|BSB GROUP, INC. V. GO, G.R. NO.

168644, [FEBRUARY 16, 2010], 626 PHIL 501-518

THIRD DIVISION: [G.R. No. 168644. February 16, 2010.]
BSB GROUP, INC., represented by its President, Mr. RICARDO BANGAYAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SALLY GO
a.k.a. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, accused-appellant.
DECISION: PERALTA, J p:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 87600 1 dated April 20, 2005, which reversed and set aside the September 13, 2004 2 and
November 5, 2004 3 Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 4 in Criminal Case No. 02-
202158 for qualified theft. The said orders, in turn, respectively denied the motion filed by herein respondent
Sally Go for the suppression of the testimonial and documentary evidence relative to a Security Bank account,
and denied reconsideration.
The basic antecedents are no longer disputed.
Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized domestic corporation presided by its herein representative,
Ricardo Bangayan (Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go, alternatively referred to as Sally Sia Go and Sally Go-
Bangayan, is Bangayan's wife, who was employed in the company as a cashier, and was engaged, among
others, to receive and account for the payments made by the various customers of the company.
In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutor's Office a complaint for estafa and/or qualified theft 5
against respondent, alleging that several checks 6 representing the aggregate amount of P1,534,135.50 issued
by the company's customers in payment of their obligation were, instead of being turned over to the
company's coffers, indorsed by respondent who deposited the same to her personal banking account
maintained at Security Bank and Trust Company (Security Bank) in Divisoria, Manila Branch. 7 Upon a finding
that the evidence adduced was uncontroverted, the assistant city prosecutor recommended the filing of the
Information for qualified theft against respondent. 8 IDCScA
Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, in an Information,
the inculpatory portion of which reads:
That in or about or sometime during the period comprised (sic) between January 1988 [and] October 1989,
inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent [to] gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and
carry away cash money in the total amount of P1,534,135.50 belonging to BSB GROUP OF COMPANIES
represented by RICARDO BANGAYAN, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of
P1,534,135.50, Philippine currency.
That in the commission of the said offense, said accused acted with grave abuse of confidence, being then
employed as cashier by said complainant at the time of the commission of the said offense and as such she
was entrusted with the said amount of money.
Contrary to law. 9
Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned. 10 The trial ensued. On the premise that respondent had
allegedly encashed the subject checks and deposited the corresponding amounts thereof to her personal
banking account, the prosecution moved for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum against
the respective managers or records custodians of Security Bank's Divisoria Branch, as well as of the Asian
Savings Bank (now Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. [Metrobank]), in Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila Branch.
11 The trial court granted the motion and issued the corresponding subpoena. 12
Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena dated November 4, 2003, addressed to Metrobank, noting
to the court that in the complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor, there was no mention made of the said
bank account, to which respondent, in addition to the Security Bank account identified as Account No. 01-14-
006, allegedly deposited the proceeds of the supposed checks. Interestingly, while respondent characterized
the Metrobank account as irrelevant to the case, she, in the same motion, nevertheless waived her objection

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to the irrelevancy of the Security Bank account mentioned in the same complaint-affidavit, inasmuch as she
was admittedly willing to address the allegations with respect thereto. 13 cTADCH
Petitioner, opposing respondent's move, argued for the relevancy of the Metrobank account on the ground
that the complaint-affidavit showed that there were two checks which respondent allegedly deposited in an
account with the said bank. 14 To this, respondent filed a supplemental motion to quash, invoking the
absolutely confidential nature of the Metrobank account under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1405.
15 The trial court did not sustain respondent; hence, it denied the motion to quash for lack of merit. 16
Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of Elenita Marasigan (Marasigan), the
representative of Security Bank. In a nutshell, Marasigan's testimony sought to prove that between 1988 and
1989, respondent, while engaged as cashier at the BSB Group, Inc., was able to run away with the checks
issued to the company by its customers, endorse the same, and credit the corresponding amounts to her
personal deposit account with Security Bank. In the course of the testimony, the subject checks were
presented to Marasigan for identification and marking as the same checks received by respondent, endorsed,
and then deposited in her personal account with Security Bank. 17 But before the testimony could be
completed, respondent filed a Motion to Suppress, 18 seeking the exclusion of Marasigan's testimony and
accompanying documents thus far received, bearing on the subject Security Bank account. This time
respondent invokes, in addition to irrelevancy, the privilege of confidentiality under R.A. No. 1405.
The trial court, nevertheless, denied the motion in its September 13, 2004 Order. 19 A motion for
reconsideration was subsequently filed, but it was also denied in the Order dated November 5, 2004. 20 These
two orders are the subject of the instant case.
Aggrieved, and believing that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in acting the way it did, respondent
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Finding merit in the
petition, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the trial court in its April 20, 2005
Decision. 21 The decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders dated September 13, 2004 and November
5, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The testimony of the SBTC representative is ordered stricken from the
records.
SO ORDERED. 22
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, 23 petitioner is now before the Court pleading the same
issues as those raised before the lower courts. DcaCSE
In this Petition 24 under Rule 45, petitioner averred in the main that the Court of Appeals had seriously erred
in reversing the assailed orders of the trial court, and in effect striking out Marasigan's testimony dealing with
respondent's deposit account with Security Bank. 25 It asserted that apart from the fact that the said evidence
had a direct relation to the subject matter of the case for qualified theft and, hence, brings the case under one
of the exceptions to the coverage of confidentiality under R.A. 1405. 26 Petitioner believed that what
constituted the subject matter in litigation was to be determined by the allegations in the information and, in
this respect, it alluded to the assailed November 5, 2004 Order of the trial court, which declared to be
erroneous the limitation of the present inquiry merely to what was contained in the information. 27
For her part, respondent claimed that the money represented by the Security Bank account was neither
relevant nor material to the case, because nothing in the criminal information suggested that the money
therein deposited was the subject matter of the case. She invited particular attention to that portion of the
criminal Information which averred that she has stolen and carried away cash money in the total amount of
P1,534,135.50. She advanced the notion that the term "cash money" stated in the Information was not
synonymous with the checks she was purported to have stolen from petitioner and deposited in her personal
banking account. Thus, the checks which the prosecution had Marasigan identify, as well as the testimony
itself of Marasigan, should be suppressed by the trial court at least for violating respondent's right to due

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process. 28 More in point, respondent opined that admitting the testimony of Marasigan, as well as the
evidence pertaining to the Security Bank account, would violate the secrecy rule under R.A. No. 1405. 29
In its reply, petitioner asserted the sufficiency of the allegations in the criminal Information for qualified theft,
as the same has sufficiently alleged the elements of the offense charged. It posits that through Marasigan's
testimony, the Court would be able to establish that the checks involved, copies of which were attached to the
complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor, had indeed been received by respondent as cashier, but were,
thereafter, deposited by the latter to her personal account with Security Bank. Petitioner held that the checks
represented the cash money stolen by respondent and, hence, the subject matter in this case is not only the
cash amount represented by the checks supposedly stolen by respondent, but also the checks themselves. 30
We derive from the conflicting advocacies of the parties that the issue for resolution is whether the testimony
of Marasigan and the accompanying documents are irrelevant to the case, and whether they are also violative
of the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits and, hence, excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405. The
question of admissibility of the evidence thus comes to the fore. And the Court, after deliberative estimation,
finds the subject evidence to be indeed inadmissible. caIDSH 
Prefatorily, fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the constitutive acts of the offense
must be established with unwavering exactitude and moral certainty because this is the critical and only
requisite to a finding of guilt. 31 Theft is present when a person, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, takes the personal property of another without the
latter's consent. It is qualified when, among others, and as alleged in the instant case, it is committed with
abuse of confidence. 32 The prosecution of this offense necessarily focuses on the existence of the following
elements: (a) there was taking of personal property belonging to another; (b) the taking was done with intent
to gain; (c) the taking was done without the consent of the owner; (d) the taking was done without violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things; and (e) it was done with abuse of confidence. 33 In
turn, whether these elements concur in a way that overcomes the presumption of guiltlessness, is a question
that must pass the test of relevancy and competency in accordance with Section 3 34 Rule 128 of the Rules of
Court.
Thus, whether these pieces of evidence sought to be suppressed in this case — the testimony of Marasigan, as
well as the checks purported to have been stolen and deposited in respondent's Security Bank account — are
relevant, is to be addressed by considering whether they have such direct relation to the fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence; or whether they relate collaterally to a fact from which, by
process of logic, an inference may be made as to the existence or non-existence of the fact in issue. 35
The fact in issue appears to be that respondent has taken away cash in the amount of P1,534,135.50 from the
coffers of petitioner. In support of this allegation, petitioner seeks to establish the existence of the elemental
act of taking by adducing evidence that respondent, at several times between 1988 and 1989, deposited some
of its checks to her personal account with Security Bank. Petitioner addresses the incongruence between the
allegation of theft of cash in the Information, on the one hand, and the evidence that respondent had first
stolen the checks and deposited the same in her banking account, on the other hand, by impressing upon the
Court that there obtains no difference between cash and check for purposes of prosecuting respondent for
theft of cash. Petitioner is mistaken.
In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of personal property of one by another with intent to
gain, and it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen because
the deprivation relative to the offended party has already ensued from such act of execution. 36 The
allegation of theft of money, hence, necessitates that evidence presented must have a tendency to prove that
the offender has unlawfully taken money belonging to another. Interestingly, petitioner has taken pains in
attempting to draw a connection between the evidence subject of the instant review, and the allegation of
theft in the Information by claiming that respondent had fraudulently deposited the checks in her own name.

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But this line of argument works more prejudice than favor, because it in effect, seeks to establish the
commission, not of theft, but rather of some other crime — probably estafa. cCDAHE
Moreover, that there is no difference between cash and check is true in other instances. In estafa by
conversion, for instance, whether the thing converted is cash or check, is immaterial in relation to the formal
allegation in an information for that offense; a check, after all, while not regarded as legal tender, is normally
accepted under commercial usage as a substitute for cash, and the credit it represents in stated monetary
value is properly capable of appropriation. And it is in this respect that what the offender does with the check
subsequent to the act of unlawfully taking it becomes material inasmuch as this offense is a continuing one. 37
In other words, in pursuing a case for this offense, the prosecution may establish its cause by the presentation
of the checks involved. These checks would then constitute the best evidence to establish their contents and
to prove the elemental act of conversion in support of the proposition that the offender has indeed indorsed
the same in his own name. 38
Theft, however, is not of such character. Thus, for our purposes, as the Information in this case accuses
respondent of having stolen cash, proof tending to establish that respondent has actualized her criminal intent
by indorsing the checks and depositing the proceeds thereof in her personal account, becomes not only
irrelevant but also immaterial and, on that score, inadmissible in evidence.
We now address the issue of whether the admission of Marasigan's testimony on the particulars of
respondent's account with Security Bank, as well as of the corresponding evidence of the checks allegedly
deposited in said account, constitutes an unallowable inquiry under R.A. 1405.
It is conceded that while the fundamental law has not bothered with the triviality of specifically addressing
privacy rights relative to banking accounts, there, nevertheless, exists in our jurisdiction a legitimate
expectation of privacy governing such accounts. The source of this right of expectation is statutory, and it is
found in R.A. No. 1405, 39 otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955. 40
R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes. It hopes to discourage private hoarding and at the same time
encourage the people to deposit their money in banking institutions, so that it may be utilized by way of
authorized loans and thereby assist in economic development. 41 Owing to this piece of legislation, the
confidentiality of bank deposits remains to be a basic state policy in the Philippines. 42 Section 2 of the law
institutionalized this policy by characterizing as absolutely confidential in general all deposits of whatever
nature with banks and other financial institutions in the country. It declares: CIAacS
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission
of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter
of the litigation.
Subsequent statutory enactments 43 have expanded the list of exceptions to this policy yet the secrecy of
bank deposits still lies as the general rule, falling as it does within the legally recognized zones of privacy. 44
There is, in fact, much disfavor to construing these primary and supplemental exceptions in a manner that
would authorize unbridled discretion, whether governmental or otherwise, in utilizing these exceptions as
authority for unwarranted inquiry into bank accounts. It is then perceivable that the present legal order is
obliged to conserve the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits. 45
The measure of protection afforded by the law has been explained in China Banking Corporation v. Ortega. 46
That case principally addressed the issue of whether the prohibition against an examination of bank deposits
precludes garnishment in satisfaction of a judgment. Ruling on that issue in the negative, the Court found
guidance in the relevant portions of the legislative deliberations on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No.
3977, which later became the Bank Secrecy Act, and it held that the absolute confidentiality rule in R.A. No.
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1405 actually aims at protection from unwarranted inquiry or investigation if the purpose of such inquiry or
investigation is merely to determine the existence and nature, as well as the amount of the deposit in any
given bank account. Thus,
. . . The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B&B Forest Development
Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not
the defendant B&B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for
purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any
withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from. the discussion of the conference committee report on
Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977 which later became Republic Act No. 1405, that it was not the
intention of the lawmakers to place banks deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final, judgment.
Thus: TIHCcA
. . . Mr. Marcos:
Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means to clarify
this further. Suppose an individual has a tax case. He is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
[(BIR)] or, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because of this the deposit of this individual [has been]
attached by the [BIR].
Mr. Ramos:
The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced sentence declaring the liability of such person.
But where the primary aim is to determine whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a proper
assessment by the [BIR], such inquiry is not allowed by this proposed law.
Mr. Marcos:
But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the attachment or garnishment of money
deposited is allowed. Let us assume for instance that there is a preliminary attachment which is for
garnishment or for holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain individual, but such attachment
or garnishment will bring out into the open the value of such deposit. Is that prohibited by . . . the law?  
Mr. Ramos:
It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry . . . is made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax liability
already declared for the protection of the right in favor of the government; but when the object is merely to
inquire whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of taxation, then this is fully covered by the law. . . .
Mr. Marcos:
The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and the amount of the deposit.
Mr. Ramos:
Into the very nature of such deposit. . . . 47
In taking exclusion from the coverage of the confidentiality rule, petitioner in the instant case posits that the
account maintained by respondent with Security Bank contains the proceeds of the checks that she has
fraudulently appropriated to herself and, thus, falls under one of the exceptions in Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405
— that the money kept in said account is the subject matter in litigation. To highlight this thesis, petitioner
avers, citing Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., 48 that the subject matter of the action refers to the
physical facts; the things real or personal; the money, lands, chattels and the like, in relation to which the suit
is prosecuted, which in the instant case should refer to the money deposited in the Security Bank account. 49
On the surface, however, it seems that petitioner's theory is valid to a point, yet a deeper treatment tends to
show that it has argued quite off-tangentially. This, because, while Mathay did explain what the subject matter
of an action is, it nevertheless did so only to determine whether the class suit in that case was properly
brought to the Court. aAcHCT
What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 has been
pointedly and amply addressed in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 50 in which the Court
noted that the inquiry into bank deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be premised on the fact that the
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money deposited in the account is itself the subject of the action. 51 Given this perspective, we deduce that
the subject matter of the action in the case at bar is to be determined from the indictment that charges
respondent with the offense, and not from the evidence sought by the prosecution to be admitted into the
records. In the criminal Information filed with the trial court, respondent, unqualifiedly and in plain language,
is charged with qualified theft by abusing petitioner's trust and confidence and stealing cash in the amount of
P1,534,135.50. The said Information makes no factual allegation that in some material way involves the checks
subject of the testimonial and documentary evidence sought to be suppressed. Neither do the allegations in
said Information make mention of the supposed bank account in which the funds represented by the checks
have allegedly been kept.
In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment itself that the Security Bank account is the
ostensible subject of the prosecution's inquiry. Without needlessly expanding the scope of what is plainly
alleged in the Information, the subject matter of the action in this case is the money amounting to
P1,534,135.50 alleged to have been stolen by respondent, and not the money equivalent of the checks which
are sought to be admitted in evidence. Thus, it is that, which the prosecution is bound to prove with its
evidence, and no other.
It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and documentary evidence relative to respondent's Security
Bank account serves no other purpose than to establish the existence of such account, its nature and the
amount kept in it. It constitutes an attempt by the prosecution at an impermissible inquiry into a bank deposit
account the privacy and confidentiality of which is protected by law. On this score alone, the objection posed
by respondent in her motion to suppress should have indeed put an end to the controversy at the very first
instance it was raised before the trial court.
In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the particulars of respondent's supposed bank account
with Security Bank and the documentary evidence represented by the checks adduced in support thereof, are
not only incompetent for being excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405. They are likewise irrelevant to the
case, inasmuch as they do not appear to have any logical and reasonable connection to the prosecution of
respondent for qualified theft. We find full merit in and affirm respondent's objection to the evidence of the
prosecution. The Court of Appeals was, therefore, correct in reversing the assailed orders of the trial court.
cEHSIC
A final note. In any given jurisdiction where the right of privacy extends its scope to include an individual's
financial privacy rights and personal financial matters, there is an intermediate or heightened scrutiny given by
courts and legislators to laws infringing such rights. 52 Should there be doubts in upholding the absolutely
confidential nature of bank deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into such accounts, then such
doubts must be resolved in favor of the former. This attitude persists unless congress lifts its finger to reverse
the general state policy respecting the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits. 53
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87600 dated April
20, 2005, reversing the September 13, 2004 and November 5, 2004 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 36 in Criminal Case No. 02-202158, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, Velasco, Jr., Nachura and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
 
A.C. NO. 6470, JULY 08, 2014 - MERCEDITA DE JESUS, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT,
RESPONDENT.
EN BANC: A.C. No. 6470, July 08, 2014
MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N: SERENO, C.J.:

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Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus) against respondent Atty.
Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty,
malpractices, and unworthiness to become an officer of the Court.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE

In the Affidavit-Complaint 1 filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar Confidant on 23 June 2004, she
alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public
market stall that falsely named the former as its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee
sued complainant for perjury and for collection of sum of money. She claimed that respondent was a
consultant of the local government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore aware that the market stall
was government-owned.

Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused complainant legal and financial
problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by respondent sometime in September 1999
without the signature of the lessees. However, complainant only found out that the agreement had not been
signed by the lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for another copy from respondent. The other
contract was a sale agreement over a property covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)
which complainant entered into with a certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent
drafted and notarized said agreement, but did not advise complainant that the property was still covered by
the period within which it could not be alienated.

In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant subsequently submitted three Special
Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino),
complainant’s secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed by the principals named therein and bore only
the signature of the named attorney-in-fact, Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino’s Affidavit corroborated
complainant’s allegations against respondent.2

On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to
submit her comment on the Complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of notice. 3

In her Comment,4 respondent explained that the mortgage contract was prepared in the presence of
complainant and that the latter had read it before affixing her signature. However, complainant urgently
needed the loan proceeds so the contract was hastily done. It was only copied from a similar file in
respondent’s computer, and the phrase “absolute and registered owner” was inadvertently left unedited. Still,
it should not be a cause for disciplinary action, because complainant constructed the subject public market
stall under a “Build Operate and Transfer” contract with the local government unit and, technically, she could
be considered its owner. Besides, there had been a prior mortgage contract over the same property in which
complainant was represented as the property’s absolute owner, but she did not complain. Moreover, the
cause of the perjury charge against complainant was not the representation of herself as owner of the
mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it was free from all liens and encumbrances. The perjury charge
was even dismissed, because the prosecutor found that complainant and her spouse had, indeed, paid the
debt secured with the previous mortgage contract over the same market stall.

With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document attached to the Affidavit-
Complaint was actually new. She gave the court’s copy of the agreement to complainant to accommodate the
latter’s request for an extra copy. Thus, respondent prepared and notarized a new one, relying on
complainant’s assurance that the lessees would sign it and that it would be returned in lieu of the original
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copy for the court. Complainant, however, reneged on her promise.

As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that complainant
was an experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no advice on the repercussions of that transaction.
Actually, when the purchase agreement was notarized, complainant did not present the CLOA, and so the
agreement mentioned nothing about it. Rather, the agreement expressly stated that the property was the
subject of a case pending before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB);
complainant was thus notified of the status of the subject property. Finally, respondent maintained that the
SPAs submitted by complainant as additional evidence were properly notarized. It can be easily gleaned from
the documents that the attorney-in-fact personally appeared before respondent; hence, the notarization was
limited to the former’s participation in the execution of the document. Moreover, the acknowledgment clearly
stated that the document must be notarized in the principal’s place of residence.

An exchange of pleadings ensued after respondent submitted her Comment. After her rejoinder, complainant
filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Submission of Additional Evidence. 5 Attached thereto were copies of
documents notarized by respondent, including the following: (1) an Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which
referred to the SPAs naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2) five SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the
principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds of sale with incomplete signatures of the parties thereto; (4) an
unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a lease contract that lacked the signature of the lessor; (6) five unsigned
Affidavits; (7) an unsigned insurance claim form (Annual Declaration by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation
Letter to a potential investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank Certification; and (10) an unsigned Consent to
Adoption.

After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective Position Papers. 6 Notably,
respondent’s Position Paper did not tackle the additional documents attached to complainant’s Urgent Ex
Parte Motion.
THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP

In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. recommended the
immediate revocation of the Notarial Commission of respondent and her disqualification as notary public for
two years for her violation of her oath as such by notarizing documents without the signatures of the parties
who had purportedly appeared before her. He accepted respondent’s explanations with respect to the lease
agreement, sale contract, and the three SPAs pertaining to Limpioso. However, he found that the inaccurate
crafting of the real estate mortgage contract was a sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for violation of
Canon 187 and Rule 18.038 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he also recommended that she be
suspended from the practice of law for six months.9

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May 2008, unanimously adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year. 10

Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration11 and Second Motion for Reconsideration.12 She
maintained that the additional documents submitted by complainant were inadmissible, as they were
obtained without observing the procedural requisites under Section 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004
Rules on Notarial Practice).13 Moreover, the Urgent Ex Parte Motion of complainant was actually a
supplemental pleading, which was prohibited under the rules of procedure of the Committee on Bar
Discipline; besides, she was not the proper party to question those documents. Hence, the investigating
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commissioner should have expunged the documents from the records, instead of giving them due course.
Respondent also prayed that mitigating circumstances be considered, specifically the following: absence of
prior disciplinary record; absence of dishonest or selfish motive; personal and emotional problems; timely
good-faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of her misconduct; full and free disclosure
to the disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings; character or reputation; remorse;
and remoteness of prior offenses.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10 March 2012, denied respondent’s
motion for reconsideration for lack of substantial reason to justify a reversal of the IBP’s findings. 14

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director for Bar Discipline Pura Angelica Y. Santiago – through a
letter addressed to then acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio – transmitted the documents pertaining to the
disbarment Complaint against respondent.15
THE COURT’S RULING

After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent and the parties’ submissions in this
case, the Court hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.

Before going into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court shall first dispose of some
procedural matters raised by respondent.

Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence by complainant are inadmissible for
having been obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A comparable
argument was raised in Tolentino v. Mendoza,16 in which the respondent therein opposed the admission of the
birth certificates of his illegitimate children as evidence of his grossly immoral conduct, because those
documents were obtained in violation Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993. 17 Rejecting his
argument, the Court reasoned as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that “evidence is admissible when it is relevant
to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules.” There could be no dispute that the subject birth
certificates are relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for
the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24,
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.

Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons
violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth
records in violation of said rule would render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the
Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal
searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against unreasonable searches and
seizures is meant only to protect a person from interference by the government or the state. In People vs.
Hipol, we explained that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation
between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and
the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers governmental power and protects the individual
against any aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies.
Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of in this case. The alleged "warrantless search"
made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurer's office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the
constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.
Page 9 of 102
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as
evidence against respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not
provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question, said public documents are,
therefore, admissible and should be properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this administrative
case against respondent.18

Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents
obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly considered in evidence the other notarized documents
submitted by complainant as additional evidence.

Respondent’s argument that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion of complainant constitutes a supplemental pleading
must fail as well. As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or adds something
to the primary pleading. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief
with respect to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint. 19 Accordingly,
it cannot be said that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by complainant was a supplemental pleading. One of
her charges against respondent is that the latter notarized incomplete documents, as shown by the SPAs and
lease agreement attached to the Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant is not legally barred from submitting
additional evidence to strengthen the basis of her complaint.

Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court finds that she committed
misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a notary public.

