Case #1 of Article 29-35:

It resolved this issue thru the following

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- disquisition:
appellee, vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS Y
CORDOVA, accused-appellant. "Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the
G.R. No. 102007 | 1994-09-02 controlling statute. It reads, in part:

*Issue: 'ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally

extinguished. ---- Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

*In re to 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal

penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment;
DECISION
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there
ROMERO, J.: is no question. The law is plain. Statutory
construction is unnecessary. Said liability is
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch extinguished.
16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova
was charged with Rape and eventually convicted The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such
thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by liability is extinguished only when the death of the
Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled
conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio of the term 'final judgment.' Is it final judgment as
respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic contradistinguished from an interlocutory order?
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma Or, is it a judgment which is final and executory?
gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme
Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept
the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
required the Solicitor General to file its comment heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of
with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in
his commission of the offense charged. part, recites:

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed 'La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
his view that the death of accused-appellant did not
extinguish his civil liability as a result of his 1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas
commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias,
General, relying on the case of People v. solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido
Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be sentencia firme.'
resolved for the purpose of reviewing his
conviction by the lower court on which the civil xxx xxx xxx
liability is based.
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other the term 'sentencia firme.' What is 'sentencia firme'
hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General under the old statute?
arguing that the death of the accused while
judgment of conviction is pending appeal XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473,
extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. furnishes the ready answer: It says:
In support of his position, said counsel invoked the
ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo 'SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere
and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado
in a criminal case takes root in the criminal por las partes litigates recurso alguno contra ella
liability and, therefore, civil liability is dentro de los terminos y plazos legalles concedidos
extinguished if accused should die before final al efecto.'
judgment is rendered.
'Sentencia firme' really should be understood as
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does one which is definite. Because, it is only when
death of the accused pending appeal of his judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts
conviction extinguish his civil liability? it, the crime is confirmed ---- 'en condena
determinada;' or, in the words of Groizard, the
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, guilt of the accused becomes ---- 'una verdad legal.'
this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to
issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the Viada, 'no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni
death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal delito ni responsibilidad criminal de ninguna clase.'
responsibility and his civil liability as a And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a
consequence of the alleged crime? defendant dies before judgment becomes
executory, 'there cannot be any determination by
final judgment whether or not the felony upon As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando
which the civil action might arise exists,' for the in the Alison case:
simple reason that `there is no party defendant.' (I
Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. "The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison
Senator Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, having been established, and considering that there
Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859- is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency
860). of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the
said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by
The legal import of the term 'final judgment' is his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes'
similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People
Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
term 'final judgment' in the sense that it is already consequently, the case against him should be
enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, dismissed."
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a
judgment in a criminal case becomes final 'after On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent
the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino
when the sentence has been partially or totally Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable
satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former,
waived in writing his right to appeal.' the issue decided by this court was: Whether the
civil liability of one accused of physical injuries
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions who died before final judgment is extinguished by
here collected funnel down to one positive his demise to the extent of barring any claim
conclusion: The term final judgment employed in therefor against his estate. It was the contention of
the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond the administrator-appellant therein that the death of
recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not the accused prior to the final judgment
become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities
defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89,
against him. paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However,
this court ruled therein:
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment
is without reason. For where, as in this case, the "We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability
right to institute a separate civil action is not has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of
reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act
necessity, cover 'both the criminal and the civil No. 386) that became operative eighteen years
aspects of the case.' People vs. Yusico (November after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the
9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code
vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal establishes a civil action for damages on account of
Procedure , 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct
Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as 'the from the criminal action.
civil action is based solely on the felony committed
and of which the offender might be found guilty, 'ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
the death of the offender extinguishes the civil physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
liability.' I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
Annotated, supra. action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability preponderance of evidence.'
is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal
liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the Assuming that for lack of express reservation,
criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we Belamala's civil action for damages was to be
will be faced with the anomalous situation considered instituted together with the criminal
whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil action still, since both proceedings were terminated
liability in a case where the source thereof ---- without final adjudication, the civil action of the
criminal liability ---- does not exist. And, as was offended party under Article 33 may yet be
well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., enforced separately."
CA-G.R. No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, 'no
party can be found and held criminally liable in a In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
civil suit,' which solely would remain if we are to
divorce it from the criminal proceeding." "xxx xxx xxx

This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo It should be stressed that the extinction of civil
case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in the liability follows the extinction of the criminal
cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio liability under Article 89, only when the civil
Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime liability arises from the criminal act as its only
Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v. basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability
Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the does not exist independently of the criminal
death of the accused pending appeal of said cases. responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death,
ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the
course, that death supervenes before final entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of
judgment. The said principle does not apply in Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the
instant case wherein the civil liability springs criminal action, for the purpose of determining if
neither solely nor originally from the crime itself he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a
but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
(Emphasis ours)
"The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan
xxx xxx xxx" for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because
his death occurred after final judgment was
In the above case, the court was convinced that the rendered by the Court of First Instance of
civil liability of the accused who was charged with Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex
estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles crimes of malversation through falsification and
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total
had swindled the first and second vendees of the sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
property subject matter of the contract of sale. It
therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the The civil action for the civil liability is deemed
death of the accused herein extinguished his impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the
criminal liability including fine, his civil liability absence of express waiver or its reservation in a
based on the laws of human relations remains." separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court). The civil action for the civil liability is
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect separate and distinct from the criminal action
to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287;
the extinction of his criminal liability due to his Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
death pending appeal of his conviction.
When the action is for the recovery of money and
To further justify its decision to allow the civil the defendant dies before final judgment in the
liability to survive, the court relied on the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be
following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 prosecuted in the manner especially provided in
of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of
money claims against the defendant whose death the Rules of Court).
occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of
First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a
actions for recovery of money may continue to be money judgment had been rendered against him by
heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant the Court of First Instance, the action survives him.
supervenes after the CFI had rendered its It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court
judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA
"the name of the offended party shall be included 394).
in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the
legal representative or the heirs of the deceased- The accountable public officer may still be civilly
accused should be substituted as defendants- liable for the funds improperly disbursed although
appellants." he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24
Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved Phil. 583).
from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was
that the survival of the civil liability depends on In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the
whether the same can be predicated on sources of dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is
claim for civil liability is also extinguished concerned, the Court Resolved to continue
together with the criminal action if it were solely exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible
based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto. civil liability for the money claims of the Province
of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal
However, the Supreme Court in People v. acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been
Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long- instituted against him, thus making applicable, in
established principle of law. In this case, accused determining the civil liability, Article 30 of the
Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is
the lower court of malversation thru falsification of directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days
public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs
during the pendency of the appeal of his or whether or not his estate is under administration
conviction. and has a duly appointed judicial administrator.
Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil
dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3,
of his criminal liability. His civil liability was Rules of Court)."
allowed to survive although it was clear that such
claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue
criminal action already extinguished. The legal have maintained adherence to our ruling in
import of such decision was for the court to Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a
reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed
rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by
criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly
upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the instituted with the criminal, as one filed under
demise of the accused. Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had
been filed but merely a separate civil action. This
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old had the effect of converting such claims from one
ruling? A re-examination of our decision in which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal
Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling. action to an entirely new and separate one, the
prosecution of which does not even necessitate the
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be
Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such
impliedly instituted in the criminal action can a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in
proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has
death of the accused pending appeal of his perforce to be determined in the criminal action,
conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the
Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to
of Court. render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides: person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal
"When a separate civil action is brought to demand action due to death of the accused pending appeal
civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of
no criminal proceedings are instituted during the the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death
pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of dissolves all things.
evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the
act complained of." In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability
arising from crime, the final determination of the
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly criminal liability is a condition precedent to the
lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. prosecution of the civil action, such that when the
Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to criminal action is extinguished by the demise of
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said
accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil
supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts
recognizes is an alternative and separate civil which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil
action which may be brought to demand civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the
liability arising from a criminal offense criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced
independently of any criminal action. In the event in the criminal proceeding. This is to be
that no criminal proceedings are instituted during distinguished from that which is contemplated
the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to
evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have the institution of a separate civil action that does
to be that which is compatible with civil liability not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The
and that is, preponderance of evidence and not Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however,
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or failed to take note of this fundamental distinction
invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the when it allowed the survival of the civil action for
civil action despite extinction of the criminal the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating
would in effect merely beg the question of whether the same as a separate civil action referred to under
civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a
the criminal action due to death of the accused summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the
during appeal of his conviction. This is because conversion of said civil action to an independent
whether asserted in the criminal action or in a one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished by the death of the accused while his Ironically however, the main decision in
conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the
Penal Code is clear on this matter: resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it
was held in the main decision:
"Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished. ---- Criminal liability is totally "Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the
extinguished: purpose of showing his criminal liability which is
the basis of the civil liability for which his estate
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal would be liable." 13
penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of
offender occurs before final judgment; his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the
xxx xxx xxx" basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction
and pronounced the same as the source of his civil from the latter category of an ordinary civil action
liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was upon the death of the offender. . . ."
not applied in the final determination of
Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a
of the criminal action already extinguished which criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability
served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary
We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21,
appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a deceased accused.
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21,
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of
on the criminal. Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the
estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are
invoked to serve as another basis for the contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to
Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money
Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court claims while the claims involved in civil liability
made in the inference that civil actions of the type ex delicto may include even the restitution of
involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86
the recovery of which may be continued on appeal provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims
if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral
by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments
Court's conclusion: for money and claim arising from contracts,
expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims
"'When the action is for the recovery of money' arising from delict do not form part of this
'and the defendant dies before final judgment in the exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no
court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as
prosecuted in the manner especially provided' in an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2)
the Rules of Court). allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor
before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a should be extinguished upon extinction of the
money judgment had been rendered against him by criminal action engendered by the death of the
the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. accused pending finality of his conviction.
It may be continued on appeal."
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party,
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto
misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, desires to recover damages from the same act or
this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be omission complained of, he must subject to Section
sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
Regalado: as amended) file a separate civil action, this time
predicated not on the felony previously charged
"xxx xxx xxx but on other sources of obligation. The source of
obligation upon which the separate action is
I do not, however, agree with the justification premised determines against whom the same shall
advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, be enforced.
relying on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication If the same act or omission complained of also
therefrom that where the civil liability instituted arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of
together with the criminal liabilities had already law, result in an injury to person or property (real
passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of or personal), the separate civil action must be filed
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the against the executor or administrator 17 of the
Court of Appeals can continue to exercise estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of
appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the the Rules of Court:
extinguishment of the component criminal liability
of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has "SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may
been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent not be brought against executor or administrator.
and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should ---- No action upon a claim for the recovery of
be set aside and abandoned as being clearly money or debt or interest thereon shall be
erroneous and unjustifiable. commenced against the executor or administrator;
but actions to recover real or personal property, or
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a
procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an
authority nor justification for its application in injury to person or property, real or personal, may
criminal procedure to civil actions. Nor is there be commenced against him."
any authority in law for the summary conversion
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala
18 where we held that, in recovering damages for apprehension on a possible privation of right by
injury to persons thru an independent civil action prescription. 22
based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same
must be filed against the executor or administrator Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we
of the estate of deceased accused and not against hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule extinguished his criminal liability and the civil
explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,
expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed
decedent, judgment for money and claims arising without qualification.
from contract, express or implied. Contractual
money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio
personal obligations other than those which have Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
their source in delict or tort.
SO ORDERED.
Conversely, if the same act or omission
complained of also arises from contract, the Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado,
separate civil action must be filed against the estate Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno,
of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Rules of Court.
Cruz, J., is on leave.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our
ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his

conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto
in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives Case #2 of Articles 29-35:
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, represented by her
other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code Attorney-in-fact, MARIE F. FUJITA,
enumerates these other sources of obligation from Petitioner, versus FLORA SAN DIEGO-SISON,
which the civil liability may arise as a result of the Respondent.
same act or omission: G.R. No. 155223 | 2007-04-04

a) Law 20 *Issue:
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . . *In re to
e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in                                              D E C I S I O N

Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
enforced either against the executor/administrator filed by Bobie Rose V. Frias represented by her
or the estate of the accused, depending on the Attorney-in-fact, Marie Regine F. Fujita
source of obligation upon which the same is based (petitioner) seeking to annul the Decision[1] dated
as explained above. June 18, 2002 and the Resolution[2] dated
September 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear in CA-G.R. CV No. 52839.
a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the Petitioner is the owner of a house and lot located at
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its No. 589 Batangas East, Ayala Alabang,
extinction, the private-offended party instituted Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, which she acquired
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the from Island Masters Realty and Development
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed Corporation (IMRDC) by virtue of a Deed of Sale
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal dated Nov. 16, 1990.[3] The property is covered by
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 TCT No. 168173 of the Register of Deeds of
21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any Makati in the name of IMRDC.[4]
 and notified petitioner through a letter[8] dated
On December 7, 1990, petitioner, as the FIRST March 20, 1991, which petitioner received only on
PARTY, and Dra. Flora San Diego-Sison June 11, 1991,[9] reminding petitioner of their
(respondent), as the SECOND PARTY, entered agreement that the amount of two million pesos
into a Memorandum of Agreement[5] over the which petitioner received from respondent should
property with the following terms: be considered as a loan payable within six months.
Petitioner subsequently failed to pay respondent
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the amount of two million pesos.
the sum of THREE MILLION PESOS
(P3,000,000.00) receipt of which is hereby On April 1, 1993, respondent filed with the
acknowledged by the FIRST PARTY from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, a
SECOND PARTY, the parties have agreed as complaint[10] for sum of money with preliminary
follows: attachment against petitioner. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65367 and raffled to
1. That the SECOND PARTY has a period of Six Branch 30. Respondent alleged the foregoing facts
(6) months from the date of the execution of this and in addition thereto averred that petitioner tried
contract within which to notify the FIRST PARTY to deprive her of the security for the loan by
of her intention to purchase the aforementioned making a false report[11] of the loss of her owner's
parcel of land together within (sic) the copy of TCT No. 168173 to the Tagig Police
improvements thereon at the price of SIX Station on June 3, 1991, executing an affidavit of
MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND loss and by filing a petition[12] for the issuance of
PESOS (P6,400,000.00). Upon notice to the FIRST a new owner's duplicate copy of said title with the
PARTY of the SECOND PARTY's intention to RTC of Makati, Branch 142; that the petition was
purchase the same, the latter has a period of granted in an Order[13] dated August 31, 1991;
another six months within which to pay the that said Order was subsequently set aside in an
remaining balance of P3.4 million. Order dated April 10, 1992[14] where the RTC
Makati granted respondent's petition for relief from
2. That prior to the six months period given to the judgment due to the fact that respondent is in
SECOND PARTY within which to decide whether possession of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT
or not to purchase the above-mentioned property, No. 168173, and ordered the provincial public
the FIRST PARTY may still offer the said property prosecutor to conduct an investigation of petitioner
to other persons who may be interested to buy the for perjury and false testimony. Respondent prayed
same provided that the amount of P3,000,000.00 for the ex-parte issuance of a writ of preliminary
given to the FIRST PARTY BY THE SECOND attachment and payment of two million pesos with
PARTY shall be paid to the latter including interest interest at 36% per annum from December 7, 1991,
based on prevailing compounded bank interest plus P100,000.00 moral, corrective and exemplary
the amount of the sale in excess of P7,000,000.00 damages and P200,000.00 for attorney's fees.
should the property be sold at a price more than P7
million. In an Order dated April 6, 1993, the Executive
Judge of the RTC of Manila issued a writ of
3. That in case the FIRST PARTY has no other preliminary attachment upon the filing of a bond in
buyer within the first six months from the the amount of two million pesos.[15]
execution of this contract, no interest shall be
charged by the SECOND PARTY on the P3 Petitioner filed an Amended Answer[16] alleging
million however, in the event that on the sixth that the Memorandum of Agreement was
month the SECOND PARTY would decide not to conceived and arranged by her lawyer, Atty.
purchase the aforementioned property, the FIRST Carmelita Lozada, who is also respondent's lawyer;
PARTY has a period of another six months within that she was asked to sign the agreement without
which to pay the sum of P3 million pesos provided being given the chance to read the same; that the
that the said amount shall earn compounded bank title to the property and the Deed of Sale between
interest for the last six months only. Under this her and the IMRDC were entrusted to Atty. Lozada
circumstance, the amount of P3 million given by for safekeeping and were never turned over to
the SECOND PARTY shall be treated as [a] loan respondent as there was no consummated sale yet;
and the property shall be considered as the security that out of the two million pesos cash paid, Atty.
for the mortgage which can be enforced in Lozada took the one million pesos which has not
accordance with law. been returned, thus petitioner had filed a civil case
against her; that she was never informed of
         x x x x.[6] respondent's decision not to purchase the property
within the six month period fixed in the agreement;
Petitioner received from respondent two million that when she demanded the return of TCT No.
pesos in cash and one million pesos in a post-dated 168173 and the Deed of Sale between her and the
check dated February 28, 1990, instead of 1991, IMRDC from Atty. Lozada, the latter gave her
which rendered said check stale.[7] Petitioner then these documents in a brown envelope on May 5,
gave respondent TCT No. 168173 in the name of 1991 which her secretary placed in her attache
IMRDC and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the case; that the envelope together with her other
property between petitioner and IMRDC. personal things were lost when her car was forcibly
opened the following day; that she sought the help
Respondent decided not to purchase the property of Atty. Lozada who advised her to secure a police
report, to execute an affidavit of loss and to get the attachment to protect her rights under the
services of another lawyer to file a petition for the agreement.
issuance of an owner's duplicate copy; that the
petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate Petitioner filed her appeal with the CA. In a
copy was filed on her behalf without her Decision dated June 18, 2002, the CA affirmed the
knowledge and neither did she sign the petition nor RTC decision with modification, the dispositive
testify in court as falsely claimed for she was portion of which reads:
abroad; that she was a victim of the manipulations
of Atty. Lozada and respondent as shown by the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision
filing of criminal charges for perjury and false appealed from is MODIFIED in the sense that the
testimony against her; that no interest could be due rate of interest is reduced from 32% to 25% per
as there was no valid mortgage over the property annum, effective June 7, 1991 until fully paid.[19]
as the principal obligation is vitiated with fraud
and deception. She prayed for the dismissal of the The CA found that: petitioner gave the one million
complaint, counter-claim for damages and pesos to Atty. Lozada partly as her commission
attorney's fees. and partly as a loan; respondent did not replace the
mistakenly dated check of one million pesos
Trial on the merits ensued. On January 31, 1996, because she had decided not to buy the property
the RTC issued a decision,[17] the dispositive and petitioner knew of her decision as early as
portion of which reads: April 1991; the award of moral damages was
warranted since even granting petitioner had no
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby RENDERED: hand in the filing of the petition for the issuance of
an owner's copy, she executed an affidavit of loss
1) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of of TCT No. 168173 when she knew all along that
P2 Million plus interest thereon at the rate of thirty said title was in respondent's possession;
two (32%) per cent per annum beginning petitioner's claim that she thought the title was lost
December 7, 1991 until fully paid. when the brown envelope given to her by Atty.
Lozada was stolen from her car was hollow; that
2) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of such deceitful conduct caused respondent serious
P70,000.00 representing premiums paid by anxiety and emotional distress.
plaintiff on the attachment bond with legal interest
thereon counted from the date of this decision until The CA concluded that there was no basis for
fully paid. petitioner to say that the interest should be charged
for six months only and no more; that a loan
3) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of always bears interest otherwise it is not a loan; that
P100,000.00 by way of moral, corrective and interest should commence on June 7, 1991[20]
exemplary damages. with compounded bank interest prevailing at the
time the two million was considered as a loan
4) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff attorney's which was in June 1991; that the bank interest rate
fees of P100,000.00 plus cost of litigation.[18] for loans secured by a real estate mortgage in 1991
ranged from 25% to 32% per annum as certified to
The RTC found that petitioner was under by Prudential Bank,[21] that in fairness to
obligation to pay respondent the amount of two petitioner, the rate to be charged should be 25%
million pesos with compounded interest pursuant only.
to their Memorandum of Agreement; that the
