SANOG12 Merike OPsec

Operational Security Best Practices
SANOG 12 – Kathmandu, Nepal

August 2008
Merike Kaeo
merike@doubleshotsecurity.com
Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

Agenda
•  What Are We Protecting Against?
•  Proactive Mitigation Techniques
–  Securing The Device
–  Securing Data Traffic
–  Securing The Routing Infrastructure
–  Mitigating DDoS Attacks
•  Auditing / Logging
–  Tools and Techniques
•  New Paradigms

Agenda Item
What Are We Protecting Against?

Basic Terms
•  Threat
–  Any circumstance or event with the potential to cause harm to a
networked system
•  Denial of Service / Unauthorized Access / Impersonation / Worms /
Viruses
•  Vulnerability
–  A weakness in security procedures, network design, or implementation
that can be exploited to violate a corporate security policy
•  software bugs / configuration mistakes / network design flaw
•  Risk
–  The possibility that a particular vulnerability will be exploited
•  Risk analysis: The process of identifying security risks, determining their
impact, and identifying areas requiring protection

How Can The Threats Be Realized ?
•  Protocol error
–  Routing protocol itself
–  TCP issues for BGP
•  Software bugs
–  Is it a bug or feature ?
•  Active attack
–  Target control/management plane
–  Target data plane
–  More probable than you think !
•  Configuration mistakes
–  Most common form of problem

Passive vs Active Attacks
•  Passive Attacks
–  Eavesdropping
–  Offline cryptographic attacks
•  Active Attacks
–  Replay
–  Man-In-The-Middle
–  Message Insertion
–  Spoofing (device or user)
–  Denial of Service
–  Protocol specific attacks

What Can Intruders Do?
•  Eavesdrop - compromise routers, links, or DNS

•  Send arbitrary messages (spoof IP headers and options)
•  Replay recorded messages
•  Modify messages in transit
•  Write malicious code and trick people into running it
•  Exploit bugs in software to ‘take over’ machines and use
them as a base for future attacks

Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
Peer Customer
Customer
NetFlow,
SNMP
Syslog, TFTP,
AAA, DNS,
SMTP NOC

What Can We Do
To Protect The Infrastructure ?
•  Understand the Problem (Risk Analysis)
•  Establish an Effective Infrastructure Security Policy
–  physical security
–  logical security
–  control/management plane
–  routing plane
–  data plane
•  Have Procedures In Place For Incident Response
–  procedures for assessing software vulnerability risk
–  auditing configuration modifications

What Are Security Goals?
•  Controlling Data Access

•  Controlling Network Access
•  Protecting Information in Transit
•  Ensuring Network Availability
•  Preventing Intrusions
•  Responding To Incidences

Security Properties
•  Confidentiality
–  Access to information is restricted to those who are privileged to see it
•  Integrity
–  Having trust that information has not been altered during its transit from
sender to intended recipient
•  Accountability
–  Non-repudiation: property of a cryptographic system that prevents a sender
from denying later that he or she sent a message or performed a certain action
•  Availability
–  Information or resources are accessible when required

Security Services
•  Authentication
–  Process of verifying the claimed identity of a device, user and/or application
•  Authorization
–  Rights and permissions granted to a user, device or application that enables
access to resources
•  Access Control
–  Means by which authorized user has access to resources
•  Encryption
–  Mechanism by which information is kept confidential
•  Auditing
–  Process that keeps track of networked activity

Security
Host / Network / Application
Application Software Socket

interface
Network Protocol Stack
Device
Data Link Device/Driver driver
interface
Need to implement security solutions at all layers

in a reasonable fashion.
So….Big Question: What Is Reasonable?

Risk Mitigation vs Cost
Risk mitigation: the process of selecting appropriate

controls to reduce risk to an acceptable level.
The level of acceptable risk is determined by

comparing the risk of security hole exposure to the
cost of implementing and enforcing the security policy.
Assess the cost of certain losses and do not spend

more to protect something than it is actually worth.

Traditional IT Security Policies
•  Physical security controls •  System and data integrity

–  Media –  Firewalls
–  Equipment location –  Network services
–  Environmental safeguards •  Data confidentiality
•  Logical security controls •  Verify / Monitor / Audit

–  Subnet boundaries –  Accounting
–  Routing boundaries –  Management
–  Intrusion detection
–  Logical access control

Added Policy Considerations
•  Policies and procedures for staff

–  Secure backups
–  Equipment certification
–  Use of Portable Tools
–  Audit Trails
–  Incident Handling
•  Security awareness training for users of the network
–  Critical for airline personnel
–  Added challenge of non-network savvy maintenance personnel

Incident Handling
•  You will have to deal with a security incident

•  DON’T PANIC!! :)
•  Systematically assess vulnerabilities and where to
possibly place more effort on auditing / monitoring
•  Detect / Assess / Respond
–  Automate as much as possible
–  Requires detailed operational guidance

Closing Thoughts on Security Policy
•  Can it be implemented technically?

•  Are you able to implement it organizationally?
•  Can you enforce it with security tools and/or sanctions?
•  Does it clearly define areas of responsibility for the
users, administrators, and management?
•  Is it flexible and adaptable to changing environments?