The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has repeatedly stressed
that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested with substantive public interest.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document
would be undermined.20

Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or information contained in
the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to
discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity
and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents
diminished. 21 In this case, respondent fully knew that complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged
market stall. That complainant comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage contract does not
make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for tolerating a wrongful act.
Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 122 and Rules 1.0123 and 1.0224 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by complainant sometime in
September 199925 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of the agreement bore the lessees’ signatures, she
could have given complainant a certified photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease agreement is not a
rarity in respondent’s practice as a notary public. Records show that on various occasions from 2002 to 2004,
respondent has notarized 22 documents that were either unsigned or lacking signatures of the parties.
Page 10 of 102
Technically, each document maybe a ground for disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial officer to
demand that a document be signed in his or her presence.26

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very same ones who
executed it and who personally appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein.27 Thus, in acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared before her,
respondent also violated Rule 10.0128 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that
she shall do no falsehood.29

Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue enjoying the solemn office of a notary public. In several instances,
the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were found to be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their
oath as notaries public.30 Even so, the rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct
that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and the Court will not
disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. 31 The blatant disregard by
respondent of her basic duties as a notary public warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the
practice of law and perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating Canon 1 and Rules 1.01,
1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as her oath as notary public. Hence, she is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective immediately. Her notarial commission, if still
existing, is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned
as a notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member of the bar and
furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts of the country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza,
Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1Rollo, pp. 1-15.

2 Id. at 14-29.

3 Id. at 30.

4 Id. at 33-69.

5 Id. at 142-196.

6 Id. at 256-285; 286-356.

7 Canon 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Page 11 of 102
8 Rule 18.03. — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.

9 Id. at 381.

10 Id. at 365.

11 Id. at 382-413.

12 Id. at 495-572.

13 SECTION 4. Inspection, Copying and Disposal. — (a) In the notary's presence, any person may inspect an entry in the notarial
register, during regular business hours, provided:

(1) the person's identity is personally known to the notary public or proven through competent evidence of identity as defined in
these Rules;
(2) the person affixes a signature and thumb or other mark or other recognized identifier, in the notarial register in a separate, dated
entry;
(3) the person specifies the month, year, type of instrument or document, and name of the principal in the notarial act or acts
sought; and
(4) the person is shown only the entry or entries specified by him.
(b) The notarial register may be examined by a law enforcement officer in the course of an official investigation or by virtue of a
court order.
(c) If the notary public has a reasonable ground to believe that a person has a criminal intent or wrongful motive in requesting
information from the notarial register, the notary shall deny access to any entry or entries therein.

14 Rollo, p. 575.

15 Id. at 573-592.

16 483 Phil. 546 (2004).

17 Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records. —

(1) The records of a person's birth shall be kept strictly confidential and no information relating thereto shall be issued except on the
request of any of the following:

a. the concerned person himself, or any person authorized by him;

b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely necessary in administrative, judicial or other official proceedings to
determine the identity of the child's parents or other circumstances surrounding his birth; and
c. in case of the person's death, the nearest of kin.

(2)Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of at least two months or a fine in an amount not
exceeding five hundred pesos, or both in the discretion of the court. (Article 7, P.D. 603)

18Tolentino v. Mendoza, supra note 16, at 557-558.

19Planters Development Bank v. LZK Holdings and Development Corp., 496 Phil. 263 (2005).

20Lustestica v. Bernabe, A.C. No. 6258 24 August 2010, 628 SCRA 613.

21Heirs of the Late Spouses Lucas and Francisca Villanueva v. Atty. Salud P. Beradio, 541 Phil. 17 (2007).

22 CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.

Page 12 of 102
23 Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

24 Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.

25Rollo, p. 8; Annex “C” of the Affidavit-Complaint.

26 Realino v. Villamor, 176 Phil. 632 (1978).

27Cabanilla v. Cristal-Tenorio, 461 Phil. 1 (2003).

28 Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice.

29Fulgencio v. Atty. Martin, 451 Phil. 275 (2003).

30 See Lustestica v. Bernabe, supra note 19; Peña v. Paterno, A.C. No. 4191, 10 June 2013, 698 SCRA 1.

31Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr., 514 Phil. 628 (2005).

|||
(PEOPLE V. SAMONTAÑEZ, G.R. NO. 134530, [DECEMBER 4, 2000], 400 PHIL 703-727)
EN BANC: [G.R. No. 134530. December 4, 2000.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO SAMONTAÑEZ y DELA VEGA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
In the early morning of November 25, 1995 Corazon delas Alas saw her 18-year old daughter, Lolita off to
school from their residence. That was the last time she saw her daughter alive because in the evening of the
same day Lolita's lifeless and naked body was found in the middle of the sugar cane plantation. She was
apparently raped before the attacker ended her life. Nobody witnessed the actual commission of the grisly
crime. However, police investigation revealed that the accused-appellant was seen around 6 in the evening of
November 25, 1995 while he was coming out of the sugar cane plantation near the place where the body of
Lolita was found. Also follow up investigation led to the recovery of the victim's personal belongings inside the
accused bag left at his work place. Samontañez was formally charged in court with the crime of rape with
homicide. He originally pleaded not guilty to the crime charged but later changed it to that of guilty. Trial
ensued, and thereafter the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of the crime charged and
was sentenced to death. The case reached the Court on automatic review.
According to the Supreme Court, the trial court failed to mention and explain clearly to the appellant the
elements of the crime of rape with homicide as charged in the information. As a result the appellant was not
properly accorded his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him,
which is an integral part of the due process clause under the Constitution. Also the trial court considered
pieces of evidence that were inadmissible in evidence for being proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree."
Ultimately, the conviction of the appellant for the crime charged rested primarily on his plea of guilty that
appeared to be improvidently made. The decision of the trial court was annulled and set aside by the Supreme
Court and the case was remanded to the court of origin for proper arraignment and trial.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PLEA OF GUILTY TO CAPITAL OFFENSE; DUTIES OF THE TRIAL
COURT. — Section 3 Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure specifically mandates the course
Page 13 of 102
that trial courts should follow in case where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, as follows: SEC. 3.
Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense,
the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused
may also present evidence in his behalf. Based on the aforecited rule, three (3) things are enjoined of the trial
court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered by the accused: 1. The trial court must conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea; 2. The trial
court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability through the requisite quantum of evidence; and 3. The trial court must ask the
accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. It must be
emphasized that the said procedure is mandatory and any judge who fails to observe it commits grave abuse
of discretion.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care
where the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such
a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. The
primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilty on the part of an accused where grave crimes are
involved since by admitting his guilt before the court, he would forfeit his life and liberty without having fully
understood the meaning, significance and consequence of his plea.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCHING INQUIRY; CONSTRUED. — Also, the trial court should have probed deeper to the
extent of securing every material detail of the crime in its lengthy inquiries to the appellant subsequent to his
re-arraignment. Questions tending to elicit corroborative responses to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses should have been asked of the appellant. Although there is not definite and concrete rule as to how
a trial judge may go about the matter of a proper "searching inquiry," it would be well for the trial court, for
instance, to require the appellant to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him, or by
making him re-enact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or by causing him to furnish and explain
to the court missing details of significance in order to determine, once and for all, his liability for the crime. As
it is, the Decision of the trial court is devoid of any factual finding relative to the actual commission of the
crime of rape with homicide by the appellant. In the final analysis, it is the quality rather than the number of
questions propounded during the inquiry that serves the task of ascertaining the voluntariness and full
comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his plea of guilty to a capital offense.
4. ID.; ID.; CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION; EVIDENCE GATHERED THRU ILLEGALLY OBTAINED CONFESSION,
INADMISSIBLE; THROUGH CASE AT BAR. — Lastly, the trial court lamentably considered pieces of evidence
that are inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree." The facts show that the
appellant Roberto Samontañez was actually arrested by police authorities of Nasugbu, Batangas on November
28, 1995 at his workplace in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite. It does not appear from the record that the
appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights during the police custodial investigation which are
enshrined in Article III, Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution. It also does not appear that he was assisted by
counsel during the said custodial investigation. In the absence of a valid waiver, any confession obtained from
the appellant during the police custodial investigation relative to the crime, including any other evidence
secured by virtue of the said confession is inadmissible in evidence even if the same was not objected to
during the trial by the counsel of the appellant. Thus, the personal belongings of the victim namely: Omax
wristwatch, gold ring and Joop cologne were recovered and found inside the bag of the appellant when the
police authorities returned to the appellant's place of work at the Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III,
Mendez, Cavite after they illegally obtained a confession from the appellant. In the case of People vs. Alicando,
the Court had opportunity to reiterate the rule that evidence gathered by virtue of an illegally obtained
confession is inadmissible, thus: We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction.
We have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the " fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase
Page 14 of 102
minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States. According to this
rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence
is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the " fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of
the same illegal act. The " fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized
evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by
the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all
evidence subsequently obtained. EDIHSC
D E C I S I O N: DE LEON, JR., J p:
Before us on automatic review is the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of Nasugbu, Batangas
dated May 15, 1998 in Criminal Case No. 1032 convicting the appellant, Roberto V. Samontañez, of the crime
of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
In the early morning of November 25, 1995, Corazon delas Alas saw her daughter, eighteen (18) year-old Lolita
delas Alas, off to school from their residence in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas. That was
the last time Corazon had seen her alive because at 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day Lolita's lifeless
and naked body was found in the middle of a sugar cane plantation in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan,
Nasugbu, Batangas. Lolita was apparently raped before the attacker ended her life.
Nobody witnessed the actual commission of the grisly crime. However, police investigation reveals that
Roberto Samontañez was seen at around 6:30 o'clock in the evening on November 25, 1995 while he was in
the act of coming out of the sugar cane plantation of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan,
Nasugbu, Batangas near the place where the dead body of Lolita delas Alas was later found. It also appears
that earlier, at around 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, Roberto passed by the house of Melecio Mendoza in Sitio
Bulanggutan, Barangay Bunducan and he headed eastward to the direction of the sugar cane plantation of
Desacola. Thirty (30) minutes later, Lolita was also spotted, and she was likewise heading eastward to her
house in Sitio Ilaya. At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, Roberto returned heading westward and he passed
through the same path along the cane field.
On November 28, 1995, Roberto was fetched by the police authorities of Nasugbu, Batangas from his
workplace at Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite. During the investigation at the
Nasugbu Police Headquarters in Nasugbu, Batangas, Roberto admitted to the police that the other personal
belongings of Lolita delas Alas were inside his bag that was left at his workplace in Mendez, Cavite. A follow-up
investigation conducted by the Nasugbu police authorities at Hermogenes Trading in Mendez, Cavite led to
the recovery of the said personal belongings of the victim.
On January 11, 1996, Roberto Samontañez was formally charged in court with the crime of rape with
homicide, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in an Information
that reads:
That on or about the 26th day of November, 1995, at about 6:30 o'clock in the evening, at Sitio Ilaya, Brgy.
Bunducan, Municipality of Nasugbu, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Lolita delas Alas y Andino against her will and consent
and by reason or on occasion of the said rape accused with intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
strangled the said Lolita delas Alas y Andino with the use of the latter's T-shirt which directly caused her
instantaneous death. Further, the personal properties of Lolita delas Alas y Andino consisting of a gold ring
and a wrist watch in an undetermined amount were taken by the accused.
Contrary to law. 2
Upon being arraigned on February 1, 1996, accused Roberto Samontañez, assisted by counsel de oficio,
entered the plea of "Not guilty" to the Information in this case.

Page 15 of 102
Pre-trial was scheduled and terminated on March 14, 1996. Before trial on the merits could ensue the
accused, through counsel, manifested his intention of changing his earlier plea of not guilty to that of guilty.
Accordingly, the trial court ordered that the accused be re-arraigned in Tagalog, a dialect which he
understood, and the said accused then pleaded guilty to the charge of rape with homicide as stated in the
instant information. After being satisfied that the accused entered a voluntary and informed plea by asking
some questions, the trial court required the prosecution to adduce evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
and the precise degree of his culpability pursuant to Rule 116, Section 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 3
The evidence of the prosecution shows that on November 26, 1995, the victim, Lolita delas Alas alias Betia,
left their house in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas at around 6:00 o'clock in the morning to
attend her classes at Kim Harold Computer School in Poblacion, Nasugbu, Batangas. She was expected to
return home at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. Having failed to come home on time, the
victim's mother, Corazon delas Alas, decided to meet Lolita in Barangay Pantalan which was her usual route in
going home from school. Upon her arrival in Barangay Pantalan however, Corazon was informed that Lolita
had already passed by, and that by then she must have reached their home. Corazon returned to Sitio Ilaya
but found that Lolita was not yet home. Filled with apprehension, Corazon sought the assistance of her
neighbors, Renato Bauyon and Dalmacio Salao, to locate her daughter's whereabouts. At 8:00 o'clock in the
evening Corazon fainted upon being informed by Bauyon and Salao that the dead body of Lolita was found in
the sugar cane plantation of Perino Desacola. The body of her dead daughter was already inside the house
when she regained consciousness. 4
Corazon gave her sworn statement 5 to the police on December 8, 1995 in connection with the rape-slay case
of her daughter Lolita delas Alas. She knew accused-appellant Roberto Samontañez for the reason that he was
a resident of Sitio Balanggutan, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas. The death of her daughter was very
painful to Corazon and that she spent about P40,000.00 in connection with her wake and funeral. 6
It appears that on November 26, 1995, Carlito Samontañez, who is a first cousin of both the accused-appellant
and the victim, was on his way home after gathering fodder for his animals when, at a distance of twenty (20)
arms length, he chanced upon Roberto at around 6:30 o'clock in the evening while the latter was coming out
of the sugar cane plantation of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas. Carlito
and Roberto were coming from opposite directions. However, when they came close to two (2) arms length
with each other, Carlito observed that Roberto, who was naked from waist up with his T-shirt placed on his
shoulder, was perspiring, somewhat surprised and looked pale ("medyo po namumutla"). Carlito greeted
Roberto and asked him where he just came from, but the latter did not answer and left hurriedly. Carlito
dismissed his cousin's reaction, thinking that he (Roberto) may have been merely drunk. 7
After reaching his house, Carlito joined in the search for Lolita upon learning that she was missing. At 8:00
o'clock in the evening, the victim was found dead in the sugar cane plantation of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya.
Lolita was lying on her stomach, naked and a black T-shirt was tied around her neck. 8
Another prosecution witness, Melecio Mendoza, who is an uncle of Roberto Samontañez by affinity, saw
Roberto walking eastward to Sitio Ilaya in Barangay Bunducan at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon on
November 26, 1995. Melecio also saw Lolita at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day walking
home to Sitio Ilaya. Subsequently, at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, Melecio again saw Roberto passed by his
house, this time heading westward to Sitio Balanggutan in Barangay Bunducan. Roberto was naked from waist
up with his T-shirt placed on his shoulder. 9
Melecio joined in the search for Lolita after having been requested by Renato Bauyon. Lolita was totally naked
and already dead when they found her in the sugar cane plantation of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya which was
approximately one hundred (100) meters away from his house in Sitio Balanggutan. 10
Acting on the report that a dead woman was found in Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas, SPO2
Buenaventura Masikat and other police officers of Nasugbu, Batangas, together with Dra. Estela Hizon,
Page 16 of 102
proceeded to the crime scene in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas where the victim, Lolita
delas Alas, was found dead and lying on her stomach totally naked with a black T-shirt tied around her neck. A
panty was stuffed in her anal area. Her hands were stretched upward and her bra was half removed. 11
Dra. Estela Hizon, M.D., Municipal Health Officer of Nasugbu, Batangas, conducted a post-mortem
examination on the cadaver of Lolita delas Alas which was already in a state of rigor mortis. Her findings are
contained in her post-mortem certification 12 dated November 26, 1995, thus:
1. Contusion around the left eye.
2. Contused wounds at the upper and lower lips
3. Presence of mark of strangulation around the neck.
4. Multiple contusions at the anterior aspect of the chest.
5. Multiple laceration of the hymen.
Cause of death : Asphyxia by Strangulation.
Dra. Hizon also prepared an anatomical sketch of the human body 13 showing the location of the injuries
indicated in her post-mortem report and another anatomical sketch showing the hymenal lacerations 14 in the
vaginal canal of the victim. She explained that the contusion on the left eye, the contused wounds on the
upper and lower lips with swelling and blackish discoloration as well as the multiple contusions at the anterior
aspect of the chest of the victim may have been caused by fist blows. The horizontal skin depressions around
the victim's neck was caused by ligature possibly with the use of a piece of cloth or a rope. The protruding
tongue of the victim may have been caused by constriction around her neck. The multiple fresh lacerations of
the hymen may have been caused by forcible penetration of the victim's vaginal canal. There was watery
bloodied fluid coming out of the victim's vagina. Finally, the cause of death of the victim was asphyxia by
strangulation. 15
Meanwhile, SPO2 Masikat found two (2) short pants and one (1) piece of slipper that belonged to Lolita delas
Alas. 16 On the other hand, SPO2 Dionisio Calara took pictures 17 of the deceased victim and the scene of the
crime on the same evening. On November 27, 1995, police officers Masikat and Calara returned to the crime
scene and found the black bag of the victim containing a lotion, a pair of maong pants and a pair of shoes. 18
They also found the brown bag of the victim which contained her Kim Harold identification card, coin purse,
hair pin, powder kit and powder puff. 19 In addition, they prepared a sketch of the scene of the crime 20 and
its vicinity. Thereafter, SPO2 Masikat conducted interviews of the persons in the vicinity among whom were
the prosecution witnesses, Carlito Samontañez and Melecio Mendoza. During the interview, SPO2 Masikat
learned, among others, that the suspect, Roberto Samontañez, could possibly be located at Hermogenes
Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite where he worked. 21
On November 28, 1995, SPO2 Masikat, together with police officers Ramos, Malinay, Ocoma, Lejano and Ilao,
all of the Nasugbu, Batangas police found Roberto Samontañez at the Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia
III, Mendez, Cavite. After talking to his employer, they invited Roberto to the Nasugbu Police Headquarters.
During the interrogation at the police headquarters, Roberto informed SPO2 Masikat and SPO2 Calara that
some of the personal belongings of Lolita delas Alas were inside his bag that was left at his workplace in
Mendez, Cavite. 22
On December 4, 1995 SPO2 Masikat and his group returned to Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III,
Mendez, Cavite and inquired from Mr. Nelson Hermogenes about the bag of Roberto. Accordingly, Mr.
Hermogenes produced a black bag purportedly belonging to Roberto containing an Omax wrist watch, a Joop
cologne and a pawnshop receipt for a gold ring that was subsequently redeemed by SPO2 Masikat for
P500.00. The three (3) articles were positively identified during the trial of the case by Corazon delas Alas as
belonging to her daughter, Lolita delas Alas. The police also found a fan knife (balisong) and a Barangay
Clearance inside the black bag of Roberto Samontañez. 23
The prosecution rested its case on November 30, 1997. During the scheduled hearings on January 14 and 29,
1998 for the presentation of evidence of the defense, the accused took the witness stand and reiterated his
Page 17 of 102
previous plea of guilty to the crime charged in the information. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, accused Roberto Samontañez is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal, of the crime of Rape with Homicide as thus penalized and is hereby sentenced to DEATH,
together with the accessory penalties provided for in Article 40 of the same code. The accused is further
condemned to pay to the heirs of the victim the amount of P40,000.00 by way of compensatory or actual
damages; P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death; and P100,000.00 as and for moral damages. The
accused should pay costs.
SO ORDERED. 24
In his Brief, appellant Roberto Samontañez assails the validity of his plea of guilty to the charge in the
information in this case for having been improvidently made. On the other hand, the People belie the claim of
the appellant by citing portions of the transcript of the stenographic notes of the hearing during the
appellant's re-arraignment on March 14, 1996 and that of the scheduled hearings on January 14 and 29, 1998
to show that he voluntarily entered the plea of guilty to the crime of rape with homicide as charged in the
information and with full knowledge of the consequences of his plea of guilty. It averred that the guilt of the
appellant was also established beyond reasonable doubt by independent evidence adduced by the
prosecution during the trial of the instant case. aDIHTE
The record shows that the trial court relied on a) the appellant's plea of guilty to the crime of rape with
homicide as charged in the information and b) the evidence adduced by the prosecution during the trial of the
instant case.
Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure specifically mandates the course that trial
courts should follow in case where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, as follows:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.
The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
Based on the aforecited rule, three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital
offense is entered by the accused: 1. The trial court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea; 2. The trial court must require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability through the
requisite quantum of evidence; and 3. The trial court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in
his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. 25 It must be emphasized that the said procedure is mandatory
and any judge who fails to observe it commits grave abuse of discretion. 26
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment
is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and
experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. The primordial purpose is to avoid
improvident pleas of guilty on the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since by admitting his
guilt before the court, he would forfeit his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning,
significance and consequence of his plea. 27
The Court notes the trial court's efforts to ensure the propriety of appellant's plea of guilty to the crime of
rape with homicide as evidenced by its lengthy inquiries to the appellant in separate hearings, the transcript of
which were reproduced in its assailed Decision. Hence, during the scheduled hearing on March 14, 1996, the
following proceedings transpired, to wit:
Court:
 Ready?
Atty. Exchaure:

