 and in the ANZ Grindlays Bank Receiver’s Account,
the ultimate balance as on 22 March, 2000 is also shown as
“Nil”39: the account being shown as closed.
(p) In the assessment of the Inquiry Committee the positive case made
by Justice Soumitra Sen in his Written Statement of Defence as to
how the sale proceeds of the goods of which he was appointed
receiver were appropriated/invested is proven to be untrue - The
assertion in the Written Statement of Defence that “at no point of
time any monies were ever used for personal gains or were
temporarily or permanently misappropriated” is shown to be false.
(q) Even if the signed Written Statement of Defence - not being on oath
- be disregarded, especially since Justice Soumitra Sen himself did
not appear personally before the Inquiry Committee to affirm its
contents as true, even then, it is apparent from the aforesaid
evidence brought on record that there has been a large scale
diversion / conversion of the funds (sale-proceeds of Rs. 33,22,800)
in the hands of the Receiver in breach of and in violation of the
orders of the Court appointing Soumitra Sen as Receiver - a
diversion / conversion of funds for purposes which were totally
unauthorised and remain unexplained.
(2) Conduct of Justice Soumitra Sen in relation to the events recited

above after December 3, 2003
All that is stated above took place during the period when Soumitra Sen
Receiver was an Advocate. The assessment of the Inquiry Committee is that
as Advocate - and as officer of the High Court of Calcutta - Soumitra Sen’s
conduct (his various acts and omissions prior to 3 December, 2003) was
wrongful and not expected of an Advocate: an officer of the High Court. But
his conduct - in relation to matters concerning the moneys received during
his Receivership - after he was appointed a Judge was deplorable: in no way
befitting a High Court Judge. It was an attempt also to cover-up not only his
infractions of orders of the Calcutta High Court but also, by the making of false
statements, it revealed an attempt also to cover up the large-scale defalcations
of Receiver’s funds - details of which are set out below:
(a) After he was appointed a Judge on 3 December, 2003 no application

was made by him for his discharge as Receiver, nor has he been
at any time, discharged of his duties as Receiver. By order dated
3 August, 200440 (in Application No: GA875/2003)41; - an application
filed by the plaintiff (Steel Authority of India) in Suit No:8 of 1983 -
the Calcutta High Court had appointed another advocate (Mr.
Soumen Bose) as Receiver, not of the sale proceeds of goods that
had been sold by the erstwhile Receiver; but as Receiver for sale
of a small portion of the remaining goods unsold (i.e. 4.311 metric
tonnes); which had not been thus far sold by the “erstwhile Receiver”
(i.e. by Soumitra Sen).42
(b) After his elevation as a Judge (in December 2003) Justice Soumitra
Sen did not seek any permission from the Court, which appointed
him Receiver- even ex-post-facto - to ratify or approve of his
dealings with the sale-proceeds under his Receivership, nor did he
file any application informing the Court as to what had happened
to those funds.
(c) It is the admitted position on record that no accounts whatever have

been filed in the Calcutta High Court as directed by the Order dated
30 April, 198443 appointing Soumitra Sen as receiver (also required
by Ch. XXI of the Calcutta High Court Original Side Rules). As a
matter of fact in one of the orders passed by the Single Judge of
the Calcutta High Court dealing with Suit No. 8 of 1983 it appears
that the Presiding Judge made specific inquiries with the Registry
of the Calcutta High Court as to the filing/non-filing of Receiver’s
accounts by Soumitra Sen, and that Inquiry resulted in a Report
dated 20 July, 200544 filed by the Accounts Department of the
Calcutta High Court (so recorded in Court Order dated 21st July
2005)45 that “no accounts has been filed by the erstwhile Receiver
in the aforesaid suit though collections have been made.........”
(d) As to the sale proceeds of Rs. 33,22,800 that had already been
paid over to the erstwhile Receiver Mr. Soumitra Sen, the events
that took place after Soumitra Sen, was appointed a Judge of the
Calcutta High Court, show a complete lack of consciousness by the
Judge of his position and responsibility as a Judge of the Calcutta
High Court. The conduct of the Judge was at first to avoid saying
anything to the Court that had previously appointed him as Receiver,
and to avoid and evade all attempts by the Court to obtain
information from him; and then, when that was no longer possible,
to make a positive misstatement to the Court - and that too on sworn
affidavit (of his mother, on his behalf, as constituted attorney) on
the basis of which, treating it as true, a Division Bench of the High
Court of Calcutta passed judgment dated 25 September, 200746 in
favour of Soumitra Sen. All these somewhat sordid events are all
brought on record of the present proceedings and are, briefly set
out below:
(i) that before Soumitra Sen became a Judge, a letter dated

7 March, 2002 47 was addressed by plaintiff’s Advocate
(advocate for the Steel Authority of India in Suit No: 8 of 1983)
calling upon Soumitra Sen to furnish the Accounts in respect
of sale proceeds of the goods sold by him as Receiver. (In
his Written Statement of Defence filed on 3 May, 2010 Justice
Sen states that he did not personally receive this letter). On
the strength of there being no response, to this letter of
7 March, 2002, the plaintiff (Steel Authority of India in Suit 8 of
1983) moved the Court by filing an application GA 875/0348
on 27 February, 2003 for an order inter-alia for rendition of
accounts and deposit of the sale proceeds in Court.
(ii) after being served with specific Orders dated 7 March, 200549
and 3 May, 200550 passed in G.A. 875/2003 (in Suit 8 of 1983)
after Sen had became a Judge on 3 December, 2003 - he
was requested by the Court “to swear an affidavit either by
himself or through any authorised agent as he may think fit
and to state what steps he had taken and how much amount
he had received on account of sale in terms of the Order of
this Court”; he was also required to state on affidavit “in which
Bank or Branch the sales proceeds has been deposited” and
required to “annex the copy of the receipts of deposits or send
in a sealed cover all documents and passbook, if any, to the
Registrar, Original Side Calcutta High Court who in his turn,
shall produce the same before this Court on the next date of
hearing” - despite this specific and detailed order: Justice
Soumitra Sen simply ignored it - he did not comply. No affidavit
was filed by Justice Sen in GA875/2003 nor did he make any
statement, nor did he choose to appear before the Court at
the hearing of application No. GA 875/2003 - either through
Counsel or by any other representative: nor was it then his

contention (as it is now) that his appointment as a Judge in
December 2003 was itself an affirmation of good conduct as
Receiver prior to 3 December, 2003: since the appointment
must have been made after full knowledge by all the
authorities concerned about his dealings as Receiver. Such
an implausible argument now made in the present
proceedings is an argument that requires only to be stated in
order to be rejected.
(iii) by the Order dated 17 May, 0551 a Judge of the Calcutta High
Court after being satisfied that the copy of the Application No.
GA875 of 2003 had been duly served on Justice Soumitra
Sen, put on record (of GA875/2003) the affidavit 52 of the
purchaser of the goods, (of which Soumitra Sen had been
appointed receiver) in respect of particulars of payment for the
price of goods sold and delivered, and recorded that a sum
of Rs. 33,22,800/- had been paid to the Receiver on various
dates commencing from 25 February, 1993 upto 30 April,
1995; the same order stated that a copy of the affidavit of the
purchaser should be supplied to the erstwhile Receiver and
“it would be open to the Receiver to file an affidavit if so
advised either by himself or authorised agent dealing with
statements and averments made by the petitioner (the plaintiff
Steel Authority of India) as well as the purchaser”. In response,
no such affidavit was filed. Since the order of 17 May, 2005
was ‘shown to have been served53 on Justice Soumitra Sen;
as the Single Judge noted: “inspite of service none appeared
to say anything about this matter.” The Single Judge then
proceeded to record that: “this Court has no option but to make
an inquiry as to what happened to payments said to have been
received by the erstwhile Receiver.”
(iv) the proceedings in GA 875 of 2003 then dragged on till

10 April, 2006 (the relevant orders have been brought on
record). Justice Soumitra Sen did not comply with any of the
orders dated 7 March, 200554, 3 May, 200555, and 17 May,
200556 (passed in GA 875/2003) by filing an affidavit nor by
making any statement to the court; nor did he even appear
through Counsel or otherwise, (in GA 875/2003) on any of
the following dates of hearings viz. 30 June, 2005 57 ,
21 July, 2005 58, 26 July, 2005 59, 7 September, 2005 60,
4 October, 200561, 12 December, 200562, 9 January 200663,
1 February, 200664, 15 February, 200665 and 1 March, 200666 -

All this ultimately led the Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court
(who was in seisin of GA 875 of 2003) to direct (by Order dated
10 April, 200667) Justice Soumitra Sen to pay up Rs. 52,46,454
being the sum of money assessed as the amount which ought
to have been in his hands as Receiver: (viz. Rs. 33,22,800, plus
5% interest thereon upto 1 April, 2003, and 9 percent interest
on the principal sum from 2 Arpil, 2003 till 1 April, 2006 - after
adjusting an amount of Rs. 5 lakhs already paid by Soumitra
Sen to plaintiffs Advocate, and after deducting Receiver’s
remuneration). Without any protest on the part of Justice
Soumitra Sen, this order was complied with - not questioned
or challenged by him in appeal or in any other proceeding.
Without demur, Justice Soumitra Sen in compliance with the
Order dated 10 April, 2006 made a part payment of Rs. 40 lakhs
on 27 June, 2006 and 15 September, 2006 (from what source
it is not revealed) and then sought more time for depositing the
balance by moving application GA 2968/0668.
(v) the Application, GA2968/2006, dated 14 September, 2006 was

the first application made on his behalf as Receiver after
Soumitra Sen became a Judge in December 2003; it was
moved not in his own name but in the name of his mother as
his constituted attorney. Its significance for the present purpose
lies in the fact that no mention whatever was made in this
application as to how the money received by the Receiver
(Soumitra Sen) had been dealt with or invested. This
application merely sought time for paying the balance of over
Rs. 12 lakhs - in this application it was submitted “that in the
event this Hon’ble Court permits the said Receiver to deposit
the remaining balance amount within 2 weeks after the long
vacation of this Hon’ble Court it will be helpful for the erstwhile
Receiver.” In the application no grievance was made about
the adverse comments of the Single Judge about Justice
Soumitra Sen’s conduct in his Order dated 10 April, 2006. The
Single Judge who heard GA2968/2006 granted Justice
Soumitra Sen the time he had requested; the balance payment
was then made by Justice Soumitra Sen on 21 November,
2006 - again without protest, and not even “without prejudice”:
no explanation being offered as to from what source this
further large sum was paid. The order of 10 April, 2006 was
accepted and acted upon.
(vi) after he had fully complied with the Order dated 10 April, 200669
directing payment of the entire adjudged sum of
Rs. 52,46,454.00, and after having taken advantage of the
further order of the Single Judge extending time for payment
as requested by Sen, on 15 December, 2006, it was for the
first time that Justice Soumitra Sen got filed through his
constituted attorney (his mother) another interlocutory
application GA 3763 of 200670 in Suit No. 8 of 1983 - for
expunging of adverse comments and prejudicial remarks made
by the Single Judge of Calcutta High Court in his previous
Order dated 10 April, 2006 - as stated above this was after
having accepted and acted on the order dated 10 April, 2006
by paying back the entire sum of Rs. 52,46,454.00 as directed
by the Judge. Even in this application Justice Soumitra Sen
did not question the Single Judge’s order dated
10 April, 200671 directing him to pay Rs. 52,46,454/-, nor did
he dispute his personal liability to repay the amounts received
by him as Receiver nor did he question the assessment of
the quantum (fixed by the High Court) that had to be repaid.
However a significant feature of this Application GA No. 3763/
0672 dated 15 December, 2006 was that it was supported by
an affidavit dated 13 December, 200673 of the mother, of Justice
Soumitra Sen, in which affidavit in paragraph 6 it was stated
(on behalf of Justice Sen) for the first time that the sale
proceeds (Rs. 33,22,800) received by him “were deposited in
the Bank Accounts but were subsequently invested in a public
limited Company, viz. Lynx India Ltd. (now in liquidation) in
order to earn more interest”. (sic) GA 3763/2006 was finally
disposed off on 31 July, 200774 by the Single Judge of Calcutta
High Court by recording due compliance of his previous Order
passed on 10 April, 2006 75 viz. of that payment of
Rs. 52,46,454/- made by the erstwhile Receiver. However the
Single Judge declined to expunge any remarks / observations
contained in his previous Order passed on 10 April, 2006. It
is this Order dated 31 July, 2007 (refusing to expunge adverse
remarks in the order dated 10 April, 2006) that was challenged
by Justice Soumitra Sen - again through his mother as
constituted Attorney by filing Memorandum of Appeal APOT
462/07 (later numbered as APO 415/07).76 In Ground XIII of
the Memorandum of Appeal dated 29 August, 2007 filed on
behalf of Justice Soumitra Sen (through his mother as
constituted attorney): - against the judgment (dated 31 July,

2007) of the Single Judge - it was stated as follows:
“XIII. FOR THAT the Learned Judge failed to appreciate

that all the investments made by the erstwhile Receiver in the
company were by way of cheques drawn on ANZ Grindlays
Bank, Account No. 01SLP0156800 maintained in the personal
name of the erstwhile Receiver. This would be borne out from
the documents disclosed by the Official liquidator as also from
the documents exhibited by the Standard Chartered Bank. This
has also been stated in the notes submitted on behalf of the
petitioner.”(Emphasis supplied)*.
(vii) the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in its judgment
dated 25 September, 200777 allowed the appeal and directed
the expunging of all comments and observations made in the
Order dated 10 April, 2006 of which the expungment was
sought, and held that the Single Judge had acted without
jurisdiction in making such comments. The Division Bench78 -
after referring to the explanation given on behalf of Justice
Soumitra Sen (in the affidavit dated 13 December, 2006), and
obviously conscious of the further statements made in Ground
XIII of the Memorandum of Appeal (quoted above) went on
to say:
* “When the Account Opening form of ANZ Grindlays Bank Church Lane Branch,
Account No: 01SLP0156800 was got produced in examination in chief through witness
CW-5, Manager (Internal Services Standard Chartered Bank, formerly ANZ Grindlays
Bank), in cross-examination Counsel for the Justice Soumitra Sen (Respondent) put
it to him (CW-5) that the account opening form of OSLP0156800 was not the account
of the respondent (Justice Soumitra Sen), and elicited from him the answer “Probably
not”. CW-5 said, in further cross-examination, that the “signature and the address
mentioned is not matching with that of the respondent.” (Soumitra Sen); the Account
number mentioned in Ground XIII was thus admittedly not the account of Soumitra
Sen who had been appointed Receiver of the goods but it was an account of a person
with the same name “Soumitra Sen” who was Sales Promoter of Food Specialities
Ltd. (See Exhibits C-304, C-303, & C-301)”! The Account number of ANZ Grindlays
Bank Church Lane Branch opened in the name of the Respondent “Soumitra Sen”
was No:01SLP0632800; a different number from Account No: 01SLP0156800 of an
entirely different person also having the same name: “Soumitra Sen”. By characterising
this Account No: 01SLP0156800 as “an account in the personal name of the erstwhile
Receiver” which it was not, the statement in Ground XIII was obviously false and
misleading: even if the number of the account had been given as 01SLP0632800,
the statements made in Ground XIII would still have been incorrect and misleading.
“There was no evidence of any kind to show that the said

erstwhile Receiver had done anything benefiting himself. On the
contrary, the records showed, the money had been deposited
with a finance company by the erstwhile Receiver, but as the
company was wound up the money could not be recovered ....
“ and that “there was no misappropriation of any kind by the
said erstwhile Receiver.”
The Division Bench then concluded:
“The findings of the learned Single Judge are based without

any material of any kind. It is not understood how a finding of
breach of trust, criminal or otherwise, could be made not it is
also understood how any comment could be made that there
was any misappropriation. The Order of learned Single Judge
is entirely without jurisdiction and not supported by the facts
on record”.
V. Events subsequent to the judgment (order dated 25 September, 2007

of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in APOT 462 of 2007
(also AP0415 of 2007):
Despite the exoneration by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court of
Justice Soumitra Sen his conduct tantamount to “misappropriation” of funds
of which he had taken charge of as Receiver, 58 members of the Rajya Sabha
(as already mentioned) gave Notice of a Motion in the Rajya Sabha - initiating
the process for removal of Justice Soumitra Sen as Judge of the Calcutta High
Court. The Motion having been admitted on 27 February, 2009 by the Hon’ble
Chairman, the present (re-constituted) Inquiry Committee was entrusted with
the task of investigating and making its Report on definite charges arising out
of the misconduct of Justice Soumitra Sen set out in the Motion. During this
investigation Counsel for the Justice Sen relied, very strongly, on the judgment
dated 25 September, 200779 of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court
to contend that the entire proceedings under the 1968 Act were without
jurisdiction, and that no proceedings could be taken against Justice Soumitra
Sen as long as this Division Bench judgment had not been recalled or set aside;
that its findings were binding on this Inquiry Committee. This, along with some
other contentions raised, must now be dealt with.
VI. Remaining contentions and submissions made on behalf of Justice

Soumitra Sen:
It was inter-alia contended on behalf of Justice Soumitra Sen as follows:

(1) A Receiver appointed by a High Court is answerable to the Court

which appoints him and no one else and therefore the Inquiry
Committee could not inquire into the conduct of the Receiver.
(2) No action against the Receiver appointed by a High Court could

be instituted or taken without leave of that Court which appointed
him the Receiver.
(3) That the Calcutta High Court, subject only to the Appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, is the sole and exclusive authority
to prepare, maintain and preserve its own record, an inquiry into
the records of the High Court (which would include its judgments)
was impermissible by anybody or any authority whatever other than
the High Court itself (or the Supreme Court of India).
(4) Non-filing of accounts by a Receiver was a matter to be investigated

into and adjudged by the Court that appointed the Receiver and no
conclusions could be drawn that were adverse to Justice Soumitra
Sen on the basis of his not having submitted any accounts -
as directed in the order appointing him as a Receiver dated
30 April, 1984.
(5) That at the time of “elevation” of Soumitra Sen as Judge of the

Calcutta High Court his appointment as receiver was known to the
Calcutta High Court Judges and therefore it is reasonable to
presume that the Judges of the Supreme Court were also aware
of the same and that the Government and the President of India
were also aware of this fact: therefore his appointment by the
President of India as Judge could not be set at naught “unless the
charges against him are proved beyond reasonable doubt.”
In the opinion of the Committee none of these contentions merit serious

consideration for the following reasons:
(A) As regards the first three contentions - Re: (1), (2) and (3) mentioned
above:-
(i) as already mentioned, the proceedings before this Inquiry

Committee are taken pursuant to the provisions of the Judges
Inquiry Act, 1968 and the Notification issued thereunder. The Motion
of 58 members of the Rajya Sabha admitted by the Hon’ble
Chairman records as under:
“Motion received under article 217 read with article

124(4) of the Constitution.
admitted the following Motion received from Shri Sitaram Yechury and
other Members (total fifty-seven) the notice of which was given under
article 217 read with article 124(4) of the Constitution of India:-
“This House resolves that an address be presented

to the President for removal from office of Justice Soumitra
Sen of the Calcutta High Court on the following two grounds
of misconduct:
(i) misappropriation of large sums of money, which he

received in his capacity as receiver appointed by the
High Court of Calcutta; and
(ii) misrepresented facts with regard to the

misappropriation of money before the High Court of
Calcutta.”
(ii) the Proceedings before the Rajya Sabha (even assuming that they
could have been challenged elsewhere) have not been so
challenged by or on behalf of Justice Soumitra Sen - either before
any appropriate Court or before any other authority. This Inquiry
Committee appointed by Notification dated 16 December, 2009 must
proceed on the basis that the Motion (which has been kept pending)
is valid. Contentions (1), (2) and (3) above are in the teeth of the
Motion admitted in the Rajya Sabha, and any contention which in
effect questions the very admission of the Motion by the Chairman
of the Rajya Sabha is beyond consideration of the Inquiry
Committee. When Parliament speaks by Legislation or by
Resolution or by Motion, no one has the authority to question it -
certainly not a Committee constituted in pursuance of that Motion.
(iii) where a party files a suit against a receiver in his capacity as a

receiver he cannot do so without leave of the court that appointed
the receiver; but it cannot be lawfully contended that a Resolution
or Motion in Parliament, or in one of its Houses, requires leave of
any Court: it is the sole and exclusive right and privilege of
Parliament to institute or not institute proceedings for the removal
of a High Court Judge and it is the sole and exclusive right and
privilege of the Presiding Officer of either House of Parliament to
admit a Motion with respect to “misconduct” alleged against a Judge

whether in respect of his duties as a receiver or otherwise.
(iv) the fact that the Calcutta High Court is a “Court of Record” cannot
be gainsaid, but the investigation before the Inquiry Committee is
not into the “records of the High Court” as was sought to be argued.
The judgment dated 25 September, 200780 of the Division Bench
of the Calcutta High Court which has been relied upon by Justice
Soumitra Sen is not a judgment in rem but a judgment inter-parties:
it exonerates the Judge from all adverse remarks and criticism
made by the Single Judge in his judgment dated 10 April, 200681;
the finding in the judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta
High Court that there has been no “misappropriation” by Justice Sen
is a finding that may be binding on the parties in Suit No. 8 of 1983;
but no more. It cannot and does not exonerate the Judge from being
proceeded with in Parliament under proviso (b) of Article 217 (1)
read with Article 124(4). The observations in the judgment dated
25 September, 2007 of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High
Court to the effect that there was no misappropriation of receiver
funds by Justice Soumitra Sen was, after considering the
uncontested affidavit filed on his behalf by his mother (set out
above) which categorically asserted that the entire sum received
by him from the sale of goods (Rs. 33,22,800/-) was invested in
Lynx India Ltd., and that that company had gone into liquidation a
couple of years later: this statement (alongwith the further
misleading and false statements in Ground XIII of the Memorandum
of Appeal quoted above: were material misrepresentations made
by and on behalf of Justice Soumitra Sen before the Division Bench
of the High Court of Calcutta. The finding by the Division Bench in
its judgment dated 25 July, 2007 that Justice Soumitra Sen was not
guilty of any misappropriation was made on a totally erroneous
premise induced by false representations made on behalf of Justice
Soumitra Sen.
(v) the records of the Calcutta High Court in the form of the judgment
of the Division Bench remain intact, they are not in any way affected
by the Motion before the Rajya Sabha nor by the Report of this
Inquiry Committee. The foundation of the charge against Justice
Soumitra Sen is one of conduct amounting to “misbehaviour”, which
was not the subject matter of consideration before the Division
Bench of the High Court of Calcutta.
(B) Re: (4) - The submission in contention (4) set out above is untenable. That
Soumitra Sen as receiver did not submit any accounts whether when he was
an advocate or after he became a Judge, and thus violated the order appointing
him as receiver, is a clear instance of “misconduct” tantamount to
“misbehaviour” especially since Justice Soumitra Sen used his position as a
Judge of the High Court by filing an affidavit of his mother (as his own
constituted attorney) making the (mis)statement that he had invested the entire
sum of Rs. 33,22,800/- with Lynx India Ltd.,) which is proven to be a false
statement. This affidavit was made in proceedings for expunging adverse
remarks made by the Single Judge in his previous judgment dated 10.4.2006;
this affidavit was relied upon by Justice Sen inter-alia before the Division Bench
of High Court and it was by relying on this affidavit - affirmed again in ground
XIII in the Memorandum of Appeal (quoted above) - that the entire amount of
Rs. 33,22,800/- had been invested in Lynx India Ltd. Which had thereafter gone
into liquidation - that the Division Bench (on a misrepresentation by Justice
Sen - obviously not known at the time by the Division Bench to be a
misrepresentation) concluded that there was in fact no misappropriation of any
of the Receiver’s funds by Soumitra Sen.
(C) Re: (5) Contention No. 5 above is untenable. A Resolution for the removal
of a Judge under proviso (b) to Article 217 (1), read with Article 124 (4), has
nothing whatever to do with his appointment as a Judge; it is because he had
already been appointed as Judge that these Articles would come into play if
the ground for his removal (viz. “proved misbehaviour”) so warrant.
VII. Acknowledgements:
Before recording findings on the charges, it remains to acknowledge, not as

a matter of form - but in earnest and with sincerity - the role of the advocates
appearing on both sides of the case. Their role and conduct was exemplary:
the Inquiry Committee is indebted to Senior Advocate Mr. Siddharth Luthra and
the Advocates assisting him, the Committee is also indebted to Senior Advocate
Mr. Shekhar Naphade, and the Advocates assisting him - for the hard work
that they have put into the case. Each of them have fully co-operated with the
Committee in the course of the entire proceedings: during evidence and at
the time of arguments. Mr. A. Sinha, Secretary appointed to the Inquiry
Committee has rendered yeoman service in ensuring timely attendance of
witnesses from Kolkata and production of records, preparing the bundles of
Exhibits, and in most efficiently performing the other manifold duties of his
office. The Inquiry Committee also wishes to acknowledge its grateful thanks
to the entire Staff who have worked tirelessly throughout these proceedings
whom the Committee desires to mention by name: viz. Shri Pramod K. Goel,
Executive Officer; Shri Jayanta Kumar Ruje, Assistant; as well as other members
of the Staff viz. Shri Manoranjan Gouda, P.A.; Kumari Jugnu Khan, Mohammad
Ajmal Khan, Shri Sajjan Lal, Shri Prabhati Lal, and Shri Surendra Kumar.
VIII. Findings of the Inquiry Committee:
Charge I Findings
MISAPPROPRIATION Duly proved - as set out in

(i.e. misappropriation of large sums of Part IV of the Report.
money, which he received in his capacity
as receiver appointed by the High Court
of Calcutta)
Charge II Findings
Making False Statement–Misrepresented Duly proved - as set out in

facts with regard to the misappropriation Part IV of this Report.
of money before the High Court of Calcutta
In view of the findings on Charge I and Charge II above, the Inquiry Committee
is of the opinion that Justice Soumitra Sen of the Calcutta High Court is guilty
of “misbehaviour” under Article 124(4), read with proviso (b) to Article 217(1)
of the Constitution of India.
Presiding Officer
(Justice B. Sudershan Reddy)
Judge, Supreme Court of India
Member Member
(Justice Mukul Mudgal) (Fali S. Nariman)
Chief Justice of Punjab & Senior Advocate,
Haryana High Court Supreme Court of India
ANNOTATIONS - EXHIBITS WITH REFERENCE TO THE

TEXT OF THE REPORT
1. Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. 48A) page-614.
“As a general rule, disciplinary or removal proceedings

relating to Judges are suigenerie and are not civil or criminal
in nature; and their purpose is to inquire into judicial conduct
and thereby maintain standards of judicial fitness.”
2. Delhi Judicial Services Association Vs. State of Gujarat - AIR 1991 S.C.
2176 paras - 12 and 13; Devi Prasad Vs. Maluram Singhani and others
1969(3) SCC 595 (3J) at para-8 page-602; Razik Ram Vs. Ch. Jaswant
Singh Chauhan 1975 (4) SCC 769 at para-15 page-776.
3. Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, (1990) page-1245.
4. From the Report of Federal Court of India (in the Archives) in respect of
charges against Mr. Justice S.P. Sinha, a Judge of the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad upon a reference made under Section 220(2)(b)
of the Government of India Act, 1935 as adapted by the India (Provisional
Constitution) Order, 1947 and the India (Provisional Constitution)
Amendment Order, 1948 - an extract from the Report has been annexed
to a Report of the Inquiry Committee under the Judges Inquiry Act, 1968
- See Annexure-F p-85 to 91 of Volume-2 (1992) in regard to investigation
and proof of the misbehaviour alleged against Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami,
Judge, Supreme Court of India.
5. Exhibit C-10.
6. Exhibit C-32.
7. Exhibit C-37.
8. Exhibit C-10.
9. Exhibit C-67+C-69.
10. Exhibit C-63, Exhibit C-143, C-144, Exhibit C-153, Exhibit C-154 &
C-59.
11. Exhibit C-85 to C-102, Exhibit C-58 and C-103.
12. Exhibit C-83 and C-84, Exhibit C-154, Exhibit C-58, C-145, Exhibit C-31
and C-54.
13. Exhibit C-70 and Exhibit C-68, C-109, C-130, C-132, C-134, C-136.
14. Exhibit C-68 and C-70.
15. Exhibit C-70 Entry No. 6, Cheque No. 624079; Five applications forms
of Lynx India Ltd Exhibit C-109, C-130, C-132, Exhibit C-134, Exhibit
C-136 Term deposits Exhibit C-111, Exhibit C-112, C-115, C-116 Receipts
Exhibit C-110, Exhibit C-129, Exhibit C-131, Exhibit C-133, Exhibit C-135.
17. Exhibit C-110, C-111, C-112, C-115 and C-116.
18. Exhibit C-63, C-143, C-144 to C-147, C-153 and C-154.
19. Exhibit C-69.
20. Section 106 of Evidence Act which reads as under:
106: Burden of proving facts especially within knowledge.
“When any fact is especially within the knowledge of

any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.”
22. Para-5 page-2 of Written Statement of defence.
23. Exhibit C-295.
24. Exhibit C-294.
25. Exhibit C-293.
26. Exhibit C-265.
27. Exhibit C-265, C-266 and C-267.
29. Exhibit C-265, C-266, C-267.
30. Exhibit C-293.
32. Exhibit C-213 to C-262.

33. Exhibit C-219 to 227; Exhibit 230 to 233; Exhibit 258 to 262.
34. Exhibit C-39.
35. Exhibit C-219 to C-227, C-230 to C-233, C-258 to C-262.
36. Exhibit C-148 to C-152.
37. Exhibit C-275 to C-279, C-297 and C-299, C-280 to C-282,

Exhibit C-285, C-286, C-288, Exhibit C-283, C-284, C-273.
38. Exhibit C-63, C-143, C-153, C-154.
39. Exhibit C-69.
40. Exhibit C-33.
41. Exhibit C-43.
42. Exhibit C-10 and C-39 and C-40
44. Exhibit C-79
45. Exhibit C-15.
46. Exhibit C-53.
47. Part of Exhibit C-43.
48. Exhibit C-43.
49. Exhibit C-11.
50. Exhibit C-12.
51. Exhibit C-13.
52. Exhibit C-54.
53. Affidavit Exhibit C-56, C-57, C-13.
54. Exhibit C-11.
55. Exhibit C-12.
56. Exhibit C-13.

57. Exhibit C-14.
58. Exhibit C-15.
59. Exhibit C-16.
60. Exhibit C-17.
61. Exhibit C-18.
62. Exhibit C-21.
63. Exhibit C-22.
64. Exhibit C-23.
65. Exhibit C-24.
66. Exhibit C-25.
67. Exhibit C-41.
68. Exhibit C-44, C-45 and C-46.
69. Exhibit C-41.
70. Exhibit C-48.
71. Exhibit C-41.
73. Exhibit C-48.
74. Exhibit C-42.
75. Exhibit C-41.
77. Exhibit C-53.
78. Exhibit C-53.
79. Exhibit C-53.
80. Exhibit C-53.
81. Exhibit C-41.

REPORT OF THE JUDGES INQUIRY
COMMITTEE (VOL. II)
RAJYA SABHA
PARLIAMENTARY BULLETIN
Part II
Nos.: 45898-45900] Friday, February 27, 2009
No.: 45898 Legislative Section
Motion received under article 217 read with article 124 (4) of the
Constitution
admitted the following Motion received from Shri Sitaram Yechury and other
Members (total fifty-seven) the notice of which was given under article 217
read with article 124 (4) of the Constitution of India:
“This House resolves that an address be presented to the President

for removal from office of Justice Soumitra Sen of the Calcutta High
Court on the following two grounds of misconduct:
(i) Misappropriation of large sums of money, which he received

in his capacity as receiver appointed by the High Court of
Calcutta; and
(ii) Misrepresented facts with regard to the misappropriation of

money before the High Court of Calcutta.”
charges leveled against you, you are requested to produce on that day all the
witnesses upon whose evidence and all the documents upon which you intend
to rely in support of your defence.
day aforementioned, the investigation into the grounds on which your removal
Given under my hand this 4th day of March 2010.
Presiding Officer,
Inquiry Committee.
Enclosures:
1. A copy of the charges framed under sub-section(2) of section 3 of the

Act.
2. Statement of grounds on which each charge is based.

STATEMENT OF GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF CHARGES
AGAINST MR. JUSTICE SOUMITRA SEN, JUDGE,
CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
A. APPOINTMENT AS RECEIVER
1. You (whilst practising as an Advocate) had been appointed as Receiver in

Civil Suit No. 8 of 1983 entitled “Steel Authority of India Limited Vs. Shipping
Corporation of India Limited & Others” by the Hon’ble High Court at Calcutta
(hereinafter referred to as “the Court”), vide order dated 30 April, 1984 on
specified terms and conditions for conducting the auction-sale of specified
quantity of Periclase Spinel Bricks (hereinafter referred to as “the Goods”).
2. In terms of the said order, you were vested with all powers provided for in
Order XL Rule 1 Clause (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. You were also
directed to take possession of the Goods together with specified documents
and papers. It was further ordered that you were to file and submit for passing
half yearly accounts in the office of the Registrar of the Court for being passed
before one of the Judges of the Court. It was further directed that you were to
make a complete inventory of the Goods at the time of taking possession
thereof.
3. Your appointment as Receiver was under the Original Side Rules of the
Court (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”), specifically Chapter XXI thereof
pertaining to ‘Receivers’ and Order XL of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
and that you were bound to comply with the same.
4. That the order dated 30 April, 1984 in Civil Suit No. 8 of 1983 was modified
by means of order dated 11 July, 1985 in Civil Suit No. 8 of 1983 to the extent
that you, as the Receiver, were permitted to act without furnishing security for
the Goods.
B. RECEIVERSHIP OVER MONIES
5. By means of order dated 20 January, 1993 in Civil Suit No. 8 of 1983,

you, as the Receiver, were directed to complete the sale and deliver the goods,
within a period of four months upon receipt of the entire price (such monies
are referred to as “sale consideration”).
6. You, as the Receiver, were specifically directed vide Order dated

20 January, 1993 to keep the sale consideration (post deduction of 5% towards
your remuneration as Receiver) in a separate account in a Bank and Branch
of your choice, and to hold the same free from lien or encumbrances and subject
to the further orders of the Court.
C. ACCOUNTS MAINTAINED BY YOU
7. That during the period from February 1993 to December 2002, you
maintained the following bank accounts:
Account Bank Branch Name Status

Number/Details
9902 Allahabad Stephen Soumitra Opened on

Bank House Sen 24.03.1993
Branch
01SLP0156800 ANZ/Standard Church Soumitra Closed on
Chartered Lane Sen 21.12.1995
Bank Branch
01SLP2089500 ANZ/Standard Church S. Sen - Closed on

Chartered Lane Recv. Suit - 08.01.1996
Bank Branch 105-1983

Chartered Lane Sen 22.03.2000
Bank Branch
(19497273) Chartered Lane Sen - Spcl. 21.05.2002
Bank Branch Officer
31534345 ANZ/Standard Church Anuradha Opened on

(33610064527) Chartered Lane Sen/ 09.03.2000
Bank Branch Soumitra and still
Sen active
8. December 1996 onwards, some amounts appear to have been deposited

by you with M/s Lynx India Limited (a company incorporated under the
provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at
12-C, Chakraberia Road (North), Ground Floor, Kolkata 700 020).
D. RECEIPT OF MONIES
9. You, as Receiver, received the sale consideration amounting to

Rs. 33,22,800/- (Rupees Thirty Three Lacs Twenty Two Thousand and Eight
Report of the Judges Inquiry Committee (Vol. II) 69
Hundred Only) in respect of the goods sold by you. The sale consideration was
received under 22 demand drafts, between 25 February, 1993 to 30 April, 1995
from the purchaser (M/s SBO Industrial Supplier) in your name.
No. Instrument Number Issuing Bank Amount

and Date
1 2 3 4
1. Demand Draft No. State Bank of India Rs. 2,25,000/-

305122 dated
25.02.1993

305125 dated
27.02.1993
3. Pay Order No. Bank of Madurai Rs. 9,000/-

002432 dated
10.03.1993
4. Pay Order No. Bank of Madurai Rs. 9,000/-

002433 dated
10.3.1993

435344 dated
3.04.1993

305171 dated
19.06.1993

305217 dated
3.08.1993
8. Demand Draft No. State Bank of India, Rs. 2,34,000/-

305245 dated Service Branch,
5.10.1993 Kolkata
1 2 3 4
9. Demand Draft No. State Bank of India Rs. 2,00,000

305343 dated
18.03.1994
10. Demand Draft No. State Bank of India Rs. 34,000/

572726 dated
18.03.1994

305348 dated
30.03.1994

305449 dated
7.06.1994

305889 dated
10.01.1995
14. Demand Draft No. State Bank of India Rs. 9,000/-

922278 dated
10.01.1995

473169 dated
13.04.1995

923990 dated
13.04.1995

473222 dated
29.04.1995

924245 dated
29.04.1995
1 2 3 4

341406 dated
29.04.1995

368155 dated
29.04.1995

151429 dated
29.04,.1995

263398 dated
29.04.1995
11. Of the 22 demand drafts received by you, 20 demand drafts (amounting

to Rs. 33,04,800/-) were drawn on State Bank of India, Service Branch, Calcutta
(now Kolkata) and 2 (amounting to Rs. 18,000/-) were drawn on Bank of
Madurai (since merged with M/s ICICI Bank).
E. MISAPPROPRIATION IN ALLAHABAD BANK ACCOUNT
12. Demand Drafts bearing No. 305122 dated 25 February, 1993 and No.
305125 dated 27 February, 1993 for Rs. 2,25,000/- each drawn on SBI were
deposited and encashed in S/B Account No. 9902 with Allahabad Bank,
Stephen House Calcutta (now Kolkata) [Account in the name of “Soumitra
Sen”], by you/on your behalf on 24 March, 1993.
13. The said portion of the sale consideration deposited in Account No. 9902
maintained with Allahabad Bank, Stephen House Branch was withdrawn,
disbursed and dealt with contrary to directions of law such that the balance in
the said account was reduced to Rs. 3,215/- as on 29 March, 1994. You
misappropriated and/or converted to your own use the sum of approximately
Rs. 4,25,000/- (Deposits made in this account less your remuneration less the
Account Balance), in violation of the orders of the Single Judge in CS No. 8/
2003 and applicable provisions of law.
F. MISAPPROPRIATION IN ANZ GRINDLAYS ACCOUNTS
14. You opened Bank Account No. 01 SLP0632800 with ANZ Grindlays (now
known as Standard Chartered Bank), Church Lane Branch, Calcutta (now

Kolkata) in or around March 1993.
15. As on 28 February,1995 you had received a sum of Rs. 24,57,000/- out of

the total sale consideration. As on 28 February, 1995, although a sum of Rs.
19,89,000/- of the sale consideration had been deposited by you in Account
No. 01SLP0632800 maintained by you with ANZ Grindlays Bank (subsequently
Standard Chartered Bank), Church Lane Branch, the total balance in the said
account was only a sum of Rs. 8,83,963.05p. At the same point in time, the
account balance in Account No. 9902 maintained with Allahabad Bank, Stephen
House Branch was negligible (approximately Rs. 5,000/-).
16. That after February 1995, you received the remaining sale consideration
amounting to Rs. 8,65,800/- and the same was credited in Account No. 01
SLP0632800 maintained by you with ANZ Grindlays Bank (subsequently
Standard Chartered Bank), Church Lane Branch on 19 April, 1995 and
6 May, 1995.
17. As on 10 June,1996 you had received the entire sale consideration of goods
sold by you as Receiver amounting to Rs. 33,22,800/-. Of this, your remuneration
(calculable @ 5%) was approximately Rs. 1,66,140/-. However, the balances in
your Bank Accounts were as under:
Account Bank Balance Comments

Number/Details (INR)
1 2 3 4
9902 Allahabad 5,439

Bank
01SLP0156800 ANZ/Standard Nil Closed on
Chartered 21.12.1995
Bank
01SLP2089500 ANZ/Standard Nil Closed on

Chartered 08.01.1996
Bank
01SLP0632800 ANZ/Standard 18,77,691.01 8,73,968/- (Term

Chartered Dep)
Bank 9,80,0001- (Term
Dep) 23,723.01
(Cash Bal)
1 2 3 4
01SLP0813400 ANZ/Standard Nil Account not

Chartered opened as yet
Bank
31534345 ANZ/Standard Nil Account not
(33610064527) Chartered opened as yet
Bank
TOTAL 18,83,130.01
18. As such on 10 June, 1996, while you had received a sum of

Rs. 33,22,800/- as sale consideration from sale of the goods under your
Receivership, you had misappropriated and/or converted to your own use at
least Rs. 12,50,000/- (Sale Consideration less the Total Balance in Banks less
your Remuneration) of such amount received by you, in violation of the orders
in Civil Suit No. 8/2003 and applicable provisions of law.
G. EVENTS OF 1997
19. That vide Order dated 20 January, 1997 passed by a Division Bench of
the Court in an Appeal arising from CP No. 226 of 1996 entitled “Calcutta Fan
Workers’ Employees’ Union and Others Vs. Official Liquidator and Others” you
were appointed as a Special Officer by the Court to receive and disburse an
amount of Rs. 70 lacs to the various claimants in those proceedings. As Special
Officer, you were directed to make such disbursements after being satisfied
about the identity of the claimants and for the said purpose, a cheque for
Rs. 70 lacs was handed over to you in those proceedings.
20. In February 1997, you opened a new Savings Bank Account bearing No.
01 SLP0813400 with ANZ Grindlays Bank, Church Lane Branch (subsequently
Standard Chartered Bank) in the name of “Soumitra Sen-Spcl. Officer”
(hereinafter referred to as “Special Officer Account”). On 7 February, 1997 a sum
of Rs. 70,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy Lacs Only) was deposited in the said
account.
21. By about 22 May, 1997 the substantial portion of the Special Officer funds
had been disbursed by you and only a sum of Rs. 2,41,411.10p remained in
the said account. You had not intermingled any other funds into Savings Bank
Account No. 01 SLP0813400 with ANZ Grindlays Bank, Church Lane Branch
(subsequently Standard Chartered Bank) till May 1997.
22. As on 22 May, 1997, there were two Fixed Deposits linked with/arising
out of funds from Savings Bank Account No. 01SLP632800 with ANZ Grindlays
Bank, Church Lane Branch (subsequently Standard Chartered Bank) for principal
sums of Rs. 8,73,968/- and Rs. 9,80,000/-.
23. You submitted a letter dated 22 May, 1997 to ANZ Grindlays Bank, Church
Lane Branch (subsequently Standard Chartered Bank) giving instructions to
break the Fixed Deposits arising out of Savings Bank Account No.
01SLP0632800 since the money was ‘needed urgently’ in order to make certain
payments. Two fixed deposits were broken and amounts (the principal along
with accrued interest) credited to your account No. 01 SLP0632800. The
account balance in this Account thus stood at Rs. 22,84,468.23p.
24. Further, on 22 May, 1997 itself you gave instructions to ANZ Grindlays
Bank, Church Lane Branch (subsequently Standard Chartered Bank) to debit
a sum of Rs. 22,83,000/- from Account No. 01SLP0632800 to Account No.
01SLP0813400 (Special Officer Account). As such, a sum of Rs. 22,83,000/-
was transferred from Account No. 01SLP0632800 to the Special Officer
Account (Account No. 01SLP0813400). As on 22 May, 1997 the account
balance in Account No. 01SLP0632800 was reduced to Rs. 1,468.23p only
and that in the Special Officer Account was enhanced to Rs. 25,73,738.66p
only.
25. Over the period 22 May, 1997 till 1 July, 1997 a series of disbursements
were made by you out of the Special Officer Account and as on 1 July, 1997
the balance in the Special Officer Account had been reduced to Rs. 19,934.66p
only. In this manner, the sale consideration of the goods was disbursed,
disposed of and dealt with between 22 May, 1997 and 1 July, 1997 and you
misappropriated and/or converted to your own use approximately
Rs. 22,00,000/- of the monies In your possession [sale consideration and
accrued interest], in violation of the directions of law.
26. That the portion of the sale consideration and accrued interest illegally
transferred by you from Savings Bank Account No. 01SLP0632800, ANZ
Grindlays Bank, Church Lane Branch (subsequently Standard Chartered Bank)
to the Special Officer Account was misappropriated and/or converted to your
own use between 22 May, 1997 and 1 July, 1997.
27. That the portion of sale consideration and accrued interest thereon obtained
by you as Receiver continued to be misappropriated and/or converted to your
own use even at the time of and subsequent to your appointment as a Judge of
the Court on 3 December, 2003.
H. ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES
28. You were obliged, by means of Order dated 30 April, 1984, the Rules and
the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, to file and submit for passing half
yearly accounts in the office of the Registrar of the Court, pertaining to the
amounts under your receivership and were to specifically show inter-alia what
the balance in hand was at each stage. That you did not, at any stage (including
after being appointed as a Judge of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court on
3 December, 2003) file any accounts in compliance with the said Order dated
30 April, 1984, the applicable Rules and the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure 1908.
29. By means of order dated 20 January, 1993 you were directed to keep the
sale consideration in a bank account. The choice of branch and bank had been
left to you. You unauthorisedly dealt with the funds by disbursing/withdrawing
them out of such bank accounts in which they had been deposited.
30. By means of order dated 20 January, 1993 you were directed to keep the
sale consideration in a ‘separate’ bank account. You allowed intermingling of
funds and did not adhere to the direction to maintain the separation of the sale
consideration from any other funds, thereby misappropriating and/or converting
to your own use, the sale consideration.
31. That you did not take any permission of the Court for dealing with,
disbursing or disposing of the sale consideration and the accrued interest in
any manner whatsoever, or to intermingle them with your personal funds or to
remove the same from Bank Accounts or in any other manner deal with the
sale consideration and the accrued interest contrary to the stipulations in the
orders dated 30 April, 1984 and 20 January, 1993, Chapter XXI of the Rules,
and the mandate of law.
32. That you failed to provide accounts even to the Plaintiff despite a letter
dated 7 March, 2002 in this regard sent by the Plaintiff and received by you.
By means of the said letter, you were requested by the Plaintiff to provide to
them the details of the amounts deposited by you, the details of such deposits
and the interest accrued thereon.
33. At the time of your appointment as a Judge of the Court, or at any time
thereafter, you did not take any steps to seek discharge from Receivership
or for return of amounts, or for furnishing any accounts in respect thereof
and continued to misappropriate/utilise the funds contrary to the directions of
law.
34. The Plaintiff instituted GA 875 of 2003 in CS 8 of 1993 seeking various

relief including directions that:-
(a) Receiver be directed to render true and faithful accounts of all monies
presently being held by him;
(b) Receiver be directed to hand over all the sale proceeds so far received
from the sale of the goods to the Plaintiff.
35. By means of order dated 7 March, 2005, the Court directed that a copy of
the order dated 7 March, 2005 along with the Notice of Motion as well as the
Petition be served upon you. You were requested to swear an affidavit either
yourself or through any authorised agent to state the steps that had been taken
by you and the amount that had been received on account of the sale of the
goods. You were also directed to state in which bank or branch the sale
proceeds had been deposited. The said order, Notice of Motion and the Petition
(GA 875 of 2003) were served upon you consequent to the order of the Court
dated 3 May, 2005.
36. However, despite service of notice and request/direction of Court in GA No.

875 of 2003 in Civil Suit 8 of 1983, by means of orders including those dated
3 May, 2005 and 17 May, 2005 passed in GA 875 of 2003 in CS 8 of 1983, you
(whilst holding office as a Judge of the Court) did not furnish any particulars
regarding the whereabouts of the sale consideration and the accrued interest,
which led the Court to pass a Judgment dated 10 April, 2006.
37. Subsequently, while holding office as a Judge of the Court, you offered an
explanation by means of applications, memorandum of appeal, affidavits, written
notes etc. that the sale consideration had been deposited with M/s Lynx India
Ltd. This explanation is found to be false and forms the subject matter of the
second charge framed against you.
38. At no stage even after being elevated as a Judge of the Court, have you
even offered an explanation or accounted for the whereabouts and/or the
method and manner of utilisation of the interest accrued on the sale consideration
from the date of deposit in your bank accounts till alleged deposits being made
with M/s Lynx India Ltd.
39. That you did not return any funds till called upon by the Court to do so by
means of order dated 10 April, 2006.
40. It is thus evident that you unauthorisedly, and in contravention of judicial

orders, Rules and directions of law, misappropriated and/or converted to your
own use, large sums of money (from the sale consideration and the accrued
interest) received in your capacity as a Receiver and thereby committed
Misappropriation of Property which constitutes ‘Misbehaviour’ under Article
124(4) read with Article 217 of the Constitution of India.
I. MISREPRESENTATIONS AND FALSE STATEMENTS
41. On 10 April, 2006, Ld. Single Judge of the Court passed a detailed Order
in GA No. 875 of 2003 in Civil Suit No. 8 of 1983 directing you to deposit a
sum of Rs. 52,46,454/- for the time being. In the said order, the Ld. Single
Judge of the Court made certain observations regarding your conduct
(hereinafter referred to as “Observations”).
42. That on 18 May, 2006 you, while holding office as a Judge of the Court,
appeared (through counsel) before the Ld. Single Judge of the Court in GA
875 of 2003 and sought time to make deposit of funds towards the satisfaction
of the order passed by the Ld. Single Judge of the Court. You (through your
constituted attorney) filed GA No. 2968 of 2006 praying therein that time to
deposit the balance amount in terms of judgment and order dated 10 April,
2006 be extended. The Court vide order dated 15 September, 2006 in GA No.
2968 of 2006 while disposing of the application also granted leave to mention
your name in the body of the petition (being GA No. 2968 of 2006), the
verification portion and in the affidavit of competency, which changes were
carried out by hand by your duly authorised counsel, Sh. Subhasis Chakraborty
on 15 September, 2006.
43. A total sum of Rs. 52,46,454/- came to be deposited in Court by you

through your counsel on various dates.
44. The Court vide order dated 20 September, 2006 in GA 875 of 2003
directed your counsel, Mr. Subhasis Chakraborty to swear an affidavit enclosing
the relevant documents to show that you had deposited the sum of
Rs. 40,00,000/- in the account of your counsel and that your counsel had
obtained Pay Orders to make payment on your behalf. The Court further
directed that your constituted Attorney also file an affidavit corroborating the
facts stated by your counsel in his affidavit.
45. Your counsel, Mr. Subhasis Chakraborty filed Affidavit dated 10 November,
2006 in GA 875 of 2003 stating therein that he had been instructed to act as
an Advocate-on-Record on your behalf in Civil Suit 8 of 1983. Mr. Subhasis
Chakraborty further stated that pursuant to orders passed by the Court, you
handed over to Mr. Subhasis Chakraborty a sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- on 27 June,
2006 and a sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- on 4 September, 2006.
Mr. Subhasis Chakraborty further stated that pursuant to instructions received

by him, he prepared drafts from the Standard Chartered Bank, Church Lane
Branch, Kolkata by depositing the said sum of Rs. 40,00,000/- in his account
and deposited the said drafts before the Registrar, Original Side of the Court.
46. In the meanwhile, by means of Order dated 10 November, 2006 the Court
took Affidavit dated 11 November, 2006 filed by your Counsel Mr. Subhasis
Chakraborty on record. The Court, vide the said order dated 10 November,
2006, noted that your constituted Attorney had not filed an affidavit in terms of
Order dated 20 September, 2006 passed by the Court in GA No. 875 of 2003
and directed you to file an affidavit explaining how the sale consideration was
dealt with after the same was withdrawn without permission of the Court. It
was observed that it would be ideal (if so advised), if the source of funds was
disclosed in the said affidavit in order that the Court be assured that the
withdrawn money had not been utilised gainfully and profitably. In the event
that the sale consideration had been utilised or invested in some other place,
then the returns from such utilisation and investment were directed to be
disclosed. It appears that you did not file any affidavit in compliance of the
said order.
47. When the matter (Civil Suit No. 8 of 1983) came up for hearing on
8 December, 2006 you, through your counsel requested for time to file an affidavit
to place on record some new facts, which time was granted.
48. You (through your constituted attorney), while holding office as a Judge of
the Court, proceeded to file GA 3763 of 2006 in Civil Suit No. 8 of 1983 before
the Ld. Single Judge seeking inter-alia, recording of compliance with Order dated
10 April, 2006 and for recalling/withdrawing/deleting the Observations, supported
by an affidavit of your constituted attorney acting under your instructions.
49. In GA 3763 of 2006 in Civil Suit No. 8 of 1983, you, through your constituted
attorney (being your mother, Smt Sumitra Sen) stated on affidavit that the sale
consideration from sale of goods received by you by means of 22 drafts, were
deposited in Bank accounts but were subsequently invested in a public limited
company, namely M/s Lynx India Limited (now in liquidation) in order to earn
more interest. The very same stand was taken in the affidavit dated 13 December,
2006 filed under your instructions and on your behalf (through your Constituted
Attorney).
50. To further support these pleas during the hearing of GA 3763 of 2006 in
Civil Suit No. 8 of 1983 and to provide correlation between the sale
consideration and the amounts lying invested with Lynx India Limited, ‘Written
Notes’ were submitted to the Court on your behalf which were taken on the
Court’s record on 25 April, 2007. In the said Written Notes, you (through your
counsel) took a stand that the sale consideration of Rs. 33,22,800/- was a part
of the total funds (amounting to Rs. 34,39,000/-) lying deposited with M/s Lynx
India Limited.
51. ln the ‘Written Notes’ submitted, you (through your counsel) further
contended that no part of the sale proceeds was ever utilised or even touched
by you; and relying upon the documents enclosed with the Report of the Official
Liquidator dated February 07, 2007 you (through your counsel) further stated
(in the Written Notes) that you had deposited the entire sale consideration with
Lynx India Limited.
52. GA 3763 of 2006 in Civil Suit No. 8 of 1983 came to be disposed of by

means of order dated 31 July, 2007 passed by the Ld. Single Judge of the
Court.
53. Aggrieved by the order dated 31 July, 2007, you (through your constituted
attorney) preferred an appeal challenging the said order before the Division
Bench of the Court, which came to be numbered as APO 415 of 2007. An
application being GA 2865 of 2007 was also filed by you.
54. In the said Memorandum of Appeal and GA 2865 of 2007 and affidavit
of your constituted attorney acting under your instructions, it was contended
that the entire money received by you from the purchaser of goods as sale
consideration was kept in a Fixed Deposit. Further you (through your
constituted attorney) again placed reliance on the Written Notes submitted
before the Ld. Single Judge (and taken on the Court’s record on 25 April, 2007)
in order to establish a correlation between the withdrawal of funds and deposit
with Lynx India Limited. You (through your constituted attorney) further
contended that:-
(a) all investments made by you in Lynx India Limited were by cheques
drawn on Account No. 01SLP0156800 maintained in your personal
name with ANZ Grindlays Bank.
(b) there was absolutely no time gap between withdrawal of amount

from your accounts and deposit with Lynx India Limited.
55. It was additionally stated by you (through your constituted attorney), while
holding office as a Judge of the Court, in GA 2865 of 2007 that the moneys
received by you were in fact utilized by you for no purpose other than for making
fixed deposits with Lynx India Limited and that no part of such deposits were
encashed or withdrawn by you.
56. You (through your constituted attorney) stated that you had deposited a
total sum of Rs. 39,39,000/- with M/s Lynx India Ltd. It was further stated by
you (through your constituted attorney) that a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- which had
been withdrawn from M/s Lynx India Ltd. was your personal funds.
57. The statements made by your constituted attorney and counsel (on your
behalf and under your instructions) in the various pleadings, applications,
memorandum of appeal, affidavits, Written Notes etc. as set out above were
false to your knowledge. All such statements were made during the period when
you were a Judge of the Court:-
(a) No deposits were made by you with M/s Lynx India Ltd. prior to
December, 1996. By March, 1994, the sale consideration deposited
in the SIB Account No. 9902 maintained with Allahabad Bank,
Stephen House Branch, Kolkata had already been withdrawn/
disbursed/dealt with by you in such a way that the balance in the
said account was negligible. As such a sum of Rs. 4,50,000/-
(approximately) of the sale consideration could under no
circumstances be deposited with M/s Lynx India Ltd. (post
December, 1996).
(b) No deposits were made by you with M/s Lynx India Ltd. prior to
December, 1996. Of the sale consideration, a sum of Rs. 28,54,800/-
had been deposited in SIB Account No. 01SLP0632800 maintained
with ANZ Grindlays Bank, (subsequently Standard Chartered Bank),
Church Lane Branch, Kolkata. By 10 June, 1996, this amount had
already been withdrawn/disbursed/dealt with in such a way that the
balance in the said account was only a sum of Rs. 18,83,130.01/-
(inclusive of accrued interest). Even making allowance for
withdrawal of your remuneration, a further sum of Rs. 8,00,000/-
(approximately) of the sale consideration was not, and could not
have been deposited with M/s Lynx India Ltd. (post December,
1996).
(c) Portion of the sale consideration and accrued interest amounting

to Rs. 22,83,000/- had been transferred by you from SIB Account
No. 01SLP0632800 maintained with ANZ Grindlays Bank
(subsequently Standard Chartered Bank), Church Lane Branch,
Kolkata to the Special Officer Account on 22 May, 1997. This amount
was then utilised by you for withdrawing/disbursing/dealing
with in such a manner that as on 1 July, 1997 only a sum of
Rs. 20,000/- (approximately) was the balance in the Special Officer
Account. Thus, Rs. 22,00,000/- (approximately) of the sale

consideration and the accrued interest was utilised by you between
22 May, 1997 and 1 July, 1997. No deposits were made with
M/s Lynx India Ltd during this period and as such this portion of
the sale consideration and the accrued interest was not, and could
not have been used for creating fixed deposits with M/s Lynx India
Ltd.
(d) You deposited a sum of Rs. 25,00,000/- with M/s Lynx India Ltd.
by means of Cheque No. 624079 drawn out of the Special Officer
Account on 27.02.1997. This was converted to five deposits of
Rs. 5,00,000/- each. As on that date, there had been no
intermingling of funds in the Special Officer Account or transfer of
funds from any other account to the Special Officer Account. Hence,
the deposit of at least Rs. 25,00,000/- in M/s Lynx India Limited is
relatable only to funds received by you in CP No. 226/1996 and not
from the sale consideration as claimed by you.
(e) The statement that the deposits in Lynx India Limited were by means
of cheques drawn on Account No. 01SLP0156800 is false. At least
Rs. 25,00,000/- had been deposited in Lynx India Limited from the
funds available in the Special Officer Account. Further, the said
Account bearing No. 01SLP0156800 had been closed by you on
21 December, 1995, prior to any deposits being made with Lynx
India Limited.
(f) The statement that there was no time gap between withdrawal of
sale consideration from your accounts and depositing the same with
Lynx India Limited is false. There is no correlation between the sale
consideration and the accrued interest with the deposits made with
Lynx India Limited.
(g) The statement that Rs. 5,00,000/- withdrawn by you from out of the
deposits made with M/s Lynx India Ltd. were your personal funds
is false. The said Rs. 5,00,000/- withdrawn from the deposits made
with M/s Lynx India Ltd. was on account of premature cancellation
of Fixed Deposit Receipt bearing No. 11351 dated 7 March, 1997.
This deposit was part of the deposits made vide Cheque No. 624079
dated 26 February, 1997 (for a total sum of Rs. 25,00,000/-) drawn
on the Special Officer Account. As on that date, the only funds
available in the Special Officer Account were those that had been
entrusted to you by the Court in CP No. 226/1996 for disbursement
to workmen. As such the Rs. 5,00,000/- withdrawn by you from

M/s Lynx India Ltd. did not represent your personal funds.
58. The pleadings, applications, memorandum of appeal, affidavits and written

notes filed before the Court in proceedings in and arising from Civil Suit 8 of
1983 and APO 415 of 2007 were submitted on your behalf, under your authority
and under your instructions. You were legally bound by an oath and/or by an
express provision of law to state the truth and/or bound by law to make a
declaration upon any subject and have made statements that are false, and
which you knew or believed to be false, or did not believe to be true.
59. That you were a Judge of the Court during the period when you gave
such false statements, misrepresentations and false evidence in judicial
proceedings before the Court.
60. You misrepresented facts with regard to the misappropriation of funds

before the Court. You, during a judicial proceeding, intentionally gave false
evidence, which constitutes ‘Misbehaviour’ under Article 124 (4) read with
Article 217 of the Constitution of India.
Dated 03.05.2010
To
The Secretary,
Judges Inquiry Committee,
Rajya Sabha Secretariat,
Vigyan Bhawan Annexe,
New Delhi-110011.
Re-Submission of Written Statements of Defence.
Dear Sir,
Enclosed please find six copies of the written statement of defence along with
seven Annexures, enclosed therein together with six sets of Volume V & VI
containing several order and communications, which shall be relied upon at
the time of hearing.
Please acknowledge the same.
Thanking you.
Your sincerely,
sd/-
(Justice Soumitra Sen)
Date: 03 May 2010
To
The Presiding Officer,

Judges Inquiry Committee,
Rajya Sabha Secretariat,
Vigyan Bhawan Annexe,
New Delhi-110011.
Sub: Reply to the Charges.
Dear Sir,
This is in response to your letter dated 5th February, 2010 received by me on

9th February, 2010, wherein I have been asked to revert to Committee in writing
dealing with the charges along with statements of ground.
Before I proceed to deal with the charges and the statement of grounds I would
like to raise certain preliminary objection to the instant inquiry, which are
required to be adjudicated and/or decided first before proceeding with the
matter.
PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
1. The Impeachment process initiated against me is outside the scope and

ambit of Article 124 (4) of the Constitution of India.
(a) All alleged acts of misconduct was prior to my elevation as Judge

of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court.
(b) There is no “proved misbehaviour or incapacity” as is the mandate

of Section 124 (4) of the Constitution of India.
REPLY ON MERITS
2. The scope and ambit of order dated 20.1.1993 was absolutely specific
and clear.
3. At no point of time I have traversed beyond the scope of order dated

20.1.1993.
4. Despite the fact that the Learned Court embarked on a Personal inquiry
with regard to my accounts which was clearly without jurisdiction and without
any basis whatsoever. However every single observation of, the Learned Court
was met with, answered and the entire monies were paid back along with
interest as was directed by the Learned Court.
5. At no point of time any monies were ever used for personal gains or were
temporarily or permanently misappropriated.
6. I have never made any false statement before the High Court.
7. It is stated that there was no occasion to return the money since:-
(a) The mandate of the orders was to complete the process of Sale
and when I was elevated the Sale was incomplete.
(b) Application seeking direction from the Court to complete the sale
and to handover the sale proceed and for Accounts was not pressed
by the concerned parties though the same was affirmed on
7 February, 2003, filed on 10 March, 2003. However it was moved
before the Hon’ble Court only on 16 July, 2004, i.e. after my
elevation.
(c) When I was elevated the sale was incomplete. No order was passed
by the Court discharging me from receivership until 3 August, 2004.
(d) The entire sale consideration was invested In the fixed deposit with
the Lynx India Private Limited which went into Liquidation in the year
1999-2000, long after the amount representing the sale
consideration was invested.
(e) For the first time the court passed an order dated 10 April, 2006
directing me to return the entire sale consideration with interest.
8. I immediately complied with the order passed by the court and paid/
deposited the amount of Rs. 52,46,454/- + Rs. 5,00,000/- inclusive of interest
when the amount of sale was Rs. 33,22,800/- and after adjusting the
remuneration of 5% the balance amount was Rs. 31,56,660/-.
9. Finally the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court vide order dated
25 September, 2007 quashed and set aside the orders dated 10 April, 2006
and 31 July, 2007 and set aside/expunged all the Observations made by the
single Judge. The Division Bench has categorically held that there was no
misappropriation either temporary or permanent or any part. It also held that
I did not make any false statement during the course of event before the Court.
10. It was the unilateral observation of the Single Judge which gave rise to
an inquiry against me and has culminated in setting up this Committee.
However since Division Bench Judgments and orders dated 25 September,
2007 has attaining finality since then, there is no occasion to make this
allegation against me.
FACTS LEADING TO THE FORMULATION OF OBJECTION
11. The actual genesis of the entire matter starts with the judgment passed
by the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court dated 10 April, 2006.
All other relevant facts would appear from a list of dates, copy of which is
annexed hereto as Annexure “A”.
12. After the judgment was passed the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India by his
letter dated 10 September, 2006 asked me to submit a fresh and final response
to the adverse judicial observations leading to complaints making allegations
of judicial misconduct and impropriety. At no point of time, the learned Single
Judge in his judgment dated 10 April, 2006 has made any observation
regarding my alleged judicial misconduct or impropriety nor any complaints
were made against me by any one whatsoever at any given point of time.
13. My response dated 28 September, 2007 was accompanied by the

judgment dated 25 September, 2007 passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench
of the High Court at Calcutta. On 3 December, 2007, the Hon’ble Chief Justice
of India wrote a letter that His Lordship was proposing to constitute a three-
member committee to institute an enquiry in the backdrop of the adverse
judicial observation made in the judgments of the learned Single Judge of the
Calcutta High Court.
14. I would like to raise the following Issues, as a preliminary objection:-
(a) From the letter dated 5 February, 2010 it appears that there are
two motions moved before the Rajya Sabha for impeachment. The
first ground cannot be the subject matter of impeachment, as it is
clearly outside the scope and ambit of Article 124(4) of the
Constitution of India read with the relevant provisions of the Judges
(Inquiry) Act, 1968. The preamble to the Judges (Inquiry) Act clearly
states as follows:-
“An Act to regulate the procedure for the investigation and

proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a judge of the
Supreme Court or a High court and for the presentation of
an address by the members of Parliament to the President
and for matters connected therewith.”
15. Past actions of a judge long prior to his elevation cannot be the subject
matter of impeachment. If past actions are brought within the ambit of Article
124(4) read with the provisions of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, it will make a
mockery of the selection process of a judge of a High Court or the Supreme
Court.
16. The constitutional mandate does not permit impeachment process to be

initiated against a judge after his elevation for alleged acts of misconduct prior
to his elevation which is itself passes through several level of scrutiny including
police verification etc. This safeguard has been provided in our constitution in
order to maintain dignity and’ independence of the judiciary. If past action of a
judge long prior to his elevation is permitted to be raised as an issue or ground
for impeachment, then anyone with a personal agenda of his own can rake
up irrelevant past issues and harass a judge of a High Court or Supreme Court
mustering enough political cloud to move a motion for impeachment.
17. The whole object and purpose of the Article 124(4) read with Judges
(Inquiry) Act is to ensure prevention of corruption and malpractice and
incapability in discharge of judicial function and for no other reasons.
18. It appears that a In-house Committee can be constituted to institute an

enquiry only if there is a complaint against a judge on two issues:–
(a) Allegations against a judge pertaining to the discharge of his judicial

functions;
(b) Conduct and behaviour of the judge outside the Court.
19. In my case from what has been stated hereinbefore with reference to the
letters of the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, it is clear, without any doubt, that
there was no complaint against me at any given point of time and the only reason
to constitute an In-house Committee to institute an enquiry was the adverse
judicial observation made in the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the
20. In absence of any complaints against me and in absence of any adverse

judicial observation against me on the given date, the In house Committee
could not have proceeded with the matter.
21. The then Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, the Hon’ble Justice V.S.
Sirpurkar dated 25 November, 2006 wrote a letter to the then Chief Justice of
India. While making observation based upon the finding of the learned Single
Judge, His Lordship in the said letter had clearly stated that even as on that
date there was no complaint against me by anyone. The relevant portion of said
letter is quoted as under:-
“Though there has been no complaint made by anybody against

Sri Sen. I deem it proper to place all these facts before your
Lordship to take an appropriate action in the matter”.
22. Having regard to the provisions of Article 124(4) of the Constitution of India
and the provisions of Judges (Inquiry) Act, it is clear that the power of
impeachment of a judge of a High Court or Supreme Court is vested with the
Parliament and not with the judiciary.
23. Rajya Sabha did not perform an independent constitutional function

as required under the Constitution of India to initiate impeachment proceedings.
As there were no third party complaints against me at any given point of time
and as the adverse judicial observations of the learned Single Judge having
been expunged from the record of the case by the Hon’ble Division Bench, it
is apparent that the members of Parliament have acted merely at the instance
of the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India when His Lordship wrote a letter to the
Prime Minister of India seeking my impeachment.
24. This entire procedure is contrary to the spirit and purpose of the
Constitution of India. It is significant to mention that even the parties to
the proceeding which culminated into the judgment of, the learned Single
Judge did not make any complaint against me either in the petition or
otherwise, on the contrary all the parties including the petitioner and the
respondent have categorically stated before the learned Single Judge as well
as before the Division that they do not wish to contest the proceeding by filing
any affidavit as they do not have any complaint against me.
25. By a letter dated 17 March, 2008, the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India wrote
to me that my explanation has failed to convince His Lordship and some of
his colleagues and, therefore, I was asked to submit my resignation or seek
voluntary retirement on or before 2 April, 2008 failing which they would proceed
in the matter and take such steps as may be deemed appropriate in public
interest and for better administration and justice.
26. The procedure adopted in this instant case by the Hon’ble Chief Justice
of India and the subsequent actions taken by some of the members of the
Rajya Sabha is a clear departure from the established procedure of law and
clearly against the spirit and purpose of the Constitution of India.
27. Under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, the appointment of the members of the
Committee is to be made either by the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha or the
Speaker of the Lok Sabha as the case may be.
28. It appears from the various documents relied upon by the Committee in
forming grounds in support of charges, there are several depositions of
witnesses which have been relied upon. These depositions were taken by the
Single Judge. Apart from the fact that the Single Judge had no authority to
examine witnesses without any suit or proceedings filed against me for which
under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, leave is required to be obtained, such
depositions were taken behind my back without affording any opportunity to
me to cross-examine such witnesses.
INCORRECT PROCEDURE ADOPTED BY THE SINGLE JUDGE AND

CONSEQUENTIAL INJUSTICE METED OUT TO ME
29. If we look into the judgment of the Single Judge, we will find that in the
first judgment dated 10 April, 2006 the Single Judge has justified the inquiry
made against me by holding that I did not come forward to give any explanation
in spite of repeated opportunity. The expression repeated opportunity has a
different connotation in the eye of law and even in common parlance it means
more than once.
30. Moreover, when a court does not wish to grant any further time to a party
to the proceeding, it should be clearly stated that time fixed was peremptory
or that a last chance was being afforded.
31. I, accordingly, moved a recalling application giving my explanation after

going through various documents called for by the Single Judge. He observed
that he “neither believed me nor disbelieved me and disposed of the
application by giving opportunity to file a fresh petition with proper
materials.”
32. It is, therefore, obvious, that the Single Judge when faced with the
materials on record could not come to a positive finding of guilt on my part or
otherwise my recalling application should have been rejected and dismissed
and not disposed of with an opportunity to file a fresh petition with further
materials. It is needless to mention here that the Division Bench after going
through the same materials on record has accepted my explanation and the
interpretation of the materials on record made by my Counsel.
33. The Single Judge gave direction to serve copies of petition and orders
to the Department which were not necessary at all, knowing fully well that at
the material point of time as a Judge, I was regularly attending court and was
discharging my judicial function.
34. My Chamber in the High Court premises and my residential address is

known to all. Even a common litigant gets a better opportunity of presenting
his case before a court of law than what was afforded to me before passing
the judgment dated 10 April, 2006.
35. The application filed by the plaintiff which resulted in the said judgement
dated 10 April, 2006 was filed sometime in the month of March, 2003, almost
9 months before my elevation which I came to know in November, 2003 when
I requested the plaintiff’s advocate to take necessary steps for my discharge
and obtain an order with regard to repayment of the amount held by me as a
Receiver.
36. The said application which was for similar reliefs was heard for the first
time on 3 August, 2004 by another Single Judge who discharged me from
further acting as a Receiver and appointed another Receiver in my place and
stead.
37. However, no direction to pay the amount held by me as a Receiver was

passed nor the copy of the said order was ever served upon me. It is significant
to mention here that the application of the plaintiff was also not served upon
me until the time hereinafter mentioned.
38. The concerned Single Judge heard the matter for the first time on
15 February, 2005 when it was treated as part heard without any prayer
being made by any of the parties to the said proceeding and directed
the entire matter to be kept in a sealed cover and no direction to serve
a copy of the application was passed.
39. On 7 March, 2005 the Single Judge for the first time gave a direction to
serve a copy of the application along with notice of motion to me as the copy
of the application was not served upon me earlier. It is obvious that at that
juncture I was not even asked to appear before the court but the Single Judge
in his order dated 7 March, 2005 directed that the copy of the application be
served upon the purchaser who had purchased the materials almost over a
decade ago.
40. If I may say so with utmost respect and humility the Single Judge had by
that time already made up his mind as to what orders he will pass and
all that was done in court like serving of copies of order, carrying out
investigation etc. were all a means for the end.
41. The order dated 7 March, 2005 contained direction upon me to file
affidavit giving details of purchase consideration. The said order also was
not served upon me. This will be apparent from the fact that by another order
dated 3 May, 2005 Single Judge gave further direction for service to be made
through the advocate on record of the plaintiff as the earlier order dated
7 March, 2005 was not served upon me.
42. On 17 May, 2005, the Single Judge passed another order wherein
direction was given to serve copy of the affidavit filed by the purchaser upon
me and if so advised deal with the averments contained in the petition filed
by the plaintiff and the affidavit filed by the purchaser. As there was no allegation
by the plaintiff and I was not disputing the fact that I received monies as stated
by the purchaser as a Receiver towards purchase consideration, I was advised
not to file any affidavit as nothing was required to be controverted.
43. By an order dated 30 June, 2005, the Single Judge gave detailed direction
for conducting an investigation on the incorrect basis that in spite of repeated
opportunity I have not come forward to give any explanation before the court.
44. It is significant to point out here that at that stage I did not even appoint
an advocate to appear on my behalf because I did not even know as to what
are the directions which have been passed by the Court from time to time.
45. Subsequent thereto various orders were passed which are dated 21 July,
2005, 26 July, 2005, 7 September, 2005, 7 October, 2005, 21 November, 2005
and 1 October, 2006. None of these orders were served upon me. Witnesses
were brought under subpoena and questions were put by the learned Single
Judge himself, as if it was a trial of a suit or trial on evidence being conducted
by the Single Judge but unfortunately I was not even informed about the same
nor any opportunity given to me to cross examine such witnesses.
46. I, therefore, wish to conclude by saying that the finding against me by

the Single Judge that in spite of repeated opportunity I did not come forward
to give an explanation and therefore he had no other option but to conduct
self-investigation in court.
THE CHARGES ARE ANSWERED AS UNDER
1. Misappropriation
2. Making False Statements

MISAPPROPRIATION
47. Primarily the Single Judge came to the conclusion of misappropriation of

money held by me as a Receiver on the fact that after having deposited Rs. 25
lacs to Lynx from account No. 01SLP0813400 (hereinafter referred to as 400
account) I deposited Rs. 22 lacs and odd from 400 account and thereafter
systematically withdrew the same to an undisclosed place thereby reducing to
a mere sum os Rs. 811.56. Unfortunately, my explanation that these withdrawals
were towards payment of workers’ dues pursuant to a Division Bench order dated
20 January, 1997 passed by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Umesh Chandra Banerjee and
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sidheshwar Narayan was totally ignored by the Single Judge
and also the In-house Committee and apparently by this Committee too.
48. For the first time evidence of such withdrawals have been produced which
in spite of my best effort I could not produce earlier. Copies of the cheques
disclosed in pages 521 to 581 in Vol. I and pages 1575 to 1607 in Vol. III, if
produced before the Single Judge it would have reversed his finding on the
said issue and would have cleared his doubt that these were not secret
undisclosed withdrawals by me for my personal benefit but genuine payments
made to genuine workers.
49. Whatever the amount and whoever the workers were quantified and
identified by the union were placed before me I had issued the cheques and
everybody has received his payment. Therefore, the finding of misappropriation
by the Single Judge on this issue is clearly controverted by evidence on record
disclosed for the first time in his proceeding. I fail to understand how this
Committee could call for these cheques whereas the learned Single
Judge, in spite of being told that the withdrawals are not personal
withdrawals but payment to workers, had deliberately not directed the
Bank to produce the copies of the cheques whereas all other documents
had been called for.
50. Such vital piece of evidence were absent before the learned Single Judge,
before the Division Bench and before the In-house Committee, which I am
sure if shown would have at least come to a different conclusion with regard
to the misappropriation based on the said withdrawals.
51. Though this Committee constituted under the Judges (Inquiry) Act is
conducting an independent inquiry but the materials on record relied upon by
this Committee appears to be almost all that where before the earlier
proceedings except the ones that has been referred to hereinbefore. All
throughout I submitted and have always maintained that I have never
withdrawn a single penny from 400 account or from any other account for my
personal benefit. This is for the first time evidence has come forward to establish
my contention that withdrawals in account no. 400 were not for my personal
benefit in any manner whatsoever.
52. With regard to the first charge I say that after the specific order of’ the
Division Bench being a judicial order which has attained finality and it holds
the fields today. A careful reading of the order of the Division Bench will make
it abundantly clear that the finding of the learned Single Judge regarding
misappropriation has been set aside by the Division Bench. However, the
charge of alleged misappropriation is factually incorrect and is based on
surmises and conjectures the relevant portion of the said judgement is set out
as follows “As discussed hereinabove, we do not find any material and/or
ingredient for arriving at the conclusion that the erstwhile Receiver had
committed breach of trust and/or misappropriated the money or utilised the
money held by him for personal gain which was unfortunately observed by
the Learned Single Judge....”
53. The whole object and purpose of inquiry by the Single Judge was to see
whether the amount of Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% was kept by me in Lynx or
not as was stated by me. My entire endeavour was also in prove the same.
The purchase consideration which I received was Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% and
the question is at the time when court is directing repayment whether that
amount was found to be intact or not.
54. The problem that I have faced in dealing with the money and maintaining
the account was primarily due to the uncertainty in the nature of the order dated
20 April, 1993. The said order did not give me any specific direction to open
a Receiver’s account. Neither the court gave any direction to keep the money
in any specific interest bearing account but the choice was left to me.
55. Because of the nature of such an order the purchaser issued drafts in
my personal name and capacity and not as a Receiver. Therefore, I had no
option but to encash those in an account standing in my name. The learned
Single Judge and the In-house committee have held that I enchased around
Rs. 4,50,000/- in Allahabad Bank and, thereafter, all encashment were done
from an account maintained with the Standard Chartered Bank, Church Lane
Branch bearing account No. 01SLP0632800 (hereinafter referred as 800
account).
56. The opening balance of the 800 account as on 28 February, 1995 shows
only Rs. 8,83,963.05. Therefore, by 28 February, 1995 and commencement
from March, 1993, I should have received approximately Rs. 22 lacs. Therefore,
there is a shortfall and which gave rise to the presumption of misappropriation.

