Fortich Vs Corona
Fortich Vs Corona
Fortich Vs Corona
FACTS:
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to
DECS, it discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its
name. It soon found out that during the pendency of both the Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the
Court of Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by Governor Carlos O.
Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of
NQSRMDCs title on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264 of the Registry of Deeds of
Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it
registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536 of
the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.
On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers protest
by issuing the so-called Win/Win Resolution penned by then Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona. A copy of the Win-Win Resolution was
received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B. Baula of
Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24, 1997 and, on December
4, 1997, they filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition (under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court) and injunction with urgent prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction (under Rule
58, ibid.), against then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR
Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene was filed by alleged
farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in
interest as they were previously identified by respondent DAR as agrarian
reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare property subject of this case. The
motion was vehemently opposed by the petitioners
ISSUES:
HELD:
With regards to the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled the remedy prescribed
in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the present petition contains an
allegation that the challenged resolution is patently illegal and was issued with
grave abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C.
Coronas) jurisdiction when said resolution substantially modified the earlier
OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. In
order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is
necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of
jurisdiction.
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other
hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by
the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of
certiorari.
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions,
including the Office of the President, may be taken to the Court of Appeals by
filing a verified petition for review within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
said judgment, final order or resolution, whether the appeal involves questions
of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
In other words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction,
not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43.
Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is
an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the
petitioners have correctly done. The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof
provides:
SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be
assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a
lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the
same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in
aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall
be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and
Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. But the jurisdiction of these three (3)
courts are also delineated in that, if the challenged act relates to acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, the
petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it
involves the act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be
filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the
Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of
jurisdiction in People vs. Cuaresma, et. al., through now Chief Justice Andres
R. Narvasa, thus:
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of
the petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and
importance of the issues rose, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be
observed.
It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a
suppletory character whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997
declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has
seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost
its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its
jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the
second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which
second motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7
of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be
taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for
reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases,
as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion
should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for
reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of
March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the
President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March
29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross
disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. we held:
Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the
President had long become final and executory, the same can no longer be
reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the
decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their
quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect
of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata The rule
of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-
judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting
within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial
powers