Page 18 of 102
 Your honor, just a moment ago I informed the accused the fact that we will now proceed with the trial on the
merits of the case, but as usual, the accused intimated to this representation that he will be pleading guilty to
the offense charged against him. I informed him the gravity of the offense as well as the corresponding severe
penalty attached to the offense which is death, considering that there is a new law. But the accused insists on
his desire to plead guilty, in fact I brought that desire of his to the attention of his mother who is present, as
well as his aunt, and grandmother, and according to them, that is the wish of the accused to plead guilty to
the charge against him.
Court:
 The Court is asking the accused.
Q: Is the manifestation of your counsel, Atty. Exchaure true and correct that you have now made up your mind
to plead guilty to the offense as charged?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you are doing that with your clear mind, nobody forced you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And did you reveal before to your counsel your decision to plead guilty?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where is the mother of the accused?
Atty. Exchaure:
 She is here, your honor.
Court: (To the mother Teresita Samontañez)
Q: Are you related to the accused?
A: He is my son, your honor.
Q: Now, is it true that your son has decided to plead guilty?
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: And as mother, did you counsel your son that pleading guilty will mean his guilt as charged?
A: Yes, your honor.
Court:
 The accused can now be re-arraigned, but after his plea of guilty, the prosecution still has to present evidence
as required by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Prosecutor Marajas:
 Yes, your honor.
Court:
 Make your motion, Mr. defense counsel.
Atty. Exchaure:
 Your honor, the accused, a moment ago, intimated to this representation that he is changing his former Plea
of Not Guilty to that of Guilty, for which reason, your honor, I move that the accused be re-arraigned so that
he could properly enter his Plea of Guilty.
Court:
 Re-arraign the accused.
 (The Court Interpreter read the information in Pilipino to the accused.)
Court Interpreter:
 (After reading the Information in Pilipino.)
 Your honor, the accused entered a Plea of Not Guilty.
Court:
 Place the accused on the witness stand. I want to clear this matter very well, because of the gravity of the
offense.
Court:
Page 19 of 102
 (To the accused)
Q: Do you swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please state your name and other personal circumstances.
A: ROBERTO SAMONTAÑEZ, 26 years old, single, laborer in a construction, and a resident of Barangay
Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas.
Q: You were re-arraigned this morning by reading to you an information in Pilipino, did you understand the
information as read to you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you are a Tagalog speaking because you were born and grew up in Brgy. Bunducan, Nasugbu,
Batangas?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you know that by pleading guilty as you did awhile ago, the Court will impose on you the death penalty
as provided for by law for this offense?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And your pleading guilty was nobody's liking but of your own volition and spontaneous decision?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did your mother tell you to plead guilty?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did your counsel, Atty. Exchaure tell you to plead guilty?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did the prosecutor tell you to plead guilty?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did anybody for that matter tell you to plead guilty?
A: None, sir.
Q: When you pleaded guilty, you were in your right senses?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What grade did you finish in school or what is your educational attainment?
A: Grade IV, sir.
Q: But you can read and write?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: As in fact, you are a registered voter, as you did vote in the last election?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did you vote?
A: Brgy. Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas, sir.
Q: In other words, you are admitting to have raped and killed the victim in this case, Lolita delas Alas on that
date in question and as charged in the information?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Nobody gave or promised you any reward for your act of pleading guilty?
A: None, sir.
Q: Did anybody threaten or coerce or cajole you to do so?
A: None, sir.
Q: When you pleaded guilty awhile ago, whose decision is that?
A: It's my own decision, sir.
Q: Do you know the consequences of your pleading guilty?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is the consequence of your pleading guilty?
Page 20 of 102
A: I will be punished with a grave penalty, sir.
Q: Do you have an idea as to the grave penalty that the Court may impose on you?
A: None, sir.
Q: Now, I am sternly and emphatically reminding you that the Court may impose on you the severe penalty of
death if you still maintain your plea of guilty?
A: Yes, sir, despite that I am not changing my plea of guilty, sir. My conscience is bothering me, for what I did
to the victim, sir.
Q: Alright, you sign on the notes together with the assistance of your counsel?
A: (The accused affixed his signature on the notes together with his counsel.) 28
During the scheduled hearing on January 14, 1998 for the presentation of evidence of the defense, the
following proceedings were duly recorded, to wit:
Atty. Exchaure:
 The witness, your honor, is the accused himself. Although he pleaded guilty to the crime imputed against him,
he will explain to the Honorable Court the reasons and circumstances, if any, why he pleaded guilty when he
was re-arraigned.
Court:
 Proceed.
Atty. Exchaure:
Q: Mr. Witness, is it not a fact that when you were re-arraigned, you pleaded guilty to the charge against you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And in fact, you were asked by the Honorable Court if your having pleaded guilty is of your own voluntary
act?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, up to the present time, do you confirm the fact that you pleaded guilty to the charge against you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At the time you pleaded guilty, nobody forced or coerced you to plead guilty?
A: Yes, sir.
Court:
Q: And even now, nobody is threatening you?
A: Nobody, sir.
Atty. Exchaure:
Q: Are you aware of the consequences of your having pleaded guilty?
A: No, sir.
Court:
Q: Why do you say you don't know the consequences?
A: I don't know what will happen to me, sir.
Q: Don't you understand that by pleading guilty, the Court will just penalize you for the crime that you
admitted?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And in fact, the charge to which you pleaded guilty calls for the supreme penalty of death?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And still you insist on or maintain your plea of guilty made before and you are confirming the same this
morning?
A: Yes, sir.
Atty. Exchaure:
Q: And you are willing to accept whatever will be the penalty will be imposed by the Honorable Court for
having pleaded guilty, which you still maintain up to now?
Page 21 of 102
A: Yes, Sir.
Court:
 Are you remorseful for the crime imputed to you and which you admitted to have committed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You just pray to God that in the final day of reckoning, God will still forgive you?
A: Yes, sir. 29
Also, on January 29, 1998, the following verbal exchange were recorded, thus:
Court: (To the accused)
Q: Roberto Samontañez, your counsel this morning manifested that you cannot furnish him any evidence at
least to mitigate the imposable penalty, now under your same oath, do you confirm that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In other words, you have nothing more to say regarding your plea of guilty?
A: None, sir.
Q: You have nothing more to present at least to mitigate your liability for the offense which you admitted to
have committed?
A: I was then high on marijuana, sir.
Q: Were you a user of marijuana?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you were repentant of what you did to the victim?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you know that your repentance cannot bring back the life of the victim?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you leave your fate to this Court?
A: Yes, sir. 30
Nevertheless, We are not convinced that such lengthy inquiries conducted by the trial court during the re-
arraignment of the appellant as well as during the subsequent hearings for the presentation of evidence of
both the prosecution and the defense sufficiently established voluntariness and full comprehension of the
appellant of his plea of guilty to the crime charged in the Information. It may be noted that the appellant
earlier entered the plea of "Not guilty" to the Information in this case during his arraignment on February 1,
1996. Subsequently, the appellant manifested, through his counsel de officio, his intention to change his
previous plea to that of a plea of guilty to the crime charged in the Information. After having entered the plea
of guilty on re-arraignment, the trial court proceeded to propound questions on the appellant during which
affirmative responses were elicited from the appellant apparently to show that his subsequent plea of guilty
was his own voluntary decision. The trial court per its Decision under review, however, failed to dwell on a
significant development that transpired during the scheduled hearing on November 13, 1997 when the
appellant revealed in open court, through counsel, that his subsequent plea of guilty was prompted by
"pressure" from a certain policeman so that he (appellant) agreed to admit the commission of the offense
charged. The pertinent portion of the transcript is quoted hereunder, to wit:
Court:
 The prosecution having rested, the Court wants to hear from the defense what it has to offer.
Atty. Exchaure:
 I am now in dilemma, your honor, considering that the accused has already pleaded guilty to the charge
against him and the accused intimated to me this morning that he is changing his plea of guilty because
according to him when he testified before this Honorable Court admitted and pleaded guilty (sic), he was
under pressure by a certain policeman to admit the commission of the offense.
Court:
 Well, that is your point, you have to present your evidence.
Page 22 of 102
Atty. Exchaure:
 In that case, your honor, considering the recent development on the intention of the accused, may I be
allowed to confer first with the accused and ask the Honorable Court to have this case to move for
continuance to give us time to present the accused himself at the next schedule hearing.
Court:
 Granted.
Prosecutor Marajas:
 I just manifest for the record that the accused is a detention prisoner if what the defense counsel stated were
true and correct that Mr. Roberto Samontañez was just pressured, the more he should present the . . .
Court:
 Precisely, that's why he is asking for postponement. 31
The trial court perfunctorily brushed aside the aforesaid disclosure from the appellant that he was pressured
by a policeman to change his earlier plea of not guilty to that of guilty to the charge in the information. It did
not propound any clarificatory questions about the matter on the same occasion such as the identity of the
concerned policeman, the nature of the pressure and the circumstances under which the alleged pressure was
applied on the appellant. Although further inquiries were undertaken by the trial court in the subsequent
hearings on January 14 and 29, 1998, the questions addressed to the appellant were primarily aimed at
eliciting affirmative responses or confirmations of his plea of guilty. The statement of the appellant that he
was pressured by a certain policeman apparently escaped the memory or concern of the trial court as it did
not crop up in its inquiry during those subsequent hearings. Left unventilated, the appellant's allegation of
pressure generates doubt on the voluntariness of his plea of guilty to a capital offense.
Certain other considerations pose nagging doubts on the clarity of appellant's grasp of the true meaning, full
significance and consequences of his plea of guilty. The trial court failed to mention and explain clearly to the
appellant the elements of the crime of rape with homicide as charged in the Information. 32 As a result,
appellant was not properly accorded his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation against him, which is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution.
Notably, the appellant who reached grade IV only stated that he did not know the consequences of his plea of
guilty during the hearing on February 14, 1996 and again, during the hearing on January 14, 1998. While the
trial court informed the appellant that his plea of guilty meant that he admitted liability for the crime of rape
with homicide, as charged in the information, which carries the penalty of death, it failed to emphasize that
his said plea of guilty would not, under any circumstance, affect or reduce the death penalty, the imposition of
which is mandatory under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659. 33 In which event, the appellant must be made
to understand in plain and simple language the precise meaning of the term "mandatory." 34 Additionally, the
trial court failed to apprise the appellant of the civil liability (e.g. indemnity, moral damages and exemplary
damages) arising from the crime of rape with homicide which shall be imposed on him as perpetrator of the
crime. 35 Despite appellant's apparent willingness to accept the penalty for his crime, it is not farfetched to
say that appellant was actually led to believe that the penalty for his crime may still be reduced upon his plea
of guilty thereto especially when the trial court informed the appellant, through counsel, that he should
adduce evidence.
Also, the trial court should have probed deeper to the extent of securing every material detail of the crime in
its lengthy inquiries to the appellant subsequent to his re-arraignment. Questions tending to elicit
corroborative responses to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should have been asked of the
appellant. Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge may go about the matter of a
proper "searching inquiry," it would be well for the trial court, for instance, to require the appellant to fully
narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him, or by making him re-enact the manner in which he
perpetrated the crime, or by causing him to furnish and explain to the court missing details of significance in
order to determine, once and for all, his liability for the crime. 36 As it is, the Decision of the trial court is
Page 23 of 102
devoid of any factual finding relative to the actual commission of the crime of rape with homicide by the
appellant. In the final analysis, it is the quality rather than the number of questions propounded during the
inquiry that serves the task of ascertaining the voluntariness and full comprehension by the accused of the
consequences of his plea of guilty to a capital offense.
Lastly, the trial court lamentably considered pieces of evidence that are inadmissible in evidence for being the
proverbial " fruit of a poisonous tree." The facts show that the appellant Roberto Samontañez was actually
arrested by police authorities of Nasugbu, Batangas on November 28, 1995 at his workplace in Barangay
Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite. It does not appear from the record that the appellant was apprised of his
constitutional rights during the police custodial investigation which are enshrined in Article III, Section 12(1) of
the 1987 Constitution. 37 It also does not appear that he was assisted by counsel during the said custodial
investigation. In the absence of a valid waiver, any confession obtained from the appellant during the police
custodial investigation relative to the crime, including any other evidence secured by virtue of the said
confession is inadmissible in evidence even if the same was not objected to during the trial by the counsel of
the appellant. Thus, the personal belongings of the victim namely: Omax wristwatch, gold ring and Joop
cologne were recovered and found inside the bag of the appellant when the police authorities returned to the
appellant's place of work at the Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite after they illegally
obtained a confession from the appellant. In the case of People vs. Alicando, 38 the Court had opportunity to
reiterate the rule that evidence gathered by virtue of an illegally obtained confession is inadmissible, thus:
We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also adopted the
libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix
Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States. According to this rule, once the primary
source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the
"fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct
result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act.
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally
inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used
to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently
obtained.
The only other evidence of the prosecution are the testimonies of Carlito Samontañez and Melecio Mendoza,
both of which merely seek to establish the presence of the appellant near the vicinity of the crime scene on or
about the time when the crime took place. Ultimately, the conviction of the appellant for the crime charged in
the case at bar rested primarily on his plea of guilty which appeared to have been improvidently made and
hence, contrary to the letter and spirit of Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court, supra. CaSHAc
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of Nasugbu, Batangas dated May 15, 1998 in
Criminal Case No. 1032 convicting the appellant, Roberto V. Samontañez, of the crime of rape with homicide
and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE; and the case
is remanded to the court of origin for the proper arraignment and trial of the accused until terminated.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
 
Footnotes
1.Penned by Judge Antonio A. De Sagun. Rollo, pp. 27-61.
2.Rollo, pp. 1-2.
3.TSN dated March 14, 1996, pp. 2-7.
4.TSN dated June 10, 1997, pp. 2-5; Exhibit "S".
5.Exhibit "S".
6.TSN dated June 10, 1997, pp. 9-10.

Page 24 of 102
7.TSN dated March 14, 1996, pp. 9-13; Exhibit "A".
8.Id., pp. 14-15.
9.TSN dated June 26, 1996, pp. 4-8; 10-11.
10.Id., pp. 8-9.
11.TSN dated July 11, 1996, p. 5.
12.Exhibit "B".
13.Exhibit "C".
14.Exhibit "D".
15.TSN dated March 27, 1996, pp. 6-10.
16.Exhibits "Q", "R", "H".
17.Exhibits "F" to "F-4".
18.Exhibits "K" to "K-3".
19.Exhibits "L" to "L-3"; Exhibits "M", "M-1".
20.Exhibit "J".
21.TSN dated July 11, 1996, p. 13.
22.Id., pp. 13-14.
23.Exhibits "N" to "P-3".
24.Rollo, p. 61.
25.People vs. Camay, 152 SCRA 401, 403 (1987); People vs. Derilo, 271 SCRA 633, 651 (1997); People vs. Sevilleno, 305 SCRA 519, 528
(1999); People vs. Bello, G.R. Nos. 130411-14, October 13, 1999.
26.People vs. Dayot, 187 SCRA 637, 641 (1990).
27.People vs. Albert, 251 SCRA 136, 145-146 (1995) citing 14 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, Sec. 271, p. 951; People vs. Gonzaga, 127 SCRA
158, 163 (1984); People vs. Havana, 199 SCRA 805, 811 (1991).
28.TSN dated March 14, 1996, pp. 2-7.
29.TSN dated January 14, 1998, pp. 2-5.
30.Minutes dated January 29, 1998. Original records, pp. 164-165.
31.Minutes dated November 13, 1997. Original records, pp. 152-153.
32.People vs. Sevilleno, supra, p. 528.
33.People vs. De Luna, 174 SCRA 204, 212 (1989); People vs. Sevilleno, supra, pp. 528-529; People vs. Bello, supra, G.R. Nos. 130411-
14.
34.People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293, 308 (1995).
35.Ibid.
36.People vs. Estomaca, 256 SCRA 429, 437 (1996) citing People vs. Dayot, supra.
37.Article III Section 12 paragraph (1) provides:
 SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
38.Supra, pp. 314-315.

NAVARRO V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 121087, [AUGUST 26, 1999], 372 PHIL 21-38)
SECOND DIVISION: [G.R. No. 121087. August 26, 1999.]
FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Lorenzo O. Navarro, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 14, 1994
which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City dated July 27, 1992 finding petitioner
Felipe Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and sentencing him to suffer ten years of prision
mayor, as minimum and fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum, but
increased the death indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim, from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. In this
appeal, petitioner contended that the appellate court had decided the case not in accord with law and with
the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. Its conclusions were based on speculation, surmise and
Page 25 of 102
conjecture and its judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts; its finding was contradicted by
evidence on record; and its finding was devoid of support in the record. cAaTED
The Supreme Court ruled that the appeal was without merit. Petitioner had not shown that the trial court
erred in giving weight to the testimony of the prosecution witness. In fact, the prosecution witness' testimony
was confirmed by the voice recording he had made which established that (1) there was a heated exchange
between petitioner Navarro and the victim Lingan on the placing of the police blotter of an entry against him
and reporter Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner and the victim Lingan,
with the latter getting the worst of it. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed with the
modification that petitioner is sentenced to suffer the term of 8 years of prision mayor as minimum, to 14
years and 8 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; THE TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS WHO HAS AN
INTEREST IN THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED IS NOT, FOR THIS REASON ALONE, UNRELIABLE; CASE AT BAR.
— Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a
biased witness, having a grudge against him. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the conviction
of the accused is not, for this reason alone, unreliable. Trial courts, which have the opportunity to observe the
facial expressions, gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while testifying, are competent to determine
whether his or her testimony should be given credence. In the instant case, petitioner Navarro has not shown
that the trial court erred in according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; WIRE TAPPING ACT; THE LAW PROHIBITS THE OVERHEARING, INTERCEPTING, OR
RECORDING OF PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS; CASE AT BAR. — Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by
the voice recording he had made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200,
which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law provides: SECTION 1. It shall be
unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word,
to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph
or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described: It shall also be unlawful
for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to
knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of
any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents
thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any
other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition. . . .
SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in
violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative or administrative hearing or investigation. Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or
recording of private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not
private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
3. ID.; REVISED PENAL CODE; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION; DEFINED; TO BE
SUFFICIENT, IT MUST BE ADEQUATE TO EXCITE A PERSON TO COMMIT THE WRONG, WHICH MUST
ACCORDINGLY BE PROPORTIONATE IN GRAVITY; CASE AT BAR. — It is argued that the mitigating circumstance
of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act should
have been appreciated in favor of petitioner Navarro. Provocation is defined to be any unjust or improper
conduct or act of the offended party; capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone. The provocation must
be sufficient and should immediately precede the act. To be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person
Page 26 of 102
to commit the wrong, which must accordingly be proportionate in gravity. And it must immediately precede
the act so much so that there is no interval between the provocation by the offended party and the
commission of the crime by the accused. In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which immediately
preceded the act of petitioner, constituted sufficient provocation. In People v. Macaso, we appreciated this
mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused, a policeman, who shot a motorist after the latter had
repeatedly taunted him with defiant words. Hence, this mitigating circumstance should be considered in favor
of petitioner Navarro. DHaECI
4. ID.; ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY; AS THERE WERE TWO MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND ONE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE, THE PENALTY SHOULD BE FIXED IN ITS MINIMUM PERIOD; CASE AT BAR. — The crime
committed as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals was homicide, for which the penalty under Art.
249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. As there were two mitigating circumstances and one
aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be fixed in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, petitioner Navarro should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is
within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision mayor, and the maximum of which is
reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
D E C I S I O N: MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated December 14, 1994,
which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Lucena City, dated July 27, 1992, finding
petitioner Felipe Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and sentencing him to ten (10) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, but increased the death indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim, Enrique "Ike" Lingan, from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. LLphil
The information against petitioner alleged —
That on or about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the nighttime, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a member of the
Lucena Integrated National Police, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault one Ike Lingan inside the Lucena police headquarters, where authorities are supposed to be engaged in
the discharge of their duties, by boxing the said Ike Lingan in the head with the butt of a gun and thereafter
when the said victim fell, by banging his head against the concrete pavement, as a consequence of which said
Ike Lingan suffered cerebral concussion and shock which directly caused his death.
The evidence shows that, at around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique
"Ike" Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan,
went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was showing nude dancers. After the three had seated
themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip
act. As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture. 2 dctai
At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and
demanded to know why he took a picture. 3 Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job." 4
Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the latter that he would kill him. 5 When Jalbuena saw
that Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his companions. 6
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. Three of the policemen on duty,
including petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police station, and they asked Jalbuena and his
companions to join them. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt. Añonuevo, to report the
incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle. 7
Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around fifteen minutes.
8 Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to him: "Putang ina,
kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?" 9 Petitioner Navarro then pulled
out his firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena, said, "Ano, uutasin na kita?" 10
Page 27 of 102
At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: "Huwag namang ganyan, pumarito kami para
magpa-blotter, I am here to mediate." 11 Petitioner Navarro replied: "Walang press, press, mag-sampu pa
kayo." 12 He then turned to Sgt. Añonuevo and told him to make of record the behavior of Jalbuena and
Lingan. 13 cda
This angered Lingan, who said: "O, di ilagay mo diyan." 14 Petitioner Navarro retorted: "Talagang ilalagay ko."
15 The two then had a heated exchange. 16 Finally, Lingan said: "Masyado kang abusado, alisin mo yang baril
mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo." 17 Petitioner Navarro replied: "Ah, ganoon?" 18
As Lingan was about to turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of his pistol above the left
eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave
him a fist blow on the forehead which floored him. 19
Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan ang
naghamon." 20 He said to Sgt. Añonuevo: "Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter, sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin,
na si Ike Lingan ang naghamon." 21 He then poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign
his name on the blotter. 22 Jalbuena could not affix his signature. His right hand was trembling and he simply
wrote his name in print. 23
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his office, while a policeman took Lingan
to the Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI, Boy Casañada, arrived and, learning that
Lingan had been taken to the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his injuries. 24 cdll
Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and
the deceased. 25 The following is an excerpt from the tape recording:
Lingan:
 Pare, you are abusing yourself.
Navarro:
 Who is that abusing?
Lingan:
 I’m here to mediate. Do not include me in the problem. I'm out of the problem.
xxx xxx xxx
Navarro:
 Wala sa akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . . .
Lingan:
 Kalaban mo ang media, pare. Ako at si Stanley, dalawa kami. Okay. Do not fight with me. I just came here to
ayusin things. Do not say bad things against me. I'm the number one loko sa media. I'm the best media man. . .
.
Navarro:
 Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag na tayong mag-takotan! Huwag mong sabihing loko ka!
Lingan:
 I'm brave also.
Navarro:
 Ay lalo na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala ka namang masasabi sa akin dahil nag-tatrabaho lang ako ng
ayon sa serbisyo ko. LibLex
Lingan:
 You are challenging me and him. . . .
Navarro:
 Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag may problema ka dito sinasabihan kita na may balita tayong maganda.
Pambihira ka Ike. Huwag mong sabihin na . . . Parang minomonopoly mo eh.
Lingan:
 Pati ako kalaban ninyo.
Page 28 of 102
Navarro:
 Talagang kalaban namin ang press. Lahat, hindi lang ikaw!
Lingan:
 You are wrong. Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?
Navarro:
 Pulis ito! Aba!
Lingan:
 Alisin mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo! Suntukan tayo, sige.
Navarro:
 Mayabang ka ah!
(Sounds of a scuffle) LibLex
Navarro:
 Hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan, testigo kayo. Alisin ko daw ang baril ko.
Hinamon ako nyan. Pare, ilagay mo diyan, hinamon ako sa harap ni Stanley. Testigo kayo, hinamon ako. Pulis
tayo eh. Puta, buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot nyan. Sa harap ni Alex, ni Joe, ni Stanley, hinamon ako. Pare,
hinamon ako, kinig nyo ha. Hinamon ako nyan. Sige, dalhin nyo sa hospital yan.
Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who tried to hit him twice, but he (petitioner) was
able to duck both times, and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor twice, each time hitting his head on
the concrete. 26
In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court stated:
After a thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defense, this
court finds that the evidence for the prosecution is the more credible, concrete and sufficient to create that
moral certainty in the mind of the court that accused herein is criminally responsible. dctai
The defense's evidence which consists of outright denial could not under the circumstance overturn the
strength of the prosecution's evidence.
This court finds that the prosecution witnesses, more particularly Stanley Jalbuena, lacked any motive to make
false accusation, distort the truth, testify falsehood or cause accusation of one who had neither brought him
harm or injury.
Going over the evidence on record, the postmortem report issued by Dra. Eva Yamamoto confirms the
detailed account given by Stanley Jalbuena on how Lingan sustained head injuries.
Said post-mortem report together with the testimony of Jalbuena sufficiently belie the claim of the defense
that the head injuries of deceased Lingan were caused by the latter's falling down on the concrete pavement
head first. LLpr
The Court of Appeals affirmed:
We are far from being convinced by appellant's aforesaid disquisition. We have carefully evaluated the
conflicting versions of the incident as presented by both parties, and we find the trial court's factual
conclusions to have better and stronger evidentiary support.
In the first place, the mere fact that Jalbuena was himself a victim of appellant's aggression does not impair
the probative worth of his positive and logical account of the incident in question. In fact, far from proving his
innocence, appellant's unwarranted assault upon Jalbuena, which the defense has virtually admitted, clearly
betrays his violent character or disposition and his capacity to harm others. Apparently, the same motivation
that led him into assailing Jalbuena must have provoked him into also attacking Lingan who had interceded for
Jalbuena and humiliated him and further challenged him to a fist fight.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, appellant's explanation as to how Lingan was injured is too tenuous and illogical to be
accepted. It is in fact contradicted by the number, nature and location of Lingan's injuries as shown in the
post-mortem report (Exh. D). According to the defense, Lingan fell two times when he was outbalanced in the
Page 29 of 102
course of boxing the appellant. And yet, Lingan suffered lacerated wounds in his left forehead, left eyebrow,
between his left and right eyebrows, and contusion in the right temporal region of the head (Exh. E). Certainly,
these injuries could not have resulted from Lingan's accidental fall. LLpr
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner Navarro contends:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT. ITS CONCLUSION IS A FINDING BASED ON SPECULATION,
SURMISE OR CONJECTURE; THE INFERENCE IT MADE IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE; IT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; ITS JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS; ITS
FINDING IS CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE ON RECORD; AND ITS FINDING IS DEVOID OF SUPPORT IN THE
RECORD.
The appeal is without merit.
First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a
biased witness, having a grudge against him. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the conviction
of the accused is not, for this reason alone, unreliable. 27 Trial courts, which have the opportunity to observe
the facial expressions, gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while testifying, are competent to determine
whether his or her testimony should be given credence. 28 In the instant case, petitioner Navarro has not
shown that the trial court erred in according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena. cdphil
Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made. It may be asked whether the
tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The
law provides:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise
described: dctai
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record,
or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of
this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether
complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as
evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be
covered by this prohibition.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any
person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. 29 Since the
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony
of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he
recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong. 30 In the
instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording; 31 that the tape played in court
was the one he recorded; 32 and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. 33 A
sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution. LLpr