fraudulent scheme employed by petitioner to Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied
deprive respondent of her only security to her by the CA in a Resolution dated September 11,
loaned money when petitioner executed an 2002.
affidavit of loss and instituted a petition for the
issuance of an owner's duplicate title knowing the Hence the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
same was in respondent's possession, entitled filed by petitioner raising the following issues:
respondent to moral damages; and that petitioner's
bare denial cannot be accorded credence because (A) WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPOUNDED
her testimony and that of her witness did not BANK INTEREST SHOULD BE LIMITED TO
appear to be credible. SIX (6) MONTHS AS CONTAINED IN THE
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT.
The RTC further found that petitioner admitted
that she received from respondent the two million (B) WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS
pesos in cash but the fact that petitioner gave the ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES.
one million pesos to Atty. Lozada was without
respondent's knowledge thus it is not binding on (C) WHETHER OR NOT THE GRANT OF
respondent; that respondent had also proven that in CORRECTIVE AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
1993, she initially paid the sum of P30,000.00 as AND ATTORNEY'S FEES IS PROPER EVEN IF
premium for the issuance of the attachment bond, NOT MENTIONED IN THE TEXT OF THE
P20,000.00 for its renewal in 1994, and P20,000.00 DECISION.[22]
for the renewal in 1995, thus plaintiff should be
reimbursed considering that she was compelled to Petitioner contends that the interest, whether at
go to court and ask for a writ of preliminary 32% per annum awarded by the trial court or at
25% per annum as modified by the CA which does not mean that interest will no longer be
should run from June 7, 1991 until fully paid, is charged after the second six-month period since
contrary to the parties' Memorandum of such stipulation was made on the logical and
Agreement; that the agreement provides that if reasonable expectation that such amount would be
respondent would decide not to purchase the paid within the date stipulated. Considering that
property, petitioner has the period of another six petitioner failed to pay the amount given which
months to pay the loan with compounded bank under the Memorandum of Agreement shall be
interest for the last six months only; that the CA's considered as a loan, the monetary interest for the
ruling that a loan always bears interest otherwise it last six months continued to accrue until actual
is not a loan is contrary to Art. 1956 of the New payment of the loaned amount.
Civil Code which provides that no interest shall be
due unless it has been expressly stipulated in The payment of regular interest constitutes the
writing. price or cost of the use of money and thus, until the
principal sum due is returned to the creditor,
We are not persuaded. regular interest continues to accrue since the debtor
continues to use such principal amount.[28] It has
While the CA's conclusion, that a loan always been held that for a debtor to continue in
bears interest otherwise it is not a loan, is flawed possession of the principal of the loan and to
since a simple loan may be gratuitous or with a continue to use the same after maturity of the loan
stipulation to pay interest,[23] we find no error without payment of the monetary interest, would
committed by the CA in awarding a 25% interest constitute unjust enrichment on the part of the
per annum on the two-million peso loan even debtor at the expense of the creditor.[29]
beyond the second six months stipulated period.
Petitioner and respondent stipulated that the loaned
The Memorandum of Agreement executed amount shall earn compounded bank interests, and
between the petitioner and respondent on per the certification issued by Prudential Bank, the
December 7, 1990 is the law between the parties. interest rate for loans in 1991 ranged from 25% to
In resolving an issue based upon a contract, we 32% per annum. The CA reduced the interest rate
must first examine the contract itself, especially the to 25% instead of the 32% awarded by the trial
provisions thereof which are relevant to the court which petitioner no longer assailed.
controversy.[24] The general rule is that if the
terms of an agreement are clear and leave no doubt In Bautista v. Pilar Development Corp.,[30] we
as to the intention of the contracting parties, the upheld the validity of a 21% per annum interest on
literal meaning of its stipulations shall prevail.[25] a P142,326.43 loan. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,
It is further required that the various stipulations of [31] we sustained the agreement of the parties to a
a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing 24% per annum interest on an P8,649,250.00 loan.
to the doubtful ones that sense which may result Thus, the interest rate of 25% per annum awarded
from all of them taken jointly.[26] by the CA to a P2 million loan is fair and
reasonable.
In this case, the phrase "for the last six months
only" should be taken in the context of the entire Petitioner next claims that moral damages were
agreement. We agree with and adopt the CA's awarded on the erroneous finding that she used a
interpretation of the phrase in this wise: fraudulent scheme to deprive respondent of her
security for the loan; that such finding is baseless
Their agreement speaks of two (2) periods of six since petitioner was acquitted in the case for
months each. The first six-month period was given perjury and false testimony filed by respondent
to plaintiff-appellee (respondent) to make up her against her.
mind whether or not to purchase defendant-
appellant's (petitioner's) property. The second six- We are not persuaded.
month period was given to defendant-appellant to
pay the P2 million loan in the event that plaintiff- Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that when the
appellee decided not to buy the subject property in civil action is based on an obligation not arising
which case interest will be charged "for the last six from the act or omission complained of as a felony,
months only", referring to the second six-month such civil action may proceed independently of the
period. This means that no interest will be charged criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
for the first six-month period while appellee was the latter.[32]
making up her mind whether to buy the property,
but only for the second period of six months after While petitioner was acquitted in the false
appellee had decided not to buy the property. This testimony and perjury cases filed by respondent
is the meaning of the phrase "for the last six against her, those actions are entirely distinct from
months only". Certainly, there is nothing in their the collection of sum of money with damages filed
agreement that suggests that interest will be by respondent against petitioner.
charged for six months only even if it takes
defendant-appellant an eternity to pay the loan.[27] We agree with the findings of the trial court and
the CA that petitioner's act of trying to deprive
The agreement that the amount given shall bear respondent of the security of her loan by executing
compounded bank interest for the last six months an affidavit of loss of the title and instituting a
only, i.e., referring to the second six-month period, petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate
copy of TCT No. 168173 entitles respondent to that respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary
moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded in damages.
culpa contractual or breach of contract cases when
the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in awarding
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or attorney's fees because the trial court's decision did
negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some not explain the findings of facts and law to justify
moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong. It the award of attorney's fees as the same was
partakes of the nature of fraud.[33] mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the
RTC decision.
The Memorandum of Agreement provides that in
the event that respondent opts not to buy the We agree.
property, the money given by respondent to
petitioner shall be treated as a loan and the Article 2208[41] of the New Civil Code
property shall be considered as the security for the enumerates the instances where such may be
mortgage. It was testified to by respondent that awarded and, in all cases, it must be reasonable,
after they executed the agreement on December 7, just and equitable if the same were to be granted.
1990, petitioner gave her the owner's copy of the [42] Attorney's fees as part of damages are not
title to the property, the Deed of Sale between meant to enrich the winning party at the expense of
petitioner and IMRDC, the certificate of the losing litigant. They are not awarded every
occupancy, and the certificate of the Secretary of time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy
the IMRDC who signed the Deed of Sale.[34] that no premium should be placed on the right to
However, notwithstanding that all those documents litigate.[43] The award of attorney's fees is the
were in respondent's possession, petitioner exception rather than the general rule. As such, it is
executed an affidavit of loss that the owner's copy necessary for the trial court to make findings of
of the title and the Deed of Sale were lost. facts and law that would bring the case within the
exception and justify the grant of such award. The
Although petitioner testified that her execution of matter of attorney's fees cannot be mentioned only
the affidavit of loss was due to the fact that she in the dispositive portion of the decision.[44] They
was of the belief that since she had demanded from must be clearly explained and justified by the trial
Atty. Lozada the return of the title, she thought that court in the body of its decision. On appeal, the CA
the brown envelope with markings which Atty. is precluded from supplementing the bases for
Lozada gave her on May 5, 1991 already contained awarding attorney's fees when the trial court failed
the title and the Deed of Sale as those documents to discuss in its Decision the reasons for awarding
were in the same brown envelope which she gave the same. Consequently, the award of attorney's
to Atty. Lozada prior to the transaction with fees should be deleted.
respondent.[35] Such statement remained a bare
statement. It was not proven at all since Atty. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
Lozada had not taken the stand to corroborate her Decision dated June 18, 2002 and the Resolution
claim. In fact, even petitioner's own witness, dated September 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals
Benilda Ynfante (Ynfante), was not able to in CA-G.R. CV No. 52839 are AFFIRMED with
establish petitioner's claim that the title was MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees
returned by Atty. Lozada in view of Ynfante's is DELETED.
testimony that after the brown envelope was given
to petitioner, the latter passed it on to her and she No pronouncement as to costs.
placed it in petitioner's attachá© case[36] and
did not bother to look at the envelope.[37] SO ORDERED.