Agenda Item
Proactive Mitigation Techniques

Agenda Item
Securing The Device

Device Physical Access
•  Equipment kept in highly restrictive environments

•  Console access
–  password protected
–  access via OOB management
•  Individual users authenticated
•  Social engineering training and awareness

Device Access (Cisco)
•  Console Port
–  Access via cable connected to the serial port
–  Only access to password recovery functions
•  Auxiliary Port
–  Generally used for out of band (OOB) access
–  Also used for connecting to other console ports
•  Virtual TTY (VTY)
–  Default access is via ‘telnet’
•  HTTP
•  TFTP
•  SNMP

Access Control Best Practices
•  Set passwords to something not easily guessed

•  Use single-user passwords (avoid group passwords)
•  Encrypt the passwords in the configuration files
•  Use different passwords for different privilege levels
•  Use different passwords for different modes of access

Secure Access with Passwords and
Logout Timers
line console 0
login
password console-pw
exec-timeout 1 30
line vty 0 4
login
password vty-pw
exec-timeout 5 00
enable secret enable-secret

username merike secret merike-secret

Never Leave Passwords in Clear-Text
•  service password-encryption command
•  password command
–  Will encrypt all passwords on the Cisco IOS
with Cisco-defined encryption type “7”
–  Use “command password 7 <password>” for cut/paste
operations
–  Cisco proprietary encryption method
•  secret command
–  Uses MD5 to produce a one-way hash
–  Cannot be decrypted
–  Use “command secret 5 <password>”
to cut/paste another “enable secret” password
Management Plane Filters
•  Authenticate Access
•  Define Explicit Access To/From Management Stations
–  SNMP
–  Syslog
–  TFTP
–  NTP
–  AAA Protocols
–  DNS
–  SSH, Telnet, etc.

Authenticate Individual Users
username merike secret merike-secret
username gaurab secret gaurab-secret
username pfs secret pfs-secret
username staff secret group-secret
Do NOT have group passwords!

Restrict Access To Trusted Hosts
•  Use filters to specifically permit hosts to access an
infrastructure device
•  Example
access-list 103 permit tcp host 192.168.200.7 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255 eq 22 log-input
access-list 103 deny ip any any log-input
!
line vty 0 4
access-class 103 in
transport input ssh telnet

Telnet is Insecure
•  Avoid using Telnet if possible

•  Telnet sends username and password information
across the wire in plain text format.
•  Do not use telnet to gain access to any of your
boxes
•  Use jumphosts for legacy equipment

Telnet using SSH ‘Jumphost’
Peer Customer
Conference
Net
2 NetFlow,
SNMP
1
Syslog, TFTP,
AAA, DNS,
NOC
1.  SSH to NOC
2.  Telnet to router SMTP

Secure Shell (SSH)
•  Username/password information is encrypted
•  Flexible authentication methods
–  One-time password
–  Kerberos
–  Public key
•  Allows Secure Tunneling
–  TCP port forwarding
–  Forward remote ports to local ones
•  Uses TCP port 22

SSH Support
•  Two flavors of ssh, ssh1 and ssh2
•  Use ssh2 if possible
•  In general the client connecting to your ssh server will
either "speak" ssh1 or ssh2
•  OpenSSH for UNIX
–  www.openssh.org
–  Supports both ssh1 and ssh2
•  Putty client for Windows
–  www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/

SSH
Enable SSH on cisco router
To enable SSH, you need to configure a hostname and a domainname
for your router before generating the RSA key pair. Enter 1024 for the
size of the key modulus when requested….this is the recommended
minimum size
Router (config)# hostname <hostname>

Router (config)# ip domain-name <domainname>
Router (config)# crypto key generate rsa
Allow SSH access via virtual terminals

line vty 0 4
transport input ssh

Added Controls For SSH Access
Configure IPv6 vty-input access-list

ipv6 access-list vty-filter
permit host <ipv6 address> host <ipv6 address>
Apply vty-input access-list to vty 0 4

line vty 0 4
ipv6 access-class vty-filter in

Secure SNMP Access
•  SNMP is primary source of intelligence on a target

network!
•  Block SNMP from the outside
access-list 101 deny udp any any eq snmp
•  If the router has SNMP, protect it!
snmp-server community fO0bAr RO 8
access-list 8 permit 127.1.3.5
•  Explicitly direct SNMP traffic to an authorized management
station.
snmp-server host fO0bAr 127.1.3.5

SNMP Best Practices
•  Do not enable read/write access unless really necessary

•  Choose community strings that are difficult to guess
•  Limit SNMP access to specific IP addresses
•  Limit SNMP output with views

Secure Logging Infrastructure
•  Log enough information to be useful but not
overwhelming.
•  Create backup plan for keeping track of logging
information should the syslog server be unavailable
•  Remove private information from logs
•  How accurate are your timestamps?

Banner – What Is Wrong ?
banner login ^C
Martini
2.5 ounces vodka

1/5 ounce dry vermouth
Fill mixing glass with ice, add vermouth and

vodka, and stir to chill. Strain into a Martini
glass and garnish with an olive or lemon twist.
RELAX....INDULGE.....Get Off My Router!!

^C

More Appropriate Banner
!!!! WARNING !!!!

You have accessed a restricted device.
All access is being logged and any unauthorized
access will be prosecuted to the full extent of the
law.