Page 30 of 102
Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated exchange between
petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2)
that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst
of it.
Furthermore, Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on the body of Lingan, issued a medical
certificate, 34 dated February 5, 1990, containing the following findings:
Post Mortem Findings:
= Dried blood, forehead & face
= No blood oozed from the ears, nose & mouth
= Swelling, 3 cm x 2 cm, temporal region, head, right
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1-2 in depth, lateral, eyebrow, Left
= Lacerated wound, 0.5 cm in length, superficial, between the left & right eyebrow
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1 cm in depth, forehead, Left
= Cyanosis of the tips of fingers & toes
CAUSE OF DEATH:
= CEREBRAL CONCUSSION & SHOCK
= BLOW ON THE HEAD
Dr. Yamamoto testified:
Q Give your opinion as to what was the possible cause of this findings number one, which is oozing of blood
from the forehead?
A It may be due to a blow on the forehead or it bumped to a hard object, sir.
Q Could a metal like a butt of a gun have caused this wound No. 1?
A It is possible, sir.
Q And in the alternative, could have it been caused by bumping on a concrete floor?
A Possible, sir.
FISCAL:
 What could have been the cause of the contusion and swelling under your findings No. 2 doctor?
WITNESS:
 It may be caused by bumping to a hard object, sir.
Q Could a butt of a gun have caused it doctor? cdasia
A The swelling is big so it could have not been caused by a butt of a gun because the butt of a gun is small, sir.
Q How about this findings No. 4?
A By a bump or contact of the body to a hard object, sir.
Q And findings No. 5 what could have caused it?
A Same cause, sir.
Q This findings No. 6 what could have caused this wound?
A Same thing, sir.
Q How about this last finding, cyanosis of tips of fingers and toes, what could have caused it doctor?
WITNESS:
 It indicates there was cardiac failure, sir.
FISCAL:
 In this same post mortem report and under the heading cause of death it states: Cause of Death: Cerebral
concussion and Shock, will you explain it?
A Cerebral concussion means in Tagalog "naalog ang utak" or jarring of the brain, sir.
Q What could have been the cause of jarring of the brain?
A It could have been caused by a blow of a hard object, sir.
Q What about the shock, what could have caused it?
Page 31 of 102
A It was due to peripheral circulatory failure, sir. LLphil
Q Could any one of both caused the death of the victim?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could cerebral concussion alone have caused the death of the deceased?
A May be, sir.
Q How about shock?
A Yes, sir.
FISCAL:
 Which of these two more likely to cause death?
WITNESS:
 Shock, sir.
Q Please explain further the meaning of the medical term shock?
A It is caused by peripheral circulatory failure as I have said earlier, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL:
 Could a bumping or pushing of one's head against a concrete floor have caused shock? Cdpr
WITNESS:
 Possible, sir.
 How about striking with a butt of a gun, could it cause shock?
A Possible, sir. 35
The above testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that petitioner Navarro hit Lingan with the handle
of his pistol above the left eyebrow and struck him on the forehead with his fist. prLL
Third. It is argued that the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party immediately preceding the act should have been appreciated in favor of petitioner Navarro.
Provocation is defined to be any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting,
inciting, or irritating anyone. 36 The provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the act.
37 To be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must accordingly be
proportionate in gravity. 38 And it must immediately precede the act so much so that there is no interval
between the provocation by the offended party and the commission of the crime by the accused. 39
In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the act of petitioner, constituted
sufficient provocation. In People v. Macaso, 40 we appreciated this mitigating circumstance in favor of the
accused, a policeman, who shot a motorist after the latter had repeatedly taunted him with defiant words.
Hence, this mitigating circumstance should be considered in favor of petitioner Navarro. Cdpr
Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed should also be appreciated in favor of petitioner. The frantic exclamations of petitioner
Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him shows that he had no intent to kill the latter.
Thus, this mitigating circumstance should be taken into account in determining the penalty that should be
imposed on petitioner Navarro. The allowance of this mitigating circumstance is consistent with the rule that
criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended. 41 In People v. Castro, 42 the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent
to commit so grave a wrong as that committed was appreciated in favor of the accused while finding him
guilty of homicide.
However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place where the public authorities are
engaged in the discharge of their duties should be appreciated against petitioner Navarro. The offense in this
case was committed right in the police station where policemen were discharging their public functions. 43
The crime committed as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals was homicide, for which the penalty
under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. As there were two mitigating circumstances
Page 32 of 102
and one aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be fixed in its minimum period. 44 Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner Navarro should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the
minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision mayor, and the
maximum of which is reclusion temporal in its minimum period. 45 cdasia
The indemnity as increased by the Court of Appeals from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 is in accordance with
current jurisprudence. 46
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner Felipe
Navarro is hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison term of 8 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and
8 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
 
Footnotes
1.Per Justice Godardo A. Jacinto and concurred in by Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and Ramon A. Barcelona.
2.TSN pp. 4-8, May 28, 1990.
3.Id., pp. 9-10.
4.Id., p. 10.
5.Id., pp. 10-11.
6.Id., p. 11.
7.Id., pp. 11-14.
8.Id., p. 15.
9.Id., pp. 16-17.
10.Id., p. 20.
11.Id., p. 23.
12.Ibid.
13.Id., p. 24.
14.Ibid.
15.Id., p. 25.
16.Ibid.
17.Id., p. 26.
18.Ibid.
19.Id., pp. 26-32.
20.Id., p. 32.
21.Id., p. 34.
22.Id., pp. 34-35.
23.Id., pp. 35-37.
24.Id., pp. 45-53.
25.TSN, pp. 8-11, June 26, 1990.
26.TSN, pp. 5-6, Sept. 16, 1991.
27.See People v. Mandal, 188 SCRA 526 (1990).
28.People v. Padilla, G.R. No. 126124, January 20, 1999.
29.Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 (1995).
30.United States v. Jones, 730 F. 2d. 593 (1984).
31.TSN, pp. 8-22.
32.Id., pp. 11-13.
33.Id., p. 11.
34.Records, p. 56.
35.TSN, pp. 7-11, Aug. 23, 1990.
36.Pepito v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119942, July 8, 1999.
37.People v. Paga, 79 SCRA 570 (1977).
38.People v. Nabora, 73 Phil. 434 (1941).
39.Supra, note 35.
40.64 SCRA 659 (1975).
41.REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 4.
Page 33 of 102
42.117 SCRA 1014 (1982).
43.People v. Regala, 113 SCRA 613 (1982).
44.REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 64.
45.Act No. 4103, §1.
46.E.g., Pepito v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119942, July 8, 1999.

REYES Y CAPISTRANO V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 229380, [JUNE 6, 2018]

SECOND DIVISION: [G.R. No. 229380. June 6, 2018.]
LENIZA REYES y CAPISTRANO,petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondent.
DECISION: PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by petitioner Leniza Reyes y Capistrano (Reyes)
assailing the Decision 2 dated May 20, 2016 and the Resolution 3 dated January 11, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36821, which affirmed the Decision 4 dated June 16, 2014 of the Regional Trial
Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 12-0627 finding Reyes guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 5 otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
This case stemmed from an Information 6 filed before the RTC charging Reyes with Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, the accusatory portion of
which states:
That on or about the 6th day of [November] 2012 in the Municipality of Cardona, Province of Rizal, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having been
authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and have in her custody and
control 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
which substance was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, which is a dangerous
drug, in violation of the above cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
The prosecution alleged that at around eight (8) o'clock in the evening of November 6, 2012, a group of police
officers from Cardona, Rizal, including Police Officer 1 (PO1) Jefferson Monteras (PO1 Monteras),was patrolling
the diversion road of Barangay Looc, Cardona, Rizal when two (2) teenagers approached and informed them
that a woman with long hair and a dragon tattoo on her left arm had just bought shabu in Barangay Mambog.
After a few minutes, a woman, later identified to be Reyes, who matched the said description and smelled like
liquor passed by the police officers. The latter asked if she bought shabu and ordered her to bring it out. Reyes
answered, "Di ba bawal kayong magkapkap ng babae?" and at that point, turned her back, pulled something
out from her breast area and held a small plastic sachet on her right hand. 8 PO1 Monteras immediately
confiscated the sachet and brought it to the police station where he marked it with "LRC-1." Thereat, he
prepared the necessary documents, conducted the inventory and photography before Barangay Captain
Manolito Angeles. 9 Thereafter, PO1 Monteras proceeded to the Rizal Provincial Crime Laboratory and turned
over the seized item for examination to Police Senior Inspector Beaune Villaraza (PSI Villaraza),who confirmed
10 that the substance inside the sachet tested positive for 0.04 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu,a dangerous drug. 11
For her part, Reyes denied the charges, claiming that the incident happened on November 5, 2012 and not
November 6. On said date, she came from a drinking spree and was about to board a jeepney, when a man
approached and asked if she knew a certain person. After answering in the negative, she rode the jeepney
until it was blocked by two (2) civilian men in motorcycles whom she identified to be one PO1 Dimacali. The
latter ordered her to alight and bring out the shabu in her possession which she denied having. She was then
brought to the police station where the police officers extorted from her the amount of P35,000.00 in
Page 34 of 102
exchange for her freedom. But since she failed to give the money, the police officers took her to Taytay for
inquest proceedings. 12
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision 13 dated June 16, 2014, the RTC found Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of 0.11 gram of shabu defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. Accordingly,
she was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate term of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00, with an order
for her immediate arrest. 14
The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to prove that Reyes was validly arrested and thereupon, found to
be in possession of shabu,which she voluntarily surrendered to the police officers upon her arrest. Likewise, it
observed that the chain of custody of the seized item was sufficiently established through the testimony of
PO1 Monteras, which was not ill-motivated. 15
Aggrieved, Reyes appealed 16 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 17 dated May 20, 2016, the CA affirmed Reyes's conviction for the crime charged. 18 It held that
the search made on Reyes's person yielding the sachet of shabu was valid as she was caught in flagrante
delicto in its possession and was legally arrested on account thereof. 19 The CA likewise found substantial
compliance with the chain of custody rule and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated item
were properly preserved. 20
However, it corrected the quantity of shabu stated in the RTC's dispositive portion to 0.04 gram in order to
conform with the findings of PSI Villaraza and accordingly, modified the penalty imposed to twelve (12) years
and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum. 21
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Reyes's conviction for Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and, thus, it
is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether
they are assigned or unassigned. 22 "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law." 23
"Section 2, 24 Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent
which, such search and seizure [become] 'unreasonable' within the meaning of said constitutional provision.To
protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),25 Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the
occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being
the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. 26
One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search may be [e]ffected is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. [27] In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.28
A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the parameters of
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should — as a general rule — be complied with:

Page 35 of 102
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.— A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of
Rule 112.
The aforementioned provision identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully
effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto;(b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on
personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a
crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving
final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another. 29
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a),Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5 (b),Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the
arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the accused had committed it. 30
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is essential.
[The scenario under] Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure [contemplates that]
the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the same, [the officer] knows for a fact that a
crime has just been committed." 31
Essentially, the validity of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test, showing that
"the accused x x x exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that [she] was in
possession of illegal drugs at the time [she] was apprehended." 32 Absent any overt act showing the
commission of a crime, the warrantless arrest is rendered invalid, as in a case where a person was
apprehended for merely carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney without acting suspiciously. 33
Similarly, in People v. Racho,34 a search based solely on a tip describing one of the passengers of a bus was
declared illegal, since at the time of apprehension, the said accused was not "committing a crime in the
presence of the police officers," nor did he commit a crime or was about to commit one. 35
In this case, Reyes argues that no valid warrantless arrest took place as she did not do anything as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that she had just committed, was committing, or was about to
commit a crime when she was just passing by. 36 During cross-examination, PO1 Monteras revealed:
[Atty. Cynthia D. Iremedio]:
Mister Witness these two youngsters, the only information that they gave you is that there is a woman with a
tattoo?
[PO1 Monteras]:
   Yes ma'am.
Q: No further description regarding this woman was given to you?
A: Long haired and with tattoo on the left arm ma'am.
Q: And no description of the tattoo on her left hand?
Page 36 of 102
A: None ma'am.
COURT:
   What is the tattoo on her left arm?
A: I think it was a Dragon sir.
Q: These two persons did not mention to you the name of the accused?
A: Yes ma'am.
Q: Aside from those description, you will agree with me that this long hair and a dragon tattoo can be
possessed by any other person aside from the accused?
A: Yes ma'am.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now Mister Witness you did not conduct further investigation on these two persons?
A: Not anymore ma'am.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, Mister Witness, can you describe to us when you saw this accused?
A: While we were at the corner of the Diversion Road we saw a female persons (sic) coming towards us who
fits the description given by the two teenagers ma'am.
Q: And despite the description, this accused merely passes in front of you and did nothing wrong against you?
A: Yes ma'am.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: But when you greeted her "good evening" there is nothing unsual with this accused?
A: She smelled of liquor ma'am.
Q: She was not holding anything or acting in a suspicious manner which will elicit a response from you?
A: None ma'am.
xxx xxx xxx 37 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that no lawful arrest was made on Reyes. PO1 Monteras himself
admitted that Reyes passed by them without acting suspiciously or doing anything wrong, except that she
smelled of liquor. 38 As no other overt act could be properly attributed to Reyes as to rouse suspicion in the
mind of PO1 Monteras that she had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, the
arrest is bereft of any legal basis. As case law demonstrates, the act of walking while reeking of liquor per se
cannot be considered a criminal act. 39
Neither has the prosecution established the conditions set forth in Section 5 (b),Rule 113, particularly, that the
arresting officer had personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that the accused had just
committed a crime. "Personal knowledge" is determined from the testimony of the witnesses that there exist
reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was committed by the accused.40 As ruled by the Court, "[a]
hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of
facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime." 41 In this
case, records failed to show that PO1 Monteras had any personal knowledge that a crime had been committed
by Reyes, as in fact, he even admitted that he merely relied on the two (2) teenagers' tip and that, everything
happened by "chance." 42 Surely, to interpret "personal knowledge" as to encompass unverified tips from
strangers would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police
officers to effect warrantless arrests, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites under Section 5 (b),Rule 113.
43
Moreover, the Court finds the version of the prosecution regarding the seizure of the subject item as lacking in
credence. To recapitulate, the prosecution, through the testimony of PO1 Monteras, claimed that when the
police officers asked Reyes if she purchased shabu,she turned her back and voluntarily showed the plastic
sachet containing the same which she retrieved from her brassiere. According to jurisprudence, the issue of
credibility of a witness's testimony is determined by its conformity with knowledge and consistency with the
Page 37 of 102
common experience of mankind. 44 As the Court observes, it is rather contrary to ordinary human experience
for a person to willfully exhibit incriminating evidence which would result in his or her conviction for a crime,
absent any impelling circumstance which would prompt him or her to do so.
In addition, the Court notes the inconsistencies in the claim of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that
Reyes consented to the search when she voluntarily showed the sachet of shabu to the police officers. In their
Comment, 45 the OSG stated that at the time of arrest, Reyes was so intoxicated that she "simply let her
senses down" and showed the shabu to PO1 Monteras; 46 but later, in the same Comment, the OSG argued
that Reyes was actually "in her right senses when she reminded the police officers" that they were not allowed
to frisk a woman. 47 These material inconsistencies clearly render suspect the search conducted on Reyes's
person and likewise, destroy the credibility of the police officers who testified against Reyes. 48 In order to
deem as valid a consensual search, it is required that the police authorities expressly ask, and in no uncertain
terms, obtain the consent of the accused to be searched and the consent thereof established by clear and
positive proof,49 which were not shown in this case.
In fine, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from Reyes on
account of the search is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.
50 And since the shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Reyes must necessarily be acquitted and
exonerated from criminal liability.
Besides, the Court finds the police officers to have committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain
of custody rule under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, through their admission that only the Barangay Captain
was present during the marking and inventory of the seized items. 51 Records are further bereft of any
showing that efforts were made by the police officers to secure the presence of the other necessary
personalities under the law or provide any justification for their absence, which could have excused their
leniency in strictly complying with the said procedure. 52 Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, prior to its
amendment by RA 10640, 53 requires, among others, that the apprehending team shall immediately after
seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to
the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. 54 It is well-settled
that unjustified non-compliance with the chain of custody procedure would result in the acquittal of the
accused, 55 as in this case.
WHEREFORE,the petition is GRANTED.The Decision dated May 20, 2016 and the Resolution dated January 11,
2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36821 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Accordingly,
petitioner Leniza Reyes y Capistrano is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is ordered to cause her immediate release, unless she is being lawfully held in custody for any
other reason.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Peralta, Caguioa and Reyes, Jr.,JJ.,concur.
 
Footnotes
1. Rollo,pp. 11-29.
2. Id.at 33-46. Penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser with Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Renato C.
Francisco concurring.
3. Id.at 48-49.
4. Id.at 68-69. Penned by Presiding Judge Dennis Patrick Z. Perez.
5. Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES," approved on June 7, 2002.

Page 38 of 102
6. Records, pp. 1-2.
7. Id.at 1.
8. See TSN September 4, 2013, pp. 4-6.
9. See id.at 6-10.
10. See Chemistry Report Number: D-521-12 dated November 6, 2016; records, p. 11.
11. See rollo,pp. 35-36.
12. See id.at 36-37.
13. Id.at 68-69.
14. Id.at 69.
15. See id.
16. See Notice of Appeal dated July 9, 2014; records, p. 174.
17. Id.at 33-46.
18. Id.at 44.
19. See id.at 38-40.
20. See id.at 40-43.
21. See id.at 43-44.
22. See People v. Dahil,750 Phil. 212, 225 (2015).
23. People v. Comboy,G.R. No. 218399, March 2, 2016, 785 SCRA 512, 521.
24. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
   Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
25.Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
   Section 3. x x x. —
   (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
26.See Miguel v. People,G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017, citing Sindac v. People,794 Phil. 421, 428 (2016);further citation omitted.
27.See Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
28.See Miguel v. People,G.R. No. 227038, supra note 26, citing Sindac v. People, supra note 26.
29.See id.See also Comerciante v. People,764 Phil. 627, 634-635 (2015).
30.See Miguel v. People,id.See also Veridiano v. People,G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017; and Comerciante v. People,id.at 635, citing
People v. Villareal,706 Phil. 511, 517-518 (2013).
31.See Miguel v. People,id.See also Comerciante v. People,id.
32.See Veridiano v. People, supra note 30.
33.See People v. Cogaed,740 Phil. 212 (2014).
34.640 Phil. 669 (2010).
35.See id.at 678-682.
36.See rollo,pp. 20-21.
37.TSN, September 4, 2013, pp. 12-15.
38.See id.at 14-15.
39.See People v. Villareal, supra note 30, at 519-520.
40.See People v. Tudtud,458 Phil. 752, 773-778 (2003).
41.See Veridiano v. People,G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017.
42.See TSN, September 4, 2013, p. 9.
43.See People v. Villareal, supra note 30, at 521.
44.See Medina, Jr. v. People,724 Phil. 226, 238 (2014).See also Flores v. People,705 Phil. 119, 136 (2013);People v. De Guzman,690
Phil. 701, 712-713 (2012);and People v. San Juan,383 Phil. 689, 703 (2000).
45.Dated August 29, 2017. Rollo,pp. 125-139.
46.See id.at 129.
47.See id.at 133.
48.See People v. Emoy,395 Phil. 371, 383 (2000).
49.People v. Nuevas,545 Phil. 356, 376-377 (2007).
50.See People v. Manago,G.R. No. 212340, August 17, 2016, 801 SCRA 103, 112.
51.See TSN, September 4, 2013, pp. 8 and 17.
52.See Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR of RA 9165. See also People v. Ceralde,G.R. No. 228894, August 7, 2017.

Page 39 of 102
53.Entitled "AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002,'"
approved on July 15, 2014.
54.See Section 21 (1) and (2), Article II of RA 9165.
55.See People v. Manansala,G.R. No. 229092, February 21, 2018. See also People v. Mendoza,736 Phil. 749, 764 (2014).

PEOPLE V. DELOCIEMBRE Y ANDALES, G.R. NO. 226485 (RESOLUTION), [JUNE 6, 2018])

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION: [G.R. No. 226485. June 6, 2018.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BERNIE DELOCIEMBRE y ANDALES and DHATS ADAM y
DANGA, accused-appellants.
RESOLUTION: PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
Before the Court is a Motion for Reconsideration 1 filed by accused-appellants Bernie Delociembre y Andales
(Bernie) and Dhats Adam y Danga (Dhats; collectively, accused-appellants) assailing the Resolution 2 dated
April 17, 2017 of the Court, which affirmed the Decision 3 dated March 31, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07231 finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 4 otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002."
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from an Information 5 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
78 (RTC), docketed as Crim. Case No. Q-10-163376, charging accused-appellants of the crime of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs, the accusatory portion of which states:
That on or about the 7th day of April, 2010, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, without lawful authority did then and there willfully and
unlawfully sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport, or act as broker in the said transaction, a dangerous drug, to wit: Five (5) pieces of transparent heat
sealed plastic sachet marked as "EXH-A-1 MPA 4/7/2010, EXH-A-2 MPA 4/7/2010, EXH-A-3 MPA 4/7/2010,
EXH-A-4 MPA 4/7/2010["] and "EXH-A-5 MPA 4/7/2010" with twenty one point forty one twenty nine
(21.4129) grams of white crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride also known as
"shabu," a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
The prosecution alleged that on April 7, 2010, a buy-bust team composed of Senior Officer II Christopher
Macairap 7 (SOII Macairap), Inspector Officer I Junef Avenido (IO1 Avenido), and IO1 Renato Reyes (IO1 Reyes)
was organized to conduct an entrapment operation against Bernie, alias "Axe," who was reportedly
"operating" within the area of Quezon City. 8 Accordingly, SOII Macairap instructed their informant to
purchase twenty-five (25) grams of shabu worth P150,000.00 from Bernie and arrange a meeting with him, to
which the latter agreed. Thus, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, the buy-bust team, together with the
informant, proceeded to the target area in NIA Road, Quezon City. Upon arriving, the informant introduced
IO1 Avenido, the designated poseur-buyer, to Bernie and his companion, Dhats. Dhats then handed over a
folded cardboard paper with a Lotto 6/49 logo containing a white crystalline substance to IO1 Avenido, who, in
turn, paid Bernie using the marked money. As Bernie was about to count the money, IO1 Avenido executed
the pre-arranged signal by taking off his cap, and consequently, accused-appellants were apprehended.
Shortly after, the team left the area and proceeded to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) office.
Thereat, the requisite marking and inventory were done in the presence of Barangay Kagawad Jose Ruiz, Jr.
and accused-appellants, while SOII Macairap took pictures of the same. Subsequently, IO1 Avenido delivered
the seized drugs to the PDEA laboratory where they were received by Forensic Chemical Officer Jappeth
Santiago (FCO Santiago) who confirmed that they tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride and

Page 40 of 102
meferonex, a dangerous drug. Consequently, FCO Santiago turned over the said items to the custody of the
trial court. 9
For their part, accused-appellants raised the defenses of denial and alibi. Bernie claimed that at around twelve
(12) o'clock in the afternoon of April 7, 2010, while he was at home preparing his son for school, he noticed
that PDEA agents Renato Reyes and Roy Allan, the alleged bosses of his brother "Axe," were knocking at the
latter's door. When asked about the whereabouts of "Axe," Bernie told them that "Axe" left for Aklan to visit
his wife. Subsequently, they left but came back shortly to invite Bernie to the PDEA office. After joining the
agents in the PDEA office, Bernie was again asked of "Axe's" whereabouts. In the interim, he noticed some
illegal drugs placed on the table and saw Dhats for the first time. After being questioned, Bernie was
purportedly taken to the city hall for inquest. 10
Meanwhile, Dhats maintained that at around twelve (12) o'clock in the afternoon of even date, he and his wife
were having lunch at their house when six (6) armed men suddenly arrived in search of "Axe," whom he
allegedly knew by name. He was then handcuffed and brought to the PDEA office where he was joined by
Bernie. Thereafter, he was taken to Camp Crame for medical examination. According to Dhats, IO1 Avenido
demanded the amount of P100,000.00 for his release, but since he could not produce the same, he was
brought to the city hall for inquest. 11
The RTC Ruling
In a Judgment 12 dated December 12, 2014, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. 13 It held that the prosecution proved all the elements of the
crime charged, as it was able to show that: (a) an illegal sale of shabu actually took place during a valid buy-
bust operation; (b) accused-appellants were positively identified in open court as the malefactors; and (c) the
forensic examination of the seized drugs yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride and meferonex. Moreover, it ruled that accused-appellants' unsubstantiated defense of denial
and alibi could not prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who had no ill-motive to
testify against them. 14
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed 15 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 16 dated March 31, 2016, the CA affirmed in toto the Judgment of the RTC. 17 It found, among
others, that while certain requirements under Section 21 of RA 9165 were not complied with, the prosecution
nevertheless established an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs, which were preserved from the
time of seizure to receipt by the forensic laboratory to safekeeping up to presentation in court. Besides, the
arresting officers provided justifiable reasons why the marking could not be done at the place of arrest, i.e., a
Muslim compound, since the same was — at that time — already getting crowded, and because one of the
suspects allegedly belonged to a Muslim clan. Further, the absence of a DOJ representative had already
become a trivial matter, considering that there was an elected local official present during the inventory. 18
Undaunted, accused-appellants elevated 19 the matter to the Court.
The Proceedings before the Court
In a Resolution 20 dated April 17, 2017, the Court upheld the CA's conviction of accused-appellants finding
them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. 21
Dissatisfied, accused-appellants moved for reconsideration, 22 arguing, among others, that the police officers
failed to comply with the mandatory procedures in the handling and disposition of the seized drugs as
provided under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. 23
The Court's Ruling
The Court grants the motion for reconsideration.
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and it is the
duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they
Page 41 of 102
are assigned or unassigned. 24 "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law." 25
In this case, accused-appellants were charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. Case law states that in every prosecution for Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs, the following elements must be proven with moral certainty: (a) the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. 26
Moreover, it is likewise essential that the identity of the prohibited drugs be established beyond reasonable
doubt, considering that the prohibited drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. The
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the dangerous drugs so as to obviate any
unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs on account of switching, "planting," or
contamination of evidence. Accordingly, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain of
custody from the moment the illegal drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the
crime. 27
In this regard, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must follow
when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. 28 Under the said
section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640, 29 the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately
after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of
the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be
turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. 30
In the case of People v. Mendoza, 31 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the
[seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-
busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads
as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence
herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the
accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."
32
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 33 In fact, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 — which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 34
— provides that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office
of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements
of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, — under justifiable grounds — will not render void and invalid the seizure
and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. 35 In other words, the failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso
facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. 36 In People v. Almorfe, 37 the Court stressed
that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. 38
Also, in People v. De Guzman, 39 it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be
proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist. 40

Page 42 of 102
In this case, the Court finds that the police officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain
of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly
seized from accused-appellants.
An examination of the records reveals that while the requisite inventory of the seized drugs was conducted in
the presence of accused-appellants and an elected public official, the same was not done in the presence of
the representatives from the media and the DOJ. More significantly, the apprehending officers failed to proffer
a plausible explanation therefor.
During his cross-examination, IO1 Avenido admitted that the DOJ office is near the place of arrest, as in fact, it
was only a five (5) minute walk therefrom. However, when asked if he bothered to pass by it to secure a DOJ
representative, he did not provide a categorical answer, and instead, disavowed responsibility therefor,
claiming that there were other members of the buy-bust team who were assigned to accomplish such task, to
wit:
Q: The arrest allegedly happened at NIA Agham, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The DOJ agency building is right there, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: About 5 minutes walk?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you bother to pass the DOJ Building to get a DOJ representative?
A: We have other team members assigned to that, sir but I don't remember why they haven't brought any DOJ
representative at that time, sir.
Q: Did you bother to get Public Attorney from the Public Attorney's Office which was also located at the DOJ
Agency Building at Agham NIA Road?
A: I don't clearly remember, sir but we have the public elected official as a witness.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: I was referring to the counsel of the accused. Did you furnish them of counsel of their own choice or a
counsel from the government?
A: Yes, sir. During that time we appraise their rights. The other members because we have a designation in our
team I think they are the one who contacted the witnesses for the accused. I think they only brought the
Kagawad, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 41 (Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, IO1 Reyes disclaimed liability but maintained that it was their team leader, SOII Macairap, who was
specifically assigned to contact the representatives from the media and DOJ, viz.:
Q: Did you contact a DOJ representative to witness the inventory taking?
A: From what I recall, it was our team leader who assigned the persons who would call the DOJ representative
and the media representative, sir.
Q: Do you have any evidence that they were actually called?
A: The Kagawad that they called came together with our team leader, sir.
Q: How about the media man, do you have any evidence that he was contacted?
A: I could not recall anything, about it, it is the team leader who can answer it, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And considering that you actually know those rights, did you get a counsel for the herein accused during
their custody?
A: Actually, nobody came. It was the duty of our team leader to task a personnel who would make the call but
when the Barangay Kagawad came, our team leader decided to conduct the inventory, sir.
Q: Even without counsel?