The present Committee is seeking to split the same by withdrawals from
Allahabad Bank and from Standard Chartered Bank separately. It is significant
to know that the extract of ledger of the Allahabad Bank disclosed in page
1493 of the Volume 3 all the documents relied upon by this Committee have
come to light for the first time.
57. In fact Allahabad Bank has earlier written a letter that documents prior
to 1995 are not available with them as the Bank has subsequently been
computerised. In any event, I have all along stated that Rs. 33,22,800/- less
5% was kept with Lynx and my endeavour was to prove the same.
58. From the statement of account of Standard Chartered Bank, disclosed

in this proceeding relating to 800 accounts it will appear that the major
withdrawals were only towards creation of fixed deposit commencing from
March, 1995.
59. The reduction of the amount in 800 account is clearly not due to personal
withdrawals as it is apparent that fixed deposits were created and were kept
lying there until it was encashed and deposited in the 400 account.
60. Prior thereto from the 400 account Rs. 25 lacs was deposited in Lynx on
26 February, 1997. From the number of fixed deposit receipts standing in my
name produced by the Official Liquidator, it is clear that there was about
Rs. 39,39,000/- deposited with Lynx.
61. There is no evidence whatsoever of any other deposit in Lynx after 1997.
Therefore, the amount in addition to Rs. 25 lacs to constitute a total sum of
Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% was deposited in Lynx earlier. Therefore, the
withdrawal either from Allahabad Bank or from the 800 account does not
constitute misappropriation nor does it contradict my stand that a sum of
Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% was in fact deposited with Lynx.
62. There are statements of account of 800 account disclosed in this

proceeding which would clearly show that apart from major withdrawals of
Rs. 8,83,963.05 and Rs. 9,80,000.00 there are no major personal withdrawal.
These two withdrawals are also not for personal gain as these withdrawals
were made for the purpose of creating a fixed deposit with the same Bank.
63. The present Committee has completely ignored the fact that from the
400 account there were no personal withdrawals of any kind. Series of cheques
which have now been produced would clearly establish my consistent stand
that all withdrawals from 400 account were made towards labour payment as
per direction of the order of the Division Bench 20 January, 1997 passed by
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Umesh Chandra Banerjee and Hon’ble Mr. Justice
Sidheshwar Narayan.
64. Therefore, finding of this Committee that the disbursement from the 400
account and reducing the amount to only Rs. 19,934.66 amounts to
misappropriation is clearly contrary to records and erroneous.
65. It is significant to point out here that the order dated 20 January, 1993
does not give any direction upon me to keep the amount in any interest bearing
account. Even parties to the proceeding did not claim any interest on the
principal sum of the purchase consideration. Therefore, to what extent interest
would be paid was a matter of adjudication by the court at the time of
repayment. The finding of the Division Bench to this effect may be
noted.....“Grievance not made in the petition could not be considered by the
learned Judge. The learned Single Judge, in the present case, considered a
point which was not raised in the petition and most unfortunately ignored the
fact that both the plaintiff - Steel Authority of India and the other respondent.
Shipping Corporation of India Limited did not raise any grievance against the
erstwhile Receiver nor even claim any interest from the erstwhile Receiver
although the Learned Single Judge of his own issued direction upon the said
erstwhile Receiver to make payment of the huge sum of Rs. 24,27,404/-
towards the interest”.
“In the present case, the learned Single Judge totally ignored
the pleadings of the parties travelled beyond the scope and
ambit of the application filed by the plaintiff by issuing several
directions upon different parties including the Official Liquidator
attached to this court apart from the erstwhile Receiver and
realised huge amount from the said erstwhile Receiver towards
the interest even in absence of any claim made by any party”.
66. It matters little as to whether the amount kept in Lynx came from
800 accounts or from the 400 account. I was to separate the total purchase
consideration of Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% and it is without any dispute that such
amount was found to be deposited with Lynx and was never reduced from
the said total quantum at any given point of time.
67. Therefore, the question of misappropriating any amount for my personal

use and benefit cannot and does not arise. I reiterate with great deal of
conviction that from all my accounts which have been disclosed it will not
appear that any amount has been deposited in Lynx after 1997 and the only
deposit made in Lynx in 1997 was of Rs. 25 lacs. But the aggregate sum of
fixed deposit receipts produced by the Official Liquidator is Rs. 39,39,000/-.
68. The only corollary and conclusion which can be drawn that the remaining
amount of purchase consideration which is alleged to have been withdrawn
and misappropriated by me was indeed to have been withdrawn and
misappropriated by me was indeed deposited in Lynx for the purpose of
creating of fixed deposit and there is no other contrary evidence on record to
contradict my said statement.
69. Since there was no transaction whatsoever in the accounts where drafts
were encashed after 1997 and that the amount of Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5%
was indeed found to have deposited in Lynx and continued to remain
throughout until 2006, question of my misappropriating the same after
appointment as a judge cannot and does not arise.
70. The amounts that were deposited In Lynx or the amounts held by me as
a Receiver were pursuant to direction of court and holding the same under
direction of court cannot amount to misappropriation.
71. In order to establish misappropriation, a transaction has to be shown

which indicates withdrawal of money for personal use and benefit.
72. After 1997 there was no transaction whatsoever. The charge with regard
to misappropriation of property and which constitutes under Article 124[4] read
with Article 217 of the Constitution of India is on the face of it is incorrect.
73. The learned Single Judge as well as the In-house Committee has never
alleged misappropriation, if any, after my elevation. It seems that this
Committee is enlarging the scope of the motion itself. The first motion admitted
by the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha clearly states misappropriation as a
Receiver. The Committee can not enlarge the scope of the motion admitted
by the Rajya Sabha and give a different complexion to it altogether.
74. The provision of the Judges (Inquiry) Act requires investigation on the
basis of the motion admitted by the Parliament. I dare say with utmost respect
and humility that the Committee is not authorised in law to come to their own
independent finding by enlarging or digressing from the scope and ambit of
the motion admitted in the Parliament. The first motion is which was admitted
by the Rajya Sabha which is quoted as under:-
“Misappropriation of large sum of money which he received in

his capacity as Receiver appointed by the High Court at
Calcutta.”
75. Therefore, the said charge that I have committed misappropriation of a

property after my elevation as a judge and the same constitutes misbehaviour
under Article 124(4) read with Article 217 of the Constitution of India is
misconceived.
76. I was to keep Rs. 33, 22,800/- less 5% being the sum representing the
purchase consideration. Since the court did not direct earlier to keep the money
in any interest bearing account, the question of payment of interest would only
arise at the time of repayment and would depend upon the adjudication by
the court.
77. Therefore, question of mis-utilising the principal or any interest accrued

thereon by me also cannot and does not arise.
78. It is significant to point out here ‘that the plaintiff being aware of the said
fact did not claim any interest in their petition and only the principal sum of
Rs. 33.22,800/- less 5% was asked to be returned to them.
CHARGES OF MAKING FALSE STATEMENT
79. With regard to the charge no. 2 i.e. making false statement, I beg to state
that from the facts, as revealed hereinbefore, it will appear that none of the
evidence collected by the Single Judge was before me to enable me to give
an appropriate explanation.
80. In fact, the Single Judge has proceeded to conduct an inquiry without
any prayer to that effect or complaint against me in that regard, which was
not made known to me and it, would also appear from record that specific
orders were suppressed from me.
81. Therefore, when the recalling application being G.A. No. 3763 of 2005
was filed on my behalf the statements contained therein were all based upon
my memory of transaction which took place over a decade ago.
82. All that I remembered at that material point of time that the amount of
Rs. 33,22,800 less 5% representing the purchase consideration was lying
deposited with Lynx. If the averments and the statements are read in their true
perspective, it will only mean that my endeavour was to establish the said fact
that a sum of Rs. 33, 22,800/- less 5% representing the purchase consideration
was lying deposited with Lynx and this fact has been proved beyond doubt from
the fixed deposit receipts produced by the Official Liquidator.
83. It is significant to point out here that no written notes were filed before the
Division Bench. The notes which were filed before the Single Judge for explaining
the accounts submitted by the Official Liquidator became a part of the trial court’s
records and pleadings which were before the Division Bench. The written notes
which are being strongly relied upon by the Committee in order to establish
making false statements were filed before the Single. Judge primarily to show
the erroneous calculation made by the Official Liquidator. Furthermore, the written
notes’ filed before the Court are always prepared by the lawyers in support of
their submissions and cannot constitute a statement far less “false statements”
by a party to the-proceeding. A counsel appearing on behalf of a party to the
proceeding is entitled to make submissions and make his own interpretation
on the basis of record and it is for the court to consider the same to accept or
reject it. It is also significant that the parties never raised any objection to such
“written note on argument”.
84. I say that it pains me a great deal when I see that a portion of the written
notes is being relied upon in support of the charge of making false
representation by me whereas other portion, where I have clearly stated that
the statements made therein are purely based on memory in absence of
record, is being totally ignored.
85. It is an established position in law that when a document is relied upon,

it has to be relied upon in its totality and part and portion thereof cannot be
used against anyone.
86. If a part or portion is accepted then the other part and portion of the same
document will also be accepted and relied upon.
87. At the cost of repetition, I say that, since the order dated 20 January, 1993
does not give direction of keeping the money in any specific account and the
order dated 20 January, 1997 (Hon’ble Justice Umesh Chandra Banerjee) does
not even direct me to open any account, it matters little from where the total
purchase consideration of Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% was deposited with Lynx.
88. It is clear from the accounts that the withdrawals from the 400 account
after deposit of Rs. 25 lacs with Lynx were towards labour payment in terms
of the order of the Division Bench dated 20 January, 1997 and the other
withdrawal from 800 account was for the purpose of creation of fixed deposit
and, thereafter, encashment of the same and deposit to the 400 account.
89. If the continuity of the money trail is taken into account, my interpretation
that the amount of Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% representing the purchase
consideration has been deposited in Lynx is not incorrect and does not amount
to making false representation.
90. Moreover, interpretation of the documents as made on my behalf by my

counsel has been accepted by the Division Bench and, therefore, it requires
no further elaboration.
91. It is incorrect to allege that my first deposit with Lynx India was
made only December, 1996. As far as the documents that were available before
the Single Judge the only document relating to deposit in Lynx was the
application form indicating deposit to Lynx is of February, 1997 and the amount
is Rs. 25 lacs.
92. The said application form indicates the cheque number which clearly
tallies with the cheque number mentioned in the 800 account for the
corresponding period and for the corresponding sum.
93. There is no evidence of deposit of the remaining Rs. 14,39,000/- which

was already lying deposited with Lynx before 1997. In fact, the only evidence
of deposit of money in Lynx available is Rs. 25 lacs that too in the year 1997.
Therefore, my contention that deposits were made in Lynx prior to 1997 cannot
be contradicted and that the earlier withdrawals either from the Allahabad Bank
or from the Standard Chartered Bank were towards creation of fixed deposit
with the Lynx and Standard Chartered Bank cannot also be contradicted.
94. If I had the passbooks (No passbook is given by Standard Chartered

Bank) or cheque books or counter foils of 1993 onwards which unfortunately
I did not preserve, I could have definitely proved my contention by direct
evidence but under the facts and circumstances, I am trying to establish that
fact by way of circumstantial evidence.
ALLEGATION OF NOT TAKING STEP TO OBTAIN DISCHARGE AS A

RECEIVER
95. I would like to draw the attention of this Committee to the order dated
3 August, 2004 passed in this proceeding whereby I was discharged and a
new Receiver was appointed in my place and stead. (at page 1619 of paper
Book Part V). In any view of the matter I do not understand how this specific
charge can be framed against me on the basis of motion admitted by the
Chairman of Rajya Sabha, as, not taking any step to seek discharge or not
returning amounts or furnishing any accounts in respect thereof does not
amount to misappropriation.
96. There, is no requirement in law for a Receiver to seek discharge or for

return of amounts. In the instant case, the facts are rather peculiar. The plaintiff
filed the application for return of money sometime in the month of March, 2003,
9 months before my elevation which fact as I have already stated, was disclosed
only in the month of November, 2003 when I inquired and requested the plaintiffs
advocate for taking necessary steps for my discharge and for obtaining direction
from the court to enable me to pay the amount.
97. It will appear from the prayers prayed for in the application filed by the
plaintiff that they had specifically sought for return of the amount held by me
towards purchase consideration which is the principal sum and not with any
interest accrued thereon, the prayers are set out as under:-
“(a) Leave be given to serve a copy of this application upon SBD

Industries Supplier:
(b) SBD Industrial Supplier be directed to lift the balance quantity of

4.311 M.T. of Periclase Spinnel Bricks upon payment of the price
within a fortnight from the date of the Order be made herein;
(c) Alternatively the Receiver be directed to sell the balance quantity

4.311 M.T. of Periclase Spinnel Bricks lying in the stores of the
Bokaro Steel Plant of the petitioner by public auction or private treaty
and to make over the net sale proceed to the petitioner towards
pro tanto satisfaction of its dues against the defendants;
(d) The Receiver be directed to hand over all the sale proceeds so far
received from the sale of the Periclase Spinnel Bricks to the
petitioner - towards and in pro tanto satisfaction of the petitioner’s
claim in the suit and be further directed to pay entire sale proceeds
after disposal of the entire lot;
(e) The Receiver be directed to render true and faithful accounts of all
moneys presently being held by him in terms of the order dated;
(f) Such further or other order or orders be passed and/or direction or

directions be given as to this Hon’ble Court may seem fit and
proper”.
98. Because of delay in the judicial process, the relevant order was passed
for the first time on 3 August, 2004 after some months of my elevation and at
the first instance the court discharged me, but unfortunately no direction was
given to return the money held by me towards purchase consideration. The
said order was not served upon me at any point of time and I was able to obtain
the same only when certified copies of all orders were subsequently obtained
by me.
99. A Receiver cannot return money unless there is a specific direction to

that effect. Furthermore, the order dated 20 January, 1993 clearly directs me
to hold the same until further order from the court. Since the application filed
by the plaintiff was pending in court with a specific prayer asking for return of
money, there was no occasion for me to personally to go to court and seek
similar order. I reasonably expected that the court would pass order on the
application of the plaintiff and I would comply with the same.
ALLEGATION OF NON FURNISHING OF ACCOUNT
100. Prior to 10 April, 2006 in spite of several orders being passed by the
court, no direction whatsoever was given to me to return of any amount. As
soon as a specific direction was given after adjudicating the interest that I was
liable to pay, I paid the same within the time allowed by the court. The Single
Judge did not raise any issue with regard to my personally not taking discharge.
Accordingly this issue was never raised, argued or explained on my behalf
either before the Single Judge or before the Division Bench.
101. As far as furnishing of accounts is concerned, when the court discharged

me on 3 August, 2004 from further acting as a Receiver by appointing another
person in my place and stead without giving any direction, for filing of accounts,
the court, dispensed me from the requirement of filing of accounts. Moreover
as a usual practice accounts are normally filed by Receiver where there are
cases of management and administration of amounts held by Receiver
meaning thereby that there are series of disbursement or series of deposits
of unquantified amounts.
102. In this case total amount received by me is not in dispute and the amount
directed to be paid by the court was also not disputed by any of the parties to
the proceeding. Therefore, furnishing of accounts was a mere formality which,
was dispensed with by the court. The accounts are required to be filed by the
Receiver during his tenure as a Receiver but not after his discharge and when
he is no longer acting as a Receiver.
103. I was discharged on 3 August, 2004 without any direction to file any
accounts. Furthermore, the Single Judge also in his orders dated 10 April, 2006
and 31 July, 2007 did not give any direction upon me to file any accounts. In
fact the application of the plaintiff stood practically disposed of by granting
almost all the orders as prayed for, I, therefore, say that I have not committed
any offence as is sought to be made out in the proposed charges by not filing
of accounts.
104. As far as the amount of accrued interest remaining in my possession,

I say with utmost conviction that it was kept under my possession and custody
until directed by judicial order to hand over the same.
105. If I had parted with the possession of the amount without any appropriate
order to that effect, I would have committed contempt of the order dated
20 January, 1993. I have not been able to appreciate the proposed charge by
this Committee that I was required under judicial orders to account for the
amount. There was no such direction upon me at least to my knowledge and
as far as the provision of law governing the receivership.
106. I have already given my explanation, with regard to the demand made
by the plaintiff by letter dated 7 March, 2002, I say that the said letter was not
received by me. In any view of the matter it is an admitted position that last of
the payments of the purchaser was made on 30 April, 1995 and the plaintiff
wrote a letter for the first time on 7 March, 2002 after almost 7 years from
the date of such deposit.
107. With regard to the intermingling the sale consideration with other monies
and removing the sale consideration from bank account for otherwise dealing
with the sale consideration in breach of the direction of law applicable to
receivership, I respectfully submit that I am to comply with the directions given
by court. I have already stated that since there was no specific direction upon
me to open a receiver’s account, I had no other option but to encash the drafts
given by the purchaser in an account held by me in my personal capacity.
Furthermore; in terms of the order dated 20 January, 1993, I was to keep the
amount in a separate account of my choice. That exercise of choice according
to my interpretation and understanding, keeping of the exact amount would
arise only after the entire payment has been made by the purchaser.
108. It is clear from the accounts as disclosed in this proceeding that as soon
as a substantial amount was deposited it was withdrawn and made into a fixed
deposit so as to prevent intermingling and also to avoid complications which
I personally faced. It is true that I did not make fixed deposit of each draft as
soon as they were encashed but it will appear that I did not allow the bulk of
the money to remain in my account as the purchase consideration after having
accumulated for a few months were withdrawn and made into a fixed deposit.
The period prior to February, 1995 is clearly explained by the fact that such
amounts were already lying with Lynx which, therefore, belies the charge of
intermingling.
109. The charge of misappropriation and/or converting to my own use of the

sale consideration and the accrued interest or that it continued even subsequent
to my appointment as a judge to the court is extremely unfortunate contrary to
records.
110. As far as the question of interest is concerned, I was under no obligation

to keep money in any interest bearing account.
111. Furthermore, there is not an iota of evidence to prove that I have utilised
any part of the sale consideration or interest accrued thereon for my own
personal use.
112. Once the court has adjudicated the interest payable on the principal
sum, the question of misappropriating the accrued interest cannot and does
not arise. The necessity of adjudicating interest by the Single Judge arose as
the order dated 20 January, 1993 does not contain any specific direction as to
which interest bearing account I shall keep the amount of sale consideration.
113. This fact has also been found to be correct by the Hon’ble Division Bench,
inter alia stating that....“Grievance not made in the petition could not be
considered by the learned Judge. The learned Single Judge, in the present case,
considered a point which was not raised in the petition and most unfortunately
ignored the fact that both the plaintiff - Steel Authority of India and the other
respondent - Shipping Corporation of India Limited did not raise any grievance
against the erstwhile Receiver nor even claim any interest from the erstwhile
Receiver although the Learned Single Judge of his own issued direction upon
the said erstwhile Receiver to make payment of the huge sum of Rs. 24,27,404/
- towards the interest”.
114. Under the orders of the Hon’ble Court I had two distinct responsibilities:-
(a) To distribute Rs. 70 lacs.
(b) To keep a sum of Rs. 33, 22,800/- less 5% separated.
115. Both these duties have been discharged by me without any doubt and
the total entire quantum of Rs. 70 lacs plus Rs. 33, 22,800/- less 5% has been
accounted for. Therefore, I do not understand how there can be any allegation
of misappropriation or making false statement as alleged.
116. Written notes filed on my behalf by the counsel explaining the materials
on record and giving their own interpretation does not amount to giving false
evidence. If the written notes are looked at, it will appear that it is not even
signed.
117. Therefore under no stretch of imagination it amounts to any evidence before

court of law far less false evidence.
118. Moreover, the statements contained in the written notes will clearly indicate
that it was only an endeavour to explain the report as well as exhibits filed by
the Official Liquidator and for no other purpose.
119. It was submitted on behalf of the Official Liquidator before the Single Judge
that total sum of Rs. 78,24,946.20 was lying deposited with the Lynx in my
name. Initially, I was completely taken aback by the said report submitted by
the said Official Liquidator as I never had this much sum of money which I would
be able to invest in Lynx after meeting my day to day expenses required to
maintain my family.
120. After careful scrutiny of the report of the Official Liquidator and the exhibits
submitted before the court it appeared that the Official Liquidator has added
fixed deposit receipts twice over when they were reissued after renewals because
the same fixed deposit receipts having same number were calculated twice over
by the Official Liquidator thereby covering the sum to almost double. This was
the only and specific purpose for filing the note and for no other purpose. This
would also appear from the heading of the note which is as follows:
“Written notes on the report filed by the learned Official

Liquidator as well as the exhibits filed before the Hon’ble Court
at the time of hearing.”
121. The written notes were not filed to establish my interpretation of the
materials on record that the amount of Rs. 33, 22,800/- less 5% representing
purchase consideration was deposited in Lynx from 800 A/C and therefore it
is wholly irrelevant as to whether the amount of Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5%
in Lynx was constituted by deposits partly from 800 account and partly
400 account or wholly from 800 account or not.
ANSWER TO THE GROUND IN SUPPORT OF CHARGES
122. With regard to the statement of grounds in support of charges, I with

due respect and humility say that large part of such grounds is beyond the
scope of the motion admitted before the Rajya Sabha. No motion was admitted
with regard to my alleged non-compliance of rules or provisions of law as a
Receiver but it is restricted only to alleged misappropriation. I do not understand
as to how the statement of grounds in support of charges with regard to alleged
violation of Code of Civil Procedure and the Original Side Rules is germane.
123. I reiterate that having been discharged from further acting as Receiver on
30 August, 2004, the court actually dispensed with my requirement of filing any
accounts.
124. The procedure of filing accounts in the Original Side Rules of the High
Court is that after an account is filed by a Receiver the Registrar, Original Side
publishes a cause list with heading “Receiver’s Account” and parties to the
proceedings are notified about the same.
125. Thereafter, the parties are required to appear and give their comments.
If none of the parties raise any objection, the accounts are accepted.
126. Therefore, in order to file accounts one has to continue as a Receiver

and a person who has been discharged as a Receiver cannot file Receiver’s
account because as on that date he is no longer a Receiver.
127. Since the order dated 30 August, 2004 discharged me from further acting
as a Receiver, I was under no obligation to file any accounts and the court
also did not ask me to file any accounts prior to discharge thereby dispensing
with the requirement of filing of accounts.
128. Chapter XXI Rule 3 of the Original Side Rules is quoted hereunder:
“Rule-3 - the party obtaining the order of appointment shall

within one week from filing of the order file an office copy
thereof in the Accounts Department of the Registrar’s Office,
whereupon an entry shall be made in the register, to be kept
for the purpose, all the contents of such order and the
particulars of the name of such Receiver, and conditions if any,
under which he has been appointed, and the dates on which
he is required by the order to file his accounts.”
129. Before proceeding further in this matter, I would like to humbly request
the Committee to find out from the parties meaning thereby the plaintiff as to
whether this part of the Rule of Chapter XXI of the Original Side of the High
Court at Calcutta has been complied with or not. Moreover, it is clear from the
order dated 20th January, 1993 or the previous order passed in this proceedings
that there was no direction upon me to file any accounts. Accounts are required
to be filed where the Receiver is required to incur certain expenses.
130. Order 40 Clause D of the civil procedure code has been relied upon in
the statement of grounds in support of charges. Careful reading of order 40
Rule 1(d) clearly indicates that it applies in cases where a Receiver has been
appointed over a property or an estate which requires realisation, management,

protection, preservation and improvement of the property, collection of rents
and profits thereof etc. Therefore, clause 1(d) applies in cases of such
Receivers who are appointed for management and administration of a property
where there are large scale dealings and day to day monetary transaction and
where expenses are incurred for preservation and protection and improvement
of the property.
131. In the instant case, the issue is only keeping a quantified sum of money
to be held until further order of the court meaning thereby as and when court
will pass subsequent order, the Receiver will hand over the same. Therefore,
in my respectful submission neither the provisions of the Original Side Rules
or Civil Procedure Code apply in this case.
ANSWER TO THE ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES
132. The observation of this Committee as attendant circumstances with

regard to my not taking any step to discharge the receivership or for return of
money or for furnishing of accounts in respect thereof or continued to
misappropriate or utilise the fund contrary to the directions of law is without
any basis and is also beyond the scope of the proceedings which was initiated
in the Calcutta High Court. Neither any law nor established procedure has been
shown to me on that account which I have allegedly violated.
133. The allegation contained in the attendant circumstances that I continued

to misappropriate or utilise the fund even after my elevation, is highly
unfortunate. It is not only contrary to records.
134. Records clearly show that the amount of fixed deposit of around
Rs. 39 lakhs approximately was lying deposited in Lynx since 1997 and that
amount was never reduced from Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% at any given point
of time. If I have not utilised any part or portion thereof since 1997, I do not
know how an allegation can be made that I had continued to misappropriate
the same even after my elevation. With a very heavy heart and great deal of
anguish, I submit that this allegation has been made in a drastic manner and
it seems to be an attempt to foist some amount of misbehaviour on me after
my elevation.
135. My bank records up to date were disclosed in 2006. From the said
accounts it will clearly appear that after 1997, there has been not one single
credit entry into my account from Lynx and the amount of Rs. 33,22,800/- less
5% representing the purchase consideration continued to remain deposited
under fixed deposit receipt with Lynx.
136. Another charge contained in the attendant circumstances regarding my

not returning any fund until called upon by the court to do so by means of the
order dated 10 April 2006. I say with utmost respect and humility that this
charge could not have been made at all, if proper appreciation of law and facts
had been made. No Receiver can hand over any money without specific
direction of court.
137. The order dated 20 January, 1993 directs me to hold the money until
further order of the court. It is on record that before 10 April, 2006, there is
not a single order passed by any court directing me to pay the amount.
138. Furthermore, I reiterate the facts relating to my alleged nondisclosure

of facts before the court or not replying to the letter of the plaintiff dated
7 March, 2002 allegedly received by me.
139. It seems that the issues seems to have been pre-judged without giving
due consideration to the mitigating circumstances and the difficulties faced by
a junior advocate as a receiver.
140. These are significant facts which clearly go to show the injustice caused
to me and that I have become a victim of circumstances.
141. The court is a mere custodian of the monies which belong to the parties.
It is for the parties to raise complaint with regard to its mis-utilisation. In the
instant case, the parties did not even ask for return of money with interest
because they were fully aware of the fact that by reason of the nature of the
order dated 20 January, 1993 they are not even entitled to ask for it but since
I had deposited the money on various interest bearing accounts I thought that
it was my moral responsibility to pay back with interest but it was impossible
to quantify the rate of interest as it varied from time to time.
142. The rate of interest on fixed deposit with banks had come down
drastically and the rate of interest promised by Lynx is no longer relevant after
its winding up. Under these circumstances, I left the matter for adjudication
by the court and the court adjudicated the same. In fact, the interest allowed
by the court is almost penal in nature because interest has been calculated
on a cumulative basis from one period to another and at a rate much higher
than the Bank rate prevailing at the relevant point of time.
143. I, therefore, submit that the money belongs to the parties. It has not yet
been adjudicated in the suit filed by the plaintiff as to who would be entitled to
get the money but, however, none of the parties to the suit had any grievance
against me in any manner whatsoever with regard to keeping the money in fixed
deposit or handling the same in the manner as disclosed in this proceeding.
The court by itself cannot raise an issue suo motto with regard to the alleged
mis-utilisation of accrued interest when the parties do not have any issue with
regard to the same.
144. I respectfully state and submit that since the total corpus of
Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% representing the purchase consideration was to be
kept, my only responsibility lay with regard thereto. At the time of return of the
money whether or not it would be returned with accrued interest was a matter
of adjudication. Therefore, to allege that there has been mis-utilisation of
accrued interest prior to return of money is completely misplaced, uncalled
for and out of context.
145. In the instant case, the Single Judge in his order dated 10 April, 2006
while directing me to pay nearly Rs. 58 lacs without even a prayer for repayment
with interest, passed an order of injunction on all my personal properties both
movable and immovable.
146. The movable property includes the cars standing in my name which were
purchased in 2004 after my elevation with bank loan.
147. An order of injunction is passed by a court only upon a prayer being

made by a party but from the petition filed by the plaintiff it would be apparent
that they have not prayed for such an order.
148. In order to pass an order of injunction under Order 39 of the CPC a

court is required to justify why such an order is passed. Without any reason
being given as to why an order of injunction is passed, it is invalid in the eye
of law in particular by reason of the decision of the Supreme Court reported
in 1993(3) SCC page 161 (Shiv Kumar Chadda Vs. Delhi Municipal Corporation).
149. It is significant to mention here that when the order of injunction was
passed, I was no longer a receiver, appointed by the court as I was already
discharged by order dated 3 August, 2004.
150. At internal page 6 of the judgment dated 10 April, 2006 last paragraph
the learned Judge has commented that the letter dated 7 March, 2002 written
by the plaintiff was received by me which is contrary to records. It is also
recorded by the Learned Single Judge that in spite of receipt of the same, no
information was supplied and no step was taken by me.
151. The Learned Single Judge at page 7 in continuation of the last paragraph
at page 6 has commented that it is not clear as to why the application was
not moved earlier than 16 July, 2004 in spite of affirming the same on
27 February, 2003 filing the application on 10 March, 2003. It is commented
at that stage “no affidavit was filed by the erstwhile receiver in spite of notice
being served.”
152. This observation is, factually, incorrect as would be evident from the
affidavit of service filed by the plaintiff that the petition was served upon me
for the first time on 11 May, 2005.
153. I would, like to respectfully state and submit the aforesaid contention
constitutes misbehaviour as contemplated under Article 124(4) of the
Constitution of India read with the Judges (Inquiry) Act.
154. I respectfully and humbly request this Committee to render justice to

me as I am entitled under the Constitution of this country and as a member of
the higher judiciary who has an unblemished record of conduct as a judge.
155. No one except for a party to the proceeding is entitled to be served the
order unless specifically directed. A Receiver is not a party to the proceeding.
The Single Judge being aware of such a position in Law gave specific direction
of certain orders being served upon me as a Receiver, Subsequent thereto
there is no order which gives such direction. That all those orders would never
reach me as they were never served upon me.
156. At the material point of time ANZ Grindlays Bank, now Standard
Chartered Bank had undergone a complete overhaul of their accounting system
which became completely computerised. As a result the numbers of digits of
the Account Numbers were changed and existing accounts were given different
account numbers having increased digits.
157. In order to find out the actual state of affairs regarding my opening and
closure of account I had sent my Advocate, to cause an inspection from the
record of the Bank, when he was informed that no details with regard to my
account can be given to him by reason of an order and/or direction given by
the “Higher Authority”.
158. Without any judicial order no bank can refuse to furnish details of a
customers account, this is against all banking norms and Reserve Bank of
India Regulations.
159. In any event without specific knowledge and information with regard to
opening and closing of various accounts as relied upon by this Committee it
would amount to a miscarriage of justice, if I am not allowed the information
as sought for by me.
PARAGRAPH-WISE DEALING OF CHARGES ALONG WITH THE GROUNDS

IN SUPPORT THEREOF AS ALSO THE ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES
160. Without prejudice to the aforesaid and strongly relying thereon, I now
proceed to deal with the charges along with the grounds in support thereof as
also the attendant circumstances.
161. With regard to charge one (misappropriation), the statements contained

in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are matters of record. I, however, deny that any
sum was misappropriated or converted to my own use, in particular, the sum
of Rs. 4.25 lacs less 5%. Mere withdrawal of amount from the bank does not
constitute misappropriation. Unless it is proved that there was any dishonest
intention on my part and that I have put the said amount to my own use, the
charge of misappropriation is untenable in law and or in facts. In this context,
I reiterate that it has been proved beyond doubt that the total amount of money
representing the purchase consideration less 5% being my remuneration was
all alone kept deposited with Lynx. Therefore, the question of misappropriation
of any amount cannot and does not arise.
162. With further reference to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, I deny that I have

misappropriated and/or converted to my own use a further sum of Rs. 8.25
lacs. At the cost of repetition, I say that mere withdrawal of money does not
constitute misappropriation.
163. With reference to paragraph 8, I deny that by making series of

disbursement from 22 May, 1997 till 1 July, 1997 from the 400 Account, I have
misappropriated and/or converted to my own use, amount of Rs. 22 lacs
together with accrued interest. I reiterate that the series of disbursement made
from 400 accounts was towards labour payment in terms of the Division Bench
order.
164. The transfer of the amount from 800 to 400 accounts has already been
explained by me. Due to the confusion at the end of the bank, my request
was scored out and the 400 account was put in. At this juncture after such a
long passage of time, it is not possible to remember as to the circumstances
leading to the said request made to the bank. Since as on the date of transfer
of the money to the Lynx from 400 account sufficient amount of money was
already lying in fixed deposit with the Standard Chartered Bank, no additional
or personal benefit was derived by me by depositing money in Lynx from
400 account which could have duly been deposited by encashing the fixed
deposit out of the 800 account.
165. In any event none of these deposits were towards withdrawing any
money for my personal benefit. From the statement of account of the
800 account, it is clear that two term deposits were created - one of 6 March,
1995 for a sum of Rs. 8,73,968/- and another term deposit was created on
4 December, 1995 for a sum of Rs. 9.80 lacs. From the further documents
submitted by this Committee being Volume 4 at page 1677, there appears to
be a copy of a fixed deposit dated 6 March, 1997. It appears from the said
document that the said fixed deposit was created on 6 March, 1996 for a sum
of Rs. 9,64,967.24. The total amount of the said two fixed deposits which were
subsequently transferred to 400 account was Rs. 22,84,459/-. The date of such
transfer was 22 May, 1997.
166. It is not understood as to whether the term deposit disclosed at page

1677 is same to that of the term deposit mentioned in the statement of account
at page 413 or 417 of Volume 1 because the figures mentioned in the term
deposit is different. Moreover the term deposit mentioned at page 1677 appears
to have been created on 6 March, 1996 for a sum of Rs. 9,64,967/- which is
totally different from the figure, of the term deposit mentioned at pages
413 and 417. Moreover, the term deposit mentioned at page 417 from the
800 account the figure is Rs. 9.80 lacs whereas the term deposit mentioned
at page 1677 is of an amount of Rs. 9,64,967.24 as on 6 March. If the fixed
deposit created in 1995 was not encashed until 1997, it is not understood as
to how on 6 March, 1996 lesser figure is shown to have been created in fixed
deposit. I, therefore, presume that the fixed deposit mentioned at page 1677
is different from the fixed deposit mentioned at pages 413 and 417 respectively
of the paper books.
167. With further reference to paragraph 8 I say that the copy of the fixed
deposit receipt disclosed at page 1681 tallies with the date of creation of the
fixed deposit mentioned in the statement of account at page 417 i.e.
4 December, 1995. The amount of fixed deposit also tallies with the debit entry
in the statement of account i.e. 9.80 lacs. From the copy of the fixed deposit
it is clear that the date on which such term deposit is created is clearly
mentioned at the bottom of the copy of the fixed deposit itself. Surprisingly,
though at page 1677 it is mentioned that the term deposit was created on
6 March, 1996, the actual entry of creation of fixed deposit in the statement of
account mentioned at page 413 is 6 March, 1995 and the figures appearing
at page 1677 and at page 413 are different.
168. Under these circumstances, I humbly state and submit that neither the
series of disbursement nor the transfer of the amount from 800 to 400 account
constitute any wrongful action on my part far less misappropriation. Under what
circumstances this Committee has framed the charge that I have
misappropriated and/or converted the said amount is still not very, clear to me.
From all the accounts disclosed there is not a single entry from which it can
be proved that I have withdrawn any amount for my personal gain and/or has
converted to my own use. It appears that the charges are purely based on
surmises and conjecture without any specific proof of either misappropriation
or conversion. It is needless to mention that mere withdrawal of money does
not constitute misappropriation unless there is proof dishonest intention and
user of the said amount towards my own use and personal gain. I have clearly
stated and have given evidence that disbursement from the 400 account were
all towards labour payment.
169. With regard to paragraph 9, I do not understand as to how the said issue
can be framed as a charge or can form a part of the charge no. 1 that is
misappropriation. I have already given my answer with regard to alleged not
taking any steps towards my discharge or for return of amounts or for furnishing
of any account in respect thereof. I say that I was not aware that there was
any legal or procedural requirement on my part to seek discharge from
receivership or to take any personal step towards return of money. The
application filed by the plaintiff was for the same purpose and was to be heard
within a short time. I thought that the said application would be heard and
disposed of with appropriate orders and it was not necessary for me to
personally go and approach the Court for similar direction. It is significant to
mention here that I was relieved from further acting as a receivership on
3 August, 2004 but unfortunately the said order did not contain any direction
to pay nor was the order served upon me and, therefore, I was completely
unaware as to the proceedings that were going on in the Court.
170. In order to return the money held as a Receiver, a direction from the
Court is required. It matters a little as to who approaches the Court. In this
case, the plaintiff had already approached the Court in March, 2003 long before
my elevation. I reasonably expected that the Court would pass necessary order
directing return of money.
171. With regard to non-furnishing of accounts, I have given my answer

earlier and I reiterate the same herein in seriatim. I humbly state and submit
that the charge as mentioned in paragraph 9 under reply does not come within
the ambit of the Motion admitted in Rajya Sabha. I further submit that the
proceedings before the Court which had culminated into the judgment and
orders, passed by the Single Judge, there was no issue or discussion as to

whether I should have taken any steps to seek my discharge or return of the
amount prior to my elevation or thereafter. In any event, the said charge is
totally outside the scope and ambit of article 124(4) of the Constitution of India
read with the provisions of Judges Inquiry Act which had been framed to
prevent corruption and incapacity of a judge. Alleged impropriety or a better
action expected out of a judge cannot be the subject matter of Article 124(4)
of the Constitution of India.
172. With reference to paragraph 10 of charge 1, I deny that I continued to

misappropriate or utilised the sale consideration or accrued interest in my
position as a Receiver even at the time and subsequent to my appointment as
a judge on 3 December, 2003. Until and unless a specific order is passed to
hand over the money, I was duty bound under orders of Court to keep the amount
in my possession. If I had handed over the money without any order of the Court,
I would have actually committed contempt of the order dated
20 January, 1993. Moreover, keeping the money in my possession per se does
not amount to misappropriation. Event not accounting for the same also does
not amount to misappropriation. In any event, I have already stated as to the
circumstances leading to the letter written by the plaintiff on 7 March, 2002 and
the orders passed by the Single Judge on 3 May, 2005 and
17 May, 2005.
173. At the cost of repetition, I say that it will appear from the letter dated
7 March, 2002 that the letter was not received by me personally. Moreover,
not answering a letter written by the plaintiffs Advocate does not amount to
misappropriation or utilisation of sale consideration, or accrued, interest thereon.
The order dated 3 May, 2005 does not contain any direction, the order dated
17 May, 2005 which was served upon me and I have given my explanation with
regard thereto which I reiterate in seriatim.
174. With further reference to paragraph 10, I say that my personal accounts
have been disclosed up to 2006. There is not a single entry which can show
that until 2006 I have utilised any part of the purchase consideration. All
transactions relating to the said purchase consideration practically ended in
1977. After the fixed deposits that were created with Lynx, it continued to remain
there. Therefore, the charge contained in paragraph 10 that I have continued
to misappropriate or utilise the sale consideration with accrued interest even at
the time of and subsequent to my appointment as a judge on 3 December, 2003
is wholly incorrect. .
175. With further reference to paragraph 10, I submit that the alleged failure
to account for despite alleged specific demand made by the plaintiff vide letter
dated 7 March, 2002 or by orders dated 3 May, 2005 and 17 May, 2005 passed
by the Single Judge does not amount to misappropriation far less an issue which
can come within the ambit of Article 124(4) of the Constitution of India.
176. With reference to paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 I deny that I have intermingled
the sale consideration with other monies or removed the sale consideration from
bank accounts or otherwise dealt with the sale consideration in breach of direction
or law applicable to the Receivership as alleged or at all. I reiterate that since
the drafts given by the purchase were in my personal name they were encashed
in accounts standing in my name. From the copies of the account disclosed in
this proceeding it will appear that after the drafts were encashed, fixed deposit
receipts were created in the bank itself. The records of Lynx clearly establishes
the fact that the fixed deposit receipts were also created there apart from fixed
deposits that were created in the Standard Chartered Bank. The drafts were
encashed in an account and thereafter withdrawn for the purpose of making fixed
deposits, which does not amount to intermingling of the sale consideration. The
removal of amounts from the bank was for the purpose of creation of fixed deposit
and for no other purpose. This has also been established not only from the fixed
deposit receipts issued by the ANZ Grindlays Bank (now known as Standard
Chartered Bank) and also fixed deposit receipts disclosed from the records of
the Official Liquidator of Lynx. Two fixed deposit receipts have been, disclosed
in Volume IV of the documents supplied to me subsequently and the same
are at Pages 1677 and 1681. From the fixed-deposit receipt contain in Page
1677 dated 6 March, 1997 it will appear that the said fixed deposit was created
and/or placed on 6 March, 1996 for a sum of Rs. 9,64,697.24p. The statement
of accounts disclosed in this proceeding contained in Page 417 of Volume I
of the documents relied upon by the Committee there is no debit entry on 6
March, 1996. The actual debit entry is for a sum of Rs. 8,73,968/- dated 6 March,
1995. Neither the date of the entry or the amount mentioned in the fixed deposit
receipt at Page 1677 corresponds to the actual entry mentioned in the statement
of accounts. There appears to be a clear anomaly in this regard.
177. With further reference to paragraphs 11, I deny that any amount of the
sale consideration has been dealt with by me in breach of any directions of law
applicable to Receivership. I submit with utmost respect and humility that this
charge appears to be rather fanciful in nature. The correct position of the
accounts has not been considered at all. The only direction upon me with regard
to keeping of the amount is contained in the order dated 20 January, 1993. Under
the said order I had the liberty to keep the money at a place of my choice.
There are clear evidence in this proceedings as to show that total purchase
consideration of Rs. 31,56,660/- has been kept deposited in Lynx throughout.
Therefore, the question of committing any breach of any directions of law

applicable to Receivership cannot and does not arise.
178. It is further submitted that my duty to act as Receiver ended after the
order dated 3 August, 2004 when I was replaced by another Receiver without
any direction either to pay or to submit any accounts. Furthermore, the order
dated 10 April, 2006 though contains diverse observations against me, and
there is no direction whatsoever to submit any account. On the contrary the
total amount was quantified by the Court and direction was given to me to
pay the same. There is no observation whatsoever by the Single Judge with
regard to alleged non-filing of accounts. I failed to appreciate as to how this
charge either relates to charge of misappropriation or can be a subject matter
in issue under Article 124(4) of the Constitution of India as neither the charge
nor the consequence thereof comes within the ambit of Article 124(4) of the
Constitution of India.
179. With reference to paragraph 12, it is denied that I have misappropriated

and/or converted to my own use the sale consideration or the agreed interest
or that such misappropriation existed or continued even subsequent to my
appointment as a Judge of the Court. I say that this charge is not only malicious
in nature but also have been made extremely recklessly without giving due
regard to the facts and understanding of the case. The charge of
misappropriation itself is without any basis and till date there is not an iota of
proof or evidence of misappropriation. The charge has remained in the realm
of assumption and/or surmise and conjunctures. Under Article 124(4) a Judge
can be removed on the ground of ‘proved misbehaviour’ or ‘incapacity as a
judge’ and not otherwise. All allegations pertaining to the charge relate long
prior to my elevation. The charge that I have continued to misappropriate
subsequent to my appointment as a Judge as has been made in desperation
only, to bring this entire inquiry within the ambit of Article 124(4) and to continue
with this enquiry under the Judges Inquiry Act, 1968. All my accounts until 2006
have been disclosed before the Learned Single Judge commencement from
1995 and some occasions even prior thereto. There is not a single credit entry
into my account, which can show that I have made any personal use of sale
consideration. After 1997 when the entire sale consideration was found to have
been kept in Lynx there was not a single transaction whatsoever from my
account showing alleged misappropriation. After December, 2003 when I was
elevated, the accounts disclosed in this proceeding would also show that there
has not been one single debit entry or credit entry which can correlate or link
the other transactions with the purchase consideration.
180. With further reference to paragraph 13, it is denied and disputed that I
have committed misappropriation of property or the same constitutes
misbehaviour under Article 124(4) read with Article 217 of the Constitution of
India as alleged or at all. I would like to point out that a very important word
contained in Article 124(4) has been deliberately left out. The language used
in Article 124(4) is ‘proved misbehaviour’ and not simply ‘misbehaviour’ as
has been used in paragraph 13. From the charges itself I say that there is
nothing which can substantiate the alleged charge of misbehaviour or ‘proved
misbehaviour’.
181. With reference Charge II (Making False Statements) contained in

paragraphs 14 to 25, I submit that the entire exercise before the Learned Single
Judge was to establish that a sum of Rs. 31,56,660/- representing the purchase
consideration was kept deposited. According to my understanding and
interpretation my obligation under orders of Court was to keep a sum of
Rs. 31,56,660/- representing the purchase consideration separate. The trail
of money deposit in Lynx does not contradict my contention that a sum of
Rs. 31,56,660/- representing the purchase consideration was kept in Lynx. The
amount of Rs. 31,56,660/- representing the purchase consideration required
to be kept by me as a specific sum does not have any identification either
from any account nor does it contain any colour, stamp of any nature
whatsoever. Therefore, it is of no importance as to from which account the
money was deposited in Lynx. After such long passage of time in absence of
the specific documents, accounts, Cheque books, pass books, counter foils
etc. in my possession it is not possible for me to remember the exact nature
of the transactions or the requirement thereof. The only fact which I remember
and was relevant to me was that the amount of Rs. 31,56,660/- representing
the purchase consideration was kept deposit in Lynx and the statements made
before the Court was purely from memory and this has been specifically stated
in the written notes filed before the Single Judge. Neither in the pleadings in
the petition filed by the plaintiff nor the issues before the Court was with regard
to the source of deposit in Lynx but whether the amount of Rs. 31,56,660/-
representing the purchase consideration was found to be deposit or not, which
I have established without any iota of doubt. Therefore, I submit that no false
statements were made by me at any point of time. Moreover, the Division
Bench has accepted my contentions and has clearly held that there is no
question of any misappropriation of any amount by me. This is a clear and
specific finding in respect of the aforesaid.
182. With particular reference to paragraph 14 of Charge II (Making

False Statements), I deny that the sum of Rs. 12,50,000/- of the sale
consideration or agreed interest thereon have been misappropriated even as
on 10 June, 1996 for the reasons as alleged or at all. It is denied and disputed
that first deposit with Lynx India Ltd. was made by me only on December 19,
1996. The only evidence to deposit in the form of an application for creating
fixed deposit is on 26 February, 1997 for a sum of Rs. 25,00,000/-. It has been
proved beyond the doubt that the total amount found to have been deposited
in Lynx was Rs. 31,56,660/-. Therefore, it is proved beyond doubt that a sum
of Rs.14,39,000/- was deposited in Lynx long prior to 26 February, 1997 and
in fact, such deposit was made-even before 28 November, 1995 since the
statement of account disclose contained in Page 413 of Volume I commences
from 28 February, 1995 and there is no debit entry in the said account till
21 April, 1999 showing another deposit to Lynx. Therefore, my specific
statements that there has been no misappropriation far less the amount of
Rs. 12,50,000/- since Rs. 14,39,000/- was deposited in Lynx. Prior to
28 February, 1995 cannot be contradicted in any manner whatsoever.
Furthermore, the charge of alleged misappropriation of Rs. 12,50,000/- is also
based on assumption without any specific proof. Mere withdrawal of amount
does not constitute misappropriation. It is clear from the nature of charges
framed against me that the charges itself are devoid of any proof and is purely
based on assumption. Such serious allegation of misappropriation has to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt in absence of statement of accounts from
1993-1995 from ANZ Grindlays Bank (now Standard Chartered Bank), it is
impossible to allege misappropriation far less prove the same against me.
Whereas on the contrary circumstantial evidence clearly suggests that the total
amount of purchase consideration as was required to be kept by me was all
along in Lynx.
183. With particular reference to paragraph 15 of Charge II (Making False

Statements), I submit that the order dated 10 April, 2006 (as would appear
from Page No. 1793 of Volume V) was available as signed copy on and from
19 May, 2006 from the Department. Even before obtaining the signed copy
on 18 May, 2006 my Learned Advocate-on-Record appeared before the Court
and expressed desire to deposit a sum less than Rs. 20 lacs, which was duly
done. Consequently when the matter appeared my Learned Advocate made
submission to deposit a sum of rupees not less than 15 lacs. However, the
actual deposit was made for a sum of Rs. 20 lacs, which was recorded in order
dated 8 September, 2006. Therefore, by 8 September, 2006 a sum of
Rs. 45 lacs was also deposited, which far exceeds the principal sum of
Rs. 31,56,660/- prior to seeking of extension. It is submitted that subsequent
thereto there was a personal inconvenience in my family as one of my uncle
fell seriously ill whose children stay abroad. I became preoccupied with his
illness and he ultimately expire sometime in the end of October and the
responsibility of observing the ‘Sradh’ ceremony came over me as I was the

only one who took part in his cremation as a member of the family. Under
these circumstances an extension was sought for to pay the remaining amount
and such extension was duly granted by the Court and the remaining amount
was paid within the extended time.

Statements), it is denied that Rs. 22,00,000/- of the sale consideration and
the agreed interest thereon was withdrawn, disbursed or utilized by me between
22 May, 1997 and 1 July, 1997. It is surprising that such charges have been
made without looking into the accounts and the evidence staring on the face
of the record. All the cheques which has been disclosed by this Committee
regarding withdrawals and/or disbursement of this sum of Rs. 22,00,000/-
withdrawn from 800 account and deposited in 400 account were towards
payment to workers in terms of the Division Bench order dated 20 January,
1997. Not a single paisa was withdrawn by me for my personal use nor any
credit entry from 400 account to 800 account has been found. I reiterate that
a sum of Rs. 25,00,000/- was deposited in Lynx on 25 February, 1997.
Therefore, the statements contained in paragraph 19 that no deposit in Lynx
was made between 22 May, 1997 and 1 July, 1998 is on the face of it, incorrect.
185. With particular reference to paragraphs 20 and 21 of Charge II (Making

False Statements), it is stated that the deposit of Rs. 25, 00,000/- from
400 account and subsequent deposit of Rs. 22 lacs from 800 account to
400 account constitutes the money trail in clear and specific terms.
Furthermore, neither the deposit of Rs. 25, 00,000- from 400 account to Lynx
nor the deposit of Rs. 22,00,000/- from 800 to 400 account and its subsequent
withdrawal was for any personal gain. It is denied that the statement made by
me that deposits in Lynx were made by me by cheques drawn on account
from 800 is false as alleged or at all. I have clearly stated - that since no
documents were available with me, my only endeavour was to establish deposit
of Rs. 31,56,660/- in Lynx. My only endeavour was to establish that I have not
personally utilized any amount and that the amount as directed by the Court
was kept deposited. All other questions become inconsequential as far as my
interpretation and/or understanding of the facts and circumstances of this case.

Statements), it is denied that the withdrawal of Rs. 5, 00,000/- from the Lynx
was from my personal fund is false as alleged or at all. The only responsibility
and duty cast upon me was to keep a sum of Rs. 31,56,660/- deposited and/
or separated. The excess amount found in Lynx was my personal fund.
Moreover, the Court have quantified amount payable by me and paid by me, all
other questions become irrelevant and/or is of no consequence as on date.

Statements), it is denied that I have made any statements that are false or
which I knew or believe to be false or did not believe to be true as alleged or
at all. My specific statement contained in the written notes filed before the
Hon’ble Judge was only for the purpose of explaining the anomaly in the
accounts disclosed by the Official Liquidator and which contains specific
statement that all that was stated by me was based upon memory of transaction
which took place long prior thereto. Without taking into consideration of the
same, such allegations of misrepresentation of facts are uncalled for. In any
event of the matter, the Division Bench after having considered all materials
of record have come to a definite conclusion and finding that the allegations
of misappropriation is unfounded. Therefore, the question of misrepresentation
of facts before the Court cannot and does not arise and in view of the specific
directions of the Division Bench expunging the adverse comments made
against me, the allegations of misappropriation and misrepresentation of facts
cannot be made in any manner whatsoever. It is significant to point out that
no new facts were placed before the Division Bench than those already before
the Single Judge.
188. With particular reference to paragraphs 24 and 25 of Charge II (Making

False Statements), it is denied that I have made any false statements or made
misrepresentation of facts or gave false evidence while I was a Judge of the
Court as alleged or at all. It is denied that during the judicial proceeding or
while holding the office of Judge of the Court intentionally gave false facts which
constitute misbehaviour under Article 124(4) read with Article 217 of the
Constitution of India as alleged or at all. I would like to point out that when
litigation was conducted against me or when the litigation was conducted by
me, it was not done in the capacity of a Judge, but in the capacity of a litigant.
My actions were not in course of discharge of my .judicial functions. Therefore,
the allegations itself does not come within the purview of “proved misbehaviour”
as contained in Article 124(4) read with Article 217 of the Constitution of India.
Significantly, my interpretation of facts of this case have been accepted by the
Division Bench which has given me a complete clean chit and have directed
diverse judicial observance made by the Single Judge be deleted from the
records of the case.
189. With regard to Statement of Ground in support of charges, it is stated

as under:-
A. Appointment of Receiver:
190. With reference to paragraphs 1 to 11 are all matters of record and save
what appears there from all allegations contrary thereto and/or inconsistent
therewith are denied and disputed.
191. With reference to paragraphs E alleging misappropriation in Allahabad

Bank account contained in paragraphs 12 and 13, it is submitted that mere
withdrawal of the amount does not constitutes misappropriation. There is not
an iota of proof with regard to disbursement or dealing with the same as there
was no direction to the contrary which prohibited me from withdrawing the
amount. Since the choice of keeping the purchase consideration by me was
left to me totally, I was free in law to withdraw the amount from Allahabad Bank.
Unless it may be specifically shown by specific evidence that I have disbursed
or dealt with the same for my own personal use, the allegation of transfer of
said amount from Allahabad Bank is untenable in facts and/or in law. I have
already stated that the choice given to me by order dated 20 January, 1993
by the Court to hold the money does not commence with the first deposit. Since
22 drafts were given to me my choice of keeping money separately
commences only when the entire purchase consideration is paid. The order
dated 20 January, 1993 specifically directs me to keep the entire sale
consideration after deducting 5% towards remuneration and not any part
thereof. It is only after 29 April, 1995 when the last payment was made,
I was under an obligation to keep the money separately and it will appear from
records of this case and also clearly established that I have fulfilled my
obligations under the said order. Moreover, the delivery of goods to the
purchase was made from the Bokaro Steel Plant. Though it was under my
possession as a Receiver in order to facilitate delivery from a very high security
area an employ of Steel Authority of India was employed as Manager under
me. Under the order dated 20 January, 1993 the purchaser was given liberty
to lift the materials in lots and a time period of four months was fixed. However,
the plaintiff use to issue the delivery challans from Bokaro Steel Plant which
was brought to me in Kolkata for counter signing which continued from 1993
till 1995. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendants nor the purchasers raised any
objection with regard thereto.

Bank account contained in paragraphs 12 and 13, it is denied that I had
misappropriated or converted to my own a sum of Rs. 4,25,000/- in violation
of the orders of the Single Judge in C.S. No. 8 of 2003 or applicable provisions
of law. I submit that the said allegations are contrary to the established
principles relating to misappropriation. Furthermore, conversion of amount to
my own use requires proof and evidence thereof. Such serious allegation cannot
be made merely on the basis of assumption of withdrawal. Proof of conversion
is an essential ingredient to substantiate the charge of misappropriation. Till
date there is not an iota of evidence to establish that
I have either misappropriated or converted any amount to my own use.

Bank account contained in paragraphs 12 and 13, it is submitted that apart
from alleging withdrawals no explanation has been given as to the two amounts
shown as creation of fixed deposit, one dated 24 March, 1993 and other
dated 21 July, 1993. There is no evidence disclosed from Allahabad Bank with
regard to creation of fixed deposit or encashment thereof. It appears that on
24 March, 1993 a sum of Rs. 4,46,000/- was deposited in fixed deposit. On
19 July, 1993, a sum of Rs. 4,58,837/- was credited from fixed deposit.
However, there is no evidence on record to show as to whether such fixed
deposit was directed to be encahsed. I, therefore, submit that the evidence
relating to accounts disclosed in this proceedings are not only full of anomalies
and are also incomplete and partly incorrect, therefore, to rely on the same
and to make specific allegation of misappropriation is unfortunate, totally
uncalled for, contrary to records and/or unjust.
194. With reference Charge II (Misappropriation in ANZ Grindlays Account)

contained in paragraphs 14, 15 and 16, I deny that the shortfall in the opening
balance as on 28 February, 1995 constitutes misappropriation or the amount
maintained in Allahabad Bank being negligible also constitutes misappropriation
as alleged or at all. I say that there is no contrary evidence to contradict my
contention that by that time substantial amount of fixed deposits was already
created in Lynx for the reasons as stated hereinbefore.

contained in paragraph 17, it is submitted that apart from the 800 accounts,
the other accounts in Standard Chartered Bank are of no relevance whatsoever.
Furthermore, without specific information from the bank as to the date of
opening of the accounts and the account opening forms and the letter of
request for closure of the accounts, it is impossible for me to make specific
comments with regard thereto. My Advocate’s letter dated 24 March 2010 and
6 April 2010 written to the bank seeking such information, copies whereof are
annexed hereto and collectively marked with the letter “D”, which has remained
unanswered till date.

contained in paragraph 18, it is denied and disputed that I have misappropriated
at least a sum of Rs. 12,50,000/- for the reasons alleged or at all. I have given
factually correct explanation with regard to the alleged misappropriation of

Rs. 12,50,000/- hereinabove and I reiterate the same in seriatim.
197. With reference paragraph G under the heading ‘Events of 1999’

contained in paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25, I say that the statements
contained therein are mostly matters of record and save what appears there
from allegations contrary thereto and/or inconsistent therewith are denied and
disputed. It is however, significant to mention herein that under the Division
Bench order dated 20 January, 1997 my only responsibility was to distribute
Rs. 70 lacs to the workers who were to be identified by the Union. There is no
direction in the said order even to open an account. The account was opened
by me only to facilitate disbursement. The nomenclature given as a ‘Special
Officer’ is only for the reason as no savings bank account in the same branch
under the same name can be opened. Since 400 account was opened by me
on my own without any direction of Court, it cannot be termed as account
opened under orders of Court. It is significant to point out that it was when my
Advocate took inspection of the documents in the office of this Committee on
19 April, 2010 it was found from the original letter dated 22 May, 1998 disclosed
in Page No. 1683 of Volume IV and also at several other places the scoring
out and/or underlying appeared in the original is of a different ink and the
scoring out portion is also not signed by me. It is, therefore, very difficult to
explain the circumstances under which the amount was transferred from 400
account to Lynx since as on that date fixed deposits worth more than
Rs. 22 lacs was already lying in Standard Chartered Bank. No special benefit
whatsoever has accrued to me personally by transferring the sum of Rs. 25
lacs from 400 account of Lynx and instead the sum of Rs. 22 lacs and more
lying in fixed deposit with Standard Chartered Bank.

contained in paragraphs 24 and 25, I say that while framing the charges due
regard to the actual facts and the evidence on record has been totally ignored
and has been done in a mechanical manner and exhibits blind adopting of
the observation made by in-house committee earlier. The entire evidence on
record has been completely ignored. The reduction of the amount in the
400 account by making series of disbursement does not amount to
misappropriation and/or conversion to my own use of approximately
Rs. 22,00,000/- as alleged or at all. Such withdrawals or disbursements have
been done in compliance with the directions given by the Division Bench
contained in the order dated 20 January, 1993.

contained in paragraphs 26 and 27, the amount of sale consideration or
accrued interest have been transferred illegally by me from 800 account or was
misappropriated and/or converted to my own use on 22 May, 1997 or 1 July,
1997 as alleged or at all. The disbursement in the 400 account between 22
May, 1997 and 1 July, 1997 are all towards making workers’ payment and not
a single paisa have been used by me for my personal gain. Therefore, the entire
allegation of misappropriation is without any basis and have been made without
due regard to the evidence on record.
200. With reference paragraph G under the heading ‘Events of 1999’ contained
in paragraph 27, it is denied and disputed that the portion of sale consideration
that accrued interest obtained by me as Receiver continued to be misappropriated
and/or converted to my own use even at the time and subsequent to my
appointment as a Judge of the Court on 3 December, 2003. These allegations
are without any basis and are purely based on surmise and conjecture and even
contrary to records and evidence on record.
201. With reference paragraph H, under the heading ‘Attendant Circumstances’

contained in paragraph paragraphs 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33, I repeat what has
been stated hereinabove and deny that there was any obligation upon me under
the signed copy of the order dated 30 April, 1984 served upon me and as quoted
by the plaintiff in its application affirmed on 7 February, 2003 or under the
provisions of the Civil Procedure Code to file a separate half-yearly accounts in
the office of the Registrar of Record pertaining to the amount under my
Receivership or were to specifically to show, inter alia, what the balance in hand
at each stage or that I did not any stage including after my appointment as
Judge of the High Court on 3 December, 2003 filed any accounts in compliance
with the said order dated 30 April, 1984 or the applicable rules or provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as alleged or at all.
202. The signed copy of the order dated 30 April, 1984 served upon me does
not contain any direction for filing of account. Even in the order dated
20 January, 1993 there is no direction given to file accounts. From the records
of this case produced so far it is clear that the certified copy of the order dated
30 April, 1984 was never served upon me. I call upon the plaintiffs to produce
the copy of the letter under cover of which the said order was served upon
me in order to act in terms of the Order.
203. From both the certified copy of the order disclosed by this Committee
at page 145 of Volume I and the signed copy quoted by the plaintiff in their
application at paragraph 11 at page 179 of Volume I, there is a clear direction
upon the Receiver to act on a signed copy of the Order and not the Certified
copy of the said order. Furthermore from the certified copy of the order relied
upon by this Committee it appears that there was no direction whatsoever as

to how the sale proceeds were to be invested. The plaintiff was given the liberty
to seek appropriate direction for investment.
204. From the certified copy of the order disclosed and relied upon by this
Committee it is clear that the certified copy was ready for delivery and obtained
on or after 28 February, 1985. It is unbelievable that after obtaining the order
dated 30 April, 1984 the plaintiff will wait till 28 February, 1985 to serve the same
upon me as receiver. The question therefore which arises is what order was
served upon me to act as a receiver. If the certified copy was not served it
has no relevance and the question of its compliance also cannot and does
not arise.
205. It is significant to note that the terms of the signed copy of the order
dated 30 April, 1984 and the terms of the certified copy of the said order are at
a great variance. Under the established practice and procedure then prevailing
in the original side of the Calcutta High Court, all orders passed in the original
side were recorded in the minute book prepared by the recording officer of the
concerned court. Signed copies were delivered on the basis of the minutes. The
signed copy and the minutes were required to be identical. Parties applying for
certified copy were required to compare the same before the Registrar Original
Side before the order is drawn up and completed and delivered to the parties
after settlement.
206. Having regard to the procedure as discussed above it is not understood

as to how can the signed copy of the order and the certified copy of the order
can be at such variance with one another.
207. It is on record that the plaintiff has not obtained any such direction and
the only direction upon me to deal with the purchase consideration is contained
in the order dated 20 January, 1993.
208. I have already given explanation with regard to alleged non-compliance

of the Original Side Rules and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 which I reiterate herein in seriatim. In any event, I say that these alleged
attendant circumstances does not constitute a function or action which can
come within the ambit of Article 124(4) read with Article 217 of the Constitution
of India. It appear from the manner in which the attendant circumstances have
been, formulated the solemn provisions of Article 124(4) read with Article 217
of the Constitution of India for the purpose for which such provisions engrafted
in the Constitution of India is sought to be diluted in an extremely cursory
manner.
209. It is denied that I had dealt with the funds by distributing or withdrawing
them out of the bank account, which had been deposited. The withdrawals all
been made to create fixed deposits and for no other purpose. It is denied that
I have allegedly intermingled all funds or did not adhere to the direction to
maintain the separation of the sale consideration from any other funds thereby
misappropriating and/or converting to my own use the sale consideration as
alleged or at all. I have already stated that the choice to keep the same
separated would arise only after the entire purchase consideration is paid and
not prior thereto. As and when substantial sum of money accrued in the bank,
fixed deposits were created so as to prevent intermingling but the
circumstances were beyond my control which permitted me to deposit the fixed
deposits in an account standing in my name only for the purpose of
encashment as by nature of the direction contained in the order dated
20 January, 1993. I was prevented from opening any Receiver’s account, which
would have solved all my problems. It is unfortunate that the mitigating
circumstances leading to the complication in handling of accounts have been
completely disregarded and allegations are being made against me though I
have tried my utmost to keep the sanctity of the orders. I submit that there is
not an iota of evidence showing misappropriation or conversion to my own
use the sale consideration or any part thereof.
210. In particular reference to paragraph 31 of paragraph H under the heading

‘Attendant Circumstances’, I submit that the order dated 20 January, 1993 did
not cast any embargo upon me in any manner whatsoever. The language is
of the widest amplitude a restrictive meaning is now sought to be given in the
form of attendant circumstances. I had absolute liberty to withdraw money and
to create fixed deposits. Even in 1993 fixed deposits were created in Allahabad
Bank. There is no contrary evidence to contradict my contention that fixed
deposits were created in Lynx long prior to 6 March, 1995. Creation of fixed
deposits does not amount to violation of the orders passed in this case or any
part of Chapter 21 of the Original Side Rules or any other provisions of law. It
is denied and disputed that I have failed to provide accounts even to the plaintiff
despite a letter dated 7 March, 2002 in this regard sent by the plaintiff or
received by me as alleged or at all. From the letter itself it will appear that my
signature on the said letter does not appear.
211. With reference to paragraph 33 in particularly of paragraph H under the

heading ‘Attendant Circumstances’, I submit that I was not aware of any
procedure, rules or law or convention that I have to seek discharge from
Receiver, at the time of appointment as a Judge of the Court. Particularly, in
view of the fact when an application was already pending filed by the plaintiffs
with regard to return of amount which would consequently result in my
discharge. It is stated that the alleged failure to take steps to discharge as a

Receiver or return of amount or furnishing of accounts constitutes
misappropriation. Unless Court gives a specific direction the amount held by
a Receiver cannot be given to anyone as I was bound by the order dated
20 January, 1993 to hold money until further orders. It is denied that I have
continued to misappropriate or utilize funds contrary to direction of law. It is
evidence on record in these proceedings that amount representing the
purchase consideration continued to remain deposited in Lynx and was not
utilised by me in any manner whatsoever.
212. With reference to paragraph 35 in particular of paragraph H under the

heading ‘Attendant Circumstances’, it is submitted that order of 7 March, 2005
was only served upon me in the month of May 2005. Consequent to the order
of 3 May, 2005 service was effected and a further was given on 17 May, 2005
to file an affidavit, if so advised, dealing with only “the petition filed by the plaintiff
and the affidavit filed by the purchaser”. It is well-established principles of law
that subsequent directions are required to be complied with. The Court was
perfectly aware that order dated 7 March, 2005 was not served upon me and
it was only served pursuant to the order dated 3 May, 2005. Even in those
circumstances on 17 May, 2005 the Court did not give any specific direction
for disclosure of any particulars. It is, therefore, understood that the Court
wanted only the 17 May, 2005 order to be complied with.
213. With reference to paragraphs 38, 39 and 40 of paragraph H under the

heading ‘Attendant Circumstances’, I deny each and every allegation as if the
same are specifically set out herein and denied in seriatim. I also reiterate what
has been stated hereinabove, with regard to the contents of the said
paragraphs under reference.
214. With reference to paragraph 39 in particular of paragraph H under the

heading ‘Attendant Circumstances’, I submit that the statements contained
I paragraph under reference have been made without any understanding of
the correct position of law. With regard to the principles of Receivership read
with the order dated 20 January, 1993 no Receiver can return any fund until
called upon by the Court to do so. It is significant to note here that until 10 April,
2006 there have been no directions upon me to return any amount.
215. With reference paragraph I under the heading ‘Misrepresentation and

false Statements’ as contained in paragraph paragraphs 41, 42, 43, 44, 45,
46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 and 56, are all matters of record and
save what appears there from I deny each and every allegation which is
contrary thereto and/or inconsistent therewith. It is submitted that written notes
submitted before the Single Judge was not in order to establish any co-relation
between the withdrawal of funds and deposit with Lynx, but was to point out
the anomalies contained in the report filed by the Official Liquidator (which
would appear from Page 132 of Volume III.) In fact, the heading of the written
notes is a clear indication of the same.
216. With reference to paragraph 39 in particular of paragraph I under the

heading ‘Misrepresentation and false Statements’, it is denied that no deposit
was made in Lynx at least prior to December, 1996. There is no evidence on
record to substantiate the same. There are fixed deposit receipts of Lynx even
in 1999. It is an admitted position that no amount has been debited in 1999
from any of my accounts. There is no corresponding debit entry. Therefore,
fixed deposit receipts shown in 1996 also do not establish that no deposits
were made prior thereto. In any event, there is no evidence of deposit in Lynx
apart from Rs. 25,00,000/- accompanied by an application form together with
Cheque numbers, but it is an admitted position that in there was an aggregate
deposit of Rs. 39,39,000/- in Lynx.
217. The allegations contained in paragraphs 57(a) to (g) of paragraph I under

the heading ‘Misrepresentation and false Statements’ are repetitive in nature
and denied by me specifically as if the same are set out in seriatim. It is further
submitted that my obligation to distribute Rs. 70,00,000/- to the workers have
been fully performed. Till date not a single worker has come forward with any
complaint of not having received his legitimate dues. Therefore, after having
disbursed the entire amount as directed by the Division Bench by the order
dated 20 January, 1997 amount withdrawn by me from Lynx after having set
apart the amount of Rs. 31,39,000/- representing the purchase consideration
was certainly permissible and does not contradict the fact that amount was
my personal fund.
218. The allegations contained in paragraphs 58, 59 and 60 of paragraph

I under the heading ‘Misrepresentation and false Statements’, I deny and
dispute that I have made any false statements which I believe to be false or
shown believed to be true as alleged or at all. In litigation I am entitled to make
my own interpretation on the basis of the facts and circumstances and it does
not amount to making false statements or misrepresentation. Conducting
litigation before the Court of Law by me was not in the capacity of a Judge or
in discharge of my judicial functions. It is incorrect to allege that I have made
false statements or misstatements or false evidence in judicial proceedings
before the Court. Curiously enough the Courts before which such statements
have been made have not been made any observations or allegations that I have
given any false statement or made any misrepresentation before, the judicial
forum. On the contrary the Division Bench had accepted my contention had
come to the specific finding that there is no misappropriation on my part.
219. I have never even once committed any act of judicial impropriety nor there
any allegation against me with regard thereto. Even my conduct and behaviour
as a judge outside the court as is understood has been impeccable and without
blemish. In spite thereof, I have been victimised.
220. I, therefore, humbly request the members of this Hon’ble Committee to

put an end to this unspeakable mental agony and harassment that I and my
family have been subjected and to take such steps that would ensure that I
may be allowed to resume my judicial function and discharge, my duties as a
judge.
221. In these circumstances, I humbly state and submit that the proceedings
be dropped and/or dismissed as against me and accept the verdict of the
Division Bench so that the confidence and belief in the judicial system is
established.
Thanking you.
Yours sincerely
(Justice Soumitra Sen)

ANNEXURE-“A”
LIST OF EVENTS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE HON’BLE

MR. JUSTICE SOUMITRA SEN
Sl. Date Particulars Corresponding Corresponding

No. pages from pages from
documents documents
supplied by prepared on
Commission behalf of
Justice
Soumitra Sen
as Volume V &
Volume VI
1 2 3 4 5
1. 30.04.1984 Mr. Soumitra Sen, as Page 145 to

an Advocate appointed 155 of
as Receiver in Suit Volume-I
No. 8 of 1983 (SAIL
Vs Shipping)
(hereinafter referred to
as the said suit)
2. 20.01.1993 By an order Justice Page 195 of Page 1689 of
A.N. Ray directed the Volume I Volume V
receiver to keep the
sale proceeds after
deducting 5 per cent
towards remuneration,
in a separate account
in a bank & branch
of his choice and to
hold the same free
from lien or encum-
brances until further
orders
3. 01.04.1993 to Receiver received the Page 653 to
01.06.1995 sale consideration for 655 of
a total sum of Volume II
Rs.33, 22,800/-
deducting his 5 per cent
remuneration of
Volume II
Rs. 1,66,140/-.
1 2 3 4 5
4. 1996 After accumulating the

entire sale proceed
Receiver kept the
entire money in
separate Fixed
Deposits in Standard
Chartered Bank (the
then ANZ Grindleys
Bank) and thereafter
transferred the same
to Lynx India Limited,
a company authorised
by R.B.I. to receive
Fixed Deposit.
5. 20.01.1997 Justice Umesh Page 157 to

Chandra Banerjee and 167 of
Justice Sidheshwar Volume I
Narayan in another
matter were pleased to
direct the Receiver to
hold a sum of Rs. 70
lakhs for distribution
amongst the workers.
Receiver deposited the
said amount in the
Standard Chartered
Bank in an account
bearing No.
01SLP0813400
(hereinafter referred
to 400 accounts).
6. 14.05.1997 to (Receiver issued Page 521 to

06.08.1997 several Account Payee 581 of Volume I
cheques to the & Page 1575
workers. to 1707 of
Volume III
7. 26.02.1997 Receiver deposited Page 921 of
Rs. 25 lakhs to the Volume II
Lynx India by a
cheque bearing
1 2 3 4 5
No. 624079 of the

Standard Chartered
Bank.
8. 27.02.2003 Plaintiff filed an inter- Page 171 to

locutory application 199 of
being G.A. No. 875 Volume I
of 2003 inter-alia
praying for an order
directing the Receiver
to handover the entire
sale proceeds and
also to render true &
faithful accounts lying
with the Receiver.
9. 03.12.2003 Receiver was elevated

as a Judge of the
10. 03.08.2004 Said application being Page 1691 to

G.A No. 875 of 2003 1693 of
was taken up for Volume V
hearing for first time
by the Hon’ble Mr.
Justice Subhro Kamal
Mukherjee and his
Lordship was pleased
to appoint a new
Receiver discharging
the erstwhile Receiver
without any direction
of refund of money
lying with the erstwhile
Receiver or furnishing
of accounts.
11. 15.02.2005 Matter appeared before Page 1695 of

Justice Sengupta for Volume V
the first time and his
Lordship treated the
matter as heard in part.
1 2 3 4 5
12. 07.03.2005 Justice Sengupta Page 1699 to

passed an order 1701 of
directing the plaintiff to Volume V
serve the copy of the
notice of motion as
well as the said
application to the
erstwhile Receiver and
also requesting the
erstwhile Receiver to
swear an affidavit
stating what steps he
had taken and how
much amount he has
received in terms of
the order of this Court
and also to state the
name of the bank
where the sale
proceeds has been
deposited.
13. 11.05.2005 Copy of the Appli- page 247 and
cation and Copies relevant portion
of the orders dated is at page 251
07.03.2005 and of Volume I
03.05.2005 were
served upon
erstwhile Receiver.
14. 17.05.2005 Since the earlier order Page 1707 to
could not be served 1709 of
upon erstwhile Volume V
Receiver Justice
Sengupta further
passed a direction to
serve a copy of the
application and also
directed the erstwhile
Receiver to file an
affidavit dealing with
the statements and/or
averments made by
the petitioner and the
purchaser.
1 2 3 4 5
15. 09.06.2005 Copy of the order Starts from

dated 17.05.2005 and page 251 and
the copy of the affidavit relevant portion
of purchaser were is at page 253
served upon erstwhile of Volume I
Receiver.
16. 30.06.2005 Hon’ble Mr. Justice Page 1711 to

Sengupta passed an 1717 of
order for making an Volume V
enquiry as to what
happened to the
payment received by
the erstwhile Receiver.
It is pertinent to
mention that said order
of enquiry was directed
not to be served upon
17. 21.07.2005 Accounts department Pages

of High Court filed 1719 to 1721
report stating that no 1723 to 1727
account was filed by 1729 to 1733
erstwhile Receiver. 1735 to 1737
Chief Manager of SBI 1745 to 1747
intimated that the and 1749
particulars of the
records cannot be
supplied.
26.07.2005 26.07.05 - Learned page 1753 to

Single Judge directed 1755 of
the Bank officer to be Volume V
present in court as the
manager of the Bank
expressed his inability
to produce the old
record and also
directed the purchaser
to be present
personally, with
relevant original
1 2 3 4 5
documents and also

expressed anxiety as
to whether the
erstwhile Receiver
realised the money
or not.
07.09.2005 07.09.2005 - Learned

Single Judge on his
own started making
enquiry and also made
several allegations
against the erstwhile
Receiver.
04.10.2005 04.10.2005 - Manager

Standard Chartered
Bank filed report
stating that they are
unable to supply any
record prior to 1996 as
the same has been
destroyed. Manager
Allahabad Bank was
directed to be present.
21.11.2005 21.11.2005 - The

persons those who are
not party to the suit
have been made
to depose before the
Court and formed an
adverse opinion
against Justice Sen.
12.12.2005 12.12.05 - Officers of

the Standard Chartered
Bank and Allahabad
Bank were directed
to be present with all
information and
documents.
1 2 3 4 5
15.02.2006 15.2.06 - Officer of the

Allahabad Bank failed
to produce any
document relating to
withdrawal of
Rs. 4,53,000/- and he
was directed to swear
an affidavit.
18. 01.11.2005 Erstwhile Receiver Page 1433 of Page 1793 of

deposited a sum of Volume III Volume IV
Rs. 5 lakhs
19. 10.04.2006 Hon’ble Justice Page 617 to Page 1757 to

Sengupta passed a 558 of 1797 of
detailed order directing Volume II Volume V
erstwhile Receiver to
pay a sum of
Rs. 52,46,454/ after
adjusting the said
sum of Rs. 5 lakhs.
The erstwhile Receiver
and /or his agent, and/
or representative was
injuncted from trans-
ferring, alienating,
disposing of or dealing
with right, title and
interest in moveable
and immovable
properties lying at his
disposal, save and
except in usual course
of business, though
he was discharged
on 03.08.2004.
20. 27.06.2006 A sum of Rs. 40 lakhs Page 789 of

and has been paid by the Volume II
05.09.2006 erstwhile Receiver.
21. 14.09.2006 On behalf of erstwhile Page 659 to

Receiver the constituted 683 of Volume II
1 2 3 4 5
Attorney filed an
application for exten-
sion of time to deposit
the balance amount.
22. 20.09.2006 Hon’ble Justice Page 705 to

Sengupta directed the 733 of
Advocate on Record Volume II
of the erstwhile
Receiver to file an
affidavit stating that
the amount paid on
behalf of the erstwhile
Receiver was received
by him from the
erstwhile Receiver.
23. 10.11.2006 Hon’ble Justice Page 735 of

Sengupta was pleased Volume II
to pass an order
granting extension of
time to pay the
balance amount for a
period of two weeks,
and was also pleased
to direct to file an
affidavit explaining
how the money was
dealt with and also
stating the source as
to the fact that the
withdrawn money has
not been utilized
gainfully and profitably.
24. 17.11.2006 Publication made in

the local newspapers.
25. 21.11.2006 Learned Advocate on Page 789 to

Record of erstwhile 791 of
Receiver by a letter Volume II
deposited the remain-
ing balance amount
1 2 3 4 5
of Rs.12 46,454/-
before the Registrar.
26. 13.12.2006 An application on Page 741 to

behalf of erstwhile 860 of
Receiver was filed for Volume II
recalling the order
dated 10.04.2006.
27. 15.12.2006 Several orders were Page 1821 to

to passed by Hon’ble 1835 of
10.05.2007 Justice Sengupta Volume V
including direction
upon the Official
Liquidator to produce
documents.
28. 31.07.2007 Application being G.A. Page 977 to

No. 3763 of 2006 for 999 of
recalling of the order Volume II
dated 10.4.2006 was
disposed of recording
that the Hon’ble
Justice Sengupta
neither disbelieved nor
believed the
explanation sought to
be given the erstwhile
Receiver and also
granting liberty to take
step under law if fresh
and relevant authenti-
cated materials are
available.
29. 28.08.2007 An appeal being APOT Page 1003 to

No. 462 of 2007 and 1440 of
an application being Volume II
G.A. No. 2865 of 2007
was filed on behalf of
1 2 3 4 5
30. 29.08.2007 The Appeal and the

Application appeared
before the Hon’ble
Mr. Justice Pinaki
Chandra Ghosh and
Hon’ble Mr. Justice
Sankar Prasad Mitra
and their Lordships
were pleased to
release the matter for
their personal ground
and thereafter
application for
assignment was made
and the Appeal and
the Application was
assigned before the
Hon’ble Justice Pranab
Kumar Chattopadhyay
and Hon’ble Justice
Kalidas Mukherjee.
31. 25.09.2007 Hon’ble Justice Pranab Page 1441 to

Kumar Chattopadhyay 1478 of
and Hon’ble Justice Volume II
Kalidas Mukherjee
were pleased to set-
aside the impugned
judgement dated
31.07.2007 and also
expunged the observ-
ation made in the
order dated 10.4.2006.
32. 03.12.2007 Hon’ble Chief Justice Page 1917 of

of India was pleased to Volume VI
intimate the Hon’ble
Mr. Justice Soumitra
Sen that a three
member committee in
terms of the in house
procedure has been
constituted.
1 2 3 4 5

of India by a letter Volume VI
served the report of
the Inquiry Committee
and also advised
Justice Soumitra Sen
to resign or seek
voluntary retirement.
34. 25.02.2008 In reply to, the said Page 1921 to

letter Justice Soumitra 1985 of
Sen made a detailed Volume VI
representation of
33 pages requesting
C.J.I, to reconsider his
decision.
35. 16.03.2008 Justice Soumitra Sen

was directed to appear
before the Hon’ble
Chief Justice of India,
Hon’ble Justice B.N.
Agarwal & Hon’ble
Justice Bhan at the
chamber of the
Hon’ble Chief Justice
of India when Justice
Soumitra Hon’ble Chief
Justice of India was
directed to submit
resignation or to take
V.R.S. on or before
02.04.2008 filing which
they would proceed
further.

of India by a Letter Volume VI
recorded the proceed-
ing and communicated
the same to Justice
Soumitra Sen.
1 2 3 4 5
37. 26.03.2008 Justice Soumitra Page 1989 to

made a further 1993 of
representation in reply Volume VI
to the said letter dated
17.03.2008.
38. 27.02.2009 The 58 members of Page 1687 of

the Rajya Sabha moved Volume IV
a motion asking
impeachment of
Justice Soumitra Sen
on the basis of die
letter written by
Hon’ble Chief Justice
of India to the Hon’ble
Prime Minister.
39. 27.03.2009 Ld. Advocate of Page 1995 to

Justice Sen wrote a 2009 of
letter to the Hon’ble Volume VI
Chairman of the
Rajya Sabha requesting
him to follow the
mandatory require-
ments of the statute,
with regard to form-
ation of the Enquiry
Committee.
40. 28.03.2009 Ld. Advocate of Justice Page to 2011

Sen by a letter of Volume VI
requested the Hon’ble
Speaker of Lok Sabha
to supply a copy of the
Rules of the Joint
Committee and the
names of the
15 members of the said
Committee in terms
of Section 7 of the
Judges Inquiry Act
1968 along with the
Gazette Notification.
1 2 3 4 5
41. 30.03.2009 Ld. Advocate of Justice Page 2015 to

Sen raised preliminary 2025 of
objection before the Volume VI
Hon’ble Chairman of
Rajya Sabha with
regard to formation of
the Inquiry Committee
by the Hon’ble Chief
Justice of India.
42. 17.04.2009 Ld. Advocate of Justice Page 2027 to

Sen made another 2043 of
representation before Volume VI
the Hon’ble Chairman
of Rajya Sabha raising
preliminary objection
with regard to exercising
simultaneous
function of the Hon’ble
Chief Justice of India in
dual capacity (Adminis-
tration & Judicial)
wherein in one hand
he became the
complainant and on
the other hand he
decided a Committee
of his choice to decide
complaint.
43. 27.05.2009 Mr. R.S. Misra, Director Page 2045 of

of Lok Sabha Volume VI
Secretariat by a letter
furnished the names of
the Chairman and
members of the
Committee constituted
under the Judges
(Inquiry) Act, 1968 and
the Rules of the
Committee.
1 2 3 4 5
44. 11.06.2009 Ld. Advocate of Justice Page 2047 of

Sen made another Volume VI
representation before
the Hon’ble Chairman
of Rajya Sabha with
regard to appointment
of Mr. Fali Nariman as
a member of the
Inquiry Committee as
he openly made a
statement in the Print
and other Media
against Justice Sen.
45. 05.02.2010 The Secretary of the Page 2049 to

Inquiry Committee 2103 of
wrote a letter to Justice Volume VI
Soumitra Sen enclosing
draft charges (contain-
ing 1608 pages) and
also requested him to
give a reply within
26.02.2010.
46. 18.02.2010 The Ld. Advocate for Page 2105 to

Justice Soumitra Sen 2109 of
prayed for inspection of Volume VI
certain documents and
also prayed for exten-
sion of time to file the
reply.
47. 23.02.2010 Learned Advocate of Page 2111 to

Justice Soumitra Sen 2123 of
further raised prelimi- Volume VI
nary objection with
regard to formation of
Inquiry Committee as
the same is beyond
the scope of Judges
Inquiry Act, 1968 and
the Rules framed
there-under.
1 2 3 4 5
48. 04.03.2010 The Secretary of Page 2125 to

Judges Inquiry 2145 of
Committee issued Volume VI
formal notice in terms
of the Rule 5(1) of the
Judges Inquiry Rules
1969 and also allowed
Justice Sen to take
inspection. The
Secretary of Judges
Inquiry Committee
also enclosed the
Rules as framed under
Section 7 of Judges
(Inquiry) Act 1968, the
Gazette Notification
constituting the
present Committee and
the Parliamentary
Bulletin dated
27.02.2009 of the
Rajya Sabha relating to
admission of the
motion.
49. 04.03.2010 The Presiding Officer Page 2147 to

wrote a letter to Justice 2199 of
Sen intimating that a Volume VI
hearing will be held on
25.03.2010 at
4.30 P.M enclosing the
final Charges which is
identical to the Draft
Charges. No chance
was given to file the
written statement of
defence.
50. 05.03.2010 Mr. S.K. Tripathi, Page 2201 of

Joint Director of Rajya Volume VI
Sabha Secretariat,
wrote a letter to the
Ld. Advocate of Justice
1 2 3 4 5
Sen enclosing a copy

each of the Judges
(Inquiry) Rules 1969
and Rajya Sabha
Parliamentary Bulletin,
Part II dated 26.03.1969
regarding constitution of
the joint Committee
51. 09.03.2010 Justice Soumitra Sen

wrote a letter to the
Presiding Officer of the
Inquiry Committee
praying for adjourn-
ment of the date of
hearing.
52. 16.03.2010 A Fresh set of docu-

ment as Volume IV
was sent
53. 19.03.2010 Committee extended

the date of hearing till
17.04.2010
54. 24.03.2010 Leaned Advocate of

Justice Sen wrote a
letter to the Manager
of the Standard
Chartered Bank asking
certain information
pertaining to the
documents annexed in
the Volume IV
55. 29.03.2010 Learned Advocate of