It is clear therefrom that petitioner's execution of

the affidavit of loss became the basis of the filing
of the petition with the RTC for the issuance of
new owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173.
Petitioner's actuation would have deprived
respondent of the security for her loan were it not
for respondent's timely filing of a petition for relief
whereby the RTC set aside its previous order
granting the issuance of new title. Thus, the award
of moral damages is in order.

The entitlement to moral damages having been

established, the award of exemplary damages is
proper.[38] Exemplary damages may be imposed
upon petitioner by way of example or correction
for the public good.[39] The RTC awarded the
amount of P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages. While the award of moral and exemplary
damages in an aggregate amount may not be the
usual way of awarding said damages,[40] no error
has been committed by CA. There is no question
Case #3 of Articles 29-35:

ANTONIO L. DALURAYA, PETITIONER,

VS. MARLA OLIVA, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 210148 | 2014-12-08
FIRST DIVISION
 
*Issue:

*In re to

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on

certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 28, 2013
and the Resolution3 dated November 22, 2013
rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 125113 finding petitioner Antonio L.
Daluraya (Daluraya) civilly liable for the death of
Marina Arabit Oliva (Marina Oliva) despite having
been acquitted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence.

The Facts
 
On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an
Information4 for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Homicide in connection with the death5 of
Marina Oliva. Records reveal that sometime in the
afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was
crossing the street when a Nissan Vanette, bearing
plate number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near
the Quezon Avenue flyover in Quezon City, ran
her over.6 While Marina Oliva was rushed to the
hospital to receive medical attention, she
eventually died, prompting her daughter, herein
respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal
case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide against Daluraya, the purported driver of
the vehicle.7
 
During the proceedings, the prosecution presented
as witness Shem Serrano (Serrano), an eye-witness
to the incident, who testified that on said date, he
saw a woman crossing EDSA heading towards the
island near the flyover and that the latter was
bumped by a Nissan Vanette bearing plate number
UPN-172. The prosecution also offered the
testimonies of (a) Marla, who testified as to the
civil damages sustained by her family as a result of
her mother’s death; (b) Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz),
who presented his findings on the autopsy
conducted upon the body of Marina Oliva; and
(c)Police Senior Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI
Gomez), who conducted the investigation
following the incident and claimed that Marina
Olivawas hit by the vehicle being driven by
Daluraya, albeit he did not witness the incident.8
 
After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed
an Urgent Motion to Dismiss The CA Ruling
(demurrer)9 asserting, inter alia, that he was not  
positively identified by any of the prosecution In a Decision24 dated June 28, 2013, the CA
witnesses as the driver of the vehicle that hit the granted the petition and reversed the RTC
victim, and that there was no clear and competent Decision, ordering Daluraya to pay Marla the
evidence of how the incident transpired.10 amounts of p152,547.00 as actual damages,
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as
The MeTC Ruling moral damages.25 In so ruling, the CA held that
  the MeTC’s Order showed that Daluraya’s
In an Order11 dated May 24, 2010, the acquittal was based on the fact that the prosecution
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
38 (MeTC) granted Daluraya’s demurrer and As such, Daluraya was not exonerated from civil
dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. It liability.26
found that the testimonies of the prosecution  
witnesses were wanting in material details and that Moreover, the CA considered the following pieces
they failed to sufficiently establish that Daluraya of evidence to support its finding that Daluraya
committed the crime imputed upon him.12 must be held civilly liable: (a) the inadmissible
  sworn statement executed by Daluraya where he
Deconstructing the testimonies of the prosecution admitted that he drove the subject vehicle which
witnesses individually, the MeTC found that: (a) hit Marina Oliva; (b) the conclusion derived from
Marla merely testified on the damages sustained by Serrano’s testimony that the woman he saw
her family but she failed to identify Daluraya as crossing the street who was hit by a Nissan Vanette
the driver of the vehicle that hit her mother; (b) with plate number UPN-172, and the victim who
Serrano also did not identify Daluraya as the driver eventually died, are one and the same; (c) the
of the said vehicle; (c) Dr. Ortiz merely testified on Philippine National Police Referral Letter of one
the autopsy results; and (d) PSI Gomez, while he Police Chief Inspector Virgilio Pereda identifying
did investigate the incident, likewise declared that Daluraya as the suspect in the case of Reckless
he did not witness the same.13 Imprudence Resulting in Homicide involving the
  death of Marina Oliva, and stating that he brought
Marla moved for reconsideration,14 which the the victim to the Quezon City General Hospital for
MeTC denied in an Order15 dated November 4, treatment but was declared dead on arrival; and (d)
2010, clarifying that the grant of Daluraya’s the subject vehicle was registered in the name of
demurrer had the effect of an acquittal and that Daluraya’s aunt, Gloria Zilmar,27 who authorized
reconsideration of its Order granting Daluraya’s him to claim the vehicle from the MeTC.28
demurrer would violate the latter’s right against  
double jeopardy.16 With respect to the civil aspect Daluraya filed a motion for
of the case, the MeTC likewise denied the same, reconsideration,29 which the CA denied in a
holding that no civil liability can be awarded Resolution30 dated November 22, 2013,hence, this
absent any evidence proving that Daluraya was the petition.
person responsible for Marina Oliva’s demise.17
  The Issue Before the Court
Aggrieved, Marla appealed18 to the Regional Trial  
Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 (RTC), insisting The sole issue advanced for the Court’s resolution
that the MeTC failed to make any finding as to the is whether or not the CA was correct in finding
civil liability of Daluraya,19 which finding was not Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Oliva’s death
precluded by the dismissal of the criminal aspect of despite his acquittal in the criminal case for
the case. Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The RTC Ruling
  The Court’s Ruling
In a Decision20 dated September 8, 2011, the RTC  
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the MeTC’s The petition is meritorious.
ruling, declaring that “the act from which the  
criminal responsibility may spring did not at all Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
exist.”21 civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused of the
  crime charged, however, does not necessarily
Marla filed a motion for reconsideration22 which, extinguish his civil liability.31 In Manantan v.
although filed beyond the reglementary period, CA,32 the Court expounded on the two kinds of
was nonetheless accepted. However, the RTC acquittal recognized by our law and their
found the same without merit and thus, sustained concomitant effects on the civil liability of the
the factual findings and rulings of the MeTC in its accused, as follows:
Order23 dated May 10, 2012.
  Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with
Dissatisfied, Marla elevated the case to the CA via different effects on the civil liability of the
petition for review, maintaining that Daluraya must accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the
be held civilly liable. accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to
civil liability, for a person who has been found to liability may arise did not exist, given that the
be not the perpetrator of any act or omission prosecution was not able to establish that he was
cannot and can never be held liable for such act or the author of the crime imputed against him. Such
omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex conclusion is clear and categorical when the MeTC
delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if declared that “the testimonies of the prosecution
any, which may be instituted must be based on witnesses are wanting in material details and they
grounds other than the delict complained of. This did not sufficiently establish that the accused
is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the precisely committed the crime charged against
Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal him.”37 Furthermore, when Marla sought
based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the reconsideration of the MeTC’s Order acquitting
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the Daluraya, said court reiterated and firmly clarified
accused has not been satisfactorily established, he that “the prosecution was not able to establish that
is not exempt from civil liability which may be the accused was the driver of the Nissan Vanette
proved by preponderance of evidence only.33 which bumped Marina Oliva”38 and that “there is
  no competent evidence on hand which proves that
In Dayap v. Sendiong,34 the Court explained the accused was the person responsible for the
further: death of Marina Oliva.”39
 