Page 43 of 102
A: Yes, sir, probably so that we would not exceed the allowable time as provided in Section 21 as to the
handling of the evidence, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 42 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Verily, apart from the unsubstantiated allegations of the prosecution witnesses, there was no showing that the
apprehending officers attempted to contact and secure the presence of representatives from the media and
the DOJ. Furthermore, no plausible reasons were given as to why their presence could not be easily secured.
Neither would IO1 Reyes's claim — that SOII Macairap decided to immediately conduct the inventory despite
the absence of the other witnesses in order "not to exceed the allowable time as provided in Section 21 as to
the handling of the evidence" — have any credence, considering that SOII Macairap himself was never
presented in court to corroborate it. Besides, the fact that it would take someone only five (5) minutes of walk
to reach the DOJ building from the place of arrest clearly repudiates such claim.
Without a doubt, procedural lapses committed by the police officers, which were unfortunately
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. 43 The
procedure in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a
simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.
44 As such, since the prosecution in this case failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the acquittal of accused-appellants is perforce in order.
As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent jurisprudence on the
subject matter:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people,
especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the
compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the
basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the
name of order. [For indeed,] [o]rder is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x. 45
"In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove compliance with the
procedure set forth in Section 21[, Article II] of RA 9165, as amended. As such, they must have the initiative to
not only acknowledge but also justify any perceived deviations from the said procedure during the
proceedings before the trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that any
issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the court/s below, would not preclude the
appellate court, including this Court, from fully examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether
the procedure had been completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit the accused, and
perforce, overturn a conviction." 46
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Resolution dated April 17, 2017 of the Court
affirming the Decision dated March 31, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07231 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is ENTERED ACQUITTING accused-appellants Bernie Delociembre
y Andales and Dhats Adam y Danga of the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered
to cause their immediate release, unless they are being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, Del Castillo, Jardeleza * and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
 
Footnotes

Page 44 of 102
* Designated Additional Member per Raffle dated June 6, 2018.
1. Dated July 20, 2017; rollo, pp. 32-38.
2. Id. at 30-31. Signed by Division Clerk of Court Edgar O. Aricheta.
3. Id. at 2-11. Penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta with Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam (now a member of the Court) and
Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. concurring.
4. Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES," approved on June 7, 2002.
5. Dated April 12, 2010. Records, pp. 1-2.
6. Id. at 1.
7. "Macalrap" in some parts of the records.
8. TSN dated November 9, 2010, pp. 4-5. See also rollo, p. 3.
9. See records, pp. 318-322. See also rollo, pp. 3-4; and Chemistry Report No. PDEA-DD010-130 dated April 8, 2010, records, p. 96
(including dorsal portion).
10. See rollo, pp. 4-5.
11. See id. at 5.
12. Records, pp. 317-328. Penned by Presiding Judge Fernando T. Sagun, Jr.
13.See id. at 327-328.
14.See id. at 325-327.
15.See Notice of Appeal dated January 9, 2015; id. at 336.
16.Rollo, pp. 2-11.
17.Id. at 10.
18.See id. at 8-10.
19.See Notice of Appeal dated April 26, 2016; id. at 12-14.
20.See Notice of Resolution dated April 17, 2017 signed by Division Clerk of Court Edgar O. Aricheta.
21.Id. at 30.
22.Dated July 20, 2017. Id. at 32-38.
23.See id. at 34-37.
24.See People v. Dahil, 750 Phil. 212, 225 (2015).
25.People v. Comboy, G.R. No. 218399, March 2, 2016, 785 SCRA 512, 521.
26.People v. Sumili, 753 Phil. 342, 348 (2015).
27.See People v. Viterbo, 739 Phil. 593, 601 (2014).
28.See People v. Sumili, supra note 23, at 349-350.
29.Entitled "AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002,'"
approved on July 15, 2014.
30.See Section 21 (1) and (2), Article II of RA 9165.
31.736 Phil. 749 (2014).
32.Id. at 764; emphases and underscoring supplied.
33.See People v. Sanchez, 590 Phil. 214, 234 (2008).
34.Section 1 of RA 10640 provides:
   Section 1. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," is hereby
amended to read as follows:
   "SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as
well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
   "(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the
National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the

Page 45 of 102
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures and custody over said items.
xxx xxx xxx"
35.See also Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR of RA 9165. See also People v. Ceralde, G.R. No. 228894, August 7, 2017.
36.See People v. Goco, G.R. No. 219584, October 17, 2016, 806 SCRA 240, 252; citation omitted.
37.631 Phil. 51 (2010).
38.Id. at 60.
39.630 Phil. 637 (2010).
40.Id. at 649.
41.TSN, February 28, 2012, pp. 6-7.
42.TSN, June 18, 2013, pp. 8-10.
43.See People v. Sumili, supra note 23, at 352.
44.See People v. Macapundag, G.R. No. 225965, March 13, 2017, citing People v. Umipang, 686 Phil. 1024, 1038 (2012).
45.People v. Go, 457 Phil. 885, 925 (2003), citing People v. Aminnudin, 246 Phil. 424, 434-435 (1988).
46.See People v. Miranda, G.R. No. 229671, January 31, 2018.

PEOPLE V. RAMOS Y CABANATAN, G.R. NO. 233744, [FEBRUARY 28, 2018]

SECOND DIVISION: [G.R. No. 233744. February 28, 2018.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILSON RAMOS y CABANATAN, accused-appellant.
DECISION: PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal 1 filed by accused-appellant Wilson Ramos y Cabanatan (Ramos)
assailing the Decision 2 dated March 21, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07864, which
affirmed the Judgment 3 dated October 23, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79 (RTC) in
Criminal Case No. Q-10-167524 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 4 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
This case stemmed from an Information 5 filed before the RTC charging Ramos of the crime of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs, the accusatory portion of which states:
That on or about the 12th day of November 2010, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
without lawful authority, did then and there willfully and unlawfully sell, trade[,] administer, dispense, deliver,
give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport, or act as broker in the said transaction,
dangerous drugs, to wit:
one (1) heat[-]sealed transparent plastic sachet containing zero point zero eight ten (0.0810) gram of white
crystalline subs[tance]
one (1) heat[-]sealed transparent plastic sachet containing zero point zero four five nine (0.0459) gram of
white crystalline subs[tance]
one (1) heat[-]sealed transparent plastic sachet containing zero point zero six one six (0.0616) gram of white
crystalline subs[tance]
one (1) heat[-]sealed transparent plastic sachet containing zero point zero five one nine (0.0519) gram of
white crystalline subs[tance]
one (1) heat[-]sealed transparent plastic sachet containing zero point zero five thirty (0.0530) gram of white
crystalline subs[tance]
with a total of ZERO POINT TWENTY NINE THIRTY FOUR (0.2934) grams, all positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The prosecution alleged that at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of November 12, 2010, the operatives of
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) went to Pingkian, Pasong Tamo, Quezon City, in order to
implement a pre-organized buy-bust operation targeting a certain "Wilson" (later identified as Ramos) who
was known to be a notorious drug pusher in the area. Upon arrival, the poseur-buyer, Intelligence Officer 1
Page 46 of 102
Cesar Dealagdon, Jr. (IO1 Dealagdon) and the confidential informant met with Ramos, who immediately
demanded the money. Since IO1 Dealagdon requested that the "item" be shown first, Ramos took out a black
coin purse from his pocket and pulled out five (5) sachets containing the suspected shabu therefrom. After
giving the marked money to Ramos and receiving the sachets from him, IO1 Dealagdon performed the pre-
arranged signal, prompting his back-ups to swoop in and arrest Ramos. Ramos was then frisked, resulting in
the recovery of the marked money, and thereafter, was brought to the police station. Thereat, the PDEA
operatives conducted the inventory and photography of the seized items in the presence of Barangay
Kagawad Jose Ruiz (Kgd. Ruiz). IO1 Dealagdon then brought the seized items to the PDEA Crime Laboratory
where the contents were confirmed 7 to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. 8
For his part, Ramos pleaded not guilty to the charge against him and interposed the defenses of denial and
frame-up. 9 He maintained that at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the day he was arrested, he was
driving his tricycle towards home when he decided to park at a jeepney terminal. After a while, a motor
vehicle stopped near him, from which armed men came out. He was asked where the "items" were but after
answering that he did not know, the armed men mauled him and forcefully boarded him inside their vehicle.
He was then taken to Camp Crame where he saw the man arrested before him released from custody. Finally,
Ramos claimed that he only saw the black coin purse and the five (5) small plastic sachets for the first time
after they came from Barangay Pinyahan en route to the PDEA Office. 10
The RTC Ruling
In a Judgment 11 dated October 23, 2015, the RTC found Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the
amount of P500,000.00. 12
The RTC found that all the essential elements in the Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs have been proven, to wit:
(a) the transaction or sale took place; (b) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and
(c) the buyer and seller were identified. It found that the prosecution was able to establish that a sale actually
took place between IO1 Dealagdon, the poseur-buyer, and Ramos, who was caught in flagrante delicto selling
shabu, during the conduct of a buy-bust operation. Moreover, the RTC held that the prosecution has
sufficiently shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items were duly preserved in this
case, pointing out that the chain of custody of the said items was shown to be continuous and unbroken, from
the time IO1 Dealagdon recovered the same from Ramos until they were turned over to the PDEA Crime
Laboratory and examined. Accordingly, the RTC upheld the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duty of the arresting officers in the absence of showing that they were motivated by ill will against Ramos.
Finally, the RTC rejected Ramos's defenses of denial and frame-up, being inherently weak defenses against the
positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. 13
Aggrieved, Ramos appealed 14 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 15 dated March 21, 2017, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling, holding that the prosecution
had shown the presence of all the elements of the crime charged. 16 It further refused to give credence to
Ramos's insistence that the arresting officers failed to observe the chain of custody rule regarding the
disposition of the seized items, i.e., failure to make an inventory at the place of his arrest in the presence of a
media man or a government official, as the PDEA operatives offered a justifiable explanation for the same. In
view thereof, as well as the fact that the arresting officers sufficiently complied with the proper procedure in
the handling of the seized items, the CA concluded that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
have been preserved. 17
Hence, this appeal. 18
The Issue before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Ramos's conviction for the crime
charged.
Page 47 of 102
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and thus, it
is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether
they are assigned or unassigned. 19 "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law." 20
Ramos was charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165. In every prosecution of unauthorized sale of dangerous drugs, it is essential that the
following elements be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. 21
Moreover, the prosecution must prove with moral certainty the identity of the prohibited drug, as the
dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. It has to show an unbroken
chain of custody over the dangerous drugs so as to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the
dangerous drugs on account of switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence. Accordingly, the
prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain from the moment the drugs are seized up to
their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. 22
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must follow when handling
the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. 23 Under the said section, prior to
its amendment by RA 10640, 24 the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and
confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or
the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP
Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. 25 In the case of People v.
Mendoza, 26 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from the
media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the
evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted
under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the
integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the
corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed,
the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody." 27
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 28 In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
RA 9165 — which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 — provide that the said
inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team
in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165
— under justifiable grounds — will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items
so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team. 29 In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with
the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody
over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved. 30 In People v. Almorfe, 31 the Court explained that for the above-saving clause to
apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. 32 Also, in People v. De Guzman,
33 it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the
Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist. 34
Page 48 of 102
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the police officers committed unjustified deviations
from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of
the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Ramos.
First, although it is true that the seized plastic sachets were marked in the presence of Ramos himself and an
elected public official, i.e., Kgd. Ruiz, the same was not done in the presence of any representative from the
DOJ and the media. IO1 Dealagdon admitted this when he testified on direct and cross-examinations, thus:
DIRECT EXAMINATION:
[ACP Bartolome]:
   Mr. witness, who were present during the inventory?
[IO1 Dealagdon]:
   The accused alias Wilson, Barangay elected official, Kagawad Ruiz, me, Agent Oliver dela Rosa, and other
members of team, sir.
Q: How about DOJ representative?
A: None, sir. 35
CROSS-EXAMINATION:
[Atty. Manzano]:
   After the arrest of alias Wilson, you immediately proceeded to Barangay Pinyahan, correct?
[IO1 Dealagdon]:
   Yes, ma'am.
Q: And according to you, you conducted the marking, inventory and photograph?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: The marking and inventory was not done in the presence of representative from the Media and DOJ,
correct?
A: Yes, ma'am. 36
When asked to explain the absence of any representatives from the DOJ and the media during the conduct of
inventory and photography, Intelligence Officer 1 Oliver Dela Rosa (IO1 Dela Rosa), another member of the
buy-bust team, testified:
[ACP Bartolome]:
   Who were present during the preparation of this Inventory?
[IO1 Dela Rosa]:
   Kagawad Ruiz, sir.
Q: Of what barangay?
A: Brgy. Pinyahan, sir.
Q: Why is it that there [is] no signatures in this space provided for the representative of the DOJ and media?
A: There was no media available, sir.
Q: Why?
A: It was past office hours and we cannot find a media, sir. 37
The Court finds the aforesaid explanation inadequate for the saving clause to apply. As may be gleaned from
the records, as early as 2:30 in the afternoon of November 12, 2010, the PDEA operatives already conducted a
briefing where they organized the buy-bust operation against Ramos; and such operation was implemented at
8 o'clock in the evening of even date. 38 Verily, the PDEA operatives had hours to spare before the buy-bust
team was deployed in Pingkian, Pasong Tamo, Quezon City to implement the entrapment operation against
Ramos. They could have used that time to secure the presence of representatives from the DOJ and the media
who would have accompanied them in the conduct of the inventory and photography of the items to be
seized from Ramos on account of the buy-bust; but unfortunately, they did not.
It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items
inadmissible. 39 However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient
Page 49 of 102
effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced. 40 In People v.
Umipang, 41 the Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting
the representatives enumerated under the law for "a sheer statement that representatives were unavailable
without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other
representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse." 42 Verily, mere statements of
unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified
grounds for non-compliance. 43 These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily
given sufficient time — beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities of
the accused until the time of his arrest — to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the
necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set
procedure prescribed in Section 21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state reasons
for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply
with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable. 44
Second, the combined weight of the seized specimens, which initially weighed 0.2934 gram during the first
qualitative examination, 45 decreased to 0.2406 during the re-examination 46 by the second forensic chemist.
These were the same items that IO1 Dealagdon identified in court as those that he had previously marked.
Although the discrepancy of 0.0528 in the amounts may be considered negligible, the prosecution,
nonetheless, did not even venture to explain how the discrepancy came about. As already adverted to, the
saving clause "applies only (1) where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter
explained the cited justifiable grounds, and (2) when the prosecution established that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved. The prosecution, thus, loses the benefit of
invoking the presumption of regularity and bears the burden of proving — with moral certainty — that the
illegal drug presented in court is the same drug that was confiscated from the accused during his arrest." 47
Verily, the procedural lapses committed by the PDEA operatives, which were unfortunately left unjustified by
the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against Ramos, as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. 48 It is well-settled that the procedure in
Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside
as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects. 49 As such, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with
Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, as well as its IRR, Ramos's acquittal is perforce in order.
As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent jurisprudence on the
subject matter:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people,
especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the
compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the
basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the
name of order. [For indeed,] [o]rder is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x. 50
In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove compliance with the
procedure set forth in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended. As such, they must have the initiative to
not only acknowledge but also justify any perceived deviations from the said procedure during the
proceedings before the trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that any
issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the court/s below, would not preclude the
appellate court, including this Court, from fully examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether
Page 50 of 102
the procedure had been completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit the accused, and
perforce, overturn a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 21, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 07864 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Wilson Ramos y
Cabanatan is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause
his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Peralta, Caguioa and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
 
Footnotes
1. See Notice of Appeal dated April 10, 2017; rollo, pp. 22-24.
2. Id. at 2-21. Penned by Associate Justice Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob with Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and
Danton Q. Bueser concurring.
3. CA Rollo, pp. 40-51. Penned by Presiding Judge Nadine Jessica Corazon J. Fama.
4. Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES," approved on June 7, 2002.
5. Records, p. 1.
6. Id.
7. See Chemistry Report No. PDEA-DD010-443 signed by Chemist Jappeth M. Santiago; id. at 12.
8. See rollo, pp. 4-5.
9. See id. at 6. See also order dated February 23, 2011; records, p. 33.
10. See id. at 6-7. See also TSN, October 6, 2015, pp. 3-5.
11.CA Rollo, pp. 40-51.
12.Id. at 50.
13.See id. at 44-50.
14.See Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee dated September 14, 2016; id. at 65-79.
15.Rollo, pp. 2-21.
16.See id. at 20 and 10-13.
17.See id. at 14-18.
18.Id. at 22-24.
19.See People v. Dahil, 750 Phil. 212, 225 (2015).
20.People v. Comboy, G.R. No. 218399, March 2, 2016, 785 SCRA 512, 521.
21.People v. Sumili, 753 Phil. 342, 348 (2015).
22.See People v. Viterbo, 739 Phil. 593, 601 (2014). See also People v. Alivio, 664 Phil. 565, 576-580 (2011) and People v. Denoman,
612 Phil. 1165, 1175 (2009).
23.See People v. Sumili, supra note 21, at 349-350.
24.Entitled "AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002,'"
approved on July 15, 2014. The crime subject of this case was allegedly committed before the enactment of RA 10640, or on
November 12, 2010.
25.See Section 21 (1) and (2), Article II of RA 9165.
26.736 Phil. 749 (2014).
27.Id. at 764; emphases and underscoring supplied.
28.See People v. Sanchez, 590 Phil. 214, 234 (2008).
29.See Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR of RA 9165.
30.See People v. Goco, G.R. No. 219584, October 17, 2016, 806 SCRA 240, 252; citation omitted.
31.631 Phil. 51 (2010).
32.Id. at 60; citation omitted.
33.630 Phil. 637 (2010).
34.Id. at 649.
35.TSN, December 6, 2013, pp. 2-3.
36.TSN, December 6, 2013, p. 16.

Page 51 of 102
37.TSN, April 21, 2015, p. 5.
38.See rollo, pp. 3-4. See also records, p. 6.
39.People v. Umipang, 686 Phil. 1024, 1052 (2012).
40.See id. at 1052-1053.
41.Id.
42.Id. at 1053.
43.See id.
44.See People v. Manansala, G.R. No. 229092, February 21, 2018.
45.See Chemistry Report No. PDEA-DD010-443 dated November 12, 2010 signed by Chemist Jappeth M. Santiago; records, p. 12.
46.See Chemistry Report No. PDEA-DD010-443B dated September 7, 2011 signed by Chemist V Severino P. Uy; id. at 54.
47.See People v. Carlit, G.R. No. 227309, August 16, 2017, citing People v. Cayas, G.R. No. 206888, July 4, 2016, 795 SCRA 459, 469.
48.See People v. Sumili, supra note 21, at 352.
49.See People v. Macapundag, G.R. No. 225965, March 13, 2017, citing People v. Umipang, supra note 39 at 1038.
50.People v. Go, 457 Phil. 885, 925 (2003), citing People v. Aminnudin, 246 Phil. 424, 434-435 (1988).

PEOPLE V. YATCO, G.R. NO. L-9181, [NOVEMBER 28, 1955], 97 PHIL 940-947
EN BANC: [G.R. No. L-9181. November 28, 1955.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, and JUAN CONSUNJI and ALFONSO PANGANIBAN, respondents.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Solicitor Meliton G. Soliman, City Attorney Pedro R. Revilla and Assistant
City Attorney Julian E. Lustre for petitioner.
Estanislao A. Fernandez, Augusto Ilagan, Claro T. Almeda and Rufino Navarro for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE; EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION; ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE OF
DECLARANT'S GUILT. — Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if an accused's confession
may not be competent as against his co-accused, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy
between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession is nevertheless,
admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt (U.S. vs. Vega, 43 Phil., 41; People vs. Bande, 50 Phil., 37;
People vs. Buan, 64 Phil., 296), and should be admitted as such.
2. ID.; ID.; ACT OR DECLARATION OF CONSPIRATOR; SECTION 12, RULE 123, IS NOT APPLICABLE TO
CONFESSION MADE AFTER CONSPIRACY HAS ENDED. — Section 12 of Rule 123, providing that "The act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration,"
refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise ("during its
existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made long after the conspiracy had been
brought to an end (U.S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613; U.S. vs. Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416; People vs. Badilla, 48
Phil., 718; People vs. Napkil, 52 Phil., 985).
3. ID.; ID.; OBJECTIONS, WAIVER OF; COURT HAS NO POWER TO DISREGARD EVIDENCE "MOTU PROPRIO." —
The exclusion of the proffered confessions was no made of the basis of the objection interposed by defense
counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court issued motu proprio. By so doing, the Court
overlooked that the right to object is a privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is
known and not seasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own
motion, to disregard the evidence (Marella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1).
4. ID.; ID.; RULE ON ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE. — The practice of excluding evidence of doubtful objections
to its materiality or technical objections to the form of the question should be avoided. In a case of any
intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to
know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on
the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safety accept the testimony upon the
statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later." (Prats & Co. vs. Pheonix Insurance
Page 52 of 102
Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816-817.) At any rate, in the final determination and consideration of the case, the trial
Court should be able to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of
evidence, should be excluded. There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where
questions arises as to admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence
may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can
no longer appeal.
D E C I S I O N: REYES, J.B.L., J p:
In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City on March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji,
Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired
together in the murder of one Jose Ramos (Criminal Case No. Q-1637 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City). Trial of the case started on May 3, 1955, and in several hearings the prosecution had been presenting its
evidence. During the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was questioning one of its
witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection with the making of a
certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the witness,
counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such
confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused
Panganiban. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether
different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan
Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy
by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances. Thereafter, according to the transcript, the
following remarks were made:
"FISCAL LUSTRE:
May we know from counsel if he is also objecting to the admissibility of the confession of Consunji as against
the accused Consunji himself?
COURT:
That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the Court that you cannot prove a confession
unless yon prove first conspiracy thru a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances as required by
law." Annex "B" of the petition, p. 9
The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the order of exclusion, but again the motion
was denied. Wherefore, this petition for certiorari was brought before this Court by the Solicitor General, for
the review and annulment of the lower Court's order completely excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial
confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.
We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of
the prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial
when the ruling was made.
Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an
accused freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against him.
"SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the
offense charged, may be given in evidence against him."
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as
against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them
without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless,
admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt (U. S. vs. Vega, 43 Phil. 41; People vs. Bande, 50 Phil. 37;
People vs. Buan, 64 Phil. 296), and should have been admitted as such.
The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule 123,
providing that:

Page 53 of 102
"The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration."
Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this
case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end (U. S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613; U. S. vs.
Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416; People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil., 718; People vs. Nakpil, 52 Phil., 985).
Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused,
nor as evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings)
had not yet even been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying
the confessions), much less formally offered in evidence. For all we know, the prosecution might still be able
to adduce other proof of conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally
offered in evidence. Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in
question, it was premature for the respondent Court to exclude them completely on the ground that there
was no prior proof of conspiracy.
It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proffered confessions was not made on the basis of the
objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court
issued motu-proprio. Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession as evidence of the guilt of the
other accused Panganiban, on the ground that it was hearsay as to the latter. But the Court, instead of ruling
on this objection, put up its own objection to the confessions — that it could not be admitted to prove
conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of such conspiracy by a number of
indefinite acts, conditions, circumstances, etc. and completely excluded the confessions on that ground. By so
doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the
ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no
power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence (Marella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1).
We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of the individual extrajudicial
confessions of two or more accused for the purpose of establishing conspiracy between them through the
identity of the confessions in essential details. After all, the confessions are not before us and have not even
been formally offered in evidence for any purpose. Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have allowed
such confessions to be given in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same
conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the
relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges. At any rate, in the final determination and consideration
of the case, the trial Court should be able to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what,
under the rules of evidence, should be excluded.
Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in the case of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix
Insurance Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816-817:
"In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously
administered in the courts where trivial objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor. The
practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to the form of
the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the
early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not;
and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the Attorney offering the evidence, the court may
as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be
connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over which he presides, a
judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical
connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme
Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error
Page 54 of 102
without returning the case for a new trial, — a step which this Court is always very loath to take. On the other
hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or
relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to
know the law; and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material
from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme
Court upon appeal, this Court then has all the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment."
There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility of
evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer appeal.
Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is
annulled and set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law and
this opinion Costs against respondents Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ.,
concur.