Turn Off Unused Services
•  Global Services
–  no service finger (before 12.0)
–  no ip finger
–  no service pad
–  no service udp-small-servers
–  no service tcp-small-servers
–  no ip bootp server
–  no cdp run
•  Interface Services
–  no ip redirects
–  no ip directed-broadcast
–  no ip proxy arp
–  no cdp enable
Device In-Band Management
•  Management traffic
uses same path as
transit data
•  Usually an issue of
operational cost

Device OOB Management
•  Terminal servers are

used at each location
for OOB management
•  Dial-back encrypted
modems are used as
backup

Device Management Common Practice
•  SSH primarily used; Telnet only from jumphosts
•  HTTP access explicitly disabled
•  All access authenticated
-  Varying password mechanisms
-  AAA usually used
•  Different servers for in-band vs OOB
•  Different servers for device authentication vs other
•  Static username pw or one-time pw
-  Single local database entry for backup
•  Each individual has specific authorization
•  Strict access control via filtering
•  Access is audited with triggered pager/email notifications
•  SNMP is read-only
-  Restricted to specific hosts
-  View restricted if capability exists
-  Community strings updated every 30-90 days

System Images and Configuration Files
•  Careful of sending configurations where people

can snoop the wire
–  CRC or MD5 validation
–  Sanitize configuration files
•  SCP should be used to copy files
–  TFTP and FTP should be avoided
•  Use tools like ‘rancid’ to periodically check
against modified configuration files

Software Upgrade / Integrity
•  Files stored on specific systems with

limited access
•  All access to these systems are
authenticated and audited
•  SCP is used where possible; FTP is
NEVER used; TFTP still used
•  Configuration files are polled and
compared on an hourly basis
•  Filters limit uploading / downloading of
files to specific systems
•  Many system binaries use MD-5 checks
for integrity
•  Configuration files are stored with
obfuscated passwords

Fundamental Device Protection Summary
•  Secure logical access to routers with passwords and timeouts
•  Never leave passwords in clear-text
•  Authenticate individual users
•  Restrict logical access to specified trusted hosts
•  Allow remote vty access only through ssh
•  Disable device access methods that are not used
•  Protect SNMP if used
•  Shut down unused interfaces
•  Shut down unneeded services
•  Ensure accurate timestamps for all logging
•  Create appropriate banners
•  Test device integrity on a regular basis

Agenda Item
Securing The Data

Securing The Data Path
•  Filtering and rate limiting are primary

mitigation techniques
•  BCP-38 guidelines for ingress filtering
•  Null-route and black-hole any detected
malicious traffic
•  Netflow is primary method used for
tracking traffic flows
•  Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding is
not consistently implemented
•  Logging of Exceptions

Data Plane (Packet) Filters
•  Most common problems

–  Poorly-constructed filters
–  Ordering matters in some devices
•  Scaling and maintainability issues with filters are
commonplace
•  Make your filters as modular and simple as possible
•  Take into consideration alternate routes
–  Backdoor paths due to network failures

Filtering Deployment Considerations
•  How does the filter load into the router?

•  Does it interrupt packet flow?
•  How many filters can be supported in hardware?
•  How many filters can be supported in software?
•  How does filter depth impact performance?
•  How do multiple concurrent features affect performance?
•  Do I need a standalone firewall?

Router Filter vs Standalone Firewall
Tradeoffs
USING A ROUTER AS FIREWALL USING A STANDALONE FIREWALL
•  Increased CPU cycles and •  Additional hardware cost

memory usage and maintenance
•  Single device to maintain •  Additional software
purchase and updates
•  Administrative setup and
training
•  Offload resources used
from router

Packet Filtering Firewall
•  examines the source and destination address of the data
packet and either allows or denies the packet from
traveling the network
•  blocks access through the firewall to any packets, which try
to access ports which have been declared "off-limits"
http - tcp 80
http - tcp 80 telnet - tcp 23

Internet
ftp - tcp 21
web server router/firewall
Allow only http - tcp 80

Drop anything else
Application Layer Firewall
•  Also known proxy firewalls, application gateway
•  attempts to hide the configuration of the network behind the firewall by acting
on behalf of that network/servers
•  All requests for access are translated at the firewall so that all packets are
sent to and from the firewall, rather than from the hosts behind the firewall
2001:DB8:501::42: 80
2001:DB8:6::99 : 80
Internet
web server router/firewall

2001:DB8:6::99
Translates 2001:DB8:501::42 : 80
To 2001:DB8:6::99 : 80
Stateful Inspection Firewall
•  Examines the state and the context of the packets
•  Remembers what outgoing requests have been sent and only allow
responses to those requests back through the firewall
•  Attempts to access the internal network that have not been
requested by the internal network will be denied
2001:DB8:8::99 : 1025 2001:DB8:501::42: 80
Internet
2001:DB8:501::42: 80
2001:DB8:8::99 : 1025
router/firewall
PC
Only allows reply packets for requests made out
Blocks other unregistered traffic

General Filtering / Firewall BCP
•  Explicitly deny all traffic and only allow what you need
•  The default policy should be that if the firewall doesn't know
what to do with the packet, deny/drop it
•  Don't rely only on your firewall for all protection of your network
•  Implement multiple layers of network protection
•  Make sure all of the network traffic passes through the firewall
•  Log all firewall exceptions (if possible)

IP Header Format
0 4 8 16 31
Version IHL Type of Service Total Length (in bytes)
Identification Flags Fragmentation Offset
Time to Live Header Checksum
Options (if any) Padding
DATA................

TCP (Transport Control Protocol)
•  Provides reliable virtual circuits to user processes
•  Lost or damaged packets are resent
•  Sequence numbers maintain ordering
•  All packets except first contain ACK #
(ACK# = sequence number of last sequential byte
successfully received)
•  Ports Numbers
–  Port numbers < 1024 are privileged ports
–  Destination port is fixed
–  Source port is randomly generated

TCP Header Format
0 4 8 16 31
Sequence Number
Acknowledgment Number
Offset Reserved Flags Window Size
TCP Checksum Urgent Pointer
Options (if any) Padding
DATA................