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the
preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC,
of the case. The extinction of the penal action does that Daluraya’s acquittal was anchored on
not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability reasonable doubt, which would necessarily call for
where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable a remand of the case to the court a quo for the
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is reception of Daluraya’s evidence on the civil
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of aspect. Records disclose that Daluraya’s acquittal
the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability was based on the fact that “the act or omission
of the accused does not arise from or is not based from which the civil liability may arise did not
upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. exist” in view of the failure of the prosecution to
However, the civil action based on delict may be sufficiently establish that he was the author of the
deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or liability should be deemed as non-existent by the
omission from which the civil liability may arise nature of such acquittal.
did not exist or where the accused did not commit  
the acts or omission imputed to him. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
  Decision dated June 28, 2013 and the Resolution
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is dated November 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals
acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to in CA-G.R. SP No. 125113 are hereby
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
unless the court also declares that the act or September 8, 2011 and the Order dated May 10,
omission from which the civil liability may arise 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
did not exist. This is because when the accused Branch 76 are REINSTATED.
files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet  
adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil SO ORDERED.
aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is  
the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson,) Carpio,* Leonardo-De
court should do is issue an order or partial Castro, and Reyes,** JJ., concur
judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and
acquitting the accused, and set the case for
continuation of trial for the accused to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the
private complainant to adduce evidence by way of
rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render
judgment on the civil aspect of the
case.35 (Emphases supplied)
 
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires
that the judgment state “whether the evidence of
the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt
of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission
from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist.”36
 
A punctilious examination of the MeTC’s Order,
which the RTC sustained, will show that
Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the conclusion
that the act or omission from which the civil
 RESOLUTION
 
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
 
On July 23, 2014, the Court rendered its
Resolution[1] in this case finding accused-
appellants Armando Dionaldoy Ebron, Renato
Dionaldo y Ebron (Renato), Mariano Gariguez,
Jr. y Ramos, and Rodolfo Larido y Ebron
(accused-appellants) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of Kidnapping
for Ransom with Homicide, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that all the
accused-appellants herein are equally found
GUILTY of the special complex crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, and are
sentenced to each suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to pay,
jointly and severally, the family of the kidnap
victim Edwin Navarro the following amounts: (1)
P100,00.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as
moral damages; and (3) P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent
(61Yo) per annum from the date of finality of
judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Accused-appellants collectively moved for

reconsideration [2] thereof, which the Court denied
with finality in its Resolution [3] dated September
24, 2014.

On even date, the Court received a letter[4] from

the Bureau of Corrections dated September 16,
2014 informing Us of the death of one of the
accused-appellants in this case, Renato, on June 1
0, 2014, as evidenced by the Certificate of
Death[5] attached thereto. As Renato's death
transpired before the promulgation of the Court's
July 23, 2014 Resolution in this case, i.e., when his
appeal before the Court was still pending
resolution, his criminal liability is totally
extinguished in view of the provisions of Article
89 of the Revised Penal Code which states:

Case #4 of Articles 29-35: Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally

extinguished. -Criminal liability is totally
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, extinguished:
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARMANDO By the death of the convict, as to the personal
DIONALDO Y EBRON, RENATO penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
DIONALDO Y EBRON, therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
MARIANO GARIGUEZ, JR. Y RAMOS, AND offender occurs before final judgment;
RODOLFO LARIDO Y EBRON, ACCUSED- x x x x
APPELLANTS.
G.R. No. 207949 | 2015-09-09 In People v. Amistoso,[6] the Court explained that
  the death of the accused pending appeal of his
*Issue: conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as
well as his civil liability ex delicto.
[7] Consequently, Renato's death on June 10, 2014
*In re to renders the Court's July 23, 2014 Resolution
irrelevant and ineffectual as to him, and is DECISION
therefore set aside. Accordingly, the criminal case  
against Renato is dismissed. JARDELEZA, J.:
Our law states that every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable. This civil liability
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated July 23, ex delicto may be recovered through a civil action
2014 and September 24, 2014 of the Court are which, under our Rules of Court, is deemed
hereby SET ASIDEand Criminal Case No. C- instituted with the criminal action. While they are
68329 before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan actions mandatorily fused,[1] they are, in truth,
City, Branch 129 is DISMISSEDinsofar as separate actions whose existences are not
accused-appellant RENATO dependent on each other. Thus, civil liability ex
DIONALDO y EBRON is concerned, in view of delicto survives an acquittal in a criminal case for
his demise. failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the Rules of Court limits this mandatory
SO ORDERED. fusion to a civil action for the recovery of civil
liability ex delicto. It, by no means, includes a civil
Sereno, C.J, (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, liability arising from a different source of
Bersamin, and Perez, JJ., concur. obligation, as in the case of a contract. Where the
  civil liability is ex contractu, the court hearing the
criminal case has no authority to award damages.
 
The Case

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Gloria S.
Dy (petitioner) seeks the reversal of the decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 25,
2009 (Assailed Decision)[2] ordering her to pay
Mandy Commodities Company, Inc. (MCCI) in the
amount of P21,706,281.00.[3]
 
The Facts

Petitioner was the former General Manager of

MCCL. In the course of her employment,
petitioner assisted MCCI in its business involving
several properties. One such business pertained to
the construction of warehouses over a property
(Numancia Property) that MCCI leased from the
Philippine National Bank (PNB). Sometime in
May 1996, in pursuit of MCCI's business,
petitioner proposed to William Mandy (Mandy),
President of MCCI, the purchase of a property
owned by Pantranco. As the transaction involved a
large amount of money, Mandy agreed to obtain a
loan from the International China Bank of
Commerce (ICBC). Petitioner represented that she
Case #5 of Articles 298-35: could facilitate the approval of the loan. True
enough, ICBC granted a loan to MCCI in the
amount of P20,000,000.00, evidenced by a
LORIA S. DY, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE promissory note. As security, MCCI also executed
OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANDY a chattel mortgage over the warehouses in the
COMMODITIES CO., INC., REPRESENTED Numancia Property. Mandy entrusted petitioner
BY ITS PRESIDENT, WILLIAM MANDY, with the obligation to manage the payment of the
RESPONDENTS. loan.[4]
G.R. No. 189081 | 2016-08-10
In February 1999, MCCI received a notice of
foreclosure over the mortgaged property due to its
*Issue: default in paying the loan obligation.[5] In order to
prevent the foreclosure, Mandy instructed
petitioner to facilitate the payment of the loan.
MCCI, through Mandy, issued 13 Allied Bank
*In re to checks and 12 Asia Trust Bank checks in varying
amounts and in different dates covering the period
from May 18, 1999 to April 4, 2000.[6] The total
amount of the checks, which were all payable to
THIRD DIVISION cash, was P21,706,281.00. Mandy delivered the
  checks to petitioner. Mandy claims that he
delivered the checks with the instruction that found Gloria Dy civilly liable to William Mandy is
petitioner use the checks to pay the loan.[7] AFFIRMED.
Petitioner, on the other hand, testified that she
encashed the checks and returned the money to SO ORDERED.[17]
Mandy.[8] ICBC eventually foreclosed the  
mortgaged property as MCCI continued to default The CA also denied petitioner's motion for
in its obligation to pay. Mandy claims that it was reconsideration in a resolution[18] dated August 3,
only at this point in time that he discovered that not 2009.
a check was paid to ICBC.[9]
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari
Thus, on October 7, 2002, MCCI, represented by (Petition). Petitioner argues that since she was
Mandy, filed a Compiamt-Affidavit for Estafa[10] acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove all
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. the elements of the crime charged, there was
On March 3, 2004, an Information[11] was filed therefore no crime committed.[19] As there was no
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court crime, any civil liability ex delicto cannot be
(RTC) Manila. awarded.
 
After a full-blown trial, the RTC Manila rendered a The Issues
decision[12] dated November 11, 2005 (RTC
Decision) acquitting petitioner. The RTC Manila The central issue is the propriety of making a
found that while petitioner admitted that she finding of civil liability in a criminal case for
received the checks, the prosecution failed to estafa when the accused is acquitted for failure of
establish that she was under any obligation to the prosecution to prove all the elements of the
deliver them to ICBC in payment of MCCFs loan. crime charged.
The trial court made this finding on the strength of  
Mandy's admission that he gave the checks to The Ruling of the Court
petitioner with the agreement that she would
encash them. Petitioner would then pay ICBC We grant the petition.
using her own checks. The trial court further made Civil Liability Arising From Crime
a finding that Mandy and petitioner entered into a
contract of loan.[13] Thus, it held that the Our laws recognize a bright line distinction
prosecution failed to establish an important between criminal and civil liabilities. A crime is a
element of the crime of estafa—misappropriation liability against the state. It is prosecuted by and
or conversion. However, while the RTC Manila for the state. Acts considered criminal are
acquitted petitioner, it ordered her to pay the penalized by law as a means to protect the society
amount of the checks. The dispositive portion of from dangerous transgressions. As criminal
the RTC Decision states — liability involves a penalty affecting a person's
  liberty, acts are only treated criminal when the law
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having failed to clearly says so. On the other hand, civil liabilities
establish the guilt of the accused beyond take a less public and more private nature. Civil
reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered liabilities are claimed through civil actions as a
ACQUITTING the accused of the offense charged. means to enforce or protect a right or prevent or
With costs de officio. redress a wrong.[20] They do not carry with them
the imposition of imprisonment as a penalty.
The accused is however civilly liable to the Instead, civil liabilities are compensated in the
complainant for the amount of P21,706,281.00. form of damages.