JUAN V. JUAN, G.R. NO. 221732, [AUGUST 23, 2017], 817 PHIL 192-208

FERNANDO U. JUAN, petitioner, vs. ROBERTO U. JUAN (substituted by his son JEFFREY C. JUAN) and LAUNDROMATIC
CORPORATION, respondents.

SECOND DIVISION: [G.R. No. 221732. August 23, 2017.] DECISION: PERALTA, J p:

For this Court's resolution is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court dated January 25, 2016, of petitioner Fernando U. Juan that seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision 1 dated May 7, 2015 and Resolution 2 dated December 4, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dismissing his appeal for failure to comply with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 44 and Section 1, Rule
50 of the Rules of Court.
The facts follow.
Respondent Roberto U. Juan claimed that he began using the name and mark "Lavandera Ko" in his
laundry business on July 4, 1994. He then opened his laundry store at No. 119 Alfaro St., Salcedo St.,
Makati City in 1995. Thereafter, on March 17, 1997, the National Library issued to him a certificate of
copyright over said name and mark. Over the years, the laundry business expanded with numerous
franchise outlets in Metro Manila and other provinces. Respondent Roberto then formed a corporation to
handle the said business, hence, Laundromatic Corporation (Laundromatic) was incorporated in 1997,
while "Lavandera Ko" was registered as a business name on November 13, 1998 with the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI). Thereafter, respondent Roberto discovered that his brother, petitioner Fernando
was able to register the name and mark "Lavandera Ko" with the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) on
October 18, 2001, the registration of which was filed on June 5, 1995. Respondent Roberto also alleged
that a certain Juliano Nacino (Juliano) had been writing the franchisees of the former threatening them
with criminal and civil cases if they did not stop using the mark and name "Lavandera Ko." It was found out
by respondent Roberto that petitioner Fernando had been selling his own franchises.
Thus, respondent Roberto filed a petition for injunction, unfair competition, infringement of
copyright, cancellation of trademark and name with/and prayer for TRO and Preliminary Injunction with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the case was raffled off at Branch 149, Makati City. The RTC issued a writ
Page 55 of 102
of preliminary injunction against petitioner Fernando in Order dated June 10, 2004. On July 21, 2008, due
to the death of respondent Roberto, the latter was substituted by his son, Christian Juan (Christian). Pre-
trial conference was concluded on July 13, 2010 and after the presentation of evidence of both parties, the
RTC rendered a Resolution dated September 23, 2013, dismissing the petition and ruling that neither of
the parties had a right to the exclusive use or appropriation of the mark "Lavandera Ko" because the same
was the original mark and work of a certain Santiago S. Suarez (Santiago). According to the RTC, the mark
in question was created by Suarez in 1942 in his musical composition called, "Lavandera Ko" and both
parties of the present case failed to prove that they were the originators of the same mark. The dispositive
portion of the RTC's resolution reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds both the plaintiff-Roberto and
defendant-Fernando guilty of making misrepresentations before this court, done under
oath, hence, the Amended Petition and the Answer with their money claims prayed for
therein are hereby DISMISSED.
Therefore, the Amended Petition and the Answer are hereby DISMISSED for no
cause of action, hence, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction is hereby DENIED
for utter lack of merit; and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on June 10, 2004 is
hereby LIFTED AND SET ASIDE.
Finally, the National Library is hereby ordered to cancel the Certificate of
Registration issued to Roberto U. Juan on March 17, 1997 over the word "Lavandera Ko,"
under certificate no. 97-362. Moreover, the Intellectual Property Office is also ordered to
cancel Certificate of Registration No. 4-1995-102749, Serial No. 100556, issued on October
18, 2001, covering the work LAVANDERA KO AND DESIGN, in favor of Fernando U. Juan.
The two aforesaid government agencies are hereby requested to furnish this Court
of the copy of their cancellation.
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED. 3
Herein petitioner elevated the case to the CA through a notice of appeal. In his appeal, petitioner
contended that a mark is different from a copyright and not interchangeable. Petitioner Fernando insisted
that he is the owner of the service mark in question as he was able to register the same with the IPO
pursuant to Section 122 of R.A. No. 8293. Furthermore, petitioner Fernando argued that the RTC erred in
giving credence to the article of information it obtained from the internet stating that the Filipino folk song
"Lavandera Ko" was a composition of Suarez in 1942 rather than the actual pieces of evidence presented
by the parties. As such, according to petitioner, such information acquired by the RTC is hearsay because
no one was presented to testify on the veracity of such article.
Respondent Roberto, on the other hand, contended that the appeal should be dismissed outright
for raising purely questions of law. He further raised as a ground for the dismissal of the appeal, the failure
of the petitioner to cite the page references to the record as required in Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d)
and (f) of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court and petitioner's failure to provide a statement of facts. Respondent
also argued that assuming that the Appellant's Brief complied with the formal requirements of the Rules of
Court, the RTC still did not err in dismissing the petitioner's answer with counterclaim because he cannot
be declared as the owner of "Lavandera Ko," since there is prior use of said mark by another person.
The CA, in its Decision dated May 7, 2015, dismissed the petitioner's appeal based on technical
grounds, thus:
Page 56 of 102
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for failure to
comply with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 44 and Section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of
Court.
SO ORDERED. 4
Hence, the present petition after the denial of petitioner Fernando's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Fernando raises the following issues:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL BY THE COURT OF APPEALS ON PURELY
TECHNICAL GROUNDS WAS PROPER CONSIDERING THAT THE CASE BEFORE IT CAN BE
RESOLVED BASED ON THE BRIEF ITSELF.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT A MARK IS THE SAME AS A COPYRIGHT.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT FERNANDO U. JUAN IS THE OWNER OF THE MARK "LAVANDERA KO."
D.
WHETHER OR NOT AN INTERNET ARTICLE IS SUPERIOR THAN ACTUAL EVIDENCE SUBMITTED
BY THE PARTIES. 5
According to petitioner Fernando, the CA should have considered that the rules are there to
promote and not to defeat justice, hence, it should have decided the case based on the merits and not
dismiss the same based on a mere technicality. The rest of the issues are similar to those that were raised
in petitioner's appeal with the CA.
In his Comment 6 dated April 22, 2016, respondent Roberto insists that the CA did not commit an
error in dismissing the appeal considering that the formal requirements violated by the petitioner in the
Appellant's Brief are basic, thus, inexcusable and that petitioner did not proffer any valid or substantive
reason for his non-compliance with the rules. He further argues that there was prior use of the mark
"Lavandera Ko" by another, hence, petitioner cannot be declared the owner of the said mark despite his
subsequent registration with the IPO.
The petition is meritorious.
Rules of procedure must be used to achieve speedy and efficient administration of justice and not
derail it. 7 Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the
rights and obligations of the parties. 8 It is, [thus] settled that liberal construction of the rules may be
invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading,
provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and it at least connotes a
reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. 9 In Aguam v. CA, 10 this Court ruled that:
x x x Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that impede
the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "A litigation is
not a game of technicalities." "Law suits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." Litigations must be
decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the

Page 57 of 102
 amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their
merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense;
rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far
better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and
afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than
dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false
impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a
miscarriage of justice.
In this case, this Court finds that a liberal construction of the rules is needed due to the novelty of
the issues presented. Besides, petitioner had a reasonable attempt at complying with the rules. After all,
the ends of justice are better served when cases are determined on the merits, not on mere technicality.
11
The RTC, in dismissing the petition, ruled that neither of the parties are entitled to use the trade
name "Lavandera Ko" because the copyright of "Lavandera Ko", a song composed in 1942 by Santiago S.
Suarez belongs to the latter. The following are the RTC's reasons for such ruling:
The resolution of this Court — NO ONE OF THE HEREIN PARTIES HAS THE RIGHT TO
USE AND ENJOY "LAVANDERA KO"!
Based on the date taken from the internet — References: CCP encyclopedia of
Philippine art, vol. 6 http://www.himig.com.ph (http://kahimyang.info /
kauswagan/articles/1420/today-in-philippine-history this information was gathered: "In
1948, Cecil Lloyd established the first Filipino owned record company, the Philippine
Recording System, which featured his rendition of Filipino folk songs among them the
"Lavandera ko" (1942) which is a composition of Santiago S. Suarez." Thus, the herein
parties had made misrepresentation before this court, to say the least, when they declared
that they had coined and created the subject mark and name. How can the herein parties
have coined and created the subject mark and work when these parties were not yet born;
when the subject mark and work had been created and used in 1942.
The heirs of Mr. Santiago S. Suarez are the rightful owners of subject mark and work
— "Lavandera ko".
Therefore, the writ of injunction issued in the instant case was quite not proper,
hence the same shall be lifted and revoked. This is in consonance with the finding of this
court of the origin of the subject mark and work, e.g., a music composition of one Santiago
S. Suarez in 1942.
Moreover, Section 171.1 of R.A. 8293 states: "Author" is the natural person who has
created the work." And, Section 172.1 of R.A. No. 8293 provides: Literary and artistic works,
hereinafter referred to as "works", are original intellectual creations in the literary and
artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation and shall include in particular:
(d) Letters;
(f) Musical compositions, with or without words;"
Thus, the subject mark and work was created by Mr. Santiago S. Suarez, hence, the subject
mark and work belong to him, alone.
Page 58 of 102
 The herein parties are just false claimants, done under oath before this court
(paragraph 4 of Roberto's affidavit, Exhibit A TRO, page 241, Vol. I and paragraph 2 of
Fernando's affidavit, Exhibit 26 TRO, page 354, Vol. I), of the original work of Mr. Santiago S.
Suarez created in 1942.
Furthermore, Section 21 of R.A. 8293 declares: "Patentable Inventions — any
technical solution of a problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves an
inventive step and is industrially applicable shall be patentable. It may be, or may relate to,
a product, or process, or an improvement of any of the foregoing." Thus, the herein subject
mark and work can never be patented for the simple reason that it is not an invention. It is a
title of a music composition originated from the mind of Mr. Santiago S. Suarez in 1942.
Thus, the proper and appropriate jurisprudence applicable to this instant case is the
wisdom of the High Court in the case of Pearl & Dean (Phil.), Incorporation v. Shoemart,
Incorporated (G.R. No. 148222, August 15, 2003), the Supreme Court ruled: "The scope of a
copyright is confined to literary and artistic works which are original intellectual creations in
the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation." The Supreme
Court concluded: "The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of
copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The object of the one is
explanation; the object of the other is use. The former may be secured by copyright. The
latter can only be secured, if it can be secured at all, by letters patent." (Pearl & Dean v.
Shoemart, supra, citing the case of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99; 1879 U.S. Lexis 1888; 25 L.
Ed. 841; 11 Otto 99, October, 1879 Term).
It is noted that the subject matter of Exhibit "5" (Annex 5) Of Fernando (IPO
certificate of registration) and Exhibit B of Roberto (Certificate of Copyright Registration)
could not be considered as a literary and artistic work emanating from the creative mind
and/or hand of the herein parties for the simple reason that the subject work was a creation
of the mind of Mr. Santiago S. Suarez in 1942. Thus, neither of the herein parties has an
exclusive right over the subject work "Lavandera Ko" for the simple reason that herein
parties were not the maker, creator or the original one who conceptualized it. Section 171.1
defines the author as the natural person who has created the work. (R.A. No. 8293).
Therefore, it can be said here, then and now, that said registrations of the word "Lavandera
Ko" by the herein parties cannot be protected by the law, Republic Act No. 8293. Section
172.2 (R.A. No. 8293) is quite crystal clear on this point, it declares: "Works are protected by
the sole fact of their creation, irrespective of their mode or form of expressions, as well as
of their content, quality and purpose." Herein parties were not the creators of the subject
word. It was a creation of Santiago S. Suarez in 1942.
Finally, in the case of Wilson Ong Ching Kian Chuan v. Court of Appeals and Lorenzo
Tan (G.R. No. 130360, August 15, 2001), the Supreme Court ruled: "A person to be entitled
to a copyright must be the original creator of the work. He must have created it by his own
skill, labor and judgment without directly copying or evasively imitating the work of
another." Again, herein parties, both, miserably failed to prove and establish on how they
have created this alleged work before registering it with the National Library and the
Intellectual Property Office, hence their claim of ownership of the word "Lavandera Ko" is
not conclusive or herein parties are both great pretenders and imitators. Therefore, it is
hereby declared that registration with the IPO by Fernando is hereby cancelled, for one and
many others stated herein, because of the admission of Fernando that he coined the name
Page 59 of 102
 from the lyrics of a song popularized in the 1950's by singer Ruben Tagalog. Admission is
admissible without need of evidence. (Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court).
Considering that herein parties had made misrepresentations before this court,
hence, both the herein parties came to this court with unclean hands. Thus, no damage
could be awarded to anyone of the herein parties. 12
The above ruling is erroneous as it confused trade or business name with copyright.
The law on trademarks, service marks and trade names are found under Part III of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8293, or the Intellectual Code of the Philippines, while Part IV of the same law governs
copyrights.
"Lavandera Ko," the mark in question in this case is being used as a trade name or specifically, a
service name since the business in which it pertains involves the rendering of laundry services. Under
Section 121.1 of R.A. No. 8293, "mark" is defined as any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods
(trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container of
goods. As such, the basic contention of the parties is, who has the better right to use "Lavandera Ko" as a
service name because Section 165.2 13 of the said law, guarantees the protection of trade names and
business names even prior to or without registration, against any unlawful act committed by third parties.
A cause of action arises when the subsequent use of any third party of such trade name or business name
would likely mislead the public as such act is considered unlawful. Hence, the RTC erred in denying the
parties the proper determination as to who has the ultimate right to use the said trade name by ruling that
neither of them has the right or a cause of action since "Lavandera Ko" is protected by a copyright.
By their very definitions, copyright and trade or service name are different. Copyright is the right of
literary property as recognized and sanctioned by positive law. 14 An intangible, incorporeal right granted
by statute to the author or originator of certain literary or artistic productions, whereby he is invested, for
a limited period, with the sole and exclusive privilege of multiplying copies of the same and publishing and
selling them. 15 Trade name, on the other hand, is any designation which (a) is adopted and used by
person to denominate goods which he markets, or services which he renders, or business which he
conducts, or has come to be so used by other, and (b) through its association with such goods, services or
business, has acquired a special significance as the name thereof, and (c) the use of which for the purpose
stated in (a) is prohibited neither by legislative enactment nor by otherwise defined public policy. 16
Section 172.1 of R.A. 8293 enumerates the following original intellectual creations in the literary
and artistic domain that are protected from the moment of their creation, thus:
172.1 Literary and artistic works, hereinafter referred to as "works", are original
intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their
creation and shall include in particular:
(a) Books, pamphlets, articles and other writings;
(b) Periodicals and newspapers;
(c) Lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery, whether
or not reduced in writing or other material form;
(d) Letters;
(e) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions; choreographic works or
entertainment in dumb shows;

Page 60 of 102
 (f) Musical compositions, with or without words;
(g) Works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving, lithography or
other works of art; models or designs for works of art;
(h) Original ornamental designs or models for articles of manufacture, whether or
not registrable as an industrial design, and other works of applied art;
(i) Illustrations, maps, plans, sketches, charts and three-dimensional works relative
to geography, topography, architecture or science;
(j) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character;
(k) Photographic works including works produced by a process analogous to
photography; lantern slides;
(l) Audiovisual works and cinematographic works and works produced by a process
analogous to cinematography or any process for making audio-visual recordings;
(m) Pictorial illustrations and advertisements;
(n) Computer programs; and
(o) Other literary, scholarly, scientific and artistic works.
As such, "Lavandera Ko," being a musical composition with words is protected under the copyright
law (Part IV, R.A. No. 8293) and not under the trademarks, service marks and trade names law (Part III,
R.A. No. 8293).
In connection therewith, the RTC's basis or source, an article appearing in a website, 17 in ruling
that the song entitled "Lavandera Ko" is protected by a copyright, cannot be considered a subject of
judicial notice that does not need further authentication or verification. Judicial notice is the cognizance of
certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof because these facts are already
known to them. 18 Put differently, it is the assumption by a court of a fact without need of further
traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on convenience and expediency in securing and
introducing evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide
disputed. 19 In Spouses Latip v. Chua, 20 this Court expounded on the nature of judicial notice, thus:
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial
notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take
judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts
of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and
the geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of
their judicial functions.
On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro is instructive:
Page 61 of 102
 I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of
the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with
caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice
is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another
way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if
knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court
assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But
judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the
judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to
make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally
known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those
matters which are "commonly" known.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice,
may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of
the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be
found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person.
We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the recent
case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, which cited State Prosecutors:
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice
is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable
dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questionable.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters
coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life,
Page 62 of 102
 or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of
ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which
may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed,
provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be
regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common
knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been
judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial
notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of
which the court has no constructive knowledge.
The article in the website cited by the RTC patently lacks a requisite for it to be of judicial notice to
the court because such article is not well and authoritatively settled and is doubtful or uncertain. It must
be remembered that some articles appearing in the internet or on websites are easily edited and their
sources are unverifiable, thus, sole reliance on those articles is greatly discouraged.
Considering, therefore, the above premise, this Court deems it proper to remand the case to the
RTC for its proper disposition since this Court cannot, based on the records and some of the issues raised
by both parties such as the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of registration issued by the Intellectual
Property Office, make a factual determination as to who has the better right to use the
trade/business/service name, "Lavandera Ko."
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated
January 25, 2016, of petitioner Fernando U. Juan is GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision dated May 7,
2015 and Resolution dated December 4, 2015 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This
Court, however, ORDERS the REMAND of this case to the RTC for its prompt disposition.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Perlas-Bernabe and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Caguioa, * J., is on leave.
Footnotes
* On leave.
1. Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Florito S. Macalino and
Melchor Quirino C. Sadang; rollo, pp. 37-45.
2. Id. at 47-48.
3. Id. at 60-61.
4. Id. at 45.
5. Id. at 15.
6. Id. at 90-106.
7. Lynman Bacolor, et al. v. VL Makabali Memorial Hospital, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 204325, April 18, 2016.
8. Zacarias Cometa, et al. v. CA, et al., 404 Phil. 107, 120 (2001), citing Casa Filipina Realty Corporation v. Office of the President, 311
Phil. 170, 181 (1995), citing Rapid Manpower Consultants, Inc. v. NLRC, 268 Phil. 815, 821 (1990).
9. Pagadora v. Ilao, 678 Phil. 208, 222 (2011), citing Mediserv, Inc. v. Court of Appeals n, 631 Phil. 282, 295 (2010).
10. 388 Phil. 587, 592-593 (2000). (Citations omitted).
11. Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo, 497 Phil. 635, 646 (2005).
12. Rollo, pp. 58-60.
13. 165.2. (a) Notwithstanding any laws or regulations providing for any obligation to register trade names, such names shall be
protected, even prior to or without registration, against any unlawful act committed by third parties.
  (b) In particular, any subsequent use of the trade name by a third party, whether as a trade name or a mark or collective mark, or
any such use of a similar trade name or mark, likely to mislead the public, shall be deemed unlawful.
14. Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, (1979), p. 304.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1339, citing Walters v. Building Maintenance Service, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 291 S.W.2d 377, 382.
Page 63 of 102
17. http//www.himig.com.ph (http://kahimyang.info/kauswagan/articles/1420/today-in-philippine-history
18. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 678 Phil. 358, 425 (2011), citing Ricardo J. Francisco, 7 The Revised Rules of Court in the
Philippines, Evidence, Part I, 1997 ed., p. 69.
19. Id., citing Oscar M. Herrera, 5 Remedial Law, 1999, p. 72.
20. 619 Phil. 155, 164-166 (2009). (Citations omitted)
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "Mediserve, Inc. v. Court of Appeals" in the original document.

||PEOPLE V. DOCUMENTO, G.R. NO. 188706 (RESOLUTION), [MARCH 17, 2010], 629 PHIL
579-586

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. OSCAR M. DOCUMENTO, appellant.

THIRD DIVISION:”[G.R. No. 188706. March 17, 2010.] RESOLUTION:NACHURA, J p:

On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated August 13, 2008, affirming the Regional
Trial Court 2 (RTC) Decision 3 dated June 9, 2003, finding appellant Oscar Documento guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Rape. IESTcD
Documento was charged before the RTC with two (2) counts of Rape, as defined and punished
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, in separate Informations, which read:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 6899

That sometime on April 22, 1996 at Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with the use of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with his daughter AAA, a minor, 16 years of age, against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW: (Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7659).

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 6900

That sometime on October 15, 1995 at Barangay Antongalon, Butuan City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with the use of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with his daughter AAA, a minor, 16 years of age, against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW: (Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7659). 4

Upon arraignment, Documento pled not guilty. Subsequently, however, he changed his earlier plea
to one of guilt. As such, the RTC ordered a re-arraignment and entered appellant's plea of guilt to the
charges.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented evidence consisting of the testimonies of private
complainant herself, AAA, her mother, BBB, and Dr. Johann A. Hugo. Their testimonies established the
following:

Page 64 of 102
 1. Documento started sexually molesting his daughter, AAA, in 1989 when she was ten (10)
years old. Eventually, AAA became pregnant and gave birth in 1993.

2. Documento raped AAA on a number of occasions in the houses of Barsilisa Morada,

Documento's relative, and Aida Documento, both located in Butuan City. During each
incident, Documento hit and hurt AAA physically. He likewise threatened to kill her if
she told anyone of the rape. cEITCA

3. AAA's mother, BBB, who was working in Manila from 1994 to 1996, went to Barsilisa and
asked for help in locating Oscar and AAA. BBB testified that she had not seen nor
heard from the two since April 7, 1994, when Documento brought their daughters
AAA and CCC to Tubod, Lanao del Norte, for a vacation. Thereafter, Documento left
CCC in Tubod and brought AAA with him to Santiago, Agusan del Norte.

4. When BBB found out from their relatives that AAA got pregnant and gave birth, she
suspected that Documento was the culprit. Upon learning that Documento and AAA
were in Butuan City, she went to the Butuan Police Station and requested assistance in
securing custody of AAA. As soon as Documento was arrested, AAA informed the
police that Documento raped her.

5. Dr. Hugo testified on the genital examination he conducted on AAA, and affirmed the
medical certificate he issued with the following findings:

  C/L — with in normal limits.