Justice Sen also made
an application under
right to information Act
2005 before the
Deputy Registrar
1 2 3 4 5
(administration) Public
Information Office,
Appellate Side, High
Court, Calcutta as to
whether the resolution
taken by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India
dated 15.12.1999,
with regard to
the Formation of In
House Committee has
been adopted by the
Hon’ble High Court,
Calcutta, or not
56. 06.04.2010 Learned Advocate of

Justice Sen further
requested the Manager
of the Bank to intimate
regarding the inform-
ation sought in his
letter dated 25.03.2010
57. 07.04.2010 Date of filling written

statement of defence
fixed on 03.05.2010
58. 19.04.2010 Inspection of docu-

ments was permitted
to be made by the
office of the Judges
Inquiry Committee.
59. 26.04.2010 In reply to the inform-

ation sought for under
right to information Act
the Deputy Registrar
(Administration), Public
Information Officer,
Appellate Side, High
Court, Calcutta by letter
being Ref. No. 3938-GS
1 2 3 4 5
intimated the Advocate

of Justice Sen that the
matter of Resolution
taken by the Hon’ble
Apex Court dated
18.12.1999 with regard
to formation of the “In
House Committee” is
still pending before the
Hon’ble Full Court for
decision”
COMMITTEE CONSTITUTED UNDER THE JUDGES

INQUIRY ACT, 1968
MINUTES
The first meeting of the Committee was held on 22 August, 2009, at

11.00 A.M. in Committee Room ‘A’ Parliament House Annexe, New Delhi.
The following Hon’ble Members attended the meeting :
1. Hon’ble Justice B. Sudarshan Reddy - Presiding Officer
2. Hon’ble Justice T.S. Thakur - Member
3. Shri Fali S. Nariman - Member
Initiating the discussion, the Hon’ble Presiding Officer apprised the Hon’ble
Member’s about the efforts made so far to arrange suitable accommodation
for the Committee, appointment of officers and staff and engagement of an
advocate to assist the Committee. The Hon’ble Members also deliberated about
summoning of the relevant records for the purpose of the enquiry. The
Committee took the following decisions :-
1. The Secretary of the Committee shall re-assess the staff

requirements of the Committee and take up the same with the
Secretary-General, Rajya Sabha.
2. The Secretary shall also re-assess the space requirement and take
up the same with the Secretary-General, Rajya Sabha.
3. Shri Siddharath Luthra, Advocate shall be requested to indicate his

terms and conditions of engagement for the consideration of the
Committee.
4. The Secretary shall take up with the concerned quarters the matter
relating to securing of the entire original documents that were
considered by the in-house Committee of the Supreme Court
headed by Hon’ble Justice A.P. Shah, the Chief Justice of Delhi High
Court.
5. The Secretary shall also take up the matter with the Registrar-
General of the Calcutta High Court to request the Hon’ble Chief
Justice thereof to make available the entire original record relating
to the appointment of Hon’ble Justice Soumitra Sen of Calcutta High
Court as the Receiver which were placed before the Single Judge
Bench as well as the Division Bench in Civil Suit No. 8 of 1983.
The meeting ended with a vote of thanks to the Chair.
(A. Sinha)
24 August, 2009 Secretary
JUDGES INQUIRY COMMITTEE
MINUTES
The Second Meeting of the Committee was held at 11.00 A.M. on Sunday, the
13 September, 2009 in Committee Room ‘A’, Parliament House Annexe, New
Delhi. The following Hon’ble Members attended, the meeting:
1. Hon’ble Justice B. Sudershan Reddy - Presiding Officer
The Hon’ble Members perused and discussed the records so far received from
the Registry of the Supreme Court and the Registry of Calcutta High Court. It
was decided to call for some more records and information from the Calcutta
High Court. It was also decided to summon relevant documents from the
concerned Banks.
The Meeting ended with a vote of thanks to the Chair.
(A. Sinha)
15 September, 2009 Secretary
MINUTES
The 3rd Meeting of the Committee was held at 11.00 A.M on 9 January, 2010
in Room No. 331-A, Vigyan Bhawan Annexe, New Delhi. The following Hon’ble
Members attended the meeting:
2. Hon’ble Justice Mukul Mudgal - Member
The Hon’ble Members considered the draft proposed charges against Hon’ble
Justice Soumitra Sen, along with the statement of grounds in support of the
charges. After deliberations, it was decided to suitably modify the draft. It was
further decided that the revised draft proposed charges along with the
statement of grounds may be placed before the Committee in its next meeting.
(A. Sinha)
18 January, 2010 Secretary

MINUTES
The 4th Meeting of the Committee was held at 4.15 P.M. on 27 January, 2010 in
Room No. 331-A, Vigyan Bhawan Annexe, New Delhi. The following Hon’ble
The Hon’ble Members considered the revised draft proposed charges and the
revised statement of grounds in support of the charges, against Hon’ble Justice
Soumitra Sen. After deliberations, both the drafts were approved with some
modifications. The Hon’ble Members also perused, the draft letter along with
which the drafit charges and the draft statement of grounds shall be sent to
Hon’ble Justice Soumitra Sen, and approved the same with some changes.
The Committee, desired photocopies of the relied upon documents to be made,
expeditiously, and required the Secretary to forward the draft charges and the
draft grounds, along with photocopies of relied upon documents at the earliest,
to Hon’ble Justice Soumitra Sen.
(A. Sinha)
2 January, 2010 Secretary

MINUTES
The 5th Meeting of the Committee was held at 11.30 A.M on 3 March, 2010 in
Room No. 331-A, Vigyan Bhawan Annexe, New Delhi. The following Hon’ble
The Hon’ble Members considered the letter dated 18 February, 2010 of

Shri Subhas Bhattacharyya, Advocate, the counsel of Justice Soumitra Sen.
After deliberations the Hon’ble Members resolved that the Inquiry Committee
may issue notice to Justice Soumitra Sen in terms section 5 of the Judges
(Inquiry) Act, 1968 and the Rules made thereunder.
(A. Sinha)
5 March, 2010 Secretary

MINUTES
The 6th Meeting of the Committee was held at 10.00 A.M on 4 April, 2010 in
Room No. 331-A, Vigyan Bhawan Annexe, New Delhi, wherein the following
Hon’ble Members were present:
The Committee carefully considered the letter dated 26 March, 2010 of Justice
Soumitra Sen along with its enclosures. The Committee was of the view that
the filing of written statement of defence by Justice Sen cannot be linked to
proposed inspection of documents. As such the Committee did not agree to
his request for extension of time by eight weeks. The Committee decided that
only three weeks time may be given to him for filing his written statement of
defence. It was decided that Justice Sen must file his written statement on or
before 3 May, 2010, failing which the matter would be proceeded ex-parte.
The Committee also felt that Justice Sen may carry out inspection of the relied
upon documents any time after fixing a date with the Secretary of the
Committee.
(A. Sinha)
7 April, 2010 Secretary

MINUTES
The 7th Meeting of the Committee was held at 4.00 P.M on 10 May, 2010 in
Room No. 331-A, Vigyan Bhawan Annexe, New Delhi. The following Members
attended the Meeting.
The Committee perused the document titled ‘REPLY TO THE CHARGES’,

along with its enclosures, sent by Justice Soumitra Sen vide his letter dated
3 May, 2010 addressed to the Secretary of the Committee. On careful
examination of the same, the Committee decided not to amend the charges
which it has framed under Section 3(3) of the Judges :(Inquiry) Act, 1968. The
Committee decided to take on record Justice Soumitra Sen’s ‘REPLY TO THE
CHARGES’ as his written statement of defence under section 3(8) of the Act
and to proceed with the inquiry under rule 7(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Rules,
1969.
In view of the request made by Shri Subhas Bhattacharyya, Advocate

representing Justice Soumitra Sen, vide his letter dated 20 April, 2010
addressed to the Secretary of the Committee, it was decided that hearing in
the matter would be held at Kolkata on 24 and 25 June, 2010, and if so
required, on 26 June, 2010 also.
It was also decided that the Hon’ble Members of the Committee shall hold a
meeting at 4.00 P.M. on 23 June, 2010 at Kolkata.
(A. Sinha)
14 May, 2010 Secretary

MINUTES
The 8th Meeting of the Committee was held at 4.00 P.M. on 29 May, 2010 in
Room No. 331, Vigyan Bhawan Annexe, New Delhi. The following Members
attended the Meeting:
Hon’ble Members perused the letter dated 19 May, 2010 of the Counsel of
Justice Soumitra Sen and considered the request made therein to shift the
venue of hearing to New Delhi and to grant further extension of time. After
deliberations, the Committee decided to partly accept his request and to hold
its sitting, as far as possible, in New Delhi.
The Committee observed that due to repeated requests for adjournment made
by Justice Sen, the Committee has not so far been able to commence hearings.
As it will now not be possible for the Committee to conclude the inquiry and
make its Report by the due date of 5 June, 2010, it had to seek extension of
time for two months from the Chairman, Rajya Sabha. In case: the Committee
continues to grant extensions, it will not be able to conclude the inquiry and
make its Report, even within the extended time which is up to 5 August, 2010.
In view of this the Committee decided not to grant any further extension of
time to Justice Soumitra Sen and to stick to the dates for recording of evidence
already fixed by it.
The Committee accordingly decided to hold proceedings for recording of

evidence at New Delhi on 24, 25 and 26 June, 2010.
(A. Sinha)
2 June, 2010 Secretary

MINUTES
The 9th Meeting of the Committee was held at 11.30 AM on 23 June, 2010 in
attended the Meeting :
Hon’ble Members perused the Paper Books, containing the charges and the
documents on the basis of which the charges have been drawn, and the written
statement of defence of Mr Justice Soumitra Sen and the documents relied
upon by him. Hon’ble Members also reviewed the preparations made in
connection with the proceedings for recording of evidence, which is scheduled
to be held on 24, 25 and 26 June, 2010.
(A. Sinha)
23 June, 2010 Secretary

MINUTES
The 10th Meeting of the Committee was held at 4.15 P.M on 6 July, 2010 in
attended the Meeting.
1. Hon’ble Justice B. Sudershan Reddy - Presiding Officer.
2. Hon’ble Justice Mukul Mudgal - Member.
3. Shri Fali S. Nariman - Member.
The Hon’ble Members perused the Exhibits and held discussion about them.
It was decided that the arguments of the parties will be heard on 18 and
19 July, 2010 in Committee Room ‘D’, Vigyan Bhawan Annexe, New Delhi. The
Hon’ble Members also decided to hold their next meeting at 4 P.M. on 12 July,
2010.
(A. Sinha)
9 July, 2010 Secretary

MINUTES
The 11th Meeting of the Committee was held at 4.00 P.M. on 12 July, 2010 in
The Hon’ble Members perused the case papers and held discussion about
the legal issues involved in the matter. They were also apprised of the steps
taken and preparation being made in connection with hearing of arguments
on 18 and 19 July, 2010.
(A. Sinha)
14 July, 2010 Secretary

MINUTES
The 12th Meeting of the Committee was held at 4.30 P.M. on 2 August, 2010
in Room No. 331, Vigyan Bhawan Annexe, New Delhi. The following Members
The Hon’ble Members met and discussed the case. The Meeting ended with
a vote of thanks to the Chair.
(A. Sinha)

MINUTES
The 13th Meeting of the Committee was held at 4.15 PM on 25 August, 2010
The Hon’ble Members met and discussed the draft report, it was decided that
the next meeting of the Committee will be held on 31 August, 2010 at 4.15 P.M.
(A. Sinha)

MINUTES
The 14th Meeting of the Committee was held at 4.15 P.M. on 31 August, 2010
The Hon’ble Members met and further discussed the draft report. It was
decided that the next meeting of the Committee will be held on 7 September,
2010 at 4.15 P.M.
(A. Sinha)

MINUTES
The 15th Meeting of the Committee was held at 4.15 P.M. on 7 September,
2010 in Room No. 331, Vigyan Bhawan Annexe, New Delhi. The following
Members attended the Meeting :
The Hon’ble Members met and finalized the Report. They also decided to hand
over the Report personally to the Chairman, Rajya Sabha on 10 September,
2010.
(A. Sinha)
7 September, 2010 Secretary

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
In the Matter of Rajya Sabha Motion under article 217 read with article 124(4)
of the Constitution of India - Notified vide Parliamentary Bulletin No. 45898
dated 27 February, 2009
CORAM: Hon’ble Mr Justice B. Sudershan Reddy - Presiding Officer

Hon’ble Mr Justice Mukul Mudgal - Member
Shri Fali Nariman, Senior Advocate - Member
Counsel for the Committee - Shri Sidharth Luthra, Senior Advocate

Shri Siddharth Aggarwal, Advocate
Counsel for the Respondent - Shri Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate

Shri Chinmoy Khaladkar, Advocate
Ms. Neha S. Verma, Advocate
Shri, Manoj, Advocate
Shri Subhasis Chakraborty, Advocate
Shri Subhas Bhattacharyya, Advocate
Shri Soumik Ghoshal, Advocate
Ms. Aparna Sinha, Advocate
24.06.2010
(Forenoon)
PROCEEDINGS
Shri Sidharth Luthra, Senior Counsel of the Committee examined S/Shri Tapas
Kumar Mallik, Assistant Registrar, Calcutta High Court (CW1), Satyalal Mondal,
Chief Manager, State Bank of India (CW2), Atchtaramaiah, Deputy Official
Liquidator, Calcutta High Court (CW3), and Shwetang Rukhaiyar, Manager
(Credit), Allahabad Bank (CW4), and through them exhibit Nos. C1 to C154
were marked. Shri Shekhar Naphde, Senior Advocate of the Respondent cross
examined CW1, CW2, CW3 and CW4. The proceedings were adjourned at
1 P.M. and shall be resumed at 2 P.M.
A. Sinha
Secretary
dated 27 February, 2009



Shri Manoj, Advocate
24.06.2010
(Afternoon)
PROCEEDINGS
The proceedings resumed at 2 P.M. Shri Arindam Sarkar, Manager, Internal

Services, Standard Chartered Bank (CW 5), was examined by the Senior
Counsel of the Committee, and through him exhibit Nos. CI55 to C308 were
marked. Shri Shekhar Naphade, Senior Counsel of the Respondent cross
examined CW5. Shri Shekhar Naphade submitted that there was neither any
evidence to be adduced nor any documents to be produced on behalf of the
Respondent. On a query from the Committee, the Senior Counsel for the
Respondent stated that he did not wish to examine his client and record his
statement. The date and time of further proceedings in the matter shall be
duly intimated to all the Counsels in due course.
A. Sinha
Secretary
dated 27 February, 2009.



18.07.2010
(Forenoon)
PROCEEDINGS
Shri Sidharth Luthra, Senior Counsel of the Committee commenced his oral
argument at 10 A.M. and was on his legs until the proceedings were adjourned
at 1 P.M.
A. Sinha
Secretary
CORAM : Hon’ble Mr Justice B. Sudershan Reddy - Presiding Officer



18.07.2010
(Afternoon)
PROCEEDINGS
The Senior Counsel of the Committee resumed his oral arguments at 2 P.M.
and concluded the same at 7.30 P.M.
A. Sinha
Secretary
dated 27 February, 2009 .



19.07.2010
(Afternoon)
PROCEEDINGS
Shri Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate of the Respondent commenced his

oral argument at 2 P.M. and concluded the same at 5.45 P.M.
A. Sinha
Secretary



20.07.2010
(Afternoon)
PROCEEDINGS
Shri Sidharth Luthra, Senior Advocate of the Committee commenced his reply
argument at 4.15 P.M. and concluded the same at 6.40 P.M.
A. Sinha
Secretary
RAJYA SABHA
REVISED LIST OF BUSINESS
Wednesday, 10 November, 2010
REPORT OF THE INQUIRY COMMITTEE UNDER

THE JUDGES (INQUIRY) ACT, 1968
SECRETARY-GENERAL to lay on the Table, the following documents, under

sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, read with rules
9 and 10 of the Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969:—
(i) Report, Volume I (in English and Hindi) and Volume II of the Inquiry
Committee appointed under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, in
respect of Mr. Justice Soumitra Sen, Judge, Calcutta High Court;
and
(ii) A copy each of evidence of witnesses tendered before the Inquiry

Committee and documents exhibited during the inquiry.
REPLY OF MR. JUSTICE
SOUMITRA SEN TO THE REPORT
REPLY OF JUSTICE SOUMITRA SEN TO THE MOTION
RECEIVED UNDER ARTICLE 217 READ WITH ARTICLE
124(4) OF THE CONSTITUTION
The march of time has witnesseth thousands all over the world wrongly
persecuted in the name of justice and/or upholding the Rule of Law. Regimes,
monarchies, republics and governments have successively repressed, crucified
and condemned and executed countless persons on the mere pretense of a
trial whose inevitable outcome as predetermined was to hold the accused
GUILTY of the charges against him. To defend oneself in such hostile environs
was an empty exercise since the verdict was already reserved even before
the trials commenced. The Rule of Law was conveniently bent if not denied
to serve such prosecution in the name of cleansing the society of its perceived
evil and corruption.
The present case is one which has the potential of a titanic tug-of-war
between the Judiciary and the Legislature reminiscent of the ‘L’ Affaire
Dreyfus. Alfred Dreyfus was a Captain in the French Army, who in the year
1894 was wrongly accused of treason for selling military secrets to Germany
and was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment at Devils Island. The
legal proceedings were based on insufficient evidence and were highly irregular,
but public opinion and French Press led by its virulent anti-Semitic section
welcomed the verdict. However, in 1906 the Civilian Court of Appeal cleared
Drefyus and reversed all charges against him and he was finally reinstated in
the Army. This affair had resulted in the separation of the Church and State in
1905 and had virtually divided the French nation into two.
The instant reply seeks to address the multiple improprieties, irregularities

and infractions committed in the matter of my “prosecution” similar to that
in the Drefyus case culminating in the instant impeachment proceedings and
which wrongful acts cry out from every bone and sinew of the entire proceeding
with the hope that upon going through this reply the Hon’ble Members of both
the Houses would at last be apprised of my “true story” so as to enable them
to vote out such injustice being meted out to me.
I.0 PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
A. CONDUCT AND ROLE OF JUDICIARY
1.1 The present impeachment proceedings against me have been initiated as

a result of the direct initiative taken by the former Hon’ble Chief Justice of
India Sri K.G. Balakrishnan, the former Hon’ble Chief Justice of Calcutta High
Court Sri V.S. Sirpurkar, and Hon’ble Justice Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta of the
Calcutta High Court in spite of there being a Judgment and Order of the Hon’ble
Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court (Justice Pranab Kumar Chattopadhyay
and Justice Kalidas Mukherjee) dated 25 September, 2007 exonerating me of
all allegations levelled against me by the Hon’ble Justice Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta
(hereinafter referred to as the Ld. Single Judge) in C.S. 8 of 1983 and the said
Judgment and Order of the Division Bench has attained finality in view of no
appeal being preferred from it to the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
1.2 The Ld. Single Judge presiding over C.S. 8 on 1983 by a private
communication to the then Hon’ble Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court
Sri V.S. Sirpurkar made allegations against me after passing Orders against
me as Receiver in C.S. 8 of 1983. This private communication by the Learned
Single Judge led to formation of an adverse opinion by the Hon’ble Justice
V.S. Sirpurkar against me on the basis whereof the said Hon’ble Justice V.S.
Sirpurkar wrote a letter to the then Hon’ble Chief Justice of India dated 25
November, 2006 informing him of the allegations against me and his opinion
and/or views regarding such allegations without giving me any opportunity to
explain the allegations made against me by the Ld. Single Judge in his private
communication. Incidentally, it was specifically stated by the Hon’ble Justice
V.S. Sirpurkar in the letter dated 25 November, 2006 that no complaints were
received against Justice Sen from any quarters.
1.3 The then Chief Justice of India Sri K.G. Balakrishnan chose to ignore the
reasoned Order dated 25 September, 2007 passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench
and relied upon the observations passed by the Ld. Single Judge in his Order
dated 10 April, 2006 passed in C.S. 8 of 1983 for the purpose of initiating his
own inquiry by way of constitution of a 3 Judge Committee in accordance with
the “In-House Procedure” (hereinafter referred to as the “In-House Committee”)
adopted by the Supreme Court to enquire into charges and/or allegations against
Judges, but abstained from giving any reasons for his such decision.
1.4 A Judgment passed by a competent court of law is binding on the parties

and all others and cannot be ignored by any authority or body of persons,
including Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, operating within the
Constitution and legal framework of the country.
1.5 The action of the then Chief Justice of India regarding constitution of the
In-House Committee by ignoring the Judgment passed by the Hon’ble Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated 25 September, 2007 in my favour has
set an extremely bad and unfortunate precedent as this has brought to
the fore the lack of respect and confidence of the then Chief Justice of India in
the very judiciary of he was the head.
Reply of Mr. Justice Soumitra Sen to the Report 175
1.6 The initiation of an inquiry into the charges and/or allegations against me
by constituting a 3 Judge In-House Committee is further bad in view of parallel
judicial proceedings pending before the Hon’ble High Court at Calcutta involving
the same allegations against me at the time of constitution of such Committee
by the then Chief Justice of India as the Report of the Committee on In-
House Procedure laying down the mode and manner of dealing with a
complaint about a Judge of the High Court or Supreme Court does not
envisage holding of a parallel enquiry into the allegations against a sitting
Judge of a High Court by the Chief Justice of India by constituting a fact
finding enquiry committee when a judicial proceeding in a competent
Court of Law is continuing prior to making such complaint, involving the
allegations made against the Judge as contained in the complaint.
1.7 If no such judicial proceeding involving the allegations against me

would be pending and a complaint would be received by the Chief Justice
of India with respect to any such allegation, then only it would be
appropriate for the Chief Justice of India to embark upon the process of
fact finding enquiry by constituting a 3 Judge In-House Committee as
laid down in the “In-House Procedure” provided the concerned High
Court has adopted the full court resolution of the Supreme Court, as
every High Court is independent and not subject to administrative control
of the Supreme Court. The setting up of the Committee by the Chief
Justice of India is therefore completely bad, illegal, unconstitutional and
in abuse of the powers vested in the Chief Justice of India to constitute
a 3 judge Committee as laid down in the Report of the Committee on
“In-House Procedure”.
1.8 Furthermore, it has been wrongly stated in the letter of the then
Chief Justice of India written me dated 10 September, 2007 that the “In-House
Procedure” adopted by the Supreme Court by a resolution passed in its meeting
held on 15 December, 1999 has been adopted by all High Courts including the
Calcutta High Court as well when it is clear from the Letter dated 26 April, 2010
of the Dy. Registrar (Administration) and Public Information Officer High Court,
Appellate Side Calcutta in response to a query under the RTI Act, 2005 that
the matter of resolution taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court dated
15 December, 1999 with regard to formation of “In-House Committee” was still
pending before the Hon’ble Full Court for decision. In this connection a
photocopy of the said letter dated 10 September, 2007 written by the then Hon’ble
Chief Justice of India and the letter dated 29 March, 2010 written by my Advocate
on record as well as the letter dated 26 April, 2010 written by the Deputy
Registrar (Administration) and Public Information Officer, High Court, Appellate
Side, Calcutta are for the sake of brevity not reproduced herein but are enclosed
separately and the contents of the same may be treated as incorporated in this
reply.
1.9 On the basis of the Report of the “In-House Committee” dated

1 February, 2008 holding me guilty of the allegations of misconduct and
recommending initiation of proceedings of my removal, the then Chief Justice
of India Sri K.G. Balakrishnan wrote to the Prime Minister of India requesting
him to initiate proceedings for my removal when under Article 217 of the
Constitution of India the President of India is the appointing authority of a Judge
of a High Court and there is no letter on record from the then Chief Justice
of India to the President of India on this subject.
1.10 The formation and inquiry held by the 3 Judge Committee constituted by
the then Chief Justice of India Sri K.G. Balakrishnan was not under any statute
nor under the Constitution.
1.11 The 3 Judge “In-House Committee” not only went into the merits of the
matter but also called for initiation of impeachment proceedings against me
on the basis of which the then Chief Justice of India Sri K.G. Balakrishnan
wrote to the Prime Minister requesting him to initiate proceedings for my
removal in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Parliament.
Significantly two of the Hon’ble Judges of the In-House Committee were
elevated to the Supreme Court during the tenure of Justice K.G. Balakrishnan
one of whom was elevated after superceding several High Court Chief Justices.
1.12 According to Article 124(4) read with Article 217(1)(b) of the Constitution
of India and Sec.3 of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 the impeachment
proceedings against a Judge of a High Court is to be initiated only by members
of either or both Houses of the Parliament and not at the instance of the
Executive headed by the President and followed by the Prime Minister and
his cabinet or by the judiciary headed by the Chief Justice of India.
1.13 The initiative taken by the then Chief Justice of India and all other
concerned Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court for initiation of
impeachment proceedings and the letter written by the Chief Justice of India
to the Prime Minister to initiate the impeachment proceedings against me is
thus ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution of India and the Judges
(Inquiry) Act, 1968.
1.14 The Chief Justice of India and his colleagues in the Judiciary having
already arrived at the conclusion of misconduct committed by me and having
thereafter giving me a veiled threat by his letter dated 17 March, 2009 to the
effect that appropriate action shall be taken against me if I do not resign on my

own and upon me not retiring, having written to the Prime Minister (Executive)
to initiate impeachment proceedings against me, has become the “prosecutor”
in the instant impeachment proceedings and has thereby rendered the entire
investigation conducted by the Committee constituted by the Chairman,
Rajya Sabha under the Judges (Inquiry) Act into a mere formality as two of
the members of such Inquiry Committee are members of higher judiciary who
cannot be expected to ever go against a decision already specifically taken
by the then Chief Justice of India. More over the members of the Inquiry
committee have been selected by the then Chief Justice of India,
K.G. Balakrishnan, for their appointment by the Chairman of Rajya Sabha. This
is in complete violation of all known principles of justice, fair play and good
conscience. Justice K.G. Balakrishnan having openly initiating the move’ for
impeachment should have distanced himself from the process of formation of
the committee. If a Judge had taken part in a judicial process where he is
interested he would have been held guilty of bias.
1.15 The then Chief Justice of India K.G. Balakrishnan has thus acted beyond
his jurisdiction and has encroached upon the domain of the Legislature resulting
in vitiation of all steps taken by the Chairman, Rajya Sabha under Article 124
(4) of the Constitution of India and the provisions of the Judges (Inquiry) Act,
1968.
B. CONDUCT OF THE LEGISLATORS AND DEFECTS IN CONSTITUTION OF

THE INQUIRY COMMITTEE:–
1.16 The motion received by the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha from Sri Sitaram
Yechury and 57 other members did not specify any fixed or definite sum of money
alleged to have been misappropriated by me and as such was vague.
1.17 Apart from the two Judges in the Committee formed under the Judges
(Inquiry) Act already having a biased mind on account of being subordinates
of the “Prosecutor” Chief Justice of India, the other member of the
Committee, the distinguished Jurist Sri Fali S. Nariman had already expressed
his opinion supporting the action of the Chief Justice of India and welcoming
the move for my impeachment of before the press thereby revealing his
predetermined and biased mind even before commencement of the
investigation into the allegations against me by the Committee.
1.18 Requests made by me to the Chairman, Rajya Sabha to replace Sri

Fali S. Nariman with some other distinguished jurist was ignored. The Inquiry
was thus vitiated at the very onset on the ground of being biased.
1.19 The mandatory requirement under Section 3 sub Section 3 of the

Judges Inquiry Act 1968 has not been followed.
(a) Under Section 3 sub Section 3 of the Judges Inquiry Act 1968,
the Chairman or the Speaker as the case may be is required to
consider materials before them prior to admitting or rejecting the
motion, brought before the concerned House.
(b) In the instant case admitedly the only material before the
Rajya Sabha was the letter written by the then Chief Justice of India
to the Hon’ble Prime Minister of India, in which he significantly did
not include my detailed reply to the report of the In House
Committee.
(c) The letter of the then Chief Justice of India recommending my

impeachment is clearly based upon the findings of the In House
Committee.
(d) The findings of the In House Committee are based upon the Single
Bench Judgment, which had no existence at that material point of
time because of the Division Bench Judgment.
(e) Therefore, since the sub-stratum of the recommendation of the then

Chief Justice of India is invalid in the eye of Law the motion moved
before Rajya Sabha based upon such recommendation is also
invalid in the eye of Law as well as in facts.
(f) Furthermore under the In House procedure itself a committee can

only be formed only when there is complaint against a Judge in
the public domain with regard to his judicial functions. In the instant
case even as on date there is no complaint against me of any
judicial misconduct, which is evident from the letter of the then Chief
Justice of Calcutta High Court dated 25 November, 2006. Therefore,
the provisions of the In House procedure clearly does not apply in
my case as the In House procedure is only applicable in case of
any complaint against any Judge while functioning as a Judge and
not otherwise.
(g) Even a cursory reading of the Single Bench Judgment will make
it clear that neither there was any issue nor any finding with
regard to my conduct as a Judge. The entire matter before the
Single Judge relates to my alleged acts of impropriety as an
Advocate.
(h) Unfortunately the then Chief Justice of India for reasons best known
to him enlarged the scope of enquiry and wrongfully and illegally
concluded the alleged acts to be an Act of Judicial Misconduct which
has an entirely different legal implication and connotation.
(i) Therefore in view what has been stated herein above the
recommendation of the then Chief Justice of India and the motion
moved before the Rajya Sabha on the basis thereof is wrongful
illegal and contrary to established Principles of Law and based upon
biased and/or incorrect appreciation of facts.
C. PROCEEDINGS INITIATED BY THE COMMITTEE WRONGLY
1.20 Surprisingly, the Judges (Inquiry) Committee under the Act, though is
only a fact finding Committed appointed for the purpose of investigating into
the correctness of the charges brought by the Members of the Parliament,
the Committee proceeded in the manner as if it is the prosecution and I am
an accused. I do not know under what provisions of law the Committee can
appoint a lawyer to act as a prosecutor in the course of investigation. The said
lawyer in course of hearing appearing on behalf of the Committee, desparately
wanted to cross-examine me as if the Committee is the prosecution and
the Lawyer is the Lawyer of the prosecution. This aspect is totally beyond
the object and scope of the investigation required to be carried out under the
Judges (Inquiry) Act.
2.0 BACKGROUND
2.1 I was admitted at the Bar and enrolled myself as an Advocate of the
Calcutta High Court on 13 February, 1984. I primarily practiced in the Original
Side of the Calcutta High Court. I was elevated as a Judge of the Calcutta
High Court on 3 December, 2003. As a Judge, I tried to give a patient hearing
to the junior lawyers and never misbehaved with any of them. To the best of
my knowledge there were no adverse comments made against me by any Bar
Association or Lawyers body till such time I was discharging my judicial duties.
2.2 By an order dated 30 April, 1984 I was appointed as a “Receiver” in Suit

No. 8 of 1983 (Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Shipping Corporation of India),
hereinafter referred to as ‘the said suit’, and by an order dated 20 January,
1993 I was directed as Receiver to keep the sale proceeds from the sale of
the materials which was the subject matter of the dispute in the said suit,
namely, 4311 M.T. of Periclass Spinnel Bricks in a separate account in a bank
and/or branch of my choice and hold the same free from lien and/or
encumbrances until further orders after deducting 5% towards my remuneration.

I kept the entire amount received from time to time without deducting any
amount on account of my remuneration which I was entitled to till such
time I was directed to do so under the Order dated 10 April, 2006.
2.3 Between 1 April, 1993 and 1 June, 1995 I, as Receiver received a sum of
Rs. 33,22,800/- by twenty-two separate demand drafts. The said amounts were
kept in a separate fixed deposit in the Standard Chartered Bank (then ANZ
Grindlays Bank), Church Road Branch, Kolkata in my personal name since there
was no direction by the High Court to open up a Receiver’s account. Furthermore,
all drafts issued by the Purchaser were in my personal name, Therefore, I had
no option but to encash those in an account held in my name. The decision as
regards the interest bearing account where such deposit was to be kept was
left to my choice.
2.4 In another matter (Calcutta Fan), a Division Bench of the Calcutta High
Court by the Order dated 20 January, 1997 directed me as Receiver in that
matter to distribute a sum of Rs. 70,00,000/- (Rupees seventy lacs) amongst
the workers without any direction to open any specific account which amount
was, however, deposited in an account with Standard Chartered Bank, Church
Road Branch, Kolkata bearing No. OSLPO 813400, to facilitated distribution,
hereinafter referred to as ‘the 400 account’. Between 14 May, 1997 and
16 July, 1997 I, as the Receiver issued several account payee cheques to
workers in terms of the order passed by the Division Bench.
2.5 On 26 July, 1997, I deposited Rs. 25,00,000/- with “Lynx India” by a

cheque bearing No. 624079 from my Account No. 400 of the Standard
Chartered Bank. However, during this period neither of the parties in Suit No.
8 of 1983 took any steps for claiming the said sums and the moneys had to
remain with me since there was no order from the Court to return the said
money to anybody.
2.6 It was only on 27 February, 2003 that the plaintiff in the said suit filed an
interlocutory application being G.A. No. 875 of 2003 praying for a direction on
the Receiver to handover the entire sale proceeds. Strangely enough the said
application was not moved until 3 August, 2004 when a new Receiver was
appointed in lieu and stead of me by the Learned Single Judge of the Calcutta
High Court after discharging me, however, without any direction for refund
of the monies lying with me or for furnishing of accounts. It is also surprising
to note that the copy of the said application being G.A. No. 875 of 2003 was
handed over only in May, 2005 to me by which time the matter had appeared
in the list of Justice Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta and treated as “Part Heard’ on
the very first date by Order dated 15 February, 2005 without any prayer made
by any of the parties to the litigation After several directions the application was
finally served on me on May, 2005.
2.7 By order dated 17 May, 2005 the Learned Single Judge directed me either
by “himself” or through my “authorized agent” to file an affidavit to the
purchaser’s affidavit and to application filed by the plaintiff, if so advised, which
was a separate affidavit and different from G.A. No. 875 of 2003.
2.8 I was advised not to file any affidavit because I did not dispute the factum
of Rs. 33,22,800/- received from the purchaser by 22 separate demand drafts
commencing from 25 February, 1993 and till 30 April, 1995. Significantly the
Order dated 17 May, 2005 also did not direct me to refund the monies
lying with me.
2.9 Despite no such direction being contained in the order dated 17 May,
2005 calling upon me to make payment of the amounts lying with me, the
Learned Single Judge merely because I had by this time been elevated as a
Judge of the Calcutta High Court and had chosen not to file an affidavit since
I felt that the statements made in the purchaser’s affidavit correctly recorded
the amounts received by me and, therefore, there was no need for any rebuttal
and further there was no direction on me for refund of such moneys, suo moto
proposed an enquiry to be held to allegedly ascertain as to what happened to
the payments being said to have been received by me. The Officer-in-Charge
of the State Bank of India, Service Branch, Calcutta was also directed to submit
a report stating whether the aforesaid 22 demand drafts, details whereof were
set out in the said order were encashed or not and in whose account or the
bank the same were paid. Interestingly, the copy of the said Order dated
30 June, 2005 was specifically directed not to be served on any other
person excepting the Registrar, Vigilance, Accounts Department of the
Calcutta High Court and the Branch Manager of the State Bank of India,
meaning thereby I was never served with a copy of the said order.
Why the Learned Single Judge chose to suspect my motives and conduct a
fishing and a roving enquiry behind my back without any materials on record
being there is inexplicable. May be it was a premeditated decision for
reasons best known to the Learned Judge.
2.10 The report of the Chief Manager of State Bank of India which was
subsequently served on the Registrar, Vigilance and Protocol, Calcutta High
Court was directed to be kept in a sealed cover by Order dated 21 July, 2005
of the Learned Single Judge, and was not served upon me.
2.11 In the subsequent order dated 26 July, 2005 the Learned Single Judge
frowned upon the report filed by the Chief Manager, State Bank of India wherein
it was stated that because the records were old in nature and the Branch was
under the process of computerization, it was difficult to trace the same readily
but serious efforts were made to trace the same.
2.12 The Learned Single Judge whilst directing Mr. C.M. Agarwal being the
purchaser to be personally present on the next date of hearing and bring all
the original documents expressed that “It was the anxiety of the Court to
retrieve the money if realized” without even considering the fact that no
directions were given even in the said order on the Receiver to make
payment of such money.
Furthermore, it is curious that before passing any order to serve upon me,
the Single Judge had issued a Sabpeona upon the purchaser to come before
the Court to file an affidavit disclosing the number of drafts and the amounts
thereby issued to me towards purchase consideration. The purchaser is not a
party to the litigation, there was no occasion to direct the purchaser to appear
before the Court when no direction was issued either to the plaintiff or to the
defendant who are parties to the litigation to disclose the amount of purchase
consideration. Such directions issued by the Learned Judge is clearly indicative
of the fact that the 10th April Order was a foregone conclusion and the Learned
Single Judge had already decided to pass such orders and proceeded to carry
out the investigation only as a means to justify the ends. If a Court is biased
in a matter or has any personal interest, such Court according to the principles
of probity should release such matter and allow other Judges to take up.
Following observations are being made by me only to show that the Learned
Judge whilst making such adverse comments in the said judgement and order
had a closed mindset. The copy of the said order dated 26 July, 2005 was,
however, not directed to be served upon me nor was the same served by any
of the parties and consequently I was totally unaware of the proceedings which
were being conducted by the Learned Single Judge.
2.13 In the subsequent order dated 7 September, 2005 the Learned Single
Judge upon obtaining the particulars of the encashment of the said 22 drafts
and finding the same being encashed through three several bank accounts in
the name of Soumitra Sen, Advocate directed the managers of the banks,
namely, Branch Manager of Allahabad Bank, Stephen House Branch, Kolkata
Branch Manager of Standard Chartered Bank, Church Lane Branch, Kolkata
to furnish information whether any account was maintained or is being
maintained by me and produce a bank statement of such accounts from
1 April, 1993 till date in a sealed cover on the next date of hearing and if the
accounts were closed the date of closure of such accounts was also to be given.
Even a copy of this order was specifically directed not to be served upon
me by the Learned Single Judge and the inquiry process being carried
out behind my back and without my knowledge. It is clearly apparent that
the Learned Single Judge on his own accord had commenced an enquiry in my
personal bank accounts without there being any charges against me which thus
was completely without jurisdiction. Even then the Learned Single Judge
never directed me to make payment of the said sum with interest.
Therefore, the question arises as to whether without calling upon me to pay the
amounts at first whether it was permissible for the Learned Single Judge on his
perceived notion of alleged misappropriation to embark on such fishing and
roving enquiry.
2.14 As would be apparent from the order dated 4 October, 2005 passed by
the Learned Single Judge that in absence of the desired information as
recorded in the earlier order dated 7 September, 2005 being not placed before
the Learned Single Judge and for reasons which were recited in the said order
dated 4 October, 2005, the Branch Manager, Allahabad Bank was directed to
remain personally present on 7 October, 2005 to explain as to why appropriate
action would not be taken against him for not carrying out the order.
2.15 In the order dated 7 May, 2005 the Learned Single Judge sought for
the assistance of the State Bank of India for bringing on record the documents
pertaining to the encashment of the demand drafts to co-relate as to whether
those were deposited in the Allahabad Bank or not. It was then brought to the
notice of the Learned Single Judge by the Learned Counsel appearing on
behalf of Steel Authority of India Ltd. that I had paid a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/-
in cash to Mr. Kanchan Roy, Advocate-on-Record of SAIL. This fact being made
known to the Court, the Learned Single Judge directed that the Branch
Manager, Standard Chartered Bank, Stephen House Branch shall “cause the
currency notes to be verified whether the same were genuine or not and
if they were found to be genuine the same should be invested in a short
term fixed deposit...............”
2.16 These directions were most uncalled for and clearly exposes the mindset
of the Learned Single Judge, who appears to have single mindedly chartered
this fishing inquiry without “causing service of various orders passed by
him from time-to-time to me” and even without calling upon me to repay
the balance sum of money. He went to the extent of suspecting the
genuineness of the currency notes given by me as if I was capable of giving
counterfeit currency as a sitting Judge. His mindset is an example of presence
of mental bias against me. This order too like in the previous occasions was
directed to be withheld from me for reasons best known to the Learned Single
Judge.
2.17 Subsequent orders dated 25 November, 2005, 12 December, 2005,

1 February, 2006 and 15 February, 2006 were passed by the Learned Single
Judge whereby it appears that directions were passed for production of records
of my various bank accounts and those upon being furnished were directed
to kept with the Registrar, though copies of such orders were also like in the
past not served on me.
2.18 Finally, on 10 April, 2006, the Learned Single Judge passed elaborate
orders wrongly and erroneously recording that “the erstwhile Receiver was
not available easily to obey the directions of the Court” whilst
conveniently forgetting the strict orders passed by him repeatedly to
specifically ensure that orders were not to be not served on me.” The
question, therefore, arises as to whether my mere non-response in the matter
of filing of an affidavit as directed by order dated 7 May, 2005 was the sole
reason to deprive me of the right to know and keep abreast with the
subsequent course of such “investigation” which amounted to denial of an
opportunity of defending myself or was there a sinister conspiracy against
me? Or it amounts to “non-cooperation in spite of repeated opportunity”
as alleged by the Judge.
2.19 Without intending to rely the order dated 10 April, 2006 which by reason
of the Hon’ble Division Bench’s Order dated 25 September, 2007 stood
quashed expunged and deleted from the records. In the Order dated 10 April,
2006 the following observations of the Learned Single Judge are relevant. It
has been recorded by him in portions of the said judgements inter alia, as
under :
I. “From the record I do not find that there has been any effort on the
part of the petitioner to know about receipt of sale proceeds and
the amount lying in the hands of the Receiver. Only on 7 March,
2002 after the aforesaid order was passed on 20 January, 1993, a
letter was written to the said Receiver Soumitra Sen asking him to
furnish information and detailed particulars about the sale proceeds
received by him and the amount of interest accrued thereon. The
said letter was received by the said Receiver but in spite of the
receipt of the same no information was supplied and no step was
taken.”
Fact remains that such letter was never received by me. The initials
purported to be shown as a mark of receipt in the letter dated
7 February, 2002 is not mine. Consequently, therefore, I had no
occasion to reply to the same. It is further strange that despite
holding that the petitioners had made no efforts to know about the
receipt of the sale proceeds and the amounts lying in my hand, no
comments were made against the petitioner and on the contrary
on the basis of mere suspicion and conjectures had launched
such elaborate enquiry in my personal financial affairs without even
having the decorum to cause service of such various orders on me
being his fellow Judge.
II. The Learned Single Judge further proceeded to record, inter alia, that
“In spite of service of notice and repeated opportunity being given by
passing several orders the Receiver has not come forward to assist
the Court in any manner by filing affidavit or informing through any
Lawyer or any recognized agent and to tell the Court about the fate
and existence of the sale proceeds received by him.”
This finding is clearly contrary to his earlier directions which

specifically recorded that the orders (save the one passed on
7 May, 2005) were not served on me. Such observations, therefore,
are clearly uncharitable and contrary to the records and disclose
the closed mindset and gross abuse of the process of law on the
part of the Learned Single Judge.
III. In the said order dated 10 April, 2005 the Learned Single Judge
thereafter proceeded to wrongfully record the purported mis-
utilization of the sale proceeds by me and the transfers of such
sums to various accounts from time to time.
This aspect of the matter would be dealt with by me subsequently

but suffice to say that such findings are clearly erroneous and
distorted.
IV. After reciting such facts the Learned Judge proceeded to hold that
I had committed “breach of trust” and “appropriated, if not
misappropriated prima facie the amount without authority of
the Court” lying in my custody and had not come forward to explain
the whereabouts of the said amount of sale proceeds received by
me. “The act and conduct of the erstwhile Receiver was apparently
nothing short of criminal misappropriation.”
V. The Learned Judge further held that “The Receiver was not authorized
to deal with money the way he has done and the fact of conversion
of amount apparently for his own gain which was entrusted with
him would be borne out by the fact that he had deposited a sum of
Rs. 5,00,000/- in cash after this .application was made and several
orders were passed......”
VI. After making such adverse and unwarranted findings against me, for
the first time, the Learned Court directed me to pay back
Rs. 31,39,560/- together with interest @ 5% per annum on average
from the respective date of encashment of demand drafts after
deducting my remuneration. The Learned Judge in the process after
calculating the interest payable directed that a sum of Rs. 52,46,454/-
was payable by me together with interest @ 9% per annum
calculated upto 1 April, 2006. The Learned Single Judge also held
that “The Court is unable to trace the amount of encashment of
the demand drafts made through the Bank of Madurai, unless the
Receiver divulges the same. He did not do so. It is therefore
presumed he has appropriated if not misappropriated the amount
of Rs. 18,000/-”.
This finding is also clearly erroneous and the Learned Judge

overlooked the fact that the same was accounted for by me.
VII. The judgement dated 10 April, 2006 leaves several questions

unanswered. Firstly, attempts have been made to show that I was
not cooperating or assisting the Court despite several opportunities
being given to me. The records, however, as would be evident from
the preceding paragraphs show otherwise. I was never apprised of
any court orders except on one occasion prior to 10 April, 2006 and
I was never called upon to repay the said sums which were lying
with me.
VIII. Till the order dated 10 April, 2004 and even after the voluntary
payment of Rs. 5,00,000/- by me there was no direction passed by
the Court upon me as Receiver to repay the said money.
IX. Even though the Learned Single Judge held that by allegedly
transferring the said funds from different accounts and by way of
making payment of a part of the sale consideration by cash, the
Learned Judge was guilty of misappropriation and criminal breach
of trust under Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code, no finding of
dishonest use or dishonest conversion of such funds for my

personal use was arrived at by the Learned Single Judge.
X. It is strange that while proceeding to condemn a Receiver of having

misappropriated the funds lying in his hands yet the Court
proceeded to grant me opportunity to take the remuneration which
was directed to be paid to him. This is clearly contrary to the adverse
observations against me by the Learned Single Judge.
XI. I upon receipt of the entirety of the sale proceeds had deposited
the whole of the sale proceeds without deducting my remuneration
despite a direction being there to that effect.
XII. It is essential whilst framing a charge of “criminal breach of trust”

or “misappropriation” that an element of “mens rea” or
“dishonest intention” should appear from the action of the
accused person, which significantly has been lost sight of nor arrived
at by the Learned Single Judge.
XIII. For the first time in the body of the order dated 10 April, 2006 a
specific direction for causing service of plain copy of the said order
upon me was made by the Learned Single Judge. On the next date
of hearing, i.e. on 18 May, 2006 Advocate on my behalf appeared
and undertook to make payment of a sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- at the
first instance without prejudice to the rights of the parties which was
directed to be kept in fixed account if and when paid.
2.20 From time to time thereafter and upon several dates being extended
by 19 November, 2006 I had paid the entire sum by way of demand drafts
excepting the said sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- which were earlier paid by cash to
Mr. Kanchan Roy, Advocate, in favour of the Registrar, Original Side of the
Calcutta High Court as directed.
2.21 After making full payment, an application being G.A. No. 3763 of 2006
was filed by me seeking expunging of the adverse comments made against
me in the order dated 10 April, 2006. This application was in addition to the
earlier application filed by me seeking condonation of delay in making payments
and the reasons for the same, which was earlier disposed of by the Learned
Single Judge by granting me time.
2.22 By an order dated 31 July, 2007 the interlocutory application being G.A.
No. 3763 of 2006 filed by me was “disposed of”. The said order once again
purports to wrongly record that “despite repeated opportunities being granted
to Justice Sen to appear earlier none had come forward to defend him”. The
Learned Judge perhaps lost sight of his directions passed in his earlier
orders to ensure that no copy of the orders after 7 May, 2005 was served
on me. I was never provided with a second opportunity nor was I ever called
upon to make payment of the said sums, which was one of the prayers in G.A.
No. 875 of 2003. However, it has been contended by the Learned Single Judge
that at that stage “his anxiety” was to find and recover the amount of the
sale proceeds and did not think in terms of initiating criminal proceeding so
the agony of the Receiver of criminal proceedings of being initiated was
misplaced.
2.23 It is stated that the simplest way would have been to direct me to deposit
all sums due and accrued in my hand till that date as was prayed for by the
plaintiff and only if despite such specific directions for refund of the sums I
had failed and neglected to do so could the question of initiation of any inquiry
could have arisen. Why I was not directed to make payment of the said
sum of money lying with me and/or in my account until 10 April, 2006? It is
judicially settled that till such time I as a Receiver am not directed to return
the sum lying with me, I cannot on my own return the same.
2.24 The Learned Single Judge in the order dated 31 July, 2007 whilst
analyzing the financial transactions pertaining to the instant matter was himself
unsure whether to disbelieve or believe the explanation sought to be given by
me in that context but whilst proceeding to specifically record payment of the
entire sums which was quantified by the Learned Single Judge expressed his
inability to expunge the remarks on the ground that “the judgement has been
satisfied”.
It is stated that such a ground for not expunging the adverse remarks is legally
unsustainable.
2.25 It is unfortunate to note that the then Hon’ble Chief Justice of India in
his letter dated 4 August, 2009 to the Hon’ble Prime Minister of India whilst
commenting upon the order dated 31 July, 2007 deliberately erroneously
recorded that the said application was “dismissed” whilst no such dismissal
of the application had taken place and on the contrary the said application was
“disposed of” on the directions and terms and conditions more fully contained
in the said order dated 31 July, 2007. The Hon’ble Chief of India ought to have
appreciated the difference between the disposal of an application with certain
directions and dismissal of the same.
2.26 In any event of the matter I preferred an appeal against the order dated
31 July, 2007 before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, whereupon
submissions were advanced, documents were filed and the written notes of
submissions was filed on my behalf filed before the Learned Single Judge were
also made part of the records. The Division Bench upon hearing the parties
and on going through the records of the entire case which were placed before
it had come to the following important findings:
(a) The erstwhile Receiver was never directed by the Learned Single
Judge to make any payment, prior to the order dated 10 April,
2006;
(b) The respondent Nos. 1 and 2, namely, Steel Authority of India Ltd.
And Shipping Corporation of India had never made any complaint
against me and on the contrary submitted before the Learned Single
Judge that they had no grievance against me;
(c) The question of breach of trust did not arise since I had not failed
to deposit the amount held by me pursuant to the direction of the
Court;
(d) In absence of any evidence on record and on definite and specific

finding of the fact and especially in absence of the fact that nobody
made any allegation against me regarding misappropriation of any
money out of the sale proceeds retained by me, the case of
misappropriation could not be made out;
(e) The plaintiff in the suit never raised any question in respect of my
conduct and function also did not claim any amount towards interest;
(f) The Learned Single Judge on his own passed various orders from
time to time in connection with the application filed on behalf of the
plaintiff and also in the application subsequently filed on my behalf
in order to “examine the conduct of the Receiver even in
absence of any allegation made by the parties”;
(g) I never failed to comply and/or discharge my obligation to refund

the money after being so directed by the Learned Single Judge;
(h) I had never utilized any amount for my personal gain or benefit;
(i) Records examined showed the money had been deposited with a
finance company by me and the said fact was corroborated by the
Official Liquidator’s report;
(j) The Learned Single Judge in passing the said order dated 10 April,
2006 travelled beyond the scope of the pleadings and the claims
of the parties inasmuch as G.A. No. 875 of 2003 never called for
an inquiry into my personal accounts and the Learned Single Judge
single handedly undertook such a venture;
(k) The allegations which formed the basis of the order dated 10 April,
2006 were not even raised in the petition and contrary, both Steel
Authority of India Ltd. and the Shipping Corporation of India Ltd.
did not raise any grievance against me nor claimed any interest from
the me but the Learned Single Judge on his own directed me to
make payment of interest for the sum of Rs. 24,27,404/- which was
ultimately paid by me and which fact was also acknowledged in the
order dated 31 July, 2007 by the Learned Single Judge;
(l) The Learned Single Judge in passing the order dated 10 April, 2006
travelled beyond the scope of the pleadings which was
impermissible in view of the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Debnarayan Halder v. Anushree Haider (Smt.) as
reported in (2003)11 SCC 303.
2.27 After coming to the aforesaid findings the Division Bench held “The
Learned Single Judge committed serious error in travelling beyond the scope
of pleading made several unwarranted and uncalled for remarks which
seriously affected my “reputation”. The findings of the Learned Single Judge
were passed without any material of any kind. It is not understood how a finding
of breach of trust, criminal or otherwise, could be made nor it is understood
how any comment could be made that there was any misappropriation. The
order of the Single Judge is entirely without jurisdiction and hot supported by
facts on record.”
2.28 The Division Bench further proceeded to hold :
“The Learned Single Judge has repeatedly resorted

to conjectures and surmises and has recorded serious and
dishonest finding against the erstwhile Receiver. The findings
are very serious in nature and no court of law can possibly
approve the same.
“...We do not approve the findings of the Learned

Single Judge regarding conduct of the erstwhile Receiver
including, the observations and/or remarks made against the
erstwhile Receiver as recorded in the order dated 10 April, 2006.
In our opinion the Learned Single Judge had no scope and/or

occasion to record the aforesaid unfortunate’ remarks in respect
of erstwhile Receiver in the order dated 10 April, 2006.
As discussed hereinabove we do not find any material and/or ingredients for

arriving at the conclusion that the erstwhile Receiver had committed breach
of trust and/or misappropriated the money or utilized the money held by him
for personal gain which was unfortunately observed by the Learned Single
Judge. The erstwhile Receiver had already suffered serious prejudice in view
of the aforesaid uncalled for and unwarranted observations and the remarks
of the Single Judge as recorded in the order dated 10 July, 2006.....
We, however, want to put an end to the aforesaid

injustice and therefore, we “set aside” and “quash” the
findings of the Learned Single Judge in respect of the erstwhile
Receiver and further direct that all the observations and
remarks made against the erstwhile Receiver as recorded in
the order dated 10 April 2006....................................Stand
“expunged” an “deleted”.
The appeal was disposed with the aforesaid directions.”
2.29 The said order dated 25 September, 2007 which was passed by the
Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court was made in exercise of
judicial authority vested in the Court.
2.30 The said judgement and order has not been appealed against by either
the plaintiff or the defendant, or the Official Liquidator or the High Court till
date and therefore, stands final. It cannot be said as has been contended that
it is a “judgement in personam” and not “in rem”. In any event of the matter
by reason of the “quashing” and “expunging” of the aforesaid remarks from
the order dated 10th April, 2006 it would be deemed that such adverse
observations of the Learned Single Judge which went about questioning my
conduct as a Receiver were never in existence since they stood quashed.
(1992)3 SCC Page 1 (Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. vs. Church of South
India Trust Association CSI Cinod Secretariat Madras.
2.31 Ordinarily the matter should have rested there, but it appears that
disregarding and/or ignoring the findings of the Division Bench, the then Chief
Justice of India in his “administrative capacity” sought explanation from me
and which explanations were properly furnished. I had repeatedly brought to the
notice of His Lordship about the order of the Division Bench dated
25 September, 2007 wherein all adverse allegations made against my purported

conduct as an erstwhile Receiver were quashed and/or expunged and therefore,
did not exist.
2.32 Disbelieving my explanation and further treating the judgement of the

Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court with disdain and without any
respect to its findings formed an In-House Inquiry Committee in terms of
the In-House procedure which was allegedly adopted by all High Courts
excluding Calcutta High Court to look into the allegations of misconduct and
misappropriation made against me. This fact was made known to me by the
then Chief Justice of India’s letter dated 10 September, 2007 wherein the
Hon’ble Chief Justice of India (Retired) had clearly admitted that the process
for proposing to hold inquiry was passed on the “alleged adverse remarks”
and “observations” which had been made by the Learned Single Judge in
the order dated 10 April, 2006. The letter also recorded that the In-House
Procedure framed by the Supreme Court, “was adopted” by all High Courts
including the Calcutta High Court.
2.33 Subsequent inquiries by my Advocate-on-Record under the Right to

Information Act, 2005 clearly revealed from a letter of the Deputy Registrar
(Administration) and Public Information Officer, High Court, Appellate Side,
Calcutta dated 26 April, 2010 that “the matter of resolution taken by the
Hon’ble High Court dated 15 December, 2009 with regard to the formation
of ‘In-House Committee’ is still pending before the Hon’ble Full Court for
decision”.
2.34 It is now clear that the then Chief Justice of India despite knowing that
such “In-House House Procedure” had not been adopted by the Hon’ble
Calcutta High Court for reasons best known to him made an incorrect
statement; which brings us to the larger issue, namely, whether the Chief
Justice of India acting in his administrative capacity could direct an enquiry by
an “In-House Committee” in respect of the subject matter of enquiry, namely,
alleged misconduct of the erstwhile Receiver as also his alleged misconduct
as a Judge of the Calcutta High Court at a point of time when the Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court in its judicial side had exonerated me and
further whether the In-House Committee could be constituted to probe into
the false and non-existant allegations which were based on observations of
the Learned Single Judge as contained in the order dated 10 April, 2006 which
however stood quashed and/or expunged by the time when the In-House
Committee was formed and further in absence of any complaint being
entertained by either Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court or the then Chief
Justice of India or by the In-House Committee.
2.35 The constitutions of the In-House Committee to inquire into the alleged/
imaginary complaint was wholly without jurisdiction for the following reasons :
(a) The In-House Committee procedure for formation of such In-House

Committee was not adopted by the Full Court of the Calcutta High
Court and therefore, a judge of the Calcutta High Court could not
be subjected to an enquiry in terms of such In-House procedure;
(b) Without prejudice to the above and assuming though not admitting
that even otherwise the Committee could have gone into such
allegations, the condition precedent for assumption of jurisdiction
to look into such allegations was the existence of any valid
complaint which was however was absent in my case. As such since
the formation of an In-House Committee was on the basis of the
alleged adverse findings contained in the order dated 10 April, 2010
which stood quashed and expunged by the time In-House
Committee was actually formed in or about 3 December, 2007, the
same was thus illegally and invalidly constituted. The In-House
Committee could not have been directed in absence of any fresh
allegations against me to go into any non-existant complaints/
allegations. The In-House Committee can only look into the
complaints regarding the conduct of a “Judge” but not is past
conduct as an advocate. Therefore, the enquiry by the In-House
Committee was wholly without jurisdiction.
(c) Whether the In-House Committee constituted by the then Chief

Justice of India not being either a statutory or a constitutional body
but merely an administrative body could sit in judgement over a
judicial order passed by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High
Court and comment upon the same and whether its finding could
supercede the observations and findings of the Division Bench and
if so whether the same tantamouts to unauthorized and illegal
encroachment of the Judiciary’s powers by the Executive without
any authority of law and/or in violation of the Rule of Law. It is humbly
submitted that the very act of seeking to sideline or dump the order
of a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court through the process of
an In-House Committee is wholly illegal, without or in excess of
jurisdiction and/or in breach of basic structure of Constitution
which guarantees the independence of judiciary and judicial orders
which cannot be questioned by any administrative of a non-statutory
body and any comment on the same falls within the mischief of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The sanctity of a judicial order
which has attained finality cannot and/or ought not to be trampled
and/or loosely interfered with since the same would lead to a wholly
unwarranted confrontation between judiciary and executive.
(d) In fact the Executive does not have the authority to override and/or
supercede any validly passed judicial order and it is only and only
in exercise of legislative powers of the Parliament or the State
Legislature by a Validating Act or otherwise, can Legislature seek
to overreach and/or nullify the effect of the judicial order. A Judicial
Order is not subservient to any Executive action.
(e) In the case of Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum,

reported in AIR 1985 SC 945 a five judges Bench of the Supreme
Court held that “divorced Muslim women have still the right
to claim maintenance under Section 125 of Code of Criminal
Procedure 1973”, and that there was no conflict between the
provisions of Section 125 of the Cr. P.C and the Muslim Personal
Law. The said case, which was popularly known as Shah Bano Case,
created a furore amongst the Muslim Community of India, who
agitated strongly against the decision on the ground that it sought
to abrogate the Principles of Muslim Law with regard to
maintenance to a divorced Muslim wife. In the wake of the protests
made against the said decision the Parliament passed the Muslim
Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which Act was
a compromise between the provisions of Section 125 Cr. P.C and
the Muslim Personal Law. In fact the statement of objects and
reasons of the Act records the fact that the decision in Shah Bano
case had created some controversy and it has became necessary
to specify the rights to which a Muslim divorced woman is entitled
at the time of divorce and to protect her interests.
(f) This example which is only indicative clearly exemplifies that under
our constitutional frame work a judgement of a High Court or the
Supreme Court can only be nullified or rendered ineffective by
appropriate legislation and not in the manner as is being done in
my case regarding the Division Bench Order dated 25 September,
2007.
2.36 It is interesting to note that even otherwise the In-House Committee is

only empowered to go into the complaints or allegations against a Judge
pertaining to discharge of his judicial functions or with regard to conduct
and behaviour outside the Court.
2.37 In my case, there was no complaint filed by any aggrieved party in C.S.
No. 8 of 1983 or was there any other independent complaint against me save
and except the remarks made by the Learned Single Judge in the order dated
10 April, 2006 which were however quashed by the Division Bench. It is also
inexplicable that the then Chief Justice of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in
his letter dated 2 November, 2006 addressed to the then Hon’ble Chief Justice
of India had admitted that “There had been no complaint made by anybody
against Justice Sen.”
2.38 The In-House- Committee’s report dated 1 February, 2008 contains

multiple instances of factual discrepancies and glaring errors of fact which go
to the root of the findings and its conclusion, thereby rendering it severely
vulnerable and no reasonable person could on the basis of such report come
to a finding that–
(a) “Shri Soumitra Sen did not have the honest intention right from the
year 1993 when he started getting the sale proceeds .............”;
(b) “That there has been misappropriation “at least temporary” of the
sale proceeds.............”;
(c) “The (temporary) misappropriation of the entire sale proceeds as

noticed above; the false explanation to the Court that an amount
of Rs. 25,00,000/- was invested from the account where the sale
proceeds were kept; his dealing with the two accounts viz.,
01SLP0632800 and O1SLP0813400 and “eloquent silence” on
his part until he was asked by judicial order to deposit the amount
of sale proceeds show “fraudulent conduct” of Shri Soumitra Sen;
(d) “The explanation of Shri Soumitra Sen in his written submission that
after having deposited the demand drafts of the sale proceeds in his
savings bank account, he invested the amount of Rs. 25, 00,000/-
with M/s. Lynx India Ltd. is palpably false”.
(e) “Mere monetary recompense under the compulsion of judicial order

does not obliterate breach of trust and misappropriation of
Receiver’s fund for his personal gain”;
(f) “The conduct (or lack of it) of Sri Soumitra Sen as noticed above
has brought disrepute to the high judicial office and dishonour to the
institution of judiciary and undermines the faith and confidence
reposed by the public in the administration of justice”.
2.39 The aforesaid conclusions have been based on total misappreciation of

the extant facts and total non-consideration of relevant materials on record and
erroneously collating and analyzing of the documents, records and facts and
the inference reached by the In-House Committee lacks judicial credibility.
However, such factual aspects of the matter is being dealt with thoroughly
elsewhere in this reply. The purported report of the In-House Committee is a
bundle of half-truths and is perverse.
2.40 Sad to say, the In-House Committee in its zest to adversely comment
upon my conduct overlooked and/or has not adverted to the specific defences
taken by me in my reply to such Committee. The vital aspect of its lack of
jurisdiction to go into such matter, especially when there was no complaint on
the basis whereof such In-House Committee could have assumed jurisdiction
and further, in absence of any resolution adopting such In-House Procedure
by the Full Court of the Calcutta High Court, went to the root of the jurisdiction
of the In-House Committee but were conveniently ignored. It was the duty of
the In-House Committee, as it is also in cases of Courts, to at first satisfy itself
that it has the jurisdiction to inquire or adjudicate any matter even in absence
of no such plea taken by any party or otherwise. I in my reply to the Committee
had specifically taken such a plea.
2.41 The then Chief Justice of India by his letter dated 6 February, 2008
informed me the decision and the recommendation of the In-House Committee
to the effect that they had found “misconduct” against me serious enough to
ensure proceedings for my removal and on the basis of such purported
recommendation the then Chief Justice of India called upon me to either to
resign or to seek voluntary retirement. Question thus arises whether such
Committee had any power to recommend initiation of proceedings for my
removal when it was not even a “Statutory authority” leave aside being a
“Constitutional authority” and thereby in this manner usurp the Constitutional
mandate reserved for the Parliament alone?
2.42 I by my letter dated 25 February, 2008 furnished an elaborate reply to

the aforesaid letter of the then Chief Justice of India and called upon him to
reconsider such a decision. In particular I highlighted several discrepancies
between the findings of the Division Bench and the Inquiry Committee as also
otherwise (detailed reference to the same can be made from Volumes VII), and
upon receipt of such reply I was called for a personal hearing before the then
Chief Justice of India and I apprised my position before the then Chief Justice
of India in presence of Justice B.N. Agarwal (Retired) and Justice Ashok Bhan
(Retired) of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
2.43 In the meeting before the then Chief Justice of India and the aforesaid
two Hon’ble Judges it was “strongly” conveyed to me that in the event I failed
to resign, ‘further inquiries’ would be taken up and made by some other
agencies before the matter was sent to the Parliament were they meaning
the Central Bureau of Investigation? It then dawned on me that the Central
Bureau of Investigation could also be arm-twisted to investigate into any matter
at the instance of the personal whims of the highest echelons of the Judiciary
also even in absence of any judicial order.
2.44 Which thus leads to the question as stated in my letter dated 26 March,
2008 addressed to the then Chief Justice of India that any further investigation
into my alleged misconduct over and above the enquiry Committee’s report
leads to the inevitable conclusion that the said Report was not “conclusive”
and therefore, any forceful decision to be obtained from me to “resign” on
the basis of such report was uncalled for. No reply to this letter containing
such specific statement was ever given by the then Chief Justice of India.
Why?
2.45 After a long hiatus since my letter dated 26 March, 2008 and during
which time I continued to be denied allocation of judicial duties, the then Chief
Justice of India by his letter dated 4 August, 2009 recommended to the Hon’ble
Prime Minister of India for initiation of proceedings contemplated under Article
217(1) read with Article 124(4) of the Constitution of India. The said letter
addressed to the Hon’ble Prime Minister of India contains repetition of the
multiple factual errors and discrepancies which despite being pointed out
several times earlier by me were repeatedly ignored and/or not taken into
consideration which thereby casts a grave doubt in the minds of the people
as to whether or not the entire proceedings were pre-meditated and/or stage
managed. Were such distortions of facts deliberate?
2.46 It appears that even before any finding or otherwise could be made into
my alleged conduct, solely based on media reports and without any
corroboration I was denied any further judicial duty from November, 2006
onwards. The said letter to the Hon’ble Prime Minister also wrongly recorded
that G.A. No. 3763 of 2006 filed by me was “dismissed” but on the contrary
the same was “disposed of” with Liberty to approach the court once again
with certain observations. Even though there was a brief reference to the
Division Bench’s order dated 25 September, 2007, the Hon’ble Prime Minister
of India was not informed that such judgement and order passed by the
Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had attained finality in absence of
any “further challenge” to the same and that finding of the Hon’ble Division
Bench which exonerated me of all the alleged charges of misconduct, criminal
breach of trust or misappropriation (temporary or otherwise) could not be
assailed and/or form the basis of an independent “administrative probe” at
the instance of the then Chief Justice of India acting in his administrative
capacity in absence of any fresh charges of the like, against me. The
recommendation which was made by the then Chief Justice of India to the
Hon’ble Prime Minister of India was thus made on erroneous factual and
legal premises which was not expected from the august Office of the then
Hon’ble Chief Justice of India.
2.47 What is more significant is that the said letter dated 4 August, 2009 does
not even refer to my detailed and elaborate reply as contained in my letter
dated 25 February, 2008 addressed to the then Chief Justice of India after I
was served with a copy of the In-House Committee’s report. On a cursory
reading of the said letter dated 4 August, 2009 it would clearly reveal that the
Hon’ble Prime Minister of India was not made aware of the contents of my
detailed letter dated 25 February, 2008, as such, the Hon’ble Prime Minister
was unaware of my defence to the report of the In-House Committee as also
against the decision of the then Chief Justice of India recommending the
initiation of proceedings for my impeachment. It is hard to fathom as to why
such a vital document, which would explain facts from my point of view was
withheld from the Hon’ble Prime Minister of India. Would I be wrong in
assuming that the die had already been cast for my impeachment?
2.48 Thereafter from various newspaper and media reports, it became

increasingly evident that impeachment proceedings would be initiated against
me. At this stage I would only comment that media reports presently have quite
an impact in the decisions of the Executive who dares to defy the media. It
professes to be the watchdog of peoples’ liabilities. Occasionally they overstep
their mandate. Upon such reports being published, several letters from time
to time were written by my Advocate-on-Record to you and the Hon’ble Speaker
of the Lok Sabha on 27 February, 2008, 28 March, 2009, 30 March, 2009,
and 17 April, 2009. In the letter dated 27 March, 2009 at paragraphs
14, 15, 16 and 17 thereof my Advocate-on-Record made the following
statements :
“14. Under Section 3 of the Judges (Enquiry) Act, 1969

admission of a motion for impeachment is not automatic. Once
a notice is given in the Council of States, then the Chairman

may after consulting such persons, if any, as he thinks fit and
after considering such materials, if any, as may be available
to him either admit the motion or refuse to admit the same.
Therefore, it is clear that the mandate of the Statute is an
independent application of mind by the Chairman before
refusing or admitting the motion.
15. In the instant case, as we have come to know from

the newspaper reports, that the M.P.’s motion only
accompanied the recommendations of the CJI. From the
newspaper report dated 14/15 March, 2008 it is clear that the
CJI had admitted, that my client detailed reply to the report of
the committee was not even mentioned. Therefore, the M.P.’s
were not favoured with our side of the story neither you had
the opportunity to look into all materials as is required under
Section 3, before admitting the motion.
16. The motion was presented on the last day of the

session of the Parliament and was perhaps the last motion.
Therefore, a vital question arises here is whether you have
the opportunity of exercising your independent mind before
admitting the motion, or whether you had any other materials
before you except the recommendation of the CJI, as is
required under the Act.
17. In the light of the statement made above, if the

mandatory requirements of the statute have not been adhered
to, then the formation of the enquiry committee by you is
unconstitutional and should be withdrawn.”
2.49 In the letter dated 11 June, 2009 addressed to Your Excellency, my

Advocate-on-Record upon acknowledging the fact that Your Excellency had
constituted a Committee under the Judges (Enquiry) Act, 1968 requested that
“under no circumstances Shri Fali S. Nariman can be a part of the said
Committee as he has openly in print and media spoken against my client
and has already expressed his opinion in favour of impeachment of my
client. My client has serious apprehension about the biasness of Mr.
Nariman in the matter and I also feel that his presence in the Committee
will go against the spirit and purpose of the Constitution of India.”
No reply was received to the above letter, which raises important issue
with regard to the impartiality and functioning of the Judges (Enquiry)
Committee.
2.50 On 5 February, 2010 I was informed that on 27 February, 2009 a motion

under Article 217 read with Article 124(4) of the Constitution was admitted by
Your Excellency which read as under :
“This House resolves that an address be presented to the President for removal
from office of Justice Soumitra Sen of the Calcutta High Court on the following
two grounds of misconduct:
(i) Misappropriation of large sums of money which he had received in

his capacity as Receiver appointed by the High Court of Calcutta;
and
(ii) Misrepresented facts with regard to misappropriation of money

The motion shall be kept pending till further action prescribed under the Judges
(Enquiry) Act, 1968 and Rules made there under is taken.”
2.51 It was further informed that the Committee was constituted under sub-
section (2) of Section 3 of the Judges (Enquiry) Act, 1968 for making
investigation into the grounds referred to in the above-mentioned motion. The
Committee after examining the matter before it had framed out a “draft”
charges along with a “draft” statement of grounds under which the
investigation is proposed to be held under the said Act. I was called upon to
peruse the same and revert back to the Committee in writing on or before
26 February, 2010 to enable the Committee to proceed further in accordance
with the Judges (Enquiry) Act, 1968 and the Rules made there under.
2.52 By a letter dated 23 February, 2010 which was in furtherance to the

earlier letter dated 18 February, 2010 certain important legal issues were raised
by my Advocate-on-Record which went to the root of the admission of the
motion in the House and the fact that the first charge did not pertain to my
capacity as a Judge of the High Court and further that only “draft charges”
were formulated instead of “definite charges” as was warranted in the said
Act. Moreover, the minutes of the meeting in which the Committee was
appointed had to deliberate upon framing of the proposed charges were also
sought for in the said letter. It is stated that the Committee exceeded its
jurisdiction in formulating the charges against me since the same was beyond
the scope of the motion which was admitted by Your Excellency.
2.53 On 4 March, 2010 a letter was written by the Presiding Officer of the
Judges (Inquiry) Committee informing me that the said Committee had framed
charges on the basis of which “investigation” was proposed to be held.
However, there was no reply to the legal issues raised in the letter dated
23 February, 2010.
2.54 It is stated that initially the Judges (Inquiry) Committee comprised of

Justice Sudharshan Reddy, as the Presiding Officer and the Hon’ble Justice
T.S. Thakur and Shri Fali S. Nariman, Eminent Jurist and Senior Advocate.
Later on Justice Thakur was replaced by Justice Mukul Mudgal, Chief Justice
of Punjab and Haryana High Court, since Justice Thakur was elevated to the
Hon’ble Supreme Court.
2.55 Despite the “apprehension” expressed by me in my letter dated

11 June, 2009 to the effect that I had “apprehension of biasness in the event
of Fali S. Nariman having continued to remain in the Committee on the ground
of having made pro-impeachment remarks in print and other media even before
his appointment”, such apprehension was not taken into consideration by the
authorities. Such pro-hearing opinions of Shri Fali S. Nariman, therefore, gave
rise to serious apprehension of bias in my mind.
2.56 It is humbly submitted that as is well settled that one of the two elements
of principles of natural justice is the “rule against biasness”.
2.57 As per Black’s Law Dictionary ‘Bias’ is “a condition of mind, which sways
judgement and renders judge unable to exercise his functions impartially in a
particular case.”
“A predisposition to decide for and against one party,

without proper regard to the true merits of the disputes is bias.”
(AIR 1988 SC 2231) (Secretary to the Government of India
v. Manuswami Mudaliar)
2.58 The test for determination of bias is not actual bias but whether there
was a “real likelihood of bias” and if there is so the Judge should not sit in
adjudication.
2.59 Therefore, when an apprehension was voiced by me to the appointment

of Shri Fali S. Nariman in the Committee constituted under Section 3 of the
Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, the same ought not to have been ignored even
without considering the merits of such statements and in failing to do so the
constitution of the Committee, the framing of charges, the proceedings before
it and its final report cannot be legally sustained.
2.60 The Committee thereafter from time to time heard the matter first on 24
June, 2010 and thereafter between the periods commencing from 18 July, 2010
to 20 July, 2010. The hearing concluded on 20 July, 2010. In course of
proceedings written notes of submissions were filed by me and at the end of,
the proceedings written arguments were also submitted by me through my
Learned Counsel. Such written submissions are for the sake of brevity not
reproduced herein but the same is relied on and the same is at pages 24 to
136 of Volume II of the Report and the written arguments filed on my behalf,
which raises important Constitutional issues, are enclosed separately (without
list of statutes and judgements relied upon by me) and the contents of the
same may be treated as incorporated in this reply. Appropriate reference shall
be made, if necessary.
2.61 The report of the Judges (Inquiry) Committee constituted by Your

Excellency was submitted by the Committee on 10 September, 2010. The said
report concludes holding me guilty on both charges on the grounds more fully
stated in the said report.
3.0 LEGAL SUBMISSIONS
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
3.1 The first of the two motions, which was admitted by the Your Excellency,
namely, “misappropriation of large sums of money which he had received in
his capacity as Receiver appointed by the High Court at Calcutta”. From the
wording of the said motion it is ex-facie clear that the motion as it has been
worded seeks to deliberate whether in my capacity as “Receiver” appointed
by the High Court, Calcutta, I had misappropriated large sums of money which
I had received in my such capacity. Clearly, therefore, the issue of alleged
misappropriation during the period when I was a Judge of th.e Calcutta High
Court was and/or is not the subject matter of the motion and/or was
consciously omitted at the time of its admission in the Rajya Sabha. However,
the Committee whilst finalizing the charges against me had recorded that I
had continued to misappropriate and/or utilize the sale consideration and
accrued interest in my possession as “Receiver” even at the time of, and
subsequent appointment as a Judge of the Court on 3rd December, 2003
at several places. Such findings/charges, therefore, are wholly outside the
admission and scope of the first motion which was admitted since the same
relates to alleged misappropriation in my capacity as “Receiver” appointed
by the Calcutta High Court and the same does not relate to the period when
I was appointed as a Judge of the Calcutta High Court. The Committee,
therefore, in framing such charges had clearly overstepped its jurisdiction in its
zeal to somehow or the other adversely comment on my conduct.
3.2 It is to be borne in mind that the word “misappropriation” implies

existence of “mensrea” and/or “criminality of mind” and “dishonest
intention”. Even though the purported report of the In-House Committee for
reasons which are “inexplicable” on the basis of the facts and circumstances
before it had come to a conclusion that I “dishonestly” misappropriated such
sums and/or “dishonestly” converted the same for my own use, strangely
enough the statement of charges against me does not contain any such
allegation. Even in the report filed by the In-House Committee, there is no
whisper of either of “dishonest intention” or “mensrea” or criminal intent
on my part. These are the essential ingredients for offence under Section 403
and 405 of the Indian Penal Code, which is conspicuously absent in my case.
3.3 “Misappropriation” is a term is generally associated with the Criminal

Law. All acts of alleged conversion of property or use of property contrary to
a particular direction could not be termed to be “misappropriation” unless it
is associated with “dishonest intention” or “criminal intent”. An act of
careless blending of entrusted property with one’s own property cannot always
be termed as misappropriation and on the contrary found to be acts of
negligence.
3.4 As stated hereinabove neither in the motion admitted in the Hon’ble Lok
Sabha nor the statement of motion of charges or the statement of grounds in
support of charges against me was there any allegation of any dishonest
intention on my part even in my capacity as a Receiver. Therefore, the essential
ingredients or elements of misappropriation as is generally perceived is
conspicuously absent and/or has been consciously omitted and therefore on
this preliminary ground and shorn of all other attendant facts and legalities the
charge of “misappropriation” against me cannot be sustained.
3.5 The Judges (Inquiry) Act cannot be extended to investigate into the
conduct of a “Judge” prior to his elevation. A Receiver being appointed by a
High Court, as such his actions cannot be investigated and/or scrutinized either
by the In-House Committee by the Committee constituted under Section 3 of
the said Act. A Receiver is only answerable to the Court which has appointed
him and it is only a finding of the particular Court appointing him can a charge
of misappropriation be levelled against him. In this case no such charge was
either levelled against me by the Single Judge or by the Division Bench of the
3.6 Past actions of a Judge long prior to his elevation cannot be the subject
matter of impeachment. If past actions are brought within the ambit of Article
124(4) read with the provisions of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, it will make a
mockery of the selection process of a Judge of a High Court or Supreme Court.
3.7 The constitutional mandate does not permit impeachment process to be

initiated against a Judge after his elevation for alleged acts of misconduct prior
to his elevation which it itself passes through several levels of scrutiny including
police verification etc. This safeguard has been provided in our constitution in
order to maintain dignity and independence of the judiciary. If past action of a
judge long prior to his elevation is permitted to be raised as an issue or ground
for impeachment, then anyone with a personal agenda of his own can rake
up irrelevant past issues and harass a Judge of a High Court or Supreme Court
mustering enough political clout to move a motion for impeachment.
3.8 The whole object and purpose of the Article 124(4) read with Judges
(Inquiry) Act is to ensure prevention of corruption and malpractice and
incapability in discharge of judicial function and for no other reasons.
3.9 The Committee in its report dated 10 September, 2010 has consciously
assessed my conduct in two phases; one which is prior to my elevation before
3 December, 2003 as Judge of the Calcutta High Court and the other thereafter.
3.10 It is stated with humility that my alleged conduct and the alleged act of
misappropriation prior to my elevation as a Judge is wholly outside the realm
of jurisdiction of the said Committee or even of the In-House Committee
appointed by the then Chief Justice of India. Therefore, in order to somehow
bring the charges under the purview of the said Judges (Inquiry) Act my alleged
conduct post-my elevation as a Judge of the Calcutta High Court was also
sought to be investigated into. Such investigation, however, is not contemplated
in the motion as admitted in the Upper House and therefore, such motion
cannot but fail since the motion as formed and which has been admitted does
not warrant any investigation by the Committee into my alleged conduct post-
my elevation as a Judge of the Calcutta High Court on the charges of alleged
misappropriation. Moreover, it is reiterated that in absence of any finding of
“dishonest intention” or “mensrea” in the matter of alleged misappropriation
or alleged conversion of funds into my own use, the charge of misappropriation
cannot be sustained which leads one to the next motion.
3.11 The second motion which has been admitted by the Hon’ble Chairman
of the Rajya Sabha is that I had misrepresented facts with regard to
misappropriation of moneys before the High Court at Calcutta. Without going
into the merits and the factual aspects leading, to the said motion at this stage,
it is humbly stated that any allegation of making false statements before the
Calcutta High Court can only be decided in the backdrop of a legally
permissible investigation being conducted in the matter of
“misappropriation of moneys”. In other words when there cannot be any
investigation in the matter of alleged misappropriation of money by reason of
the fact (a) that the charge of alleged misappropriation of money by me in my
capacity as Receiver appointed by the Calcutta High Court is beyond jurisdiction
of the Committee set up under Section 3 of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968;
and (b) no investigation was warranted under the first motion to inquire/
investigate as to whether such alleged acts of misconduct continued at a point
of time after I was elevated as a Judge of the Calcutta High Court, therefore
the question whether I had made false statements or misrepresented facts
about such ‘misappropriation’ before the Calcutta High Court is equally
beyond the scope of any investigation because the two motions are
‘intrinsically linked’ and the second motion has no ‘independent legs’ to
stand on. If the charges on the first motion cannot be investigated into in the
first place the question as to whether or not I had misrepresented before the
Calcutta High Court with regard to such misappropriation also cannot be
decided because the Committee cannot test the falsity or otherwise of any
statement made by me when the subject matter of the same is outside its
jurisdiction. The alleged act of misrepresentation has to be adjudged in the
backdrop as to whether or not there has been a misappropriation in the first
place. If such an investigation of misappropriation is not permissible and/or is
without jurisdiction, the question whether any misrepresentation had been made
or not is an empty exercise.
3.12 Therefore, in the above conspectus of facts the legal position which
emerges is that–
(a) The first motion of alleged misappropriation by me of money

received by me in the capacity as a Receiver appointed by the
Calcutta High Court cannot on the face of it be a subject matter of
an investigation by the Judges (Inquiry) Committee since the actions
of a Receiver is outside the scrutiny of the Judges (Inquiry)
Committee and further the motion as it has been admitted does not
empower the Committee to look into my alleged conduct after my
elevation as a Judge of the Calcutta High Court;
(b) In the event the allegations pertaining to the first motion cannot be
investigated and consequently, therefore, any finding on the same
would be without and/or in excess of jurisdiction of such Committee,
the second charge of misrepresentation with regard to

misappropriation is equally unsustainable because to try me on a
charge of misrepresentation qua misappropriation, there is to be a
legal finding regarding misappropriation of money by a Committee
and/or authority which has the legal capacity and competence to
undertake such investigation which admittedly on the face of it the
instant Committee does not. In any event the question of
misappropriation cannot and does not arise under any stretch of
imagination for the simple reasons as follows :
(i) There were no transactions in the bank account concerning the

purchase consideration after 1997;
(ii) The Lynx India (now in Liquidation) went into liquidation in the
year 2000. After liquidation the Official Liquidator in terms of
the Companies Act, 1956 is in possession of all the assets of
the company including the fixed deposit receipts which were
found in original in the custody of the Official Liquidator;
(iii) The police authorities have also seized large number of

documents of Lynx.
Under these circumstances question of misappropriating any amount after