TCP Control Flags
URG ACK PSH RST SYN FIN
•  URG: indicates urgent data in data stream

•  ACK: acknowledgement of earlier packet
•  PSH: flush packet and not queue for later delivery
•  RST: reset connection due to error or other interruption
•  SYN: used during session establishment to synchronize
sequence numbers
•  FIN: used to tear down a session

UDP (User Datagram Protocol)
•  Delivery is on a best-effort basis
–  No error correction
–  No retransmission
–  No lost, duplicate, re-ordered packet detection
•  Easier to spoof than TCP packets
–  No handshake
–  No sequence numbers

UDP Header Format
0 16 31
Length Checksum
Data............

ICMP
•  Transmits command and control information
–  ICMP Echo
•  determines whether another system is alive
–  ICMP Destination Unreachable
•  No route to destination
–  ICMP Source Quench
•  Slow down number of packets sent

ICMP
•  IP Hdr and first 64 bits of transport header

–  included in ICMP Message
–  limits scope of changes dictated by ICMP
–  older implementations do not use this info
•  Destination Unreachable messages can affect all connections
between a pair of hosts
•  Redirect messages should only be obeyed by hosts (from router or
directly connected network)

ICMP Message Types
Message Type Value Description
Echo Reply 0 Ping response if system alive

Destination Unreachable 3 Earlier IP message not deliverable
Source Quench 4 Packets received too fast to process
Redirect 5 Traffic should be directed to another router
Echo 8 Send a ping
Time Exceeded 11 Max # of hops in TTL field is exceeded
Parameter Problem 12 Bad parameter in header field

Timestamp 13 Includes time on sending machine and requests
time on destination machine
Timestamp Reply 14 Timestamp response
Information Request 15 Used by host to determine which network it is on
Information Reply 16 Contains response to information request

IP Fragment Issues
•  Only first fragmented packet contains port number

information
•  Firewall should have capability of fragment reassembly

Fragmentation Overlap
•  Description
–  reassembly algorithms result in new fragments overwriting any
overlapped portions of previously-received fragments
•  Exploit
–  an attacker could construct a series of packets in which the
lowest (zero-offset) fragment would contain innocuous data (and
thereby be passed by packet filters)
–  If some subsequent packet has a non-zero offset it would overlap
TCP header information and cause it to be modified
–  The second packet would be passed through most filter
implementations because it does not have a zero fragment
offset.
Fragmentation Overlap Example
1.  The filter is configured to drop TCP connection request packets.
2.  The first fragment contains values, e.g., SYN=0, ACK=1, that enable
it to pass through the filter unharmed.
3.  The second fragment, with a fragment offset of eight octets,contains
TCP Flags that differ from those given in the first fragment, e.g.,
SYN=1, ACK=0.
4.  Since this second fragment is not a 0-offset fragment, it will not be
checked, and it, too will pass through the filter.
5.  The receiving host, if it conforms fully to the algorithms given in
RFC 791, will reconstitute the packet as a connection request
because the "bad" data arrived later.

Tiny Fragments
•  Description
–  It is possible to impose an unusually small fragment size on
outgoing packets.
•  Exploit
–  If the fragment size is made small enough to force some of a
TCP packet's TCP header fields into the second fragment,
filter rules that specify patterns for those fields will not match.
–  If the filtering implementation does not enforce a minimum
fragment size, a disallowed packet might be passed because
it didn't hit a match in the filter

Tiny Fragment Example
•  The first fragment contains only eight octets of data (the
minimum fragment size).
•  In the case of TCP, this is sufficient to contain the source

and destination port numbers, but it will force the TCP
flags field into the second fragment.
•  Filters that attempt to drop connection requests (TCP

datagrams with SYN=1 and ACK=0) will be unable to
test these flags in the first octet, and will typically ignore
them in subsequent fragments.
Filtering Recommendations
•  Log filter port messages properly

•  Allow only internal addresses to enter the router from
the internal interface
•  Block packets from outside (untrusted) that are
obviously fake or commonly used for attacks
•  Block packets that claim to have a source address of
any internal (trusted) network.

Filtering Recommendations
•  Block incoming loopback packets and RFC 1918 networks
–  127.0.0.0
–  10.0.0.0 – 10.255.255.255
–  172.16.0.0 – 172.31.0.0
–  192.168.0.0 – 192.168.255.255
•  Block multicast packets (if NOT using multicast)
•  Block broadcast packets (careful of DHCP & BOOTP users)
•  Block incoming packets that claim to have same destination
and source address

DoS Filtering
(* these networks were reallocated and are actually used)
Description Network
default 0.0.0.0 /8
loopback 127.0.0.0 /8
RFC 1918 10.0.0.0 /8
RFC 1918 172.16.0.0 /12
RFC 1918 192.168.0.0 /16
Net Test 192.0.2.0 /24
Testing devices * 192.18.0.0 /15
IPv6 to IPv4 relay * 192.88.99.0 /24
RFC 1918 nameservers * 192.175.48.0 /24
End-node auto configuration * 169.254.0.0 /16
Operational Security Best Practices-

SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August
2008
Example Incoming IPv4 Bogon Packet Filter
ip access-list extended DSL-Incoming
deny ip 127.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any log
deny ip 0.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any log
deny ip 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any log
deny ip 169.254.0.0 0.0.255.255 any log
deny ip 172.16.0.0 0.15.255.255 any log
deny ip 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 any log
deny ip 224.0.0.0 15.255.255.255 any log
permit icmp any any ttl-exceeded
permit icmp any any echo-reply
permit icmp any any echo
permit tcp any any eq 22 log
permit udp host <ip address> eq domain <subnet range>
permit udp host <ip address> eq domain <subnet range>
permit udp host <ip address> <subnet range> eq ntp
permit udp host <ip address> <subnet range> eq ntp
deny tcp any any eq 443
permit tcp any <my sybnet> established
deny ip any any log

RFC2827 (BCP38) – Ingress Filtering
If an ISP is aggregating routing announcements for multiple
downstream networks, strict traffic filtering should be used to
prohibit traffic which claims to have originated from outside of these
aggregated announcements.
The ONLY valid source IP address for packets originating from a

customer network is the one assigned by the ISP (whether statically
or dynamically assigned).
An edge router could check every packet on ingress to ensure the

user is not spoofing the source address on the packets which he is
originating.