  CVB — with in normal limits.
  EBD — Soft; NABS
  GU — (-) KPS
Genitalia - Parrous
  - Healed vaginal laceration
  - Vaginal introitus; admits 2 finger[s] with ease
  - Hymen with pemnants "caruncula multiforma"

Labs; Vaginal Smear; Negative for Spermatozoa. 5

Documento testified as the sole witness for the defense. He asseverated that he pled guilty to the
crime of Rape only because Prosecutor Hector B. Salise convinced him to do so. Documento contended that he
did not rape AAA, and that, to the contrary, they had a consensual, sexual relationship. He further alleged that
the incident did not happen in Butuan City, but in Clarin, Misamis Occidental. Finally, on cross-examination,
Documento disowned the handwritten letters he had supposedly written to his wife and to AAA, asking for
their forgiveness. DCcHIS

The RTC rendered judgment convicting Documento of both counts of Rape, to wit:

WHEREFORE, as a consequence of the foregoing, this Court finds accused Oscar M.

Documento GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) counts of rape and
correspondingly sentences him:

Page 65 of 102
 1. To suffer the penalty of DEATH in each of the two (2) rape cases filed against him —
Criminal Case No. 6899 and Criminal Case No. 6900;

2. To indemnify the victim, AAA, in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, respectively, for each
count of rape in accordance with recent jurisprudence.

Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused Oscar M. Documento
from Butuan City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

Let the records of these cases be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for
mandatory review.

SO ORDERED. 6

Consistent with our ruling in People v. Mateo, 7 Documento's appeal was remanded to the CA.

Ruling on the appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction, but changed the penalty imposed on
Documento from death penalty to reclusion perpetua, and increased the award of moral damages from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 for each count of Rape. The fallo of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision finding appellant Oscar Documento guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of the crime of rape and ordering him to indemnify the victim
for each count of rape the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages
is increased to P75,000.00 for each count of rape and that in lieu of the death penalty,
appellant Oscar Documento is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
for each count of rape without possibility of parole. HSaEAD

SO ORDERED. 8

Hence, this appeal, assigning the following errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE WITHOUT FIRST RESOLVING ITS
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME CHARGED AS THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO
ESTABLISH THAT THE TWO (2) COUNTS OF RAPE WERE PERPETRATED IN BUTUAN CITY.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY INTO THE
VOLUNTARINESS AND FULL COMPREHENSION BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA. 9

We find no cogent reason to disturb Documento's conviction. We affirm the CA, but with modification.

Page 66 of 102
 On the issue of the trial court's territorial jurisdiction over the crime, we completely agree with the
appellate court's ruling thereon. Contrary to the insistence of Documento that the prosecution failed to
establish that the two (2) counts of Rape were perpetrated in Butuan City, the CA pointed to specific parts of
the records which show that, although AAA did not specifically mention "Butuan City" in her testimony, the
incidents in the present cases transpired in Barangay Antongalon and on Ochoa Avenue, both in Butuan City.

First. AAA in her Sworn Statement dated April 24, 1996 answered the prosecutor's
question in this wise:

15.Q: Right after you arrived [in] Butuan City, did your father molest you or rape you? CDHcaS

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When was that?

A: From the month of October 15, 1995 when we stayed [in] Barangay Antongalon, Butuan
City, and the last happened in the evening of April 22, 1996 [on] Ochoa Avenue,
Butuan City.

Second. The Resolution dated May 3, 1996 of Hector B. Salise, Second Assistant City
Prosecutor, states that:

There were many places they stayed and several sexual intercourse that took
place which this office has no jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation but only
on the incidents of rape that took place [in] Antongalon, Butuan City on October 15,
1995 and [on] Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City on April 22, 1996.

Third. The two (2) Informations dated May 8, 1996, clearly state that the crimes
charged against appellant were perpetrated in Barangay Antongalon and Ochoa Avenue,
Butuan City on October 15, 1995 and April 22, 1996, respectively.

Fourth. The inclusion of the two Barangays in the City of Butuan is a matter of
mandatory judicial notice by the trial court. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence provides —

Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states,
their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time,
and the geographical divisions. 10

Documento avers that his conviction for Rape must be reversed because the trial court did not
properly conduct a searching inquiry on the voluntariness and full comprehension of his plea of guilt.

We disagree.

Page 67 of 102
 It is true that the appellate court noted the trial court's failure to conduct the prescribed "searching
inquiry" into the matter of whether or not Documento's plea of guilt was improvidently made. Nonetheless, it
still found the conviction of appellant proper. Its disquisition on Documento's plea of guilt is in point. aSEDHC

Nothing in the records of the case at bench shows that the trial court complied with
the guidelines [set forth by the Supreme Court in a number of cases] after appellant's re-
arraignment and guilty plea. The questions propounded to appellant during the direct and
cross-examination likewise fall short of these requirements. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The questions propounded were clearly not compliant with the guidelines set forth by
the High Court. The appellant was not fully apprised of the consequences of his guilty plea. In
fact, as argued by appellant, "the trial court should have informed him that his plea of guilt
would not affect or reduce the imposable penalty, which is death as he might have
erroneously believed that under Article 63, the death penalty, being a single indivisible
penalty, shall be applied by the court regardless of any mitigating circumstances that might
have attended the commission of the deed." Moreover, the trial court judge failed to inform
appellant of his right to adduce evidence despite the guilty plea. 

With the trial court's failure to comply with the guidelines, appellant's guilty plea is
deemed improvidently made and thus rendered inefficacious.

This does not mean, however, that the case should be remanded to the trial court.
This course of action is appropriate only when the appellant's guilty plea was the sole basis
for his conviction. As held in People v. Mira —

Notwithstanding the incautiousness that attended appellant's guilty plea, we

are not inclined to remand the case to the trial court as suggested by appellant.
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the
sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence
in finding the accused guilty, the judgment must be sustained, because then it is
predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but also on evidence proving
his commission of the offense charged. 11

On the whole, we find that the appellate court committed no reversible error in affirming the trial
court's ruling convicting Documento.

Lastly, on the matter of the appellate court's award of exemplary damages, we increase the award
from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. aIETCA

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 13, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00285 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages is hereby increased
from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. The Decision is affirmed in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

Page 68 of 102
 Corona, Velasco, Jr., Peralta and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja, with Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez and Elihu A. Ybañez, concurring;
rollo, pp. 5-26.
2.Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch 5.
3.Penned by Judge Augustus L. Calo, CA rollo, pp. 21-38.
4.Rollo, p. 6.
5.Id. at 8.
6.CA rollo, p. 38.
7.G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
8.Rollo, pp. 25-26.
9.CA rollo, p. 50.
10.Rollo, pp. 23-24.
11.Id. at 13-16. 

PELTAN DEVELOPMENT, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 117029, MARCH 19,1997

PELTAN DEVELOPMENT, INC.,PATROCINIO E. MARGOLLES, EDGARDO C. ESPINOSA,

VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, LUCIA E. LAPERAL, NORMA C. 1 ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL and
ALICE E. SOTTO, petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, ALEJANDRO Q. REY and JUAN B.
ARAUJO, respondents. THIRD DIVISION: [G.R. No. 117029. March 19, 1997.]

Padilla Law Office for petitioners. Eddie Tamondong for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO DISMISS; IN THE RESOLUTION OF A MOTION TO

DISMISS BASED ON FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, ONLY THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT
MUST BE CONSIDERED. — It is a well-settled rule that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. In the resolution of a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of
action, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test in cases like these is whether a
court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based upon the facts alleged and pursuant to the prayer
therein. Hence, it has been held that a motion to dismiss generally partakes of the nature of a demurrer which
hypothetically admits the truth of the factual allegations made in a complaint.

2. ID.;ID.;PARTIES IN CIVIL ACTION; REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST; THE GOVERNMENT, NOT THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS, IS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IN THE CASE AT BAR. — The Court also holds that private
respondents are not the proper parties to initiate the present suit. The complaint, praying as it did for the
cancellation of the transfer certificates of title of petitioners on the ground that they were derived from a
"spurious" OCT No. 4216, assailed in effect the validity of said title. While private respondents did not pray for
the reversion of the land to the government, we agree with the petitioners that the prayer in the complaint
will have the same result of reverting the land to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Gabila vs.
Barriga ruled that only the government is entitled to this relief.

Page 69 of 102
 3. ID.;EVIDENCE; JUDICIAL NOTICE; IN RESOLVING A MOTION TO DISMISS, EVERY COURT MUST TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF DECISIONS THIS COURT HAS RENDERED BECAUSE THEY ARE PROPER SUBJECTS OF
MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE. — It is axiomatic nonetheless that a court has a mandate to apply relevant
statutes and jurisprudence in determining whether the allegations in a complaint establish a cause of action.
While it focuses on the complaint, a court clearly cannot disregard decisions material to the proper
appreciation of the questions before it. In resolving a motion to dismiss, every court must take cognizance of
decisions this Court has rendered because they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice as provided
by Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.

4. ID.;ID.;ID.;RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR FAILURE TO TAKE

JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE COURT'S PROMULGATION OF MARGOLLES VS. COURT OF APPEALS CASE. — The
Court is well aware that a decision in Margolles vs. CA,rendered on 14 February 1994, upheld the validity of
OCT No. 4216 (and the certificates of title derived therefrom),the same OCT that the present complaint seeks
to nullify for being "fictitious and spurious." Respondent CA, in its assailed Decision dated 29 June 1994, failed
to consider Margolles vs. CA.The Supreme Court promulgated Margolles ahead of the assailed CA decision. It
was incumbent upon Respondent CA to take judicial notice thereof and apply it in resolving this case. That the
CA did not is clearly a reversible error.

5. LAND TITLES; LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS SYSTEM; ALLOWING REPEATED SUITS SEEKING TO
NULLIFY ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE WILL BRING TO NAUGHT THE PRINCIPLE OF INDEFEASIBILITY OF
TITLES ISSUED UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION; CASE AT BAR. — Allowing repeated
suits seeking to nullify OCT No. 4216, like the present case, will bring to naught the principle of indefeasibility
of titles issued under the Torrens system-of land registration. Thus, in a resolution dated 10 August 1994, the
First Division of this Court, applying the Margolles ruling, dismissed a petition for review involving herein
petitioner Peltan Corporation which had raised as issue the validity of OCT No. 4216. The Court, in the case at
bench, can do no less. Subjecting OCT No. 4216 to further scrutiny, as proposed in the amended complaint, is
no longer an available option.

D E C I S I O N: PANGANIBAN, J p:

In resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, should the Court of Appeals
invoke a Supreme Court decision promulgated after such motion was filed by defendants and ruled upon by
the trial court? Is such invocation violative of the rule that motions to dismiss based on lack of cause of action
should be ruled upon only on the basis of the allegations of the complaint? Who are the real parties-in-
interest in an action to cancel a Torrens certificate of title?

Petitioners challenge the Decision 2 of public respondent 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 28244 promulgated on
June 29, 1994, which ruled as follows: 4

"WHEREFORE, the appealed order dated August 22, 1989 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The trial court is ordered to try the case on plaintiffs' (herein private respondents)
complaint/amended complaint against all defendants (herein petitioners).cdphil

Let the original record of the case be returned to the court of origin."

Page 70 of 102
 In a Resolution 5 promulgated on September 2, 1994, Respondent Court denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.

The order reversed by public respondent had been issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 112, in Civil Case No. LP-8852-P. The order in part ruled: 6

"Considering the arguments and counter-arguments urged by the parties in this case,
particularly on the nature and effect of the action filed by plaintiffs, the Court is inclined to
grant the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Peltan Development Corporation on the basis
of the Supreme Court ruling in Gabila vs. Barriga,41 SCRA 131. The ultimate result of the
cancellation prayed for by the plaintiffs, if granted by this Court, would be to revert the
property in question to the public domain. Therefore, the ultimate beneficiary of such
cancellation would be the Government. Since the Government can only be represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General, which has repeatedly refused to institute or join an action
for cancellation of defendant's titles, then, the real party in interest cannot be said to have
instituted the present action. It is the Government, not the plaintiffs which is the real party in
interest. Plaintiffs not being the real party in interest, they have no cause of action against the
defendants.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted and this case is hereby
dismissed, without prejudice to plaintiffs' pursuing administrative relief in the proper
government agencies concerned."

The Facts

The facts, as found by public respondent, are undisputed by the parties, to wit: 7

"On February 20, 1981 plaintiffs (herein private respondents) filed against eleven (11)
defendants (herein petitioners) a complaint captioned for 'Cancellation of Titles and
Damages'.On December 15, 1981, the complaint was amended by including or impleading as
the twelfth defendant the City Townhouse Development Corporation. Omitting the
jurisdictional facts, the allegations in the amended complaint are quoted hereunder:

'II

Plaintiffs are applicants for a free patent over a parcel of land comprising an
area of 197,527 square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Tindig na Manga, Las
Piñas, Metro Manila.

III

Prior to the filing of their petition for free patent, plaintiffs had for many years
been occupying and cultivating the aforestated piece of land until their crops, houses
and other improvements they introduced thereon were illegally bulldozed and
destroyed by persons led by defendant Edgardo Espinosa ...Thereafter, the same
persons forcibly and physically drove out plaintiffs therefrom.

Page 71 of 102
 IV

Plaintiffs filed their petition for issuance of free patent covering the aforesaid
property with the Bureau of Lands in May 1976, as a result of which they were issued
by the Lands Bureau Survey Authority No. 54 (IV-1) on December 16, 1976.

Accordingly, and on the strength of the aforesaid authority to survey, plaintiffs

had the property surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Regino L. Sobrerinas, Jr. on
December 20-21, 1976.

VI

During the years that plaintiffs were occupying, cultivating, planting and
staying on the aforestated parcel of land, neither ...one of the defendants was in
possession thereof.

VII

The processing and eventual approval of plaintiffs' free patent application or

petition over the subject piece of land have, however, been obstructed and/or held in
abeyance, despite the absence of any opposition thereto, because of the alleged
existence of several supposed certificates of title thereon, ...of the defendants,
namely:

Peltan Development, Inc. — Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-17992

xxx xxx xxx

VIII

The aforestated transfer certificates of title of the abovenamed defendants,

plaintiffs discovered, and therefore they hereby allege, were all derived from an
alleged Original Certificate of Title No. 4216 supposedly issued by the Register of
Deeds of Rizal and registered in the name of the Spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria
Juliana Carlos in 1929 allegedly pursuant to Decree No. 351823 issued by the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 672.

IX

Plaintiffs, however, subsequently discovered, after a thorough research, that

the alleged Original Certificate of Title No. 4216 of the Spouses Lorenzo Gana and
Juliana Carlos — whence all the transfer certificates of title of the ...abovenamed
defendants originated and/or were derived from — was FICTITIOUS and/or SPURIOUS
...

Page 72 of 102
 xxx xxx xxx

Being, thus, derived and/or having originated from a FICTITIOUS and/or

SPURIOUS original certificate of title (OCT No. 4216),as herein above shown, ALL the
aforestated transfer certificates of title of the ...abovenamed defendants are, logically
and imperatively, FAKE, SPURIOUS and/or NULL AND VOID as well. Hence, they all
must and should be CANCELED.

xxx xxx xxx

XIV

Before they decided to institute this action, plaintiffs informed, indeed they
warned, the defendants that their so-called titles over the parcels of land or portions
thereof covered by plaintiffs' free patent application and/or petition are either fake,
spurious or void for reasons aforestated. But the defendants simply ignored plaintiffs'
admonitions.

XV

Accordingly, plaintiffs were compelled to retain the services of the undersigned

counsel to file this complaint not only because they have been materially and
substantially prejudiced by the existence of defendants' spurious titles, but also
because as citizens and taxpayers of this country they have a legitimate interest in the
disposition of alienable lands of the State, as well as the right to question any
illegitimate, unlawful or spurious award, disposition or registration thereof to protect
not just their interest but also the public.

XVI

Because of the defendant's illegal titling of the parcel of land or portions

thereof covered by plaintiffs' free patent application, and particularly by the unlawful
disturbance of plaintiff's possession thereof and destruction of plaintiffs' plants and
dwellings thereon, which was caused and/or directed by the defendants Edgardo
Espinosa and Pat C. Margolles, said defendants should be ordered to pay plaintiffs
actual or compensatory damages in such amount as may be proven during the trial of
this case.' (Original Records, Vol. I, pp. 202-214) LexLib

On the basis of the foregoing allegations, the prayer in the amended complaint states:

'WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment

(should) be rendered:

1. Canceling the transfer certificates of titles of the defendants as specified in

par. VII hereof and/or declaring them null and void for having originated or being
derived from a fictitious, spurious or void original certificates of title.

Page 73 of 102
 2. Ordering defendants Edgardo Espinosa and Pat C. Margolles to pay plaintiffs
actual or compensatory damages as may be proven during the trial of this case. And —

3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs appropriate amount of exemplary

damages and reasonable amount of attorney's fees, as well as to pay the costs.

Plaintiffs further respectfully pray for such other reliefs just and equitable in
the premises.' (Original Records, Vol. I, p. 215)

xxx xxx xxx

On April 3, 1985, defendant Peltan Development Corporation (Peltan, for brevity) filed
a 'Motion For Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defenses' mainly on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action against defendant Peltan. It is alleged in the motion that
plaintiffs are not the real parties in interest in the action as they do not assert any present and
subsisting title of ownership over the property in question. Invoking the case of Gabila vs.
Barriga, L-28917, promulgated on September 30, 1971, the defendant Peltan contends that
the action being one for cancellation of the certificates of title the Government, through the
Solicitor General — not a private individual like plaintiff Gabila — was the real party in
interest.

On April 27, 1989 plaintiffs filed their opposition to defendant Peltan's aforesaid
motion in which plaintiffs reasserted their cause of action as set forth in their complaint, and
pointed to the trial court the pertinent averments in their action showing their rights and
interests or claims that had been violated which thus placed them in the status of a real party
in interest. Subsequently, defendant Peltan filed its reply to plaintiffs' opposition, with
plaintiffs submitting their rejoinder thereto. Then finally defendant Peltan filed its comment
on the rejoinder.

On August 22, 1989, the trial court dismissed the complaint. Holding that the plaintiffs were not the
real parties-in-interest, the RTC ruled that they had no cause of action against the defendants. The order was
reversed by public respondent. Hence, this petition for review.

In a motion filed before this Court on March 8, 1996, petitioners prayed for the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens annotated on their titles "under Entry No. 210060/T-12473-A." The notice was caused by
Private Respondent Alejandro Rey because of the pendency of Civil Case No. LP-8852-P, the dismissal of which
is the issue at bench. 8

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court,
holding that the two elements of a cause of action were present in the complaint, to wit: 1) the plaintiff's
primary right and 2) the delict or wrongful act of the defendant violative of that right. The CA held that private
respondents had a right over the property as shown by the allegation that they had been occupying the
landholding in question and that they had applied for a free patent thereon; and that petitioners committed a
delict against private respondents by forcibly driving them out of the property, and delaying the processing
and approval of their application for free patent because of the existence of petitioners' transfer certificates of
Page 74 of 102
title derived from OCT No. 4126. 9 The CA further held that the RTC "should have treated the case as an
accion publiciana to determine who as between the parties plaintiffs and defendants have a better right of
possession." 10

Stressing that only the facts alleged in the complaint should have been considered in resolving the
motion to dismiss, Respondent CA held that the trial court had erred in accepting the allegations of herein
petitioners that private respondents' requests for the Solicitor General to file an action to annul OCT No. 4216
had been repeatedly denied.

Public respondent also rejected the application of the Gabila 11 ruling to the case at bar. It reasoned:
12

"True, plaintiffs in their complaint prayed inter alia for the cancellation of the transfer
certificates of title of the defendants for being derived from a spurious or false original
certificate of title. Relying on the case of Gabila vs. Barriga, supra,defendants argued that the
ultimate result of a favorable decision on complaints of such nature is for the lands to revert
back to the ownership of the state, and hence, such actions may only be instituted by the
Government through the Solicitor Generel (sic).This argument is misplaced. Firstly, unlike the
Gabila case, the herein plaintiffs in their complaint did not assert and pray for reversion.
Secondly, the prayer for cancellation of the defendants' Torrens titles does not negate nor
eliminate the presence of the elements of plaintiffs' cause of action on the basis of the
allegations in the complaint, as already discussed. Thirdly, the prayer of a complaint is not a
material factor in determining the relief grantable, which rests upon the facts proved (Lacson
vs. Diaz, 47 O.G. No. 12 Supp. 377, Aug. 4, 1950, No. L-2839).Precisely, as a matter of practice,
complaints filed in court usually contain a general prayer 'for other relief which may be just
and equitable in the premises' like the complaint in the case at bar. Fourthly, in the Gabila
case, the Supreme Court did not affirm the trial court's dismissal order. Instead, per
dispositive portion of the decision, it ordered the setting aside of the appealed dismissal order
and directing the return of the records of the case to the trial court with admonition to the
party interested to formally implead the Bureau of Lands with notice to the Solicitor General.
Obviously, the posture of defendants Peltan is not entirely supported by the Gabila case." cda

The Issues

Petitioners assign the following errors committed by public respondent: 13

"a. Ordering the trial court to proceed on private respondents' cause of action for the
nullification of OCT No. 4216 on the ground that it is fake/spurious when the Supreme Court
had already ruled in G.R. No. 109490 and in G.R. No. 112038 that OCT No. 4216 is genuine
and valid — and in disregarding and refusing to pass upon the said squarely applicable
decisions of this Honorable Court;

b. Ordering the trial court to proceed on private respondents' cause of action for
damages for the supposed acts of the private respondents Margolles and Espinosa despite
non-payment of the jurisdictional docket fees when this cause of action had already
prescribed — and in disregarding and refusing to pass upon the squarely applicable
Manchester ruling;
Page 75 of 102
 c. In not applying the Gabila ruling to dismiss the subject complaint considering that
respondents do not even pretend to have any title or right to the subject property to
authorize them to ask for a free patent thereon since it is already (a) private property covered
by petitioners' torrens title derived from OCT No. 4216 issued in 1929."

The Court's Ruling

We grant the petition and reverse the public respondent.

What Determines Cause of Action?

It is a well-settled rule that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. 14 In the resolution of a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, only the facts
alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test in cases like these is whether a court can render a valid
judgment on the complaint based upon the facts alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein. 15 Hence, it has
been held that a motion to dismiss generally partakes of the nature of a demurrer which hypothetically admits
the truth of the factual allegations made in a complaint. 16

It is axiomatic nonetheless that a court has a mandate to apply relevant statutes and jurisprudence in
determining whether the allegations in a complaint establish a cause of action. While it focuses on the
complaint, a court clearly cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions
before it. In resolving a motion to dismiss, every court must take cognizance of decisions this Court has
rendered because they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice as provided by Section 1 of Rule 129
of the Rules of Court, to wit:

"SEC. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without
the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty
and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines,laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions." (Emphasis
supplied.)

The said decisions, more importantly, "form part of the legal system," 17 and failure of any court to
apply them shall constitute an abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance with law, and shall be a
ground for administrative action against an inferior court magistrate.

In resolving the present complaint, therefore, the Court is well aware that a decision in Margolles vs.
CA, 18 rendered on 14 February 1994, upheld the validity of OCT No. 4216 (and the certificates of title derived
therefrom), the same OCT that the present complaint seeks to nullify for being "fictitious and spurious."
Respondent CA, in its assailed Decision dated 29 June 1994, failed to consider Margolles vs. CA.This we cannot
countenance.

In finding that the complaint stated a cause of action, Public Respondent CA recognized that private
respondent had a valid right over the property in question, based on their actual possession thereof and their
pending application for a free patent thereon. The linchpin of this right, however, is the validity of OCT No.

Page 76 of 102
4216. In other words, private respondents' right is premised on the allegation that the title of herein
petitioners originated merely from the "fictitious and/or spurious" OCT No. 4216.

Because it had failed to take cognizance of Margolles vs. CA,the CA was unable to consider that the
legality of OCT No. 4216. As adverted to earlier, Margolles vs. CA upheld the validity of this title and the titles
derived therefrom by, among others, Petitioner Peltan Corporation. Clearly, private respondents' possession
of the land, and their pending application for a free patent thereon, did not not vest in them a right superior
to the valid title of petitioner originating from OCT No. 4216. Indeed, private respondents can invoke no right
at all against the petitioners. Accordingly, the first element of a cause of action, i.e.,plaintiff's right, is not
present in the instant case.

In this light, the CA's treatment of the present suit as an accion publiciana to determine which one
among the parties had a better right over the property is but an exercise in redundancy. As discussed above,
the same issue has been foreclosed by the Supreme Court in Margolles.

The Supreme Court promulgated Margolles ahead of the assailed CA decision. It was incumbent upon
Respondent CA to take judicial notice thereof and apply it in resolving this case. That the CA did not is clearly a
reversible error.