1997 or even after 2000 is a legal and a factual impossibility. It is needless
to mention that I was elevated only in the year 2003.
(c) When rightly or wrongly the report of the In-House Committee

contained a finding of dishonest misappropriation of money by me
and dishonest conversion of the sum for my own use, significantly,
however, the statement of imputation of the charges and grounds
in support thereof as also the motion admitted by the Hon’ble
Chairman does not contain any such allegation. In other words that
the appointment of the Judges (Inquiry) Committee and the
investigation being made afresh by such Committee is without any
advertence to the finding of the In-House Committee’s report to the
aforesaid effect and therefore was given.
4.0 ROLE OF THE THEN CHIEF JUSTICE IN THE ENTIRE EPISODE
4.1 The In-House Committee was not constituted by the Chief Justice either
under the provisions of any statute or under any constitutional provisions.
The then Hon’ble Chief Justice of India adopted such In-House procedure,
which was not ratified by the Calcutta High Court to look into certain
complaints against me on the basis of the aforesaid judgment of the Single
Bench of the Calcutta High Court which had found me ‘guilty’ of certain acts
of misconduct allegedly committed at a time when I had not been appointed
as a Judge and there was no ‘complaint’ whatsoever against me about alleged
misconduct or incapacity qua a Judge of the High Court.
4.2 Importantly by a letter dated 17 March, 2008 the then Hon’ble Chief
Justice of India wrote to me that my explanation had not convinced the Judges
of the Supreme Court who were in the Committee and I was asked to submit
my ‘resignation’ or ‘seek voluntary retirement’ on or about April, 2009. In
that letter of the then Chief Justice of India, it was specified that “as already
made clear to you yesterday, if you fail to act upon this advice and to intimate
the same to me within the time prescribed above, we would proceed further
and take such steps (emphasis supplied) as may be deemed appropriate in
public interest and for better administration of justice. It is thus clear that the
then Chief Justice of India and some of his colleagues had decided about my
alleged misconduct and that we would take steps deemed appropriate in the
matter.” Thus, after such decision the whole issue became closed matter and
clearly what the Learned Judges meant that they would take appropriate action,
which could only be initiation of impeachment proceedings.
4.3 It is unfortunate that at no point of time the Learned Judges of the

Supreme Court, formally or informally, did even take note of the judgment of
the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court on the appeal filed by me, which
set aside all the findings of the Single Judge. The Division Bench set aside
and quashed the findings of the Single Judge and further directed that the
observations/remarks made against me in my capacity as the erstwhile
Receiver as recorded in the order dated 10 April, 2006 by the Learned Single
Judge should be expunged and/or deleted.
4.4 It is important to note that the Learned Single Judge as well as the Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court were both concerned that my conduct, not
in my capacity as Judge but only as Receiver appointed by the Court before
I was appointed as a Judge. The decision of the Hon’ble Judges of the
Supreme Court and the finding, even if primarily relying on the decision of the
Single Judge without considering the judgment, of the Division Bench in the
same proceeding, is a disturbing feature, which can shake the conscience of
any right, believing citizen. In fact, in the article published in the ‘Times of India’,
Kolkata on 26 February, 2009 under the heading ‘Unpopular Free Speech’
Sri Avishek Singhvi, a distinguished Lawyer whilst citing my example, had
written “the simple point is that in the last several months of this debate, civil
society, the media and the judiciary has not even discussed the existence
of a detailed judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court
which appears to have exonerated Justice Sen of any wrong doing in
the very same transaction and with respect to the same allegations. It
was also stated in the said article “No one has spoken up or asked the
question as to how any proceedings against Sen by the Apex Court or
any other institution can proceed without that detailed judicial order of
the Division Bench being at least challenged judicially and reversed by
the Apex Court. Is this happening, irrespective of merits, it is an
unpopular view of articulate?”
4.5 It is not known whether any body or person or authority including Judges
of the Supreme Court who can ignore the judgment of a competent court of
law which, not having been set aside judicially, is binding on the parties and
all others and cannot be ignored by any authority whatsoever, which operated
within the Constitution and legal framework of our country. It is inexplicable
how a proceeding can be initiated on the basis of a Single Judge’s judgment,
which has been set aside by a competent Division Bench, which has become
final and binding on all. In fact the Judges Inquiry Committee has clearly erred
in holding that the judgment of the Division Bench operated qua parties and
was not “a judgment in rem”. Clearly the legal position is just the reverse.
4.6 The records of the proceedings and the consequences of events which
followed leaves no room for any doubt of any ordinary person that the whole
initiative for initiating the impeachment proceedings has been taken by the
then Chief Justice of India and some of his brother Judges, who had gone
into the matter without apparently giving any opportunity to me except on the
question of punishment and communications addressed to me, which clearly
indicates that he and some of the Learned Judges had taken a decision which
was intended to be formalized by giving a personal hearing to me which was
meant not to satisfy the Learned Judges of the Supreme Court, as was clearly
indicated by the then Chief Justice of India in his letter dated 17 March, 2008.
In fact the Learned Judges went into the merits of the matter and took the
surprising step of directing the executive to start impeachment proceedings.
Obviously any person would be under an illusion that in as much as the then
Chief Justice of India and some of his colleagues had already found me guilty
of the alleged misbehaviour committed before I became a judge, no further
question could arise about my guilt of which an impeachment proceedings
could only be found by the Enquiry Committee after due investigation. It is
hard to fathom any person who in India would question a decision taken
at the topmost echelons of the judicial world.
4.7 The Constitutional framework of Article 124(4) provides that an action taken
against a Judge must come and can only come from the members either of
the Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha and certainly not at the instance of the Executive
or the Judiciary. The letter dated 17 March, 2009 of the then Chief Justice of
India clearly shows that the initiative for initiating impeachment proceedings
against me had been taken by no lesser than a person than by the then Hon’ble
Chief Justice of India. It has appeared in the press (which has not been
controverted) that he had initiated the move for my impeachment. The Learned
Chief Justice had also written to the Hon’ble Prime Minister in the matter and
thereby coaxing the Executive at its highest level to take a follow up action
on his decision in the matter. The irresistible conclusion appears to be the then
Hon’ble Chief Justice of India and few of his collegues had already decided
on my fate and had pronounced me guilty of alleged misbehaviour for which
it was a fit case for my removal and therefore, wanted me to resign or take
voluntary retirement. In such circumstances constitution of the Judges Inquiry
Committee is nothing but a mere formality when my death warrant had already
been signed, especially in view of the fact that the Committee of Judges in all
probability would not ever go against the decision which was specifically taken
by the then Chief Justice of India and who himself had initiated the move of
impeachment and who realizing that he lacks in constitutional authority to do
so had goaded the Government as it were to initiate impeachment move. The
impeachment move, therefore, is a consequence of my refusal to resign despite
being called upon to do so which amounts to “appropriate action” having been
taken against me by the then Chief Justice and his brother Judges. The chances
of any Committee of Judges coming to a contrary finding to a decision taken
by the Chief Justice of the Country is extremely remote.
4.8 It is under these circumstances that an important legal question emerges,

i.e. despite the Learned Single Judge’s judgment being set aside by the Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court and which order has attained finality and is
to be respected even by the Hon’ble Supreme Court since no appeal has been
preferred there from, could the same form the basis for taking action against
me, specially when there is not even an iota of allegation against me of
corruption or any judicial impropriety or misbehaviour or of my incapacity as a
Judge. It is not understood as to on what grounds I could be impeached when
the proceedings for impeachment can only be taken within the parameters of
Article 124(4) of the Constitution of India which speaks only of misbehaviour
and incapacity of Judge, which is not so in the present case.
5.0 FACTUAL ISSUES
A. CHARGES OF MISAPPROPRIATION
5.1 The facts narrated hereinabove would clearly support my following

contentions.
(i) The Learned Single Judge embarked on a personal inquiry with

regard to my bank Accounts, which is wholly without jurisdiction and
without basis whatsoever. Such observations of the Learned Single
Judge as recorded in the order dated 10 April, 2006, were, however,
was set aside, quashed and expunged by the Hon’ble Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court 25 September, 2007.
(ii) The entire money was paid back along with interest as was directed
by the Learned Court and at no point of time any money was ever
used for my personal gains or were temporarily or permanently
misappropriated.
(iii) I had never made any false statement before the High Court or in
any other proceedings.
(iv) Primarily the Single Judge came to the conclusion of

misappropriation of money held by me as a Receiver on the basis
that after having deposited Rs. 25 lacs to Lynx from account No.
O1SLP0813400 I deposited Rs. 22 lacs and odd from 400 account
and thereafter systematically withdrew the same to an undisclosed
place thereby reducing to a mere sum of Rs. 811.56. Unfortunately,
my explanation that these withdrawals were towards payment of
workers’ dues pursuant to a Division Bench order dated 20 January,
1997 passed by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Umesh Chandra Banerjee and
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sidheshwar Narayan was totally ignored by the
Single Judge and also the In-house Committee and apparently by
this Committee too.
(v) For the first time evidence of such withdrawals have been produced
which in spite of my best effort I could not produce earlier. Copies
of the cheques disclosed in pages 521 to 581 in Vol. I and pages
1575 to 1607 in Vol. Ill, if produced before the Single Judge it would
have reversed his finding on the said issue and would have cleared
his doubt that these were not secret undisclosed, withdrawals by
me for my personal benefit but genuine payments made to genuine
workers.
(vi) Whatever the amount and whoever the workers were quantified and
identified by the union were placed before me. I had issued the
cheques and everybody has received his payment. Therefore, the
finding of misappropriation by the Single Judge on this issue is
clearly controverted by evidence on record disclosed for the first
time in this proceeding. I fail to understand how this Committee
could call for these cheques whereas the learned Single Judge,
in spite of being told that the withdrawals are not personal
withdrawals but payment to workers, had deliberately not
directed the Bank to produce the copies of the cheques
whereas all other documents had been called for.
(vii) Such vital piece of evidence were absent before the learned Single
Judge and before the In-house Committee, which I am sure if shown
would have at least come to a different conclusion with regard to
the misappropriation based on the said withdrawals.
(viii) Though this Committee constituted under the Judges (Inquiry) Act
is allegedly conducting an ‘independent’ inquiry but the materials
on record relied upon by this Committee appears to be almost all
that were before the earlier proceedings except the ones that has
been referred to hereinbefore. All throughout I submitted and have
always maintained that I have never withdrawn a single penny from
400 account or from any other account for my personal benefit. This
is for the first time evidence has come forward to establish my
contention that withdrawals in account no. 400 were not for
my personal benefit in any manner whatsoever.
(ix) The whole object and purpose of inquiry by the Single Judge was
to see whether the amount of Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% was kept by
me in Lynx or not as was stated by me. My entire endeavour was
also to prove the same. The purchase consideration which I
received was Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% and the question is at the
time when court is directing repayment whether that amount was
found to be intact or not.
(x) The problem that I have faced in dealing with the money and
maintaining the account was primarily due to the uncertainty in the
nature of the order dated 20 April, 1993. The said order did not give
me any specific direction to open a Receiver’s account. Neither the
court gave any direction to keep the money in any specific interest
bearing account but the choice was left to me.
(xi) Because of the nature of such an order the purchaser issued drafts
in my personal name and capacity and not as a Receiver. Therefore,
I had no option but to encash those in an account standing in my
name. The learned Single Judge and the In-house Committee have
held that I encashed around Rs. 4,50,000/- in Allahabad Bank and
thereafter all encashment were done from an account maintained
with the Standard Chartered Bank, Church Lane Branch bearing
account No. O1SLP0632800.
(xii) The opening balance of the 800 account as on 28 February, 1995

shows only Rs. 8,83,963.05. Therefore by 28 February, 1995 and
commencing from March, 1993, I should have received
approximately Rs. 22,00,000/-. Therefore there is a shortfall and
which gave rise to the presumption of misappropriation. The present
Committee is seeking to split the same by withdrawals from
Allahabad Bank and from Standard Chartered Bank separately. It
is significant to know that the extract of ledger of the Allahabad Bank
disclosed in page 1493 of the Volume 3 all the documents relied
upon by this Committee have come to light for the first time.
(xiii) In fact Allahabad Bank has earlier written a letter that documents
prior to 1995 are not available with them as the Bank has
subsequently been computerised. In any event, I have all along
stated that Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% was kept with Lynx and my
endeavour was to prove the same.
(xiv) From the statement of account of Standard Chartered Bank,

disclosed in this proceeding relating to 800 account it will appear
that the major withdrawals were only towards creation of fixed
deposit commencing from March, 1995.
(xv) The reduction of the amount in 800 account is clearly not due to
personal withdrawals as it is apparent that fixed deposits were
created and were kept lying there until it was encashed and
deposited in the 400 account.
(xvi) Prior thereto from the 400 account Rs. 25 lacs were deposited in
Lynx on 26 February, 1997. From the number of fixed deposit
receipts standing in my name produced by the Official Liquidator, it
is clear that there was about Rs. 39,39,000/- deposited with Lynx.
The figure of Rs.39,39,000/- was arrived at on the basis of analysis
of the report filed by the Official Liquidator which contained several
incorrectness and/or lacunas. It is an admitted position as recorded

by the Learned Single Judge which was accepted by the Division
Bench as also by the In-House Committee and the present Committee
that a sum of Rs. 70,25,147/- together with interest was found lying
in the fixed deposit with Lynx since 1999. Under these circumstances
by a simple arithmetical calculation it can be concluded without any
doubt that at least Rs. 15,00,000/- was deposited in the year 1993.
Therefore, the question of misappropriating any amount out of the
purchase consideration by me cannot and does not arise. In spite
of such fact being placed before the present Committee, the
Committee has deliberately with a preconceived notion choose to
ignore the same.
(xvii) It is significant to point out herein that during the course of cross-
examination of the Official Liquidator by my Counsel before the
Committee, it was clearly admitted by the Official Liquidator that no
document in Lynx other than those produced were available before
the Official Liquidator. It was also admitted that large number of
documents of Lynx (now in Liquidation) has been seized by the
police authorities and that the Official Liquidator does not have any
seizure list of the documents seized by the police authorities.
(xviii) The only document showing deposit in Lynx produced by the Official
Liquidator is the application form for deposit of Rs.25,00,000/- in
the year 1997. Admittedly the amount found to be deposited with
Lynx in 1999 together with interest was Rs. 70,25,147/-. Therefore,
the one and only presumption is that the remaining amount after
deducting the Rs. 25,00,000/- deposited in 1997 was deposited prior
to 1997.
(xix) Furthermore since only part documents relating to the deposits were
produced by the Official Liquidator, the automatic presumption
is that if all the documents were produced it would clearly establish
the fact that deposits were duly made in Lynx from 1993 onwards
and that there was no question of any misappropriation of the said
sums.
(xx) The Official Liquidator in cross-examination has also clearly

admitted that no effort was made by the Official Liquidator, though
in law the Official Liquidator is in custody of the company in
liquidation, i.e., Lynx India, for retrieving the documents from the
police authorities.
(xxi) Therefore, the Standard of proof required for impeaching the High
Court Judge has not been satisfied in the instant case and the
Committee has clearly proceeded on the basis of adverse
presumption without any material documents before it and/or in
absence of all documents of Lynx pertaining to the relevant periods,
i.e. 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996.
(xxii) Therefore, the findings of the Committee with regard to the

alleged misappropriation are clearly perverse and a product of
non-application of mind or extreme bias against me.
(xxiii) There is no evidence whatsoever of any other deposit in Lynx after

1997. Therefore, the amount in addition Rs. 25.00,000/- to constitute
a total sum of Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% was deposited in Lynx earlier.
Therefore, the withdrawal either from Allahabad Bank or from the
800 account does not constitute misappropriation nor does it
contradict my stand that a sum of Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% was in
fact deposited with Lynx.
(xxiv) There are statements of account of 800 account disclosed in this

proceeding which would clearly show-that apart from major
withdrawals of Rs. 8,83,963.05 and Rs. 9,80,000.00 there are no
major personal withdrawal. These two withdrawals are also not for
personal gain as these withdrawals were made for the purpose of
creating a fixed deposit with the same Bank
(xxv) The present Committee has completely ignored the fact that from
the 400 account there were no personal withdrawals of any kind.
Series of cheques which have now been produced would clearly
establish my consistent stand that all withdrawals from 400 account
were made towards labour payment as per direction of the order
of the Division Bench 20 January 1997 passed by Hon’ble Mr.
Justice Umesh Chandra Banerjee and Hon’ble Mr. Justice
Sidheshwar Narayan.
(xxvi) Therefore finding of this Committee that the disbursement from the
400 account and reducing the amount to only Rs. 19,934.66
amounts to misappropriation is clearly contrary to records and
erroneous.
(xxvii) It matters little as to whether the amount kept in Lynx came from
800 accounts or from the 400 account. I was to separate the total
purchase consideration of Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% and it is without
any dispute that such amount was found to be deposited with Lynx
and was never reduced from the said total quantum at any given
point of time.
(xxviii) Therefore, the question of misappropriating any amount, for my

personal use and benefit cannot and does not arise. I reiterate with
great deal of conviction that from all my accounts which have been
disclosed it will not appear that any amount has been deposited in
Lynx after 1997 and the only deposit made in Lynx to 1997 was of
Rs. 25 lacs. But the aggregate sum of fixed deposit receipts
produced by the Official Liquidator is Rs. 70,25,147/-.
(xxix) The only corollary and conclusion which can be drawn that the
remaining amount of purchase consideration which is alleged to
have been withdrawn and misappropriated by me was indeed
deposited in Lynx for the purpose of creating of fixed deposit and
there is no other contrary evidence on record to contradict my said
statement.
(xxx) Since there was no transaction whatsoever in the accounts where

drafts were encashed after 1997 and that, the amount of
Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% was indeed found to have deposited, in
Lynx and continued to remain throughout until 2006, question of my
misappropriation the same after appointment as a judge cannot and
does not arise.
(xxxi) The amounts that were deposited in Lynx or the amounts held by
me as a Receiver were pursuant to direction of court and holding
the same under direction of court cannot amount to
misappropriation.
(xxxii) In order to establish misappropriation, a transaction has to be shown

which indicates withdrawal of money for personal use and benefit
with a dishonest intention.
(xxxiii) After 1997 there was no transaction whatsoever. The charge with
regard to misappropriation of property and which constitutes under
Article 124[4] read with Article 217 of the Constitution of India is on
the face of it is incorrect.
(xxxiv) The learned Single Judge as well as the In-house Committee has
never alleged misappropriation, if any, after my elevation. It seems
that this Committee is enlarging the scope of the motion itself. The
first motion admitted by the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha clearly

states misappropriation as a Receiver. The Committee cannot
enlarge the scope of the motion admitted by the Rajya Sabha and
give a different complexion to it altogether.
(xxxv) The provision of the Judges (Inquiry) Act requires investigation on the
basis of the motion admitted by the Parliament. I dare say with utmost
respect and humility that the Committee is not authorised in law to
come to their own independent finding by enlarging or digressing from
the scope and ambit of the motion admitted in the Parliament. The
first motion which was admitted by the Rajya Sabha which is quoted
as under:
“Misappropriation of large sum of money which he received in his

capacity as Receiver appointed by the High Court at Calcutta.”.
(xxxvi) Therefore, the said charge that I have committed misappropriation

of a property after my elevation as a judge and the same constitutes
misbehaviour under Article 124(4) read with Article 217 of the
Constitution of India is misconceived and erroneous.
(xxxvii) I was to keep Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% being the sum representing
the purchase consideration. Since the court did not direct me earlier
to keep the money in any interest bearing account, the question of
payment of interest would only arise at the time of repayment and
would depend upon the adjudication by the court.
(xxxviii) Therefore question of mis-utilizing the principal or any interest,

accrued thereon by me also cannot and does not arise.
(xxxix) It is significant to point out here that the plaintiff being aware of the
said fact did not claim any interest in their petition and only the
principal sum of Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% was asked to be returned
to them.
B. CHARGES OF MAKING FALSE STATEMENT
5.2 (i) With regard to the charge no. 2 i.e. making false , statement, I beg to
state that from the facts, as revealed hereinbefore, it will appear that none of
the evidence collected by the Single Judge was before me to enable me to
give an appropriate explanation.
(ii) In fact, the Single Judge has proceeded to conduct an inquiry

without any prayer to that effect or complaint against me in that
regard, which was not made known to me and it, would also appear
from record that specific orders were suppressed from me.
(iii) Therefore, when the recalling application being G.A. No. 3763 of 2005
was filed on my behalf the statements contained therein were all
based upon my memory of the transactions, which took place
over a decade ago.
(iv) All that I remembered at that material point of time that the amount
of Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% representing the purchase consideration
was lying deposited with Lynx. If the averments and the
statements are read in their true perspective, it will only mean that
my endeavour was to establish the said fact that a sum of
Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% representing the purchase consideration
was lying deposited with Lynx and this fact has been proved beyond
doubt from the fixed deposit receipts produced by the Official
Liquidator.
(v) It is significant to point out here that no written notes were filed
before the Division Bench. The notes which were filed before the
Single Judge for explaining the accounts submitted by the Official
Liquidator became a part of the trial court’s records and pleadings
which were before the Division Bench. The written notes which are
being strongly relied upon by the Committee in order to establish
making false statements were filed before the Single Judge primarily
to show the erroneous calculation made by the Official Liquidator.
Furthermore, the written notes filed before the Court are always
prepared by the lawyers in support of their submissions and
cannot constitute a statement far less “false statements” by a
party to the proceeding. A counsel appearing on behalf of a party
to the proceeding is entitled to make submissions and make his
own interpretation on the basis of record and it is for the court to
consider whether to accept or reject it. It is also significant that the
parties never raised any objection to such “written notes on
argument”.
(vi) I say that it pains me a great deal when I see that a portion of the
written notes is being relied upon in support of the charge of making
false representation by me whereas other portion, where I have
clearly stated that the statements made therein are purely based
on memory in absence of record, is being totally ignored.
(vii) It is an established position in law that when a document is relied

upon, it has to be relied upon in its totality and part and portion
thereof cannot be used against anyone.
(viii) If a part or portion is accepted then the other part and portion of
the same document will also be accepted and relied upon.
(ix) At the cost of repetition, I say that since the order dated 20 January,
1993 does not give any direction of keeping the money in any
specific account and the order dated 20.01.1997 (Hon’ble Justice
Umesh Chandra Banerjee) does not even direct me to open any
account, it matters little from where the total purchase consideration
of Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5% was deposited with Lynx.
(x) It is clear from the accounts that the withdrawals from the 400
account after deposit of Rs. 25 lacs with Lynx were towards labour
payment in terms of the order of the Division Bench dated
20 January, 1997 and the other withdrawal from 800 account was
for the purpose of creation of fixed deposit and thereafter
encashment of the same and deposit to the 400 account.
(xi) If the continuity of the money trail is taken into account, my

interpretation that the amount of Rs. 33,22,800/- less 5%
representing the purchase consideration has been deposited in Lynx
is not incorrect and does not amount to making false
representation.
(xii) Moreover, interpretation of the documents as made on my behalf

by my counsel has been accepted by the Division Bench and,
therefore, it requires no further elaboration.
(xiii) It is incorrect to allege that my first deposit with Lynx India was made
only December, 1996. As far as the documents that were available
before the Single Judge the only document relating to deposit in
Lynx was the application form indicating deposit to Lynx is of
February, 1997 and the amount is Rs. 25,00,000/-.
(xiv) The said application form indicates the cheque number, which
clearly tallies with the cheque number mentioned in the 800 account
for the corresponding period and for the corresponding sum.
(xv) There is no evidence of deposit of the remaining Rs. 14,39,000/-

which was already lying deposited with Lynx before 1997. In fact,
the only evidence of deposit of money in Lynx available is

Rs. 25,00,000/- that too in the year 1997. Therefore, my contention
that deposits were made in Lynx prior to 1997 cannot be
contradicted and that the earlier withdrawals either from the
Allahabad Bank or from the Standard Chartered Bank were towards
creation of fixed deposit with the Lynx and Standard Chartered Bank
cannot also be contradicted.
(xvi) If I had the passbooks (No passbook is given by Standard Chartered

Bank) or cheque books or counter foils of 1993 onwards which
unfortunately I did not preserve, I could have definitely proved my
contention by direct evidence but under the facts and circumstances,
I am trying to establish that fact by way of circumstantial evidence.
6.0 PARAWISE REPLY
6.1 It is stated that the Inquiry Committee was unduly influenced by the fact
that I had chosen to remain silent and not appeared in person before the said
Committee. However, through my Learned Advocates, I rendered all sorts of
cooperation, which was also recorded by the Committee at the conclusion of
its report. The Committee ought not to have laboured on as to whether I should
have appeared in person or I should have opened my mouth so long as the
Committee was assisted by my Learned Counsel. In fact, in the letter dated
4 March, 2010 issued by the Presiding Officer of the Inquiry Committee, I was
requested to appear before the said Committee in person or by a Pleader duly
instructed and able to answer all material questions relating to the enquiry on
the date fixed for hearing. It does not appear from any portion of the said report
that the Advocates who were instructed by me to appear on my behalf had
failed to answer any material questions related to the inquiry. Even before
discussion of the facts on merits the Committee came to a conclusion that
the affidavit filed by my mother contained false representation to the effect that
monies received by way of sale proceeds of goods had been invested to earn
more interest in a company called Lynx India Ltd., which had gone into
liquidation in the year 1999-2000 and attributed this reason for loss of money.
It is not known on what basis this reasoning was proven in the present
proceedings to be untrue and false which ‘influenced’ the Division Bench of
the Calcutta High Court in its judgment dated 25 September, 2007 to expunge
the Single Judge’s remarks against me. The Committee perhaps lost sight of
the Learned Single Judge’s order which itself recorded that monies were
deposited in Lynx India and that fact could not be said to be false which could
have otherwise influenced the judgment of the Calcutta High Court.
6.2 The Inquiry Committee harboured under the wrong impression that I ought
to have appeared before it for being examined. I had no documents to prove. I
had not relied on any documents. All documents were produced by the Bank
and the Official Liquidator and the High Court and therefore, the onus of proving
the same fully lay on them. Even otherwise the Committee despite being
empowered under Section 5 under the Judge’s (Inquiry) Act, 1968 did not
choose to issue any summons to me to be examined. When I was represented
by competent Advocates who had answered all relevant queries of the
Committee, it is unlikely that my presence in the proceedings could have
changed the decision of the Committee.
6.3 Rule 11 of the Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969 clearly stipulates that every
Judge whose removal motion has been admitted shall have the right to represent
and be defended by a legal person of his choice.
6.4 It seems that failure of the Committee to break my silence (though I was
all along represented by my Lawyers) had clouded the judgment of the Committee
which materially affected its findings and the conclusion of the Committee that
my right of silence was “untenable” and “fallacious” is not warranted under
Law, especially when under the Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969 I had a right to be
defended by a Lawyer of my choice and moreover despite having power to
summon me under Section 5 of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, the Committee
did not choose to do so. It does not behove the Committee that my silence
ought to have been adversely commented upon by the Committee or give rise
to the presumption against me. It has been alleged that my Learned Advocates
had failed to answer the questions of the Committee. The findings of the
Committee with regard to the said monies and the banking transactions referred
to in the report clearly suggest total non-application of mind on the part of the
Committee. Times without number the Committee in its report has adverted to
the fact that I had not chosen to personally attend any part of the proceedings
of the Inquiry Committee which suggests that the single minded focus of the
Committee was directed to ensure my personal presence only and in this
process to attempt to humiliate me and cause further loss of my reputation and
push my family to the brink of ruination.
6.5 The Committee has in its finding held “Neither in law nor in the facts and
circumstances of this case does Justice Sen had the right to remain silent, as
was claimed on his behalf. And the irresistible inference in the want of any
explanation whatsoever about the whereabouts of the sum of Rs. 33,22,800/-
(or any part thereof) is that Justice Soumitra Sen had no convenient explanation
to give.”
6.6 The aforesaid opinion is not warranted in view of the provisions of Section
3 of the Act and Rule 11 of the Rules and further the Committee has perhaps
overlooked the elaborate explanation given by me in the written arguments
and subsequently .written submission submitted by my Counsel and merely
because I did not personally choose to appear the same “ought not to have
been the anvil” on which any “test” with regard to my explanation should
have been considered. The factual discrepancies and errors of the Inquiry
Committee in this aspect has been explained by me in the preceding
paragraphs which for the sake of brevity are not repeated here but are treated
to be incorporated herein.
6.7 As stated hereinabove, the Committee had sought to investigate into my

conduct as Receiver as also my alleged conduct after I was appointed as a
Judge, namely, giving a false explanation to cover up my unauthorized
withdrawals from the Receiver’s two accounts, swearing an affidavit through
my mother as constituted attorney as both of which I knew to be false and
which I never believed to be true are matters which bring dishonour and
disrepute to higher judiciary. It observed that “they are such issues to shake
the faith and confidence which public repose in the higher judiciary”.
6.8 I once again reiterate and emphasise that the Committee acted beyond
its jurisdiction since any investigation into the my conduct prior to my elevation
was beyond the ambit of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 and in absence of
any inquiry being statutorily permitted in so far as my acts prior to my elevation
as Judge are concerned, the question of testing the falsity or otherwise of any
statement made in a Court of Law in absence of any such backdrop is equally
wholly in excess and/or without jurisdiction.
6.9 The entire contentions of the Committee as contained in Part II of its report
and the adverse comments made by it without any factual or legal basis clearly
drives home the point that the Committee was probably determined to hold me
‘somehow guilty’ of any acts of misconduct (even though in the facts of the
present case) the same was legally improbable if not impossible so as to present
this August House with an adverse finding containing totally a distorted version
of the entire facts and ignoring the law governing the field, especially when it
simply seeks to disregard the findings of the Division Bench of the Calcutta
High Court which too went into all these allegations and found me ‘not guilty’.
The question, therefore, which arises is whether the findings of the Division Bench
of the Calcutta High Court by reason of not being appealed against and having
reached finality was a sufficient testimony of my innocence or whether I would
once again have to prove my innocence before the Committee which obviously
did not have the authority and/or jurisdiction to judge my aforesaid actions in
the teeth of the order of the Division Bench.
6.10 The fact remains that initially a draft charge was forwarded to me by letter
dated 5 February, 2010 and upon perusal of the such draft charge I had replied
to the Committee that an inquiry or investigation could be made only in the
event of framing of definite charges. Subsequently, it appears that without any
further investigation on the basis of the draft charges the same was ‘converted’
into a ‘definite’ charge to launch the present investigation. The question,
therefore, remains to be answered as to why in first place a draft charge was
forwarded and the same without any further finding and/or investigation was
translated into a ‘definite charge’. It is inconceivable that such a Judicial
Committee comprising of legal luminaries would from the very inception of the
proceedings conduct itself in such a lackadaisical manner so as to raise serious
questions as regards its ‘impartiality and ‘motives’.
6.11 As stated hereinabove, the Committee in Part IV of its report had bifurcated
my ‘conduct’ into two separate periods, one before elevation as a Judge upto
December, 2003 and the other after my elevation on and from 3rd December,
2003. Such investigation into the conduct of a Receiver prior to my elevation is
not warranted under the provisions of Article 124(4) of the Constitution of India
or under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. In causing such bifurcation the
Committee practically for all purposes admitted and acknowledged that in order
to “prove to the hilt” my alleged acts of misconduct, the same was not possible
until my .actions as Receiver could at first be investigated into, but the same in
the teeth of the Division Bench’s order dated 25 September, 2008 was
impermissible since no statutory body could supercede and/or question any
judicial order passed by a competent High Court, and not even the Parliament
in the absence of any legislation could obliterate the effect of the Division Bench’s
order. The scope of the purported investigation by the Committee was the same
as was embarked by the Learned Single Judge and therefore operated on the
same field. The findings and observations of the Learned Single Judge having
been quashed by the Division Bench against which no appeal was preferred
therefore, could not be the subject matter of any further inquiry either by the In-
House Committee appointed by the then Chief Justice of India or by the present
Judges (Inquiry) Committee constituted under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.
6.12 The Inquiry Committee at para I of part IV at Page 17 of its report has
observed, inter alia, “It was further specifically ordered that the Receiver should
file and submit for passing his half yearly accounts to the Registrar of the High
Court. Such accounts to be made out at the end of months of June and
December every year and filed for the months of January to June and July to
December respectively and that the same when filed be passed before the one
of the Judges before the High Court...............”
6.13 Such a finding is again not borne out by the evidence on record. In the
course of hearing it was stated that only the signed copy of the order was
supplied to me where no such direction was made and the copy of the minutes
of the order and the signed copy of the minutes are totally different. This
contradiction, however, despite being pointed out by the Learned Counsel
appearing on my behalf was not taken into consideration by the Committee.
6.14 In so far as subparagraphs (g) to (q) of Para 1 of Part IV of the report is

concerned, it is stated that the allegations that there was abundant evidence
brought on records which established assertions in the written statement of
defence that the entire sale consideration was invested in a fixed deposit with
Lynx India is not true is a finding which is ‘wholly perverse’ as would be
evident from the statements made hereinbefore.
6.15 The finding that there was clear diversion of funds from the accounts of
the Grindlay’s Bank is equally perverse and exposes clear non-application of
mind on the part of the Inquiry Committee. It is once again reiterated that no
Receiver’s account which was opened by me in so far as the Suit No. 8 of 1983
is concerned.
6.16 The Committee has laid emphasis on an handwritten letter dated

22 May, 1997 signed by me and addressed to the Manager, ANZ Grindlays Bank
with a request to encash approximately Rs. 22,00,000/- and deposit the same
in my other account as I needed this money urgently as lot of payments would
be disbursed very soon. The Committee failed to appreciate that these payments
as would be evident from the records were made, in respect of another matter
(Calcutta Fan) in which directions were given to me by the Division Bench to
pay off the workers dues.
6.17 It matters little that the order was passed in a different proceeding since
in that proceeding being C.A. No. 226/1886 (Calcutta Fan Workers’ Employees
Union & Ors.-vs.-Official Liquidator & Ors.) I was directed to deposit a sum of
Rs.70,00,000/- for the purpose of disbursing the same to the workers and till
date there is no complain from any worker. The workers were identified by
the. Secretary of the Union.
6.18 It is hard to digest the fact that the Inquiry Committee has thought it fit
to record that no list of workers was produced by me to whom the cheques
had been issued. Frankly speaking it is not known as to whether such an inquiry
could be contemplated by the Inquiry Committed since it pertains to an entirely
different judicial proceeding. The Committee could not have expected me to

produce the workers’ list before it since such records were very old and not
preserved by me. However, there was no allegation by the worker’s union in
the said proceedings about any non-payment of their dues by me even till date.
This was not even argued by the Learned Lawyer of the prosecution/
Committee.
6.19 At page 26 at paragraph 2 of its Report the Inquiry Committee has

observed, inter alia, “All that is stated above took place during the period when
Soumitra Sen, Receiver was an Advocate.” The assessment of the Inquiry
Committee is that as Advocate — and as officer of the High Court of
Calcutta — Soumitra Sen’s conduct, his various acts and omission prior to 3
December, 2003 was wrongful and not expected as an Advocate; an officer of
the High Court.
6.20 This investigation into my alleged conduct as ‘Receiver’ is wholly

unauthorized and also encroaches upon the jurisdiction of the High Court since
the Division Bench of High Court has not found any misconduct on my part
and, therefore, this observation amounts to ‘contempt on the face’ of the order
of the Division Bench dated 25 September, 2007. To put it mildly the Committee
was acting as an Appellate Court over the Division Bench’s order which clearly
is unfathomable and if such finding is to be encouraged, it will be an ‘unholy
precedent’ by which judicial orders of the High Courts or even the Supreme
Court can be made ‘impotent’ at the whims and caprices of any administrative
or statutory or any quasi judicial body with impunity. Clearly the Inquiry
Committee had no business to go into my action, which had been given clean
slate by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court.
6.21 In the same paragraph the Inquiry Committee further proceeds to hold
as under :–
“But his conduct—in relation to matters concerning

monies received during his Receivership,—after he was
appointed as a Judge was deplorable—in no way befitting a
High Court Judge. It was an attempt also to cover up not his
infractions of the orders of the Calcutta High Court, but also,
by making false statement, it revealed an attempt also to cover
up the large scale defalcations of funds”—details of which
have been set out in the said paragraph.
6.22 The aforesaid comments further brutally exposes the fact that the
Committee over stepped its jurisdiction in making such unwarranted and
insinuating comments against me, especially when the motion which has been
admitted in the Hon’ble Rajya Sabha pertains only to my alleged acts of
‘misappropriation’ as ‘Receiver’ and not as a Judge of the Calcutta High
Court. There is no authenticity in the allegation of my making any false
statement to cover up such alleged defalcation. Defalcation implies a
fraudulent conduct, which can be associated with dishonest intention. The
Inquiry Committee whilst using such forensic expressions, however, has
failed to arrive at any conclusion that there was any element of fraud involved
or any dishonest intention, which is the essence of proving a charge of
misappropriation/ defalcation. In absence of any such finding of fraudulent
conduct the user of the word ‘Defalcation’ clearly suggests that the Committee
was conducting the proceedings in a preconceived manner only for the
purpose of making an adverse finding against me without any sustainable legal
basis. More so, in view of the fact that it had no authority and/or jurisdiction to
inquire into my alleged conduct or misconduct during my days as Receiver of
the Calcutta High Court. The Committee as it appears, unilaterally took up the
mantel of championing its fight against perceived misconducts and left no
stone unturned to make an adverse finding against me even at the cost of
overstepping its jurisdiction, distorting facts and/or disregarding vital evidence
in my favour and in particular the Division Bench’s order of the Calcutta High
Court.
6.23 At subparagraph (a) at Page 27 of the report, the Committee has observed
that I had not at any time been discharged of my duties as Receiver. This is
wholly incorrect.
6.24 In the order dated 3 August, 2004 the Learned Single Judge of the Calcutta
High Court had appointed another Receiver Mr. Soumen Bose instead and in
place of me to sell 4311 M.T. of Periclass Spinnel Bricks. The subsequent order
also dated 15 February, 2005 records that “The present Receiver shall complete
the sale so far as the left out materials are concerned.” Therefore, to observe
that I was not discharged as Receiver at any point of time clearly shows the
lack of application of mind of the Committee to the facts of the case Such factual
discrepancies gives rise to a genuine apprehension that the Committee was
deliberately distorting facts or ignoring the same with a perverted mindset
and present a wholly distorted version to the ultimate seat of power that is the
Parliament of this Country.
6.25 At subparagraph (b) at Page 27 of the report, the Committee has observed
that after I had been elevated I did not seek any permission from the Court which
appointed me as Receiver even ex-post or ratify or approve my dealings with
the sale proceeds under my Receivership nor did I file any application informing
the Court as to what had happened with those funds. Clearly the Committee
appears to have forgotten the relevant laws governing the field.
6.26 There is no requirement in law for a Receiver to seek discharge or for

return of amounts. In the instant case, the facts are rather peculiar. The plaintiff
filed the application for return of money sometime in the month of March, 2003,
9 months before my elevation which fact as I have already stated, was
disclosed only in the month of November, 2003 when I inquired and requested
the plaintiffs advocate for taking necessary steps for my discharge and for
obtaining direction from the court to enable me to pay the amount. Copy of
the application was however served only in May, 2005 after my elevation
pursuant to directions of the Learned Single Judge.
6.27 It will appear from the reliefs prayed for in the application filed by the plaintiff
that they had specifically sought for return of the amount held by me towards
purchase consideration which is the principal sum and not with any interest
accrued thereon, the prayers are set out as under:
(a) Leave be given to serve a copy of this application upon SBD Industries
Supplier.
(b) SBD Industrial Supplier be directed to lift the balance quantity of 4.311
M.T. of Periclase Spinnel Bricks upon payment of the price within a
fortnight from the date of the Order be made herein.
(c) Alternatively the Receiver be directed to sell the balance quantity

4.311 M.T. of Periclase Spinnel Bricks lying in the stores of the
Bokaro Steel Plant of the petitioner by public auction or private treaty
and to make over the net sale proceed to the petitioner towards
protanto satisfaction of its dues against the defendants.
(d) The Receiver be directed to hand over all the sale proceeds so far
received from the sale of the Periclase Spinnel Bricks to the
petitioner towards and in protanto satisfaction of the petitioner’s
claim in the suit and be further directed to pay entire sale proceeds
after disposal of the entire lot.
(e) The Receiver be directed to render true and faithful accounts of all
moneys presently being held by him in terms of the order dated.
(f) Such further or other order or orders be passed and/or direction or

directions be given as to this Hon’ble Court may seem fit and
proper”.
6.28 Because of delay in the judicial process, the relevant order was passed
for the first time on 3 August, 2004 after some months of my elevation and at
the first instance the court discharged me, but unfortunately no direction was
given to return the money held by me towards purchase consideration. The
said order was not served upon me at any point of time and I was able to
obtain the same only when certified copies of all orders were subsequently
obtained by me.
6.29 A Receiver cannot return money unless there is a specific direction to

that effect. Furthermore, the order dated 20 January, 1993 clearly directs me to
hold the same until further order from the court. Since the application filed by
the plaintiff was pending in court with a specific prayer asking for return of money,
there was no occasion for me to personally go to court and seek similar order.
I reasonably expected that the court would pass order on the application
of the plaintiff and I would comply with the same.
6.30 At subparagraph (c) at Page 27 of the report, it has been recorded by

the Committee “it is the admitted position on record that no accounts whatsoever
have been filed in the Calcutta High Court as directed by the order dated 30
April, 1984.
6.31 Prior to 10 April, 2006 in spite of several orders being passed by the court,
no direction whatsoever was given to me to return any amount. As soon as a
specific direction was given after adjudicating the interest that I was liable to
pay, I paid the same within the time allowed by the court. The Single Judge did
not raise any issue with regard to my personally not taking discharge.
Accordingly this issue was never raised, argued or explained on my behalf
either before the Single Judge or before the Division Bench.
6.32 As far as furnishing of accounts is concerned, when the court discharged

me on 3 August, 2004 from further acting as a Receiver by appointing another
person in my place and stead without giving any direction for filing of accounts,
the court dispensed me from the requirement of filing of accounts. Moreover
as a usual practice accounts are normally filed by Receiver where there are
cases of management and administration of amounts held by Receiver
meaning thereby that there are series of disbursement or series of deposits
of unquantified amounts.
6.33 In this case total amount received by me is not in dispute and the amount,
directed to be paid by the court was also not disputed by any of the parties to
the proceeding. Therefore, furnishing of accounts was a mere formality, which
was dispensed with by the court. The accounts are required to be filed by the
Receiver during his tenure as a Receiver but not after his discharge and when
he is no longer acting as a Receiver.
6.34 Order 40, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down the following
duties of the Receiver:
(a) To furnish such security as the Court thinks fit.
(b) To submit accounts of such periods and in such forms as the court
directs.
(c) Pay the amount due from him as the court directs.
(d) He is responsible for any loss occasioned by willful default or gross

negligence.
6.35 Order 40, Rule 4 lays down that where a Receiver fails to submit accounts
of such period and in such form as directed by the court or to pay the amount
due from him as the court directs, or causes loss for his willful default or gross
negligence, the court can direct attachment of his property and sell the same
and apply the proceeds to make good any amount found to be due from him or
any loss occasioned by him.
6.36 Whenever the Receiver is guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance, it is the

duty of the court to call him to account and in a proper case it has the undoubted
right to order the summary removal. [Woodroffe on Receiver, Chapter VI, page
261].
6.37 Chapter 21 of the Calcutta High Court (O.S) Rules supplement the
provisions of Code of Civil Procedure regarding the Receiver. In the present case
what was served on me is a signed copy dated 20 January, 1993, which did
not contain any direction regarding furnishing security and periodical filing
accounts. The certified copy, which is now on record refers to furnishing the
security and filing the six-monthly accounts. There is no evidence to show that
certified copy of the order dated 25 September, 2007 was ever served on me.
Without prejudice to the above contention and in the alternative it is further
submitted as follows.
6.38 Rule 4 of Chapter 21 of the Calcutta High Court (O.S) Rules requires a
Receiver to furnish a security bond. I was appointed as Receiver by order dated
30 April, 1984 and I was never asked to furnish any security bond or security
in any other form. If the court had thought that the action of the Receiver of
not furnishing such security constitutes a default or misconduct, the court would
have taken appropriate proceedings within the reasonable time of appointment.

This only means that there was no grievance or complaint as regards me not
furnishing the security bond.
6.39 Rule 15 of the Calcutta High Court (O.S) Rules lays down that unless
ordered otherwise, the order appointing a Receiver shall contain a direction that
the Receiver shall file and submit for passing half-yearly accounts in the office
of the Registrar and that such accounts are to be made at the end of months
of June and December every year and are required to be filed in the months of
July and January respectively. The Rule also further lays down that the Judge
may direct the Receiver to file annual accounts which have then been made up
to 31 December every year and be filed in the succeeding month of January.
6.40 Rule 24 of the Calcutta High Court (O.S) Rules lays down that if a
Receiver neglects to file his accounts or to pass the same or to pay the balance
or any part thereof as ordered, the matter shall be reported by the officer and
the Registrar on the application of any of the parties interested, intimate to
the Judge such neglect and the Judge may from time to time when the
accounts of such Receiver are produced to be examined and passed, not only
disallow the Receiver’s remuneration but also charge with interest @ 6% per
annum on the balance, if any, so neglected to be paid by him during the time
the same shall appear to have remained in the hands of such Receiver.
6.41 Rule 25 lays down that where any Receiver fails to file any accounts or
to pass such accounts or to make any payment or commits a default otherwise,
the Receiver can be discharged by the court.
6.42 I was appointed as a Receiver in the year 1984 i.e. by order dated
30 April, 1984. Till 2003, neither the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court nor any of the
parties required me to render any accounts. For the first time, on
27 February, 2003 an application was made by the plaintiff seeking directions
for accounts and sale of the remaining goods and handing over sale proceeds.
Despite the aforesaid statutory matrix, for about 19 years nobody sought
accounts which is a clear indication that in Calcutta High Court a practice had
developed of not giving periodical accounts to the Court. Had there been no
such practice, the Court would have called upon me to render accounts much
earlier and would have taken action against me of terminating my receivership
or any other suitable action that the Court would have considered necessary
in the facts of the case.
6.43 The witness Mr. Tapas Kumar Malik, Assistant Registrar of Calcutta High
Court (Original Side) who was examined on behalf of the Committee, admitted
that he has not worked in the Accounts Department and that Accounts
Department takes care of Receiver’s accounts. There is no material on record

to show that any notice was issued to me as a Receiver on account of alleged
default of not filing six-monthly account for passing it. The Accounts Department
has not produced any of its records showing that any notice was issued to
me for not filing and passing six-monthly accounts. This again shows that
nobody had any grievance or complaint about non-filing of accounts periodically.
6.44 It is also to be noted that no party to the proceedings has alleged that I
as the Receiver had misappropriated any amount received by me in my capacity
as a Receiver. It is also not in dispute that I had invested the money in Lynx
India Limited, which went into liquidation. Nobody had objected to my handling
the funds received by me as a Receiver.
6.45 The overall picture that emerges is this that the office of the Registrar of
the Calcutta High Court (Original Side) or the Accounts Department or the parties
concerned never asked for six-monthly accounts and never made any inquiries
at the relevant time about the handling of funds by me. This means that the
Calcutta High Court had accepted that I had not committed any default on
account of my alleged failure to submit six-monthly accounts.
6.46 In subparagraph (d) at page 28 of the report, the Committee has come
to a conclusion that I had avoided and evaded all attempts to obtain information
from me and then when that was no longer possible, to make a positive
misstatement to the Court and that too on swearing affidavit by my mother
(since deceased) on my behalf as constituted attorney on the basis of which
treating it as true a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court passed the
judgement dated 25 September, 2007 my in favour. All these sordid events
were brought on record of the present proceedings, which have been set out
in the subsequent paragraphs of the Report.
6.47 The Committee despite possessing the records of all orders passed by
the Learned Single Judge prior to 10 April, 2006 only adverted to the said order
dated 10 April, 2006 without considering the fact that as it would evident from
the preceding paragraphs none of the earlier orders were caused to be served
on me excepting the order dated 7 May, 2005 which shows that I had no
occasion to know that the Learned Single Judge suo moto and unilaterally on
his own embarked into a personal probe of my accounts which was not
permitted and the same was without jurisdiction.
6.48 The observations of the Committee in subparagraph (d) (ii) of the report,
that despite the order dated 7 March, 2005 and 3 May, 2005 passed by the
Learned Single Judge I did not file any affidavit and I simply ignored it is equally
erroneous and factually incorrect. The said two orders were for the first time
served upon me after 3 May, 2005 and which fact was recorded in the
subsequent order dated 17 May, 2005 passed by the Learned Single Judge.
Therefore, it is yet another instance of total lack of appreciation of factual matrix
of the entire case by the said Committee. The Committee has also lost sight
of the fact that the subsequent orders were specifically directed not to be served
on me and therefore, I had no occasion to know about the course of such
proceedings.
6.49 As stated earlier in this reply, the direction of the Learned Single Judge
as contained in the order dated 30 June, 2005 to the effect that in view of my
non-appearance and non-supply of information the Court had no option but to
make an inquiry into what happened to the payments said to have been
received by me on several dates in the shape of demand drafts is uncalled
for inasmuch as the Learned Single Judge save to the extent of making a
solitary direction for filing affidavits had never called upon me to deposit the
sums which had been received by me. It is strange that without any such
directions for repayment of sums being passed how such adverse inference
could be deduced by the Learned Single Judge unless those were
actuated by other reasons.
6.50 It is also strange that when an inquiry was sought to be made, the Learned
Judge sought to keep me in the dark by directing the Registrar (Vigilance),
Calcutta High Court to ensure that the copy of the said order dated 30 June,
2005 be not served on me. This fact has been duly ignored by the Committee
in its report.
6.51 If one looks into the order dated 10 April, 2006 of the Single Judge, one
will find that, the Single Judge has justified the ‘enquiry’ made against me by
holding that I did not come forward to give any explanation in spite of repeated
opportunity. The expression repeated opportunity has a different connotation in
the eye of law and even in common parlance it means more than once.
6.52 Moreover, when a court does not wish to grant any further time to a party
to the proceeding, it should be clearly stated that time fixed was peremptory or
that a last chance was being afforded.
6.53 I, accordingly, moved a recalling application giving my explanation after

going through various documents called for by the Single Judge. He “neither
believed me nor disbelieved me” and disposed of the application by
giving opportunity to file a fresh petition with proper materials.
6.54 It is, therefore, obvious that the Learned Single Judge when faced with
the materials on record could not come to a positive finding of guilt on my part
or otherwise ray recalling application should have been rejected and dismissed
and not disposed of with an opportunity to file a fresh petition with further
materials. It is needless to mention here that the Division Bench after going
through the same materials on record has accepted my explanation and the
interpretation of the materials on record made by my Counsel.
6.55 The Single Judge gave direction to serve copies of petition and orders to
the Department which were not necessary at all, knowing fully well that at the
material point of time as a Judge, I was regularly attending court and was
discharging my judicial function.
6.56 My Chamber in the High Court premises and my residential address is

known to all. Even a common litigant, gets a better opportunity of presenting
his case before a court of law than what was afforded to me before passing
the judgment dated 10 April, 2006.
6.57 The concerned Single Judge heard the matter for the first time on
15 February, 2005 when it was treated as ‘part heard’ without any prayer
being made by any of the parties to the said proceeding and directed
the entire matter to be kept in a sealed cover and no direction to serve
a copy of the application was passed. Why this sudden interest in the
matter so far as to make it ‘part heard’ on the very first day itself?
6.58 On 7 March, 2005 the Single Judge for the first time gave a direction to
serve a copy of the application along with notice of motion to me as the copy
of the application was not served upon me earlier. It is obvious that at
that juncture I was not even asked to appear before the court but the Single
Judge in his order dated 7 March, 2005 directed that the copy of the application
be served upon the purchaser who had purchased the materials almost over
a decade ago.
6.59 If I may say so with utmost respect and humility the Single Judge had
by that time already made up his mind as to what orders he will pass
and all that was done in court like serving of copies of order, carrying
out investigation etc. were all a means for the end.
6.60 The order dated 7 March, 2005 contained direction upon me to file affidavit
giving details of purchase consideration. The said order also was not served
upon me. This will be apparent from the fact that by another order dated 3
May, 2005 Single Judge gave further direction for service to be made through
the advocate on record of the plaintiff as the earlier order dated

7 March, 2005 was not served upon me.
6.61 On 17 May, 2005, the Single Judge passed another order wherein direction
was given to serve copy of the affidavit filed by the purchaser upon me and if
so advised deal with the averments contained in the petition filed by the plaintiff
and the affidavit filed by the purchaser. As there was no allegation by the plaintiff
and I was not disputing the fact that I received money as stated by the purchaser
as a Receiver towards sale consideration, I was advised not to file any
affidavit as nothing was required to be controverted.
6.62 By an order dated 30 June, 2005, the Learned Single Judge gave detailed
direction for conducting an investigation on the incorrect basis that in spite of
‘repeated opportunity’, I have not come forward to give any explanation before
the court.
6.63 It is significant to point out here that at that stage I did not even appoint
an advocate to appear on my behalf because I did not even know as to what
were the directions which had been passed by the Court from time to time.
6.64 Subsequent thereto various orders were passed which are dated 21 July,
2005, 26 July, 2005, 7 September, 2005, 7 October, 2005, 21 November, 2005
and 1 October, 2006. None of these orders were served upon me.
Witnesses were brought under subpoena and questions were put by the
learned Single Judge himself, as if it was a trial of a suit or trial on evidence
being conducted by the Single Judge but unfortunately I was not even informed
about the same nor any opportunity given to me to cross examine such
witnesses.
6.65 I, therefore, wish to conclude this issue by saying that the finding against
me by the Single Judge that in spite of repeated opportunity I did not come
forward to give an explanation and therefore he had no other option but to
conduct self-investigation in court is clearly perverse and contrary to the
records. Sadly enough, the Inquiry Committee also fell in the same error.
6.66 In subparagraphs (d)(v) of the report, the Committee has also ‘frowned’
upon the fact that I had made no grievance about the adverse comments made
by the Learned Single Judge in the order dated 10th April, 2006 before making
the entire payments again ‘without protest’ and not even ‘without prejudice’
and further without offering any explanation to show as to from what ‘source
of funds’ those large sums were paid and thus the order dated 10 April, 2006,
was ‘acted upon’.
6.67 The finding of the Committee, as above, is rather strange. At no point of

time I had disputed the quantum of the purchase consideration since the money
was lying with me as a Receiver. It is not only my moral obligation as also my
legal duty to return the same as per direction of the Court. My grievance was
only with regard to the fact that the Learned Single Judge while directing return
of the money also made adverse observations against me. Therefore, the
question of payment money under protest cannot and does not arise.
6.68 The observation of the Committee that I should have paid the amount
“without protest” or “without prejudice” gives rise to a corollary that the
Committee is suggesting that I should not pay. Kindly appreciate my
predicament. I am being held guilty for not paying even without any direction
of Court and also been held guilty for paying back the money in terms of the
directions of the Court. If this is not gross injustice and abuse of process of
law, I do not know that could constitute miscarriage of justice. With utmost
respect and humility I am constrained to say that the Hon’ble Members of the
Committee are raising such issues in desperation only to cause as much
prejudice as possible against me in the eye of public so that their decision to
impeach me becomes successful, which process was set in motion by a person
no less than the former Chief Justice of India for reasons best known to him.
6.69 It is submitted with humility that this observation of the Committee is also
unwarranted and uncalled for and seeks to ‘overreach’ the order of the Division
of the Calcutta High Court dated 25 September, 2007 since the Division Bench
had not only ‘entertained’ the appeal but had also ‘quashed’ and ‘expunged’
such adverse remarks made against me. The observation of the Committee
clearly suggests that the order of the Division Bench has been treated with
utmost disdain and the Committee has acted extra judicially in this matter
which is clearly beyond the scope of its power and authority. I had made the
payments only after the same were quantified and in order to show my bona
fide I had earlier paid Rs. 5 lacs. Yes, I could have paid the moneys under
“protest” and/or “without prejudice”. I did not do so only to maintain the
highest judicial decorum and dignity. It would not behove me as a Sitting
Judge of the Calcutta High Court to question the quantum of such amounts
directed to be paid for the first time. I had no intention of challenging the
quantum of such sums.
6.70 But to suggest that I by paying off the said sum had ‘acted upon’ such
order is to say the least ‘preposterous’ and indicative of extreme bias against
me. I by merely paying the said amount had certainly not accepted the adverse
findings against me - as any righteous person would not have. My desire was
that I should come to Court only after complying with the direction for making
payments so as to prove my bona fides. If such a direction had been passed

earlier in the year 2005 itself, I would have immediately complied with the same.
How could the Learned Single Judge contemplate the since I had not filed
my affidavit, as such I was shy of disclosing facts or even making payments
especially since in the first place there was no direction for making payments
of the said sums.
6.71 In fact in such cases, usually directions are passed at the first instance
on the Receivers to pay all sums, which are lying in his hand to the concerned
party. Why was such a direction not made in my case in the first place?
What was so special in my case that an ‘inquiry’ had to be ordered behind
my back even without a direction for making payments.
6.72 The Committee has harped on Ground No. XIII of memorandum of Appeal
in A.P.O.T. No. 432 of 2007, which is under:
“XIII. FOR THAT the Learned Judge failed to appreciate

that all the investments made by the erstwhile Receiver in the
company were by way of cheques drawn on ANZ Grindlays
Bank, Account No 01SLP0156800 maintained in the personal
name of the erstwhile Receiver. This would be borne out from
the documents disclosed, by the Official Liquidator as also from
the documents exhibited by the Standard Chartered Bank. This
has also been stated in the notes submitted on behalf of the
petitioner.”
6.73 In this context it is stated that the case of a misstatement being made
by me in my affidavits qua the said ground is totally erroneous and misplaced.
I had no records of the bank statements prior to 1996 as it was not possible
for me to retain the same for over 10-12 years. At the point of time when
I was supplied with the document bearing Serial No. 9 being letter written to
the Registrar, Vigilance-Protocol, High Court, Calcutta issued by the Manager
of the Standard Chartered Bank, Church Lane Branch, the bank account being
01SLP0156800 in the name of ‘Soumitra Sen’ was shown to have been closed
on 21 December, 1995. Another bank account being 01SLP0632800 also in
the name of ‘Soumitra Sen’ was shown to have been closed on 23 February,
2000.
6.74 In absence of any records it was not possible for me to exactly recall
which of the two accounts were actually in my name. Subsequently, it transpired
from the documents supplied by the Judges Inquiry Committee that the Account
No. 01SLP156800 was in the name of another Soumitra Sen who resided at
Ballygaunge Place having a profession of Sales Promotion. This bona fide

mistake on my part was quite natural in absence of records being retained by
me and it is to be borne in mind that the appeal was filed very hurriedly and
at that stage I had by reason of such adverse comments being made was in
a state of mental agony and trauma and consequently could not properly apply
my mind to the said appeal and had left it at discretion of my Counsel and
consequently, therefore, there was a bona fide mistake in not citing correct
account number. In fact the concerned Bank Manager had also apologized
for making such a mistake. In any event of the matter being a Judge of the
High Court I was quite conscious at least of the fact that even my constituted
attorney, my mother who was representing me should not make any incorrect
statement. The recording of the account number in Ground No. XIII is a
bonafide mistake both on the part of my lawyers who did not have the time to
cross check the same in absence of proper records and it is only after
I received the additional documents from the Judges Inquiry Committee that
this ‘mistake’ was actually revealed. Therefore, I had no opportunity or
occasion to rectify this error at an earlier stage.
6.75 It is preposterous to suggest or allege that such statement was false or

false to my knowledge and belief and deliberately made. What benefit would I
gain if I had deliberately made a false statement? The basis on which the
Committee has come to a conclusion that I had made a false statement
knowing fully well that the same was false was based on sheer surmises and
conjectures especially having regard to the fact that I was handicapped by lack
of relevant records and therefore, I could not recall the events which took place
over the last 10 years and as such I could not correctly recall the exact figures
and/or numbers of the bank account which I had operated over 10 years back.
6.76 In any event the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court was not
‘influence or induced’ by this ground alone in passing the judgment dated
25 September, 2007. The fact remains that the cheque was paid through
Account No. 01SLP632800. It hardly, therefore, makes any difference as to
whether the statements regarding the account was incorrect or not. The anxiety
of the Division Bench was to ascertain as to whether investments were made
by me or not. Before the Division Bench it is nobody’s case that no investments
were made by me.
6.77 Importantly the charge which has been levied against me as would appear
from paragraph 54(a) of the statements and grounds in support of the charges
states that “All investments made by you in Lynx India Ltd. were by cheques
drawn No. 01SLP0156800 maintained in your personal name with ANZ Grindlays
Bank.” As stated herein above the said Bank Account was not in my name but
in the name of another gentleman with the same name. As such on the basis
of the aforesaid charge no investigation could be made against me.
6.78 The contentions of paragraph V of the report of the Committee, is clearly

contumacious and insinuating which has lowered the dignity, majesty and
prestige of the Calcutta High Court and the same amounts to wrongful and
unfair criticism of a judgment delivered by the Division Bench which has
attained finality. In the teeth of the Division Bench’s order it was not open to a
statutory committee to make such disparaging remarks about the Division
Bench’s findings in order to somehow prove that I was guilty of
misappropriation. Even in this paragraph the Committee has failed to come to
any finding that there was any dishonest intention or dishonest conversion of
the said funds by me.
6.79 With regard to the finding of the Committee as appearing in Para A of

Part VI of the report, the Committee has probably lost sight of the fact that
even the Parliament except by way of an appropriate legislation cannot
question the correctness or otherwise of a judicial order passed by the High
Court. If the contrary was to be true then even the orders of the Supreme Court
of India would not be immune from such attacks. It is not understood that under
the present Constitutional framework, the Committee could come to a finding
that the Members of the Rajya Sabha had the “overriding” and/or
“empowering authority” to move a resolution in respect of a subject matter
over which the Calcutta High Court had exonerated me. If this is the correct
view point then I am afraid that it will lead to a Constitutional anarchy and/
or crisis.
6.80 For example if charges of corruption are alleged against a Minister in office
and which charges are also being investigated by either a High Court or Supreme
Court, it is quite possible that the Minister may be forced to resign, due to
political pressure. However, if he is subsequently exonerated by the court and
cleared of all charges he may be once again appointed as such Minister. In
such a case his exoneration by a Court will more often then not be cited as the
ground for his reinstatement. Such examples are galore now a days. Therefore,
it is axiomatic that different standards apply with regard to treatment of judicial
orders in case of Politicians and that of Judges. This is sheer hypocrisy. Such
an opportunity is not, however, available for a Judge either of the High Court or
Supreme Court since once he is impeached, the chance of him being reinstated
in office may be extremely difficult since that in a sense would mean that
Supreme Court would have to exonerate him of the charges on which he has
been impeached thereby leading to a constitutional flash point between the
Judiciary and the Parliament. Therefore, to contend that the Committee had no
right to question the admission of motion by the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha
or the same was beyond the consideration of the Inquiry Committee tantamounts
to abdication of its functions and responsibilities since the Judges Inquiry
Committee is not powerless to comment upon the legality or otherwise of the
motions which have been admitted by the Rajya Sabha or the Lok Sabha, as
the case may be.
6.81 The Committee in its eagerness to appease the powers-that may be, has
held that the Parliament has “the exclusive right and privilege” through its
Presiding Officer with respect to misconduct alleged against a Judge in respect
of his duties as a Receiver or otherwise even when such alleged misconduct
pertains to a period long prior to the elevation of a Judge and despite the said
Judge being exonerated from charges of misappropriation or misconduct. This
observation might be music to the ears of the Members of the Legislators,
but the consequence of the same will have a catastrophic effect in the
relationship between the Judiciary and the Legislature.
6.82 It is to be borne in mind that my case is unique in the sense that unlike
in the case of Justice Ramaswamy which impeachment motion had being heard
by the Joint Houses of the Parliament, no order of any court of law, High Court
or Supreme Court, like the one passed by the Division Bench of the Calcutta
High Court on 25 September, 2007 in my favour, had been passed exonerating
him of the charges of financial irregularities which were alleged to have been
committed by Justice Ramaswamy. Therefore, the Parliament in such
proceedings had no occasion to go into the question whether any judicial order
passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court governing the same field being
the subject matter of any resolution by the Parliament could be ignored or nullified
without any appropriate legislation.
6.83 In this context, the Committee at subparagraph (iv) of Part A of Part VI of

the Report has held that investigation before the Inquiry Committee is not ‘into
the records’ of the High Court and that the judgment dated
25 September, 2007 is not a judgment in rem, but a judgment ‘inter-parties’
and that this finding is binding only on the parties in Suit No. 8 of 1983 but
‘no more’ and ‘certainly does not’ exonerate the Judge from being proceeded
with in Parliament under proviso (b) of Article 217(1) read with Article 124(4).
The finding is legally absurd for the reasons already stated above and thus
not repeated here. “The finding by the Division Bench in its Judgment dated
25 September, 2007 that Justice Sen was not guilty of any misappropriation
was made on a totally erroneous premise induced by false representation
made on behalf of Soumitra Sen”. Assuming though not admitting that such a
judgment was obtained by ‘inducement’ nevertheless it is not for the Judges
Inquiry Committee to comment on the same and hold that it was passed on
‘inducement’. Could any statutory body make such an inference? So long as
judgement is not reversed or set aside by a Supreme Court it had a binding
value. If judgments of the High Court are treated in such a manner by the
Committee then tomorrow every other statutory bodies, tribunals, commissions
or committees would be similarly emboldened to criticize and/or ignore a
Supreme Court or High Court judgement. The Committee, as it appears, was
motivated, actuated and instructed to pass an adverse finding whether such
adverse findings withstood the scrutiny of law or not.
6.84 In fact, several contentions raised by me and the submissions made by

my Learned Advocates have not been considered by the Committee. The
Committee has solely sought to focus on the issue of alleged misappropriation
overlooking the fact that it was totally impotent to investigate into such finding
leave alone pass any judgment or recommendation when the order of the
Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court was staring at its face. In fact, it
appears from the report of the Committee that it was an exact replica of the
Learned Single Judge’s orders. Times without number it has relied upon the
said Single Judge’s order. It was totally influenced and hypnotized by such
order even through the adverse comments and findings in such order was no
longer in existence by dint of the same being quashed.
6.85 Article 215 of the Constitution of India clearly lays down that the High
Court is a Court of Record. As a Court of Record, the High Court has some
regal and sovereign powers of the State. A Receiver appointed by the Calcutta
High Court is by a Court of Record. A Receiver appointed by the court is an
officer of the court and he is not an agent or trustee of a party on whose
instance his appointment has been made [Halsburys Laws of England, para
808, page 407].
6.86 On Law of Receivers Woodroffe at, Chapter V, page 240 states that a
Receiver is an officer of the court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court and the various
High Courts have clearly recognized that a Receiver is an officer of the court.
Any action against the Receiver, therefore, has an impact on the powers and
jurisdiction of the court, which appointed him. In case of any misconduct by
the Receiver appointed by the Calcutta High Court, it is only the Calcutta High
Court, which alone can deal with the Receiver. Any action either in civil court
or in criminal court or in any other Forum against the Receiver has a direct
impact and interference with the powers and jurisdiction of the Calcutta High
Court. It is the Calcutta High Court alone, which can decide what action should
be set in motion against him. This is a part of its powers and jurisdiction not
only as a court appointing him but also as a constitutional court being a court
of record. The Receiver’s actions and the orders of the court regarding the
Receiver constitute an integral part of the record of the High Court. It is the
exclusive prerogative of the Calcutta High Court to decide what action should
be taken against him. Any other authority however high it may be, cannot
interfere with the aforesaid prerogative of the Calcutta High Court.
6.87 It is not in dispute in the instant case that the Calcutta High Court has
not granted leave and/or has not recommended any action against the Receiver.
It is not in dispute that the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal
No. APOT No.462/2007 (APO No.415/2007) by judgement dated
25 September, 2007 has clearly held that I in my capacity as Receiver had
not committed any act of criminal breach of trust or any other offence or
misconduct. This judgement of the Division Bench of the High Court becomes
a part of the record of the High Court and any authority, save and except the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in exercise of its appellate powers, which tends to
interfere with such records by holding or by recording conclusions and findings
contrary to the findings of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, is
interfering not only with the administration of justice but is interfering with the
record of the Calcutta High Court. There is a clear constitutional bar for such
interference. It is not in dispute that the judgement of the Division Bench of
the Calcutta High Court has not been challenged in the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
6.88 It is further submitted that even Article 121 of the Constitution of India
limits the powers of the Parliament as regards the proceedings before the High
Court. Article 121 at the first blush does seem to suggest that the conduct of
a High Court Judge can be discussed in Parliament for the purpose of
presenting a motion to the President in respect of his impeachment and,
therefore, the present proceedings against me are not hit by Article 121 of the
Constitution of India but a deeper examination would indicate that what in
substance before the Committee, is the conduct of a Receiver and his conduct
has been a subject matter of the record of the court which includes
the judgement of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated
25 September, 2007.
6.89 It is further submitted that any inquiry into the conduct of a Receiver by
any authority other than the Calcutta High Court, which appointed him, is an
inquiry into the record of the High Court. The Calcutta High Court, subject to
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, is the sole and the exclusive
authority to prepare, maintain and preserve its records. The inquiry made by
the Calcutta High Court as regards the conduct of the Receiver has resulted
into Receiver being exonerated and any attempt by any other authority, save
and except the Supreme Court in its appellate jurisdiction, cannot interfere with
such record and establish that the High Court’s record on that score is not free
from blemish and/or that it is erroneous.
6.90 The Calcutta High Court is a Court of Record on account of provisions of

Article 215 of the Constitution of India. In the case of Supreme Court Bar
Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409, the Supreme Court has
dealt with the concept of Court of Record with reference to the provisions of
Article 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India. While dealing with the same,
the Apex Court has quoted with approval passages from different Law Lexicons
relating to a Court of Record. The relevant paragraphs are paragraphs 9 to
14 and the said paragraphs are as follows:
9. To appreciate the submissions raised at the Bar, let us first

notice Article 129 of the Constitution, it reads:
“129. The Supreme Court to be a court of record.-

The Supreme Court shall be a court of record and shall have
all the power of such a court including the power to punish for
contempt of itself.”
10. The article on its plain language vests this Court with all
the powers of a court of record including the power to punish
for contempt of itself.
11. The expression court of record has not been defined in

the Constitution of India. Article 129 however, declares the
Supreme Court to be a court of record, while Article 215
declares a High Court also to be a court of record.
12. A court of record is a court, the records of which are

admitted to be of evidentiary value and are not to be
questioned when produced before any court. The power that
courts of record enjoy to punish the contempt is a part of their
inherent jurisdiction and is essential to enable the courts to
administer justice according to law in a regular, orderly and
effective manner and to uphold the majesty of law and prevent
interference in the due administration of justice.
13. According to Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Laws First

Edn. (p. 526) a court of record has been defined as:
“A court whereof the acts and judicial proceedings are

enrolled for a perpetual memory and testimony, and which
has power to fine and imprison for contempt of its
authority.”
14. Wharton’s Law Lexicon explains a court of record as:
“Record, courts of, those judicial acts and proceedings are

enrolled on parchment, for a perpetual memorial and
testimony; which rolls are called the records of the court, and
are of such high and super eminent authority that their truth
is not to be called in question. Courts of record are of two
classes - superior and inferior. Superior courts of record
include the House of Lords, the Judicial Committee, the Court
of appeal, the High Court, and a few others. The Mayor’s Court
of London, the County Courts, Coroner’s Courts and others
are inferior courts of record, of which the Country Courts are
the most important. Every superior court of record has
authority to fine and imprison for contempt of its authority; an
inferior court of record can only commit for contempts
committed in open court, in facie curiae (emphasis provided).”
6.91 In the case of Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat

(1991) 4 SCC 406, the Apex Court again dealt with the concept of court of record.
In paragraph 19 on pages 437 to 438, the Apex Court has dealt with this concept
and has quoted with approval passages from various authorities. The said
paragraph clearly indicates that the record of the court of record is conclusive
evidence of that which is recorded therein. Part of the said paragraph reads as
follows:
“19. Article 129 provides that the Supreme Court shall be a court
of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including
the power to punish for contempt of itself. Article 215 contains
similar provision in respect of High Court. Both the Supreme
Court as well as High Courts are courts of record having powers
to punish for contempt including the power to punish for
contempt of itself. The Constitution does not define “Court of
Record”. The expression is well recognized in juridical world.
In Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, “Court of Record” is defined
as:

enrolled for a perpetual memorial testimony, and which has
power to fine and imprison for contempt of its authority.”
6.92 The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has in crystal clear terms
laid down that the allegation of misappropriation made against me is without
any substance. The record maintained by the High Court as regards my

Receivership has culminated in the aforesaid judgment and order of the
Division Bench. The said judgment is, therefore, conclusive evidence of what
is stated therein i.e. I am not guilty of the charge of misappropriation.
6.93 The contentions of the findings of the Committee in Part A of Part VI of

the report to the effect that my conduct amounting to alleged misbehaviour was
not the subject matter of consideration of the Division Bench of the High Court
of Calcutta is totally erroneous and contrary to the facts on record. The Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court at several pages as observed, inter alia, as
follows :
“The Learned Single Judge on his own passed various

orders from time to time in connection with the application filed
on behalf of the plaintiff and also in the application
subsequently filed on behalf of the erstwhile Receiver in order
to examine the conduct of the said Receiver even in absence
of any allegation by the parties herein.
The parties to the suit, namely, the respondent Nos.