Example Outgoing Packet Filter
ip access-list extended DSL-Outbound

permit tcp host <my host ip address> eq ftp-data any log
permit tcp host <my host ip address> eq ftp any log
permit ip <my subnet> any
deny ip any any log

Email Spam Sources
•  Open relays and proxies

•  Compromised machines
•  Direct Spam sources
•  Insecure Webmail interfaces / Perl scripts

Preventing Outbound SPAM
•  Scan network for open relays and proxies
•  Block compromised hosts until fixed
•  Block outbound port 25 for dynamic IP addresses
•  Filter inbound access to known proxy ports

Filtering Inbound SPAM
•  Check SMTP headers

•  Build DNS block lists (DNSBLs)
•  HELO filtering
•  Use SPAM filters (Spamassassin, Razor)
•  Block routes to major spammers

EMAIL (SMTP) Filtering
•  Sample SMTP Filtering

–  Permit outgoing traffic to port 25
–  Permit incoming traffic from port 25
–  Permit our trusted hosts with dst port 25
–  Permit all other traffic with src port 25 and ACK flag set (the reply)

Defining Filtering Rules (SMTP)
Direction SRC IP DST IP Protocol SRC DST ACK Description
address address Port Port set
In External Internal TCP >1023 25 * Incoming mail

Sender to recipient
Out Internal External TCP 25 >1023 Yes Incoming mail

Recipient to sender
Out Internal External TCP >1023 25 * Outgoing mail

Sender to recipient
In External internal TCP 25 >1023 Yes Outgoing mail

Recipient to sender
* ACK not set on first packet but set on all subsequent packets

2008
Example Edge Filter (part 1)
access-list 100 permit icmp any any echo-reply
access-list 100 permit icmp any any echo
access-list 100 permit icmp any any ttl-exceeded
access-list 100 permit icmp any any unreachable
access-list 100 deny icmp any any
access-list 100 deny tcp any any eq www
access-list 100 deny tcp any any eq 1080
access-list 100 deny udp any any eq 6881
access-list 100 deny udp any eq 6881 any
access-list 100 deny tcp any eq 6881 any
access-list 100 permit tcp any any established
access-list 100 permit tcp any any eq 22
access-list 100 permit tcp any any eq bgp
access-list 100 permit udp any any eq domain

access-list 100 permit tcp any any eq ident
access-list 100 permit udp any any eq ntp
access-list 100 permit udp any eq ntp any
access-list 100 permit udp any any eq 5
access-list 100 permit udp any eq isakmp any
access-list 100 permit udp any any gt 1023
access-list 100 permit ipinip any any
access-list 100 permit 41 any any
access-list 100 permit esp any any
access-list 100 permit gre any any
access-list 100 deny ip any any log
!
access-list 101 permit icmp any any echo-reply
access-list 101 permit icmp any any echo
access-list 101 permit icmp any any ttl-exceeded
access-list 101 permit icmp any any unreachable
access-list 101 deny icmp any any
access-list 101 deny udp any any eq netbios-ns
access-list 101 deny udp any any eq netbios-dgm

access-list 101 deny udp any eq 6881 any
access-list 101 permit ipinip any any
access-list 101 permit 41 any any
access-list 101 permit esp any any
access-list 101 permit gre any any
access-list 101 permit ip any any
access-list compiled
!
Interface FastEthernet0/0
description Link to ISP
ip access-group 100 in
ip access-group 101 out

Agenda Item
Securing The Routing

Infrastructure

Router Security Considerations
•  Segment areas for route redistribution and ensure
limited access to routers in critical backbone areas
•  Design networks so outages don’t affect entire network
but only portions of it
•  Control router access….watch against internal attacks
on these systems. Use different passwords for router
enable and monitoring system root access.
•  Scanning craze for all kinds of ports – this will be never
ending battle

Routing Control Plane
•  MD-5 authentication
–  Some deploy at customer’s request
•  Route filters limit what routes are
believed from a valid peer
•  Packet filters limit which systems can
appear as a valid peer
•  Limiting propagation of invalid routing
information
–  Prefix filters
–  AS-PATH filters (trend is leaning
towards this)
–  Route dampening (latest consensus
is that it causes more harm than
good)
•  Not yet possible to validate whether
legitimate peer has authority to send
routing update

Why Use Route Authentication
•  Route Authentication equates to data origin authentication
and data integrity
•  In BGP, requires TCP resets to be authenticated so
malicious person can’t randomly send TCP resets
•  In cases where routing information traverses shared
networks, someone might be able to alter a packet or send
a duplicate packet
•  Routing protocols were not initially created with security in
mind…..this needs to change….