SO ORDERED.[14] Nevertheless, our jurisdiction recognizes that a

  crime has a private civil component. Thus, while
Petitioner filed an appeal[15] of the civil aspect of an act considered criminal is a breach of law
the RTC Decision with the CA. In the Assailed against the State, our legal system allows for the
Decision,[16] the CA found the appeal without recovery of civil damages where there is a private
merit. It held that the acquittal of petitioner does person injured by a criminal act. It is in recognition
not necessarily absolve her of civil liability. The of this dual nature of a criminal act that our
CA said that it is settled that when an accused is Revised Penal Code provides that every person
acquitted on the basis of reasonable doubt, courts criminally liable is also civilly liable.[21] This is
may still find him or her civilly liable if the the concept of civil liability ex delicto.
evidence so warrant. The CA explained that the
evidence on record adequately prove that petitioner This is echoed by the New Civil Code when it
received the checks as a loan from MCCI. Thus, recognizes acts or omissions punished by law as a
preventing the latter from recovering the amount of separate source of obligation.[22] This is
the checks would constitute unjust enrichment. reinforced by Article 30 of the same code which
Hence, the Assailed Decision ruled refers to the filing of a separate civil action to
  demand civil liability arising from a criminal
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the offense.[23]
appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November
11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, The Revised Penal Code fleshes out this civil
Branch 33 in Criminal Case No. 04-224294 which liability in Article 104[24] which states that it
includes restitution, reparation of damage caused cannot and can never be held liable for such act or
and indemnification for consequential damages. omission. There being no delict civil liability ex
delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if
Rules of procedure for criminal any, which may be instituted must be based on
and civil actions involving the grounds other than the delict complained of. This
same act or omission is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal
The law and the rules of procedure provide for a based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
precise mechanism in instituting a civil action accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the
pertaining to an act or omission which is also accused has not been satisfactorily established, he
subject of a criminal case. Our Rules of Court is not exempt from civil liability which may be
prescribes a kind of fusion such that, subject to proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is
certain defined qualifications, when a criminal the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is
of the civil liability arising from the offense is "for the same act or omission." Although the two
deemed instituted as well.[25] actions have different purposes, the matters
discussed in the civil case are similar to those
However, there is an important difference between discussed in the criminal case. However, the
civil and criminal proceedings that require a fine judgment In the criminal proceeding cannot be
distinction as to how these twin actions shall read in evidence In the civil action to establish any
proceed. These two proceedings involve two fact there determined, even though both actions
different standards of proof. A criminal action involve the same act or omission. The reason for
requires proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt this rule is that the parties are not the same and
while a civil action requires a lesser quantum of secondarily, different rules of evidence are
proof, that of preponderance of evidence. This applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein
distinction also agrees with the essential principle petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in
in our legal system that while a criminal liability determining whether Article 29 applied, was not
carries with it a corresponding civil liability, they precluded from looking into the question of
are nevertheless separate and distinct. In other petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.[32]
words, these two liabilities may co-exist but their  
existence is not dependent on each other.[26] In Dayap v. Sendiong,[33] we further said —
 
The Civil Code states that when an accused in a The acquittal of the accused does not automatically
criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect
that his guilt has not been proven beyond of the case. The extinction of the penal action does
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
same act or omission may be filed. In the latter where:
case, only preponderance of evidence is required.  
[27] This is supported by the Rules of Court which (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as
provides that the extinction of the criminal action only preponderance of evidence is required;
does not result in the extinction of the  
corresponding civil action.[28] The latter may only (b) the court declares that the liability of the
be extinguished when there is a "finding in a final accused is only civil; and
judgment in the criminal action that the act or  
omission from which the civil liability may arise (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise
did not exist."[29] Consistent with this, the Rules from or is not based upon the crime of which the
of Court requires that in judgments of acquittal the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action
court must state whether "the evidence of the based on delict may be deemed extinguished if
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of mere is a finding on the final judgment in the
the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt criminal action that the act or omission from which
beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the the civil liability may arise did not exist or where
judgment shall determine if the act or omission the accused did not commit the acts or omission
from which the civil liability might arise did not imputed to him.[34]
exist."[30]  
Hence, a civil action filed for the purpose of
Thus, whether an exoneration from the criminal enforcing civil liability ex delicto, even if
action should affect the corresponding civil action mandatorily instituted with the corresponding
depends on the varying kinds of acquittal. In criminal action, survives an acquittal when it is
Manantan v. Court of Appeals,[31] we explained based on the presence of reasonable doubt. In these
— instances, while the evidence presented does not
  establish the fact of the crime with moral certainty,
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with the civil action still prevails for as long as the
different effects on the civil liability of the greater weight of evidence tilts in favor of a
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the finding of liability. This means that while the mind
accused is not the author of the act or omission of the court cannot rest easy in penalizing the
complained of. This instance closes the door to accused for the commission of a crime, it
civil liability, for a person who has been found to nevertheless finds that he or she committed or
be not the perpetrator of any act or omission omitted to perform acts which serve as a separate
source of obligation. There is no sufficient proof adequate evidence to prove that Mandy gave the
that the act or omission is criminal beyond checks to petitioner with the instruction that she
reasonable doubt, but there is a preponderance of will use them to pay the ICBC loan. Citing
evidence to show that the act or omission caused Mandy's own testimony in open court, the RTC
injury which demands compensation. Manila held that when Mandy delivered the checks
to petitioner, their agreement was that it was a
Civil Liability Ex Delicto in Estafa Cases "sort of loan."[36] In the dispositive portion of the
RTC Decision, the RTC Manila ruled that the
Our laws penalize criminal fraud which causes prosecution "failed to establish the guilt of the
damage capable of pecuniary estimation through accused beyond reasonable doubt."[37] It then
estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal proceeded to order petitioner to pay the amount of
Code. In general, the elements of estafa are: the loan.
 