1 and 2 herein never made any allegation regarding
misappropriation of amount retained by the erstwhile
Receiver.”
At another place the Division Bench proceeded to hold

as under:-
“Observation of the Learned Single Judge regarding

betrayal of the trust and confidence of this Court by the
erstwhile Receiver is not based on proper materials on record
since the said erstwhile Receiver in compliance with the
directions of this Court not only deposited the entire sale
proceeds retained by him pursuant to the earlier direction of
this Hon’ble Court but also paid a Substantial amount as
adjudged by the Learned Single Judge towards interest
although the plaintiff never claimed any interest from the
Receiver...............
We also did not find any materials wherefrom it may

be said that the erstwhile Receiver utilized any amount for
personal gain.
The Division Bench further held and observed as

follows:
“We do not approve the findings of the Learned Single

Judge regarding the conduct of the erstwhile Receiver
including the observations and/or remarks made against the
said erstwhile Receiver as recorded in the order dated
10 April, 2006. In our opinion the Learned Single Judge had
no scope and/or occasion to record the aforesaid unfortunate
remarks in respect of erstwhile Receiver in the order dated
10th April, 2006.
6.94 These findings of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court proves
beyond the shadow of any doubt that my conduct and my alleged act of
misappropriation were examined both by the Single Judge and the Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court and thus to contend that my conduct was
not the subject matter of consideration before the Division Bench of the
Calcutta High Court implies that the members of the Committee proceeded in
a preconceived and prejudged manner and came to such a perverse finding.
6.95 With regard to Part B of Part VI of the said report, it is stated that the
said Committee has clearly ignored the records of the case and erred in coming
to a conclusion that I had not invested any sums in Lynx India or that the same
is proven to be a false statement.
6.96 The Committee further had observed “That the Division Bench (on a
misrepresentation by Justice Sen—obviously not known at the time the Division
Bench to be a misrepresentation) concluded that there was in fact no
misappropriation of any Receiver’s fund by Soumitra Sen.”
6.97 The aforesaid finding of the Inquiry Committee is clearly contrary to the
finding of the Division Bench, which had not been persuaded by Ground No. XIII
to the Memorandum of Appeal alone as was relied upon by the Committee in
order to buttress its aforesaid incorrect finding. The Division Bench held “On
the contrary, the records showed, the money has been deposited with a finance
company by the erstwhile Receiver, but as the company was wound up the
money could not be recovered. Further from the records produced by the
Official Liquidator it has been established that the money was deposited by
the said erstwhile Receiver.
6.98 Even in the order of the Learned Judge dated 31 July, 2008, the Learned
Single Judge held “Now coming to the aspect of investment in Lynx, I find from
the document; annexed to the report of the Official Liquidator that on the following
dates amounts were invested by the erstwhile Receiver:–
FDR No. 23053 dated 22.06.1999 Rs. 5,98,000/-
FDR No. 11349 dated 07.03.1997 Rs. 5,00,000/-
(Cheque No. 624079)
FDR No. 17089 dated 27.02.1997 Rs. 5,00,000/-
FDR No. 11351 dated 27.02.1997 Rs. 5,00,000/-
(Premature receipt)
FDR No. 17088 dated 27.02.1997 Rs. 5,00,000/-
FDR No. 11353 dated 07.03.1997 Rs. 5,00,000/-
FDR No. 22653 dated 28.02.1999 Rs. 4,46,000/-
FDR No. 22652 dated 28.02.1999 Rs. 5,98,000/-
FDR No. 22554 dated 24.03.1999 Rs. 3,93,000/-
FDR No. 22651 dated 28.02.1999 Rs. 5,98,000/-
FDR No. 11350 dated 07.03.1997 Rs. 5,00,000/-
FDR No. 11352 dated 27.02.1997 Rs. 5,00,000/-
FDR No. 11353 dated 07.03.1997 Rs. 5,00,000/-
FDR No. 20883 dated 03.12.1998 Rs. 58,000/-
Showing receipt of payment of interest as against few of the fixed deposits by

the Receiver.
28.02.2000 22653 73,233.20
.28.02.2000 22652 98,191.60
28.02.2000 22654 64,530.60
28.02.2000 22651 98,191.60
3,34,147.00
6.99 Therefore, even when the Learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court
had himself recorded a finding that I had deposited sums on various dates in
Lynx India how could the Committee come to a conclusion that I had induced
the Division Bench or had made a misrepresentation before the Division Bench
with regard to the amount invested in Lynx India Ltd. The Committee
perhaps in its anxiety to prove me guilty had not even bothered to take these
aforesaid facts into consideration, which, therefore, demonstrates a closed mind
and bias on their part against me.
6.100 With regard to Part C of Part VI of the report, the aforesaid facts would
clearly demonstrates that since the very inception of launching of an inquiry
into my personal accounts as Receiver appointed by the Calcutta High Court
in the said suit, the various orders passed from time to time by the Learned
Single Judge, the illegal constitution of an In-House Committee by the then
Chief Justice of India, without any complaint being made against me, the biased
and distorted finding of the In-House Committee against me, the active role
of the then Chief Justice of India in forcing the Executive to commence
impeachment proceedings against me, the resolution adopted by the Upper
House which the Members of this August House, the formation of the Judges
(Inquiry) Committee consisting of a member who had prior to his such
appointment had expressed his views in media in favour of my impeachment
and despite the same being pointed out, being not removed from the
Committee and ultimately the report of the Committee dated 10 September,
2010 which is a product of a complete distortion of facts and shows lack of
rudimentary legal knowledge regarding the law governing the field clearly
suggests that these proceedings have been continued for the purpose of
securing my impeachment and thereby put a lid over the other more glaring
and important acts of judicial misdeamoners affecting public interest which have
surfaced for quite sometime in the past but for inexplicable reasons being
brushed under the carpet.
6.101 The Committee has very conveniently refrained from addressing the larger
issues raised by me through my Learned Counsel in course of the proceedings,
may be, perhaps they knew that they had no answers to such core issues raised
by me and therefore avoided a finding on the same and concentrating only on
the charges of my alleged misbehaviour and my allegedly making false
statements, both of which has not been proved even prima facie —leave alone
“to the hilt” and thereby the report of the Committee does not appear to be
worth the paper on which it was written on. The Committee has not made any
convincing observations as to whether or not the Parliament or itself could ignore
and nullify the order of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in such a
manner as it has so done or whether the role of the then Chief Justice of India
was befitting his high office. It has resorted to several instances of conjectures
and guess work and has discovered imaginary acts of misappropriation solely
because it was mandated to come to an adverse finding against me. Therefore,
to expect an unbiased, fair and correct report from this Committee is an utopia.
7.0 CONCLUSION
To conclude, I would humbly appeal to the Hon’ble Chairman of the Upper House
of India that a grave injustice has been caused to me and my family members
and I have been reduced to a social pariah for no conscious or unconscious
act of either misappropriation by me or committing any conscious or unconscious
act of making any false statement deliberately on oath.
Chronology of events as narrated by me hereinabove would prove beyond doubt

that the Learned Single Judge entered into a (mis) adventure on his own without
having any authority and/or jurisdiction to do so to inquire into my personal
accounts and making disparaging comments on my alleged misconduct even
without directing me to make payments of the money lying with me at any time
before the order dated 10 April 2006.
The order of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court which has been
severely maligned and criticized both the In-House Committee and by the
present Committee and disdainfully ignored by the then Chief Justice of India
as also the then Chief Justices of the Calcutta High Court can only lead to the
inevitable conclusion question that even judicial orders are not immune from
political, executive and legislative interference and can be rendered nugatory
by adverse media trial.
This trend if encouraged would rip apart the last Constitutional pillar of strength,
which the people of India are clinging on to as it is their only saviour against
the apathy and misdoings of the executives and administration. It will not only
compromise with independence of the judiciary which is an avowed basic
structure of our Constitution, but, will also shake the confidence of the Judges
to pass judgements which may not find favour with certain powerful sections of
administration and the executive for fear of reprisals. If a judgement of a Division
Bench of the High Court is sought to be made impotent in such an
unconstitutional manner for sake of political expediency the Indian Judiciary will
not be able to rear its head any longer if the impeachment motion is sought to
be laid before the Council of State or before the House of the People for
consideration and the same will inevitably signify that the judiciary despite of
its chest thumping would be ultimately subservient to the Legislature. Do the
people of India deserve that?
In the land of Dreyfus, the Rule of Law was honoured and the judgement of the
Court of Appeal exonerating Dreyfus was given the respect it deserved—namely
it led to the reinstatement of Dreyfus. Would it be too much to expect from our
Constitutional authorities and Hon’ble Members of both the Houses to uphold
the Rule of Law and respect the sanctity of the Division Bench’s order exonerating
me and thereby drop this impeachment proceedings.
I leave it to Your Excellency for the rest.
Sd/-
(Soumitra Sen)
CONFIDENTIAL
K.G. Balakrishnan 5, Krishna Menon Marg,

Chief Justice of India New Delhi-110011
September 10, 2007
Dear Justice Sen,
The Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court has apprised me, in detail,
about the developments which have taken place pursuant to the passing of
the judgments/orders dated 10th April, 2006 and 31st July, 2007 in C.S. No. 8
of 1983 wherein adverse observations have been made against you. A copy
each of the said two judgments/orders is enclosed for your ready reference.
Although your written response dated 23.11.2006 submitted to the then

Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court is already on record and subsequently,
on advice of your Chief Justice, you have orally explained your conduct when
you visited my residence on 12th July, 2007, in the light of the recent order
dated 31st July, 2007 you are requested to submit your fresh and final response
to the aforesaid adverse judicial observations leading to complaint/s making
allegations of judicial misconduct and impropriety.
In these circumstances, it is proposed to hold an enquiry - in terms of

the In-House Procedure adopted by all the High Courts including the Calcutta
High Court - into the allegations of misconduct and impropriety made against
you.
Please note that if your response does not reach me within 15 days of
the receipt of this letter, I shall have no hesitation to proceed ahead in the
matter, assuming that you have nothing more to add to what is already on
record.
Yours sincerely,
(K.G. Balakrishnan)
End: As above
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Soumitra Sen

Judge, Calcutta High Court
Kolkata -700 001
To
The Deputy Registrar (Administration)

Public Information Officer
Appellate Side
High Court
Calcutta
1. Name of the Applicants : Subhas Bhattacharyya, Advocate
2. Address : 7B, Kiran Sankar Roy Road,

Kolkata-700001
3. Particulars of Information :
Whether the resolution taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India dated
15 December, 1999, with regard to the formation of In-House Committee has
been adopted by the Hon’ble High Court, Calcutta.
4. Concerned Department: : Hon’ble High Court, Calcutta
i) Particulars of information required
Details of the information required
Whether the resolution taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India dated
15 December, 1999, with regard to the In-House Committee has been
adopted by the Hon’ble High Court, Calcutta. If yes, kindly furnish the
particulars of such resolution with date.
ii) Period of which information asked for : Since 1990
5. I the undersigned herein state that the information sought do not fall within
the restrictions contained in Section 6 of the Act and to the best of my
knowledge it pertains to your office.
6. A fee of Rs. 20/- has been deposited in the office of the Competent
Authority by submitting a Non Judicial stamp of Rs. 20/- dated 10 January,
2010.
(Subhas Bhattacharyya)
Applicant
Place : Calcutta
Date : 25.03.2010
From: Deputy Registrar (Administration) & Public Information

Officer High Court, Appellate Side, Calcutta
To,
Sri Subhas Bhattacharyya

Advocate
7B, Kiran Shankar Roy Road
Kolkata-700001
Kolkata, Dated the 26th April, 2010
Re: Your application dated 25.3.2010 under the Right to

Information Act, 2005
Sir
With reference to your application dated 25.3.2010 I am directed to inform

you that the matter of the resolution taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court dated
15.12.1999 with regard to the formation of “In-House Committee”, is still
pending before the Hon’ble Full Court for decision.
Yours faithfully,
Deputy-Registrar (Administration)
&
Public Information Officer
High Court, Appellate Side
Calcutta
I. THE RECEIVER IS ANSWERABLE TO THE COURT WHICH APPOINTS

HIM AND TO NO ONE ELSE AND THEREFORE THE HON’BLE
COMMITTEE CANNOT ENQUIRE INTO THE CONDUCT OF THE
RECEIVER
1. A receiver is answerable only to the Court which appoints him and to no

one else and, therefore, the Hon’ble Committee cannot enquire into the conduct
of the Respondent in his capacity as the Receiver. In case the Receiver violates
the directions of the Court and/or does not render accounts and/or otherwise
commits a misconduct while discharging his duties as a Receiver, the Court
appointing him can take any of the following actions:
i. terminate his Receivership;
ii. call upon him to render accounts;
iii. take action in contempt;
iv. sanction his prosecution in case he has committed any criminal

offence while discharging his duties.
What action should be taken against a Receiver in a given case is

a matter wholly and exclusively within the powers, authority and
jurisdiction of the court which appoints him. If any other authority
or court including a criminal court wants to proceed against a
Receiver for any of his acts of omission or commission in discharge
of his duties, must obtain the leave of the court which has appointed
him. The aforesaid proposition derives support from the following:
2. A Receiver is only amenable for his acts and accountable to the Court
which appoints him. His amenability to the court appointing him arises from
his being an officer of the court. Out of this rule that the Receiver is amenable
only to the court which appoints him, what emerges is that all persons desiring
to enforce any claim against the Receiver must first obtain the leave of the
court. A Receiver’s duty is to obey the order of the court appointing him. If he
does not he can be proceeded against in contempt proceedings. [See
Woodroffe on Receiver, Chapter V, page 240].
3. The power to terminate the authority of the Receiver flows naturally and as
a necessary consequence from the power to create and such power can be
exercised by the court at any stage of the litigation. This power to remove is a
necessary adjunct of the power of appointment and is to be exercised by the
court when the Receiver is guilty of an abuse of his authority or is guilty of
misconduct in discharge of his duties and functions. [See Woodroffe on

Receiver, Chapter VI, page 256].
4. The court’s power of removal of a Receiver may in a proper case direct his
removal and may enforce such conditions in connection therewith as the court
may deem just and proper. The court’s power is not limited in the matter of
time for removal of the Receiver, but may act there upon whenever it deems fit
and proper at any stage of litigation. [See Woodroffe on Receiver, Chapter VI,
page 257].
II. NO ACTION AGAINST A RECEIVER WITHOUT THE LEAVE OF THE

COURT
1. According to Halsbury Laws of England, paragraph 891, page 452, bringing

an action against the Receiver without the leave of the court that appointed
him, amounts to contempt of the court. In the present case admittedly no leave
of the Calcutta High Court is obtained for enquiring into the conduct of the
Respondent.
2. In the case of W.R. Pink v. Calcutta Municipal Corporation, 7 CWN 706,

the question arose whether a Receiver could be prosecuted for violation of
provisions of the Municipal Act. In that case the Receiver was appointed in
respect of certain property in Calcutta. The Municipal Magistrate imposed fine
on the Receiver on the ground that he failed to take steps to close certain
service areas and to make certain structural alterations in the premises in
respect of which he was appointed as the Receiver. The proceedings against
the Receiver were taken without the leave of the court. The order of the
Municipal Magistrate imposing fine on the Receiver was quashed by the
Calcutta High Court and the court, inter-alia, held that a Receiver cannot be
made a party to any suit or the proceedings without the leave of the court
appointing him. In coming to that conclusion, the Calcutta High Court relied
upon its own earlier judgment in the case of Dunne v. Kumar Chandra Kishore,
7 CWN 390.
3. A similar preposition has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Everest Coal Company (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors. (1978)
1 SCC 12. In paragraph 4 on page 14 and 15 of the judgement, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held as follows:
“Instead of leaving the matter ‘astrologically’ vague and

futuristically fluid, we shall state the legal position and settle
the proposition governing this and similar situations. When a
Court puts a receiver in possession of property, the property
comes under court custody, the receiver being merely an officer

or agent of the Court. Any obstruction or interference with the
court’s possession sounds in contempt of that court. Any legal
action in respect of that property is in a sense such an
interference and invites the contempt penalty of likely
invalidation of the suit or other proceedings. But, if either
before starting the action or during its continuance, the party
takes the leave of the court, the sin is absolved and the
proceeding may continue to a conclusion on the merits.”
4. In the case reported as Kanhaiyalal v. Dr. D.R. Banaji & Ors. (1958) SCR
page 333, a Receiver was appointed in respect of certain property. The property
in question was sold by Revenue officials on account of non-payment of the
land revenue. Before selling the property, no notice was given to the Receiver.
The leave of the court was also not taken prior to the sale. After the sale was
confirmed by the Revenue officials, the Receiver applied for a review of the
order to the concerned Revenue Officer who declined to set aside the same.
The Receiver, therefore, filed a suit and challenged the sale. The auction-
purchaser contended that the grounds for setting aside the same are specified
in Section 157 of the Land Revenue Code and these grounds are either
irregularity or mistake in publishing proclamation sale or conducting the sale,
and the suits based on other grounds are not within the prohibition. This
argument was negatived by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court held at pages 339 & 340 as follows:
“The general rule that property in custodial legis through its

duly appointed Receiver is exempt from judicial process except
to the extent that the leave of that court has been obtained,
is based on a very sound reason of public policy, namely, that
there should be no conflict of jurisdiction between different
courts. If a court has exercised its power to appoint a Receiver
of a certain property, it has done so with a view to preserving
the property for the benefit of the rightful owner as judicially
determined. If other courts or Tribunals of co-ordinate or
exclusive jurisdiction were to permit proceedings to go on
independently of the court which has placed the custody of
the property in the hands of the Receiver, there was a
likelihood of confusion in the administration of justice and a
possible conflict of jurisdiction. The courts represent the
majesty of law, and naturally, therefore, would not do anything
to weaken the rule of law, or to permit any proceedings which
may have the effect of putting any party in jeopardy for
contempt of court for taking recourse to unauthorized legal

proceedings. It is on that very sound principle that the rule is
based. Of course, if any court which is holding the property
in custodial legis through a Receiver or otherwise, is moved
to grant permission for taking legal proceedings in respect of
that property, the court ordinarily would grant such permission
if considerations of justice require it.”
With special reference to the provisions of the ground of challenging the

revenue sale, the Hon’ble Court on page 345 and 346 held as follows:
“Thus, if the leave of the Bombay High Court had been taken
to initiate proceedings under the Code, for the realization of
Government revenue, or if the Receiver had been served with
the notice of demand, it would have been his bounden duty
to pay up the arrears of land revenue and to continue paying
Government demands in respect, of the property in his charge,
in order to conserve it for the benefit of the parties which were
before the court in the mortgage suit. If such a step had been
taken, and if the Receiver, in spite of notice, had allowed the
auction-sale to be held for non-payment of Government
demands, the sale would have been valid and subject only to
such proceedings as are contemplated under ss. 155 and 156
of the Code. In that case, there would have been no conflict
of jurisdiction and, therefore, no question of infringing the
sound principle discussed above. But, the absence of the
leave of the court and of the necessary notice to the Receiver,
makes all the difference between a valid and an illegal sale.”
5. In the case reported as Santok Chand & Anr. v. Sugan Chand Manawat
& Anr., AIR 1919 (Cal.) 647 the question arose before the Calcutta High Court
whether a Receiver can be prosecuted for alleged criminal breach of trust
without the leave of the court. The party to the suit in which the Receiver was
appointed complained of Receiver having committed criminal breach of trust
and filed a complaint before the Magistrate without obtaining the leave of the
court by which the Receiver was appointed. The Division Bench of the Calcutta
High Court held as follows on page 649:
“It must be borne in mind, (and this is point which the learned
Magistrate seems to have overlooked) that the jute in question
was entrusted to Santok Chand not by the defendants but by
the Court in whose possession and custody it undoubtedly
came. The defendants had only an indirect interest in the

property contingent upon the fulfilment of certain conditions.
It was not open, therefore, to Sugan Chand to commence
proceedings against Santok Chand for criminal breach of trust
without first obtaining the leave of the court which held the
property. The principle which guided the court of Chancery in
England in dealing with cases where an officer of the court
was charged with misconduct in executing its orders was
clearly laid down by Lord Brougham in Aston v. Heron (1). He
said (at p. 395):
“The two descriptions of cases to which I have adverted

these where the jurisdiction of the Court is disputed
directly by resistance or indirectly by obstruction and
those where complaint is only made of the irregular or
oppressive, and, therefore, illegal execution of its
unquestioned decrees do neither of them accurately
embrace the facts of the present case although they
furnish a principle which exhausts the whole subject, and
which, therefore, rules the present case as well as all
others. That principle is that in the first class of cases
those where the jurisdiction is disputed the court has no
choice but must at all events and at once draw the whole
matter over to its own cognizance; but that in the other
class where admitting the court’s authority redress is only
sought for irregularity or excess in performance of its
orders and generally speaking wherever the jurisdiction
is not denied or resisted the court has an indisputable
right to assume the exclusive jurisdiction, but may if it
think fit on the circumstances being specially brought
before it permit other courts to proceed for punishment
or redress.”
“The High Courts in this country may we think adopt that

principle for their guidance applying it to the present case
(which falls within the 2nd class of cases alluded to by the Lord
Chancellor) if the defendants had any cause of complaint as
to the delivery of the jute by the plaintiffs under the order of
this court it was clearly their duty to bring the matter to the
notice of this court, and let it decide what course should be
followed. It was a right of this court to be so informed in order
that it might exercise the discretion which it undoubtedly
possessed of dealing with the matter itself or sending it for
disposal to the Magistrate’s Court. If the matter had been

investigated by this court it could have determined after
hearing both parties whether any irregularity had been or was
being committed by its officer the receiver and if that were the
case whether an award of pecuniary compensation would
suffice or whether the receiver should be prosecuted criminally.
All this was prevented by the defendant Sugan Chand rushing
to the police court.”
6. In 1962 KLT 25, Vasudevan Namboodiri v. Gopala Pillai, the Kerala High
Court considered a very moot question of law. In that case a Receiver was
appointed in respect of certain properties and after taking accounts, it was
found that the Receiver was liable to pay certain amounts. Accordingly, the
court passed an order directing the Receiver to pay the amount. Receiver did
not pay the amount and, therefore, the person entitled to the amount took out
an application u/s 51 of the CPC for arrest and detention of the Receiver. The
Kerala High Court held that the only mode of enforcing the obligation of the
Receiver is the one contained in Order 40, Rule 4 which, inter alia, refers to
attachment of his property and sale of the same or from the security furnished
by him and, therefore, he cannot be detained in a civil prison u/s 51 of the
CPC.
III. HIGH COURT IS COURT OF RECORD
1. Article 215 of the Constitution of India clearly lays down that the High Court
is a court of record. As a court of record, the High Court has some legal and
sovereign powers of the State. A Receiver appointed by the Calcutta High Court
is appointed by a court of record. A Receiver appointed by the court is an officer
of the court and he is not agent or trustee of a party on whose instance his
appointment has been made. [See Halsbury Laws of England, para 808, page
407].
2. Woodroffe also, Chapter V, page 240 states that a Receiver is an officer

of the court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court and the various High Courts have
clearly recognized that a Receiver is an officer of the court. Any action against
the Receiver, therefore, has an impact on the powers and jurisdiction of the
court which appointed him. In case of any misconduct by the Receiver
appointed by the Calcutta High Court, it is only the Calcutta High Court which
alone can deal with the Receiver. Any action either in civil court or in criminal
court or in any other Forum against the Receiver has a direct impact and
interference with the powers and jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. It is
the Calcutta High Court alone which can decide what action should be set in
motion against him. This is a part of its powers and jurisdiction not only as a
court appointing him but also as a constitutional court being a court of record.
The Receiver’s actions and the orders of the court regarding the Receiver
constitute an integral part of the record of the High Court. It is the exclusive
prerogative of the Calcutta High Court to decide what action should be taken
against him. Any other authority, however, high it may be, cannot interfere with
the aforesaid prerogative of the Calcutta High Court. It is not in dispute in the
instant case that the Calcutta High Court has not granted leave and/or has not
recommended any action against the Receiver. It is not in dispute that the
Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal No. APOT No.462/2007
(APO No.415/2007) by judgment dated 25 September, 2007 has clearly held
that the respondent in his capacity as Receiver has not committed any act of
criminal breach of trust or any other offence or misconduct. This judgment of
the Division Bench of the High Court becomes a part of the record of the High
Court and any authority, save and except the Hon’ble Supreme Court in exercise
of its appellate powers, which tends to interfere with such records by holding or
by recording conclusions and findings contrary to the findings of the Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court, is interfering not only with the administration
of justice but is interfering with the record of the Calcutta High Court. There is
a clear constitutional bar for such interference. It is not in dispute that the
judgement of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has not been
challenged in the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
3. It is further submitted that even Article 121 of the Constitution of India limits
the powers of the Parliament as regards the proceedings before the High Court.
Article 121 at the first blush does seem to suggest that the conduct of a High
Court Judge can be discussed in Parliament for the purpose of presenting a
motion to the President in respect of his impeachment and, therefore, the present
proceedings against the respondent are not hit by Article 121 of the Constitution
of India but a deeper examination would indicate that what in substance before
the Committee, is the conduct of a Receiver and his conduct has been a subject
matter of the record of the court which includes the judgement of the Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated 25 September, 2007.
4. It is further submitted that any inquiry into the conduct of a Receiver by

any authority other than the Calcutta High Court which appointed him, is an
inquiry into the record of the High Court. The Calcutta High Court, subject to
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, is the sole and the exclusive
authority to prepare, maintain and preserve its records. The inquiry made by
the Calcutta High Court as regards the conduct of the Receiver has resulted
into Receiver being exonerated and any attempt by any other authority, save
and except the Supreme Court in its appellate jurisdiction, cannot interfere with
such record and establish that the High Court’s record on that score is not free
from blemish and/or that it is erroneous.
5. The Calcutta High Court is a Court of Record on account of provisions of

Article 215 of the Constitution of India. In the case of Supreme Court Bar
Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409, the Supreme Court has dealt
with the concept of Court of Record with reference to the provisions of Article
129 and 215 of the Constitution of India. While dealing with the same, the Apex
Court has quoted with approval passages from different Law Lexicons relating
to a Court of Record. The relevant paragraphs are paragraphs 9 to 15 and
the said paragraphs are as follows:
“9. To appreciate the submissions raised at the Bar,

let us first notice Article 129 of the Constitution, it reads:
“129. The Supreme Court to be a court of record. The

Supreme Court shall be a court of record and shall have all
the power of such a court including the power to punish for
contempt of itself.”
10. The article on its plain language vests this Court

with all the powers of a court of record including the power to
punish for contempt of itself.
11. The expression court of record has not been

defined in the Constitution of India. Article 129 however,
declares the Supreme Court to be a court of record, while
Article 215 declares a High Court also to be a court of record.
12. A court of record is a court, the records of which

are admitted to be of evidentiary value and are not to be
questioned when produced before any court. The power that
courts of record enjoy to punish the contempt is a part of their
inherent jurisdiction and is essential to enable the courts to
administer justice according to law in a regular, orderly and
effective manner and to uphold the majesty of law and prevent
interference in the due administration of justice.
13. According to Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law,

First Edn. (p. 526) a court of record has been defined as:

enrolled for a perpetual memory and testimony, and which has
power to fine and imprison for contempt of its authority.”
14. Wharton’s Law Lexicon explains a court of record

as:
“Record, courts of, those judicial acts and proceedings

are enrolled on parchment, for a perpetual memorial and
testimony; which rolls are called the records of the court, and
are of such high and supereminent authority that their truth is
not to be called in question. Courts of record are of two classes
- superior and inferior. Superior courts of record include the
House of Lords, the Judicial Committee, the Court of appeal,
the High Court, and a few others. The Mayor’s Court of
London, the County Courts, Coroner’s Courts and other are
inferior courts of record, of which the Country Courts are the
most important. Every superior court of record has authority
to fine and imprison for contempt of its authority; an inferior
court of record can only commit for contempts committed in
open court, in facie curiae.” (emphasis provided)
15. Nigel Lowe and Brenda Sufrin in their treatise on

the Law of Contempt (Third Edn.) (Butterworths 1996), while
dealing with the jurisdiction and powers of a court of record
in respect of criminal contempt say:
“The contempt jurisdiction of courts of record forms

part of their inherent jurisdiction.
The power that courts of record enjoy to punish

contempts is part of their inherent jurisdiction. The juridical
basis of the inherent jurisdiction has been well described by
Master Jacob as being:
“The authority of the judiciary to uphold, to protect and

to fulfil the judicial function of administering justice according
to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner.”
Such a power is not derived from statute nor truly from

the common law but instead flows from the very concept of a
court of law.
* * * * *
All courts of record have an inherent jurisdiction to

punish contempts committed in their face but the inherent
power to punish contempts committed outside the court
resides exclusively in superior courts of record.
* * * * *
“Superior courts of record have an inherent

superintendent jurisdiction to punish contempts committed in
connection with proceedings before inferior courts.”
6. In the case of Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat (1991)

4 SCC 406, the Apex Court again dealt with the concept of court of record. In
paragraph 19 on pages 437 to 438, the Apex Court has dealt with this concept
and has quoted with approval passages from various authorities. The said
paragraph clearly indicates that the record of the court of record is conclusive
evidence of that which is recorded therein. The said paragraph reads as
follows:
“19. Article 129 provides that the Supreme Court shall be a

court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court
including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Article 215
contains similar provision in respect of High Court. Both the
Supreme Court as well as High Courts are courts of record
having powers to punish for contempt including the power to
punish for contempt of itself. The Constitution does not define
“Court of Record”. The expression is well recognized in juridical
world. In Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, “Court of Record”
is defined as:

enrolled for a perpetual memorial testimony, and which
has power to fine and imprison for contempt of its
authority.”
In Wharton’s Law Lexicon, Court of Record is defined

as:
“Courts are either of record where their acts and judicial

proceedings are enrolled for a perpetual memorial and
testimony and they have power to fine and imprison; or
not of record being courts of inferior dignity, and in a less
proper sense the King’s Courts - and these are not
entrusted by law with any power to fine or imprison the
subject of the realm, unless by the express provision of
some Act of Parliament. These proceedings are not
enrolled or recorded.”
In Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition, Vol. 10, page 429) “Court of Record”
is defined as under:
“Court of record is a court where acts and judicial proceedings

are enrolled in parchment for a perpetual memorial and
testimony, which rolls are called the “record” of the court, and
are of such high and super eminent authority that their truth
is not to be questioned.”
Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 10, para 709, page 319, states:
“Another manner of division is into courts of record and courts

not of record. Certain courts are expressly declared by statute
to be courts of record. In the case of courts not expressly
declared to be courts of record, the answer to the question
whether a court is a court of record seems to depend in
general upon whether it has power to fine or imprison, by
statute or otherwise, for contempt of itself or other substantive
offences; if it has such power, it seems that it is a court of
record - The proceedings of a court of record preserved in its
archives are called records, and are conclusive evidence of
that which is recorded therein.”
7. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has in crystal clear terms
laid down that the allegation of misappropriation made against the respondent
is without any substance. The record maintained by the High Court as regards
the Receivership of the respondent has culminated in the aforesaid judgment
and order of the Division Bench. The said judgment is, therefore, conclusive
evidence of what is stated therein i.e. respondent herein is not-guilty of the
charge of misappropriation.
8. As stated herein above, the Division Bench of the High Court has clearly
held that the respondent is not guilty of misappropriation. If any action is to be
taken against the respondent, then not only the leave of the High Court is to
be obtained but the record of the High Court holding that the respondent is
not guilty of misappropriation will have to be corrected. Such correction can
only be made by the High Court either in Sui Juris proceedings or on the
application of any aggrieved party. This power of the High Court as court of
record is unfettered. In the case of M.M. Thomas v. State of Kerala (2000)
1 SCC 666, in paragraphs 14 to 17, the Apex Court has dealt with this power
of the High Court, as follows:
“14. The High Court as a court of record, as envisaged

in Article 215 of the Constitution, must have inherent powers
to correct the records. A court of record envelops all such
powers whose acts and proceedings are to be enrolled in a
perpetual memorial and testimony. A court of record is
undoubtedly a superior court which is itself competent to

determine the scope of its jurisdiction. The High Court, as a
court of record, has a duty to itself to keep all its records
correctly and in accordance with law. Hence, if any apparent
error is noticed by the High Court in respect of any orders
passed by it the High Court has not only power, but a duty to
correct it. The High Court’s power in that regard is plenary. In
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar Vs. State of Maharashtra a nine-
Judge Bench of this Court has recognized the aforesaid
superior status of the High Court as a court of plenary
jurisdiction being a court of record.
15. In Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn., Vol. 10,

para 713) it is stated thus:
“The chief distinctions between superior and inferior courts are

found in connection with jurisdiction. Prima facie, no matter is
deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court unless
it is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is within the
jurisdiction of an inferior court unless it is expressly shown on
the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is within
the cognizance of the particular court. An objection to the
jurisdiction of one of the superior courts of general jurisdiction
must show what other court has jurisdiction, so as to make it
clear that the exercise by the superior court of its general
jurisdiction is unnecessary. The High Court, for example, is a
court of universal jurisdiction and superintendency in certain
classes of actions, and cannot be deprived of its ascendancy
by showing that some other court could have entertained the
particular action.”
(Though the above reference is to English courts the principle

would squarely apply to the superior courts in India also.)
16. Referring to the said passage and relying on the

decision of this Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar a two-Judge
Bench of this Court in M.V. Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment &
Trading (P) Ltd. has observed thus: (AIR Headnote)-
“The High Courts in India are superior courts of record. They

have original and appellate jurisdiction. They have inherent
and plenary powers. Unless expressly or impliedly barred, and
subject to the appellate or discretionary jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, the High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction...”
17. If such power of correcting its own record is denied

to the High Court, when it notices the apparent errors its
consequence is that the superior status of the High Court will
dwindle down. Therefore, it is only proper to think that the
plenary powers of the High Court would include the power of
review relating to errors apparent on the fact of the record.”
9. The importance of High Court being a court of record is recognized by

Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Naresh S.
Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, 1966 (3) SCR 744 on page 771 of the report,
it is held as follows:
“There is yet another aspect of this matter to which it is

necessary to refer. The High Court is a superior Court of
Record and under Art. 215, shall have all powers of such a
Court of Record including the power to punish contempt of
itself. One distinguishing characteristic of such superior courts
is that they are entitled to consider questions of their
jurisdiction raised before them. This question fell to be
considered by this Court in Special Reference No. 1 of 1964
(1965) 1 SCR 413 at p. 499. In that case, it was urged before
this Court that in granting bail to Keshav Singh, the High Court
had exceeded its jurisdiction and, as such, the order was a
nullity. Rejecting this argument, this Court observed that in the
case of a superior Court of Record, it is for the court to
consider whether any matter falls within its jurisdiction or not.
Unlike a court of limited jurisdiction, the superior Court is
entitled to determine for itself questions about its own
jurisdiction. That is why this Court did not accede to the
proposition that in passing the order for interim bail, the High
Court can be said to have exceeded its jurisdiction with the
result that the order in question was null and void. In support
of this view, this Court cited a passage from Halsbury’s Laws
of England where it is observed that “prima facie, no matter
is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court
unless it is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is within
the jurisdiction of an inferior court unless it is expressly shown
on the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is
within the cognizance of the particular Court”. If the decision
of a superior Court on a question of its jurisdiction is erroneous,
it can, of course, be corrected by appeal or revision as may
be permissible under the law; but until the adjudication by
a superior Court on such a point is set aside by adopting the

appropriate course, it would not be open to be corrected by
the exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this Court.”
IV. ACCOUNTS
1. Order 40, Rule 3 lays down the following duties of the Receiver:
a. To furnish such security as the Court thinks fit.
b. To submit accounts of such periods and in such forms as the Court

directs.
c. Pay the amount due from him as the Court directs.
d. He is responsible for any loss occasioned by willful default or gross

negligence.
2. Order 40, Rule 4 lays down that where a Receiver fails to submit accounts
of such period and in such form as directed by the Court or to pay the amount
due from him as the Court directs, or causes loss for his willful default or gross
negligence, the Court can direct attachment of his property and sell the same
and apply the proceeds to make good any amount found to be due from him
or any loss occasioned by him.
3. Whenever the Receiver is guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance, it is the

duty of the Court to call him to account and in a proper case it has the
undoubted right to order the summary removal. [See Woodroffe on Receiver,
Chapter VI, page 261].
4. Chapter 21 of the Calcutta High Court (O.S.) Rules supplement the

provisions of Code of Civil Procedure regarding the Receiver. In the present
case what was served on the Respondent is a signed copy dated 20 January,
1993 which did not contain any direction regarding furnishing security and
periodical filing accounts. The certified copy which is now on record refers to
furnishing the security and filing the six-monthly accounts. There is no evidence
to show that certified copy of the order dated 25 September, 2007 was ever
served on the respondent. Without prejudice to the above contention and in
the alternative it is further submitted as follows.
5. Rule 4 of Chapter 21 of the Calcutta High Court (O.S.) Rules requires a

Receiver to furnish a security bond. The respondent was appointed as Receiver
by order dated 30 April, 1984 and he was never asked to furnish any security
bond or security in any other form. If the Court had thought that the action of
the Receiver of not furnishing such security constitutes a default or misconduct,
the court would have taken appropriate proceedings within the reasonable time
of his appointment. This only means that there was no grievance or complaint
as regards respondent not furnishing the security bond.
6. Rule 15 of the Calcutta High Court (O.S.) Rules lays down that unless
ordered otherwise, the order appointing a Receiver shall contain a direction
that the Receiver shall file and submit for passing half-yearly accounts in the
office of the Registrar and that such accounts are to be made at the end of
months of June and December every year and are required to be filed in the
months of July and January respectively. The Rule also further lays down that
the Judge may direct the Receiver to file annual accounts which have then
been made up to 31 December every year and be filed in the succeeding month
of January.
7. Rule 24 of the Calcutta High Court (O.S.) Rules lays down that if a Receiver
neglects to file his accounts or to pass the same or to pay the balance or any
part thereof as ordered, the matter shall be reported by the officer and the
Registrar on the application of any of the parties interested, intimate to the
Judge such neglect and the Judge may from time to time when the accounts
of such Receiver are produced to be examined and passed, not only disallow
the Receiver’s remuneration but also charge with interest @ 6% per annum
on the balance, if any, so neglected to be paid by him during the time the same
shall appear to have remained in the hands of such Receiver.
8. Rule 25 lays down that where any Receiver fails to file any accounts or to
pass such accounts or to make any payment or commits a default otherwise,
the Receiver can be discharged by the Court.
9. The Respondent was appointed as a Receiver in the year 1984 i.e. by

order dated 30 April, 1984. Till 2003, neither the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court
nor any of the parties required the respondent to render any accounts. For
the first time, on 27 February, 2003 an application was made by the plaintiff
seeking directions for accounts and sale of the remaining goods and handing
over sale proceeds. Despite the aforesaid statutory matrix, for about 19 years
nobody sought accounts which is a clear indication that in Calcutta High Court
a practice had developed of not giving periodical accounts to the Court. Had
there been no such practice, the Court would have called upon the respondent
to render accounts much earlier and would have taken action against the
respondent of terminating his receivership or any other suitable action that the
Court would have considered necessary in the facts of the case.
10. The witness Mr. Tapas Kumar Malik, Assistant Registrar of Calcutta High
Court (Original Side) who was examined on behalf of the petitioner, admitted
that he has not worked in the Accounts Department and that Accounts
Department takes care of Receiver’s accounts. There is no material on record
to show that any notice was issued to the respondent as a Receiver on account
of alleged default of not filing six-monthly account for passing it. The Accounts
Department has not produced any of its records showing that any notice was
issued to the respondent for not filing and passing six-monthly accounts. This
again shows that nobody had any grievance or complaint about non filing of
accounts periodically.
11. It is also to be noted that no party to the proceedings has alleged that the
respondent as the Receiver had misappropriated any amount received by him,
in his capacity as a Receiver. It is also not in dispute that the respondent had
invested some money in Lynx India Limited which went into liquidation. Nobody
had objected to the respondent’s handling the funds received by him as a
Receiver.
12. The overall picture that emerges is this that the office of the Registrar of
the Calcutta High Court (Original Side) or the Accounts Department or the
parties concerned never asked for six-monthly accounts and never made any
inquiries at the relevant time about the handling of funds by the respondent.
This means that the Calcutta High Court had accepted that the respondent
has not committed any default on account of his failure to submit six-monthly
accounts.
13. At the rejoinder stage, it was contended that the application being G.A.
No.875 of 2003 filed by Steel Authority of India did not contain any allegation
of misappropriation. It is true that the plaintiff did not make any allegation of
misappropriation, but the learned Single Judge held that there is
misappropriation and in fact the same was recorded in judgement dated
10 April, 2006 in Volume II being Exhibit C-51 at page 779, paragraph 2.
14. The Manager of the different banks were summoned and examined and
the records of Official Liquidator were also tallied and as such it is not correct
to suggest that the Court did not come to any finding on misappropriation. It
is not possible to ignore the Division Bench judgement by suggesting that the
application and the Single Bench judgement did not have any issue regarding
misappropriation.
15. The sequence of events in this case cannot be ignored. That the whole
thing started from the Single Bench judgement is proved beyond doubt from
the fact that the then Hon’ble Chief Justice of India in his letter dated
10 September, 2007 clearly stated that the in-house committee was proposed
to be constituted because of the adverse observation of the Single Judge with
regard to misappropriation.
16. The second charge is misrepresentation of facts relating to misappropriation

clinches the issue that misappropriation of money was the issue before the single
judge which led to the present proceeding. The charge of misrepresentation of
facts can only be in relation to misappropriation of money as alleged. Once
that charge fails the second charge cannot survive.
17. It is also significant that even after coming to the conclusion that the
Receiver is guilty of misappropriation the learned Single Judge duly allowed
the Receiver to take his remuneration and prayer (d) for filing of accounts was
not allowed. Therefore, it can be concluded that filing the accounts by the
Receiver was dispensed with by the Court as no order was passed in spite of
the specific prayer to that effect.
18. It is an admitted position that, the Official Liquidator submitted a report

dated 7 February, 2009 and annexure B-10 to the said gives details of
investments made by the Respondent in Lynx India Ltd. The amount is more
than Rs. 78 lakhs which is inclusive of warrant cheques. But, the learned Single
Judge in the judgement reduced the figure approximately to 71 lakhs.
19. As per the submission of the prosecution only Rs. 25 lakhs were deposited
in the year 1997 and Rs. 5 lakhs was withdrawn. So, therefore, only Rs.20 lakhs
was deposited in the year 1997 and that cannot become Rs. 71 lakhs in the
year 1999, even calculating the rate of interest as 18.25% per annum. By any
simple mathematics it can be proved that there were early deposits, which have
taken the figure up to Rs. 71 lakhs.
20. Out of Rs. 33 lakhs, 5% were allowed as remuneration i.e. Rs. 31 lakhs
and Rs. 5 lakhs were paid to the Advocate of the plaintiff in 2006. The balance
was Rs. 26 lakhs and the Court ordered the Receiver to pay Rs. 52 lakhs after
calculation.
21. The record produced by the Official Liquidator clearly show that diverse
amounts were invested by the respondent in Lynx India. The respondent has
also submitted a calculation at the time of hearing indicating that the diverse
amounts were invested in Lynx India and a statement showing as to how the
amount was kept in Lynx India was submitted. The said statement was
prepared on the basis of the findings of the learned Single Judge. The said
statement is only a calculation and made on the basis of the findings of the
learned Single Judge in order dated 31 July, 2007 (Exh. C-42).
22. Mere failure to produce accounts cannot give rise to an inference of

misappropriation. The plaintiff had made a specific prayer for accounts. The
said prayer was not granted by order dated 3 August, 2004 passed by Mr.
Justice Mukherji and also by order dated 10 April, 2006 of Mr. Justice Sen
Gupta. The clear result of a prayer not being granted is that the filing of
accounts was no longer necessary and the respondent was discharged as a
Receiver without filing of the accounts. As stated herein above that it is only
the court that appoints him can call upon him to submit the accounts and as
that court has not chosen to do so, no other authority can call upon the
respondent to do so.
23. It is submitted that non filing of the accounts is beyond the scope of the
present enquiry and no conclusions adverse to the respondent can be drawn
on the basis of he not having submitted the accounts. In this context, it also
must be noted that by order dated 10 April, 2006, the respondent was called
upon to pay Rs.52.46 lakhs to the plaintiff and it is an admitted position that
the respondent has paid the said amount. In fact, the respondent has paid
Rs. 57.46 lakhs. Therefore, there is no question of the respondent having
defaulted in making payment to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has not complained
that the amount that he has received is less than what is due. A Receiver is
not an agent or a trustee of the plaintiff but is only an officer of the Court.
24. In this context it also must be noted that when the learned Single Judge
started holding enquiry as regards the receivership of the respondent and
specially when the bank witnesses were summoned, no notice of the same
was given to the respondent and no opportunity was given to the respondent
to cross examine the bank witnesses. The proceedings, therefore, before the
learned Single Judge were held in breach of principles of natural justice. On
the basis of the evidence of the bank witnesses adverse inferences are drawn
against the respondent and the proceedings before the learned Single Judge
stood vitiated on account of breach of principles of natural justice. The
respondent learnt about the proceedings before the learned Single Judge much
later as the learned Single Judge by order dated 10 April, 2006 had directed
that further orders of the courts are not to be served on the receiver. In this
context, it is also to be noted that the application made by the plaintiff for
accounts etc. contained a reference of a letter dated 7 March, 2002 allegedly
addressed by the plaintiff’s advocate to the respondent. No acknowledgment of
the respondent is produced. It is a specific contention of the respondent that
this letter was not served on him.
25. In the instant case, the court after examining the entire matter and
documents quantified the specific sum to be paid by the respondent to the
plaintiff. Since the court took upon itself the burden of quantifying the amount
payable by the respondent to the plaintiff, the question of receiver-respondent
not filing the accounts has lost its significance.
26. Lynx is a non-banking financial company. Section 58A of the Companies

Act empowers the Central Government in consultation with the Reserve Bank
of India (RBI) to prescribe limits up to which and the conditions subject to which
a company can accept deposits or invite members of the public for depositing
any amount with the company. In exercise of that power, the Central
Government has framed rules which are known as Companies (Acceptance
of Deposits) Rules, 1975. Section 58(7)(b) lays down that the provisions of
the said section shall not apply to such classes of financial companies as the
Central Government may, in consultation with RBI, specify in that behalf. In
exercise of that power the Central Government has exempted non-banking
financial companies from the operation of the provisions of the said Section
58A by Notification dated 18 September, 1975.
27. Rule 1(3) of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 1975 lays
down that the said rule shall apply to such companies as are not banking
companies and are not financial companies. Therefore, the non-banking
financial companies are not covered by the said rules.
28. In respect of non-banking financial companies, RBI had issued directions

in exercise of power under section 45K of the RBI Act in 1977. The said
directions are now replaced by 1998 directions.
29. The provisions of Chapter IIIB of the RBI Act confer substantial powers
of controlling and monitoring the affairs of non-banking financial companies.
Every non-banking financial company has to register with the RBI under section
45-IA of the Act and while granting registration, the RBI has to satisfy itself as
regards the following conditions:
i. That the non-banking financial company shall be in a position to

pay its present or future depositors in full as and when their claims
accrue;
ii. That the affairs of the non-banking financial company are not likely
to be conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of the
depositors;
iii. That the non-banking financial company has adequate , capital

structure and earning prospects, etc.
30. The registration of a non-banking financial company is liable to be

cancelled if it fails to comply with the provisions of the Act and the directions
of the RBI. The investments to be made by non-banking financial companies,
the reserve funds that they have to maintain, the prospects of the non-banking
financial company or the advertisements soliciting deposits are subject to the
control and supervision of the RBI.
31. Under Section 45 JA, RBI has power to determine policy matters of non-
banking financial company and issue directions in that behalf. Under Section
45K, RBI has power to collect information from the non-banking financial
company and to give directions. Similarly, under section 45L, RBI has power
to call for information and give directions that the non-banking financial
companies have to submit a report to the RBI. The RBI can also issue
instructions to the auditors of the non-banking financial company, and last but
not the least, the RBI has power to issue directions to any non-banking financial
company prohibiting it from accepting any deposits and alienating its property.
Even the winding up of a non-banking financial company is at the initiative of
the RBI Section 45N of the Act empowers RBI to carry out inspection of the
records of any non-banking financial company.
32. As stated herein above, in exercise of powers under the provisions of

RBI Act, the RBI has issued directions in 1998 and the said directions in Clause
16, inter alia, require any non-banking financial company to maintain a register
of depositors giving all particulars about the deposits, including name and
address of the depositor, date and amount of deposit, duration and the due
date of deposit and the interest/premium payable, the date of claim made by
the depositor, repayment etc. etc.
33. In view of the aforesaid provisions contained in the RBI Act and the
directions issued by the RBI in 1977 and 1998, it was reasonable to assume
for the respondent that the investments in Lynx by way of deposits can be a
safe investment. If the entire record of Lynx is perused and specially the register
maintained under Clause 16 of the RBI directions, it will be established that
respondent has not misappropriated the funds. Unfortunately, the entire record
of Lynx is not available. The most important piece of evidence is the register of
deposits which would clearly show the investments made by the Respondent
and their details. Unfortunately, the Official Liquidator does not have the said
register.
34. PRESERVATION OF RECORDS: NBFC
Provisions relating to preservation of records of NBFC Companies:
Clause 16 of Non-Banking Financial Companies Acceptance of Public Deposits

(Reserve Bank) Directions, 1998, (w.e.f. 31.1.98) directs NBFC companies to
keep register(s) of deposit inter alia containing name, date of deposit, interest
accrued on deposit, date of repayment of each depositor.
For the sake of convenience, Clause 16 is reproduced herein below.
(16) Register for deposit - (i) Every non-banking

financial company shall keep one or more registers in respect
of all deposits in which shall be entered separately in the case
of each depositor, the following particulars, namely-
(a) Name and address of the depositors,
(b) Date and amount of each deposit,
(c) Duration and the due date of each deposit,
(d) Date and amount of accrued interest or premium on each deposit,
(e) Date of claim made by the depositor,
(f) Date and amount of each repayment, whether of principal, interest

or premium,
(g) The reasons for delay in repayment beyond five working days, and
(h) Any other particulars relating to the deposit.
The branch in respect of the deposit accounts opened by that branch of the
company and a consolidated register for all the branches taken together at
the registered office of the company and shall be preserved in good order for
a period of not less than eight calendar years following the financial year
in which the latest entry is made of the repayment or renewal of any
deposit of which particulars are contained in the register:
Provided that, if the company keeps the books of account referred to in sub-
section (I) of section 209 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) at any place
other than its registered office in accordance with the proviso to that sub-
section, it shall be deemed to be sufficient compliance with this clause if the
register aforesaid is kept at such other place, subject to the condition that the
company delivers to the Reserve Bank of India, a copy of the notice filed with
the Register of Companies under the proviso to the said sub-section within
seven days of such filing.
Besides complying with Clause 16 of the Non-Banking Financial Companies

Acceptance of Public Deposits (Reserve Bank) Directions, 1998, NBFC is also
required to keep the statutory books of accounts and other documents in
compliance with the Companies Act, 1956 such as Register of members,
Investments etc.
35. OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR’ REPORT
(i) In the Report dated 7 February, 2007 (at Page 1173-1177) filed by
the Official Liquidator in the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court, it is
submitted that the records pertaining to financial affairs of the
Company (Lynx India Limited) had been seized by the State Police
Authority for the purpose of investigation and that the Official
Liquidator had already issued letter to the competent police authority,
communicating the direction of the Hon’ble Company Court, with
request to hand over the records. It was also submitted by the OL
that the report dated 7 February, 2007 was being filed in compliance
of order dated 31 January, 2007 and without taking into
consideration the contents of record under custody of the police
authority.
(ii) Thus, it is evident from the above that the said OL’s Report, filed in
compliance of the High Court Order, was based on incomplete
evidence as all the records pertaining to the company had not been
obtained from the police authorities. Subsequent thereto, there is
no evidence to the effect that OL had obtained further documents
from the police authorities.
(iii) No further Report has been filed by the OL.
(iv) Cross examination of Deputy OL during cross-examination on

26 June, 2010 before the COMMITTEE also substantiates the position
that the OL has not received any records from the Police after the
above Report.
(v) OL’s Report in respect of Lynx is only for the period 7 March, 1997
to 28 February, 2000. Even for the aforesaid period, it is inconclusive
and cannot be completely relied upon to prove the charges.
However, the Annexure to the said Report, as reproduced by the

Single Judge in his order dated 31 July, 2007 (Exhibit C-42 @ 303-
332) Pages 977-999), shows that an amount of Rs. 70,25,147 (at
page 321 of Exhibit C-42) was lying deposited in Lynx.
(vi) From the discussions aforesaid, it is clear that the record in respect
of Lynx, which is with the OL, is incomplete. The best evidence
about the amounts invested by Respondent/Receiver in Fixed
Deposits with Lynx, from time to time, could be seen only from the
Register of Deposits which is compulsorily required to be maintained
under Directions of RBI and also from the Books of Accounts for
the relevant period which is required to be maintained under the
Companies Act. Admittedly, neither the Register nor the Books of
Accounts for the period 1993-1995 has been produced by the OL
before the Calcutta High Court under directions of Learned Single
Judge. OL has also not produced such records before the
COMMITTEE in these proceedings. In the absence of such records,
no conclusion can be drawn that the Respondent has committed
any misconduct or default. The necessity for furnishing of the
relevant record before the COMMITTEE is quite apparent. In the
absence of such record, charge of misappropriation cannot be
proved and, in any event, cannot be proved beyond any reasonable
doubt.
36. CONCLUSION
(i) It is evident from the above that the said OL’s Report, filed in
compliance of the High Court Order, that it was based on incomplete
(ii) No further Report has been filed by the OL.
(iii) Cross examination of Deputy OL during cross-examination on

26 June, 2010 before the Committee also substantiates the position
that the OL has not received any records from the Police after the
above Report.
(iv) OL’s Report in respect of Lynx is only for the period 7 March, 1997

Single Judge in his order dated 31 July, 2007 (Exhibit C-42 @ 303-
332 Pages 977-999), shows that an amount of Rs. 70,25,147 (at page
321 of Exhibit C-42) was lying deposited in Lynx.
(v) It is, thus, clear that the record in respect of Lynx, which is with the
OL, is incomplete. The best evidence about the amounts invested
by Respondent/Receiver in Fixed Deposits with Lynx, from time to
time, could be seen only from the Register of Deposits which is
compulsorily required to be maintained under directions of RBI and
also from the Books of Accounts for the relevant period which is
required to be maintained under the Companies Act. Admittedly,
neither the Register nor the Books of Accounts for the period 1993-
1995 has been produced by the OL before the Calcutta High Court
under directions of Learned Single Judge. OL has also not produced
such records before the Committee in these proceedings. In the
absence of such records, no conclusion can be drawn that the
Respondent has committed any misconduct or default. The
necessity for furnishing of the relevant record before the Committee
is quite apparent. In the absence of such record, charge of
misappropriation cannot be proved and, in any event, cannot be
proved beyond any reasonable doubt.
37. PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO PRESERVATION OF BANKING RECORDS

(INCLUDING PRESERVATION AND DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS)
Insofar as the preservation of banking records is concerned, Section 45Y of the

Banking Regulation Act, 1949, is the governing provision, which states that the
Central Government may after consultation with RBI and publication in Official
Gazette make rules specifying the periods for which a bank shall inter alia
preserve its books and other documents.
Vide Notification No. S.O. 265(E), dated 29 March, 1985, the Banking
Companies (Period of Preservation of Records) Rules, 1985, came into effect.
The said 1985 Rules prescribe the nature of books of accounts and documents
to be preserved for a period of five years and eight years respectively. However,
upon perusal of the list of various categories of books and documents required
to be preserved under the said Rules, it is pertinent to state that nowhere it
has been prescribed that a bank is required to maintain or preserve a record
of the destroyed documents.
For the sake of convenience, Section 45Y of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949,
and the Banking Companies (Period of Preservation of Records) Rules, 1985,
are reproduced herein below:
38. THE BANKING REGULATION ACT, 1949 - S. 45Y
PROVISIONS RELATING TO CERTAIN OPERATIONS OF BANKING

COMPANIES
(45Y). Power of Central Govemment to make rules for

the preservation of the records - The Central Government may,
after consultation with the Reserve Bank and by notification
in the Official Gazette, make rules specifying the periods for
which—
(a) A banking company shall preserve its books, accounts and other
documents; and
(b) A banking company shall preserve and keep with itself different
instruments paid by it.
39. THE BANKING COMPANIES (PERIOD OF PRESERVATION OF

RECORDS) RULES, 1985
Notification No. S.O. 265(E), dated 29 March, 1985 - In exercise of the powers
conferred by Section 45Y of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949),
the Central Government, after consultation with the Reserve Bank of India,
hereby makes the following rules, namely :
R.1. Short title and commencement. - (1) These rules

may be called the Banking Companies (Period of Preservation
of Record) Rules, 1985.
(2) They shall come into force on the date of their

publication in the Official Gazette.
R. 2. Every banking company shall preserve, in good

order, its books, accounts and other documents mentioned
below, relating to a period not less than five years immediately
preceding the current calendar year.
Ledgers and Registers:
(1) Cheque Book Registers

(2) Delivery Order Registers
(3) Demand Liability Registers
(4) Demand Remittances Dispatched Registers
(5) Demand Remittances Received Registers
(6) Vault Registers
Records other than Registers:
(1) Telegraphic Transfer Confirmations
(2) Telegrams and Telegram Confirmations
R. 3. Every banking company shall preserve, in good

order, its books, accounts and other documents mentioned
below, relating to a period of not less than eight years
immediately preceding the current calendar year.
Ledgers and Registers:
(1) All personal ledgers
(2) Loans and Advance Registers and Ledgers
(3) Call, Short or Fixed Deposit Registers or Ledgers
(4) F.D. Interest Registers
(5) Draft T.T. and Mail Transfer Registers
(6) Remittance Registers
(7) Bills Registers
(8) Clearing Registers
(9) Demand Loan liability Registers
(10) Draft and Mail Transfer Advises Dispatched Registers
(11) Draft and Mail Transfer Advices Received Registers

(12) Draft payable Registers
(13) Drawing Power Registers
(14) Stock Registers of Goods Pledged
(15) Stock and Share Registers
(16) Government Securities Registers or Ledgers
(17) Registers Showing Collection of Dividends and Interest on Securities

on Behalf of Constituents
(18) Registers or Ledgers of bank’s own Investments
(19) Branch Ledgers
(20) Overdrafts and Loan Registers
(21) Safe Custody Registers
(22) Equitable Mortgage Registers
(23) Trust Registers
(24) Clean cash Books
Records other than Registers:
(1) Bank Cash Scrolls
(2) Bank Transfer Scrolls
(3) Remittance Schedule
(4) Paid cheques
(5) Paying in slips
(6) Voucher relating to DDs, TTs, MTs, Fixed Deposits, Call Deposits,
Cash credits and other deposit and loan accounts including
vouchers relating to payment to nominees.
(7) Account opening forms, inventories prepared in respect of articles

in safe custody and safety locker and nomination forms.
(8) Standing Instructions regarding Current Accounts
(9) Applications for TTs, DDs, MTs, and other Remittances
(10) Applications for Overdrafts, Loans and Advances
(11) Press-copy books.
R. 4. Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 2 and

3, the Reserve Bank may, having regard to the factors
specified in sub-section (1) of Section 35-A, by an order in
writing, direct any banking company to preserve any of the
books, accounts or other documents mentioned in those rules,
for a period longer than the period specified for their
preservation, in the said rules.
It is also relevant to add that Section 2 of the Banking Regulation Act

states that the said Act is not in derogation of the Companies Act,
meaning whereby that relevant provisions of Companies Act vis-a-vis
preservation of records (such as Books of accounts etc.), would also be
applicable to the Banking Companies.
Thus provisions of Companies Act particularly Section 209(4A) are required

to be complied with.
40. CONCLUSION
The record in respect of Standard Chartered Bank is clearly incomplete. No

documents have been produced for the period 1993 to 1995. Admittedly, those
documents for the period 1993-1995 were produced neither before the Calcutta
High Court nor before the Committee in these proceedings. In the absence of
such records, no conclusion can be drawn that the Respondent has committed
any misconduct or default. Hence, charge of misappropriation cannot be proved
and, in any event, cannot be proved beyond any reasonable doubt.
41. CIRCUMSTANCES CREATING DOUBT
A. Official Liquidator’ Report
i. In the Report dated 7 February, 2007 (at Exhibit No. C-78, pages
1827 -1902) filed by the Official Liquidator in the Hon’ble Calcutta
High Court, it is submitted that the records pertaining to financial
affairs of the Company (Lynx India Limited) had been seized by the
State Police Authority for the purpose of investigation and that the
Official Liquidator had already issued letter to the competent police
authority, communicating the direction of the Hon’ble Company
Court, with request to hand over the records. It was also submitted
by the OL that the report dated 7 February, 2007 was being filed in
compliance of order dated 31 January, 2007 and without taking into
consideration the contents of record under custody of the police
authority.
ii. Thus, it is evident from the above that the said OL’s Report, filed in
compliance of the High Court Order, was based on incomplete
iii. No further Report has been filed by the OL.
iv. Cross examination of Deputy OL during cross-examination on

26 June, 2010 before the COMMITTEE also substantiates the
position that the OL has not received any records from the Police
after the above Report.
v. Hence, such a report which is based on incomplete documents

cannot be relied upon, particularly to “prove charge muchless
beyond reasonable doubt”.
B. Documents of Lynx
i. The documents annexed to the OL’s Report evidencing receipts

of Fixed Deposits with Lynx India Ltd. and other documents
annexed to the OL’s Report show that 4 Interest warrants of
Rs. 73,233 (Pg.1521), Rs. 98191.6 (Pg.1527), Rs. 64530.6 (Pg.1533)
and Rs. 98191(Pg.1537) [those 4 cheques are Exhibits C-118 (page
1981) Exhibits C-121 (page 1987) Exhibits C-124 (page 1993)
Exhibits C-127 (page 1999)] - amounting to a sum of Rs. 3,34,147/
- have been issued by Lynx India Ltd. in favour of Soumitra Sen vide
UBI cheques dated 28 February, 2000. Since Lynx India Ltd. had
already gone into liquidation in 2000, the said interest warrant could
never have been issued by OL. Therefore, there is no question of
the said interest amount having been received by Justice Sen. Hence,
these documents create a misleading picture.
It may be relevant to note that under Section 45MC (4) of RBI

Act, all provisions of Companies Act relating to winding up of
a company shall apply to winding up proceeding of NBFC
initiated by RBI. Under section 536 of the Companies Act, any
disposition of the property of the company made after
commencement of the winding up shall be void. The date of
presentation of the petition is the commencement of winding
up.
ii. OL’s Report in respect of Lynx is only for the period 7 March, 1997
Single Judge in his order dated 31 July, 2007 [Exhibit C-42@ page
302-332] (Page 977-999), shows that an amount of Rs. 70,25,147
[Page 321 of Exhibit C-42] (page 991) was lying deposited in Lynx.
iii. From the discussions under Para A and B above, it is clear that the
record in respect of Lynx, which is with the OL is incomplete. The
best evidence about the amounts invested by Respondent/Receiver
in Fixed Deposits with Lynx, from time to time, could be seen only
from the Register of Deposits which is compulsorily required to be
maintained under Directions of RBI and also from the Books of
Accounts for the relevant period which is required to be maintained
under the Companies Act. Admittedly, neither the Register nor the
Books of Accounts for the period 1993-1995 has been produced by
the OL before the Calcutta High Court under directions of Learned
Single Judge. OL has also not produced such records before the
Committee in these proceedings. In the absence of such records,
no conclusion can be drawn that the Respondent has committed any
misconduct or default. The necessity for furnishing of the relevant
record before the Committee is quite apparent. In the absence of such
record, charge of misappropriation cannot be proved and, in any event,
cannot be proved beyond any reasonable doubt.
C. Documents of Banks
i. Vide an undated letter (Exhibit C-76, Page 1817-1818), Standard

Chartered Bank has provided the present status of five accounts
maintained by Mr. Soumitra Sen. Ironically one such a/c bearing
No.01SLP0156800 belongs to one Mr. Soumitra Sen who happens
to be Sales Promoter of Food Specialities Ltd. having his address
at 20-E, Ballygunge Terrace, Calcutta-700029 [Exhibit C-304 @ page

2409] (see Page 2243). This fact became evident at a much belated
stage when Additional Documents were filed as Volume VII (Pages
2213-2253) under cover of letter dated 29 May, 2010, issued by
Secretary of the Judges Inquiry Committee.
ii. The said undated letter referred to in Para 1 above also states that
statement prior to 1995 have been destroyed as per RBI Guidelines
(page 339, Vol I). Since there is no record of bank statements prior
to the year 1995, certain vital links in money trail has been lost
forever and, under such circumstances, charges against Justice Sen
cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
iii. The record in respect of Standard Chartered Bank is clearly

incomplete. No documents have been produced for the period 1993
to 1995. Admittedly, those documents for the period 1993-1995 were
produced neither before the Calcutta High Court nor before the
Committee in these proceedings. In the absence of such records,
no conclusion can be drawn that the Respondent has committed
any misconduct or default. Hence, charge of misappropriation
cannot be proved and, in any event, cannot be proved beyond any
reasonable doubt.
iv. Relevant provisions of the Banker’s Books of Evidence Act, 1891,

are reproduced below:
Section 2(8)- “certified copy” means when the books of a bank
(a) are maintained in written form, a copy of any entry in-such books
together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is
a true copy of such entry, that such entry is contained in one of the
ordinary books of the bank and was made in the usual and ordinary
course of business and that such books is still in the custody of
the bank, and where the copy was obtained by mechanical or other
process which in itself ensured the accuracy of the copy, a further
certificate to that effect, but where the book from which such copy
was prepared has been destroyed in the usual course of the bank’s
business after the date on which the copy has been so prepared,
a further certificate to that effect, each such certificate being dated
and subscribed by the principal accountant or manager of the bank
with his name and official title; and
(b) consists of printouts of data stored in a floppy, disc, tape or any

other electro-magnetic data storage device, a printout of such entry
or a copy of such printout together with such statements certified
in accordance with the provisions of section 2A.]
[(c) a printout of any entry in the books of a bank stored in a micro film,
magnetic tape or in any other form of mechanical or electronic data
retrieval mechanism obtained by a mechanical or other process
which in itself ensures the accuracy of such printout as a copy of
such entry and such printout contains the certificate in accordance
with the provisions of section 2A.]
Section 2A - Conditions in the printout
A printout of entry or a copy of printout referred to in subsection (8) of section

2 shall be accompanied by the following, namely: -
(a) a certificate to the effect that it is a printout of such entry or a copy

of such printout by the principal accountant or branch manager; and
(b) a certificate by a person in-charge of computer system containing

a brief descriptions of the computer system and the particulars of-
(A) the safeguards adopted by the system to ensure that data is

entered or any other operation performed only by authorised
persons;
(B) the safeguards adopted to prevent and detect unauthorised

change of data;
(C) the safeguards available to retrieve data that is lost due to

systemic failure or any other reasons;
(D) the manner in which data is transferred from the system to

removable media like floppies, discs, tapes or other electro-
magnetic data storage devices;
(E) the mode of verification in order to ensure that data has been
accurately transferred to such removable media;
(F) the mode of identification of such data storage devices;
(G) the arrangements for the storage and custody of such storage
devices;
(H) the safeguards to prevent and detect any tampering with the
system; and any other factor which will vouch for the integrity
and accuracy of the system.
(c) a further certificate from the person in-charge of the computer system
to the effect that to the best of his knowledge and behalf, such
computer system operated properly at the material time, he was
provided with all the relevant data and the printout in question
represents correctly, or is appropriately derived from, the relevant
data.
Section 4 - Mode of proof of entries in bankers’ books
Subject to the provisions of this Act, a certified copy of any entry in a banker’s
book shall in all legal proceedings be received as prima facie evidence of the
existence of such entry, and shall be admitted as evidence of the matters,
transactions and accounts therein recorded in every case where, and to the
same extent as, the original entry itself is now by law admissible, but not further
or otherwise.
v. In AIR 1962 Cal 325 at 336, the Calcutta High Court held that the
books were not certified according to the Bankers’ Books Evidence
Act for the reason that the Certificate did not have the following
written at the foot of such copy:
“that it is a true copy of such entry, that such entry is contained

in one of the ordinary books of the bank and was made in the
usual and Ordinary course of business, and that such book
is still in the custody of the Bank, such certificate being dated
and subscribed by the principal accountant or manager of the
bank with his name and official title.”
In the instant case also, the certificate which is appended to the

banking documents relied upon do not observe most of these restrictions. It
is therefore, not certified under the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act.
vi. It is further submitted that even it was assumed that those documents
were relevant and admissible under Section 34 of the Evidence Act,
they could be, in view of the plain language of that Section, used
only as corroborative evidence, but in absence of any independent
evidence to prove the payments alleged therein the documents were
of no avail to the prosecution. In (1998) 3 SCC 410, [1998] 1 SCR
1153, CBI V. V.C. Shukla & Ors., the Hon’ble Supreme Court held:
“From a plain reading of the Section, it is manifest that to make

an entry relevant thereunder it must be shown that it has been
made in a book, that book is a book of account and that book
of account has been regularly kept in the course of business.
From the above Section, it is also manifest that even if the
above requirements are fulfilled and the entry becomes
admissible as relevant evidence, still, the statement made
therein shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any
person with liability. It is thus seen that while the first part of
the section speaks of the relevancy of the entry as evidence,
the second part speaks, in a negative way, of its evidentiary
value for charging a person with a liability. It will, therefore,
be necessary for us to first ascertain whether the entries in
the documents, with which we are concerned, fulfil the
requirements of the above section so as to be admissible in
evidence and if this question is answered in the affirmative
then only its probative value need be assessed.”
In AIR 1967 SC 1058 [1967] 1 SCR 898, C. Goswami V. The Gauhati Bank
Ltd.,
“But no person can be charged with liability on the basis of

mere entries whether the entries produced are the original
entries or copies under s. 4 of the Bankers’ Books Evidence
Act.”
vii. Further, it is to be noted that not even a single credit entry in any
of the Bank Statements, whether of Allahabad Bank or of Standard
Chartered Bank, has been shown, evidencing misappropriation of
any part of sale proceeds by Justice Sen.
viii. Mere intermingling of funds between two bank accounts and transfer
to Lynx India Ltd. cannot be sufficient to prove the charge of
misappropriation of sale proceeds against Justice Sen.
ix. Disbursements made from 22 May, 1997, till 1 July, 1997, from the
400 A/c was towards payments of workers dues pursuant to order
dated 20.1.1997 [See Exhibit C-212, Page 2217-2219] (Page 1565-
1567 of Vol. III)]. Amount of Rs. 22,70,454/- was disbursed by the
erstwhile Receiver during 14 May, 1997 to 12 June, 1997, evidenced
by the copies of cheques issued to workers annexed at Pages 1675
to 1607 in Volume IV-[Exhibit C-213, Page 2221 to Exhibit C-262,
Page 2319). Hence, it counteracts the charge of misappropriation of

the above amount.
D. Witnesses before Judges Inquiry Committee.
i. None of the persons who were associated with the inquiry conducted
by the Single Judge against Justice Sen and who had adduced
documents and deposed affidavits were called as witness before the
Committee to depose. It may be noted that the Committee is relying
upon the same documents and records of the Calcutta High Court.
ii. Smt. Anjana Guha of Allahabad Bank, who had filed Affidavits (Exhibit
C-63, Page 1587-1592) and deposed (Exhibit C-64, Page 1593-1604)
during the course of inquiry before the Single Judge was not called
to depose before the Committee. Even those Affidavit and Deposition
do not state whether she was working in Allahabad Bank at the
relevant period of time when the concerned transactions took place.
iii. In place of Anjana Guha, Shwetang Rukhsaria of Allahabad Bank was

called to depose, who could only verify the signature of Anjana Guha.
Mr. Rukhsaria in his examination deposed that he had been working
in Allahabad bank for only one year and seven months. Clearly he
has no personal knowledge of the concerned transactions.
iv. Similar was the case of Standard Chartered Bank, Mr. Arindam
Sarkar, who deposed as witness on behalf of Stan Chart Bank had
no first hand knowledge of the transactions. Prabir Das of Standard
Chartered Bank, who had produced the documents and deposed
on 12 December, 2005 (Exhibit C-65, Page 1605-1612) and on
9 January, 2006 (Exhibit C-66, Page 1613-1616) before the Calcutta
High Court, did not appear before the Committee.
v. Further, as noted above, the accounts produced by both the Banks

are not in accordance with the provisions with the Banker’s Books
of Evidence Act, 1891. From the above provisions, it is manifest
that those books of account cannot be looked into. If at all they can
be looked into, its evidentiary value will only be prima facie. [See
Sec. 4 r/w Section 2(8) and Sec. 2A of Banker’s Books of Evidence
Act, 1891]
vi. The Assistant Registrar of Calcutta High Court, who has been deputed
by the Registrar (OS) to depose before the Committee, stated during
his cross-examination that Accounts Department takes care of

Receiver’s account subject to fulfillment of Original Side Rules and
that Exhibit C-79 (wherein it is stated that the erstwhile Receiver had
not filed the accounts) was the report of the Calcutta High Court’s
Accounts Department. However, he was unable to throw any light
on the basis on which Report was made as he was admittedly not
associated with the preparation of the said Report nor with the High
Court’s Accounts Department ever.
vii. PK Acharjee, Official Liquidator, who had submitted the above Report
before the High Court, also did not depose before the Committee.
Instead, Mr. Achyuthramaiah, Deputy OL, was called as witness.
viii. Thus, the witnesses before the Committee were ignoramus and not
competent to prove the documents relied upon. Hence, the contents
of the document have no evidentiary value and, thus, are not
proved.
V STANDARD OF PROOF
1. In the present impeachment proceedings a Judge of the High Court who is

a constitutional functionary is proposed to be removed from that office by process
of impeachment under Article 124 read with Article 217(1)(b) of the Constitution
of India for a proved misconduct. The question which arises is what should be
the standard of proof. Is mere suspicion enough or the standard of proof is as
in the case of a civil matter or is it as high as in a criminal matter. It is submitted
that the standard of proof must be as high as in the criminal case and a person
occupying an office of a constitutional post cannot be removed on a mere
suspicion or merely on the ground of probability. It is submitted that the alleged
misconduct must be proved beyond a shadow of doubt. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court in several judgments relating to election petitions challenging the election
of returned candidates to Parliament or to the State Legislature has consistently
held that the alleged corrupt practice allegedly committed by a returned candidate
must be established beyond a reasonable doubt and that the standard of proof
is as high as in the criminal case. The basic reason behind this is that a peoples’
mandate which is a democratic mandate cannot be set at naught lightly.
2. Similarly, the process of appointing the High Court Judge is preceded by

all relevant inquiries regarding competence, integrity, etc. and that he is
appointed in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court and other
puisne Judges of the High Court and also in consultation with the Chief Justice
of India and other puisne Judges of the Supreme Court. On the basis of such
recommendations, the Central Government decides to appoint a person as a

High Court Judge and requests the President to issue the necessary warrant.
Even at the stage of the matter pending before the President it is open to the
President to make appropriate inquiries and then issue the warrant. In
appropriate cases the President may send back the proposal as it often
happens in the recent years. The point to be emphasized is that the selection
of a High Court Judge is through a very detailed procedure involving high
constitutional functionaries and, therefore, their decision to appoint a High Court
Judge cannot be lightly set at naught by impeaching the Judge.
3. In the present case, it is not in dispute that at the time of elevation of the
respondent, his appointment as a Receiver was known to the Calcutta High
Court Judges and, therefore, it is reasonable to presume that the Judges of
the Supreme Court were also aware of the same and that the Government
and the President also were aware of this fact. The respondent was elevated
in December, 2003 while he was still a Receiver. He was Receiver for 19 years
and, therefore, whether he has committed a default or not is also a question
which is deemed to have been examined by high constitutional functionaries
and, therefore, his appointment by the Hon’ble President as per the prescribed
procedure cannot be set at naught unless the charges against him are proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
4. It is respectfully submitted that the petitioner has failed to establish a case

of misappropriation against the respondent not only beyond reasonable doubt,
but has failed to bring on record any cogent material to hold that the
respondent who was appointed as Receiver in the year 1984 has
misappropriated either temporarily or permanently any sums/monies which he
received as a Receiver.
5. In the case of Sarojini Ramaswamy v. Union of India (1992) 4 SCC page

509, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 140 on pages 601 and 602 has,
inter-alia, held that the Committee (i.e. the Committee appointed under the
Judges Inquiry Act, 1968) has no other function except to adjudicate upon the
dispute of “proved guilt, proved guilty or not guilty”. The Committee must apply
the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt and make a finding that the
misbehavior or incapacity of the Judge has been proved.
6. In the case of Devi Prasad v. Maluram Singhani & Ors. reported as 1969
(3) SCC 595 (SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment in paragraph 8
of page 602 has held that it must be remembered that the proceedings
involving proof of corrupt practices are of a quasi criminal nature and it must
be proved beyond doubt and that all the necessary facts which would establish
the commission of corrupt practice must be proved beyond doubt.
7. In the case of Ch. Razik Ram v. Ch. Jaswant Singh Chouhan & Ors. 1975
(4) SCC page 769, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 15 while dealing
with the standard of proof in an election petition, held that the trial of an election
petition being in the nature of an accusation bearing the indelible stamp of
quasi criminal action, the standard of proof is the same as in the criminal trial.
The respondent against whom the charge of corrupt practice is leveled is
proved to be innocent unless proved guilty. A grave and heavy onus rests on
the accuser to establish each and every ingredient of the charge by clear,
unequivocal and unimpeachable evidence beyond reasonable doubt. The
Hon’ble Court has further observed that in a civil case, a mere preponderance
of probability may be an adequate basis of the decision, but in an election
petition and in criminal matters a far higher degree of assurance and judicial
certitude is required for conviction and, therefore, charge of corrupt practice
cannot be established by mere balance of probabilities and if after due
consideration of evidence the court is left with a reasonable doubt, it must hold
that the corrupt practice is not proved.
8. In the case of S.N. Balakrishnan v. George Fernandes, 1969 (3) SCC page
238, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the trial of an election petition
is made in accordance with the Civil Procedure Code, yet the corrupt practice
must be proved in the same way as a criminal charge is proved. In other words,
the election petitioner must exclude every hypothesis except that of guilt on
the part of the returned candidate.
9. Section 33 of the Evidence Act provides that in certain situations evidence

of witness given in a previous proceeding may be admitted as evidence in a
letter proceeding subject to requirements of the section itself.
10. The general rule of evidence is that it must be direct, and hence section
33 being an exception to the said rule must be construed in the strictest sense
before it is applied in a given situation.
11. In order to be able to get the benefit of the aforesaid section, it must be
clearly established by the party placing reliance thereupon that:-
* the witness is dead, or
* the witness cannot be found, or

* the witness is incapable of giving evidence, or
* the witness is being kept out way by the adverse party, or
* the presence of the witness cannot be obtained without delay or

expense.
12. Hence, before this section can be invoked the aforesaid conditions must
be both pleaded and established. Therefore, it the prosecution has neither
pleaded nor established that the requirements of the section are satisfied in
the facts of the case, it cannot seek to rely upon the said section or derive
benefit thereunder.
13. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court while interpreting section 33 in

Mr. Padam Chandra Singh & Ors. v. Dr. Praful B. Desai and Ors. reported in
(2008)110 Bom LR 795 held:
“15. The depositions are in general admissible only

after proof that the persons who made them cannot be
produced before the Court to give evidence. It is only in cases
where the production of the primary evidence is beyond the
party’s power that secondary evidence of oral testimony is
admissible.
16. It is an elementary right of a litigant in civil suit that

a witness, who is to testify against him, should give his
evidence before the Court trying the case, the adverse party
gets an opportunity to cross-examine............the court has the
opportunity of seeing the witness and observing his demeanour
and can, thus, form a better opinion as to his reliability rather
than reading a statement or deposition given by that witness
in a previous judicial proceeding or in an early stage of the same
judicial proceeding.
17. Where a statute i.e. the Evidence Act, makes

provision for exceptional cases where it is impossible for the
witness to be before the Court, the court is expected to be
careful to see that the conditions on which the statute permits
previous evidence given by the witness to be read are strictly
complied with. Previous statement of a witness not appearing
in Court cannot be taken on record under section 33 without
strict proof of the conditions justifying it before taking it on
record.”
10. It has been held by the privy Council in the case of

Chainchal Singh v. Emperor, reported in AIR 1946 PC I, as
regards section 33 that:
“4. Where it is desired to have recourse to this section on the

ground that a witnesses incapable of giving evidence that fact
must be proved, and proved strictly. It is an elementary right
of an accused person or a litigant in a civil suit that a witness
who is to testify against him should give his evidence before
the court trying the case which then has the opportunity of
seeing the witness and observing his demeanour and can thus
form a far better opinion as to his reliability than is possible
from reading a statement or deposition. It is necessary that
provision should be made for exceptional cases where it is
impossible for the witness to be before the court, and it is only
by a statutory provision that this can be achieved. But the court
must be careful to see that the conditions on which the statute
permits previous evidence given by the witness to be read are
strictly proved. In a civil case a party can if he chooses waive
the proof, but in a criminal case strict proof ought to be given
that the witness is incapable of giving evidence.”
14. Even when in a given case the main part of the section is satisfied (which
is not satisfied in the present case), the section requires 3 prerequisites (by
way of provisos) to be established before the evidence of the earlier proceeding
can be admitted, namely:
* The first proceeding must be between same parties;
* The adverse party in the previous proceeding must have an

opportunity to cross-examine the said witness;
* And the questions in issue were substantially the same as in the

first proceeding.
15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sashi Jena v. Khadal Swain
reported in (2004) 4 SCC 236 has held that to attract section 33 of the Evidence
Act, the three prerequisite mentioned in the section must be satisfied to attract
the section and if any one of the prerequisites is not satisfied the said section
will not be attracted.
16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of V.M. Matthew v. V.S. Sharma
reported in (1995) 6 SCC 122 while discussing section 33 stated that “the proviso
(to section 33) lays down the acid test that the statement of a particular witness
should have been tested by both parties by examination and cross examination
in order to make it admissible in later proceedings.”
17. In view of the above, it is submitted:
* The prosecution in the present case is heavily relying upon the

depositions and affidavits made before the learned Single Judge.
The witnesses who gave the depositions and the affidavits have not
been produced before this Committee.
* However, in terms of the requirement of the main part of section

33 itself, the Prosecution has neither pleaded nor proved that direct
evidence of such witness could not be produced on account of the
circumstances mentioned in the said section.
* In fact, the prosecution has not even sought to rely upon section
33 to support the admissibility of the evidence sought to be
produced by it, let alone seeking to establish that the conditions and
prerequisites of the said section have been satisfied.
* The witnesses that were produced before the Committee could only
prove the factum of the said affidavits being tendered and
depositions being given before the Ld. Single Judge; they were,
however, not competent to prove the truth and other contents of
the affidavits or the depositions.
* In the proceedings before the Ld. Single Judge, the Respondent i.e.
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Soumitra Sen was admittedly not a party.
* He was not a party and he did not have a chance to cross-examine

the witnesses before the Ld. Single Judge.
* As none of the conditions required to be satisfied u/s 33 are fulfilled

(either of the main part or the provisos), the evidence is not
admissible before the High Power Committee.
* The evidence led by the prosecution before this committee is not

direct evidence and hence is not admissible. It cannot also be
admitted under section 33 because it has neither been pleaded by
the prosecution nor have they been able to establish that conditions
enumerated in the said section are satisfied.
18. In the instant case mere non submission/non filing of the accounts by the
Receiver (which is an irregularity) would not point out towards the conclusion
that there was an (intentional) misappropriation on his part.
19. Mere non-filing of the accounts would not lead to the conclusion of Mens
Rea being evident in the instant transaction.
20. It has been held in the case of Abdula v. State reported in (1980) 3 SCC
110 and in the case of Changa Reddy v. State of A.P. reported in (1996) 10
SCC 193, that mere violation of rules and procedure does not amount to an
offence. In the instant case the lapse on the part of the Receiver in not filing/
submitting the account does not amount to any offence especially there is no
evidence of Mens Rea.
21. The circumstance relied upon by the prosecution do not lead to the
irresistible conclusion that the circumstances are compatible only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the receiver. The acts of omission and commission,
which are attributed to the Receiver, by themselves, do not establish the
commission of the offence alleged against him. The aforesaid acts may give
rise to suspicion, howsoever strong it may be, cannot take the place of the
proof. In the instant proceedings the burden of proving the same lies on the
prosecution.
22. In the case of Ranjit Singh v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2005) 5

SCC 294, the law as laid down in the aforesaid cases has been approved and
it has been held that merely not following the rules or irregularities or lapses or
violation of provisions and rules would not automatically result in commission
of an offence. The prosecution will have to establish the essential ingredients of
the offence which is Mens Rea.
23. In the instant case there is no allegation of fraud, misappropriation, criminal

breach of trust against the Receiver either by the plaintiff or by
the defendant. In such circumstances there is no question of Mens Rea
which would lead towards an inescapable conclusion of commission of an
offence.
VI. ARTICLE 20(3)
It is not in dispute that in the present proceedings, a specific allegation of

misappropriation is made against the respondent. This allegation clearly has
criminal connotation. The proceedings before this Committee, therefore, clearly

partake of criminal character and, as such, the basic notions of criminal law
adumbrated herein below are applicable:
1. There is a presumption of innocence in favour of the respondent;
2. The entire onus of establishing the charge of misappropriation is on the

other side;
3. The respondent has a right to maintain silence. This right not only flows
out of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, but also from the basic
principles of criminal law. Article 20(3) reads as follows:
“No person accused of any offence shall be compelled

to be a witness against himself.”
The wording of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India

can be compared to the 5 th Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. The 5th Amendment reads as follows:
“No person... ... shall be compelled in any criminal

case to be a witness against himself”
4. Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution does not refer to a criminal case.
All that Article 20(3) lays down is that a person accused of an offence has the
protection of that article. Therefore, the sweep of Article 20(3) of the Indian
Constitution is much wider than the 5th Amendment of American Constitution.
By judicial interpretation, the American Supreme Court has given a very wide
connotation to the 5th Amendment. The privilege against self-incrimination has
been held to apply to witnesses as well as parties in proceedings both of civil
and criminal nature and it covers documentary evidence and oral evidence and
extends to all disclosures, including answers which by themselves support
criminal conviction or furnishing a link in the chain of evidence needed for
conviction.
5. The other side has repeatedly invoked the provisions of Section 106 of
the Evidence Act on the ground that once it is admitted by the respondent that
he has received the amount in question, it is for him to explain how the same
has been dealt with. This argument is misplaced as it ignores a basic principle
that where the allegations are of a criminal nature, the onus is on the one who
makes the allegation and it is only after all the ingredients of the alleged offence
are established then only under section 106 of the Evidence Act the onus shifts.
The respondent remaining silent cannot be a substitute for the evidence to be
produced by the Petitioner whether the Respondent has misappropriated funds

or not can also be established on the basis of the record required to be
maintained by Lynx about deposits made by the Respondent.
6. The case of the respondent has been throughout that the monies received
by him are invested in Lynx India. Whether the monies are invested in Lynx
India or not can be easily established from the records of Lynx India, therefore,
the other side also has access to the information in the form of records
maintained by Lynx India. The failure of the other side to do so cannot be held
against the respondent by taking recourse to provisions of Section 106 of the
Evidence Act. As has been pointed out that under relevant directives of the
RBI Act, Lynx India which is a non-banking financial company has to maintain
a register of depositors giving the following details:
“(16) Register of deposit:
(i) Every non-banking financial company shall keep one or more

registers in respect of all deposits in which shall be entered
separately in the case of each depositor the following particulars,
namely -
(a) Name and address of the depositor;
(b) Date and amount of each deposit;
(c) Duration and the due date of each deposit;
(d) Date and amount of accrued interest or premium on each

deposit;
(e) Date of claim made by the depositor;
(f) Date and amount of each repayment, whether of principal,

interest or premium;
(g) The reasons for delay in repayment beyond five working days;
(h) Any other particulars relating to the deposit.”
7. Unfortunately, this register is not on the record of the Official Liquidator who
has been appointed in respect of Lynx India which is in liquidation. The
representative of the Official Liquidator has admitted in his evidence before
this Committee that some record of the Lynx India is lying with the Calcutta
Police and the Official Liquidator has not been able to retrieve the same. This
register would establish when the deposits were made by the respondent and
when they matured and what is the interest that is earned and whether the
amounts deposited were re-invested or not. The report and the information
submitted by the Official Liquidator clearly shows that in 1999 a sum of approx.
Rs. 66 lacs was to the credit of the respondent as per the record available with
the Official Liquidator.
8. In view of these circumstances, the argument based on Section 106 of the

Evidence Act is totally misconceived. In this connection, the attention of the
Hon’ble Committee is drawn to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer, reported as (1956) S.C.R. 199 at 205.
In that case, S.N. Mehra who was clerk in the office of the Divisional Engineer
Telegraphs, Ajmer was convicted of offences under Sections 420 IPC and (2) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The substance of the allegation was that
he obtained a sum totalling to about Rupees 23 and 12 Anna from the
Government as T.A. for two journeys. The money represents the 2nd Class
Railway fare. The allegation against him was that either he did not travel at all
or if he did, he did not pay the fare. In this context, Section 106 of the Evidence
Act was pressed into service and the burden was placed on him to establish
that in fact he did travel and that he spent the amount in question. The Apex
Court held on page 205 of the report that from the registers and books of the
Railway and of the Department the prosecutor was in a position to know and
prove the official movements of the employee concerned and this information
was as much within the knowledge of the accused and also the prosecution.
The prosecutor has sought to charge him on the ground that the accused was
unable to produce a ticket and also was not in a position to give any explanation
for the same. In this context and with reference to Section 106 of the Evidence
Act, the Apex Court observed as follows on page 204:
“Illustration (b) to section 106 has obvious reference

to a very special type of case, namely to offences under
sections 112 and 113 of the Indian Railways Act for travelling
or attempting to travel without a pass or ticket or with an
insufficient pass, etc. Now if a passenger is seen in a railway
carriage, or at the ticket barrier, and is unable to produce a
ticket or explain his presence, it would obviously be impossible
in most cases for the railway to prove, or even with due
diligence to find out, where he came from and where he is
going and whether or not he purchased a ticket. On the other
hand, it would be comparatively simple for the passenger
either to produce his pass or ticket or, in the case of loss or
of some other valid explanation, to set it out; and so far as

proof is concerned, it would be easier for him to prove the
substance of his explanation than for the State to establish
its falsity.
We recognize that an illustration does not exhaust the

full content of the section which it illustrates but equally it can
neither curtail nor expand its ambit; and if knowledge of certain
facts is as much available to the prosecution, should it choose
to exercise due diligence, as to the accused, the facts cannot
be said to be “especially” within the knowledge of the accused.
This is a section which must be considered in a commonsense
way; and the balance of convenience and the disproportion
of the labour that would be involved in finding out and proving
certain facts balanced against the triviality of the issue at stake
and the ease with which the accused could prove them, are
all matters that must be taken into consideration. The section
cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law
that, save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is
on the prosecution and never shifts.”
VII. SECTION 106 OF EVIDENCE ACT
1. In the case of Ambalal v. Union of India & Ors. (1961) 1 SCR 933, the
question of onus under section 106 of the Evidence Act arose before the
Constitution Bench of five Judges of the Apex Court. In the said case, the
Customs authorities recovered 10 articles from the house of the appellant which
were in the nature of silver slabs, pieces of gold bullion, etc. The Customs
authorities held that the goods were imported by the appellant into India in
contravention of Import-Export Control Act read with the Sea Customs Act and
the Land Customs Act, after the Customs barrier was raised against Pakistan
in March, 1948.
2. The contention of the appellant was, that 5 articles had been brought by
him in India from Pakistan in 1947 after partition and that with respect to the
other 5 articles he was the bonafide purchaser thereof. There was no evidence
adduced by the Customs authorities to establish that the goods were smuggled
into India after raising of the Customs barrier in March, 1948 and the onus was
sought to be put on the appellant for proving the import of the goods. The onus
was sought to be shifted on the appellant by reason of Section 178A of the
Sea Customs Act and Section 5 of the Land Customs Act, along with Section
106 of the Evidence Act.
3. The Apex Court rejected the application of Section 178A to the said case
on the ground that Section 178A was inserted in 1955 and was prospective in
nature, whereas the confiscation order was passed in 1952. As regards Section
5 of the Land Customs Act, the Court held that the application of this section
is conditioned by the legal requirement to obtain a permit for passage of goods
and, therefore, the same also was not relevant. With regard to the application
under section 106 of the Evidence Act, the Apex Court held that the onus was
on the Customs authorities to prove that the goods were brought into India
after the Customs barrier was established in March, 1948. The Apex Court
observed that under this Section, only a fact which is especially within the
knowledge of a person has to be proved by him, the said Section cannot be
used to undermine the well established rule of law that, save in a very
exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts.
4. The Apex Court held that, in case Section 106 of Evidence Act is to be
applied, then by analogy the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence
must equally be invoked. If so, it follows that the onus to prove the case against
the appellant is on the Customs authorities and they failed to discharge that
burden.
RAJYA SABHA
Parliamentary Bulletin
PART-II
No. 48696 TUESDAY, AUGUST 09, 2011
Legislative Section
NO-DAY-YET-NAMED MOTIONS LIST NO. 3
Motion admitted under rule 170
BY SHRI SITARAM YECHURY

SHRI PRASANTA CHATTERJEE
SHRI ARUN JAITLEY:
86. “This House do consider the Report of Inquiry Committee in regard to

investigation and proof of the misbehaviour alleged against Shri Soumitra Sen,
Judge, High Court of Calcutta which was laid on the table of the House on
10 November, 2010.”
V.K. AGNIHOTRI
Secretary-General
RAJYA SABHA
REVISED LIST OF BUSINESS

Wednesday, 17 August, 2011
Ψ
MOTIONS
*A Motion for presenting an Address under article 217 read with clause (4)
of article 124 of the Constitution
SHRI SITARAM YECHURY

SHRI ARUN JAITLEY to move the following motion:—
“This House resolves that an address be presented to the President for removal
from office of Justice Soumitra Sen of the Calcutta High Court on the
following two grounds of misconduct:—
(1) Misappropriation of large sums of money, which he received in his

(2) Misrepresented facts with regard to the misappropriation of money

*B. Motion for considering the Report of the Inquiry Committee constituted
to investigate into the grounds on which removal of Shri Soumitra Sen,
Judge, Calcutta High Court was prayed for
SHRI SITARAM YECHURY

SHRI ARUN JAITLEY to move the following motion:—
“This House do consider the Report of the Inquiry Committee in regard to

investigation and proof of the misbehaviour alleged against Shri Soumitra
Sen, Judge, High Court of Calcutta which was laid on the Table of the
House on the 10th November, 2010.”
%C. ADDRESS TO THE PRESIDENT UNDER CLAUSE (4) OF ARTICLE 124

OF THE CONSTITUTION
“WHEREAS a notice was given of a motion for presenting an address

to the President praying for the removal of Shri Soumitra Sen, from his
Ψ At 3-00 P.M.
* Items at A and B to be taken up together.
% Item at C to be put to the vote together with Motion at Item A.
Item for List of Business, Rajya Sabha dated 17 August, 2011 301
office as a Judge of the High Court at Calcutta by fifty-seven members

of the Council of States (as specified in the Annexure ‘A’ attached
herewith#);
AND WHEREAS the said motion was admitted by the Chairman of the Council
of States;
AND WHEREAS an Inquiry Committee consisting of—
(a) Shri B. Sudershan Reddy, a Judge of the Supreme Court of India;
(b) Shri Mukul Mudgal, Chief Justice of the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh; and
(c) Shri Fali S. Nariman, a distinguished jurist, was appointed by the

Chairman of the Council of States for the purpose of making an
investigation into the grounds on which the removal of the said Shri
Soumitra Sen from his office as a Judge of the High Court at
Calcutta has been prayed for,
AND WHEREAS the said Inquiry Committee has, after an investigation made
by it, submitted a report containing a finding to the effect that
Shri Soumitra Sen is guilty of the misbehaviour specified in such report
(a copy of which is enclosed and marked as Annexure ‘B’)@;
AND WHEREAS the motion afore-mentioned, having been adopted by the

Council of States in accordance with the provisions of clause (4) of article
124 of the Constitution of India, the misbehaviour of the said Shri
Soumitra Sen is deemed, under sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Judges
(Inquiry) Act, 1968, to have been proved;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Council of States requests the President to pass an

order for the removal of the said Shri Soumitra Sen from his office as a
Judge of the High Court at Calcutta.”
NEW DELHI; V.K. AGNIHOTRI
16 August, 2011 Secretary-General
# See Item A above.