Hash Functions
A hash function takes an input message

of arbitrary length and outputs fixed-length
code. The fixed-length output is called the
hash, or the message digest, of the original
input message.
Common Algorithms: MD-5 (128), SHA-1 (160)

Basics of Hash Algorithms
•  Reduces a variable-length input to a fixed-length output

–  Output is called a hash or message digest or fingerprint
–  Output length is 128 bits for MD5 and 160 bits for SHA-1
•  Requirements
–  Can’t deduce input from output
–  Can’t generate a given output
–  Can’t find two inputs which produce the same output
•  Used to
–  Create data checksum to detect data modification
–  Create fixed-length encryption keys from passwords

MD-5 Based Authentication
Routing Update
Router A
Hash Routing Update
Hash

MD-5 Based Authentication
Hash Routing Update

Receiving Router Separates
Routing Update and Hash
Routing Update
The Routing Update and

the Preconfigured Shared
Key are used as Input to
the Hash Function
If Hashes Are Hash

Hash Equal, Routing Update
Is Accepted

Sample MD-5 Auth Configuration (OSPF)
interface Loopback0 interface Loopback0

ip address 70.70.70.70 255.255.255.255 ip address 172.16.10.36 255.255.255.240
interface Serial2 interface Serial1/0

ip address 192.16.64.2 255.255.255.0 ip address 192.16.64.1 255.255.255.0
ip ospf message-digest-key 1 md5 mk6 ip ospf message-digest-key 1 md5 mk6

router ospf 10 router ospf 10
network 192.16.64.0 0.0.0.255 area 0 network 172.16.0.0 0.0.255.255 area 0
network 70.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 area 0 network 192.16.64.0 0.0.0.255 area 0
area 0 authentication message-digest area 0 authentication message-digest

Control Plane (Routing) Filters
•  Filter traffic destined TO your core routers

•  Develop list of required protocols that are sourced from
outside your AS and access core routers
–  Example: eBGP peering, GRE, IPSec, etc.
–  Use classification filters as required
•  Identify core address block(s)
–  This is the protected address space
–  Summarization is critical for simpler and shorter filter lists

BGP Prefix Filtering
•  All BGP Prefixes coming into your network and leaving
your network need to be filtered to enforce a policy.
•  The problem is most ISPs are not:
–  Filtering Comprehensively
–  Filtering their customer’s prefixes
–  Filtering prefixes going out of their network.

Example: No Prefix Filtering
I accept the entire Internet
with /24 more specifics
and sent them on. Customer
Peer
Lets advertise the

entire Internet
with /24 more
specifics
Customer
Customer
Customer I accept the entire Internet with /24 more
specifics and sent them on.

Where to Prefix Filter ?
Customer
•  Customer’s Ingress/Egress
•  ISP Ingress on Customer (may
Egress to Customer)
ISP
•  ISP Egress to Peer and Ingress
from Peer
•  Peer Ingress from ISP and
Egress to ISP
Peer

Receiving Customer Prefixes
Customer
router bgp 100
neighbor 123.123.6.1 remote-as 101
neighbor 123.123.6.1 prefix-list customer in
!
ip prefix-list customer permit 121.60.0.0/2
ip prefix-list customer deny 0.0.0.0/0 le 32
ISP

Peering With Other ISPs
•  Similar to eBGP customer aggregation except inbound

prefix filtering is rarely used (lack of global registry)
•  Use maximum-prefix and prefix sanity checking instead
•  Still use per-neighbor passwords!

Example of ISP-Peers
(peer group)
neighbor nap peer-group

neighbor nap description for peer ISPs
neighbor nap remove-private-AS
neighbor nap version 4
neighbor nap prefix-list sanity-check in
neighbor nap prefix-list cidr-block out
neighbor nap route-map nap-out out
neighbor nap maximum prefix 30000

Example of ISP Peers route-map
route-map nap-out permit 10

match community 1 ; customers only
set metric-type internal ; MED = IGP metric
set ip next-hop peer-address ; our own

Sanity Check Prefix List (part 1)
# FIRST - FILTER OUT YOUR IGP ADDRESS SPACE!!

# deny the default route
ip prefix-list sanity-check seq 5 deny 0.0.0.0/32
# deny anything beginning with 0
ip prefix-list sanity-check seq 10 deny 0.0.0.0/8 le 32
# deny masks > 20 for all class A nets (1-127)
ip prefix-list sanity-check seq 15 deny 0.0.0.0/1 ge 20
# deny 10/8 per RFC1918

# reserved by IANA - loopback address

# deny masks >= 17 for all class B nets (129-191)
# deny net 128.0 - reserved by IANA
# deny 172.16 as RFC1918

# class C 192.0.20.0 reserved by IANA
# class C 192.0.0.0 reserved by IANA
# deny 192.168/16 per RFC1918
# deny 191.255.0.0 - IANA reserved
# deny masks > 25 for class C (192-222)
# deny anything in net 223 - IANA reserved
# deny class D/Experimental

BGP Configuration for Bogon Filtering
Router bgp 300

No synchronization
neighbor x.x.x.x remote-as 66
neighbor x.x.x.x version 4
neighbor x.x.x.x prefix-list bogon-filter in
neighbor x.x.x.x prefix-list bogon-filter out
neighbor z.z.z.z remote-as 99
neighbor z.z.z.z version 4
neighbor z.z.z.z prefix-list bogon-filter in
neighbor z.z.z.z prefix-list bogon-filter out
no auto-summary

Example: Bogon Filter
ip prefix-list bogon-filter deny 0.0.0.0/8 le 32


Prefix Filter Bogons and
RIR Blocks
•  Templates available from the Bogon Project:
–  http://www.cymru.com/Bogons/index.html
•  Cisco Template
–  ftp://ftp-eng.cisco.com/cons/isp/security/Ingress-Prefix
-Filter-Templates/
•  Juniper Template
–  http://www.qorbit.net/documents.html

Other BGP Security Techniques
•  BGP Community Filtering

•  MD5 Keys on the eBGP and iBGP Peers
•  Max Prefix Limits
•  Prefer Customer Routes over Peer Routes (RFC 1998)
•  GTSM (i.e. TTL Hack)

Audit and Validate
Your Routing Infrastructures
•  Are appropriate paths used?