(1) That the accused defrauded another The ruling of the RTC Manila was affirmed by the
(a) by abuse of confidence, or CA. It said that "[t]he acquittal of Gloria Dy is
(b) by means of deceit; and anchored on the ground that her guilt was not
  proved beyond reasonable doubt - not because she
(2) That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary is not the author of the act or omission complained
estimation is caused to the offended party or third of. x x x The trial court found no trickery nor
person. deceit in obtaining money from the private
  complainant; instead, it concluded that the money
The essence of the crime is the unlawful abuse of obtained was undoubtedly a loan."[38]
confidence or deceit in order to cause damage. As
this Court previously held, "the element of fraud or Our jurisprudence on this matter diverges.
bad faith is indispensable."[35] Our law abhors the
act of defrauding another person by abusing his Earlier cases ordered the dismissal of the civil
trust or deceiving him, such that, it criminalizes action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto
this kind of fraud. whenever there is a finding that there was no estafa
but rather an obligation to pay under a contract. In
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code identifies People v. Pantig,[39] this Court affirmed the ruling
the circumstances which constitute estafa. Article of the lower court acquitting Pantig, but revoked
315, paragraph 1 (b) states that estafa is committed the portion sentencing him to pay the offended
by abuse of confidence — party the amount of money alleged to have been
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa)-x x x (b) By obtained through false and fraudulent
misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of representations, thus —
another, money, goods, or any other personal  
property received by the offender in trust or on The trial court found as a fact that the sum of
commission, or for administration, or under any P1,200, ordered to be paid in the judgment of
other obligation involving the duty to make acquittal, was received by the defendant-appellant
delivery of or to return the same, even though such as loan. This finding is inconsistent with the
obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a existence of the criminal act charged in the
bond; or by denying having received such money, information. The liability of the defendant for the
goods, or other property. return of the amount so received arises from a civil
  contract, not from a criminal act, and may not be
In this kind of estafa, the fraud which the law enforced in the criminal case.
considers as criminal is the act of misappropriation
or conversion. When the element of The portion of the judgment appealed from, which
misappropriation or conversion is missing, there orders the defendant-appellant to pay the sum of Pi
can be no estafa. In such case, applying the ,200 to the offended party, is hereby revoked,
foregoing discussions on civil liability ex delicto, without prejudice to the filing of a civil action for
there can be no civil liability as there is no act or the recovery of the said amount.[40]
omission from which any civil liability may be  
sourced. However, when an accused is acquitted This was also the import of the ruling in People v.
because a reasonable doubt exists as to the Singson.[41] In that case, this Court found that
existence of misappropriation or conversion, then "the evidence [was] not sufficient to establish the
civil liability may still be awarded. This means existence of fraud or deceit on the part of the
that, while there is evidence to prove fraud, such accused. x x x And when there is no proven deceit
evidence does not suffice to convince the court to or fraud, there is no crime of estafa."[42] While we
the point of moral certainty that the act of fraud also said that the established facts may prove
amounts to estafa. As the act was nevertheless Singson's civil liability (obligation to pay under a
proven, albeit without sufficient proof justifying contract of sale), we nevertheless made no finding
the imposition of any criminal penalty, civil of civil liability because "our mind cannot rest easy
liability exists. on the certainty of guilt"[43] considering the above
finding. The dispositive portion stated that Singson
In this case, the RTC Manila acquitted petitioner is acquitted "without prejudice to any civil liability
because the prosecution failed to establish by which may be established in a civil case against
sufficient evidence the element of her."[44]
misappropriation or conversion. There was no
However, our jurisprudence on the matter appears breach. Thus, any finding that the source of
to have changed in later years. obligation is a contract negates estafa. The finding,
in turn, means that there is no civil liability ex
In Eusebio-Calderon v. People,[45] this Court delicto. Thus, the rulings in the foregoing cases are
affirmed the finding of the CA that Calderon "did consistent with the concept of fused civil and
not employ trickery or deceit in obtaining money criminal actions, and the different sources of
from the private complainants, instead, it obligations under our laws.
concluded that the money obtained was
undoubtedly loans for which [Calderon] paid We apply this doctrine to the facts of this case.
interest."[46] Thus, this Court upheld Calderon's Petitioner was acquitted by the RTC Manila
acquittal of estafa, but found her civilly liable for because of the absence of the element of
the principal amount borrowed from the private misappropriation or conversion. The RTC Manila,
complainants.[47] as affirmed by the CA, found that Mandy delivered
the checks to petitioner pursuant to a loan
The ruling was similar in People v. Cuyugan.[48] agreement. Clearly, there is no crime of estafa.
In that case, we acquitted Cuyugan of estafa for There is no proof of the presence of any act or
failure of the prosecution to prove fraud. We held omission constituting criminal fraud. Thus, civil
that the transaction between Cuyugan and private liability ex delicto cannot be awarded because
complainants was a loan to be used by Cuyugan in there is no act or omission punished by law which
her business. Thus, this Court ruled that Cuyugan can serve as the source of obligation. Any civil
has the obligation, which is civil in character, to liability arising from the loan takes the nature of a
pay the amount borrowed.[49] civil liability ex contractu. It does not pertain to the
civil action deemed instituted with the criminal
We hold that the better rule in ascertaining civil case.
liability in estafa cases is that pronounced in Pantig
and Singson. The rulings in these cases are more in In Manantan, this Court explained the effects of
accord with the relevant provisions of the Civil this result on the civil liability deemed instituted
Code, and the Rules of Court. They are also with the criminal case. At the risk of repetition,
logically consistent with this Court's Manantan held that when there is no delict, "civil
pronouncement in Manantan. liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the
civil action, if any, which may be instituted must
Under Pantig and Singson, whenever the elements be based on grounds other than the delict
of estafa are not established, and that the delivery complained of."[51] In Dy's case, the civil liability
of any personal property was made pursuant to a arises out of contract—a different source of
contract, any civil liability arising from the estafa obligation apart from an act or omission punished
cannot be awarded in the criminal case. This is by law—and must be claimed in a separate civil
because the civil liability arising from the contract action.
is not civil liability ex delicto, which arises from
the same act or omission constituting the crime. Violation of Due Process
Civil liability ex delicto is the liability sought to be
recovered in a civil action deemed instituted with We further note that the evidence on record never
the criminal case. fully established the terms of this loan contract. As
the trial before the RTC Manila was focused on
The situation envisioned in the foregoing cases, as proving estafa, the loan contract was, as a
in this case, is civil liability ex contractu where the consequence, only tangentially considered. This
civil liability arises from an entirely different provides another compelling reason why the civil
source of obligation. Therefore, it is not the type of liability arising from the loan should be instituted
civil action deemed instituted in the criminal case, in a separate civil case. A civil action for collection
and consequently must be filed separately. This is of sum of money filed before the proper court will
necessarily so because whenever the court makes a provide for a better venue where the terms of the
finding that the elements of estafa do not exist, it loan and other relevant details may be received.
effectively says that there is no crime. There is no While this may postpone a warranted recovery of
act or omission that constitutes criminal fraud. the civil liability, this Court deems it more
Civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded as it important to uphold the principles underlying the
cannot be sourced from something that does not inherent differences in the various sources of
exist. obligations under our law, and the rule that fused
actions only refer to criminal and civil actions
When the court finds that the source of obligation involving the same act or omission. These legal
is in fact, a contract, as in a contract of loan, it tenets play a central role in this legal system. A
takes a position completely inconsistent with the confusion of these principles will ultimately
presence of estafa. In estafa, a person parts with his jeopardize the interests of the parties involved.
money because of abuse of confidence or deceit. In Actions focused on proving estafa is not the proper
a contract, a person willingly binds himself or vehicle to thresh out civil liability arising from a
herself to give something or to render some contract.[52] The Due Process Clause of the
service.[50] In estafa, the accused's failure to Constitution dictates that a civil liability arising
account for the property received amounts to from a contract must be litigated in a separate civil
criminal fraud. In a contract, a party's failure to action.
comply with his obligation is only a contractual
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights states that no person look for in the initiatory pleading. In such a case,
shall be deprived of property without due process the accused-respondent is blindsided. He or she
of law. This provision protects a person's right to could not even have prepared the appropriate
both substantive and procedural due process. defenses and evidence to protect his or her interest.
Substantive due process looks into the validity of a This is not the concept of fair play embodied in the
law and protects against arbitrariness.[53] Due Process Clause. It is a clear violation of a
Procedural due process, on the other hand, person's right to due process.
guarantees procedural fairness.[54] It requires an
ascertainment of "what process is due, when it is The Rules of Court also allows a party to a civil
due, and the degree of what is due."[55] This action certain remedies that enable him or her to
aspect of due process is at the heart of this case. effectively present his or her case. A party may file
a cross-claim, a counterclaim or a third-party
In general terms, procedural due process means the complaint.[61] The Rules of Court prohibits these
right to notice and hearing.[56] More specifically, remedies in a fused civil and criminal case.[62]
our Rules of Court provides for a set of procedures The Rules of Court requires that any cross-claim,
through which a person may be notified of the counterclaim or third-party complaint must be
claims against him or her as well as methods instituted in a separate civil action.[63] In a legal
through which he or she may be given the adequate regime where a court may order an accused in a
opportunity to be heard. fused action to pay civil liability arising from a
contract, the accused-respondent is completely
The Rules of Court requires that any person deprived of the remedy to file a cross-claim, a
invoking the power of the judiciary to protect or counterclaim or a third-party complaint. This—
enforce a right or prevent or redress a wrong[57] coupled with an accused-respondent's inability to
must file an initiatory pleading which embodies a adequately prepare his or her defense because of
cause of action,[58] which is defined as the act or lack of adequate notice of the claims against him
omission by which a party violates a right of or her—prevents the accused-respondent from
another.[59] The contents of an initiatory pleading having any right to a meaningful hearing. The right
alleging a cause of action will vary depending on to be heard under the Due Process Clause requires
the source of the obligation involved. In the case of not just any kind of an opportunity to be heard. It
an obligation arising from a contract, as in this mandates that a party to a case must have the
case, the cause of action in an initiatory pleading chance to be heard in a real and meaningful sense.
will involve the duties of the parties to the contract, It does not require a perfunctory hearing, but a
and what particular obligation was breached. On court proceeding where the party may adequately
the other hand, when the obligation arises from an avail of the procedural remedies granted to him or
act or omission constituting a crime, the cause of her. A court decision resulting from this falls short
action must necessarily be different. In such a case, of the mandate of the Due Process Clause.
the initiatory pleading will assert as a cause of Indeed, the language of the Constitution is clear.
action the act or omission of respondent, and the No person shall be deprived of property without
specific criminal statute he or she violated. Where due process of law. Due Process, in its procedural
the initiatory pleading fails to state a cause of sense, requires, in essence, the right to notice and
action, the respondent may file a motion to dismiss hearing. These rights are further fleshed out in the
even before trial.[60] These rules embody the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court enforces
fundamental right to notice under the Due Process procedural due process because, to repeat the
Clause of the Constitution. words of this Court in Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion, it provides for "what process is due, when
In a situation where a court (in a fused action for it is due, and the degree of what is due."[64] A
the enforcement of criminal and civil liability) may court ordering an accused in a fused action to pay
validly order an accused-respondent to pay an his or her contractual liability deprives him or her
obligation arising from a contract, a person's right of his or her property without the right to notice
to be notified of the complaint, and the right to and hearing as expressed in the procedures and
have the complaint dismissed if there is no cause remedies under the Rules of Court. Thus, any court
of action, are completely defeated. In this event, ruling directing an accused in a fused action to pay
the accused-respondent is completely unaware of civil liability arising from a contract is one that
the nature of the liability claimed against him or completely disregards the Due Process Clause.
her at the onset of the case. The accused- This ruling must be reversed and the Constitution
respondent will not have read any complaint upheld.
stating the cause of action of an obligation arising
from a contract. All throughout the trial, the Conclusion
accused-respondent is made to believe that should The lower courts erred when they ordered
there be any civil liability awarded against him or petitioner to pay her civil obligation arising from a
her, this liability is rooted from the act or omission contract of loan in the same criminal case where
constituting the crime. The accused-respondent is she was acquitted on the ground that there was no
also deprived of the remedy of having the crime. Any contractual obligation she may have
complaint dismissed through a motion to dismiss must be litigated in a separate civil action
before trial. In a fused action, the accused- involving the contract of loan. We clarify that in
respondent could not have availed of this remedy cases where the accused is acquitted on the ground
because he or she was not even given an that there is no crime, the civil action deemed
opportunity to ascertain what cause of action to instituted with the criminal case cannot prosper
precisely because there is no delict from which any criminal courts as their collection agents, and
civil obligation may be sourced. The peculiarity of should provide a disincentive to the practice of
this case is the finding that petitioner, in fact, has filing of criminal cases based on unfounded
an obligation arising from a contract. This civil grounds in order to provide a litigant a bargaining
action arising from the contract is not necessarily chip in enforcing contracts.
extinguished. It can be instituted in the proper
court through the proper civil action. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the CA
We note that while there is no written contract of dated February 25, 2009 is REVERSED. This is
loan in this case, there is an oral contract of loan however, without prejudice to any civil action
which must be brought within six years.[65] Under which may be filed to claim civil liability arising
the facts of the case, it appears that any breach in from the contract.
the obligation to pay the loan may have happened
between 1996 and 1999, or more than six years SO ORDERED.
since this case has been instituted. This Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez, and
notwithstanding, we find that the civil action Reyes, JJ., concur.
arising from the contract of loan has not yet
prescribed. Article 1150 of the Civil Code states —
 