@ The Report of the Inquiry Committee was laid on the Table of the House on the
10 November, 2010.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE
RAJYA SABHA DATED THE
17 AUGUST, 2011 AND
18 AUGUST, 2011
OBSERVATION BY THE CHAIRMAN
MR. CHAIRMAN: Hon. Members, the House will now take up the Motion for
presenting an Address to the President for removal of Justice Soumitra Sen,
Judge, High Court of Calcutta from his office together with the Motion for
considering the Report of the Inquiry Committee constituted to investigate into
the grounds on which removal of Justice Soumitra Sen, Judge, Calcutta High
Court was prayed for.
Before calling the mover to move the Motion, I wish to inform the Members
the procedure that I propose to follow.
After the motions are moved and the mover of the motion has spoken, I shall
call Justice Soumitra Sen to present his defence. After the presentation, Justice
Sen shall withdraw.
The House will then proceed to consider the motion and Members will
participate in the discussion on the motion.
I would urge upon the Members to make precise and short speeches restricting
themselves broadly to the findings of the Inquiry Committee, as contained in
its Report. I also seek cooperation of the Members in maintaining the dignity
of the House during the presentation of Justice Soumitra Sen to the House in
keeping with the solemnity of the occasion.
After all the Members have spoken, the mover will reply to the discussion.
Thereafter, I shall put the Motion for presenting an Address to the President
received under article 217 read with clause (4) of the article 124 of the
Constitution, and, the Address to the President together to the vote of the
House in terms of Rule 16(4) of the Judges Inquiry Rules, 1969.
I may inform the Members that the Motion and the Address are required to be
adopted by a majority of the total membership of the House, and, by a majority
of not less than two-thirds of the Members of the House present and voting in
terms of clause (4) of article 124 of the Constitution, and, presented to the
President in the same Session.
The matter pertaining to the removal of a Judge is very serious, and, may be
dealt with in a careful and sound manner.
I request the Members not to repeat the points and not to bring in any
extraneous matter while speaking on the Motion. Since the time allowed for
discussion is four hours, excluding the ninety minutes time, which is the time
allotted to the Judge for his defence, I would urge the Members to restrict
themselves to the facts mentioned in the Judges Inquiry Committee Report
and the reply of the Judge. Both the documents have been circulated to the
Members on 10th November, 2010, and, on 21st February, 2011, respectively.
Marshal.
MARSHAL: Yes, Sir.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Is Justice Soumitra Sen in attendance?
MARSHAL: Yes, Sir.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Bring him to the Bar of the House.
(Justice Soumitra Sen was then brought to the Bar of the House)
MOTION FOR PRESENTING AN ADDRESS UNDER ARTICLE 217 READ

WITH CLAUSE (4) OF ARTICLE 124 OF THE CONSTITUTION TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR REMOVAL FROM OFFICE OF JUSTICE SOUMITRA SEN
OF THE CALCUTTA HIGH COURT;
AND
MOTION FOR CONSIDERING THE REPORT OF THE INQUIRY

COMMITTEE CONSTITUTED TO INVESTIGATE INTO THE GROUNDS ON
WHICH REMOVAL OF SHRI SOUMITRA SEN, JUDGE, CALCUTTA HIGH
COURT WAS PRAYED FOR.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Shri Yechury may now move the motions and speak.
SHRI SITARAM YECHURY (WEST BENGAL): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Sir.
I rise, Mr. Chairman, Sir, to move these motions in response to the call of duty
to my country and my Constitution. Particularly, I rise at a time when waves of
protests are taking place all across the country on the issue of corruption at
high places. But, I think, though by accident and not by design, these motions
are conning up for debate before us in this august House very fortuitously and
it is happening at a time when the Parliament can also exercise its will and
resolve of fighting corruption in high places. And it is in that context I rise to
Proceedings of the Rajya Sabha 307
move these motions, as you have mentioned, fully conscious of the solemnity
of the occasion. I also rise with a deep sense of anguish to move these
motions. I shall return to these aspects a little later. Let me first move these
motions.
Sir I beg to move the following motion:
This House resolves that an address be presented to the

President for removal from office of Justice Soumitra Sen of
the Calcutta High Court on the following two grounds of
misconduct :
(iii) Misappropriation of large sums of money, which he received in his

(iv) Misrepresented facts with regard to misappropriation of money

Sir, I also move the following motion:
This House do consider the Report of the Inquiry Committee in regard to

investigation and proof of the misbehaviour alleged against Shri Soumitra Sen,
Judge, High Court of Calcutta which was laid on the Table of the House on
the 10th November, 2010.
Sir, as I have said, I moved these motions fully conscious of the solemnity of
the occasion. This arises from the fact that it is for the first time that this august
House is considering the invocation of our Constitutional provisions for the
adoption of such motions. This has not happened in our history so far.
Sir, I also wish to categorically state that by moving this motion we are not
moving against the judiciary as a whole which we hold in the highest of esteem.
This is not a motion questioning the integrity of the judiciary. This is a motion
against one Judge who has been found to have indulged in conduct that
constitutes the definition of misbehaviour within the meaning of our Constitution.
It thus makes this Judge unsuitable to occupy the exalted office of a Judge of
a High Court. Individual acts of misbehaviour can’t find refuge, Mr. Chairman,
Sir, behind the integrity of the judiciary as a whole. The issue is one of infallibility
and, therefore, the integrity of one individual Judge and not the integrity of the
judiciary as a whole. This motion is, therefore, moved, as I have said, not to
question the integrity but to strengthen that very integrity of our judiciary from
being besmirched by one act of a single Judge.
Mr. Chairman, Sir, our Constitution very rightly provides the judiciary with a
very important position and role. People’s faith in the independence and integrity
of our judiciary is a very crucial element in the functioning and maturing of
our democracy. It would be a very sad day if this faith of the people is
undermined due to the acts of conduct of an individual member. The judiciary
is held in high esteem by both the people and the system as it dispenses with
justice and is one of the important organs of our State. The Judges are correctly
assumed to be people of character, honesty and integrity who discharge their
duties and functions without fear or favour in the spirit of upholding justice. It
is, therefore, a call of duty to the nation to correct any aberration that may
lead to the undermining of this faith. I have moved this motion in response to
this call of duty.
As I have said, Sir, I moved these motions also with a deep sense of anguish.
There is no sense of frivolity or elafiah, neither is there any sense of
vindictiveness or retribution. These motions are, therefore, moved with full
sanction of our Constitution and in accordance with these provisions.
Sir, my grandfather retired as a Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court when
I was eight years old and I learnt at that time that a Judge is not a Judge only
in the court, but a Judge is a Judge everywhere else in the society and that
his acts, inside or outside the court, are reflection on the judiciary as a whole.
I think this spirit has been contained in the Inquiry Report to which, Sir, you
wanted us to confine. When the Inquiry Report comments on the character
of a judge, both inside and outside the court—I read from this; in order to
establish the charge — that since these acts of misbehaviour were committed
when Justice Soumitra Sen was not a member of the Bench or not a judge,
therefore, they cannot be applicable, that I think is untenable on these grounds.
I quote from the Inquiry Committee Report. It says, “A judge of the High Court
is placed on a high pedestal in our Constitution simply because Judges of High
Courts like Judges of the Supreme Court have functions and wield powers
of life and death over citizens and inhabitants of this country, such as are not
wielded by any other public body or authority. It is a power coupled with a duty,
on the part of the Judge to act honourably at all times whether in court or out
of court. Citation of case law is superfluous because the categories of
‘misbehaviour’ are never closed. In interpreting Articles 124 (4) and (5) and
the provisions of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 and when considering any
question relating to the removal of a Judge of the higher Judiciary from his
office, it must not be forgotten that it was to secure to the people of India a
fearless and independent judiciary that the Judges of Superior Courts were
granted a special position in the Constitution with complete immunity from
premature removal from the office except by the cumbersome process
prescribed in Articles 124 (4) and (5) read with the law enacted by Parliament,
the Judges Inquiry Act, 1968.
The very vastness of the powers vested in the Higher Judiciary and the
extraordinary immunity granted to Judges of the High Courts and of the
Supreme Court require that Judges should be fearless and independent and
that they should adopt a high standard of rectitude so as to inspire confidence
in members of the public who seek redress before them. While it is necessary
to protect the Judges from motivated and malicious attacks, it is also necessary
to protect the fair image of the institution of the Judiciary from such of those
Judges who choose to conduct themselves in a manner that would tarnish
this image. The word ‘misbehaviour’ after all is the antithesis of ‘good
behaviour’. It is a breach of the condition subsequent upon which the guarantee
of a fixed judicial tenure rests. High judicial office is essentially a public trust
and it is the right of the people through its representatives in the Parliament
to revoke this trust but only when there is ‘proved misbehaviour’.”
This, Sir, is what I think the Inquiry Committee has proven in its report that it
submitted to you which has been laid on the Table of the House.
The Constitution also provides specific provisions which are essential, as I said,
for the independence of the Judiciary, but also for safeguards in the process
of the removal of a judge. These provisions, in my opinion, are aimed at
strengthening the independence of the Judiciary rather than undermining it.
The provisions for removal, however, are the most stringent and come into
effect only in the case of ‘proved misbehaviour’.
I think, this hon. House must refresh itself with strict safeguards that have been
provided by the Constitution in order to ensure that no particular member of
the Judiciary is moved against in a spirit of vendetta or vindictiveness. These
are: (1) At least 50 Members of the Rajya Sabha or 100 Members of the Lok
Sabha must bring a motion in either House; (2) The hon. Chairman or the hon.
Speaker will apply his or her mind before admitting the motion; (3) Once
admitted, the Chairman or the Speaker will constitute a high level inquiry
committee under the Judges Inquiry Act; the concerned judge will have full
opportunity for defence before this Committee; (4) If the Committee does not
find the judge guilty, then the matter ends there with no scope of any
parliamentary or judicial review. It is only when the Committee finds the
concerned judge guilty, will the matter come up before the Parliament; (5) The
Parliament cannot decide the matter by a simple majority; a two-thirds majority
is required. The concerned judge will have the opportunity to make his defence
once again before the Parliament, in that House where it is moved. Sixthly,
both the Houses of Parliament will have to decide, by two-thirds of majority,

separately and within the same Session of Parliament. Finally, even after his
removal by the President of India, following the decision, when we adopt these
Motions today, taken up by both the Houses, the Judge in question, in
accordance with the Supreme Court’s directives, can seek redress from the
Supreme Court by way of a judicial review. Thus, Mr. Chairman, Sir, there is
very little ground to apprehend that justice will not be done to these safeguards.
Therefore, as far as the present case is concerned, we have reached the fifth
stage.
The Report of the Inquiry Committee has been laid before Parliament, on the
10th of September, as I have said, and the Report, unambiguously upholds
these charges. I quote: “Whether the grounds of misconduct, which Justice
Soumitra Sen has been charged with, if proved, amount to misbehaviour under
article 124 (4) read with article 217 (1) of proviso (b). In the opinion of the
Committee, the grounds of misconduct, as set out in the Motion, when proved,
would amount to misbehaviour under the relevant articles. Then, it proceeds
to establish this unambiguously. Sir, since you have told us about the paucity
of time, I do not want to go through a long quotation of the Inquiry Committee.
But it enlightens us how this entire concept of misbehaviour had come in the
Act of 1935, in the Constituent Assembly Debates, and how, under the present
constitutional provisions, both the charges against Justice Soumitra Sen have
been held to be valid and unambiguously held to be correct. I quote: “in view
of the findings on Charge I and Charge II above, the Inquiry Committee is of
the opinion that Justice Soumitra Sen of Calcutta High Court is guilty of
misbehaviour under article 124 read with proviso (b) to article 127 (1) of the
Constitution of India.” So, after this, I think, the matter needs to be treated as
closed. And the Inquiry Committee has, actually, provided us with all the
defence. However, since you have referred to the defence of Justice Soumitra
Sen as well, I would like to refer to one of .the aspects that he has referred to
in his defence. In his defence to the reply to the Motion submitted to the hon.
Chairman by myself and 57 others, Justice Soumitra Sen invokes, from French
history, the Dreyfus Affair. Then, he proceeds to say, “The march of time has
witnessed thousands, all over the world, wrongly persecuted in the name of
justice and for upholding the rule of law.” He then proceeds to cast aspersions
on the then Chief Justice of India, whose letter to the Prime Minister, seeking
removal of Justice Soumitra Sen, was appended to our Motion, and other
members of the highest judiciary who have either pronounced or opined against
him, to try and establish that “the verdict was already reserved even before
the trials commenced.” Now, the invocation of Dreyfus Affair, I think, is
thoroughly inappropriate. The Dreyfus Affair, all of us will know, was brought
into public domain by the famous French intellectual and writer, Emile Zola. It
was brought about at a time when the entire battle was taking place in Europe
over the formation of the nation States. It was brought about at a time when
secularism and separation of the Church from the State was a big affair in the
history of Europe. And, at that point of time, somebody caught in the crossfire
cannot be treated as an example of somebody being wronged, and abstracted
from this history, I think, it will be completely out of context to have brought
this in here. But it is from this process of evolution of human civilization, you
have the French Philosopher, Charles Montesquieu, who laid down the
benchmark, in a modern democracy, for checks and balances between these
three important organs, namely, the Executive, the Legislature and the
Judiciary. And, it is on that basis that our Constitution has also been drawn
up. And, while working out the mechanics of the three wings to play a joint
participatory role in our Constitution, we define the centrality of the will of the
people. The Preamble begins by saying, “We, the people”. This centrality of
the will of the people, is expressed through its elected representatives from
Parliament, and this centrality is supreme in our constitutional scheme of things.
And it is with this supremacy today that we are taking up this matter. And
I wish, instead of quoting the Dreyfus Affair, we would have rather recollected
what we stand for today, on the basis of what law, and whether these laws
are being violated.
But if, at all, you want to go back into history, Sir, I think it is more appropriate
to recollect the debate in the British Parliament on the Censure Motion against
Robert Clive when he was charged with amassing huge amounts of money
after the Battle of Plassey and the loot of Kolkata. And, Sir, Thomas Babington
Macaulay, the same Macaulay who is known for his infamous minute on
education in colonial India, notes, Clive at that time was trying to justify what
he did to the rapacious loot of Kolkata by saying that this was a city waiting to
be taken. People welcomed me with both extended hands, one laden with gold,
the other laden with gems and jewellery, and, then, justifying his loot, he goes
on to say, and it is in the House of Commons Records, Sir, “By God,
Mr. Chairman, at this moment, I stand astonished at my own moderation”. Now,
according to the law of the land, at that point of time you have violated that
law and you have committed acts of misbehaviour. You judge yourself from
the moment of the law of the time.
Let us not go back into history and draw parallels which are not applicable.
Or, for that matter, Sir, if you really want to go back into history, let us go back
to the history of impeachment of Warren Hastings.
For seven long years the House of Lords heard the case of Warren Hastings
after the House of Commons had impeached him. Edmond Burke in one of
his most memorable orations, when he introduced this case to the House of
Lords, in fact, defines judges there. It was a brilliant definition, Sir, of what the
role of a Judge was in those times. This is 11 scores of years ago, more than
two centuries ago. Therefore, there is a time-lag and difference. Where we
affirm faith in our Constitution, the faith was affirmed in God then. So, do not
misunderstand then when this quotation is given. Burke says in that oration of
his recommending the impeachment of Warren Hastings, “Law and arbitrary
power are in eternal enmity”. And, then, he proceeds to say, “Judges are guided
and governed by the eternal laws of justice to which we are all subject. We
may bite our chains if we will, but we shall be made to know ourselves and be
taught that man is born to be governed by law and that he who substitutes
will in the place of law is an enemy of God.”
So, what we are talking about is: do we, in accordance with the law of the
land as it exists today, the Constitution of the Republic of India and its
provisions, find Justice Soumitra Sen guilty of the two charges that we have
made?
Sir, even though the proceedings against Clive were not passed because of
the times, he committed suicide before he was exonerated. Edmund Burke’s
plea to the Lordships to impeach Warren Hastings was, “in the name of the
people of India whose laws and rights and liberties he has subverted, whose
properties he destroyed, whose country he has laid waste and desolate, he
needs to be impeached”. ‘This is why he needs to be impeached’ is what
Edmond Burke argued. But that precisely was what British colonialism wanted
to continue in India. For 190 years, it continued that loot and plunder. And,
therefore, impeaching him would not have served their political objective.
Therefore, after seven long years, as Macaulay says, “The fatigue of time took
over and Hastings was allowed to retreat”.
But drawing from this history, Sir, in the instant case that we are discussing
now, as I said, all the provisions of the Constitution have been scrupulously
adhered to, all the matters of contention have been unambiguously disposed
of by the duly constituted Inquiry Committee. I have established these points
earlier, Sir. But since the labour of argument of Justice Sen’s reply has been
that the motion moved by me and 57 other hon. colleagues does not contain
any specific amounts of money that have been misappropriated.
Yes, Sir, the Motion does not contain; the Motion was appended with the letter
of the then Chief Justice of India to the hon. Prime Minister where the entire
case was argued. And, in order to avoid repetition, all the charges that are
contained in his letter, we appended that letter. We appended that letter not
as a recommendation that you should accept, our Motion. We appended that

letter because it contains all the facts which need not be repeated. If the
contention is that these facts are not there, I think, that is wrong. If you permit
me, I can read out from the letter of the then Chief Justice of India which details
all these charges, which Justice Soumitra Sen now today contends are not
correct against him. But, all these have been detailed.
Sir, I will take about 5-7 minutes, I may be permitted to read. It says, “On 10th
September, 2007, I had asked Justice Soumitra Sen to furnish his fresh and
final response to the judicial observations made against him. After seeking
more time for this purpose, he furnished his response on 28th September, 2007
requesting that he may be allowed to resume duties in view of the order of
the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. Since I felt that a proper probe
was required to be made into the allegations to bring the matter to a logical
conclusion, I constituted a three-member committee consisting of Justice A.P.
Shah, the then Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, Justice A.K. Patnaik,
the then Chief Justice of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and Justice R.N.
Lodha, Judge of the Rajasthan High Court. The in-house procedure adopted
by the Supreme Court and various High Courts is as envisaged in this
procedure to conduct a fact-finding inquiry. The committee submitted its report
on such and such date, etc., etc.” Then, it concluded by saying, I will read out
the main charges: “(1) Shri Soumitra Sen did not have honest intentions right
from the year 1993. Since he mixed the money received as a receiver and
his personal money and converted receiver’s money to his own use, there has
been a misappropriation at least temporarily of the sale proceeds, (a) He
received Rs.24,57,000 between 25th February, 1993 to 10th January, 1995. But,
the balance in his account number so and so and dated so and so was only
Rs.8,83,963.05. (b) Further, a sum of Rs. 22,83,000 was then transferred by
him into so and so account number, name so and so, and the entire amount
was withdrawn in a couple of months reducing the balance to a bare minimum
of Rs.811, diverting the sale proceeds for his own use with dishonest intentions,
(c) He gave false explanation to the court that an amount of Rs. 25 lakhs was
invested from the account where the sale proceeds were kept whereas in fact
the amount of Rs.25 lakhs was withdrawn from Special Officer’s account
number so and so and not from the account number so and so in which the
sale proceeds were deposited, (d) Mere monetary deposit under the
compulsion of judicial orders does not obliterate breach of trust and
misappropriation of receiver’s funds for personal gain, (e) The conduct of Shri
Soumitra Sen has brought disrepute to the high judicial office and dishonour
by the institution of judiciary undermining the faith and confidence reposed by
the public in the administration of justice.” Then, he goes on to say, “A detailed
representation was made by Justice Soumitra Sen on 25th February, 2008 and
a collegium consisting of himself, that is, Chief Justice of India, Justice B.N.
Aggarwal and Justice Ashok Bahl, seniormost judges of the Supreme Court,
gave a hearing to Shri Soumitra Sen and reiterated the advice given to him to
submit his resignation or seek voluntary retirement on or before 2nd April, 2008.
However, vide his letter dated 26 th March, 2008, Justice Soumitra Sen
expressed his inability to tender resignation or seek voluntary retirement.”
So, the charges, Sir, are very specific and an in-house inquiry committee
consisting of two Chief Justices and a justice of a High Court has gone into it
and established it. A collegium of judges of seniormost judges of the Supreme
Court has re-established them. Now, the Inquiry Committee constituted by your
hon. self has, once again, unambiguously established it. So, I do not think there
is any degree of ambiguity on the veracity of these charges. Since they stand
established by three separate, independent and duly constituted authorities,
I think, this is a matter that should be accepted by us as the final issue that
these charges have been now proved, Sir.
But, therefore, in this view, I feel that there is no other option but for us to
proceed with these Motions. I say that, as 1 have said earlier, with a sense of
call of duty to my country and the Constitution, fully conscious of the solemnity
of the occasion and that we are exercising our right in the Constitution, and
with a deep sense of anguish that we have to move against a judge, and that
in order to strengthen the integrity and safeguard the institution of our Judiciary,
in that light, therefore, Sir, I think we should proceed. But, finally, Sir, I would
like to appeal and go back to the speech of Edmund Burke in the House of
Lords when he finally makes the appeal to the Lordships and I quote, “My
Lords, if you must fall, you may so fall. But if you stand, and stand, I trust you
will, may you stand as unimpeached in honour as in power. May you stand
not as a substitute for virtue, but as an ornament of virtue, as a security for
virtue. May you stand as a sacred temple for the perpetual residence of
inviolable justice.” And this, Sir, is the inviolable justice that this House today
represents when it converts itself into a Bar, when it takes up these
Constitutional provisions, it is the temple of inviolable justice. And, therefore,
Sir, a sacred temple for the perpetual residence of inviolable justice, that is
what this House must be, Sir. Justice and temple are used in the terms that
Pandit Nehru used after Independence when he talked of our important public
sector constructions as the temples of modern India. These are the temples
of modern India that our Republic created. Sir, I say this with all honour at my
command and all the commitment at my command that the Republic that was
founded in India, I was born after that, Sir, both after the Independence and
the Republic, but the Republic that was founded was a far-reaching vision in
modern civilisation and society. Way back, more than six decades ago, we
had given universal adult franchise in our country, which was then considered
absolutely abnormal and unusual. We must recollect, Sir, okay, when the
President of USA comes and signs in our Golden Book in our Central Hall, all
of us are very happy, when he says, “Greetings from the oldest democracy to
the largest democracy”. But, Sir, remember, the African Americans in the USA
had the universal right to vote granted to them one year after President Obama
was born. One year after he was born, they were given the universal right to
vote. We gave it way back in 1950, Sir. That is the faith that we had in our
people, we have in our people. And that is the faith, Sir, that has to be exercised
in our constitutional scheme of things through the elected representatives, and
it is that faith that today unfortunately is being questioned by some quarters
that this august Parliament is not competent or not capable enough to deal
with corruption in high places, and, therefore, it cannot and will not move
against corruption in high places. Therefore, we must set the precedent. We
must give that confidence to the people of India. We owe it to the people of
India that we will take action on these Motions precisely in order to strengthen
our Republic and it is for strengthening of our Republic, Sir, I would now
commend these Motions for adoption by this House, and commend them to
make sure that we convey not only to the people of India but also to the people
of the world and modern human civilisation that the Indian Parliament is a
sacred temple, it is the perpetual residence of an inviolable justice. And this
has to be established, Sir. With this appeal, I commend these Motions for your
consideration and adoption. Thank you, Sir.
THE QUESTIONS WERE PROPOSED
MR. CHAIRMAN: Motions moved. Mr. Justice Sen, you may present your
defence in relation to the findings of the Inquiry Committee, as contained in
its Report which was laid on the Table of the Rajya Sabha on the 10th of
November, 2010, and a copy of which was sent to you by the Rajya Sabha
Secretariat vide their letter dated 11th of November, 2010. You may address
the House for about one hour and thirty minutes.
JUSTICE SOUMITRA SEN: I am grateful, Mr. Chairman, Sir. I am also

extremely grateful to hon. Members of the House for giving me this opportunity
for presenting my defence. I am also grateful to Mr. Yechury when he began
his moving of the motion by saying that ‘this is a motion for a larger interest
and not as against me personally.’ I am extremely grateful to you. We are all
now in a very crucial stage where the issue of corruption has come up.
Everybody wants that there should not be corruption in high places. There
cannot be any dispute to this proposition. The hon. Members of this House,
you are elected Members of the people, in effect you are my elected
representatives also. Therefore, I have come to you to seek justice on certain

very fundamental issues not only on questions of law but on questions of facts.
It seems that the concept of presumption of innocence has now been reversed
into a concept of presumption of guilt. The moment somebody is alleged to
have committed some offence, it is presumed to be true. But, Mr. Chairman,
Sir, I will prove from the facts as revealed from the Inquiry Committee itself
that there has been no misappropriation in fact and in law. The language used
in article 124 (4) is ‘proven misbehaviour’. The question of ‘proven
misbehaviour’ means to be proved beyond reasonable doubts, not on the basis
of presumption or on the basis of probability. Hon. Members, it has been
suggested in the Inquiry Report that since that proceedings before the Judges
Inquiry Committee is not in the nature of the criminal proceedings, presumption
or probability is enough. But at the same time and at the same place, it has
been suggested that proof has to be beyond reasonable doubt, meaning
thereby if I have to prove something, I have to prove it beyond reasonable
doubt and if charges are proved against me, it can go by way of probability.
There cannot be different stand with regard to proof on a matter of facts.
Mr. Chairman, Sir, and the Members of this august House, the motions that
have been moved are two in number, one is misappropriation of large sums
of money which I received in my capacity as a receiver appointed by the High
Court of Calcutta, therefore, misappropriation of money as a receiver not as a
Judge, and secondly, misrepresentation of facts with regard to misappropriation
of money before the Calcutta High Court. Both the motions are inexplicably
connected. If I can demonstrate on the basis of the facts and evidence that
there has been no misappropriation at all, the second motion automatically
fails. Hon. Members, in accordance with the Judges Inquiry Act under section
3, before admission of a motion materials before the House are to be discussed
because it presupposes that frivolous motions against Judges may or may not
be admitted. So, before the admission stage, there is certain factual material
basis to be examined independently by the Legislature. The power conferred
to impeach a Judge of High Court or Supreme Court is absolutely on the
Legislature. The Constitution has consciously excluded the Judiciary and the
Executive to perform any such function of impeachment. Mr. Chairman, Sir,
and the hon. Members of the House, I say this with conviction that after my
elevation on 3rd of December, 2003, till November 2006, there has been no
complaint against my integrity, my honesty in the public domain. Therefore,
what is the substance and how could this motion come about? It is apparent
that the Motion came about by reason of a letter written by our former Chief
Justice to the hon. Prime Minister. Please don’t take me amiss. I am not casting
aspersions on anyone. I belong to an august institution which I respect. But, if
I can demonstrate before you that there has been an abuse of power in an
administrative side by a person holding high office, then, I am sure this House
will think twice. In this letter, if you kindly come to a point where he has said,
that after the Division Bench judgment, Justice Balakrishnan, hon. Former Chief
Justice of India thought that a deeper probe is necessary in order to arrive at
a logical conclusion to the allegations. Pausing here for a moment, whose
allegation is Justice Balakrishnan talking about? Nobody has alleged anything
against me. In the judicial proceeding in which the 10th April order was passed,
the parties did not raise any allegation against me. There is a letter written by
our, the then Chief Justice of our Court dated 26th of November. In spite of
this judgment, the letter in the last line says, ‘However, there is no complaint
against Justice Sen. The allegation, if any, is in the form of the adverse
observations of a single judge and subsequently substituted by the In House
Committee’. In this context, I would like to draw your kind attention to a letter
dated 10th September, 2007. That is at page 148 of my reply. I believe the
Members have got it. May I proceed?
MR. CHAIRMAN: Please.
JUSTICE SOUMITRA SEN: Although you have written response, prior to that
kindly read the first paragraph. ‘The Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court has
apprised me in detail about the developments which have taken place pursuant
to passing of the judgments dated 10th April, 2006 and 31st July, 2007 wherein
adverse observations have been made against you. A copy of the two
judgments is enclosed for your ready reference. Although your written response
dated 23rd November 2006 submitted to the then Chief Justice of Calcutta High
Court is already on record and subsequently on advice of your Chief Justice,
you have orally explained your conduct when you visited my residence on
12th of July, 2007. In the light of the recent order dated 31st July, 2007, you are
requested to submit your fresh and final response to the aforesaid adverse
judicial observation leading to complaints making allegations of judicial
misconduct and impropriety’. Pausing here for a moment, these two judgments
arise out of an application filed in a suit between parties inter se where there
are even private parties. The suit is filed in the year 1983 and is still pending
disposal. No final decision has yet been made. In that suit, an application was
filed in the month of March 2003, nine months before my elevation with only
the prayers which is normally prayed for return of money. Hon. Chairman, Sir,
and hon. Members, we will search the petition in vain with regard to a whisper
of an allegation against my conduct as a receiver. The money belongs to third
parties. They want it back. They have no complaint against me. On the contrary,
before the High Court, when the proceedings went on, none of the parties
contested it. They have clearly said they have no allegation against me and
they do not wish to contest the proceeding by filing an application. Then, it is
whose allegation? The proceeding before the learned single judge was purely
to examine the conduct of a receiver. There was no question of examining the

conduct of a judge. Therefore, the statement made in this letter that allegation
of judicial misconduct and impropriety, with utmost and humility, is not correct.
My conduct, as a Judge, was never in question, was never in examination before
a Single Judge; it was the conduct of a Receiver.
Now, kindly come to the next paragraph. It says, ‘In these circumstances, it is
proposed to hold an enquiry in terms of in-house procedure adopted by all
the High Courts, including the Calcutta High Court into the allegation of
misconduct and impropriety made against you.’ Hon. Chairman and the
Members of this House, I would like to draw your attention to certain very
relevant facts which may seem that I am casting aspersions. It is not an
aspersion; it is a matter of fact. Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court
and the High Court are in two different Chapters. The power and duty of
Supreme Court and High Court are duly circumscribed. I say this with conviction
that the Supreme Court does not have administrative control over the High
Courts and they are independent in nature. This is in order to create a
dichotomy in furtherance of our Constitutional mandate that India is a Quasi
Federal State. Therefore, the learned former Chief Justice of India was allied
with the situation that the procedure adopted by the Supreme Court out of and
full house —full court — reference is not binding on a High Court, unless it is
adopted. Therefore, the expression ‘adopted by all the High Courts, including
Calcutta High Court’, is incorrect. Had I known that these statements are not
correct, I would have challenged the constitution of the In-House Committee,
because, by that time, when it was constituted, the Division Bench has passed
an order completely exonerating me from all the charges. I agree with
Mr. Yechury when he said that people in high office should be absolutely clean.
There is no doubt about it. But, when a judicial proceeding has taken place
and certain allegations are made against me in a judicial proceeding and when
I win in the ultimate judicial proceeding will I be still held guilty of the same
charges?
Now, the mind of Justice K.G. Balakrishnan is clearly expressed when he writes
that in spite of a Division Bench judgment, I want a deeper probe. He wants
a deeper probe into a judicial order which he is bound by it in his administrative
capacity. Today, Supreme Court is saying that it is all powerful. Why did they
not bring the judgment to Supreme Court and set it aside on the judicial side?
If they are all powerful, they can do that. You allow the Judgment to attain a
stage of finality; nobody prefers an appeal. I cannot prefer an appeal, because
I have won in that matter. Today, it is being said that I cannot take shelter under
a judicial verdict. Therefore, how a person is acquitted by judicial process can
again be held guilty in a non-judicial process?
Now, with regard to the adoption, I would like to make one submission. This
was a situation which really confuses me, because I did not know about any
such resolution being passed by the Calcutta High Court during my tenure. I
continued to enquire from Judges in the past and the present whether there
is any such resolution. Everybody said that they do not know. I do not have
the infrastructure to go and search all the High Courts in the country to find
out whether any such adoption took place. So, I filed an application under the
Right to Information Act before the Calcutta High Court. A competent officer
under the RTI Act of the Calcutta High Court has said, categorically, that there
has been no such adoption. I have annexed it. Is this not a misrepresentation
of facts by a person sitting in high office? Is that not a corruption? And, you
are holding me guilty of corruption when I have been cleared by everybody by
a judicial process. So, you are trying to hold me guilty by a non-judicial process
because you have already determined what to do—to catch hold of this fellow
and hang him in order to show that the Judiciary is being cleaned. I am the
sacrificial lamb. The real issues are swept under the carpet. I have got three
instances how the real issues of corruption were dealt by him. We all know
about the Provident Fund Scam of the Allahabad High Court. A key witness
died inside a jail under mysterious circumstances. What has been done? A
briefcase containing rupees fifteen lakhs was found outside a Judge’s chamber.
The CBI wanted to prosecute. The sanction to prosecute was refused by
Justice K.G. Balakrishnan. Is this the way that one Judge should be treated
as against the other? I definitely say one wrong does not make the other right.
But, I am not wrong. I will prove it that I am not wrong. Hon. Member, Yechury,
referred to the question of diversion of funds from one account to the other. It
is said that rupees twenty-two lakhs went from one account to another and
secretly reduced to make it eight hundred and eleven; therefore, there is
diversion.
Hon. Chairman, Sir, I will prove it from records that this distribution has been
made to the workers of a closed factory, pursuant to a Division Bench’s order.
The cheques are before the Judge Enquiry Committee. Seventy-nine account
payee cheques have been disclosed. Payment of over rupees fifty-one lakhs
was made through account payee cheques out of that money. Is it anybody’s
case that I had opened seventy-nine fictitious accounts? About forty-seven were
bearer cheques. So, more than 120 cheques were issued. All for my personal
gain! And, this is the allegation of diversion of funds! And, this money was
distributed, pursuant to a Division Bench’s Order, to the members of the CITU
union of a closed factory. Mr. Yechury, Sir, it is your Union. You can easily call
up the Kolkata Office and find out whether they have received the money or
not. Find out the presumption of innocence on my part. Find out the identity
of one person. Where is the question of misappropriation? The clear evidence
has been bypassed. And, that evidence has been taken as the touchstone of
the allegation of misappropriation by diversion of funds. If this is held,
Mr. Chairman, Sir, the gravest of injustice will be done. A truthful transaction
will be buried forever as untruthful. Also see the question of probability. The
factory was closed for fifteen years. The money had been distributed in 1997.
Has a single worker come forward to complain? The nature of unionism in
Bengal is known. If I had taken one naya paisa, I would not be standing here
and talking to you today. I would have been hanged. The Union has not come
and complained that they have not received the money. The workers have not
come here and complained that they have not received the money. But a single
Judge says that this is the diversion of funds. It is a unique case! If I pay, I am
held guilty; If I don’t pay, I am held guilty! Heads I win, tails you lose. Is it justice?
So, after making a misrepresentation to me, an In-House Committee is
constituted three months after the Division Bench’s order. Now, kindly see one
more thing. Now, please see the letter of 10th September, 2007, I am again
referring to it. It says, ‘Allegations against you of judicial misconduct and
impropriety in the judgements of the single judge...” So, the presumption is
that I am going to make an inquiry on to the allegations existing as on that
date. I was asked to give a final response to this letter. By that time the time
came to give the reply, the Division Bench had already passed a detailed
judgement. Allegations against me were expunged from records of the case
and were deleted. They do not exist in the eye of law. So, if the original
allegations do not exist, then, what is being inquired into? Whose allegations
are being inquired into by the in-house Committee? Is it the personal allegation
of the former Chief Justice of India? Is he not satisfied with the Division Bench
judgement? Does not the Division Bench judgement apply to him in his
administrative capacity? I dare say, please don’t take me amiss; even a district
judge’s order is binding on everyone unless it is set aside by a higher judicial
forum. I am not trying to take shelter behind a judicial order. I will clear the
conscience of this House that there has been no misappropriation at all.
Now, many will ask this question. Even if you have not done this, then, how
could this high-powered committee hold investigation against you? With due
respect, Mr. Chairman, Sir, the decision was made long time ago to hold me
guilty. It is apparent from the letter written to the hon. Prime Minister that after
the Division Bench order, the hon. Chief Justice of India wanted to look into
the allegations and to reach a logical conclusion. Whose allegations are they
and what is the logical conclusion? What has happened in the meantime is
only a means to an end. But this is now the real fact, Sir.
The Judges’ Enquiry Committee has devoted a lot of time on the issue of my
silence. According to them, two central issues arise which are supposed to
be the heart of the entire case. “One, the submission that during investigation
into the conduct of Justice Soumitra Sen, he had the right to remain silent.” It
is at page 2 of the report. I am told, Mr. Chairman, Sir, that the report which
has been circulated in the House is not what was given to me by the Rajya
Sabha. So, there may be a variance with regard to pagination. Therefore, kindly
permit me. We got this today at around 12.40 p.m. So, I will be relying upon
the report which was given to me while I was in Kolkata because my
preparation is based on that.
Therefore, kindly allow me to read it for the benefit of the House. It says, “The
submission that during the investigation into the conduct of Justice Soumitra
Sen, he had the right to remain silent.” Mr. Chairman, Sir, in my respectful
submission, this is a clear indication of a state of bias. If I was not here and
my lawyer was arguing today, was I silent? Is the appearance of my lawyer
not my appearance? When did I remain silent? There is a strong allegation
against me that I have been avoiding court. I will demonstrate before you how
mala fide that submission and that finding is. You will be surprised to know
that the trial judge proceeded to investigate against me by suppressing orders.
There is a clear direction in an order that these orders which pertain to
investigation behind my back into my personal bank account shall not be served
upon me. I will draw your kind attention to those orders. Now, the rules of
Judges Inquiry Act, 1969, give me an opportunity—these are statutory rules—
that I can appear by myself or through my counsel. Therefore, appearance
through a counsel is also my appearance. The notice issued to me by Rajya
Sabha clearly says that I can either appear by myself or through my lawyer.
That notice is in conformity with the rules. Even then, it is alleged that, because
I, personally, did not appear before the Judges Inquiry Committee, I chose to
remain silent. Firstly, I have nothing to prove. Witnesses have been produced
by the Judges Inquiry Committee. When a committee produces witness in
support of its case, it becomes a witness for the prosecution. I am only to
disprove it. I have never said that I did not receive the money. I have never
ever said that I cannot give it back or should I not give it back. There is a
common perception and it has been said in the Judges Inquiry Report and
also the in-House Committee that I was compelled to pay until the court
ordered. Mr. Chairman, Sir, let me first point out to you what the law is. A
Receiver cannot hand over any money to anybody unless the court directs,
because his custody alleges. The first order for return of money came on 10th
of April, 2006 and I was appointed in 1984. There was no demand, no order,
in the meantime. It is alleged that I have not given back and I was compelled
to give it back. The 1993 order, which directs sale, categorically, records that
I am to hold the money until further orders. Mr. Chairman, Sir, what was my
duty in respect of both the accounts? One is, distribution of Rs.70,00,000/- to
the workers and the other is to keep Rs.33,22,800/- after I have completed
the sale. There is an order dated 3rd August, 2004. When the application came
up for the first time before another learned single judge, I was discharged from
further acting as a Receiver. This is not adverted to anywhere, but without any
direction to pay. Kindly look at my predicament. Then, the 10th April order was
passed. Before that, the application, which was filed, contains another prayer
which will, actually, establish what I am trying to say here. First prayer is of
return of money and the next prayer is to complete the sale, because the
purchaser did not even lift the materials within time. So, my obligation under
1993 order to segregate the entire sale proceeds did not arise until the sale
was complete. There has been a further direction in 2004, directing the
Receiver to sell the balance quantity. There are some amounts still lying. So,
when the total corpus came to me, I thought of keeping it apart. But to say
that I have always said that Rs.33,22,800/- was invested from this account at
a time only after 1995 would be incorrect, because I did not receive
Rs.33,22,800/- in the year 1993, not even in the year 1994; it became this
corpus only after 1995. You will be surprised to know that when the court called
for records, the bank came and said, “We don’t have accounts from 1993 to
1995.” And, this is the vital period in which the alleged misappropriation has
been supposed to take place. In absence of the bank accounts, presumption
is drawn. The question is: Where did the money go? I have always been saying
that the money was invested there.
After the 10th April order, when I filed the recalling application, in the judgment,
the Judge records that ‘the total amount of money found in possession or the
fixed deposit receipts found in the hands of the official liquidator amounts to
over Rs. 70 lakhs.’ The fixed deposit receipts are still lying in their custody
untouched, unencashed. So, if in 1999, between 1997 and 1999, Rs. 71 lakhs
of fixed deposits is found, where is the question of misappropriation? It is a
clear evidence of fact that there has been no further deposit, except for Rs.
25 lakhs after 1997. Then, by what arithmetical magic, Rs. 25 lakhs becomes
Rs. 71 lakhs within two years? Is it not evidence enough that money was duly
invested between 1993 and 1995? When the bank account is not there for
the last 15 years, when direct evidence is not available, am I not supposed
to take advantage of the circumstantial evidence? On the contrary, these are
not circumstantial evidence. The fixed deposit receipts in its physical form are
still lying. The company had gone into liquidation. I could have taken shelter
behind the Companies Act and said that ‘you sell the assets of the company,
realize money and the balance shortfall I will pay.’ I did not do so. Is that a
crime? The official liquidator is still in possession and custody of the assets
and liabilities of the company. There is no direction anywhere that you take
steps in accordance with the Companies Act. The only person guilty here is
‘Soumitra Sen’ because it is easy to showcase him as a cleansing of the

Judiciary.
I am actually a victim of an abuse of process by person in high office. Kindly

don’t treat me emissor. I have decided to come whatever the outcome may
be, and I wish that the Members of this august House would actually decide
the matter purely on questions of fact in law. Merely because the hon. Chief
Justice of India had already formed an opinion, that cannot go against me. In
fact, right from the beginning, there has been misrepresentation of facts.
I will point out another very vital misrepresentation of fact. In the letter written
to the hon. Prime Minister, it is mentioned that the learned Judge has dismissed
my second application. I am sure, many hon. Members here are eminent jurists,
legal luminaries in their field. They will be able to understand what is the
difference between an application being dismissed and an application being
disposed of with liberty to apply afresh. On my application, recalling application,
when the facts were brought before the learned Judge, the learned Judge was
undecided. There is a clear recording of fact that he neither believes me nor
disbelieves me. The Judge did not disbelieve me when the real facts were
brought to him. In spite of this fact, the Judge gives me a liberty to come before
him once again with fresh materials. That application is still pending. The suit
is pending for last 27 years. Money is still lying undistributed in the High Court.
The High Court is seized of the matter. I have still the liberty to go to High
Court with the fresh material and say that ‘your earlier opinion was wrong, and
I am being held guilty of misappropriation and impeachment proceedings are
going on against me.’ Is there a single allegation of dishonesty, corruption in
my judicial functioning? Have I passed a single order for extraneous
consideration? Are my sons and daughters or my brothers and brother-in-law
guilty of amassing wealth, abusing my position? Am I guilty of laundering? No.
The entire thing starts from a judicial process and it is ended with a Division
Bench order.
Nothing else can continue. Therefore, to say that a Judge should be honest
in all respects is absolutely a correct proposition, there cannot be an image
tarnished, because tarnishing the image of a Judge is tarnishing the image of
the judiciary. But, if he becomes a victim of abuse of power, then, hon.
Members, you may kindly decide in accordance with your conscience whether
such abuse should continue or not. If a High Court Judge with a constitutional
authority can be treated in this manner, imagine the plight of the common man.
They will be squished like a fly. I am not fighting here for my position alone. I
will tell you, why. After I filed the reply to the in-House Committee Report, I
got a telephone call from the Chief Justice’s residence to meet him personally.
There is no official record of that meeting with the other superior Judges there;
you would search in vain; there is no official communication to me. When I
went there and met him in his drawing room, I found two other Judges. That
is being communicated as a hearing given to me. Is the direction upon a Judge
to resign so informal, so petty, that the only issue discussed was my
resignation? Interestingly, VRS was offered. Now, have you ever seen an
organization or an institution where an employee charged with defalcation of
funds is rewarded with a VRS? I would have gone back happy with quite a
few lakhs of money because I had a long tenure of service left, and I still have
a long tenure of service left. So, first, carrot; the stick is coming later; it is an
offer of VRS. Next, ‘you resign and if you resign, we shall ensure that you get
a good post in some public sector undertaking’. I am willing to say this, standing
here, before this august House, openly. I challenge anybody to dispute it. Then,
‘if I do not take any of the options, I will be further investigated by an Inspector
of CBI and, if necessary, third degree will be applied to me’. I was interrogated.
Then, I wrote to the Chief Justice of India that ‘if you want a further agency to
inquire, then how can you ask me to resign on the basis of a report that is
already before you?’ Then it is inconclusive. If that is conclusive, then what is
the need to have further investigation by another agency? It is not a statement
of facts that I am saying. I have put it on record. I have written a letter that is
uncontroverted till date. Is this the way a high judicial authority shall function
in an administrative manner? I would have had no issues if the judgement of
the Division Bench had been set aside by a higher judicial forum. I would have
never been here. I have exhausted my remedies in accordance with law, and
I have succeeded. I repeat, I am not taking shelter behind a judicial order. I
am trying to clear the conscience of the House that there has been no
misappropriation at all.
With regard to misrepresentation, something very interesting will emerge. The

Judges Inquiry Committee holds me guilty of misrepresentation on an account
number. They say that you have given this account number, but the money
has actually not gone from this account. Therefore, you are guilty of
misrepresentation of facts. The chargesheet has been prepared on the basis
of this account number. The charge of misrepresentation is based on this
account number by the Judges Inquiry Committee itself. But when the account-
opening form was brought, it was found that it was some other Soumitra Sen;
father’s name is different, signature is different, profession is different and
address is different.
So, an impeachment Motion is going on in this House with a chargesheet with

a wrong Account Number, and I am being held guilty of putting that Account
Number. You will be surprised to know what is that Account Number and how
did it come into being. It was supplied by the learned Single Judge that this is
the account, money was withdrawn and closed, therefore, misappropriation.
They say, substitute this by “800 Account”, it will be wrong. I say if you substitute
it by “400 Account”, it will be right because money indeed go from the “400
Account”. What did I say all along that Rs.32,33,000, or whatever the figure
is, is available irrespective of from which account it has come. My duty is to
keep that money safe. Even after the winding up orders and even after the
company not paying, I have paid back from my own pocket Rs.57 lakhs. I did
not take shelter behind the Companies Act because I thought it was my moral
responsibility to pay back the money of the parties. They did not pray for
interest. The Court granted interest of Rs.24 lakhs. Who has benefited and
who is prejudiced? Only the parties have benefited; I am prejudiced. And I am
being held liable for impeachment for wrong-doing. This is unique. I will show
that. Since this record is not before you, I will place it. What is my ground?
Kindly see what is the ground on which the second Motion fully stands. The
entire second Motion is based on this one ground. If I may say so with utmost
respect and humility, a very huge constitutional requirement and necessity of
impeachment of a judge has been so flimsily framed. I had told before the
Division Bench for that the learned Judge failed to appreciate that all the
investments made by the Receiver in the company by way of cheques drawn
on ANZ Grindlays Bank Account No.OISLP56800. In evidence, the bank’s
official has come with the Account Opening Form. When my senior counsel
cross-examined him, he said, ‘Probably not his account.’ Answer was very
skeptic. So, further question was asked. Is this signature his? No. What do I
have to prove? I say, a great eulogy has been given to my senior lawyer by
the Judges Enquiry Committee for doing a commendable job. I say, my senior
counsels who appeared before the Judges Enquiry Committee have
demolished their case altogether. They have no witness to prove anything.
Kindly don’t take this matter in the light that simply because allegations are
made, it has to be accepted, a clean judiciary is to be shown, therefore, throw
him out.
There is a preponderance of evidence. There is a constitutional requirement

of proof. That cannot be taken away. Now I read out the evidence. I put it to
you Exhibit C-304 which is annexed to the letter dated 2nd of March. Exhibit
296, Account Opening Form in OISLP156800 is not the Account of the
Respondent. Answer is, ‘Probably not’. Did you verify the records in the High
Court of Calcutta that this Account Number 56800 pertains to the Respondent?
The documents in the High Court were produced by Shri Prabir Kumar Das,
the then Manager of the Bank. Shri Prabir Kumar Das is in service, still avoiding
not interested in giving the right answer. I have verified as to whether this
account bearing OISLP56800 belongs to the respondent. On verification, I
found that the signature and the address mentioned are not matching with that
of the respondent. And, this is the account number put in the charge-sheet
before the Judges Inquiry Committee. It took one-and-a-half years for the
Judges Inquiry Committee to enquire. What did they enquire? A great deal of
certificate has been given to their lawyer for rendering excellent assistance.
This is the assistance rendered. They are too anxious to hold me guilty; they
are too anxious to hold me guilty. Therefore, kindly put a blinder in your eye
and believe what former CJI said; don’t see anything else. Again, I repeat, if
the allegation of diversion of funds, which they say, is believed and this Motion
proceeds on that basis, it will be the gravest of injustice ever. The dues of the
workers have been fully paid. On the contrary, they have been paid one lakh
rupees more; whatever interest accrued in the account was paid to them.
I have worked in that matter without remuneration because I thought taking
remuneration out of poor workers’ fund was not moral. The entire work was
done freebie. I was the appearing counsel in that matter. The Court reposed
trust in me and appointed me as the Special Officer.
Now, with regard to merger of funds, Mr. Yechury began by saying that I have
put money in my own account and there has been a merger of funds. It has
been repeatedly said that this is Receiver’s Account. With due respect,
Chairman, Sir, the expression ‘Receiver’s Account’ has a separation
connotation in banking parlance as well as in law. It has to be opened by an
order of Court. Today, if I go and ask the bank to open a Receiver’s Account,
they will not open a Receiver’s Account. At least, that is the procedure in
Kolkata. You may find it out. In the 1993 Order, which directs me to sell and
keep the money, there is no direction to open the account. The choice was
left to me, ‘bank and branch of his choice’. So, what wrong have I committed?
The fixed deposit receipts were given from a period from 1993 March onwards
till 1995 May - 22 drafts in two-and-a-half years. Is it possible for a junior
advocate to run 22 times in 22 different courts and encash them? The drafts
are before you, Sir. See the drafts. Drafts are in the name of Soumitra Sen,
Advocate; not Soumitra Sen, Receiver. So, where do I encash them? Wherever
I encash them, it becomes my personal account. Encashment had to be done
to deliver materials to the purchaser. It was a conscious decision I took. As a
Receiver, I took a decision. It may or may not be right. But, that is not
misappropriation. It may be alleged against me that I could have handled the
accounts in a better way. Agreed. As an Advocate, there may have been some
indiscretion on my part, as a junior Advocate having seven-eight years of
practice. But, that does not constitute misappropriation. I will go back from this
House, even if you hold me guilty, and I will scream from the rooftop in the
rest of my life that I have not misappropriated. That is my personal conviction.
And the substratum of the allegations of misappropriation based on diversion of

funds is demolished by the cheques themselves. The High Court does not
produce the entire bunch of cheques. I have calculated it myself from the
statement of account which was before the Judge. The High Court one set -
one Judge disbelieves me, two Judges believe me. Now comes the question
of Justice Balakrishnan. He disbelieves me, again in spite of a Judicial Order.
Where do I go? Where do I seek justice? If the man assuming the highest
post in the Judiciary has already formed an opinion of guilt, then everything
else is a consequence thereof.
Mr. Chairman, Sir, the accounts are all before you. The question is of
misappropriation. The misappropriation amounts only when it can be proved
that I have utilized it for my personal gain. Mere transfer of money from one
account to another is not misappropriation. Where is the evidence today that
I have misappropriated it personally? Is there any credit entry into my accounts
from these that I have misappropriated? Is it possible for me to create 79
fictitious accounts and obtain money from them? I say, the bearer cheques
which were issued to the workers, some of them bore illegible signature of an
illiterate man, and, some bore thumb impression. You take my thumb
impression. Take my thumb impression and match it with those cheques
whether I have gone behind somebody’s back and withdrawn the money or
not. A fair transaction, an honest transaction is sought to be presented in such
a prejudicial manner, which is alleging diversion of funds. Unless you can prove
diversion of funds, you cannot prove misappropriation, and, if you cannot prove
misappropriation, there is no question of misrepresentation of facts either. It
is said, I dare say, and, I do not know whether it is possible to say, that my
statement before the Division Bench influenced the Judges; as if, insinuation
is that, I got the order by influencing the Judge. Is it not at the same time casting
aspersions on the Judges themselves who passed the order? I will read out
the Division Bench Judgement, and, from that you kindly appreciate whether
there is an iota of indication whether I influenced the Judges or not, and,
I think, the Judgement is before you. Come to Exhibit Volume III, page 1441.
Kindly come to the first portion where the prayer in the petition which resulted
in the 10th April order containing adverse inference is set out. Kindly see.
“Receiver be directed to hand over all the sale proceeds so far received —
sale proceeds, no interest — from the sale of the Periclase Spinnel Bricks to
the petitioner towards and in pro tanto satisfaction of the petitioner’s claim in
the suit and be further directed to pay entire sale proceeds after disposal of
the entire lot. Receiver be directed to render true and faithful accounts of all
moneys presently held by him in terms of the order.” So, order is required to
be passed to furnish accounts.
Now, in this case, when the first application was filed, the logic, the explanation
of the Judge to proceed with an independent inquiry behind my back is that
I have not approached the Court in spite of repeated opportunities. Please note
it very carefully. From my little knowledge of English language, I think, repeated
means, at least, more than once. In a court of law, when a person does not
follow a direction, sometimes, times are given, and, sometimes it is mentioned
that time is pre-empted, and, no further time will be granted. This august House
will be surprised to know that the application which was filed in the month of
March, 2003 was served upon me for the first time in the month of May, 2005.
By that time, several orders had been passed. No copies were served upon
me. In the month of March, the Judge passes an order, which was not served
upon me until May, that you give details, particulars as to the money. In May,
another order is passed in modification of that earlier order. Sugar-coated.
Perhaps the trap was laid for the first time that you may file an affidavit, so
advised, on what, on the application of the plaintiff and the affidavit of the
purchaser. In a proceeding in a court of law, you file an affidavit when you
controvert the allegations, when you contest the proceedings.
Here, I am not controverting anything from this application because there is

not a whisper of allegation against me. Why should I controvert? In fact,
I wanted this application to be allowed so that I am relieved from the burden.
Then, in the month of June, the Judge proceeds to hold an enquiry against
me. Official liquidator called, registered a vigilance call, bank called, my
personal account investigated under a microscope and a specific direction was
given in that order that I shall not be served with that order. Is this a fair
procedure to be adopted in a court of law? Even a common litigant gets a
better chance. You will be surprised to know that subsequent orders have been
passed deliberately suppressing it, and today there is an allegation that I did
not approach the court, I did not cooperate. In order to dispel that doubt, I am
here today. I did not allow anyone to argue lest it is said that he is a person
who avoids. I am not a person who avoids; I am not a quitter. I did not quit
from the drawing room of the CJI. What shall I quit from? Therefore, once
this application was taken up, the presumption is, and he writes in the
judgement that because of repeated opportunity given, and because I did not
approach the court, he is compelled to make an investigation against me. And,
in the findings, based upon those withdrawals which I said, in fact, I have cried
horse, that these payments are not my personal withdrawals, these are labour
payments, he says this is a diversion of fund to an unknown place and,
therefore, misappropriation. Without any order or prayer for interest, he passes
an order for interest of nearly twenty five lakh rupees. You will be surprised,
on the one hand, direction is given for payment and on the other hand, an
order of injunction is passed. In my house property, in my bank account, in
my moveable properties, all the assets that I have personally have been
injuncted. Is this fun going on? On the one hand you say for payment, on the
other hand, you are passing an order for injunction. This order of injunction is
clear violation of Chadha’s law, clear violation of Order 38, Rule 5 of the Civil
Procedure Code, clear violation of Order 39, Rules 1 & 2.
There has to be an apprehension, there has to be a prayer for an ad interim

order of injunction. Where the parties did not pray for an ad interim order of
injunction—the prayers are set out here; you will search in vain for an order
of injunction—why did the Judge pass an order of injunction against my
personal property? Because I am a Judge again in the High Court, he has a
special interest in the matter? The application which came out for the first time
before him, without any prayers being made by anyone, he put it as ‘part heard’.
Till date it is ‘part heard’ before the same single Judge. There is a specific
order that the papers and documents relating to this matter shall be kept in a
sealed cover, will not go down to the department. I sent my juniors for
inspection. I could not get inspection. It was kept in the Judge’s chamber. The
order was passed on 10th April 2006, and when I almost pay the money, entire
text of the Judge comes out in the newspaper. How did it come out of the
sealed cover? Kindly, hon. Members, look into the facts before holding me
guilty. When he says that I did not approach and he is compelled to make an
enquiry against me, after making the full payment, I go with a recalling
application. I will just read out one order passed by the single Judge. “This
matter will appear once again on 25th July 2005. Let a xerox copy of the order
dated 30 th June be made available to the learned advocate on record,
Mr. Chatterjee. Report shall once again be kept in a sealed cover by the officer
of this court”. I am not making a statement from the air. These are on record.
So, when I go before the Single Judge with all the facts that this is your wrong
conception, these payments are labour payments, you have yourself recorded
seventy one lakhs of investment, then how can you allege misappropriation?
Twenty five lakhs by magic cannot become seventy one lakhs in two years’
time. Investments must have been made earlier. When there is no evidence,
no bank accounts from 1993-1995 is established, how can you make a
presumption? Is it not based on pure surmises and conjectures? When faced
with all this, what will the judge do? The judge says, “I neither believe him nor
disbelieve him.” So, at least, he does not believe me, but he does not disbelieve
me either. Therefore, he says come to court once again with fresh material.
This is a mockery; a total anarchy is going on. And when I establish all this
before the Division Bench, the former Chief Justice of India says, “He wants
a deeper probe.” He disregards the Order of the Division Bench. What is the
special suspicion on me? Why? Whose money have I usurped? The money
belongs to third party. They never came to me and said that I had
misappropriated the money. The real interested parties, whose money it is,
do not make an allegation. It is the headache of the Single Judge.
On what evidence did the Judges Inquiry Committee proceed? The official
Liquidator said, “We have no record after 1997 and before 1997.” The police
authorities have seized many documents from this finance company. There is
no panchnama. The bank says, ‘There is no account.’ Neither the account
opening form nor the application on which I said that investments were made
was available. And the account on which the matter proceeded is not my
account at all. And you hold me guilty of misappropriation. I have said that
investments in truncated form were definitely made. It is impossible for a person
to remember all the nitty-gritty of the account number. Even if I close my
account, I won’t be able to remember 56800368002176. I don’t think anybody
remembers this. It begins with 01SLP and ends with 800. Both are same. Both
end with 800; both start with 01SLP. This mistake of fact, which actually
emanated from the court, is the ground to hold me guilty of misleading the
Division Bench. There is no other charge.
After the Order of the 31st July, when the court held ‘it neither disbelieves me
nor believes me,’ I moved the Appeal Court. I may take a little of your time to
place the judgement of the Division Bench. Kindly permit me to do so.
The Learned Single Judge passed an Order in the aforesaid application filed
on the 10th of April 2006 directing the erstwhile Receiver to deposit a sum of
Rs.52,46,454 with the Registrar, Original Side of this Court, within a period of
one month from the date of receipt of the copy of the Order. In the said Order,
it was also mentioned that in default of payment of the aforesaid amount, court
will initiate proceedings for recovery of the same.
Now pausing here for a moment, the Single Judge passes an Order directing
payment to be made within a period of time, and then passes an Order
restraining me to pay. My bank account was sealed. Is it the intention of the
Learned Judge that I fail to comply with his direction, so that further orders
can be passed against me? The erstwhile Receiver deposited the said amount
of Rs.52,46,454 with the Registrar, Original Side of this Court, in compliance
with the aforesaid direction. This is the observation of the Division Bench
passed by the Learned Single Judge. In the Order, as a matter of fact, it’s
said that the erstwhile Receiver deposited the aforesaid amount in addition to
Rs.5,00,000 which was deposited earlier.
So, altogether, it becomes almost Rs.58 lakhs. So, the parties who are entitled
to almost Rs.32 lakhs have got Rs.58 lakhs. Is it an act of a person who has
misappropriated the money when the fixed deposit receipts are available and
there is no encashment of them? After depositing the aforesaid money, an
application was filed on behalf of the erstwhile receiver as recorded on the
10th of April, particularly those indicated, for deletion of the adverse remarks.
After going through the order of 15th December 2006, we find—now, this is
very significant—the advocate represented the parties before the court. It did
not go ex parte. The parties were there. What did the party say? They said,
“We have no allegation against the receiver. As far as our money is concerned,
we have no allegation against his conduct.” Then, whose allegation is it? Have
I taken bribe? Have I misappropriated Government funds? Have I misused
my position by buying properties for myself by misusing Government funds?
No. It is the money of the private party who has no allegation against me and
the rest of the country is interested to know what I have done with the money.
It is submitted on instructions by Mr. Kanchan Roy, learned advocate appearing
for the plaintiff Steel Authority of India Limited that his client does not want to
file any affidavit either in support or in opposition to the present application.
Right from the trial court, nobody contested and I can tell you that was a real
heartburn for the learned Judge. He, in fact, insisted upon the parties to file
an affidavit. They said, “No, we are not interested.” So, if the parties, who are
really interested in money, do not file affidavit, is it non-cooperation on my part
not to file an affidavit by a modified order? And, thereafter, you suppress that
order and carry on investigation behind my back. Who has actually abused
the process of law? Is it me? Will this House not see how the whole thing
was conducted? It is necessary, Mr. Chairman, Sir, that in every proceedings,
every trial, there has to be a fairness in procedure. Even an apprehension of
bias vitiates the proceedings. That is established law. If anybody has a special
interest in me, he should not judge me. Justice K.G. Balakrishnan by writing
that letter has become accuser, prosecutor and the Judge. How can that be?
He, on one hand, alleges guilt and he constitutes the in-house committee. This
is not a fair procedure. Which Judge in this country today has guts to defy
the highest person holding the highest office? Where shall I get trial? Where
shall I get justice? I will get justice from this House and I am confident I will
get.
Now, I will skip over the first few pages because these are all repetitive and
very technical in nature. I will read from page 5 of the judgment. Mr. Anindya
Mitra, learned senior counsel representing the appellant, submits that the
erstwhile receiver was never directed by the learned Single Judge to make
any payment prior to the order of 10th of April 2006 wherein the said learned
Single Judge has made certain observations and remarks against the erstwhile
receiver. Mr. Mitra submits that the aforesaid remarks were not necessary for
deciding the matter. Mr. Mitra further submits that the erstwhile receiver never
disputed his obligation to pay the money pursuant to the directions of the hon.
Court. Learned senior counsel for the appellant specifically submits that
possible claimants, namely, 1 and 2 herein, never made any complaint against
the erstwhile receiver; on the contrary, submitted before the Single Judge that
they had no grievance against the receiver. This is the recording of finding of
fact by the Division Bench.
Referring to the remarks and observations made by the learned single Judge
and recorded in the order dated 10th April, Mr. Mitra submits the learned single
Judge had no reason to observe that the erstwhile receiver has committed a
breach of trust. This is the finding of the Division Bench, a judiciary order. Today,
you say you disregard the judicial order because he holds a high office. He
has to be like a saint covered with a halo so that whenever he goes people
will bow down to him. Is that the test of morality of a Judge? The test which is
said in 124/4, has proof for misbehaviour. What have I done as a Judge? All
these actions you are talking about are ten years before my elevation. Am
I not a victim of circumstances?
Now, I will read the portion where he says—I will not read out the submission
made by the Counsel, it is not necessary—I will go with the findings. The
objectionable remarks and observations of the learned single Judge recorded
in the order dated 10th April, 2006 have been summarized in Annexure ‘B’,
application filed in connection with ‘B’. On behalf of the erstwhile decision, on
examination of the orders passed by the learned single Judge, from time to
time, including the order dated 10th April, 2006, and the judgement order dated
31st July, 2007, we are satisfied that the erstwhile receiver never disobeyed
any direction passed by the learned single Judge regarding payment and the
refund of the money as was held by him in person to the order of court. So,
the Division Bench comes to a finding based on record that I have never
committed any wrong on the matter of returning the money.
Undisputedly the application being G.A.No.875 of 2003 was filed in connection

with CS No.8 of 1983. Kindly note the date, 1983, today we are in the 2011.
So, the suit is still pending. The parties are still awaiting the disposal of the
money. We do not even know who will get the money. Misappropriation is
alleged against me and I am sought to be impeached. This is anarchy; and
complete misuse of power. With utmost respect and humility I submit kindly
do not permit this. On the contrary, ensure that people in high office do not
misuse their power and make easy target of easy victims. The English language
is very interesting. It says ‘sacrificial lamb’; it does not say ‘sacrificial ram’
because lamb is easy to catch.
Undisputedly the application being GA No.875 of the 2003 was filed in

connection with the CS No.8 of 1983 on behalf of the plaintiff for issuing a
direction upon the receiver to hand over all the sale proceeds. So far, receipt
from the sale of material in question to the plaintiff towards prudent satisfaction
of the claim of the petition, the claimant is the plaintiff, it will be decided finally
in the suit who will get it. Money is still held by the Registrar of the Kolkata
High Court till nine years. After the disposal of the entire lot, kindly note here
for a moment, as I said earlier, in 1993 order, the obligation arises only upon
completion of sale for segregation. The sale is still not complete. It is not known
how much money will come. It is still not known what sort of directions the
court will give.
Therefore, the matter is still sub judice. According to Rule 169 of the
Parliamentary rules, when a matter is still sub judice, it should not be discussed
in the House. Rule 169 of the Parliamentary Rules also says that abstract
questions of law cannot be decided by the House. This judgement decides
on certain questions of law. You will also have to decide whether the Division
Bench judgement can be negated, can be rendered nugatory by a non-judicial
body. You will have to finally take that call. If that is permitted, it will result in
judicial anarchy. Anybody and everybody will say, ‘I will not follow a Division
Bench judgment. I will not follow a judgment because you have obtained it by
misleading of facts or you have obtained it by bribing the Judge.’ And, then,
probe starts, without setting aside the judgment in a judicial forum! Our
Constitution debars this. There is a hierarchy of Judiciary, right from the District
Court level. We follow that. As I said, a District Judge’s order will have to be
followed by a Supreme Court Judge in his administrative side. He cannot defy
it. That is the law. If High Court Judges are treated like this by the Judiciary
itself, then I dare say ‘common man will never get justice.’ That is the call
I am putting on to the House; prevent this. There is a tendency of misusing of
power. Kindly prevent this. I have become a victim of that. Kindly prevent this.
In the said application, the plaintiff never raised any question in respect of the
conduct and functioning of the erstwhile receiver, and also did not claim any
amount towards interest. The learned Single Judge, on his own, passed various
orders, from time to time, in connection with the application filed on behalf of
the plaintiff, and also in the application subsequently filed on behalf of the
erstwhile receiver. In order to examine the conduct of the receiver, even in
absence of any allegation made by the parties, the parties to the suit, namely
the Respondent Nos. I and II herein, never made any allegation regarding
misappropriation of amount. This is the misappropriation with regard to
diversion of funds, which I have paid to the workers, undisputedly paid to the
workers. No worker has come forward today to allege ‘that I have not received
my dues.’ And this is the transaction which you say ‘diversion of funds resulting
in misappropriation’. Unheard of! The said erstwhile receiver also never refused
to discharge his obligation to refund the money held by him. As a matter of
fact, the learned Single Judge, by the Order, dated 10th of April, directed the
erstwhile receiver to deposit this sum, even in addition to five lakhs, which
was deposited earlier. See the observation of the learned Single Judge
regarding betrayal of trust. Because it was held, kindly see the gravity of the
allegations made in the 10th April Order. He alleges that ‘I betrayed the trust,
therefore, attracting penal provisions under the IPC.’ To this extent, the Judge
has gone, without any charge being made against me by anyone! Is it an
independent charge of the Judge against another Judge? See the observation
of the learned Single Judge. This is the finding of the Division Bench. Kindly
note for a moment, think that I am taking shelter behind this judgment.
My conscience is clear, and I will try to clear your conscience on facts and
evidence. The observation of the learned Single Judge regarding betrayal of
the trust and confidence of this Court by the erstwhile receiver is not based
upon proper materials on record. Since the erstwhile receiver, in compliance
with the direction of the Court, not only deposited the entire sale proceeds
retained by him, pursuant to the earlier direction of this hon. Court, but also
paid a substantial amount, as alleged by the learned Single Judge, towards
the interest to the plaintiff, never claimed any interest by the receiver. We also
do not find two Judges of the Division Bench saying this, ‘We do not find any
material where from it can be said that the erstwhile receiver utilised any
amount for his personal gain.’ This is a binding observation on all. Can it be
reopened in a non-judicial forum by setting up an In-House Committee? The
foundation/formation of the In-House Committee is a misrepresentation of fact
on me. The Calcutta High Court has never adopted that resolution. Therefore,
the In-House Committee is not applicable on a Calcutta High Court Judge.
And whose allegation? At that time, when the Committee was formed, the
allegation has been disposed of by this Division Bench order, deleted from
the record. Even then the former Chief Justice of India proceeds to hold an
inquiry into the allegation. Whose allegation?
Now, pausing here for a moment, I will draw the attention of this hon. House,
Mr. Chairman, Sir, to the fact that the procedure for forming the In-House
Committee was pursuant to a Full Court Resolution of the Supreme Court in
1999. This procedure was not in favour to me before the Committee was
formed. Is it a fair procedure? In every investigation the procedure of formation
of the Inquiry Committee is furnished to allow the person to know in what form
it has to be done. The procedure came after the Report, along with the Report
holding me guilty. When I go through the procedure, I find that the prerequisite
for holding an inquiry is a complaint. A detailed procedure has been laid as to

what happens when a person makes a complaint of corruption or bribery
against a Judge. If an allegation is made directly to the Chief Justice of that
High Court, a procedure is laid; if an allegation is made directly to the Chief
Justice of India, a procedure is laid. Who has raised a complaint against me?
How could that procedure be adopted? The prerequisite of the procedure, the
substratum, the foundation was not there on the day when the In-House
Committee was constituted, irrespective of the fact that all allegations have
been withdrawn by the Division Bench. There is a procedural irregularity; there
is a violation of the order of the court; there is complete unconstitutionality and
there is absolute anarchy. That is the Report which is being relied upon by the
hon. Members and which is appended to the motion.
The letter of the hon. Chief Justice of India is nothing but a reproduction of
the findings of the In-House Committee. I think, I don’t know, in the Rajya
Sabha, I have a right, I have a privilege, to make certain submissions. It is
significant to note that out of the three Judges, two have been brought to the
Supreme Court within three months after giving the Report against me. You
make your own conclusions. I don’t have to say. The third Judge who was not
brought made public his displeasure in his retirement speech that he was
overlooked. So, our house which the judiciary wants to clean found only one
person to be cleaned. I had said earlier, “don’t push me; I will expose”, because
my conscience is clear. I don’t live in a glass house that you can throw stones
at. I started from a small town. I was brought up in Assam. I don’t have any
father, mother and brother in the judiciary. Today this position has come to
me because of my hard work. My honesty and integrity throughout my career
was untarnished. Is it because I have a long career that this has been done
to me? I am forthright. You can’t touch me. Examine everything, all my assets;
open my locker and find out. Therefore, I am not afraid to speak the truth.
I appeal to you, the Members of this House, the elected representatives, to
do justice.
This is the finding of the Division Bench. “The erstwhile Receiver to hand over
all the sale proceeds so far received from the sale of materials”. They said,
“The erstwhile Receiver has no occasion to submit any explanation or to file
any objection to the said application”. The Division Bench observed in its earlier
order and said that I had no occasion to give an explanation. As the said
erstwhile Receiver was well aware of his obligation to refund the amount held
by him immediately after issuance of necessary direction by the court, as a
matter of fact — please note this carefully — such a direction was issued by
the Learned Single Judge only on 10th of April, 2006 and the same order which
directs payments holds me guilty of misappropriation.
I could have understood if you gave a direction for payment. If I do not pay,
hold an inquiry; hold me guilty of misappropriation; draw an adverse inference.
But in the same order, where you give direction, you hold me guilty of
misappropriation and then pass an order of injunction on my bank accounts
so that I am prevented from paying, without any person paying for such interim
order. This is mockery of a judicial process. This is what has been relied upon
by the In-House Committee, by the hon. CJI and the Judges Inquiry Committee.
This conception that this is an independent inquiry, with due respect,
Mr. Chairman, Sir, was prejudged long back because when the hon. CJI writes
to the hon. Prime Minister saying that my allegation should reach a logical
conclusion, then I have no hope of getting justice from that process. I can only
get justice here.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Justice Sen, you are coming to the end of the time allotted
to you.
JUSTICE SOUMITRA SEN: Sir, give me a little more time. I will read the
judgement of the Division Bench. (Interruptions). I will not unnecessarily take
your time.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Okay. That is all right. Please proceed.
JUSTICE SOUMITRA SEN: In the aforesaid circumstances, we fail to

understand how the aforesaid, uncalled for, unwarranted observations/remarks
could be made against the erstwhile receiver even prior to issuing any direction
for payment. This is the order of the Division Bench. This is the finding that a
court cannot hold a person guilty of misappropriation without giving him an
opportunity to pay. You don’t give me an opportunity to pay and in the same
order hold me guilty based on presumptions. And when I come with facts, you
say, “l can neither believe you nor disbelieve you; you come once again with
proper materials”. How will I go to the learned single judge who has already
become blind in his eye? He will never listen to me. Therefore, I had to go to
the Division Bench.
It is difficult to fathom — kindly see the observation of the Division Bench —

the reason for such inquiry. But it is significant that even after going through
the personal bank accounts — kindly appreciate one thing that my bank
accounts were put under a microscope from 1993 till 2006, even after I was a
judge — not a single entry was found which was suspicious. All that is credited
into my bank account is my salary that I received as a judge. There is not a
single entry kept from the finance company; after the encashment of some
FDRs, I have taken away the money. The only withdrawals they talk about are
the withdrawals to the workers. That is the ground for holding me guilty of
misappropriation. I told them that it was very easy to find out the identity of
this person. The Judges Inquiry Committee said, “Unidentified persons”, casting
an insinuation as if I was saying something fictitious and they were not
believing. Is it so difficult to find out the identity of persons who have been
paid by account payee cheques? The Judges Inquiry Committee had all the
power in the world to call for evidence and records, which they have done so.
Couldn’t they ask the paying bank to bring the accounts and examine the
identity of the persons? Then the whole thing would have gone. But the whole
thing is ‘I don’t want to believe’. If that is the approach that ‘I don’t want to
believe you’, no matter whatever I say, you will not believe me.
Now kindly appreciate one thing. Witnesses were called from Kolkata. Who
came and gave evidence? They were bank officials, official liquidator, Registrar,
etc. Was it not the duty of the Judges Inquiry Committee to call the Director
of the company in liquidation and ask whether what I was saying was correct
or not? Call the Directors and find out from them as to what I am saying is
wrong or not. Call for the bank accounts and find out whether the distribution
was to the workers or not. This is the basis of corruption against me. During
the three little years that I was able to function as a Judge, nobody raised a
finger against me, towards my judicial conduct. My integrity was never in
question. My honesty was never in question. Now, transactions ten years prior
to my appointment are put under a scanner. This is the way it has been done,
and I am here today before you, before this august House, defending an
Impeachment Motion.
In fact, I am grateful because I have not been able to say all these before. I
have been put under a CAT. I did not want to go to the media and become a
spectacle and a media trial. I wanted an opportunity to come at the right place
to say the truth because I know this is where I will be able to say what I want
to say, irrespective of what you decide. But to go to the judiciary and say is a
futile exercise. The decision was made long ago. Now, kindly see what the
Division Bench has to say. “In the aforesaid circumstances, we fail to
understand how the unfortunate, uncalled for, and unwarranted observations
and remarks could be made against an erstwhile receiver, even prior to
issuance of any directions to the erstwhile receiver for depositing the
accounts.” This is the law that you draw an adverse inference on failure to
pay. But adverse inference is drawn even before that. “The application filed
by the Respondent No.1 being G.A. No.875 of 2003, that is, the plaintiff’s
application was merely an application for handing over the amount lying with
the receiver. The scope and ambit of the said application did not contemplate
any inquiry into the personal accounts of the erstwhile receiver.” It is again a
finding of the Division Bench. “With respect, the learned single Judge
committed a serious error in making a detailed inquiry into the personal affairs
and bank accounts of the erstwhile receiver.” This is again the observation of
the Division Bench. Now, this is not liked, and therefore, the second inquiry
of a non-judicial nature.
If a judgement is not liked, you can bypass it. Gloss it over. Don’t hold it binding,
with the ground that you have a higher responsibility to look for. But if your
image is tarnished deliberately, what do you do? Don’t you not defend it? And,
in defending it, if I have come here and say certain things, that is not tarnishing
the image of the judiciary. This is unfortunate that it is being said that the
moment an allegation is made, the image of the judiciary is tarnished. I have
not tarnished the image of the judiciary. The other people are responsible for
tarnishing the image of the judiciary by making me a victim and compelling
me to come here and speak like this. I do not get a special desire and
happiness to say all these things. It is unfortunate that where I am today is
because of the judiciary. I have to say this also. There is no pleasure in it,
like, Shri Sitaram Yechury said, he is also extremely distressed, that he does
not derive any pleasure in moving this Motion against me in this House, but
that he wants that the issue of corruption should be settled. But is this an issue
of corruption in the higher judiciary, or, are real issues to be glossed over?
Make me a show-case. But, in any event, there was neither any ground nor
any reason to embark upon, practically, a State trial, when the subject matter
of application being G.A. No. 875 of 2003 was merely for issuance of a direction
upon the purchaser to lift the balance materials.
In the alternative, it was a direction upon the Receiver to sell the balance
quantity. It appears that witnesses were examined. Even after all this, there
was no evidence of any kind to show that the erstwhile Receiver had done
anything benefiting himself. That is the finding of the Division Bench on record.
Can anybody contradict it today? It is a judicial finding. On the contrary, the
record showed that the money has been deposited with the finance company
by the erstwhile Receiver but as the company was wound up the money could
not be recovered. It is seventy-one lakhs in fixed deposits. I asked this question
to myself: If I receive a one thousand rupee note from anybody and I am
supposed to give it back after six months, is it necessary to give back that
thousand rupee note or is it possible that I can give ten hundred rupee notes?
This is what is being said. Where is the purchaser’s money? Your thirty-two
lakhs do not constitute that money. Money has no colour. I had two bank
accounts. I took a step which may not be proper but it does not constitute
misappropriation. I will never accept this.
I had written to the Chief Justice that he can hold me guilty of mishandling of
accounts, being inexperienced, having wrong judgment, having made an error
of judgment but if you say I have misappropriated it, I will never accept it. He
ought to have got the message then what kind of a person I was. You don’t
charge me on things which I have not done. I will never accept it.
Now, there is one thing which is very interesting. They have said here, “l have
continued to misappropriate after I have become a Judge”. This is being done
only to bring me within the ambit of article 124 read with 217. The company
went into liquidation in the year 1999. The last transaction is of 1997. The
assets and liabilities of the wound up company are in possession and custody
of the Official Liquidator since 2000. I was elevated in 2003. How could I
misappropriate? This is the wildest of imagination. How can one imagine that
I have misappropriated money after my elevation? How can it be held?
Now, another allegation has been made that you have given certain written
notes. And the Division Bench has believed only that! There are two people
sitting there only... to believe me, and in the same court when such adverse
remarks have already been made against me. So, if I had such friends in the
Bench, I would not be here today.
After going through the written notes submitted on behalf of the Receiver on
the report filed by the Official Liquidator, the court came to an independent
finding. Kindly note this very carefully. The Official Liquidator had given a report
to the Single Judge giving him totality of the amount. It was a mere calculation;
there was some lacuna. My notes were only to point out that lacuna. There
was no argument made. Also, when you read the judgment, read it as a whole!
Don’t take a portion and hold me guilty. Going through the written note
submitted on behalf of the erstwhile Receiver on the note filed by the Official
Liquidator as well as Exhibits, the court went through the records of the Trial
Court and came to an independent finding. It is a judicial finding. What is the
finding? We find that the erstwhile Receiver had deposited the entire amount
received by him from the respective purchasers. Can anybody else hold it
otherwise? Is this judgment a product of inference, as is being suggested? It
is also being suggested that this judgment is not binding on the Judges Inquiry
because this is a judgment in personam, not in rem. We all know that a
judgment in rem is a judgment which decides a proposition of law with fine
spots.
In this judgment, there are propositions of law which have been decided as to
whether an application can be allowed without averments, as to whether without
prayers orders can be made. Assuming that this is a judgment in rem, what is
the issue here? The issue is misappropriation of money between parties inter
se. If the parties cannot raise this issue of misappropriation between
themselves, can a third party raise this issue? This is a fantastic logic that
this judgment is a judgment in personam, it just does not bind the Parliamentary
Committee. This is a judicial order. ‘Settling the issue of misappropriation for
all times to come’ cannot be raised once again. I have established from the
fact; because, if I have to take you to this bunch of evidence, the detailed bank
account, all the fixed deposit details, it will take four days. But I am trying to
finish within the time.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Please do conclude, we are running short of time.
JUSTICE SOUMITRA SEN: Well, Sir. The hon. Members may please take
the trouble of going through the Division Bench order and then decide. I have
also raised a point under rule 169, this is not a technical point, that a sub judice
matter cannot be discussed. This matter is still sub judice in the High Court at
Calcutta. The application is still pending. The liberty given to me is still alive.
Mr. Chairman, Sir, as I have said, ultimately it will have to be decided in this
House whether after a Division Bench order a nonjudicial body can set it aside.
That is an abstract proposition of law which you will have to decide.
I think, I have taken enough of your time. Sir, in such a situation, as you can
quite appreciate, I am defending my life, the very existence before you. Before
deciding it, kindly decide in accordance with your conscience, apply your
independent mind and then decide on merit. I am grateful to you, Sir.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Justice Sen. You may now withdraw
from the House.
(JUSTICE SOUMITRA SEN THEN WITHDREW)
MR. CHAIRMAN: The Motions and the Address to the President under Clause
4 of Article 124 of the Constitution are now open for discussion. Any Member
wishing to speak may do so, after which the mover will speak. Now, the hon.
Leader of the Opposition.
THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION (SHRI ARUN JAITLEY): Mr. Chairman,