–  check routing tables
–  verify configurations
•  Is router compromised?
–  check access logs

Routing Security Conclusions
•  Current routing protocols do not have adequate

security controls
•  Mitigate risks by using a combination of techniques to
limit access and authenticate data
•  Be vigilant in auditing and monitoring your network
infrastructure
•  Consider MD5 authentication
•  Always filter routing updates….especially be careful of
redistribution

Agenda Item
Mitigating DDoS Attacks

DDoS Is A Huge Problem
•  Distributed and/or coordinated attacks
–  Increasing rate and sophistication
•  Infrastructure protection
–  Coordinated attack against infrastructure
–  Attacks against multiple infrastructure components
•  Overwhelming amounts of data

–  Huge effort required to analyze
–  Lots of uninteresting events

Automated Distributed Denial of Service Attack
2 Vulnerable hosts are

compromised and 2 Vulnerable hosts are
Attacker
attack tools compromised and
installed 1 attack tools
Initiate port scan installed
3 3
Further scanning Further scanning
for compromises for compromises
4
Massive DDoS
attack launched
Victim

Router CPU Vulnerabilities
CPU Overload
–  Attacks on applications on the Internet have affected
router CPU performance leading to some BGP
instability
–  100,000+ hosts infected with most hosts attacking
routers with forged-source packets
–  Small packet processing is taxing on many routers
…even high-end
–  Filtering useful but has CPU hit

DoS Filtering
(* these networks may be reallocated)
Description Network
default 0.0.0.0 /8
loopback 127.0.0.0 /8
RFC 1918 10.0.0.0 /8
RFC 1918 172.16.0.0 /12
RFC 1918 192.168.0.0 /16
Net Test 192.0.2.0 /24
Testing devices * 192.18.0.0 /15
IPv6 to IPv4 relay * 192.88.99.0 /24
RFC 1918 nameservers * 192.175.48.0 /24
End-node auto configuration * 169.254.0.0 /16

2008
Today’s DoS Prevention
•  Allow only good traffic into your network (ingress filtering)

•  Allow only good traffic out of your network (egress filtering)
•  Stop directed broadcast traffic (to avoid being an amplifier)
Deny all and permit only what’s needed is most effective policy

DoS/DDoS Tools
–  Vendor provided
•  Arbor TrafGen
–  Open source
•  stream
•  litestorm
•  rc8.o
•  f__kscript
•  slice3

Using IP Routing as a Security Tool
•  IP Routing can be used to manipulate traffic on a
network to:
–  Null0 (Black Hole)
–  Shunts
–  Sink Hole
–  Analysis Devices
–  Clean up Devices
–  Rate-Limit

Securing The Device
•  Miscreants have a far easier time gaining access to

devices than you think.
•  Ensure that the basic security capabilities have been
configured.

Fundamental Device Protection Summary
•  Secure logical access to routers with passwords and timeouts
•  Never leave passwords in clear-text
•  Authenticate individual users
•  Restrict logical access to specified trusted hosts
•  Allow remote vty access only through ssh
•  Disable device access methods that are not used
•  Protect SNMP if used
•  Shut down unused interfaces
•  Shut down unneeded services
•  Ensure accurate timestamps for all logging
•  Create appropriate banners
•  Test device integrity on a regular basis

DoS Mitigation - RTBH Basics
•  Use BGP routing protocol to trigger network wide

response to an attack flow.
•  Simple static route and BGP allows ISP to trigger network
wide black holes as fast as iBGP can update the network.
•  Unicast RPF allows for the black hole to include any
packet whose source or destination address matches the
prefix.
•  Effective against spoofed and valid source addresses.

Blackhole Filtering
Packets FIB Egress

Ingress
Arrive --------------------- Interface
---------------------
---------------------
Packet
---------------------
---------------------
Filter
---------------------
---------------------
---------------------
---------------------
---------------------
---------------------
---------------------
Null0/Discard
•  Forward packet to the Bit Bucket

•  Saves on CPU and ACL processing

RTBH in the Network
Provider Edge Routers
Attack Traffic
BGP Update
eBGP
Session
iBGP
Trigger Router
TARGET

Destination-Based RTBH
Steps:
1.  Preparation
2.  Trigger iBGP
3.  Withdrawal
Trigger Router
1 PE configured with static TR configured to

TARGET 1
route to unused space set to redistribute static into
Null0 (192.0.2.6/32 set to every iBGP peer
Null0) N OTE: All traffic to
the target is dropped,
2 Receives iBGP update even legitimate traffic 2 Add static route which
which states next hop for sets next hop to target
target is 192.0.2.6/32 destination (192.0.2.6)
3 Installs new (valid) 3 Manually remove static
route to target route which causes
BGP route withdrawl
Source-Based RTBH Filtering
•  Ability to drop packets at network edge based on specific
source address
•  Permits legitimate traffic from reaching target destination
•  Depends on uRPF
•  Packet dropped if:
•  If router has no entry for source IP address
•  If source IP address entry points to Null0

uRPF Loose Mode
•  Originally created to scale BCP 38 ingress filtering on the ISP
–  Customer Edge of an ISP’s network.
•  Loose Check Mode added to provide ISPs with means to trigger
a network wide, source based black hole filter activated at BGP
update speeds.
•  uRPF Loose Check will passively drop any packet whose source
address is not in the router’s FIB (Forwarding Information Base).
•  Effective way to drop Bogon addresses.