Art. 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of
actions, when there is no special provision which
ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day
they may be brought.
 
We held in numerous cases that it is the legal
possibility of bringing the action that determines
the starting point for the computation of the period
of prescription.[67] We highlight the unique
circumstances surrounding this case. As discussed
in this decision, there has been diverse
jurisprudence as to the propriety of ordering an
accused to pay an obligation arising from a
contract in the criminal case where the accused
was acquitted on the ground that there is no crime.
Litigants, such as MCCI, cannot be blamed for
relying on prior rulings where the recovery on a
contract of loan in a criminal case for estafa was
allowed. We have found the opportunity to clarify
this matter through this decision. As it is only now
that we delineate the rules governing the fusion of
criminal and civil actions pertaining to estafa, it is
only upon the promulgation of this judgment that
litigants have a clear understanding of the proper
recourse in similar cases. We therefore rule that
insofar as MCCI is concerned, the filing of an
action, if any (that may be sourced from the
contract of loan), becomes a legal possibility only
upon the finality of this decision which definitively
ruled upon the principles on fused actions.

We add, however, that upon finality of this

decision, prospective litigants should become more
circumspect in ascertaining their course of action
in similar cases. Whenever a litigant erroneously
pursues an estafa case, and the accused is
subsequently acquitted because the obligation
arose out of a contract, the prescriptive period will
still be counted from the time the cause of action
arose. In this eventuality, it is probable that the
action has already prescribed by the time the
criminal case shall have been completed. This
possibility demands that prospective litigants do
not haphazardly pursue the filing of an estafa case
in order to force an obligor to pay his or her
obligation with the threat of criminal conviction. It
compels litigants to be honest and fair in their
judgment as to the proper action to be filed. This
ruling should deter litigants from turning to
 the appellate court upheld accused-appellant's
conviction, but modified the award of damages to
AAA. The Court of Appeals decreed:
 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We find
no error committed by the Trial Court and, hence,
DENY the appeal. The Decision dated 11 March
2015 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Loay, Bohol 7th Judicial Region, Branch 50, in
Case #6 of Articles 29-35: Criminal Case Nos. 1317 and 1318, is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RUBEN As modified, [accused-]appellant Ruben Calomia
CALOMIA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. is ordered to pay the victim AAA the amounts of
G.R. No. 229856 | 2017-11-20 P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00, as
moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary
*Issue: damages. Interest is imposed on all damages
awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.[4]
 
*In re to On September 21, 2016, accused-appellant filed
his Notice of Appeal expressing his intention to
appeal the foregoing Decision before this Court.

RESOLUTION The Court issued a Resolution dated April 25,

  2017 requiring the parties to file their respective
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30
  days from notice; ordering the Provincial Jail
In Criminal Case Nos. 1317 and 1318, accused- Warden, Bohol Detention and Rehabilitation
appellant Ruben Calomia was charged before the Center, Tagbilaran City, to transfer accused-
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Loay, Bohol, appellant to the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa
Branch 50, with two counts of qualified rape of his City and to submit a report of such transfer; and
minor daughter, AAA,[1] which he allegedly ordering the Director General of the Bureau of
committed sometime in August 2007 and April Corrections to confirm the confinement of
2008.[2] accused-appellant to said prison and submit a
report thereon.
After trial on the merits, the RTC promulgated its  
Decision on March 11, 2015 finding accused- However, the Court received on September 4, 2017
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both a letter dated August 2, 2017 from Jail Chief
counts of qualified rape and sentencing him as Inspector (J/CINSP) Felipe A. Montejo (Montejo),
follows: DDM, Bohol District Jail Warden, stating thus:
   
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing Please be informed that the said appellant [has]
evidence, the court finds the accused guilty beyond died while in the confinement of Bohol District Jail
reasonable doubt of (Qualified) Incestuous Rape in last Sept. 29, 2015 due to Asphyxia due to
Crim. Case No. 1317 and Statutory Incestuous Strangulation, Self Inflicted, Hanging and declared
Rape in Crim. Case No. 1318. dead by Dr. Calvelo, Medical Officer III, City
Health Office, Tagbilaran City, Bohol per
Accordingly, in both cases, the court has no Certificate of Death from Local Civil Registrar.
recourse but to impose on the accused the penalties
mandated by law. Although the crimes of Qualified Accused Ruben Calomia was due for transfer at
Incestuous Rape and Statutory Incestuous Rape BUCOR Muntinlupa City at that time pending the
would have been punishable by death, in view of approval of budget but unfortunately he died with
the passage of R.A. [No.] 9346 (which prohibits the aforementioned cause of death before the
the imposition of the death penalty), the penalty scheduled date and time to transfer.[5]
iinposable for each of the two offenses is only  
reclusion perpetua. Attached to J/CINSP Montejo's letter is a copy of
accused-appellant's Death Certificate issued by the
Because of the qualifying or aggravating Office of the Civil Registrar General indicating
circumstance of relationship, the victim is entitled that accused-appellant died on September 29, 2015
to civil indemnity in each case of P75,000 ex in Cabawan District, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, of
delicto, P75,000 in moral damages (People v. "Asphyxia due to Strangulation, Self Inflicted,
Lauga, G.R. No. 186228, Mar. 15, 2010), and Hanging."
P30,000 in exemplary damages (ibid.).[3]
  Paragraph 1 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Accused-appellant's appeal before the Court of Code, as amended, provides that the death of an
Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC accused pending his appeal extinguishes both his
No. 02040. In its Decision dated August 26, 2016, criminal and civil liability ex delicto, thus:
 
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally In the instant case, accused-appellant's death
extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally occurred prior to the finality of the judgment of
extinguished: conviction rendered against him. In fact, accused
appellant died way back on September 29, 2015,
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal during the pendency of his appeal before the Court
penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability of Appeals. Unfortunately, the appellate court was
therefore is extinguished only when the death of not timely inf9rmed of accused-appellant's death
the offender occurs before final judgment[.] prior to the promulgation of its Decision in CA-
  G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 02040 on August 26, 2016.
In People v. Bayotas,[6] the Court construed the
above provision and pronounced these guidelines: Irrefragably, accused-appellant's death
  extinguished his criminal liability and his civil
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his liabilities directly arising from and based solely on
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as the crime/s he committed. Accused-appellant's
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As conviction by the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the Appeals, must therefore be set aside as the same
death of the accused prior to final judgment had already been rendered ineffectual.
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to SET
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto ASIDE the Decision dated August 26, 2016 of the
in senso strictiore." Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No.
02040 and to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 1317
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives and 1318 before the Regional Trial Court of Loay,
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same Bohol, Branch 50, by reason of the death of the
may also be predicated on a source of obligation sole accused therein, Ruben Calomia, on
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code September 29, 2015.
enumerates these other sources of obligation from
which the civil liability may arise as a result of the SO ORDERED.
same act or omission:
Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Del Castillo,
a) Law Jardeleza, and Tijam, JJ., concur.
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in

Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of
the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear

a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155
of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription. (Emphases supplied.)
 
The death of an accused pending the appeal of his
conviction extinguishes the criminal action, as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; and the civil action instituted therein for
the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is likewise
ipso facto extinguished, as it is grounded on the
criminal action.[7]