Sir, today is an occasion which is both sad and historic. We have all assembled
here in an alternative capacity of Parliament where we perform a function where
we decide the fate of a man who has conventionally been deciding the fate of
others. Though this is a political House, it performs a judicial function. We have
had an opportunity to hear the mover of the Motion, Shri Sitaram Yechury
articulating his point of view in support of the Motion. We have also, at length,
heard the learned judge who is sought to be impeached.
Sir, we are conscious of the fact that the power of impeachment is intended
to be exercised in the rarest of the rare cases. The power of impeachment of
a holder of a Constitutional office is an authority or jurisdiction given to us to
remove a man in order to save the dignity of his office.
The Office gets precedence over the man who occupies it. And if we find that
the man is guilty of any misdemeanor, in the case of a judge, a proven
misconduct or incapacity, we impeach him so that we can ensure that the
dignity of the Office of judge that he occupies can be maintained. This power,
Sir, is both punitive and also a deterrent power. We regulate the exercise of
this power by article 124(4) in the case of a judge of a Supreme Court and
read with it article 217 in the case of a judge of a High Court. The two grounds
on which a judge, in either case, can be impeached is either proven
misbehaviour or incapacity. In this case, Mr. Yechury’s Motion is confined to
the first ground, i.e., proven misbehaviour.
Sir, when these articles were being drafted by the Constituent Assembly,
Shri Gopalaswamy Iyengar had expressed the hope that, perhaps, these
powers would never be used. He espoused the confidence that, at least, in
his lifetime it will never be used. His prophesy was partly correct because it
was not used in his lifetime. Virtually, we have made two efforts in the past.
One at the pre-Constitution stage, when a judge of the Allahabad High Court
was sought to be impeached. He resigned before the Impeachment Motion
could go through. There was a second occasion in 1993, where the Motion
fell in the other House because of want of quorum itself.
Sir, before I deal with what the learned Judge has presented before us, a few
words about the kind of system which we have adopted in this country. We,
perhaps, have adopted some of the soundest principles for running Indian
Democracy. We are a Parliamentary Democracy where different shades of
opinion are represented. We have an independent Judiciary. We have the
concept of separation of powers. And this power of removal of a judge is given
to the legislative body, a political sovereign, which conducts an inquiry in
accordance with the Judges Inquiry Act, where there is a pre-dominant
participation of judges and on their recommendations decides whether to
remove a judge or not to remove a judge. Sir, originally, when we devised the
concept of independence of Judiciary, world over, the whole mankind was
conscious of the fact that to judge the fate of ordinary humans is normally a
divine function. But we bestowed this power with an ordinary human being in
the hope that this ordinary human being would almost be perfect. He would be
free from all collateral considerations; he would have a high level of scholarship;
he would have the utmost integrity and, therefore, we were convinced that this
function could be performed by the Judiciary and that itself would safeguard the
rule of law and adjudicate fairly disputes between ordinary people.
Sir, as times have passed by, there are too many whispers and too many
aberrations which we are confronted with. It is only a very rare case which
comes to this House for consideration. And, therefore, Sir, we are now living
in a changed time where the level of vigilance and the standards of probity
will also have to be higher. The judges will also have to realise that Judiciary
is no longer an institution which lives on ivory towers. Judges, like most of us
here and others holding constitutional offices or high offices, also now live in
glass houses. And, therefore, whether it is public or it is the media or it is the
litigant or it is the Bar, they eventually become the best judges of judges. Their
conduct is also going to be watched and watched very closely. This is not to
say that we can make unfounded allegations against a Judge because a Judge
in ordinary circumstances speaks only through his judgments and he is not
able to defend himself.
Therefore, we have to be very cautious about every word that we say as right
to speak, both inside and outside this House that Judges and the Judiciary is
an institution which cannot be thrown to the wolfs. It cannot be made an object
of unfounded allegations but it will also like other institutions have to stand by
the scrutiny of all times. When, Sir, a Judge is sought to be impeached through
a procedure, what are really the standards we expect from the Judge?’ Do
we expect from a Judge to resort to every technicality which is available to
him? Do we expect a Judge to say that ‘I will not enter the box so that I cannot
be questioned; there are hard facts which I will not be able to answer?” Or, do
we expect a Judge to be a role model as a litigant and then candidly states
every question that is put to him because system cannot suffer for a Judge
who is stigmatised? A Judge who is stigmatised can really never be in a position
to represent the face of rule of law in India and be a Judge as far as others in
the society are concerned. Therefore, Sir, when a Judge says, ‘I will not appear
myself and answer the questions, or, that first that prove the allegations against
me and let me see how much you have in your pocket against me, only then
I will let you know what my response is’, that is not the case of an ideal Judge
facing an inquiry.
It has been repeatedly said and we hear rightly so these days that holders of
high offices must be like Caesar’s wife, they must be above suspicion. Caesar
divorced his second wife because he suspected her of an illicit relationship. Even
though the charge was not fully proved, he went through divorce because he
said, ‘Caesar’s wife, considering the position she is in, must be ‘unsuspectable’.
So, a Judge cannot really say, ‘first prove an allegation against me beyond
reasonable doubt and only then I will come up and tell you whether I have an
answer to give or not.’ A Judge by his very character must be ‘unsuspectable’.
His position must be such that nobody can point a finger to him. We have, Sir,
heard the presentation of the learned Judge at length. Sir, I have had an
opportunity to read the entire record which the Secretariat has served and
distributed to the Members. At times I got an impression whether the facts which
I have read are similar to the facts which I was hearing from the learned Judge.
Sir, when we were young lawyers we were all trained that if in a given case you
are strong on facts, you bang the facts first. If you are weak on facts but strong
on law, you bang the law. And, if you are weak on the both, then you bang the
desk, at least, you will appear to be confident. I was wondering what the facts
are. The facts are in a very narrow compass. One does not have to go into a
complicated circle of facts in order to determine that there are many other cases
in the Judiciary where people are accountable. Of course, there are other cases
in the Judiciary also where the persons should be accountable. In the matter of
probity or lack of probity, there is no right of equality. There are other people
who have committed offences while being Judge and got away with it is no ground
available to any Judge to say that ‘I must also get away from this offence.’ In
the matter of violation of law there is no article 14. Article 14, the Right to Equality,
applies in the matter of application of law not in the matter of violation of law.
Therefore, to discredit other Judges and say, ‘well, there are others like this
and, therefore, I must get away’ is never an argument available to any citizen,
least of all, to a Judge.
What are the facts as are apparent from the Report of the Inquiry Committee
and the entire records which the Secretariat has served? I heard large
discussions about workmen being paid and all workmen have signed, I found
that this case has nothing to do with any workman. The charge has nothing to
do with the workman. The case in a nutshell is that Steel Authority of India, a
public sector company brought certain goods. The goods were to be brought
through the shipping route by the Shipping Corporation of India and there was
a supplier. There was a dispute over those goods and its qualities. The-Steel
Authority of India moved the Calcutta High Court and the Calcutta High Court
on 30th April, 1984 appointed the then Mr. Soumitra Sen, an advocate as a
receiver. The Calcutta High Court said, ‘Take charge of these goods. You can
then make an inventory of the goods. Depending on the direction of the court,
you can sell these goods.’ Mr. Sen takes charge of these goods and he keeps
the goods in his custody. Nothing happens. There was a direction of the Calcutta
High Court that what you do to these goods and the moneys you recover, every
six months, please file a return with the Calcutta High Court. From 1984 till
2006, 18 years have passed, not once is the return filed. Nothing very seriously
happened till 1993. On 20th January, 1993, the Calcutta High Court says, ‘What
has happened to these goods? Please sell them. You are entitled as your fee
to five per cent of whatever is your sale value and whatever you sell, open a
bank account, keep it in that bank account and the court will decide what is to
be done with this money’, and the court says, ‘don’t create any encumbrances
on this money or on the goods. You can’t use it for any other purpose.’
Over the period of time, the goods are slowly sold and finally an approximate
sum of Rs. 33,22,800 is received against these goods. Goods are sold over
different periods of time. Mr. Sen, as he then was, opens two bank accounts,
one account in the ANZ Grindlays Bank and the other account in the Allahabad
Bank. He deposits Rs. 4,68,000 in Allahabad Bank and the balance of about
Rs. 28 lakhs in the ANZ Grindlays Bank which later merged and became the
Standard Chartered Bank. What does he do with these moneys? Now, these
moneys are to be kept in these accounts. They will earn interest and eventually,
whoever succeeds in the case will get these moneys. So, what does he do
with the money lying in the Allahabad Bank? That is the reason, the judges’
Inquiry Committee said, ‘He claimed a right of silence.’ Obviously, his advocate
could not come and answer. He only argued on law. If he had appeared and
the Inquiry Committee had asked him these questions, ‘how come this money
was lying in these accounts which were for the benefit of the court?’ You are
the receiver of the court and the court would give it to a winning party. He first
cuts out cheques from these accounts, gives four cheques in the names of
private individuals who are known to him, who have nothing to do with this
case.
One Subroto Mukherjee, Biresh Pratap Choudhary, Somnath Ray, K.L. Yadav,
one Jai Guru Enterprises gets that money. Other amounts of money, his visa,
credit card bills are debited to it. There is a well known law book publisher,
S.C. Sarkar and Company. So, law books are purchased. The moneys go from
that account. While this was happening and this was the entire rigmarole that
the presentation today was getting into, another judge of the Calcutta High
Court appoints him as a special officer in the case of one Calcutta Fans. That
case has nothing to do with this case. He is paid Rs. 70 lakhs so that workmen
of Calcutta banks could be paid. He opens another bank account and puts
the Rs. 70 lakhs there. Of this Rs. 70 lakhs, he quietly withdraws Rs. 25 lakhs
and makes a deposit in the name of one company, Links-India. Obviously, this
Rs. 25 lakhs has gone there. So, the money is shortfall of workmen in the
second case. The second case has nothing to do with this impeachment
proceeding. When he is paying the workmen, he realized that he is short of

money because M/s Links India went into liquidation soon after he deposited
the money. So, what he does is, he removed Rs. 22 lakhs from the SAIL’s
money, which is lying in the other account, and deposited in the Calcutta Fans
Case. As a result of which only Rs. 800 and odd are left in this account. Well,
this is a serious issue to ponder over which I deal with it in a little later.
In February, 2003, the SAIL moved the court and said, ‘We have not got any
accounts. We have not got our money. What has happened to our money?
This case is pending for over 19 years.’ And, the weakness of our system is,
since Judges appoint Judges in this country, the Government has a very
marginal role.
In December, 2003, he was elevated to a Judge. Now, the first thing that should
have struck him when he becomes a Judge was that he was a Receiver in
some cases and he got somebody else’s money and he has to clear that first.
He has already misappropriated that money for some alternative purpose. He
just keeps quite and keeps sitting on it. So, during his tenure, as a Judge from
2003 onwards, this misappropriation for ‘alternative’ purpose continues. When
he does not answer the advocate of the Steel Authority of India, it moved the
Calcutta High Court. The Calcutta High Court issues notice to him repeatedly,
‘please file an affidavit and tell us...’—by this time he is a Judge—‘...as to what
have you done with this money?’ When he does not respond, the Judge, who
was being put across as a villain of the peace, comes up and then makes
enquiries. He calls people from the Registry and he calls people from banks
and tries to trace out where this money has gone. After all, this money was
put in trust with the court and the court keeps its trust in him. He was holding
it for the benefit of some other parties. He has utilized it and misappropriated
it for some other purpose. Now, if he goes back to court as a Judge, he has
to tell the Judge that my Visa Credit Card bills paid from this account, from
other account I paid to the workmen and that deficit I compensated from this
account, my books’ bills, my self cheques—there are a large number of self
cheques which all enquiries revealed—are paid from this account. So, what
he does is: He does not file any Affidavit or response to the court. The court,
finally, delivers a judgment. He has paid back to SAIL Rs. 5 lakhs. With regard
to the balance amount, with interest, the court then passes a decree against
him saying that Rs. 52,46,454 be paid. In three installments he paid
Rs. 40 lakhs. Now, he is a Judge. He has not voluntarily paid for three years.
Only on a coercive direction of the court he pays Rs. 40 lakhs. Then, he asks
his mother to move an application before the Calcutta High Court praying for
giving some more time to pay the balance amount. So, the Calcutta High Court
says, ‘first tell us as to what happened to this money in the meanwhile.’ So,
the court is told, ‘I have put this money in M/s Links India and that money got
lost because M/s Links India went into liquidation.’ But, you never put this
money in M/s Links India. You put some other money into M/s Links India.
Why are you confusing the two? And, Sir, that is where the misrepresentation
comes in. So, the court passes a judgment by giving him time and makes some
adverse remarks against him.
When these adverse remarks are reported in newspapers, the Chief Justice of
Calcutta High Court writes to the Chief Justice of India, saying that this case
has come to notice and this is a conduct unbecoming of a Judge. Sir,
10th September, 2007 —by this time he has paid the entire amount—the Chief
Justice of India calls him and says, ‘how do you explain this conduct?’ He says,
‘give me some more time.’ So, the Chief Justice fairly says, ‘Please take some
more time, but explain to me your conduct in this case, because it is
unbecoming of a Judge.’ He goes back, files an appeal through his mother
again before the Division Bench, after taking time. The appeal comes up before
the Division Bench. It is not a very happy commentary either on Judges or on
lawyers. As the appeal comes on day one—now, one brother Judge is getting
into trouble; he has to explain to the Chief Justice of India—they asked the
advocate of the Steel Authority of India and the buyer of the goods if he has
no objection if they set aside this judgement, at least, the observations against
him. So, on a concession made by a party, those parts of the observations
were all set aside. And, those advocates get up and say that they have no
objection you can set aside the observations. And, collusively, on that
concession, the Division Bench passes an order. He goes back to the Chief
Justice and says, “You had asked me for an explanation. Now, I have a very
good judgement from the Division Bench which has set aside, by this method,
the strictures against me.” So, the Supreme Court was legitimately concerned
as to what you do. So, the Chief Justice of India asked two very eminent Chief
Justices of High Courts, and a Judge. All of them were men of proven integrity.
The Chief Justice A.P. Shah, the Chief Justice Patnayak, and the Justice R.M.
Lodha, men of great reputation, said, “This is an in-house mechanism”. Now,
the learned Judge, today, says that the in-house mechanism is extra
constitutional. Obviously, the Constitution does not provide for any in-house
mechanism. Impeachment is a near-impossible procedure. So, the in-house
mechanism is: Let the Judiciary, in the first instance, look into the allegation
itself and prima facie see whether any unfounded allegation is being made or
it is a serious allegation. So, the three judges repeatedly call him. He gets a
detailed hearing from them. He puts up his defense. They asked him what he
did with this money all this while, both, when you were an advocate and from
2003 to 2006, when you were a Judge. There is a continuing running threat.
But, as a Judge, are you expected to misappropriate the money and keep to
yourself the misappropriated money; and, then, not share with anybody where
you kept this money? It is only when there is a coercive order of a court that
you decide to return the money.
Now, you say, “Since I have returned the money my sins are all washed off.”
Section 403 of the Indian Penal Code, Mr. Jethmalani knows Criminal Law
better than most of us, talks regarding misappropriation of money. Even a
temporary misappropriation of money is a misappropriation of money. The fact
that I stole this money or I misappropriated this money and when I got caught
I returned it with interest does not wash off your crime. In any case, what is
the level of probity that we expect from a person who is going to judge the
rest of the society? The standard of proof may be beyond reasonable doubt,
but a Judge is expected to act with probity and not in this manner. After the
inquiry holds him guilty—that is the procedure they follow, so that the dirty linen
of Judiciary is not washed in public—the three senior most Judges of the
Supreme Court call him and ask him to submit his resignation because prima
facie there is a serious material against him. Now, should this be interpreted
as some kind of belinious act or a conspiracy? They have gone through a
procedure. The Chief Justice of the High Court said, “Prima facie the allegations
appear true and serious.” The inquiry said that the charges were serious. And,
since he does not agree to resign, fifty-eight Members of Parliament submit a
motion, for his removal, to the hon. Chairman. The hon. Chairman constitutes
a Committee, which comprises, under the Judges Inquiry Act, of a sitting Judge
of the Supreme Court, Justice Reddy, a Chief Justice of a High Court, who
got changed in between Justice Mudgil, and the third has to be a Jurist,
Mr. Fali S. Nariman. He appears through an advocate. The first thing he does
is, raises an allegation of bias against Mr. Nariman. He, then, appears before
the Inquiry through his advocate and says, “I will not enter the witness box”.
Obviously, he would have had to answer where these moneys were from 1993
to 2003, and from 2003 to 2006. He did not enter the witness box. That’s what
they referred to his right of silence. So, the Judges’ Inquiry Committee has to
do a fishing inquiry. They have to call bankers. They have to call various people
and then find out that these were two separate transactions. The Kolkata fans
case, which is payment of workers’ dues, had nothing to do with this
misappropriation. He only made good of the shortfall from here by putting the
monies into that account. And, then, it has written a detailed finding holding
him guilty of proven misconduct. I have just recollected this fact because the
manner in which some of the facts have been given are really made out as
though it is a different case between the paper circulated to us, what we have
understood and what the learned judge was really arguing. In a nutshell, Sir,
the misconduct is this. The first misconduct, which is a proven misconduct is,
that you misappropriated the monies. The misappropriation started when you
were an advocate. It continued after your elevation. You kept the monies and
allowed them to remain misappropriated. You didn’t cooperate with the Judicial
institution in telling them the truth. Finally, when there were a compulsion of a
judicial order, you claim it to be a virtue that now, at least, I have returned the
entire money with interest. The second fact is this. Why did you misrepresent
the facts? Even today, Sir, when he seeks indulgence from this hon. House,
did we once hear him tell us where the money of the Steel Authority case went?
All we were told was this money was used for some fixed deposits, this went
to workmen, this has been honourably paid, etc. This money had nothing to
do with workmen. It was some other Kolkata Fan’s case. He kept misleading
the in-house inquiry, the judges’ inquiry, even today, the House that I honestly
deposited the money. The impression which any person who has not read the
record would get is, that I deposited this money with a company and that
company went into liquidation. So, I was good enough to take my own money
and pay it back with interest. That is the case being made out.
Sir, having said this, on both counts, the prima facie opinion of the Chief Justice
of the High Court, the firm opinion of the Judges’ Inquiry Committee, which is
the in-house Inquiry Committee, and, then, the opinion of senior three-judges
of the Supreme Court to ask him to submit his resignation so that things don’t
come to such a pass. It has happened in the past. It may be extra-
constitutional. It is the in-house persuasive method which the Judiciary has.
And, then, comes, finally, the statutory constitutional procedure. Again, there
was an inquiry by three eminent people. All findings come to a unanimous
conclusion that, ‘Yes, you did misappropriate money, and you did misrepresent
the facts by not telling the truth. This case had nothing to do with Lynx India.
You were using some other monies in Lynx India.’ What business did you have
even in that case to put the workers’ money into Lynx India; a company which
was on the verge of liquidation? You only made good of the shortfall in this
case and put it into Lynx India. Is there any reason, is there any extraordinary
argument that we must disagree with all these reports of all these experts and,
then, come to a finding that the learned judge has not committed a misconduct
or a proven misbehaviour? Sir, from the beginning to the end, it smacks of an
abuse of a process both as an advocate and as a judge. And when it smacks
of abuse of a procedure, are we being guided by the opinion of a former Chief
Justice of India? He may have his own grievances against the former Chief
Justice of India. That is not an issue today. Can he today seriously contend
that the sub—judice rule must apply to the impeachment jurisdiction of
Parliament? The misconduct of a judge; of this judge, is not pending before
any court. We are relying on independent evidence which was even held back
from the single-judge Division Bench and elsewhere.......which came up for
the first time before the Judges Inquiry Committee, which was appointed by the
Chairperson. This House, in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction to remove
a judge, will look at the kind of evidence which has come out. And, then, to
say, in a single day hearing, as soon as I filed an appeal, on basis of
concessions of two advocates, I managed to get a judgement; therefore, all
my sins are washed off. Sir, we are not relying on any judgement in the course
of this impeachment proceeding against him; we are relying on the Report of
the Judges Inquiry Act. Judgements which are obtained in this manner by
concessions between parties may be binding between those parties. That is
why, the Committee appointed by the hon. Chairman rightly says that these
are judgements in personam, inter se the parties; these are not judgements
on an issue, concerned with larger public interest, dealing with the misconduct
of a judge. Therefore, they will not be binding, as far as this House is
concerned, as far as the misconduct of a judge is concerned. This House is
not moving on a presumption of guilt.
In fact, a full opportunity has been provided by the Inquiry Committee, by this
House. We start with the presumption of innocence, but when the facts, which
are prejudicial, come before us, then, this House, prima facie comes to an
opinion, and then, if the Motion is passed, comes to an opinion that the Judge,
in question, really should not hold such a high office. He is a judge who stands
stigmatized by repeated reports and those reports have a strong basis on the
face of it. Those facts are borne out by the fact that monies have been diverted
for collateral purposes. There may be other problems with the judicial
institutions, which the Judiciary or the Legislature will seek to correct. But, then,
Sir, these are not issues on which the judge can say, “I need the benefit of any
doubt”. Because no doubt has been cast on any of the findings which the Inquiry
Reports, placed before us, have, really, revealed. I, therefore, strongly support
the Motion, moved by Shri Sitaram Yechury, for the fact that an Address be sent
to the President supporting the fact that this judge is unfit to be in the Office of
Judge. There is a case of proven misbehaviour against him; therefore, the judge
be removed from office. Having said this, Sir, a few observations that....
SHRI M. VENKAIAH NAIDU (KARNATAKA): Mr. Chairman, Sir, we can continue

it tomorrow.
SHRI S.S. AHLUWALLA (JHARKHAND): Sir, today, there is a function at six

o’clock. We all have to attend that.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Mr. Jaitley, do you wish to conclude or would you take more
time?
SHRI ARUN JAITLEY: Sir, I will take 15-20 minutes tomorrow morning.
MR. CHAIRMAN: All right. The House is, then, adjourned to meet at 11 o’clock
tomorrow morning.
The House then adjourned at fifty-three minutes past

five of the clock till eleven of the clock on
Thursday, the 18th August, 2011.
The House re-assembled after lunch at two of the clock,
MR. CHAIRMAN IN THE CHAIR.
MOTION FOR PRESENTING AN ADDRESS UNDER ARTICLE 217 READ WITH

CLAUSE (4) OF ARTICLE 124 OF THE CONSTITUTION TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR REMOVAL FROM OFFICE OF JUSTICE SOUMITRA SEN OF THE
CALCUTTA HIGH COURT;
AND
MOTION FOR CONSIDERING THE REPORT OF THE INQUIRY COMMITTEE

CONSTITUTED TO INVESTIGATE INTO THE GROUNDS ON WHICH
REMOVAL OF SHRI SOUMITRA SEN, JUDGE, CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
WAS PRAYED FOR;
AND
MOTION FOR ADDRESS TO THE PRESIDENT UNDER CLAUSE (4) OF

ARTICLE 124 OF THE CONSTITUTION (CONTD.)
MR. CHAIRMAN: We shall now resume discussion on the Motion that could
not be finished yesterday. The hon. Leader of Opposition.
THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION (SHRI ARUN JAITLEY): Mr. Chairman,

Sir, yesterday, after some initial observations with regard to the bar being raised
on issues of probity when it comes to Constitutional functionaries like the
Judges, I had dealt with at length what the learned Judge had to say in his
defence when he appeared before the House yesterday.
In a nutshell, so as to maintain the continuity, if I can just repeat two or three

sentences, the case against the Judge is that from his tenure as an Advocate-
Receiver to his tenure as a Judge, there is a thread of continuity where he
never rendered accounts for monies which came into his possession as Receiver.
He created, on his own admission, encumbrances. And I was trying to build up
a case that he even misappropriated those funds. And, that is the case the
Inquiry Committee has established and the in-House Judges Committee has
established. This misappropriation spilled over into his tenure as a Judge. He
became a Judge on 3rd December, 2003. It is only in 2006, when the Court
passed an Order against him, that he had to then repay it under a coercive
threat of a Court Order.
The second limb of the charge against him is that before various authorities,
whether it was the Court, the in-House Committee, or the Inquiry Committee,
he misrepresented the facts. He misled them, and this entire misrepresentation
was during his tenure as a Judge. A Judge is expected to be candid. A Judge
is expected to be a role model litigant. A Judge does not come up and say, ‘I
invested this money erroneously, by an error of judgement, in Lynx India. The
money got lost because of insolvency’, when the fact is that he did not, from
the monies, in this case, of Steel Authority of India, invest any monies in Lynx
India.
Sir, since the House had adjourned yesterday for continuing this debate today,
I got a further opportunity to read the entire evidence which came up before
the Committee set up under The Judges Inquiry Act by the hon. Chairman.
And, I must say that even when the learned Judge was here yesterday, and
he made a very persuasive presentation, some of the facts that he stated—
and I say this with a sense of responsibility—were not merely a continuation
of this exercise to mislead the entire enquiry process, and earlier, the judicial
process; when he appeared before this House, the entire basis of his defence,
on the basis of documents admittedly before the inquiry which the hon.
Chairman appointed, was completely at variance. The truth was something
else. I will refer to three illustrations of this fact.
The hon. Judge says, “The Committee that the hon. Chairman appointed
mentioned that the Judge was a holder of a particular account whereas the
account belonged to some other Soumitra Sen, and that he was being hanged
because the Committee attributed a bank account to him which was in the
name of some other Soumitra Sen. When all of us heard this, we were actually
surprised that how the Committee could commit such a patent error on the
face of it. I checked up the entire evidence. When the charge was made against
him that you obtained moneys by sale of goods in the Steel Authority case,
you usurped those moneys; you misappropriated those moneys. On the
contrary, from some other case of Calcutta Fans where you were a Special
Officer, you invested those moneys in a company called Lynx India. The
Committee or any other litigant did not make this charge of this account against
him. This judge, in the first instance, through his mother went to a single judge
of the Calcutta High Court and he told the single judge of the Calcutta High
Court, “Well I had kept this money in Account No.O1SLP0156800 and this
money was invested in Lynx India.”
Through his mother he filed a written note. This account number that he himself
gave was the account of the other Soumitra Sen. And that written note—I hold
in my hand the relevant extract—is before the Inquiry Committee. The Calcutta
High Court never had an opportunity to see it. Even the in-house inquiry did
not get it. It’s only the Inquiry Committee appointed by the hon. Chairman that
obtained this by directing the bank to come here. Not only this, when we
challenged the order of the Division Bench at two places—and I will read it
and those familiar with court proceedings will appreciate that this is in form of
grounds of appeal and an interim application—he makes the same observation.
“For the learned judge failed to appreciate that all investments made by the
erstwhile Receiver in the company were by way of cheques drawn on ANZ
Grindlays Bank from bank Account No.01SLP0156800.” His defence was that
from this account he made the investments in Lynx. So, both the High Court
and everybody called for this account and they found that from this account
no investments had been made. Twice he told the Division Bench this. After
he told the Division Bench this and the single judge did not accept his case
and they found that from this account no moneys had been paid to Lynx, the
matter came up for inquiry under the Judges (Inquiry) Act. They charged him
not for holding this account; but you say that from this account you paid moneys
to Lynx, unfortunately, from this account no money has been paid. The copy
of the charge is then given to him. He doesn’t correct the error. The charge is
then given to him. The charge doesn’t say that you hold this account. The
charge says from this account also no money has been paid to Lynx. So, the
defence is false. When he comes up before the inquiry Committee, he files a
detailed reply. Even in the reply, he doesn’t say that this belongs to some other
Soumitra Sen. It is only when the bank official comes his counsel now very
conveniently puts a question to him, ‘Well this account doesn’t belong to my
client, it belongs to somebody else’. So, the bank rightly says, ‘Yes, it belongs
to somebody else.’ So, the Inquiry Committee says, ‘You yourself put up a false
account from which you had made the payments and when it is found out that
this is not the real account, they get the account opening form. The account
opening form is of one Soumitra Sen who is an employee of Food Specialities
Ltd. So, you passed off his account as your account in the pleadings.’ So, the
Inquiry Committee holds against him from these moneys of sale or this account
you have not paid any money. Now what does he do when he appears before
us? He comes here and says, ‘Look so casual and vindictive was this Inquiry
Committee that they foisted a false account on me.’ Sorry, the truth is otherwise.
You passed off a false account as your account. When the bank was called,
they detected this fraud and the Committee has, therefore, given a finding
against you.
So, the first point on which he tried literally to rubbish the procedure of the
inquiry was by saying that a false account is foisted on me. The second fact—
and we can check up the record—is when he says, “The accounts were
materially operated between 1993 and 1995. No bank statements are available,
and I am being hanged without the bank statement showing expenditure.” This
worried me a little, Sir. So, I went and checked back the record at night, and
from the evidence, which the Committee appointed by the hon. Chairman, I
found that before the High Court, he never brought the bank statement.
Obviously, he himself had to show the bank statement of expenditure. But,
the inquiry appointed by the hon. Chairman directed one of the banks to come
and show the statement. So, the bank filed the ledger. So, second falsehood
where he misled the House yesterday was, “bank statements are not available”.
The bank statements are available. They are exhibited in the inquiry appointed
by the hon. Chairman. What does the bank statement say? I am just holding
the statement of Allahabad Bank where I had mentioned yesterday that some
Rs.4,68,000 was deposited. From 24th March, 1993 onwards, by cash, and
mostly by cash, some payments by cheque, he withdraws the money. And,
Rs.4,68,000, on 8th March, 1996, within two years, becomes Rs.5,378. No
money given to any workmen; no money given to Lynx India; all cash and
cheque withdrawals for himself. Till date, he has not explained what did he do
with this money. It’s only in 2006, ten years later, when he got caught, he says,
“Okay, I will pay with interest”. So, this House was again misled yesterday by
saying that bank statements are not here. Bank statements are available. I
hold them in my hand.
The third thing he said yesterday where he tried to mislead us, “Even if you
hold me guilty and remove me, I will still shout from rooftops that I did not
misappropriate the money.”. Well, you may have a great determination or a
pathological conviction that you have not misused the money, but the best proof
is : how were the cheques cut out from this account? The cheques can’t lie;
individuals can. On the inquiry appointed by the hon. Chairman, what do the
cheques show? I am holding zerox copies of the cheques which are on the
record of the inquiry. The same names as I mentioned yesterday -cheques in
favour of one K.L. Yadav, one Guru Enterprises, one Subroto Mukherjee,
Prashed Prasad Chaudhary, Ram Nath Roy and the same names which I had
mentioned yesterday. Now, who are these people? These are not workmen.
What is the second set of cheques? Now, regarding the second set of cheques,
the record is with me. It is in Committee’s record. Any Member can borrow
the record from me. All these cheques are cut out ‘self’ and cash withdrawn.
You can shout from rooftops that you did not withdraw this money, but these
cheques and this misappropriation will hang like an albatross around your neck
even when you are shouting from rooftops. These are all self withdrawals.
These are all withdrawals in favour of a company, S.C. Sarkar and Company,
the bookseller, publishers that I mentioned. And, then, there are cheques
towards ANZ Grindlays Bank card number so and so which is for VISA credit
card. These are exactly the same facts I had given yesterday. Now, you use
the money, you utilise the money which is really custodial, as he says, in his
possession, which is case property. He holds it as a trustee. And, when he
holds it as a trustee, he not only misuses this money, misappropriates this
money, but in 2003 when he becomes the Judge, he does not tell the Court
that I should now be discharged. He continues this misappropriation. The
misappropriation continues to 2006. And, the second limb of his offence is when
he is called before Courts, when he is called before an in-House inquiry, when
he is called before the inquiry appointed by the hon. Chairman, he tells them,
“I made some wrongful investments. There must have been an error of
judgement on my part, but there is no misappropriation.”
Self cheques, credit card cheques, book publisher’s cheques, cheques in

favour of some other unknown gentleman! And, both the inquiries, the inquiry
appointed by the Chief Justice of India, and, the inquiry appointed by the
Chairperson of the Rajya Sabha, have come to a finding that this was a case
of misappropriation.
He says that I eventually went and returned the money. I mentioned this
yesterday, and, some of us who are familiar with this branch, know that the
first explanation, in fact, that is the only explanation, to breach of trust deals
with a situation when, as a trustee, you hold money which is to be used for a
particular purpose. The explanation to section 403 of the IPC states that a
dishonest misappropriation for a time only is a misappropriation with the
meaning of this section.
So, any kind of misappropriation, even if it is for a temporary period, in this

case, this period stretches to almost more than ten years, is a misappropriation.
And, as a Judge, between 2003 to 2006, not only he continues the
misappropriation but also misrepresents to every authority, and, he tells to every
authority which is constituted, “well, these were some honest, bonafide
investments, which got lost, and, therefore, I paid back after ten years with
interest”.
Can we afford to have a Judge whose conduct is of this manner? The plea that
he raises is that since the main suit is pending, the issue is sub judice. The
issue of Justice Sen’s misconduct or proven misbehaviour within the meaning
of article 124 and article 217 is not pending in any court. In fact, that is the
sole jurisdiction of this House. He then says, “I did not claim a right of silence”.
The summons issued to him under the Judges Inquiry Act say, “you can appear
in person and through counsel but be prepared to answer all the questions”.
So, his counsel appears, and, it is a clever strategy that he does not appear
himself nor offer himself as a witness. He is the best available person who can
tell us and produce his accounts. What would a Judge do? He will be candid
and say, this is how I spent the money. It was an error of judgement. I
compensate the loss caused. He does not appear because these cheques would
be confronted to him, the accounts would be confronted to him, and, he will
have no answers to give.
So, the second limb of the charge on which he is held guilty is his misconduct
during his tenure as a Judge, both continuing the misappropriation and stating
incorrect, inaccurate facts. So, on each of these grounds, two different bodies
have come to a conclusion, and, in all fairness, we are not really bound by
what the in-house inquiry has said; we are not even bound by what the then
Chief Justice’s letter to the Prime Minister contains. There may be many cases
of a grosser impropriety, of which evidence, unfortunately, may not be
forthcoming. Therefore, we have to consider how we strengthen the system
that even those cases do not go unchecked. But is that a ground that because
many people who have committed similar or larger offences have got away,
therefore, why pick me up, why single me out? Can we afford to have a Judge
whose conduct smacks of this kind of a proven misconduct? Therefore, when
an opportunity has come, where a committee of two very eminent Judges and
one very eminent jurist has come to a finding, is there anything extraordinary
in his presentation saying that they have violated the procedures, or, the
substantive facts are incorrect, that we should really consider not accepting
the committee’s recommendation?
And, therefore, I concluded yesterday, and, I am reaffirming that, I support

Mr. Sitaram Yechury’s motion that this is a fit case of proven misconduct where
the Judge concerned must be removed from office, and, the Address to the
President should be so recommended by this hon. House.
Sir, I would now like to make just a few observations. The first thing that comes
to our mind is—and this has nothing to do with this particular case—that even
in 2003, when this misconduct was continuing, how come such persons get
to be appointed? It really seriously means that we have to revisit that process.
Originally, when the Constitution was framed, we had a system where Judges
were appointed by the Executive Government in consultation with the Chief
Justice of India. Ordinarily, the Government would be bound by the Chief
Justice’s advice. In 1993, that system got changed by a judicial interpretation
and the advice of the Chief Justice of India was binding on the Executive
Government. That is the position today. Today, even though the Government
is a part of the consultation process, it can refer back the case once, but
effectively, our experience has been, this was the experience when the NDA
Government was in power, this is the experience of the present Government,
that we are living in a system where Judges appoint Judges. The Government,
at best, has only a very marginal say. There is no other process by which there
is any kind of a participation in the process of appointment of Judges. Sir, both
the pre-1993 system and the post-1993 system had several handicaps. The
best in this country are not willing to become Judges. We have to seriously
consider why. At times, the selection process, where only Judges appoint
Judges and the process is a non-transparent process, will always create
situations where rumours in the corridors of the court and those who are close
observers of the judicial process will be far too many. It was unthinkable once
upon a time; it is not unthinkable today. That is why whereas, on the one hand,
I suggested that vigilance has to increase, at the same time, we think of an
alternative. My suggestion to the alternative is, I am not going into the details
but a two-fold alternative. We should seriously consider a system which is being
debated about setting up a National Judicial Commission. The National Judicial
Commission must have Judges. It must have the participation of the Executive.
It can also have participation of the people selected by a collegium of some
eminent citizens. It can’t only remain the domain of the Judges. Therefore,
public interest has to be protected in the matter of appointment of competent
Judges, in the matter of appointment of Judges who are men of integrity, men
of scholarship. Not only this, the criteria for appointment today does not exist.
Is it today the discretion of the collegium? Collegium is also a system of sharing
the spoils. When the High Courts recommend, members of the collegium share
the spoils. This is an impression which close observers have. Therefore, the
discretion whether the collegium system continues or we have a National
Judicial Commission must also be now statutorily regulated so that arbitrariness
can be avoided. After all, there has to be some objective criteria. Except elected
offices, there is no other appointment which is made where there is no
threshold criteria for entry. What is your academic qualification? How bright
were you during your academic days? What is your experience as a lawyer?
If you are a Judge, how many judgements have you written? How many have
been set aside? How many have been upheld? How many juniors have you
trained? How many cases have you argued? How many cases have been
reported which you have argued? Have you got laws laid down? Have you written
papers on legal subjects? These are all objective criteria. One cannot disregard
them and say I pick up a name out of my hat and appoint him because I am in
the collegium. Therefore, we need, I am glad the hon. Prime Minister himself is
here, a system where this should be seriously reviewed.
Secondly, Sir, the matter of Judges judging Judges and nobody else participating
in this is also an issue which requires a serious review and which requires to
be referred to, in my opinion, the same National Judicial Commission.
The third issue is this. When appointments are made we have to seriously
consider how the institution functions, whether it functions without any
pressures. Today, whether it is politicised appointments or it is appointments
which lack credibility or it is subsequent lack of accountability or biases on
account of relatives, biases on account of religion,, caste, and personal
relationship, these are all areas where accountability and vigilance norms have
to be improved and increased, so that the independence of the institution can
seriously be preserved.
Sir, I have always believed that we must seriously consider this larger issue
of almost every retiring judge, barring a few honourable exceptions, holding a
belief that he is entitled to a job after retirement. Jobs have been provided in
certain statutes; they are created by certain judicial orders. Therefore, search
for a job on the eve of retirement begins, as a result of which there is a serious
doubt which is raised that retirement eve judgements at times get influenced
by the desire to get a job after retirement.
Therefore, I think when there is a Bill pending with regard to increasing the
retirement age from 62 to 65 in the case of High Court Judges, we should
correspondingly think of increasing the strength of judges, even increasing the
facilities, remuneration and pension available, but putting a stop to this practice
of everybody being entitled to a job after retirement. The desire of a job after
retirement is now becoming a serious threat to judicial independence.
Lastly, Sir, it is just a brief comment. I have said in the very beginning that the
separation of powers is one of the basic features of our Constitution. At times
it’s argued that the separation of powers is threatened because Governments
of the day don’t want an independent judiciary. They want to influence the
independence of judiciary. So the theories like committed judges, judges with
the social philosophy were all propounded at one point in time. Those are now
ideas of the past.
Separation of powers requires that every institution works in its own spheres.
And if every institution works in its own spheres, it has to lay down the lakshman
rekha of its own jurisdiction. But why is it necessary to lay down lakshman
rekha of its own jurisdiction? What happens if one steps into the other’s
domain? And I must candidly confess that this attempt to encroach upon the
lakshman rekha is neither coming from governments of the day in the Centre
or the States nor is it coming from the Executive or the Legislature. Some
serious sidestepping is coming from the judicial institution itself. Therefore, we
require a certain element of judicial statesmanship; we require a certain
legislative vision so that we can maintain this separation of powers. Otherwise,
what should be the economic philosophy of India? What should be our
economic policy? Whether we go to the post-91 policy of liberalisation or we
go to State controls is the matter entirely for the Executive. Courts cannot say
that this is neoliberalism which is creating problems. Courts cannot have an
ideology. The only ideology that courts can have is commitment to the rule of
law and what law is made by Parliament. Courts cannot tell this to the
Government.
There was an incident in the past when a terrorist group was holed up in
Kashmir and courts asked our security agencies how many calories were to
be fed to the terrorists, because they have a right under Article 21 carrying a
gun in their own hands. How Maosim is to be fought or insurgency in the North-
East is to be fought, we have gone through these debates in this House. That
is the domain of the Government. The Government has to decide the policy.
Courts cannot decide that policy. What should be the land acquisition policy?
The Government is seriously contemplating a new Land Acquisition Act. What
should be the quantum of relief and rehabilitation? These are all area for the
government to decide.
I recently came across a fact that a Pakistani prisoner should be released.

There may be some space for compassion in any civilised society.
But, whether the Government of India wants to release the Pakistani prisoner
or it wants to exchange for another Indian prisoner in Pakistan, is a matter of
the foreign policy or the security policy of the Government of India. We have
not handed over the management of India’s foreign policy to the Supreme Court
of India and, therefore, how the Pakistani prisoner is to be treated–released
or otherwise–is entirely in the domain of the Government of India. Now, these
are all examples of recent past that I am mentioning where the space or line
of separation of powers itself gets obliterated and the encroachment, in most
cases, is neither coming from the Legislative nor the Executive. Therefore,
we need a serious introspection and I, therefore, said that we need a judicial
vision, a legislative statesmanship and vice-versa in this country so that the

correct balance of separation of powers can itself be maintained.
Finally, Sir, we were dealing with the case of a delinquent Judge. I am of the
clear opinion after going through the reasoning of the Inquiry Committee;
detailed reasoning has been given; it’s a very well written report which is
substantiated by huge number of documents. The conduct of the Judge leaves
much to be desired - his conduct as a receiver, his conduct as a Judge, his
conduct in the course of inquiry and finally—though not a ground for
impeachment, but a ground on the basis of which we must make our own
assessment - the kind of statement he made yesterday. I think, this is a case
which should leave none of us in doubt that it’s a fit case for removal of this
Judge and we must so make a recommendation of the Address to the
President of India. Thank you.
DR. E.M. SUDARSANA NATCHIAPPAN (TAMIL NADU): Thank you, Sir. I support
the Motion for presenting an Address under article 217 read with clause (4) of
article 124 of the Constitution followed by the Motion for considering the Report
of the Inquiry Committee constituted to investigate into the grounds on which
removal of Shri Soumitra Sen, Judge, Calcutta High Court was prayed for and
Address to the President under clause (4) of article 124 of the Constitution.
Sir, we respect the judiciary in all quarters. We never mention the name of any
individual Judge or any action of the Judges or any of the courts. We are following
the system of separation of power and more so, under the leadership of Dr.
Manmohan Singhji, the Government always obliges and respects the orders and
directions of the Supreme Court, the High Courts and all the courts. But,
yesterday, we felt very sorry after hearing an eloquent speech of a Judge, who
is a sitting Judge, where he attacked the judiciary to the maximum. We can
even see that the words he used were never used in the record of the Parliament.
Never as a politician or as a Member of Parliament, we used the word ‘prejudice’;
we never used the word ‘pre-judge’; we never used the words ‘they don’t have
any power’; we never said that Order 39 or Order 40 of CPC says that they
cannot ask anything from the receiver. We never said like that. We oblige that
they have got separate jurisdiction. We have our own jurisdiction. We are doing
our job; they are doing their job. That was the nature of the speech that we had
in Parliament yesterday.
Sir, really, it is a historic day that now we are discussing the issue which was
initiated by the judiciary. It is not initiated by any Member of Parliament except
the procedure. Under the Judges Inquiry Act 1968, there is a procedure that
you have to come forward with a petition or complaint against the sitting Judge
of the High Court or the Supreme Court with the signature of 50 or above
Members of Rajya Sabha or 100 Members from Lok Sabha. That procedure
alone is followed by our side and we initiated this procedure only on the basis
of the judicial aspect. The hon. Chief Justice of India had made a request to
the President, requesting initiation of these proceedings against a sitting Judge
of the Calcutta High Court.
For that I am just quoting from the report of the Inquiry Committee,
Volume-ll, page 65, item No.9, “On 03-12-2003 Receiver was elevated as a
Judge of the Calcutta High Court” This is a date very important for us. From
that date onwards our jurisdiction starts to discuss on this matter. Then, he
cites 20 events which have happened before the single Judge of the Calcutta
High Court where it was dealing with a Receiver’s petition, how the Receiver
has not properly acted and how he has not produced the accounts. In spite of
the repeated summons were issued to him, he did not appear before the court.
He did not give proper answers to the court. Events according to him, have
been given on pages 65, 66, 67 and 68.
Finally, Sir, on the 19th item, on 10-04-2006, hon. Justice Sengupta passed a
detailed order, directing the erstwhile Receiver to pay a sum of Rs.52,46,454/-
after adjusting the said sum of Rs. Five lakhs. The erstwhile Receiver and/or
his agent, and/or representative was injuncted from transferring, alienating,
diposing of or dealing with right, title and interest in moveable and immovable
properties ling at his disposal, save and except in usual course of business,
though he was discharged on 03-08-2004.
Sir, it is a very pathetic situation. A Judge, who has assumed a position of a

Judge, was continuing as a Receiver also for more than eight months. If he
was really feeling that he was elevated to a Judge of High court, the entire lite
of the people, the entire judicial system were in his hands, he should also feel
that when the warrant of appointment had come from the President of India,
he should have relinquished from the Receivership, he should have deposited
the amount in the court and he should have given accounts to the court and
then he should have assumed the position of the Judge of the High Court. He
has never done it. From the dates of events, he has just passed on the case
as a Judge while we are discussing on his misbehaviour and misappropriation
only during the period he was a Judge. He was questioning how could you
deal with the person, Receiver, how could you question the Receiver, only the
court could do so. Further he quoted order 40 of the Civil Procedure Code.
As a Judge he continued himself as a Receiver also for more than three years,
that is, till he was relieved. Eight months after the single Judge decided the
case on the basis of a petition, he was removed from the Receivership and
somebody else was appointed in that place. Subsequently, the proceedings

continued for four years. And for four years he was representing the matter
through various agents and Advocates. Finally, when the clear order was given
by the Single Judge in 2007, he came forward to deposit the entire amount. He
paid the first installment of Rs. 40 lakhs. Then, he paid the rest of the amount
on 27.06.2006.
I am quoting from page 69 of the report. On his own submission a sum of Rs.40
lakhs has been paid by the erstwhile Receiver. Then, on behalf of erstwhile
Receiver the constituted Attorney filed an application for extension of time to
deposit the balance amount. This matter was considered by the court when he
was also a sitting Judge of the same Calcutta High Court.
Then the pitiable position was, on 17-11-2006 a publication was issued, in the
local newspaper.
A publication on this issue was made in the local newspaper. Then, the Chief
Justice of that particular High Court, Calcutta, Chief Justice V.S. Sirpurkar, wrote
a letter to the Chief Justice of India on 25.11.2006. This I am placing from his
own submission, given on page number 3 of the reply, which is given before
the Inquiry Committee. I am reading it from page number 3, para 1.2:
“This private communication by the Learned Single

Judge led to the formation of an adverse opinion by the
Hon’ble Justice V.S. Sirpurkar against me on the basis whereof
he said, Hon’ble Justice V.S. Sirpurkar wrote a letter to the
then Hon’ble Chief Justice of India dated 25.11.06 informing
him of the allegations against me and his opinion and/or his
views.”
In that way, it goes on, Sir. Therefore, this is a suo motu proceeding which
started with the Chief Justice of a particular High Court and it goes to the Chief
Justice of India. Then, subsequently, he started to work on. The Judge—he is
also a sitting Judge in the same Court—started working on and paid the rest
of the amount on 21.11.2006. The Learned Advocate on record of erstwhile
Receiver by a letter deposited the remaining balance amount of Rs.12,46,454/-
before the Registrar. Then the Single Judge orders, on 31.7.2007, the
application being G.A. No. so and so, for recalling the order, dated so and so.
In that way, he lifted the injunction imposed on him. Till 31.7.2007, the Judge
has never challenged the order of the Single Judge. He has never gone to
this Division Bench. He has never gone in for any other review or revision or
any proceedings. He has never gone for that. He has never challenged it. He
accepted it. But, subsequently, when he finds out that Justice Sirpurkar has
initiated the proceedings through the Chief Justice of India, then only he files
a petition before the Division Bench; that is on 25.9.2007. Hon’ble Justice
Pranab Kumar Chattopadhyay and Hon. Justice Kalidas Mukherjee were
pleased to re-set aside the impugned judgment on 31.7.2007. Sir, repeatedly,
he was telling us, “We have to rely upon this judgment.’ Sir, nobody who has
got small knowledge of law can accept when the initiated proceeding is already
on. Whatever thing had happened anywhere, that will not be counted. Already,
a Single Judge has passed an order; that was obeyed by the particular person;
he paid the deposit. That means, he accepted every misappropriation,
mishandling, everything. It was accepted. Then where is the position for citing
another Division Bench judgment on which he has initiated afterwards, through
his mother and other persons, that this order is wrong and, therefore, you
expunge the portion which has commented upon the Receiver who was a
erstwhile Receiver, and, therefore, he initiated that proceedings? Therefore,
we cannot look into the Division Bench judgment at all. It cannot be a binding.
He was telling us, “You want to take away the proceedings of the Division Bench
judgment and you don’t want to obey the Judge’s order. Sir, the Judge’s order
is not a judgment in rem. It is not a judgment for the whole world. He has not
produced any particular thing. It was a judgment in a particular person per se.
That particular person is going to get a relief by that order. If that is so, it is
not binding upon anybody. And more so, Sir, he challenged every position
afterwards. Sir, being a Judge of the High Court, he should understand how
the proceedings of the law have come up, how the Supreme Court has evolved
a new system of correcting themselves within their own peer group and how
they came out. In 1968, we enacted the law. In 1993, they took their own power
of appointing themselves as Judges, and within three years, a lot of complaints
started coming. Therefore, many cases have come to light and one of the
cases is Ravichandran Iyer vs. Justice Bhattacharya. In that judgement, Justice
Ramaswamy and another Judge have passed a judgment saying that the time
has come; therefore, we have to rectify ourselves by way of creating an
in-house system.
By this system we have come forward with a new convention.
Sir, I am just citing from the 21st Report of the Department-related Parliamentary
Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice on
Judges (Inquiry) Bill, 2006. It is on page 9, paragraph 10 and I quote:
“10.0. In 1997 the Supreme Court of India passed two

resolutions dealing with Judicial Accountability viz Restatement
of Values of Judicial Life and in-House procedure within the

Judiciary. The Restatement of Values of Judicial Life Resolution
was adopted in the full court meeting of the Supreme Court on
May 7, 1997 which included the following:
‘That an in-House procedure should be devised by the

Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to take suitable remedial action
against the Judges who by their acts of omission or
commission do not follow the universally accepted values of
Judicial Life including those indicated in the Restatement of
Values of Judicial Life’.
The in-House procedure is essentially meant for

disciplining the Judges, against whom complaints of judicial
misconduct and misbehaviour were received. The in-House
procedure rests on the premise that there may be complaints
casting reflection on the independence and integrity of a Judge
which is bound to have a prejudicial effect on the image of
the higher judiciary. In the in-House procedure, a complaint
against a judge is dealt with at an appropriate level within the
institution. It is examined by his peers and no outside agency
is involved, thus the independence of judiciary is maintained”.
This was actually made on the basis of an observation of the Supreme Court
in C. Ravichandran Iyer vs. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee and others case. The
Law and Justice Department Standing Committee had sent the Bill to all the
High Court Judges. That was the first time that the Judges (Inquiry) Bill was
sent to the High Court Judges. A full court of ten or eleven High Courts were
convened by the High Courts and all of them replied in certain ways. They
supported the in-House system. They supported the amendment to insert the
provision. They opposed certain provisions. This is the kind of reply given by
the full court of every High Court. That was a new history which was created
during that period. At that time they cited a full Court decision of the Allahabad
High Court, as they replied to the request of the Standing Committee. They
cited the Ravichandran Iyer’s case. I am just reading out that portion on
page 134:
“The Apex Court itself has laid down that the Chief
Justice of a High Court has ample power to deal with any
Judge who misconduct himself. Self-regulation by Judiciary is
the method which has been emphasized by the Apex Court.
The in-House remedy for restoring the confidence of the
people against errant behaviour or misconduct by any Judge

has functioned quite effectively.
The Chief Justice of India being head of the Judicial

fraternity does not lack means and power to discipline the
Judges. The gap between proved misbehaviour and bad
behaviour inconsistent with high office can only be disciplined
by self-regulation through an in-House procedure as laid down
by the Apex Court in C. Ravichandran Iyer’s case”.
This is the position of the Supreme Court. How can a sitting Judge criticise
and say that the Chief Justice of India had made his own effort and he had
prejudged everything? He also commented that the in-House procedure is not
at all correct because there was no resolution passed by Calcutta High Court.
Sir, all of us very well know that an annual conference of Chief Justices of all
High Courts is convened. The hon. Prime Minister also attends that meeting.
At that time the Chief Justices of all High Courts come. They make certain
procedure for themselves. They make their own resolution. They follow that
resolution. That is the convention that we are following in India. It is happening
every year. They are making resolutions and they are acting upon them. But
he challenged even that. He challenged each and every system and institution.
We can’t tolerate this just like that. He challenges in-House proceedings. He
challenges the Chief Justice of India. He challenges the Judges who were
Members of the in-House proceedings.
He says that two judges were elevated as the Supreme Court Judge and
another judge was not elevated. These are all the things which he has
mentioned. Even we have never mentioned these things in this House. This
is the first time when we have heard this from a sitting High Court Judge in
this Upper House.
Sir, I have gone through each and every part of the evidence before the
Committee. This Committee was constituted by the hon. Chairman only after
the CJI was convinced after the in-House proceedings that there was
misbehaviour and misappropriation and he recommended it to the President
of India. On the basis of that, hon. Members of this House took this initiative
and that initiation has led to the provision of appointing a new Committee. That
Committee was also challenged by him. He questions as to what is the right
of the Committee to look into receiver’s activities; they have got no right on
that. He was saying like this. We are not saying who should be appointed as
a receiver; we are not asking as to how he was appointed; we are also not
asking whether he was doing the work properly or not. No, we are not doing
that job. We are trying to find out after being a Judge of the High Court what is
his conduct; what misappropriation he has done. From his own submission,
we can find out how he misappropriated. As I have submitted earlier, he admitted
that by way of submitting to the Court’s order he paid the amount after four
years, after he became a judge of the same Court. That means after four years
he comes out and deposits the amount. He says, “l deposited the amount twice;
I have deposited all the money in the Lynx India Co. which has liquidated.
Therefore, the matter is over.” He wants to tell one part of the story. This is like
the Shakespeare drama. ‘Iron was eaten away by the rat’. That is the story he
wants to tell. Subsequently, he says, “No, no, even then I paid from my own
pocket; I deposited around Rs. 50 lakhs.” Why did you deposit the money? If
you have not misappropriated the money in the last 14 years, why did you deposit
the money? He deposits the money and he does not challenge the order. Then
he comes forward and says that it was purely on a prejudicial matter.
Sir, I would like to talk about another thing. He has even come to a conclusion
that the selection process was poor. On page 61, para 3.6, in his reply to the
Committee, he says, “Past actions of a Judge long prior to his elevation, cannot
be the subject matter of impeachment. If past actions are brought within the
ambit of Article 124 (4) read with the provisions of the Judges Inquiry Act, it
will make a mockery of the selection process of a Judge of the High Court or
the Supreme Court”. Here I would like to submit one proposition. After 1993,
the procedure which is being followed by the judges is totally different. They
never consult the Executive. Previously, before 1993, the procedure was like
this: The local Chief Minister, through the Governor, will give a list of names,
who have got good background and good reputation. That will then be
considered by the Chief Justice of the High Court. Then he will make his remark
on that and then send it to the Ministry of Law and Justice. The Ministry of
Law and Justice, through its apparatus, as the department was looked after
by Home Secretary will find out as to what is the background of that particular
nominee. Then they will compile a report on the basis of his background and
that is then submitted to the Chief Justice of India. The Chief Justice of India
will consider it and finally he will take his decision and then it will be forwarded
to the President of India for issuing the warrant of appointment.
That was the procedure followed before 1993. Sir, the Constitution never says
as to who has to appoint a judge. It is the President’s will. At the same time,
the settled provision, which was followed till 1993, was the will of the people,
the will of the local federal Government, the will of the elected representatives.
The Chief Minister represents the whole State, and, therefore, his will was to
be considered. So, it was routed through him. But they have to find out whether
they come within the purview of the judicial system. Therefore, the Chief Justice
of that particular High Court made the recommendation. And, finally, they have
to find out whether he is a person of integrity, whether he is having the national
spirit and whether he will abide by the Constitution. These are all the things
which will be considered by the Union Government. Then, it will go to the Chief
Justice of India, and it will then go to the President. But, after 1993, they have
been totally misled by the Judgement which was rendered by a Bench. Before
that, in the Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Law
and Justice, the former Chief Justice of India, Justice R.S. Pathak, former Chief
Justice of India, Justice P.N. Bhagwati, and former Chief Justice of India,
Justice Ranganath Mishra, all of them deposed before the Committee. I would
like to read out the 21st Report of the Committee. On Page No.27, it says: While
taking stock of the impact of the post-1993 situation, the former Chief Justice
of India, Justice P.N. Bhagwati, stated as follows: “Ask any lawyer, standard
has gone down. Why? It is because of the mode of appointment. When the
Supreme Court gave its Judgement that the appointment should be in the
hands of the judiciary, the Government should be bound by it, and it should
end with the judiciary, namely, the Chief Justice and first four Judges, everyone
thought, perhaps, at least, some people thought, but I never thought myself
that this would improve the appointment or quality of appointment of judges.”
Also, the former Chief Justice and Judge of the International Court of Justice,
Shri R.S. Pathak, says, “So far as the collegium is concerned, I must frankly
confess that I have serious reservations about it. In regard to the old practice
that we used to follow in appointment of judges, although this is not a matter
really for today’s deliberations, in my Judgement in S.P. Gupta’s case, you will
find that I thought we were quite happy with the old system provided it worked
out bona fide.” The former Chief Justice of India, Justice Ranganath Misra,
summed up on the issue of appointment of Judges as under:-“I had made a
reference, as a Judge or as a Chief Justice, to a larger Bench of the Court to
find out how this process will be worked out. It was sent to a Nine-Judge Bench.
It was a larger Bench. We wanted a decision from the Supreme Court on the
question. It was not a matter which was to go beyond a point and decide how
the vacancies of the Judges would be filled up. There was a wrong thing,
probably, in my own way. I consider that the referring Bench had said that all
other questions were closed and that was the only issue to be discussed by
the larger Bench.” And it goes on like that. Therefore, all the former Chief
Justices of India, very reputed persons at the international level, they have
come forward to say that post-1993 situation is bad enough. This particular
occasion we can prove it. If, really, this particular appointment was a transparent
one, it was known to the Judges of the Calcutta High Court, it was known to
the advocates of the Calcutta High Court, it was known to the people of Calcutta
because the fate of the State is to be decided by that particular judge when
the case comes before him, then, they would have come forward and said,
“Sir, he has already cheated up to Rs.35 lakhs. Therefore, he should not be

appointed as a judge.”
3.00 P.M.
They will come out and they will tell the concerned people that this Judge has
created a bad precedent. He swallowed the money in the past ten years. He
has not placed the accounts before the court. He has not obeyed the orders
of the court. Even if we accepted it for the sake of argument that he had
deposited the money, the Lynx India Limited was not ordered to deposit by
way of the order of the Court; it was done by him. That is the misappropriation.
He accepted it in his own reply that he had deposited money. Where is the
order for that? No court had ordered that but he had done it. Therefore, such
persons are not needed in the Judiciary. And such persons can never be
appointed if proper procedures are followed.
Therefore, Sir, my submission is that these proceedings are very clear. The
Inquiry Committee has gone through each and every aspect of the case. Sir,
he had even challenged these proceedings as ‘criminal proceedings’. He
wanted his innocence to be proved beyond doubt, it wasn’t and it was very
clearly explained in the Inquiry Committee Report (Volume I) at page 3, “The
proceedings for the investigation into the conduct of a Judge under the 1968
Act are not criminal proceedings against the concerned Judge; the Judge
whose conduct is under inquiry is not a person who is to be visited either with
conviction, sentence or fine; nor is the Inquiry Committee, appointed under
the 1968 Act, empowered to make any such recommendations. Besides, the
Judge in respect of whose conduct an inquiry is ordered under the 1968 Act
is not a person ‘accused of any offence’ and no fundamental right of his under
article 20(3) of the Constitution of India would be infringed by his giving
evidence during an investigation into his conduct...”. Sir, he avoided appearing
before the Committee at every stage and he challenged the veracity of the
Committee. And finally, he went on to say if he did not get justice from the
Inquiry Committee, he would go to the rooftop and tell the world that he has
not done anything. Such was his position. He misused his eloquence and, that
too, at a place where he is not supposed to. Therefore, I finally submit that
the impeachment proceedings should go on.
Sir, finally, the Judiciary has to be clear in its mind. This is one of the cases,
one of the test cases, where they have been challenged. We have not
challenged them. No politician has challenged them. No parliamentarian has
challenged them. But their own people have challenged them. It is high time
they had reviewed their own position. They should not cross the Lakshman
Rekha. This is how we have to work. This is the way in which the Parliament
is working. This is the way in which the Executive is working. Therefore, we
have to coexist and we have to protect the Constitution. Thank you, Sir.
SHRI SATISH CHANDRA MISRA (UTTAR PRADESH): Sir, while agreeing on

certain issues which both the speakers before me, especially the Leader of
the Opposition, have stated, in respect of the role of the Judiciary and the way
the Judiciary is now encroaching into the area of the Legislature and the
Executive, with great respect, I disagree on certain other issues.
Hon. Chairman, Sir, the Parliament, Judiciary and the Press, the media, are
the safeguards of justice and liberty and they embody the pillars and the spirit
of the Constitution. But, unfortunately, today, the credibility of all these pillars
is being openly questioned now.
Sir, as junior lawyers we were always taught by our seniors that while arguing
cases in the court we should not see who the Judge is, we should not see the
face of the Judge and start arguing but we should see the files and the merit
of the case that we have. Similarly, at a certain point of time, most of the
hon. Judges also conducted themselves with great dignity and did not see the
faces of lawyers during the court proceedings. But they used to see the cases
on merits — what was the case which a lawyer was presenting before the
hon. Judge.
But, Sir, today the situation is largely changed and it is unfortunate. Today, in
the corridors of courts, and otherwise, when the lawyers are talking to litigants,
they are not concerned to know how much law the lawyers know with respect
to the matter or how expert he is in the law. But, now the question usually put
to the lawyer is whether he knows the judge or not. So, that is the unfortunate
situation which has now reached which, of course, requires serious
consideration.
Sir, earlier we always had hon. Judges, who used to function in a manner that
it was not their job to make the law, but it was the job of the Parliament or the
Legislature. But, today what the courts say is not what the Legislature says or
what the Act or the Constitution says, but, it is a matter of fact; now the judges
instead of discovering the law, stating the law and applying the law, not making
the law, forgetting the judicial review part, have started framing the law which
is what the hon. Leader of the Opposition has elaborated in detail with respect
to the separation of powers — getting into the field where the separation of
power is now given a go-bye, which is not correct.
Sir, before coming to the issue of the impeachment and on merits of

impeachment which is before us, I would like to say that there are certain issues
which the hon. Leader of the Opposition has spoken, and the other colleague
has spoken, on the appointment of judges. It was said that in the appointment
of the hon. judges, there is a detailed procedure. The judges have taken on
themselves the appointment of judges, post-1993, and that is why the
denigration in the system has been found today. The Executive or other
authorities have no role to play now. Sir, I beg to disagree on this because I
know that the judge whom we are impeaching today was appointed at a time
when we had one of the finest and most eminent Law Ministers; the
appointment was done in the year 2003. (Interruption) In 2003, we had
Shri Arun Jaitley as the Law Minister. The appointment was made at that time.
The scrutiny was also made at that time by him in his capacity as the Law
Minister. And, I, as an individual, say before the House that I know that the
scrutiny that was done was not a scrutiny which was here and there; but it
was a detailed scrutiny. Why I say this? Because I know this. I myself was
one of the persons who got scrutinized by him. That is why I am saying this,
with great respect.
(INTERRUPTION)
SHRI SITARAM YECHURY (WEST BENGAL): That is why you were not
appointed.
SHRI SATISH CHANDRA MISRA: I am coming to that. Sir, everybody knows;

in my family, my father was a judge, he retired as the Chief Justice; my uncle
was a High Court judge; my elder brother was a High Court judge, he retired
as a High Court judge. But, Sir, when I was called upon by the hon. Chief
Justice to give the consent, with folded hands I requested and said, “No, I am
not the person who is fit to sit on that seat.” But, then, I was asked from various
sources; when the collegium members were asked to force me that I should
give my consent. One of the hon. judges who was in the collegium is presently
a judge in the hon. Supreme Court and the other retired as the Chief Justice.
Then, ultimately, Sir, I had given my consent, in spite of the advice given by
my father that I should think it several times, but I was asked to give my consent
and I gave my consent. After the consent was given, the collegium met, it
cleared the name. The process followed. It went to the Chief Minister. The
Chief Minister cleared it. Then, it came to Delhi. In the meantime, when it was
being scrutinised in the Law Ministry, at that point of time, the Chief Minister
was changed. A new Chief Minister came. Of course, from the same party.
But, then, suddenly, a letter was written to the Law Ministry by the Chief Minister
saying, “Look here, I have certain reservations for this gentleman, and one more
gentleman who was there also for different reasons”. The reason for this was,
‘that we have found out that when he was the Chairman, Bar Council of U.P.
and the Secretary of the Bar Association, he had led a big agitation of the lawyers
because the jurisdiction of the Lucknow was being taken away by the Allahabad
Bench. So, there was the agitation and he participated in that’. This was number
one. Number two was, ‘that kindly find out, according to an information, he is
not an advocate’. I had already become a Senior Advocate by that time. The
full court had designated me as a Senior Advocate. But why I was not an advocate
was, because it was said, ‘that he has several houses; he has several buildings;
he has a building in Noida; he has a building in Nainital; he has a building in
Lucknow, and he is getting rent from those buildings. Though he is the highest
income-tax payer amongst the lawyers in the State, but kindly scrutinise whether
he is actually an advocate or something else or a builder’. So, this letter went.
When it went to Law Minister of course, it was looked into, and the matter was
forwarded to the collegium. Then, I wrote a letter saying, “Kindly do not consider
my name, if all this is being done and I don’t want to be considered”. But the
scrutiny was done. The scrutiny was done at that level and this intervention
was there. As such an intervention was there and thus to say that ‘no intervention’
is done, is not correct. In spite of the fact the allegation was there that you are
not an advocate, the fact was, I was not in politics; I was purely a lawyer. At
that point of time, I was always engaged by the parties which were in the
opposition. Those parties which were not in power used to engage me for their
cases. The Bhartiya Janata Party which was there in the opposition had engaged
me to challenge the President’s rule, I had argued it before the Division Bench
and before the full Bench and had won, and strictures were passed against the
Presidential Proclamation, but still I was not a lawyer! So, this was the scrutiny
which was done.
SHRI RAVI SHANKAR PRASAD (BIHAR): You are better here.
SHRI SATISH CHANDRA MISRA: No, I am thankful. I thank the hon. Chief
Minister who was in this House earlier. The day I took oath, I said, “Because
of you I am here”. Today, I get this opportunity to see whether a High Court
judge should be impeached or not. This is the irony of the fate which is there.
Therefore, to say that the appointment of the judges is purely by the judges,
Sir, so far as I am concerned, I do not agree to that because I personally know
these facts for that purpose.
SHRI SITARAM YECHURY: We are glad that you are here with us now.
SHRI SATISH CHANDRA MISRA: I thanked him for that.

Sir, now coming to the matter which is before us today, i.e., the Impeachment
Motion, though the time has been allotted, I have seen the time, but I have
made a written request, the time is at your discretion, that the time may be
extended because I would be speaking, probably, a bit differently.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Please do economize.
SHRI SATISH CHANDRA MISRA: If I have to stand up and say, “I agree to

the proposal, then, I can sit down straightway and I will not require any time”.
But this is a serious issue, Sir, where we have to consider the Motion with
respect to impeachment of a sitting hon. judge. Therefore, we have to look
into the background not only the facts and merits of the case but also the
background with respect to what is the scope of article 124 and what is
misbehaviour within its meaning how an act is considered as misbehaviour?
All these aspects will have to be looked into, and, then, we have to see whether
it falls into that category or not.
And whether it is a case where under impeachment we should accept the

Resolution and remove the Judge. I also do not agree to what the hon. learned
speaker spoke before me that the hon. Judge when he was standing yesterday
and he was making his submissions as accused and did not speak, properly.
He had every right. A person who is coming, who is being charged that you
have to be removed. A right to defend has been given to him which has also
been considered by the hon. Supreme Court in Constitutional Bench judgments
holding that he has full right to defend. If it is not given, then, of course, it will
be violation and the entire action of this House is likely to be struck down even
if it is passed. Therefore, he has every right to defend and once he is in the
defence he has the right to say that these are the facts which have been
ignored or which have not been looked into and which should be seen.
Therefore, for this purpose, I would refer to what was said by the Committee
which was appointed in the case of Justice Ramaswamy, the in-House
Committee Report I one paragraph what they said at that point in time was:
“The immunity of Judges is not for the protection of a malicious or a corrupt
but for public in whose interest it is that Judges should be at liberty to exercise
their functions with independence and without fear of consequences. However,
the standards of ethical and intellectual rectitude expected of Judges are
directly proportional to the exalted Constitutional protection that they deserve
to enjoy. The country is entitled to be most exacting in its prescription of the
standards of rectitude in judicial conduct. What might be pardonable in the
case of an ordinary citizen or officer might in the case of a Judge look indeed
unpardonable. His morals are not the standards of marked place but is the
punctilio of a higher code.”
Sir, in V. Ramaswami vs. Union of India while considering the matter the hon.
Supreme Court had observed : “The Judge of the Supreme Court as well as
the Judge of High Court is a Constitutional functionary and to maintain the
independence of Judiciary and to enable the Judge to effectively discharge
his duties as a Judge and to maintain the rule of law even in respect of the lis
against the Central Government or the State Government, the Judge is made
totally independent of the control and influence of the Executive by mandatorily
embodying in article 124 or article 217 that a Judge can only be removed from
his office in the manner provided in clause 4 and 5 of article 124. Thus a Judge
either of a High Court or the Supreme Court is independent of the control of
the executive while deciding cases between the parties including the Central
Government, State Governments uninfluenced by the State in any manner
whatsoever. It is beyond any pale of doubt. There is no master and servant
relationship or employer and employee relationship between the Judge of a
High Court and the President of India in whom the Executive power of the
Union of India is vested under the provisions of article 53 of the Constitution.
The President has not been given the sole power or the exclusive power to
remove a Judge either of the Supreme Court or High Court from his office
though the President appoints the Judge by warrant under his hand and seal
after consultations with such of the Judges of the Supreme Court or High Court
in the States as he may deem necessary for the purpose and in the case of
appointment of a Judge of the High Court, the President appoints the Judge
by warrant but still the only mode of removal of a Judge from his office is on
the ground of proved misbehaviour....” The word is ‘proved misbehaviour’ “..or
incapacity as laid down in clauses 4 and 5 of article 124.” Here we are on the
question of proved misbehaviour; we are not on the question of incapacity with
respect to the hon. Judge. Sir, under article 124 of the Constitution action for
removal of a Judge is only on proved misbehaviour. The word ‘misbehaviour’
was not advisedly defined. It is a vague and elastic word and embraces within
its sweep different facets of conduct, as opposed to good conduct.
Sir, the word ‘misbehaviour’ has found place under Article 124. The scope of
Article 124 was considered, again, in the case of Krishna Swamy in 1992. Sir,
Krishna Swami was a Member of Parliament and belongs to this House. He
was also an advocate. He had filed his petition before the hon. Supreme Court.
A Constitution Bench had considered the matter and then it had considered
the scope of Article 124 and it said in para 60, “The Committee as Judicial
authority adopts the procedure of a trial of a civil suit under the Code of Civil
Procedure; it is not inquisitorial but adversary to search for the truth or falsity
of the charges by taking evidence during the investigation like a trial of a civil
suit and it should be the duty of the advocate and the learned Judge or his
counsel to prove/disprove if burden of proof rests on the Judge, as a fact by
adduction of evidence or the affirmation or negation or disproof of the

imputation under investigation. The word ‘investigation’ is to discover and collect
the evidence to prove the charge as a fact or disproved. The Evidence Act
defined the words ‘proved’ and ‘disproved’ as and when after considering the
matters before it, the court either believes the fact to exist or not to exist or its
existence is so probable/non-existence is probable and the test of acceptance
or non-acceptance by a prudent man placed in the circumstances of particular
case was adopted. The consideration of the evidence is like a criminal
case...”—hon. Chairman, Sir, this is very important—“...as the finding would
be ‘guilty’ or ‘non-guilty’ of misbehaviour under Section 6 of the Act. The test
of proof is ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt.”
So, it is like a criminal case. It has to be either proved guilty or non-guilty. And,
it has to be ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ If there is any doubt, you cannot
prove him guilty. It has to be completely ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ That is
the aspect which has been referred to in this judgment.
Sir, with respect to definition of ‘misbehaviour’, the same has further been
discussed in the same judgment. It says in para 71, “Every act or conduct or
even error of judgment or negligent acts by higher judiciary per se does not
amount to misbehaviour. Willful abuse of judicial office, willful misconduct in
the office, corruption, lack of integrity, or any other offence involving moral
turpitude would be misbehaviour. Misconduct implies actuation of some degree
of mens rea by the doer. Judicial finding of guilt of grave crime is misconduct.
Persistent failure to perform the judicial duties of the judge or willful abuse of
the office would be misbehaviour. Misbehaviour would extend to conduct of
the judge in or beyond the execution of judicial office. Even the administrative
actions or omissions too need accompaniment of mens rea. The holder of the
office of the Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court should, therefore,
be above the conduct of ordinary mortals in the society.” So, now, after going
through this, we have to find out what the evidence is and what the charges
are. The charges, to which a reference was made, are two. The first one is
misappropriation of large sums of money which he received in his capacity as
a Receiver appointed by the High Court of Calcutta. The second charge is,
making false statements, misrepresented facts with regard to the
misappropriation of money before the High Court of Calcutta. Now, the question
is what is the finding? Before coming to the findings, a question arises. We
have to see whether the misbehaviour is proved as a Judge or we have to
see whether misbehaviour is proved as a lawyer. I was only thinking that if my
name had been cleared I would have been standing here for the behaviour
as a lawyer either today or on some other day. But, is that the jurisdiction and
scope under Article 124? We have to see this. We have to look into what the
hon. Supreme Court had said. It says ‘proven misbehaviour’ in the capacity of
a Judge. Or, when he was a student or when he was in university or when he
was an advocate, he did certain acts which, according to you, were not akin
to what an advocate is expected to do, you prove him guilty and oust him from
the position of Judge. That is not permissible under this. But, here, a reference
is made. He did properly reply to these charges yesterday. It will have to be
seen whether an act, as an advocate, would be a ground for his ousting as a
Judge. It is not a case of a person committing murder which remained hidden
or involved in dacoity or some other thing which remained hidden earlier and
erupted suddenly.
He was a lawyer in that court from where the name was recommended. It was
known that he was ‘Receiver’; and, he was functioning as a Receiver when
he was appointed. Now, the question is whether that becomes a ground for
his removal as a Judge which was before having been appointed as a Judge.
For this purpose, I would like to refer to the findings of the Inquiry Report. Did
the Inquiry Committee go into all those questions and all those grounds that
were raised by him in his explanation? We find a very sketchy and short-inquiry
report, which deals, very precisely, with the issues and it appears that the
conclusion was already in the mind that he has to be held guilty, which ultimately
comes out in the report. Up to page 22 of the report, which deal with respect
to inquiry it is all with respect to the conduct as an advocate. After hearing the
judge, I thought he had a case. But after hearing the hon. Leader of the
Opposition, I thought he had no case at all and we were just made to hear
something having no foce for two hours. But, then, I thought that I should go
deep into the Inquiry Committee’s report and see what it says. Kindly see what
the findings say. It says that it is diversion of funds; it is misapplication of funds,
so far as the first charge is concerned, as an advocate. It does not say
‘misappropriation of funds’. Now, it can be said that since it is misapplication
of funds, since it is diversion of funds, therefore, it is a ‘misappropriation’. Sir,
‘misappropriation’ to the understanding of common man, to the understanding
of a layman would be that if I had been given some money or some property
or anything in trust to me to keep it with myself till required to be returned;
and, when I am supposed to return it, I don’t return it and I misappropriate
even that money, then, it would of course be misappropriation. (Interruptions)
Yes, diversion. (Interruptions) It is said that there is diversion from one account
to another account. That is the finding. Now, if it is transferred from this account
to that account, it would not become misappropriation. Since reference has
been made, I would like to refer to one of the paragraphs of the report, which
says that when it was asked to make the payment, when he was directed to
give the payment, he immediately paid that. He did not protest. That is the
charge. That is the allegation. For arriving at the conclusion that he is guilty,
his action of making payment of the entire money with full interest is taken in
the report. And, it is said that it means he was guilty. So, this is not the right
ground to hold him guilty. Had he taken the money himself, it would have been
alright. The second most important thing is that the entire findings with respect
to second charge and also the first charge are based through and through
only on the basis of the hon. Single Judge order. It says that the hon. Single
Judge said this and the hon. Single Judge said that, completely overlooking
the Division Bench Order which sets aside single Judge order. It was looked
in the manner in which, probably, the Committee wanted to look it. It completely
over looked that this entire charge is demolished by the Division Bench. To
say that when he was called by CIT, thereafter, he went back and filed an
appeal and got it the single Judge order set aside will not demolish the
existence of Division Bench order...(Interruptions)
MR. CHAIRMAN: Conclude please.
SHRI SATISH CHANDRA MISRA: I am just going to conclude.