Source Based Remote Triggered Black
Hole Filtering
•  What do we have?
–  Black Hole Filtering – If the destination address equals Null 0 we
drop the packet.
–  Remote Triggered – Trigger a prefix to equal Null 0 on routers
across the Network at iBGP speeds.
–  uRPF Loose Check – If the source address equals Null 0, we
drop the packet.
•  Put them together and we have a tool to trigger drop for any
packet coming into the network whose source or destination
equals Null 0!

Source-Based RTBH
Steps: iBGP
1.  Preparation
2.  Trigger
3.  Withdrawal
Trigger Router
1 PE configured with static

TARGET 1 TR configured to
route to unused space set to
Null0 (192.0.2.6/32 set to redistribute static into
Null0) and loose mode every iBGP peer
N OTE: Only traffic
uRPF on external
interfaces from the attack sources 2 Add static route which
get dropped sets next hop to target
2 Receives iBGP update destination (192.0.2.6)
which states next hop for
3 Manually remove static
target is 192.0.2.6/32. All route which causes
traffic from source IP will
BGP route withdrawl
fail loose uRPF check.
3 Installs new (valid route to target

RTBH Configuration Example
interface Null0
Trigger Router
! avoid backscatter traffic
no ip unreachables
!
router bgp 6665
redestributre static route-map bh-trig
!
route map bh-trig permit 10
match tag 66
set ip next-hop 192.0.2.1
set local-preference 200
set origin igp
! ensure edge router does not readvertise
! prefix to any eBGP peer
interface Null0 set community no-export
no ip unreachables !
! ! make sure no other static routes affected
ip route 192.0.2.1 255.255.255.255 null0 ! by the bh-trig route map
route-map bh-trig deny 22
!
! the manually configured trigger
ip route 192.168.33.0 255.255.255.0 null0 tag66

Additional RTBH Considerations
•  Avoid intentionally/unintentionally dropping legitimate

traffic
•  Deploy secure BGP features
–  Neighbor authentication
–  Prefix filters
–  ‘TTL hack’
•  Use prefix filters at edge and trigger routers to ensure
essential services (e.g. DNS) not black-holed by
mistake

Remote Triggered Drops
•  Use one or both techniques to contain a worm

–  Internal deployments limit spread within enterprise
–  Edge deployments limit spread to internet and/or other
external destination
•  Depending on null0 location, effective quarantine tool
•  Rapid reaction, highly scaleable
–  Proven technique used by large service providers

DoS Mitigation Summary
•  Consider MD-5 authentication in your routing infrastructures.

•  Filter obviously bogus networks at ingress / egress points.
•  Use prefix filters.
•  Use remote triggered filtering techniques.
•  Understand your traffic patterns and help deter attacks to
downstream and upstream neighbors.

Operational Security Summary
•  No single technique will solve all problems

•  Ensure the simple sanity checks are in place
•  Enforce filtering policies
•  Log filter exceptions and monitor them
•  Make friends with your upstream and downstream
neighbors and support each other during DoS attacks

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Operational Security Best Practices

SANOG 12 – Kathmandu, Nepal

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

What Are We Protecting Against?

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

• Eavesdrop - compromise routers, links, or DNS

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

• Controlling Data Access

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

Application Software Socket

Network Protocol Stack

Need to implement security solutions at all layers

So….Big Question: What Is Reasonable?

Risk mitigation: the process of selecting appropriate

The level of acceptable risk is determined by

Assess the cost of certain losses and do not spend

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

• Physical security controls • System and data integrity

• Logical security controls • Verify / Monitor / Audit

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

• Policies and procedures for staff

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

• You will have to deal with a security incident

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

• Can it be implemented technically?

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

Proactive Mitigation Techniques

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

Securing The Device

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

• Equipment kept in highly restrictive environments

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

• Set passwords to something not easily guessed

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

enable secret enable-secret

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

username merike secret merike-secret

username gaurab secret gaurab-secret

username pfs secret pfs-secret

username staff secret group-secret

Do NOT have group passwords!

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

• Avoid using Telnet if possible

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

Operational Security Best Practices- SANOG 12 Kathmandu, Nepal - August 2008

Router (config)# hostname <hostname>

Allow SSH access via virtual terminals

•  Eavesdrop - compromise routers, links, or DNS

•  Controlling Data Access

•  Physical security controls •  System and data integrity

•  Logical security controls •  Verify / Monitor / Audit

•  Policies and procedures for staff

•  You will have to deal with a security incident

•  Can it be implemented technically?

•  Equipment kept in highly restrictive environments

•  Set passwords to something not easily guessed

•  Avoid using Telnet if possible

•  SNMP is primary source of intelligence on a target

•  Do not enable read/write access unless really necessary

•  Terminal servers are

•  Careful of sending configurations where people

•  Files stored on specific systems with

•  Filtering and rate limiting are primary

•  Most common problems

•  How does the filter load into the router?

•  Increased CPU cycles and •  Additional hardware cost

•  URG: indicates urgent data in data stream

•  IP Hdr and first 64 bits of transport header

•  Only first fragmented packet contains port number

•  In the case of TCP, this is sufficient to contain the source

•  Filters that attempt to drop connection requests (TCP

•  Log filter port messages properly