But...(Interruptions)
MR. CHAIRMAN: Your extended time is over.
SHRI SATISH CHANDRA MISRA: Sir, I had sought time for this purpose only.
Please give me some more time. If the appellate order completely exonerates
him from the misappropriation and says that there is no misappropriation, why
was this order not challenged in the Supreme Court? Why didn’t anybody else
go to the Supreme Court? Why didn’t anybody else or any of the parties go to
the Supreme Court to say that the Division Bench had joined with him? Who
else has been charged for this offence? Conspiracy cannot be single-handed.
There have to be two minds and two people. There is no charge on anybody
else with respect to this. It is like casting an aspersion on the Division Bench
also to say that he obtained the orders. Therefore, my submission at the end
is this. Charge number one says, ‘It is duly proved.’ It is not proved. The charge
was about misappropriation of large sums of money which he received in his
capacity as a Receiver. There is no misappropriation. Simply say at the end
of the Report that it is duly proved is not correct. And the inquiry Committee’s
finding on this issue cannot be blindly accepted.
The second charge is about making false statements. It is said that the
statements made by the mother in the affidavit were false. There is no
misappropriation from this, and there is no proven misbehaviour.
I would only conclude by saying that I do not agree with the Motion which has
been proposed. I feel that it should be rejected. I think all of us should not be
swayed and conclude that we have to remove him come what may. We should
look into the facts of the case. Each one of us have got the material. It is the
duty of each one of us that we should tread very cautiously in this field. We
should apply our minds. Thank you very much.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Before I call the next speaker, may I remind the hon. Members
that the time allotted for this debate is four hours. Therefore, a certain time-
discipline has to be maintained.
SHRI ARUN JAITLEY: We are glad Mr. Misra did not become a judge.
...(Interruptions)...
SHRI SITARAM YECHURY: Sir, do these four hours include today’s timings
or is yesterday’s time also included in this?
MR. CHAIRMAN: I think there was no ambiguity about it. Today’s timing is 2
hours 56 minutes....(Interruptions)....We will try to accommodate, but I do
request everyone to maintain time-discipline because we have a process to
go through at the end of it....(Interruptions)....No; there is a set procedure. Mr.
N.K. Singh, please go ahead.
SHRI N.K. SINGH (BIHAR): Sir, it is an immense privilege to participate in this

very important debate. One must feel somewhat handicapped considering that
one is speaking after three very eminent lawyers who have already spoken at
great length. My preceding speaker was Mr. Satish Chandra Misra. The first
non-legal luminary, so to say, given with very ordinary discipline, I would beg
to submit before this House eight points for your consideration.
First and foremost, clearly one is reminded of what an eminent jurist , Arthur
Schlesinger had said. He said, “The genius of an impeachment proceeding
lies in the fact that it punishes the man without punishing the office.” This is
precisely what this House intends to do through this very important Motion
moved by my senior esteemed colleague, Mr. Yechury. Sir, yesterday, when I
heard with careful attention the defence made by Justice Sen, I got three
distinct impressions which I must share with this House. First and foremost,
the impression which I got was that he sought to create a false hiatus between
the sovereignty of Parliament seeking to bring it in conflict with the higher
Judiciary. He repeatedly quoted what has been happening by the higher judicial
functions as if to say that we would really stand up to the underdog in which
he claimed to place himself in that position. I do believe, Sir, that for the reasons
that I am going to give, that was a false hiatus, and a somewhat misleading
thing.
My third important point, Sir, is that in his entire defence, he sought to create
straw-enemies and straw-allegations which he then started to destroy. What
was that? For instance, Sir, kindly look at page 74 of his written reply where
he mentions about the fact that an order passed; and he says, ‘Unfortunately,
my explanation that these withdrawals were towards payment of workers’ dues
pursuant to a Division Bench order...” Sir, it was nobody’s case. Nobody had
alleged that he was being held responsible for the payment or the delay in the
payment of workers’ dues. So, to demolish something which was initially never
leveled against him is like creating straw-enemies to be able to then answer
that in his own way.
Similarly, Sir, I think that in the Inquiry Commission’s Report, he has clearly
sought to alter the meaning of misappropriation. My esteemed colleague, Mr.
Misra, has dealt greatly with the meaning of what he believes is
misappropriation. As a Trustee, Sir, it is clearly understood that the money which
he received was to be held in Trust. That Trust enjoined upon him a
responsibility that he could not divert the proceeds of that Trust into some other
account. For instance, he could not use it for his personal purposes, no matter
whether he reimburses it subsequently or not. As a Trustee, Sir, there are
certain obligations which are cast upon him and therefore, any attempt in his
defence to alter the meaning of misappropriation, in my view, is flawed.
Also, Sir, his suggestion in his defence yesterday—and that is my next point—
on biases and predilections of successive high judicial authorities and by
successive inquires which were held, in my view, did not seem to be borne
out, considering that he himself had not cooperated with any of the processes.
If you look, Sir, at the successive adjournments which he sought, where he
failed to appear himself personally, where he really appeared through his
attorney and sometimes really giving petitions in the name of his mother, in
my view, suggests that the suggestion of bias and predilection looks to be
flawed.
My next point really, Sir, is about the credibility and the integrity of the processes
and procedures which you have followed before these judicial findings were
reached. I believe that nothing which he has said in his defence casts any
doubt on the procedures and credibilities. I agree, Sir, that a Judge is not
supposed to know anything about the facts of life until they have been
presented to him in evidence, and, as has been said by very eminent jurists
all over the world, explained to him at least three times. Indeed, Sir, they were
explained to him more than three times. Sir, the findings which have been
received in this, clearly, are findings in two parts. One, as very rightly pointed
out by my esteemed colleague, Mr. Misra, is regarding his conduct as an
advocate. As an advocate, he knows better than I do that you are enjoined upon
as an Advocate to follow the Advocates Act. What did his conduct mean? What
he did under the Advocates Act? Report comes to the conclusion that his
conduct was most unbecoming of an advocate. There is a Part II which then
deals with his conduct as a Judge. Therefore, Sir, in the findings which have
been reached, in the concluding paragraph, in part 8 of the Inquiry Committee
Report, the misappropriation is duly proved. This is in two parts, in his conduct
as an Advocate and in his conduct really as a Judge.
Sir, I go to my last point which is about some of the broader issues. This
Impeachment Motion has enabled this House to deliberate, for the first time,
on the area of stalled judicial reforms. Sir, India is seeking to become a major
economic power. It is seeking to achieve over 8 per cent rate of growth.
Whether we go to John Rawls Theory of justice which really wants to seek an
explanation that inequalities and certain kinds of economic deprivation can only
be tolerated if it benefits all sections of society.
And we must ask ourselves this important question whether our present judicial
system is adequate to meet India’s changing economic realities. In terms of
improving, and the Prime Minister knows it better than anyone else, in choosing
our climate of investment, on transfer of properties, on mergers, on pricing
and a whole host of things and addressing it in a manner which really would
enable this country to grow. Is our judicial system equipped for a system which
is managing rapid economic changes, Sir, while maintaining the social
cohesiveness of a social order with a nine per cent rate of growth? Indeed,
Sir, as has been very rightly pointed out by the hon. Leader of Opposition,
this Impeachment Motion has given us an invaluable opportunity to consider
some of these things beyond narrow partisan confines.
Sir, I strongly believe in the appointment of a National Judicial Commission

and the demarcation of responsibilities between the three functions. Indeed,
many of us were shocked and I am sure many of us would have been shocked
when certain judicial pronouncements were made which questioned the
Parliament, which questioned, for instance, whether it was necessary to attend
Parliament, which questioned the integrity of this very vital organ, which is the
over-arching organ of our Constitution. Many of us were so appalled, many of
us were ashamed to be part of a process when it was being pronounced, and
certain aspersions were being cast on Parliament, and we were mute
spectators. Indeed, If we do not consider this opportunity to think about major
issues of judicial reforms, setting up a Judicial Commission, a better
demarcation of responsibilities, a better examining of whether our present
judicial system equips us to deal with rapid economic growth, with issues of
poverty and inequalities, we will miss, Sir, a very important opportunity.

I, therefore, support this Motion. I support it because I do believe that in the
end, if we do not maintain justice, justice will not maintain us. This was a very
important saying by Francis Bacon in 1615 at the impeachment of the then
Attorney General in the House of Commons. You must be reminded of this.
We must be reminded also that how easy it is to judge rightly after one sees
what evil comes from judging wrongly. We must judge rightly. We must exercise
the sovereignty of this House. We must not allow this valuable opportunity to
slip away.
I support this Motion and I support also the opportunity of this Motion to bring
about a kind of qualitative change in the way in which the demarcation of
powers between the three important organs enshrined in our Constitution can
be restored and a measure of dignity and respect for each of these organs
which the Constitution defines.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your precision. Mr. Tiruchi Siva.
SHRI TIRUCHI SIVA (TAMIL NADU): Sir, I rise to support the Motion moved by
Shri Sitaram Yechury.
Sir, Francis Bacon once said, “The place of justice is a hallowed place, and
therefore, not only the Bench but also the foot-space and the confines and
the purpose thereof ought to be preserved without scandal or corruption.”
Sir, we are proud that we have a long-standing tradition of sustaining an

independent judiciary which has safeguarded our democracy and Constitution.
The Indian judiciary which has got its own tradition is considered to be one of
the pillars of democracy and it is duty-bound to uphold the moral values and
ethics to secure the trust of the people. The trust in the judiciary by the people
of this country and the Constitution is so immense that the day that trust is
breached, it is the breach of trust of the people of India and the Constitution.
Sir, it is to be understood that however carefully the institutional forms may be

constructed, the final analysis mostly depends upon the actual behaviour and
the accountability of the individuals concerned. What is ‘accountability’? The
Oxford dictionary says, one who is responsible for one’s own actions and
decisions and is expected to explain when asked for. So, accountability is an
inevitable and indispensable part of democracy. No public functionary or no
public institution is exempt of this accountability, Sir.
Sir, the judicial accountability may not be on the same lines of the accountability
of the Legislature or the accountability of the Executive. But they are also not
above scrutiny. Sir, when the faith of the people in the quality, integrity and
efficiency of the Government institutions starts eroding, we have a responsibility.
The check and balance system comes in between. When we find the breach
of trust by the judiciary, the only remedy available is that of the impeachment
brought in the Parliament. Sir, in the long history of our Parliament the first
impeachment which was brought in the other House fell through, but this is
the first ever case—the case of Justice Soumitra Sen. When we surveyed the
pages of the Constituent Assembly, there was near unanimity in bringing the
impeachment. Only one Member of the Assembly, Shri R.K. Sidhwa, from
Central Province had cautioned on 24th May, 1949 while participating in the
debate of the Constituent Assembly that if two-thirds majority of the two Houses
sitting together want a judge to be removed it would be quite possible that no
judge would be ever dismissed for an act of wrong-doing. This is the only
observation, only caution, given by one Member. Otherwise, there was
unanimity. And, we have experienced that. Even this one case is being criticized
and evaluated and there were difference of views which cannot be disputed.
This is very essential. The case of Justice Soumitra Sen also puts forward a
strong case for judicial reformation in the country. Sir, the method of selection
of judges, as earlier spoken by my colleagues here, to the High Courts and to
the Supreme Court by the collegium should have to be reconsidered. The
Legislature movement towards constitutional amendment in these lines is the
need of the hour. Sir, may I quote Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar in the Constituent
Assembly regarding this? In fact, the question as to whether the appointment
of judges requires the concurrence of the Chief Justice was seriously debated
in the Constituent Assembly. Dr. Ambedkar responded to the said suggestion
in the following words: “With regard to the question of concurrence of the Chief
Justice, it seems to me that those who advocate that proposition seem to rely
implicitly both on the impartiality of the Chief Justice and the soundness of his
judgement. I personally feel no doubt that the Chief Justice is a very eminent
person. But after all, the Chief Justice is a man with all failings, all the
sentiments and all the prejudices which we as common people have; and I
think to allow the Chief Justice practically a veto upon the appointment of
judges is really to transfer the authority to the Chief Justice which we are not
prepared to vest in the President or the Government of the day. I, therefore,
think that that is also a dangerous proposition.” That is the observation made
by Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar, not mine. Now, the Government’s approval of
the Judicial Accountability Bill is a positive step to check the discrepancies of
the higher judiciary and to ensure necessary action to be taken. In this context,
I support the Motion moved by my colleague, Shri Yechury. Yesterday, we heard
Justice Sen’s defence argument. He was eloquent as everyone appreciated.
I would like to submit some of the observations, through you, to this august
House. In what authority he went to that extent? There are two things. One is
that the findings of the Committee appointed by you clearly say that there was
a large-scale diversion of funds and such diversion was in violation of the
orders of the High Court; the purpose for such diversion remains unexplained.
Justice Soumitra Sen was appointed as High Court Judge on 3rd December,
2003. The Committee noted that Justice Sen’s actions were an attempt to cover
up the large-scale defalcation of Receiver’s fund. Sir, out of the two grounds
of misconduct, the second is misrepresentation of facts with regard to the
misappropriation of money before High Court of Calcutta.
Sir, this is what Justice Soumitra Sen said in reply to the motion received under
article 217, read with article 124(4) of the Constitution, to the Rajya Sabha.
Sir, I will quote. He himself contradicts. At one place, he says, “The respondent
was appointed as a Receiver in the year 1984 by Order dated 30.4.1984. Till
2003, neither the hon. Calcutta High Court nor any of the parties required the
respondent to render any accounts. For the first time, on 27.2.2003, an
application was made by the plaintiff seeking directions for accounts and sale
of the remaining goods and handing over sale proceeds. Despite the aforesaid
statutory matrix, for about 19 years, nobody sought accounts, which is a clear
indication that in Calcutta High Court, a practice had developed of not giving
periodical accounts to the Court.” He himself says again, “Rule 15 of the
Calcutta High Court OS Rules lays down that unless ordered otherwise, the
order appointing a Receiver shall contain a direction that the Receiver shall
file and submit for passing half-yearly accounts in the Office of the Registrar
and that such accounts have to be made at the end of months June and
December every year and are required to be filed in the months of July and
January respectively.” So, at one place, he says that in the Calcutta High Court,
there is no practice of giving periodical accounts to the Court. On the other
hand, the rule 15 of the Calcutta High Court clearly says that he has to maintain
accounts and give every six months. Then, I come to the second most
important point. I am having the synopsis of yesterday’s debate. He has clearly
observed that the sale is still not complete. Therefore, the matter is still sub
judice and it should not be discussed in the House. Sir, nowadays, it has
become a fashion to question the sovereignty and the authority of the House.
Sir, he says that it cannot be discussed in the House. But, Sir, we are
empowered by the Constitution under article 124, clause (4) and clause (5)
that we can impeach; we can take the case of a Judge under the provisions
of this article. Article 124(5) states, “Parliament may by law regulate the
procedure for the presentation of an address and for the investigation and proof
of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge under clause (4).” Sir, while
submitting before the Judges Inquiry Committee, he very clearly says that a
Receiver is answerable only to the Court which appoints him and to no one
else, and, therefore, the hon. Committee cannot enquire into the conduct of
the respondent in its capacity as the Receiver. So, he questions the authority
of the Inquiry Committee. He questions the authority of the Parliament even
when the Constitution has empowered the Parliament. I second my colleague,
Shri N.K. Singh’s observation that it is our foremost duty to uphold the
sovereignty and authority of the Parliament.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Would you please conclude?
SHRI TIRUCHI SIVA: Sir, I would like to conclude by quoting hon. Justice J.S.
Verma who said, “The existence of power must be accompanied by
accountability. Erosion of credibility in the public mind resulting from any internal
danger is the greatest latent threat to the independence of the Judiciary. Eternal
vigilance to guard against any latent internal danger is necessary lest we suffer
from self-inflicted moral wounds.” Mr. Yechury, before he moved this motion,
said that it is not a motion against the Judiciary; it is only a motion against the
misbehaviour of one Judge. On these grounds, and on the arguments that
we have placed, Sir, I support the motion moved by Mr. Yechury.
DR. YOGENDRA P. TRIVEDI (MAHARASHTRA): Thank you, Sir. Mr. Arun Jaitley
told us that this is rarest of the rare event. I agree with him. Here are so many
legal luminaries giving their best, putting their viewpoint in a scintillating manner
with eloquence and then is the catch word, all that they are doing is without
charging any fees. That is the rarest of the rare event. I was hearing with rapt
attention to Shri Sitaram Yechury when he referred to the trial of Robert Clive
and Warren Hastings...
He quoted from the oration of Edmond Burke. I also looked into what happened
at that trial, and, I would like to quote another eminent jurist who addressed
the House of Lords. His name is Sheridan, and, in my opinion, Sheridan even
excelled Burke in certain respects, and, this is what he said while the trial of
Warren Hastings was there. He said, “Not a hair shall be plucked from head
to the ground unless legal guilt is established by legal proof.” This is what
Sheridan said. Mr. Yechury made out a very spirited and detailed account of
what has happened. There was also a very spirited reply by Justice Soumitra
Sen. He made out four points, which have to be examined because this House
today is acting in the capacity both as jury as well as judge. So, let us look at
what was the defence of Justice Sen. He said that he had collected the money
as a receiver when he was a lawyer. A struggling laywer; I can understand.
He is in command of some money, which he put in here and there; for the
time being, he parked the money somewhere. He parked the money with Lynx
India Private Limited, which later went into liquidation. I am little surprised
because according to my knowledge, Lynx India Private Limited is still a very
living corporation. It has large properties in the city of Mumbai. The building in
which I am staying in Mumbai, there also, it has a very valuable flat running
into quite a few crores of rupees. So, it is not a dead company. It is Lynx India
Private Limited. Then, he said, later on, he returned the money. He gave it to
the workers, and, thereafter, returned the money. This is his first submission.
The second thing which he said was that there is a difference between his
role as a Receiver and later as a Judge. He says that as a judge, he has an
impeccable career, and, none of his judgement was doubted, and, he has been
an excellent and ideal judge.
Later, he talked about res judicata and referred to the Division Bench
judgement, which has been referred to earlier, and, which is at page 31 of the
Inquiry Report. Lastly, he said, and, this is something, which I did not expect
from a Judge, that there are others who have done similar crimes and they
have all escaped. Mr. Arun Jaitley, thereafter, took us through the facts. I believe
that more than law, facts are more important. According to me, facts are like
arguments of God. So, we must examine the facts very minutely. How the
moneys were parked with Lynx India is mentioned at page 16. For what reason,
the moneys were parked with a private limited company, and not with an
established undertaking, not with a public sector company, not with a big
corporation. We do not know for what reasons it was done. Later, thereafter,
moneys were disbursed at various places, and, probably trying to get a soft
corner from Mr. Yechury, he said that moneys were given to workers. It is a
very humanitarian job, but whose money? It was not his personal money. It
was the money which was deposited with him on escrow account, which he
was holding as a trustee, and, first of all, that money was given to the workers,
as he says, and, later, thereafter, it was returned to the court as per the
directions of the court, but at what stage? Much after he became the Judge.
He became the Judge in 2003, and, moneys were returned sometime later in
2005 after the court’s order.
4.00 P.M.
This is the catch. If the moneys would have been returned before he became
a judge, it was understandable. He could say, “I was a struggling lawyer. I was
in possession of money which I might have misused or mismanaged. Now, I
want to start a new career. So, I want to atone for my sins or whatever it may
be and I am returning the money”. But he did not do it. There was no
atonement. There was no repentance. There was no pashchataap. But he
continued to keep the money even after he became a Judge. That means it
becomes a continuing offence. The “ offence which was committed earlier, he
continued with the offence later also. He did not try to wriggle out of it. He
property got purged of the character of a trust property. If he has realised that
I have now ceased to be a Receiver, it was his duty to walk up to the court and
say, “I am now becoming a Judge. Please relieve me of this trust property which
has been in my hands and here is that property. Take charge of it”. Sir, he did
not do this. He thought that when he has become a Judge, all people surrounding
him will turn into sycophants and will forget the rupees fifty two lakhs which he
had pocketed. But, unfortunately for him, there was a fellow Judge in the High
Court itself who did not become a sycophant and he carried on an investigation
into the trust property which was in his hands. Sir, look at this explanation. At
page 31, he propounds a doctrine and I want you to hear this doctrine. “It is
judicially settled that till such time I, as a Receiver, am not directed to return
the sum lying with me, I cannot on my own return the same”. In other words,
he is telling you to accept the proposition that even though he ceased to be a
Receiver and it was his duty to go and give an account of the property which
he received as a Receiver to the court which appointed him a Receiver, he is
not bound to do anything of that kind until he is asked to do so.
In other words, the trust property becomes personal property and I can deal
with it as I like. Sir, this receiver lawyer should have known that as a trustee
he is bound by the provisions of the Indian Trust Act. The Indian Trust Act has
an express provision, Section 20, which deals with investments. A trustee can
invest trust property in seven specified investments which are permitted under
that Section and if you invest in any unauthorized deal, that itself renders you
liable for a prosecution for criminal breach of trust. The law does not permit a
trustee because the law says, “in these seven ones and no other”—so clear
is the law—and yet he went and invested this property in a private financial
business which is not a Government authorized entity in which he could have
put this money. He claims that that entity became insolvent, went into
liquidation, and he thought that everybody would forget about that money.
Sir, now for Mr. Mishra’s bravery. If you had read this Report and if you had
come up to page 22—because I don’t blame anybody for losing patience after
you read the 22 nd page—at page 22, the Report starts dealing with his
misbehaviour as a judge. I am reading the last paragraph on page 22. It says,
“All that is stated above took place during the period when Sen, the receiver,
was an advocate. The assessment of the Inquiry Committee is that as an
advocate and as an officer of the High Court of Calcutta, Sen’s conduct was
wrongful and not expected of an advocate. But his conduct in relation to matters
concerning the moneys received during his receivership after he was appointed
a judge was deplorable, in no way befitting a High Court Judge”. From here
starts their dealing with this misbehaviour as a judge of the High Court. I regret
to say that if there was a more vigilant method of appointment of judges, this
man did not deserve to be appointed, but having been appointed, he has no
business to stay as a judge for even one day. And this House will be committing
a hara-kiri of its judicial functions, if you don’t rise to the occasion and see that
not only this judge goes, but other judges who similarly misbehave do not occupy
judicial offices for a day longer.
Sir, there was a reference to his eloquence. Eloquence is, doubtless, a quality
which people should possess. I must tell you that I have never heard
Shri Mohan Singh speak, but today I was so impressed while I was hearing
your Hindi eloquence, I said, I hope before I die, I will one day be able to deliver
a speech like you. But, Sir, eloquence has nothing to do with moral sense;
eloquence has nothing to do with the quickened conscience. Eloquence is often
the property of the biggest cheats and charlatans. After all, unless you know
this glib talking art, you will not be able to cheat people and it is not a matter
of surprise that today the glib talkers are at the top of the world and people
who can’t speak are not.
This gentleman gave a demonstration of his eloquent deception. But why did
he not appear before those three Judges which were inquiring into his conduct?
Because he is afraid of answering questions. I wanted to ask questions while
he stood there. In three questions I would have demolished his eloquence and
he would have faltered, he would have fallen down here right in this House
and would not have been able to go back.
You can speak as much untruth as you like so long as there is no risk of
interrogation and cross-examination. That is why, in the court of law, we do
not believe a witness who has not submitted himself to cross-examination.
Examination, in itself, is useless unless it has survived the filter of cross-
examination, and, cross-examination by people who would know how to cross-
examine. Before every judicial authority where he could be questioned, he did
not get up and answer. To those three Judges, who were holding an inquiry,
when they called him, he said, “I am pleading the Fifth Amendment.” Fifth
Amendment is not meant for crooks like this. Fifth Amendment is meant for
illiterate accused who, by answering questions, might implicate themselves in
offences which they have not committed. That, of course, is the origin of the
rule. Now, Fifth Amendment is a Constitutional right. But that right is available
in a prosecution for a criminal offence. This Judge was not being prosecuted
for a criminal offence. He was being prosecuted for his ability and for his
qualifications of being a judge and continuing to remain a judge of the High
Court. He is not going to be sentenced to imprisonment. So, Sir, don’t be
impressed by the kind of eloquence. He becomes eloquent wherever he cannot
be questioned.
The next question is that he has paid Rs. 52 lakhs. He paid that amount of Rs.
52 lakhs, while that single judge caught hold of him and asked, “Where is that
money which you got as receiver? You have not given it.” So, he paid that money.
Sir, my fellow Members in this House tell me outside, “The man has paid Rs.
52 lakhs. So, why not let him go?” Please understand what he got by paying
those Rs. 52 lakhs at that late stage! He should thank his stars for that. But
he is an ungrateful man. He eats and gobbles up the hand which feeds him.
These brother judges, who, unfortunately, continue to practice some kind of trade
unionism to save their brother judges, have saved him from being prosecuted
and punished for a serious offence of criminal breach of trust, punishable under
Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, where the maximum punishment is life
imprisonment and imprisonment which may extend to ten years. But, by paying
off that money which he had pocketed,—though, of course, I am sure, his poor
mother made some contribution to that money—he has earned his freedom from
jail. And, I assure you that if he had been prosecuted, he would have been in
jail for, at least, five or ten years. He has earned that freedom by that money.
Therefore, please do not entertain any sympathy for this man, that this man
has paid Rs. 52 lakhs, and we should let him go. This is not settlement of a
civil dispute. He was guilty of a non-compoundable offence under which you
can pay millions and millions but you cannot compound that offence. It is only
an extenuating circumstance on the question of punishment. But that
extenuation value he has already got out of that money because he has escaped
the whole prosecution under Section 409, and the ignominy which he would
have gone through, which his family would have gone through, as a result of
prosecution, and, ultimately, appealing to the Court to give him a lighter
sentence, because he has paid off. So, I would like to tell my friends that this
is a case in which we are dealing with a judge who ought not to have been
made a judge, if there were better methods of appointment, and who, fortunately,
has been caught as a result of another vigilant judge. He talks of the Division
Bench. If a single Judge had no jurisdiction to go into matters in which he went
into, what was the Division Bench doing? The Division Bench merely said, “All
right, you have paid this money.” Therefore, again, out of that true trade unionism
and a little sense of mercy, they said, “We will remove that remark which the
single Judge has made. We will expunge that remark.” That judgement was a
bad judgement, and that judgement is a judgement which was, certainly,
considered by the Chief Justice to whom a complaint went from the Chief Justice
of the Calcutta High Court.
Sir, that Chief Justice of India may be somewhat controversial, but so far as
this Judge is concerned, this Chief Justice helped him. He gave him an extra
hearing. He gave him a hearing in his house. He listened to him and then he
said, ‘I would give you an extra-Constitutional opportunity to establish your
innocence’, and gave him that in-House Committee of Judges who sat and
listened to this man and said that ‘you seem to be a hypocrite’. You don’t give
him any mercy, and it says, ‘You face the consequences of the conduct in which
you have indulged.’
So, Sir, this is not a matter in which the House can take a lenient view. Let us
settle a good precedent today so that Judges who are of the same mould of
mind as this Judge realize that the Parliament of this country will rise to the
occasion and not do things which we have done in the past. Of course, this is
not an occasion to enter into a debate about the appointment of an extra-judicial
commission; we may do that some other time. But today, I hope that even
Mr. Misra would withdraw his dissent and the decision shall be unanimous.
Thank you.
SHRI RAVI SHANKAR PRASAD: Sir, I am extremely grateful to you for giving
me this limited time. I have to make very few points.
(MR. CHAIRMAN IN THE CHAIR)
What is Justice Soumitra Sen’s conduct as a Judge? He became the Receiver

in the 80s; got the sale proceeds in the early 90s. He became the Judge in
December, 2003. The first thing that was required to do was to submit to the
court that ‘I do not want to be named the Receiver any further’. He did not do
so. For the whole of 2004 and for the whole of 2005, he did not submit any
account. When the Single Judge issued him a show cause notice, he did not
reply. The notice was given thrice. Most importantly, Sir, when a final order
was passed asking him to pay Rs. 33 lakhs with an interest of Rs. 55 lakhs,
he went and prayed for more time. He made a part-payment.
A question has been asked about the Division Bench. The Division Bench relies
upon his affidavit but in the inquiry conducted by your committee it has been
found that it was a case of misrepresentation. He said that he had invested in
Lynx India Limited but that was not a fact. He did not invest this received
amount of the Receiver. It is a case of misconduct as a lawyer; it is a case of
continued misconduct and misrepresentation as a Judge.
Therefore, Sir, I request that this impeachment has to succeed.
I have to make only one more point at the end. What is the authority of a
Judge? Is it the source of law? Is it the power of contempt? Or, is it something
more? Sir, we have seen Additional District Judges giving capital punishment
and, after their retirements, moving around in their mohallas, with all the mafiosi
whom they had awarded punishments never dared to challenge them. We have
rarely heard a District Judge or a retired Additional District Judge ever getting
threatened or any revenge being taken against them by those criminals who
had been given conviction by them. Why is it so? It is the moral authority of a
Judge. This is a great tribute to our Judiciary and our rule of law that the moral
authority of a Judge is the most important authority and, for that, integrity is
very important. If that integrity is found to be wavering, it is time to take action.
I will conclude, Sir, with what the hon. Leader of the Opposition has stated.
There is a need for a lot of improvement in judicial appointments. This whole
case of appointments by the collegium is a kind of Constitutional appropriation
by the judges from the Executive and the Constitution. This is not permissible.
This needs to change, Sir.
There is one thing more which is very important in the present context. Yes,
judges’ activism in probity, in the fight against corruption is okay, but all over
the country we see that judges are taking away power by appointing
committees — MCD should work like this; this committee should work like this.
Sorry, Me Lords, this is not your function. May be, the authority is not functioning
properly, but for that you are not the authority. Let the democratic process,
the rule of the law and parliamentary accountability set right the course. That
is important.
With these words, I fully support the Motion which Mr. Yechury has moved.
Thank you, Sir.
SHRI SITARAM YECHURY: Mr. Chairman, Sir, we are reaching conclusion of

a historic debate on the Motions that I had moved which is on the brink of
creating history, not only in the history of Parliament but, I think, also in the
history of our democracy. As I said at the outset, Sir, I had moved these
Motions, not as an indictment or a reflection of our opinion of the Judiciary as
a whole, but I had moved these Motions in order to strengthen the
independence of the Judiciary, in order to establish the integrity of the Judiciary
which was getting besmirched by the acts of one particular individual and, while
moving these Motions, I had said that we are doing this with no jubilation or
elation, neither vindictiveness nor vendetta, but we are invoking legitimate
Constitutional provisions to ensure that the sanctity of our Constitution, is
maintained and the supremacy or the centrality of our Constitution, which is
the sovereignty of the people, is established through their elected
representatives, that is the Parliament. In doing so, I think, we have today, in
a sense, also reflected the general mood that is there in the country. We have
seen the waves of protests against corruption at high places. We have seen
the concern and the actual disgust that many in our country are reflecting in
their own ways against this sort of corruption; and, in the midst of that, the
Parliament rising to the occasion and saying that we will invoke our Constitution,
we will invoke the supremacy of the Parliament in order to ensure that
corruption in high places will be checked and when anything wrong is brought
before us, we will act to correct it. That, I think, is a very important element
today to convey to the country and our people—the will and resolve of this
House in tackling corruption at high places. I think, this is something the debate
has established. That is why, Sir, I am truly impressed with the richness of the
debate and this only further strengthens my own confidence that when the
occasion demands, this august House has risen to the occasion, and has risen
to the occasion in a splendid manner with no acrimony or personal attacks.
We have discussed an issue as serious as this and on the merits of it; it is a
matter to note we have the Leader of the House, the hon. Prime Minister, sitting
through the entire debate; we had the hon. Leader of the Opposition not only
being present but also contributing richly to the content of this debate which
was shared by all, cutting across the political-lines. I think, the richness of the
debate also naturally transcended the limited purpose of the Motions. It is only
natural, Sir. It naturally transcended the barriers of these Motions in talking of
the separation of powers between the Legislature, the Executive and the
Judiciary. It talked of the issues of separation of these powers, what should
be the role of the Judiciary, how the appointments should be done and I am
very glad that these issues have been brought into public domain and in the
discussion of the Parliament so that in the coming days we should address
them in all seriousness and, if time permits, I will return to that shortly.
But, Sir, there have been some questions that have been raised. Notably, my
distinguished friend and colleague, Shri Satish Chandra Misra, who of course
told me personally and he apologised for saying that he opposed the Motions.
I said, “What is the debate if there were no dissent?” Like Ram had said,
I must thank Shri Ram Jethmalani; I must dare say—Sir, I do not want to use
this—but who else will come to the defence of Sita Ram but Ram? In that
sense, he has made my job much easier by taking up some of these matters.
But, Sir, an important question has been raised by Shri Misra and also by my
distinguished colleagues, Shri Bharat Singh Raut and others, on the question
of the word and the concept of misbehaviour. Now, the question of what was
the role of Shri Soumitra Sen after he became a judge? That has been
answered by Shri Jethmalani and I do not want to repeat it.
And, Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad has answered some of the other issues. I do
not want to repeat only for the sake of time, and also respecting the reminding
that Mr. Ahluwalia has done about the Iftar and the timing of it, I don’t want to
go into all those aspects of it. But there is the word ‘misbehaviour’. Sir, the
Inquiry Committee that you had established actually goes into the genealogy
of this particular word, which due to paucity of time, I did not read out at the
time of introducing the Motions, but I will read out now. It is a short passage.
It says, I quote, “The word ‘misbehaviour’ in the context of the judges of the
High Courts in India was first introduced in proviso (b) to Section 202 of the
Government of India Act, 1935.” Under the 1935 Act, it was initially the Privy
Council and later the Federal Court of India that had to report to India’s
Governor General when charges were made of misbehaviour against a judge
of a High Court. In the Report of the Federal Court in respect of charges made
against Justice S.P. Sinha, a judge of the High Court of Allahabad, one of the
charges made by the Governor General against the judge were, “That Justice
S.P. Sinha has been guilty of conduct outside the court, which is unworthy of
and unbecoming of the holder of such a high office,” which was then
particularized. Since this charge was not substantiated against the Judge by
evidence, it was held to have been not established. But the charge as they
framed has tersely but correctly described the scope and ambit of the word
‘misbehaviour’, namely, guilty of such conduct whether inside or outside the
court, i.e., “Unworthy and unbecoming of the holder of such a high office.” The
same word ‘misbehaviour’ now occurs in the Constitution of India in article
124(4) when read in context with proviso (b) to Article 217(1). These provisions
state that a judge of the High Court shall not be removed from his office except
on the grounds of proved misbehaviour. The prefix ‘proved’ only means proved
to the satisfaction of the requisite majority of the appropriate House of the
Parliament, if so recommended by the Inquiry Committee. The words ‘proved
misbehaviour’ in Article 124 have not been defined. Advisedly so because the
phrase ‘proved misbehaviour’ means such behaviour which, when proved, is
not befitting of a judge of the High Court.”
Sir, the entire discussion we have had in the last two days here has only proved
that there is a misbehaviour on the part of Shri Soumitra Sen. And since this
is now being proved in my opinion and contention, which we will decide upon
through a vote subsequently, that this has been proved in a House of
Parliament on the basis of this discussion that we have had, after giving all
the time required, in fact, we extended the time required for Justice Soumitra
Sen to make his defence, if after that we come to that conclusion, Sir, that is
the meaning of proved misbehaviour. And that proving we have to do. Are we
convinced about that proving? That is what we have to stand up to, and that
is what we have to do, Sir, and that is the issue that is there. But with regard
to the other thing, Mr. Jethmalani answered it, about the role of Mr. Soumitra
Sen after he became a judge, and, in fact, he just quoted the introductory
paragraph, but if you just go through the Inquiry Committee Report, Sir, there
are, at least, four major sections and, at least, seven sub-sections where the
Inquiry Committee has established, after becoming a judge, the misbehaviour
of Mr. Soumitra Sen. This is all there on record from pages 22 to 26, and I do
not want to take time reading them out, and it is all there on record, and as
part of the evidence that we have. So, today, it is not a question of our passing
judgement or discussing about Mr. Soumitra Sen as an advocate and not as
a judge. And, also, as I said, when I was moving the Motion, it is no longer
tenable to say that these charges were made against Mr. Soumitra Sen before
he became a judge, therefore, the Judges Inquiry Act does not apply to him
since it was not when he was a judge. That has also been established under
law, that it is not the question of what is established on the issue of
misbehaviour that I have just quoted to you; it is not a question of when you
are a judge or when you are not; it is not a question whether you are doing it
in the court or you are doing it outside. But the question is whether your
behaviour will cast aspersions not only on your character and integrity but the
character and integrity of the entire Judiciary. You are liable to be drawn under
this section. Mr. Bharatkumar Raut has also raised the issue of the Division
Bench. Mr. Ravi Shankar Prasad has referred to it. But, let me just take up
this matter on behalf of what the Inquiry Committee has said. Mr. Jethmalani
also answered it that and, of course, Mr. Arun Jaitley, answered it in the
morning. We also exposed that and I am not repeating that deliberately. When
Mr. Soumitra Sen also made a lot of false and misleading statements here
with—claims—authenticated documents, I would want him to authenticate and
place the same before the House and make them the property of the House.
I will come as to why I am saying this subsequently before I conclude this reply.
But, I would only request the hon. Leader of the Opposition to do so.
Sir, this what the Inquiry Committee has said on the Division Bench. It says,
“The observation in the judgment dated 25 September, 2007, of the Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court to the effect that there was no
misappropriation of Receiver funds by Justice Soumitra Sen was, after
considering the uncontested Affidavit filed on his behalf by his mother which
categorically asserted that the entire sum received by him from the sale of
goods i.e., Rs. 33,22,800 was invested in M/s Lynx India Limited and that the
company has gone into liquidation a couple of years later. This statement, along
with further misleading and false statements, in Ground 13 of the Memorandum
of Appeal that they have appended to this Report were material
misrepresentation made by and on behalf of Justice Soumitra Sen before the
Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta. The finding by the Division Bench
in its judgment of 25 July, 2007, that Justice Soumitra Sen was not guilty of
any misappropriation was made on a totally erroneous premise induced by the

false representation made on behalf of Justice Soumitra Sen.” Sir, I don’t think
you require a greater clarity than this. Therefore, what was the misbehaviour or
what was misappropriation that was done has to be understood.
Sir, Mr. Jethmalani has referred to Section 403 of IPC. What was the deal? Why
did he pay the money back when he was asked to pay back? It is only to escape
imprisonment. Sir, the questions were raised on the question of misappropriation.
Is diversion a misappropriation? Is using that money temporarily for some
purpose constitutes misappropriation? We have heard the labours of Mr. Soumitra
Sen yesterday when he said, ‘you tell me one paisa that is there in my account.
Have I made any money at all from holding this money? So, therefore, there is
no misappropriation that I have committed.’ But, Sir, what is the definition of
‘misappropriation’ under Section 403 of IPC? Section 403 of IPC says, ‘Whoever
dishonestly misappropriates or...“—please underline—”...converts to his
own........shall be punishable with imprisonment... It clearly says if a person
‘coverts to his own use.’ Then it goes on to clarify in the explanation, “A dishonest
misappropriation for a time only is a misappropriation within the meaning of this
section.” So, whether it is for a short time or whether it is for personal use only
to be returned even if you are a fiduciary and a trustee. If money is deposited
with me, I cannot borrow that money even temporarily. Sir, even temporarily I
cannot borrow that money for my personal use and return back that money. I
may be very honest and return back that money. But, the very act of borrowing
that money makes me guilty of misappropriation. That is the Indian law. Our
laws are very clear—it is both the acts of omission and commission. You cannot
say, ‘I don’t have any money that I have put in my bank accounts and, therefore,
I am not guilty.’ But, your acts of omission that have led to such acts of guilt
are actually breach of law. Therefore, on all these counts—whatever matters
that we have discussed earlier—he is guilty. In 1984 he was appointed as
Receiver and the matter finally settled in 2006. In 2002, SAIL asked for the
accounts as to what happened to that money. He does not reply immediately.
Yesterday he was telling us in a much laboured manner. In the whole two hours
of his presentation, there was only one mention about SAIL and that one mention
came in terms of reference to the learned counsel of the SAIL. When the whole
case of misappropriation centers around the money of dispute between SAIL
and the SCIL, he was made the trustee of it and for that there is no reference.
But, he, of course, asked me to go back to my workers and find out if they
have been paid. I am grateful if that had happened. Sometimes, justice can
be done by these courts also and by such Judges. If the workers have been
paid, it is good. But, that is not the issue. The issue is, who gave you the right
of Rs. 70 lakhs given to you to pay to the workers to divest Rs. 25 lakhs of that
and invest in a private company which was going into liquidation? Is there any
scam involved in this? That needs to be investigated, Sir. You have divested
Rs. 25 lakhs of money that was meant and set aside for wages and
compensation to the workers to be invested in a private company which goes
bust, within a couple of years! Was it done with knowledge that it is going to
go into liquidation? What is the feedback there? That also needs to be
investigated today, Sir. So, these are various issues which have come up. They
all have come on record now. We all came to know how fictitious accounts
have been recorded, how cheques have been issued for the payment of Credit
Cards. Therefore, keeping this in mind, as I mentioned, the case, according
to me, is a closed case.
Finally, the point I want to make is, the labour behind the entire argument
yesterday was that there was a great conspiracy against him. What is the
conspiracy? You have the Chief Justice of India. You have noted Judges like
Justice A.P. Shaw, Justice A.K. Patnaik and Justice R.M. Lodha. Have they all
conspired against Justice Soumitra Sen? You have the Chief Justice Justice
B.N. Agarwal and Justice Ashok Bhan. They are all the senior most Judges.
Do you mean to say that they have conspired against Mr. Sen? And, now, do
you mean to say that Justice Sudarshan Reddy, Shri Mukul Mudgal and Fali
Nariman have all conspired against Mr. Sen. We have had the pleasure of
knowing Mr. Nariman. I mean, he was four colleague here. We have known
his uprightness here. To question the integrity of such people and to say that
all of them have collided in a great conspiracy to prosecute Mr. Soumitra Sen
is a great conspiracy theory that has been woven yesterday and that conspiracy
theory needs to be broken.
Therefore, Sir, finally, I think, the issues that have been raised by the hon.
Leader of the Opposition echoed by many other hon. Members here on the
larger issues connected with Judiciary, Executive and the Legislature, this
Motion today has to be adopted and should be used as the trigger for us to
continue with these discussions, so that we, as parties—CPI (M) has always
been asking and continues to ask even now—have to ask for establishment
of the National Judicial Commission along with the Lokpal. We think that both
should go together. And, these are the issues, finally, we have to take up,
because our constitutional scheme of things talks of judicial review, not judicial
activism. And, that is where, Sir, the hon. Judges will interpret the law. But,
unfortunately, the power to make law lies with Parliament and that is the
supremacy. And, it is that supremacy we should uphold.
Finally, Sir, let me quote what Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has said during the
Constituent Assembly debates. He said, ‘No Supreme Court and no judiciary
can stand in judgment over the sovereign will of the Parliament representing
the will of the entire community. If we go wrong here and there, it...“—the
Judiciary—”...can point it out. But, in the ultimate analysis, where the future of
the community is concerned, no judiciary can come in the way. Ultimately, the
fact remains that the Legislature must be supreme and must not be interfered
with by the court of law in measures of social reform.” So, this is something
which we will have to uphold.
I thank all those who participated, and, through you, urge that the Motions that
I have moved yesterday be accepted.
I, therefore, recommend, once again, that these Motions be accepted by the

House.
MR. CHAIRMAN: I shall now put the Motions, moved by Shri Sitaram Yechury,
for presenting an Address to the President for removal of Justice Soumitra
Sen, Judge, High Court of Calcutta, from his office, along with the Address to
the President, under clause (4) of Article 124 of the Constitution, to the vote
of the House.
As I have informed earlier, the Motions, along with the Address are required
to be adopted by a special majority. The question is:
“This House resolves that an address be presented

to the President for removal from office of Justice Soumitra
Sen of the Calcutta High Court on the following two grounds
of misconduct :-
(1) Misappropriation of large sums of money, which

he received in his capacity as receiver appointed by the High
Court of Calcutta; and
(2) Misrepresented facts with regard to the

misappropriation of money before the High Court of Calcutta.“-
The Address shall be as follows:
“Whereas a notice was given of a motion for

presenting an address to the President praying for the removal
of Shri Soumitra Sen, from his office as a Judge of the High
Court at Calcutta by fifty-seven members of the Council of
States (as specified in Annexure ‘A’ attached herewith).
AND WHEREAS the said motion was admitted by the Chairman of the Council
of States;
AND WHEREAS an Inquiry Committee consisting of —
(a) Shri B. Sudershan Reddy, a Judge of the Supreme Court of India;
(b) Shri Mukul Mudgal, Chief Justice of the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh; and
(c) Shri Fali S. Nariman, a distinguished jurist, was appointed by the

Chairman of the Council of States for the purpose of making an
investigation into the grounds on which the removal of the said Shri
Soumitra Sen from his office as a Judge of the High Court at
Calcutta has been prayed for;
by it, submitted a report containing a finding to the effect that Shri Soumitra
Sen is guilty of the misbehaviour specified in such report (a copy of which is
enclosed and marked as Annexure ‘B’);

Council of States in accordance with the provisions of clause (4) of article 124
of the Constitution of India, the misbehaviour of the said Shri Soumitra Sen is
deemed, under sub-section (3) of section 6 of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968,
to have been proved;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Council of States requests the President to pass an

order for the removal of the said Shri Soumitra Sen from his office as a Judge
of the High Court at Calcutta.”
Under clause (4) of Article 124 of the Constitution the Motion and the Address
will have to be adopted by a majority of the total membership of the House
and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the Members of the House
present and voting.
6.00 P.M.
THE HOUSE DIVIDED.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Subject to correction: Ayes :189, Noes : 16

AYES-186
Achuthan, Shri M.P. Chaturvedi, Shri Satyavrat

Adik, Shri Govindrao Chowdary, Shri Y.S.
Agarwal, Shri Ramdas Daimary, Shri Biswajit
Ahluwalia, Shri S.S. Dalwai, Shri Husain
Aiyar, Shri Mani Shankar Das, Shri Kumar Deepak
Akhtar, Shri Javed Dave, Shri Anil Madhav
Alvi, Shri Raashid Deora, Shri Murli
Amin, Shri Mohammed Deshmukh, Shri Vilasrao Dagadojirao
Anand Sharma, Shri Dua, Shri H.K.
Antony, Shri A.K. Dwivedi, Shri Janardan
Apte, Shri Balavant Alias Bal Elavarasan, Shri A.
Ashk Ali Tak, Shri Faruque, Shrimati Naznin
Ashwani Kumar, Shri Fernandes, Shri Oscar
Azad, Shri Ghulam Nabi Gill, Dr. M.S.
Badnore, Shri V.P. Gnanadesikan, Shri B.S.
Baidya, Shrimati Jharna Das Goyal, Shri Piyush
Baishya, Shri Birendra Prasad Gujaral, Shri Naresh
Balaganga, Shri N. Gupta, Shri Prem Chand
Balagopal, Shri K.N. Hashmi, Shri Parvez
Batra, Shri Shadi Lal Hema Malini, Shrimati
Behera, Shri Shashi Bhusan Husain, Shri Jabir
Benegal, Shri Shyam Ismail, Shri K.E.
Bernard, Shri A.W. Rabi Jain, Shri Ishwarlal Shankarlal
Bhartia, Shrimati Shobhana Jain, Shri Meghraj
Budania, Shri Narendra Jaitley, Shri Arun
Chakraborty, Shri Shyamal Javadekar, Shri Prakash
Chatterjee, Shri Prasanta Jayashree, Shrimati B.
Jethmalani, Shri Ram Mishra, Shri Kalraj

Jha, Shri Prabhat Mitra, Dr. Chandan
Jinnah, Shri A.A. Mohanty, Shri Kishore Kumar
Jois, Shri M. Rama Mohapatra, Shri Pyarimohan
Joshi, Dr. Manohar Mohite Patil, Shri Ranjitsinh Vijaysinh
Kalita, Shri Bhubaneswar Moinul Hassan, Shri
Karan Singh, Dr. Mukherji, Dr. Barun
Karat, Shrimati Brinda Mukut Mithi, Shri
Katiyar, Shri Vinay Mungekar, Dr. Bhalchandra
Keishing, Shri Rishang Naidu, Shri M. Venkaiah
Kesari, Shri Narayan Singh Naik, Shri Pravin
Khan, Shri K. Rahman Naik, Shri Shantaram
Khan, Shri Mohd. Ali Nandi Yelaiah, Shri
Khanna, Shri Avinash Rai Naqvi, Shri Mukhtar Abbas
Khuntia, Shri Rama Chandra Natarajan, Shrimati Jayanthi
Kidwai, Shrimati Mohsina Natchiappan, Dr. E.M. Sudarsana
Kore, Dr. Prabhakar Pande, Shri Avinash
Koshyari, Shri Bhagat Singh Pandian, Shri Paul Manoj
Krishna, Shri S.M. Pany, Shri Rudra Narayan
Kshatriya, Prof. Alka Balram Parida, Shri Baishnab
Kurien, Prof. P.J. Parmar, Shri Bharatsinh Prabhatsinh
Kushwaha, Shri Upendra Pasha, Shri Syed Azeez
Lad, Shri Anil H. Paswan, Shri Ram Vilas
Lepcha, Shri O.T. Patel, Shri Ahmed
Madani, Shri Mahmood A. Patel, Shri Kanjibhai
Maitreyan, Dr. V. Patel, Shri Surendra Motilal
Malihabadi, Shri Ahmad Saeed Pilania, Dr. Gyan Prakash
Mangala Kisan, Shri Pradhan, Shrimati Renubala
Mathur, Shri Om Prakash Prasad, Shri Rajniti
Prasad, Shri Ravi Shankar Seema, Dr. T.N.

Punj, Shri Balbir Selvaganapathi, Shri T.M.
Rai, Shrimati Kusum Sen, Shri Tapan Kumar
Raja, Shri D. Shanappa, Shri K.B.
Rajeeve, Shri P. Shanta Kumar, Shri
Ram Prakash, Dr. Sharma, Shri Raghunandan
Ramalingam, Dr. K.P. Sharma, Shri Satish
Ramesh, Shri Jairam Shukla, Shri Rajeev
Rangarajan, Shri T.K. Singh, Shri Amar
Rao, Dr. K.V.P. Ramachandra Singh, Shri Birender
Rashtrapal, Shri Praveen Singh, Shri Ishwar
Ratna Bai, Shrimati T. Singh, Shri Jai Prakash Narayan
Raut, Dr. Bharatkumar Singh, Dr. Manmohan
Raut, Shri Sanjay Singh, Shrimati Maya
Ravi, Shri Vayalar Singh, Shri Mohan
Rebello, Ms. Mabel Singh, Shri N.K.
Reddy, Shri G. Sanjeeva Singh, Shri R.C.
Reddy, Shri M.V. Mysura Singh, Shri Shivpratap
Reddy, Dr. T. Subbarami Singhvi, Dr. Abhishek Manu
Roy, Shri Tarini Kanta Siva, Shri Tiruchi
Rudy, Shri Rajiv Pratap Solanki, Shri Kaptan Singh
Rupala, Shri Parshottam Khodabhai Soni, Shrimati Ambika
Rupani, Shri Vijaykumar Sood, Shrimati Bimla Kashyap
Sadho, Dr. Vijaylaxmi Soz, Prof. Saif-ud-Din
Sahani, Prof. Anil Kumar Stanley, Shrimati Vasanthi
Sahu, Shri Dhiraj Prasad Swaminathan, Prof. M.S.
Sai, Shri Nand Kumar Tariq Anwar, Shri
Sangma, Shri Thomas Tarun Vijay, Shri
Seelam, Shri Jesudasu Thakor, Shri Natuji Halaji
Thakur, Dr. C.P. Vasan, Shri G.K.

Thakur, Dr. Prabha Verma, Shri Vikram
Thakur, Shrimati Vipolve Vora, Shri Motilal
Thangavelu, Shri S. Vyas, Shri Shreegopal
Tiriya, Ms. Sushila Waghmare, Dr. Janardhan
Tiwari, Shri Shivanand Yadav, Shri Ram Kripal
Trivedi, Dr. Yogendra P. Yadav, Shri Veer Pal Singh
Uikey, Miss Anusuiya Yechury, Shri Sitaram
NOES-16
Agrawal, Shri Naresh Chandra Kashyap, Shri Narendra Kumar

Ali, Shri Munquad Kureel, Shri Pramod
Ansari, Shri Salim Misra, Shri Satish Chandra
Baghel, Prof. S.P. Singh Pathak, Shri Brajesh
Ganga Charan, Shri Rajan, Shri Ambeth
Jai Prakash, Shri Rajaram, Shri
Jugul Kishore, Shri Saini, Shri Rajpal Singh
Karimpuri, Shri Avtar Singh Singh, Shri Veer
The Motions and the Address are adopted by a majority of the total membership
of the House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the Members of
the House present and voting.
MR. CHAIRMAN: The House stands adjourned till 11 a.m. on Friday, the
19th of August, 2011.
The House then adjourned at ten minutes past six of the clock till
eleven of the clock on Friday, the 19 August, 2011.
RELEVANT EXTRACTS FROM THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Relevant Extracts from the Constitution and Statutory Provisions 423
EXTRACTS FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
124. Establishment and Constitution of Supreme Court—(1) There shall

be a Supreme Court of India consisting of a Chief Justice of India and, until
Parliament by law prescribes a larger number, of not more than seven1 other
Judges.
(2) Every Judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President
by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with such of the Judges
of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States as the President
may deem necessary for the purpose and shall hold office until he attains the
age of sixty-five years:
Provided that in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief
Justice, the Chief Justice of India shall always be consulted:
Provided further that—
(a) a Judge may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President,
resign his office;
(b) a judge may be removed from his office in the manner provided in
clause (4).
2
[(2A) The age of a Judge of the Supreme Court shall be determined by such
authority and in such manner as Parliament may by law provide.]
(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme
Court unless he is a citizen of India and—
(a) has been for at least five years a Judge of a High Court or of two
or more such Courts in succession; or
(b) has been for at least ten years an advocate of a High Court or of
two or more such Courts in succession; or
(c) is, in the opinion of the President, a distinguished jurist.
1. Now “twenty-five”, vide. Act 22 of 1986.

2. Ins. by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, s. 2.
Explanation I—In this clause “High Court” means a High Court which exercises,
or which at any time before the commencement of this Constitution exercised,
jurisdiction in any part of the territory of India.
Explanation II—In computing for the purpose of this clause the period during
which a person has been an advocate, any period during which a person has
held judicial office not inferior to that of a district judge after he became an
advocate shall be included.
(4) A Judge of the Supreme Court shall not be removed from his office except
by an order of the President passed after an address by each House of
Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and
by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present
and voting has been presented to the President in the same session for such
removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity.
(5) Parliament may by law regulate the procedure for the presentation of an
address and for the investigation and proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity
of a Judge under clause (4).
(6) Every person appointed to be a Judge of the Supreme Court shall, before
he enters upon his office, make and subscribe before the President, or some
person appointed in that behalf by him, an oath or affirmation according to
the form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule.
(7) No person who has held office as a Judge of the Supreme Court shall
plead or act in any court or before any authority within the territory of India.
217. Appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a High

Court—(1) Every Judge of a High Court shall be appointed by the President
by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with the Chief Justice
of India, the Governor of the State, and, in the case of appointment of a Judge
other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court, and 1[shall
hold office, in the case of an additional or acting Judge, as provided in article
224, and in any other case, until he attains the age of 2(sixty—two years)]:
Provided that—
(a) a Judge may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President,
resign his office;
1. Subs, by s. 12, ibid, for “shall hold office until he attains the age of sixty years.”
2. Subs, by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, s. 4, for “sixty years”.
(b) a Judge may, be removed from his office by the President in the
manner provided in clause (4) of article 124 for the removal of a
Judge of the Supreme Court;
(c) the office of a Judge shall be vacated by his being appointed by

the President to be a Judge of the Supreme Court or by his being
transferred by the President to any other High Court within the
territory of India.
(2) a person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court
unless he is a citizen of India and—
(a) has for at least ten years held a judicial office in the territory of India;
or
(b) has for at least ten years been an advocate of a High Court1**** or
of two or more such Courts in succession;2***
Explanation—For the purposes of this clause—
3
[(a) in computing the period during which a person has held judicial
office in the territory of India, there shall be included any period,
after he has held any judicial office, during which the person has
been an advocate of a High Court or has held the office of a
member of a tribunal or any post, under the Union or a State,
requiring special knowledge of law;]
4
[(aa) in computing the period during which a person has been an
advocate of a High Court, there shall be included any period during
which the person 5[has held judicial office or the office of a member
of a tribunal or any post, under the Union or a Stale, requiring special
knowledge of law] after he became an advocate;]
1. The words “in any State specified in the First Schedule” omitted by the Constitution
(Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, s. 29 and Sch.
2. The word “or” and sub-cl. (c) were ins. by the Constitution (Forty-second
Amendment) Act, 1976, s. 36 (w.e.f. 3.1.1977) and omitted by the Constitution
(Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, s. 28 (w.e.f. 20.6.1979).
3. Ins. by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, s. 28 (w.e.f.
20.6.1979).
4. CI. (a) re-lettered as cl. (aa) by s. 28, ibid, (w.e.f. 20.6.1979).
5. Subs, by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, s. 36, for “has
held judicial office” (w.e.f. 3.1.1977).
(b) in computing the period during which a person has held judicial office
in the territory of India or been an advocate of a High Court, there
shall be included any period before the commencement of this
Constitution during which he has held judicial office in any area which
was comprised before the fifteenth day of August, 1947, within India
as defined by the Government of India Act, 1935, or has been an
advocate of any High Court in any such area, as the case may be.
1
[(3) If any question arises as to the age of a Judge of a High Court, the
question shall be decided by the President after consultation with the Chief
Justice of India and the decision of the President shall be final.]
218. Application of certain provisions relating to Supreme Court to High

Courts—The provisions of clauses (4) and (5) of article 124 shall apply in
relation to a High Court as they apply in relation to the Supreme Court with
the substitution of references to the High Court for references to the Supreme
Court.
1. Ins. by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, s. 4 (with retrospective

effect).
II
THE JUDGES (INQUIRY) ACT, 1968
(51 OF 1968)
An Act to regulate the procedure for the investigation and proof of the
misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court
and for the presentation of an address by Parliament to the President and for
matters connected therewith.
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Nineteenth Year of the Republic of India as

follows:—
1. Short title and commencement.—(1) This Act may be called the Judges
(Inquiry) Act, 1968.
(2) It shall come into force on such date* as the Central Government may,
by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint.
2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—
(a) “Chairman” means the Chairman of the Council of States;
(b) “Committee” means a Committee constituted under section 3;
(c) “Judge” means a Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court

and includes the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of a
High Court;
(d) “Prescribed” means prescribed by rules made under this Act;
(e) “Speaker” means the Speaker of the House of the People.
3. Investigation into misbehaviour or incapacity of Judge by Committee.—

(1) If notice is given of a motion for presenting an address to the President
praying for the removal of a Judge signed,—
(a) in the case of a notice given in the House of the People, by not
less than one hundred members of that House;
* 1-1-1969, vide Notification No. GSR. 35, dt. 1-1-1969, Gazette of India,
Extraordinary, Pt. II, Sec 3, sub-section (i), p. 5.
(b) in the case of a notice given in the Council of States, by not less
than fifty members of that Council;
then, the Speaker or, as the case may be, the Chairman may, after consulting
such persons, if any, as he thinks fit and after considering such materials, if
any, as may be available to him, either admit the motion or refuse to admit
the same.
(2) If the motion referred to in sub-section (1) is admitted, the Speaker, or,
as the case may be, the Chairman shall keep the motion pending and
constitute, as soon as may be, for the purpose of making an investigation,
into the grounds en which the removal of a Judge is prayed for, a Committee
consisting of three members of whom—
(a) one shall be chosen from among the Chief Justice and other Judges
of the Supreme Court;
(b) one shall be chosen from among the Chief Justices of the High
Courts; and
(c) one shall be a person who is, in the opinion of the Speaker or, as
the case may be, the Chairman, a distinguished jurist:
Provided that where notices of a motion referred to in sub-section (1) are given
on the same day in both Houses of Parliament, no Committee shall be
constituted unless the motion has been admitted in both Houses and where
such motion has been admitted in both Houses, the Committee shall be
constituted jointly by the Speaker and the Chairman:
Provided further that where notices of a motion as aforesaid are given in the
Houses of Parliament on different dates, the notice which is given later shall
stand rejected.
(3) The Committee shall frame definite charges against the Judge on the
basis of which the investigation is proposed to be held.
(4) Such charges together with a statement of the grounds on which each
such charge is based shall be communicated to the Judge and he shall be
given a reasonable opportunity of presenting a written statement of defence
within such time as may be specified in this behalf by the Committee.
(5) Where it is alleged that the Judge is unable to discharge the duties of
his office efficiently due to any physical or mental incapacity and the allegation
is denied, the Committee may arrange for the medical examination of the Judge
by such Medical Board as may be appointed for the purpose by the Speaker
or, as the case may be, the Chairman or, where the Committee is constituted
jointly by the Speaker and the Chairman, by both of them, for the purpose and
the Judge shall submit himself to such medical examination within the time
specified in this behalf by the Committee.
(6) The Medical Board shall undertake such medical examination of the Judge
as may be considered necessary and submit a report to the Committee stating
therein whether the incapacity is such as to render the Judge unfit to continue
in office.
(7) If the Judge refuses to undergo medical examination considered

necessary by the Medical Board, the Board shall submit a report to the
Committee stating therein the examination which the Judge has refused to
undergo, and the Committee may, on receipt of such report, presume that the
Judge suffers from such physical or mental incapacity as is alleged in the
motion referred to in sub-section (1).
(8) The Committee may, after considering the written statement of the Judge
and the medical report, if any, amend the charges framed under sub-section
(3) and in such a case, the Judge shall be given a reasonable opportunity of
presenting a fresh written statement of defence.
(9) The Central Government may, if required by the Speaker or the Chairman,
or both, as the case may be, appoint an advocate to conduct the case against
the Judge.
4. Report of Committee.—(1) Subject to any rules that may be made in this

behalf, the Committee shall have power to regulate its own procedure in making
the investigation and shall give a reasonable opportunity to the Judge of cross-
examining witnesses, adducing evidence and of being heard in his defence.
(2) At the conclusion of the investigation, die Committee shall submit its report
to the Speaker or, as the case may be, to the Chairman, or where the
Committee has been constituted jointly by the Speaker and the Chairman, to
both of them, stating therein its findings on each of the charges separately
with such observations on the whole case as it thinks fit.
(3) The Speaker or the Chairman, or, where the Committee has been
constituted jointly by the Speaker and the Chairman, both of them, shall cause
the report submitted under sub-section (2) to be laid, as soon as may be,
respectively before the House of the People and the Council of, States.
5. Powers of Committee.—For the purpose of making any investigation under

this Act, the Committee shall have the powers of a civil court, while trying a
suit, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in respect of the
following matters, namely:—
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and

examining him on oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;
(c) receiving evidence on oath;
(d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or

documents;
(e) such other matters as may be prescribed.
6. Consideration of report and procedure for presentation of an address for

removal of Judge.—(1) If the report of the Committee contains a finding that
the Judge is not guilty of any misbehaviour or does not suffer from any
incapacity, then, no further steps shall be taken in either House of Parliament
in relation to the report and the motion pending in the House or the Houses of
Parliament shall not be proceeded with.
(2) If the report of the Committee contains a finding that the Judge is guilty
of any misbehaviour or suffers from any incapacity, then, the motion referred
to in sub-section (1) of section 3 shall, together with the report of the Committee
be taken up for consideration by the House or the Houses of Parliament in
which it is pending.
(3) If the motion is adopted by each House of Parliament in accordance with

the provisions of clause (4) of article 124, or, as the case may be, in accordance
with that clause read with article 218 of the Constitution, then, the misbehaviour
or incapacity of the Judge shall be deemed to have been proved and an
address praying for the removal of the Judge shall be presented in the
prescribed manner to the President by each House of Parliament in the same
session in which the motion has been adopted.
7. Power to make rules.—(1) There shall be constituted a Joint Committee

of both Houses of Parliament in accordance with the provisions hereinafter
contained for the purpose of making rules to carry out the purposes of this
Act.
(2) The Joint Committee shall consist of fifteen members of whom ten shall
be nominated by the Speaker and five shall be nominated by the Chairman.
(3) The Joint Committee shall elect its own Chairman and shall have power
to regulate its own procedure.
(4) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1),

the Joint Committee may make rules to provide for the following among other
matters, namely:—
(a) the manner of transmission of a motion adopted in one House to

the other House of Parliament;
(b) the manner of-presentation of an address to the President for the

removal of a Judge;
(c) the travelling and other allowances payable to the members of the
Committee and the witnesses who may be required to attend such
Committee;
(d) the facilities which may be accorded to the Judge for defending
himself;
(e) any other matter which has to be, or may be, provided for by rules
or in respect of which provision is, in the opinion of the Joint
Committee, necessary.
(5) Any rules made under this section shall not take effect until they are
approved and confirmed both by the Speaker and the Chairman and are
published in the Official Gazette, and such publication of the rules shall be
conclusive proof that they have been duly made.
III
THE JUDGES (INQUIRY) RULES, 1969
*G.S.R. 2168.—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (4) of section

7 of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 (51 of 1968), the Joint Committee constituted
under sub-section (1) of that section, hereby makes the following rules, the same
having been approved and confirmed by the Chairman of the Council of States
and the Speaker of the House of the People, as required by sub-section (5) of
that section, namely:—
1. Short title and commencement.—(1) These rules may be called the Judges
(Inquiry) Rules, 1969.
(2) They shall come into force on the date of their publication in the Official
Gazette.
2. Definition.—In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires,—
(a) “Act” means the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 (51 of 1968);
(b) “Constitution” means the Constitution of India;
(c) “Form” means the form specified in the Schedule;
(d) “Inquiry Committee” means the Committee constituted under

subsection (2) of section 3;
(e) “motion” means the motion admitted under sub-section (1) of

section 3;
(f) “section” means a section of the Act;
(g) Words and expressions not defined herein but defined in the Act
have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Act.
3. Presiding Officer.—The member chosen under clause (a) of sub-section

(2) of section 3 shall preside over the meetings of the Inquiry Committee, or,
in his absence, the member chosen under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of
section 3 shall preside over the meetings of the Inquiry Committee.
* Published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary, Pt.II, Sec. 3, Sub-section (i),

dt. 8-9-1969, pp. 617-23.
4. Quorum.—(1) Two members of the Inquiry Committee present at a meeting

of the Inquiry Committee shall be the quorum for such meeting.
(2) No meeting of the Inquiry Committee shall be held unless a quorum is

present.
5. Service on the Judge of the charges framed against him.—(1) The Inquiry
Committee shall issue a notice, by registered post acknowledgement due, to
the Judge in Form I and shall enclose with the said notice—
(a) a copy of the charges framed by it under sub-section (3) of

section 3, and
(b) the statement of the grounds on which each such charge is based.
(2) If the notice referred to in sub-rule (1) is accepted by the Judge, the Inquiry
Committee shall file with its records the postal acknowledgement, or where
the postal acknowledgement has not been received back, the registration
receipt granted by postal authorities.
(3) If the Judge concerned omits or refuses to accept the notice referred to
in sub-rule (1), or, if he is not found at his last known address, the Inquiry
Committee may order the publication, in such manner as it may think fit, of a
notice requiring the Judge to appear at a specified time and place to answer
the charges framed against him.
6. Objection to charges.—When the Judge appears, he may object in writing

to the sufficiency of the charges framed against him and if the objection is
sustained by the majority of the members of the Inquiry Committee, the Inquiry
Committee may amend the charges and give the Judge a reasonable
opportunity of presenting a fresh written statement of defence.
7. Plea of Judge.—(1) If the Judge admits that he is guilty of the misbehaviour,

or suffers from the incapacity, specified in the charges framed against him
under sub-section (3) of section 3, the Inquiry Committee shall record such
admission and may state its findings on each of the charges in accordance
with such admission.
(2) If the Judge denies that he is guilty of the misbehaviour or suffers from
the incapacity, specified in the charges framed against him under subsection
(3) of section 3, or if he refuses, or omits, or is unable, to plead or desires
that the inquiry should be made, the Inquiry Committee shall proceed with the
inquiry.
8. Effect of non-appearance.—If the Judge does not appear, on proof of service

on him of the notice referred to in rule 5, or, upon publication of such notice,
the Inquiry Committee may proceed with the inquiry in the absence of the
Judge.
9. Report of the Inquiry Committee.—(1) Where the members of the Inquiry

Committee are not unanimous, the report submitted by the Inquiry Committee
under section 4 shall be in accordance with the findings of the majority of the
members thereof.
(2) The presiding officer of the Inquiry Committee shall—
(a) cause its report to be prepared in duplicate,
(b) authenticate each copy of the report by putting his signature thereon,
and
(c) forward, within a period of three months from the date on which a
copy of the charges framed under sub-section (3) of section 3 is
served upon the Judge, or, where no such service is made, from
the date of publication of the notice referred to in sub-rule (3) of
rule 5, the authenticated copies of the report to the Speaker or
Chairman by whom the Committee was constituted, or where the
Committee was constituted jointly by them, to both of them:
Provided that the Speaker or Chairman, or both of them (where the Committee
was constituted jointly by them), may, for sufficient cause, extend the time within
which the Inquiry Committee shall submit its report.
(3) A copy of the report of the Inquiry Committee, authenticated in the manner
specified in sub-rule (2), shall be laid before each House of Parliament.
(4) Where the majority of the members of the Inquiry Committee makes a
finding to the effect that the Judge is guilty of a misbehaviour or that he suffers
from an incapacity, but the third member thereof makes a finding to the
contrary, the presiding officer of the Inquiry Committee shall authenticate, in
the manner specified in sub-rule (2), the finding made by such third member,
in duplicate and shall forward the same along with the report submitted by
him under section 4.
(5) An authenticated copy of the finding made by third member, referred to

in sub-rule (4), shall also be laid before each House of Parliament.
(6) Where the majority of the members of the Inquiry Committee makes a finding
to the effect that the Judge is not guilty of any misbehaviour or that he does
not suffer from any incapacity, and the third member thereof makes a finding to
the contrary, the Inquiry Committee shall not disclose the finding made by such
third member to Parliament or to any other authority, body or person.
10. Recording of evidence-(1) The evidence of each witness examined by the

Inquiry Committee shall be taken down in writing under the personal direction
and superintendence of the presiding officer thereof and the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure. 1908 (5 of 1908), shall, so far as may be, apply to the
examination of any witness by the Inquiry Committee.
(2) A copy of the evidence, oral and documentary, received by the Inquiry
Committee shall be laid before each House of Parliament along with the report
laid before it under section 4.
11. Facilities to be accorded to a Judge for his defence-—(1) Every Judge

for whose removal a motion has been admitted shall have a right to consult,
and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.
(2) If the report of the Inquiry Committee contains a finding that the Judge
referred to in sub-rule (1) is not guilty of any misbehaviour or does not suffer
from any incapacity, then the Central Government shall reimburse such Judge
to the extent of such part of the costs of his defence as the Inquiry Committee
may recommend.
12. Travelling and other allowances.—(1) A member of the Inquiry Committee

shall be entitled to travelling allowances for the journey from his usual place
of residence to, and from, the place where any meeting of the Inquiry
Committee is held and shall also be entitled to daily allowances in respect of
tours undertaken by him in connection with any meeting of the Inquiry
Committee.
(2) The travelling and daily allowances referred to in sub-rule (1) shall be
payable at the rates admissible,—
(a) in the case of a member referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (2)

of section 3, to a Judge of the Supreme Court;
(b) in the case of a member referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2)

of section 3, to a Judge of a High Court; and
(c) in the case of a member referred to in clause (c) of sub-section (2)

of section 3, to a Judge of a High Court.
13. Travelling and daily allowances to witnesses.—(1) Every witness who is

summoned to give evidence, or to produce a document or thing before the
Inquiry Committee, shall be paid travelling and daily allowances at such rates
as the Inquiry Committee may determine.
(2) In determining the rates of travelling and daily allowances under sub-rule
(1), the Inquiry Committee shall have regard to the rates at which travelling
and daily allowances are payable to witnesses who are summoned to give
evidence or to produce documents before a civil court in the State or Union
Territory in which the witness gives evidence or produces any document or
thing before the Inquiry Committee.
14. Central Government to bear travelling and other allowances.—The travelling

and other allowances referred to in rules 12 and 13 shall be borne by the
Central Government.
15. Cost of medical examination etc.—The costs of the medical examination

of a Judge, made under sub-section (5) of section 3, shall be borne by the
Central Government.
16. Adoption, passing and transmission of address.—(1) Where the Inquiry

Committee, or the majority of the members thereof, makes a finding to the
effect that the Judge is guilty of any misbehaviour or that the Judge suffers
from an incapacity, the Secretary of the House of the People or the Council of
States, as the case may be, shall prepare, in duplicate, an address in Form II.
(2) A copy of the motion admitted under sub-section (1) of section 3 shall be
reproduced as an Annexure to such address.
(3) The Speaker, or in his absence the Deputy Speaker, or the Chairman, or
in his absence the Deputy Chairman, as the case may be, shall fix a day for
the consideration by the House of the People or the Council of States, as the
case may be, of the address prepared under sub-rule (1), and such day shall
be so fixed that the address may be supported by both Houses of Parliament
in the same session.
(4) The address, prepared under sub-rule (1), and the motion, shall be put
to vote together in each House of Parliament.
(5) If the address referred to in sub-rule (1) is supported by a majority of the

total membership of the House of the People or the Council of States, as the
case may be, and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of
that House present and voting, the address shall be transmitted, as
expeditiously as possible, to the other House of Parliament with a message to

the effect that the address has been so supported.
(6) The Secretary of the House of the People or the Council of States, as the
case may be, in which the address is so supported, shall, before transmitting
the address to the other House, make the following certificate on the top of the
address, namely:—
“Certified that at a sitting of the House of the People/

Council of States held on the............, the under-mentioned
address was supported by a majority of the total membership
of the House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of
the members of the House present and voting at such sitting.
Secretary”
(7) When the message referred to in sub-rule (5) is received by the House
of the People or the Council of States, as the case may be, the Speaker, or in
his absence the Deputy Speaker, or the Chairman, or in his absence the Deputy
Chairman, as the case may be, shall fix a day for the consideration of the
address which has been supported by the other House and such day shall be
so fixed that the address may be supported by both Houses of Parliament in
the same session.
17. Presentation of address to the President.—(1) When the address is

supported by each House of Parliament by the majorities specified in clause
(4) of article 124 of the Constitution, the Speaker, or in his absence, the Deputy
Speaker, and the Chairman, or in his absence, the Deputy Chairman, shall
separately prepare, in duplicate, the address as supported by both Houses of
Parliament, and shall separately authenticate the same by appending thereon
a certificate to the following effect, namely:—
“Certified that at a sitting of the House of the People/

Council of States held on the.........., the address specified
above was supported by the House of the People/Council of
States by a majority of the total membership of the House and
by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of
the House present and voting at such sitting.”
(2) A copy of the address, as authenticated in the manner specified in sub-

rule (1), shall be separately presented by the—
(a) Speaker, or in his absence, the Deputy Speaker,

(b) Chairman, or in his absence, the Deputy Chairman, to the President

as expeditiously as possible, and, in any case, before the expiry of
the session in which the address is so supported.
(3) The duplicate copy of the authenticated address shall be kept in the House
of the People or the Council of States, as the case may be, for its record.
THE SCHEDULE
[See rule 2(c)]
FORM I
[See rule 5(1)]
To
Shri.............................
Judge, Supreme Court of India/High Court at..................
WHEREAS a motion for presenting an address to the President praying for

your removal from your office as a Judge of the Supreme Court/High Court
at...........has been admitted by the Speaker of the House of the People/
Chairman of the Council of States;
AND WHEREAS the Speaker or the Chairman, or both, has/have constituted

an Inquiry Committee with me, a Judge of the Supreme Court of India, as the
presiding officer thereof for the purpose of making an investigation into the
grounds on which your removal has been prayed for;
AND WHEREAS the Inquiry Committee has framed charges against you on
the basis of which investigation is proposed to be held;
You are hereby requested to appear before the said Committee in person, or
by a pleader duly instructed and able to answer all material questions relating
to the inquiry, on the...............day of...................at................O’clock in the
forenoon/afternoon to answer the charges;
charges levelled against you, you are requested to produce on that day all
the witnesses upon whose evidence and all the documents upon which you
intend to rely in support of your defence.
day afore-mentioned, the investigation into the grounds on which your removal
Given under my hand this day..........................
Presiding Officer,
Inquiry Committee.
Enclosures:—
1. A copy of the charges framed under sub-section (3) of section 3 of the

Act.
2. Statement of grounds on which each charge is based.
NOTE.— Strike out the words which are not applicable.
FORM II
[See rule 16(1)]
WHEREAS a notice was given of a motion for presenting an address to the

President praying for the removal of Shri..................from his office as a Judge
of the Supreme Court of India/High Court at ..............................by..................
members of the House of the People/Council of States/both Houses of
Parliament (as specified in the Annexure ‘A’ attached herewith);
AND WHEREAS the said motion was admitted by the Speaker of the House
of the People/Chairman of the Council of States/both by the Speaker of the
House of the People and the Chairman of the Council of States;
AND WHEREAS an Inquiry Committee consisting of—
(a) Shri...................., a Judge of the Supreme Court of India,
(b) Shri...................., Chief Justice of the High Court at.............., and
(c) Shri...................., a distinguished jurist,
was appointed by the Speaker of the House of the People/Chairman of the

Council of States/ both by the Speaker of the House of the People and the
Chairman of the Council of States, for the purpose of making an investigation
into the grounds on which the removal of the said Shri....................from his
office as a Judge of the Supreme Court of India/ High Court at ....................has

been prayed for;
by it, submitted a report containing a finding to the effect that Shri................is
guilty of the misbehaviour/suffers from the incapacity specified in such report
(a copy of which is enclosed and marked as Annexure ‘B’);

House of the People/Council of States in accordance with the provisions of
clause (4) of article 124 of the Constitution of India, the misbehaviour/incapacity
of the said Shri....................is deemed, under sub- section (3) of section 6 of
the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, to have been proved;
NOW, THEREFORE, the House of the People/Council of States requests the

President to pass an order for the removal of the said Shri....................from
his office as a Judge of the Supreme Court of India/High Court at.................
Speaker/Deputy Speaker of the House of the People Chairman/Deputy

Chairman of the Council of States
NOTE.—Strike out the words which are not applicable.
ANNEXURE ‘A’
[See rule 16(2)]
[A copy of the motion should be reproduced here]
ANNEXURE ‘B’
[A copy of the report of the Inquiry Committee should be enclosed and
marked as Annexure ‘B’]

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PREFACE

The process of removal of a judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court is

NEW DELHI; V. K. AGNIHOTRI

1. Chronology of Events in Justice Soumitra Sen’s Case 1-2

2. Notice of Motion 3-8

3. Names of Members of Rajya Sabha who were signatories to 9-11

4. Rajya Sabha Bulletin Part-II regarding admittance of the Motion 12

5. Notifications regarding constitution/reconstitution of Inquiry 13-15

6. Report of the Judges Inquiry Committee (Vol. I) 17-59

7. Report of the Judges Inquiry Committee (Vol. II) 61-168

8. Item for List of Business, Rajya Sabha dated the 169

9. Reply of Mr. Justice Soumitra Sen to the Report 171-298

13. Relevant extracts from the Constitution and Statutory

I. Constitution of India 423-426

II. The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 427-431

III. The Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969 432-440

1. Notice of motion given by Shri Sitaram Yechury and : 20.02.2009

2. Admission of motion by the Chairman, Rajya Sabha : 27.02.2009

3. Date of constitution of ‘Inquiry Committee’ by Hon’ble : 20.03.2009

The Committee comprised:

(i) Justice D.K. Jain, Judge, Supreme Court of India

(ii) Justice T.S. Thakur, Chief Justice, Punjab &

(iii) Shri Fali S. Nariman, distinguished jurist and

4. First reconstitution of the Committee due to the : 25.06.2009

5. Second reconstitution of the Committee due to : 16.12.2009

6. Forwarding of draft Charges and draft statement of : 05.02.1010

7. *Issue of Statutory notice by the Committee to Justice : 04.03.2010

8. Presentation of Report by the Committee to the : 10.09.2010

10. Forwarding a copy of the Report of the Committee to : 11.11.2010

11. Reply of Justice Sen on finding of the Report of the : 18.01.2011

12. Circulation of reply of Justice Sen to all Members of : 21.02.2011

13. Letter sent to Justice Soumitra Sen regarding his : 09.08.2011

14. Bulletin Part II regarding admittance of Motion : 11.08.2011

16. Consideration of Motions and the Address to the : 17 and 18

17. Adoption of the Motion and the Address to the : 18.08.2011

18. Result of Division : Ayes: 189

19. Justice tendered his resignation to the President : 01.09.2011

20. Listing of Motions and the Address to the President : 05.09.2011

Dated the 20th February, 2009

1. Misappropriation of large sums of money which he received in

2. Misrepresented facts with regard to the misappropriation of

Dated: 4 August, 2008

Dear Prime Minister,

I write this to recommend that the proceedings contemplated by Article 217(1)

3. Justice Soumitra Sen was also appointed as a Special Officer by Calcutta

4. On March 7, 2002, Steel Authority of India Limited (Plaintiff) wrote a letter

5. The High Court, then proceeded to summon the purchaser of goods as

9. Reports appeared in newspapers concerning the conduct of Justice

(i) he received Rs. 24,57,000/- between 25 February, 1993 to

(ii) a sum of Rs. 22,83,000/- was transferred by him from that

(c) he gave false explanation to the Court that an amount of

In the opinion of the Committee misconduct disclosed is so serious that it calls

In view of the foregoing, it is requested that proceedings for removal of Justice

With warm regards,

Hon’ble Dr. Manmohan Singh,

Sl. No. Name of Member

1. Shri Sitaram Yechury

2. Shri Mohammed Amin

3. Shri Prasanta Chatterjee

4. Smt. Brinda Karat