Furthermore, allowing repeated suits seeking to nullify OCT No. 4216, like the present case, will bring
to naught the principle of indefeasibility of titles issued under the Torrens system of land registration. 19 Thus,
in a resolution 20 dated 10 August 1994, the First Division of this Court, applying the Margolles ruling,
dismissed a petition for review involving herein petitioner Peltan Corporation which had raised as issue the
validity of OCT No. 4216. The Court, in the case at bench, can do no less. Subjecting OCT No. 4216 to further
scrutiny, as proposed in the amended complaint, is no longer an available option.

Are Private Respondents the

Real Parties-in-Interest?

The Court also holds that private respondents are not the proper parties to initiate the present suit.
The complaint, praying as it did for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title of petitioners on the
ground that they were derived from a "spurious" OCT No. 4216, assailed in effect the validity of said title.
While private respondents did not pray for the reversion of the land to the government, we agree with the
petitioners that the prayer in the complaint will have the same result of reverting the land to the government
under the Regalian doctrine. 21 Gabila vs. Barriga ruled that only the government is entitled to this relief. The
Court in that case held:

"The present motion to dismiss is actually predicated on Section 1(g),Rule 16 of the

Revised Rules of Court, i.e.,failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, for it alleges in
paragraph 12 thereof that the plaintiff admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation
or amendment of the defendant's title, because, even if the said title were canceled or
amended, the ownership of the land embraced therein, or of the portion thereof affected by
the amendment, would revert to the public domain. In his amended complaint the plaintiff
makes no pretense at all that any part of the land covered by the defendant's title was
privately owned by him or by his predecessors-in-interest. Indeed, it is admitted therein that
the said land was at all times a part of the public domain until December 18, 1964, when the
Page 77 of 102
 government issued a title thereon in favor of defendant. Thus, if there is any person or entity
to relief, it can only be the government.

In the case at bar, the plaintiff's own averments negate the existence of such right, for
it would appear therefrom that whatever right might have been violated by the defendant
belonged to the government, not to the plaintiff. Plaintiff-appellant argues that although his
complaint is captioned as one for cancellation of title, he has nevertheless stated therein
several causes of action based on his alleged rights of possession and ownership over the
improvements, on defendant-appellees alleged fraudulent acquisition of the land, and on the
damages allegedly incurred by him (plaintiff-appellant) in relation to the improvements.
These matters are merely ancillary to the central issue of whether or not defendant-
appellee's title should be canceled or amended, and they may not be leaned upon in an effort
to make out a cause of action in relation to the said focal issue. Indeed, the principal relief
prayed for in the amended complaint is the cancellation or amendment of defendant-
appellee's title." 22

Nonpayment of Docket Fees

As we have already ruled that the private respondents are not the real parties in interest, we find no
more need to pass upon the question of nonpayment of filing fees. cdt

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint of private respondents in Civil Case No. LP-8852-P is DISMISSED. The notice of lis
pendens,annotated in the titles of petitioners because of Civil Case No. LP-8852-P, is ordered CANCELED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J .,Melo and Francisco, JJ ., concur.

Davide, Jr.,J., concurs but only on ground that private respondents are not the real party in interest.

Footnotes
1.The middle initial is E in the case of Margolles vs. Court of Appeals,230 SCRA 97, February 14, 1994.
2.Rollo,pp. 28-38.
3.Thirteenth Division composed of Justice Alfredo Marigomen, ponente,and Justices Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez and Ruben T. Reyes,
concurring.
4.Rollo,pp. 37-38.
5.Ibid.,p. 40.
6.Ibid.,pp. 32-33.
7.Ibid.,pp. 28-32.
8.Ibid.,pp. 166-169.
9.CA Decision, pp. 6-7; Rollo,pp. 33-34.
10.Ibid.,p. 8; Rollo,p. 35.
11.Supra.
12.Rollo.,pp. 35-36.
13.Ibid.,p. 7.
14.Republic vs. Estenzo,158 SCRA 282, 285, February 29, 1988.

Page 78 of 102
15.Galvez vs. Tuason,10 SCRA 344, February 29, 1964; Mindanao Realty Corp. vs. Kintanar,6 SCRA 814, November 30, 1962; Uy Chao
vs. De la Rama Steamship Co.,Inc., 6 SCRA 69, September 29, 1962; Zobel vs. Abreu, et al.,98 Phil. 343 (1956);De Jesus, et al.,vs.
Belarmino, et al.,95 Phil. 365 (1954).
16.Perpetual Savings Bank & Trust Co. vs. Fajardo,223 SCRA 720, June 28, 1993.
17.Article 8 of the Civil Code provides that "[J]udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of
the legal system of the Philippines."
18.Supra.
19.See Widows & Orphans Association vs. Court of Appeals,212 SCRA 360, August 7, 1992.
20.Goldenrod, Inc.,vs. Court of Appeals and Peltan Development, Inc.,G.R. No. 112038, August 10, 1994.
21.Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
  "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the state. ..." Regalian doctrine is enunciated in
the case of Piñero, Jr. vs. Director of Lands,57 SCRA 386, June 14, 1974. cdt
22.41 SCRA at 135-136, September 30, 1971.

BORROMEO V. MINA, G.R. NO. 193747, [JUNE 5, 2013], 710 PHIL 454-466)

JOSELITO C. BORROMEO, petitioner, vs. JUAN T. MINA, respondent.

SECOND DIVISION: [G.R. No. 193747. June 5, 2013.] DECISION: PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the April 30, 2010 Decision 2 and September
13, 2010 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101185, dismissing petitioner Joselito
C. Borromeo's petitions which identically prayed for the exemption of his landholding from the coverage of
the government's Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program as well as the cancellation of respondent Juan T.
Mina's title over the property subject of the said landholding.
The Facts
Subject of this case is a 1.1057 hectare parcel of agricultural land, situated in Barangay Magsaysay,
Naguilian, Isabela, denominated as Lot No. 5378 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. EP-
43526, 4 registered in the name of respondent (subject property). It appears from the foregoing TCT that
respondent's title over the said property is based on Emancipation Patent No. 393178 issued by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on May 2, 1990. 5
Petitioner filed a Petition dated June 9, 2003 6 before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO)
of Isabela, seeking that: (a) his landholding over the subject property (subject landholding) be exempted
from the coverage of the government's OLT program under Presidential Decree No. 27 dated October 21,
1972 7 (PD 27); and (b) respondent's emancipation patent over the subject property be consequently
revoked and cancelled. 8 To this end, petitioner alleged that he purchased the aforesaid property from its
previous owner, one Serafin M. Garcia (Garcia), as evidenced by a deed of sale notarized on February 19,
1982 (1982 deed of sale). For various reasons, however, he was not able to effect the transfer of title in his
name. Subsequently, to his surprise, he learned that an emancipation patent was issued in respondent's
favor without any notice to him. He equally maintained that his total agricultural landholdings was only
3.3635 hectares and thus, within the landowner's retention limits under both PD 27 and Republic Act No.
6657, n otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988." In this regard, he claimed
that the subject landholding should have been excluded from the coverage of the government's OLT
program. 9

Page 79 of 102
 Petitioner filed a subsequent Petition dated September 1, 2003 10 also with the PARO which
contained identical allegations as those stated in his June 9, 2003 Petition (PARO petitions) and similarly
prayed for the cancellation of respondent's emancipation patent. aHCSTD
After due investigation, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Joey Rolando M. Unblas
issued a Report dated September 29, 2003, 11 finding that the subject property was erroneously identified
by the same office as the property of petitioner's father, the late Cipriano Borromeo. In all actuality,
however, the subject property was never owned by Cipriano Borromeo as its true owner was Garcia —
notably, a perennial PD 27 landowner 12 — who later sold the same to petitioner.
Based on these findings, the MARO recommended that: (a) the subject landholding be exempted
from the coverage of the OLT; and (b) petitioner be allowed to withdraw any amortizations deposited by
respondent with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to serve as rental payments for the latter's use of
the subject property. 13
The Ruling of the PARO
In an undated Resolution, the PARO adopted the recommendation of the MARO and accordingly
(a) cancelled respondent's emancipation patent; (b) directed petitioner to allow respondent to continue in
the peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject property and to execute a leasehold contract over
the same pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3844 (RA 3844), otherwise known as the
"Agricultural Land Reform Code"; and (c) authorized petitioner to withdraw from the LBP all amortizations
deposited by respondent as rental payments for the latter's use of the said property. 14
Aggrieved, respondent filed an administrative appeal to the DAR Regional Director.
The Ruling of the DAR Regional Director
On November 30, 2004, DAR Regional Director Renato R. Navata issued an Order, 15 finding that
petitioner, being the true owner of the subject property, had the right to impugn its coverage from the
government's OLT program. Further, considering that the subject property was erroneously identified as
owned by Cipriano Borromeo, coupled with the fact that petitioner's total agricultural landholdings was
way below the retention limits prescribed under existing agrarian laws, he declared the subject
landholding to be exempt from OLT coverage.
While affirming the PARO's Decision, the DAR Regional Director did not, however, order the
cancellation of respondent's emancipation patent. He merely directed petitioner to institute the proper
proceedings for such purpose before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). ATHCDa
Consequently, respondent moved for reconsideration, 16 challenging petitioner's ownership of the
subject property for lack of sufficient basis to show that his averred predecessor-in-interest, Garcia, was its
actual owner. In addition, respondent pointed out that petitioner never filed a protest against the issuance
of an emancipation patent in his favor. Hence, petitioner should be deemed to have slept on his rights on
account of his inaction for 21 years.
The aforesaid motion was, however, denied in the Resolution dated February 10, 2006, 17
prompting respondent to elevate the matter to the DAR Secretary.
The Ruling of the DAR Secretary
On September 12, 2007, then DAR Secretary Nasser C. Pagandaman issued DARCO Order No. EXC-
0709-333, series of 2007, 18 affirming in toto the DAR Regional Director's ruling. It upheld the latter's
findings that the subject landholding was improperly placed under the coverage of the government's OLT
program on account of the erroneous identification of the landowner, 19 considering as well the fact that
Page 80 of 102
petitioner's total agricultural landholdings, i.e., 3.3635 hectares, was way below the retention limits under
existing agrarian laws. 20
Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for review with the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In a Decision dated April 30, 2010, 21 the CA reversed and set aside the DAR Secretary's ruling. It
doubted petitioner's claim of ownership based on the 1982 deed of sale due to the inconsistent allegations
regarding the dates of its notarization divergently stated in the two (2) PARO Petitions, this alongside the
fact that a copy of the same was not even attached to the records of the case for its examination. In any
case, the CA found the said sale to be null and void for being a prohibited transaction under PD 27 which
forbids the transfers or alienation of covered agricultural lands after October 21, 1972 except to the
tenant-beneficiaries thereof, of which petitioner was not. 22 It also held 23 that petitioner cannot mount
any collateral attack against respondent's title to the subject property as the same is prohibited under
Section 48 of the Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529), otherwise known as the "Property Registration
Decree." DTcHaA
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated September
13, 2010. 24
Hence, this petition.
The Petition
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in declaring the sale between him and Garcia as null and
void. In this connection, he avers that there was actually an oral sale entered into by him and Garcia
(through his son Lorenzo Garcia) in 1976. The said oral sale was consummated on the same year as
petitioner had already occupied and tilled the subject property and started paying real estate taxes
thereon. He further alleges that he allowed respondent to cultivate and possess the subject property in
1976 only out of mercy and compassion since the latter begged him for work. The existing sale agreement
had been merely formalized by virtue of the 1982 deed of sale which in fact, expressly provided that the
subject property was not tenanted and that the provisions of law on pre-emption had been complied with.
25 In this regard, petitioner claims that respondent cannot be considered as a tenant and as such, the
issuance of an emancipation patent in his favor was erroneous. Likewise, petitioner claims that his right to
due process was violated by the issuance of the aforesaid emancipation patent without any notice on his
part.
In his Comment, 26 respondent counters that petitioner cannot change his theory regarding the
date of sale between him and Garcia nor even raise the same factual issue on appeal before the Court. 27
Moreover, he asserts that the 1982 deed of sale was not registered and therefore, does not bind him. In
any event, he posits that the sale between petitioner and Garcia was null and void. 28 Finally, he argues
that petitioner's PARO petitions constitute collateral attacks to his title to the subject property which are
disallowed under PD 1529. 29
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
A. Petitioner's change of theory
on appeal
The Court first resolves the procedural matter. ECaScD

Page 81 of 102
 Settled is the rule that a party who adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and
decided by the lower courts or tribunals will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, 30 not
because of the strict application of procedural rules, but as a matter of fairness. 31 Basic considerations of
due process dictate that theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court
would not ordinarily be considered by a reviewing court, 32 except when their factual bases would not
require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable him to properly meet
the issue raised, 33 such as when the factual bases of such novel theory, issue or argument is (a) subject of
judicial notice; or (b) had already been judicially admitted, 34 which do not obtain in this case.
Records show that petitioner changed his theory on appeal with respect to two (2) matters:

First, the actual basis of his ownership rights over the subject property, wherein he
now claims that his ownership was actually based on a certain oral sale in 1976 which was
merely formalized by the 1982 deed of sale; 35 and

Second, the status of respondent as tenant of the subject property, which he never
questioned during the earlier stages of the proceedings before the DAR but presently disputes
before the Court.

Clearly, the factual bases of the foregoing theories require the presentation of proof as neither of
them had been judicially admitted by respondent nor subject of judicial notice. Therefore, the Court
cannot entertain petitioner's novel arguments raised in the instant petition. Accordingly, he must rely on
his previous positions that (a) his basis of ownership over the subject property rests on the 1982 deed of
sale; and (b) that respondent's status as the tenant of the subject property remains undisputed.
Having settled the foregoing procedural issue, the Court now proceeds to resolve the substantive
issue in this case. ETIcHa
B. Validity of the sale of the
subject property to petitioner
PD 27 prohibits the transfer of ownership over tenanted rice and/or corn lands after October 21,
1972 except only in favor of the actual tenant-tillers thereon. As held in the case of Sta. Monica Industrial
and Development Corporation v. DAR Regional Director for Region III, 36 citing Heirs of Batongbacal v. CA:
37

. . . P.D. No. 27, as amended, forbids the transfer or alienation of covered

agricultural lands after October 21, 1972 except to the ten-ant-beneficiary. . . . .

In Heirs of Batongbacal v. Court of Appeals, involving the similar issue of sale of a

covered agricultural land under P.D. No. 27, this Court held:

Clearly, therefore, Philbanking committed breach of obligation as an

agricultural lessor. As the records show, private respondent was not
informed about the sale between Philbanking and petitioner, and neither
was he privy to the transfer of ownership from Juana Luciano to Philbanking.
As an agricultural lessee, the law gives him the right to be informed about
matters affecting the land he tills, without need for him to inquire about it.

Page 82 of 102
 xxx xxx xxx

In other words, transfer of ownership over tenanted rice and/or corn lands
after October 21, 1972 is allowed only in favor of the actual tenant-tillers thereon.
Hence, the sale executed by Philbanking on January 11, 1985 in favor of petitioner was
in violation of the aforequoted provision of P.D. 27 and its implementing guidelines,
and must thus be declared null and void. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) CITcSH

Records reveal that the subject landholding fell under the coverage of PD 27 on October 21, 1972
38 and as such, could have been subsequently sold only to the tenant thereof, i.e., the respondent.
Notably, the status of respondent as tenant is now beyond dispute considering petitioner's admission of
such fact. 39 Likewise, as earlier discussed, petitioner is tied down to his initial theory that his claim of
ownership over the subject property was based on the 1982 deed of sale. Therefore, as Garcia sold the
property in 1982 to the petitioner who is evidently not the tenant-beneficiary of the same, the said
transaction is null and void for being contrary to law. 40
In consequence, petitioner cannot assert any right over the subject landholding, such as his present
claim for landholding exemption, because his title springs from a null and void source. A void contract is
equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and it does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical
relation. 41 Hence, notwithstanding the erroneous identification of the subject landholding by the MARO
as owned by Cipriano Borromeo, the fact remains that petitioner had no right to file a petition for
landholding exemption since the sale of the said property to him by Garcia in 1982 is null and void.
Proceeding from this, the finding that petitioner's total agricultural landholdings is way below the
retention limits set forth by law thus, becomes irrelevant to his claim for landholding exemption precisely
because he has no right over the aforementioned landholding.
In view of the foregoing disquisition, the Court sees no reason to delve on the issue regarding the
cancellation of respondent's emancipation patent, without prejudice to petitioner's right to raise his other
claims and objections thereto through the appropriate action filed before the proper forum. 42
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed April 30, 2010 Decision and September 13, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101185 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. HAaDTI
Brion, * Del Castillo, Perez and Leonen, ** JJ., concur. 
Footnotes
*Designated Acting Chairperson in lieu of Justice Antonio T. Carpio per Special Order No. 1460 dated May 29, 2013.
**Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1461 dated May 29, 2013.
1.Rollo, pp. 4-20.
2.Id. at 69-82. Penned by Associate Justice Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente, with Associate Justices Romeo F. Barza and Amy C. Lazaro-
Javier, concurring.
3.Id. at 28-30.
4.CA rollo, pp. 45-46.
5.Rollo, p. 70.
6.CA rollo, p. 42.
7."DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL, TRANSFERRING To THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF
THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISM THEREFOR."
8.Docketed as Adm. Case No. A-0204-0113-03.
9.Supra note 6.
10.CA rollo, p. 43.
11.Rollo, pp. 31-32.

Page 83 of 102
12.Id. at 31.
13.Id. at 31-32.
14.See Order dated November 30, 2004. CA rollo, pp. 48-49.
15.Id. at 47-51.
16.Id. at 52-55.
17.Id. at 67-69. Penned by DAR OIC-Regional Director Araceli A. Follante, CESO IV.
18.Id. at 77-80.
19.Id. at 78.
20.Id. at 79.
21.Rollo, pp. 69-82.
22.Id. at 78-80.
23.Rollo, p. 80.
24.Supra note 3.
25.Rollo, pp. 9-10.
26.Id. at 97-117.
27.Id. at 100-103.
28.Id. at 106-109.
29.Id. at 113-115.
30.Kings Properties Corporation v. Galido, G.R. No. 170023, November 27, 2009, 606 SCRA 137, 154, citing Philippine Ports Authority
v. City of Iloilo, 453 Phil. 927, 934 (2003).
31.Duty Free Philippines Services, Inc. v. Tria, G.R. No. 174809, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 222, 231.
32.Jarcia, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 187926, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 336, 359.
33.Bote v. Veloso, G.R. No. 194270, December 3, 2012.
34.Rule 129 of the Rules of Court enumerates what matters need not be proved, to wit:
  RULE 129
  What Need Not Be Proved
  SECTION 1.  Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official
acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.
  SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
  SEC. 3.  Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may
announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
  After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial
notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
  SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case,
does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made.
35.Rollo, pp. 9, 122-123.
36.G.R. No. 164846, June 18, 2008, 555 SCRA 97, 105.
37.438 Phil. 283, 295 (2002).
38.To note, based on the MARO's findings, Garcia is a "perennial P.D. No. 27 landowner." See rollo, p. 31.
39.Id. at 78.
40.Article 1409 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
  Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
  (1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy;
xxx xxx xxx
  These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.
41.Menchavez v. Teves, Jr., 490 Phil. 268, 280 (2005).
42.To note, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9700 (which took effect in 2009), amending Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6657, partly
reads as follows:
  Section 9. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
  "SEC. 24.  Award to Beneficiaries. — The rights and responsibilities of the beneficiaries shall commence from their receipt of a duly
registered emancipation patent or certificate of land ownership award and their actual physical possession of the awarded land.

Page 84 of 102
xxx xxx xxx
  "All cases involving the cancellation of registered emancipation patents, certificates of land ownership award, and other titles
issued under any agrarian reform program are within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DAR."(Emphasis
supplied)
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "Republic Act No. 6647" in the original document

CANDELARIA V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 209386, [DECEMBER 8, 2014], 749 PHIL 517-530

FIRST DIVISION: [G.R. No. 209386. December 8, 2014.] DECISION: PERLAS-BERNABE, J p

MEL CARPIZO CANDELARIA, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision 2 dated January 31, 2013 and the
Resolution 3 dated September 3, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 34470 which
affirmed the conviction of petitioner for the crime of Qualified Theft.

The Facts

In the morning of August 23, 2006, Viron Transit Corporation (Viron) ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel
(diesel fuel) allegedly worth P497,000.00 from United Oil Petroleum Phils. (Unioil), a company owned by
private complainant Jessielyn Valera Lao (Lao). 4 Petitioner Mel Carpizo Candelaria (Candelaria), a truck driver
employed by Lao, was dispatched to deliver the diesel fuel in Laon Laan, Manila. 5

However, at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Viron informed Lao through a phone
call that it had not yet received its order. Upon inquiry, Lao discovered that Candelaria, together with his
helper Mario Romano (Romano), also an employee of Unioil, left the company premises at 12:50 in the
afternoon of the same day on board a lorry truck with plate number PTA-945 to deliver Viron's diesel fuel
order. When Lao called Candelaria on his mobile phone, she did not receive any response. 6

Thereafter, or at around 6 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Romano returned alone to Unioil's
office and reported that Candelaria poked a balisong at him, prompting Lao to report the incident to the Anti-
Carnapping Section of the Manila Police District (MPD), as well as to Camp Crame. 7

After a few days, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents found the abandoned lorry truck in
Calamba, Laguna, emptied of the diesel fuel. 8 Under the foregoing premises, Lao filed a complaint for
Qualified Theft against Candelaria, docketed as Crim. Case No. 08-259004. 9

Lita Valera (Valera), Lao's mother, and Jimmy Magtabo 10 Claro (Claro), employed as dispatcher and
driver of Unioil, corroborated Lao's allegations on material points. More specifically, Claro verified that it was
Candelaria who was tasked to deliver the diesel fuel to Viron on August 23, 2006, which likewise happened to
be Candelaria's last trip. 11

In his defense, Candelaria demurred to the prosecution's evidence, 12 arguing that there was no direct
evidence that linked him to the commission of the crime, as Lao had no personal knowledge as to what

Page 85 of 102
actually happened to the diesel fuel. 13 Moreover, the information relayed by Romano is considered hearsay
due to his untimely demise. 14

The RTC Ruling

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (RTC) convicted Candelaria of Qualified Theft
in a Decision 15 dated June 21, 2011, having found a confluence of all the elements constituting the abovesaid
crime, to wit: (a) there was a taking of personal property; (b) said property belonged to another; (c) the taking
was done with intent to gain; (d) the taking was done without the consent of the owner; (e) the taking was
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things; and (f) the
theft was committed by a domestic servant with abuse of confidence. 16

In convicting Candelaria, the RTC took the following circumstances into consideration: (a) on August
23, 2006, Candelaria was the driver of the truck with plate number PTA-945, loaded with 14,000 liters of diesel
fuel valued at P497,000.00, for delivery to Viron in Laon Laan, Manila; (b) Viron did not receive the diesel fuel;
(c) Lao reported the incident to Camp Crame and the MPD; and (d) the following day, August 24, 2006, the
same truck was found abandoned and emptied of its load in Calamba, Laguna. 17 On the basis of the
foregoing, the RTC concluded that Candelaria was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

Consequently, it sentenced Candelaria to suffer the indeterminate penalty of fourteen (14) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and ordered him to indemnify Lao the amount of PhP497,000.00 as the value of the
stolen diesel fuel, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs. 18

Dissatisfied, Candelaria elevated his conviction to the CA. 19

The CA Ruling

In a Decision 20 dated January 31, 2013, the CA affirmed Candelaria's conviction, ruling that a finding
of guilt need not always be based on direct evidence, but may also be based on circumstantial evidence, or
"evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference."
21 In this regard, and considering that the crime of theft in this case was qualified due to grave abuse of
confidence, as Candelaria took advantage of his work, knowing that Lao trusted him to deliver the diesel fuel
to Viron, 22 the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Citing jurisprudence, 23 it observed that theft by a truck
driver who takes the load of his truck belonging to his employer is guilty of Qualified Theft. 24

However, while the CA affirmed Candelaria's conviction as well as the prison sentence imposed by the
RTC, it modified the amount which he was directed to indemnify Lao, fixing the same at P14,000.00 in the
absence of any supporting documents to prove that the diesel fuel was indeed worth P497,000.00. 25

Aggrieved, Candelaria filed a motion for reconsideration 26 which was eventually denied in a
Resolution 27 dated September 3, 2013, hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The main issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly found Candelaria guilty of
the crime of Qualified Theft on the basis of circumstantial evidence.

Page 86 of 102
 The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

The elements of Qualified Theft, punishable under Article 310 28 in relation to Article 309 29 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs
to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner's consent; (e) it be
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it
be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of
confidence. 30

In this case, there is a confluence of all the foregoing elements. Through the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses, it was sufficiently established that the 14,000 liters of diesel fuel loaded into the lorry
truck with plate number PTA-945 driven by Candelaria for delivery to Viron on August 23, 2006 was taken by
him, without the authority and consent of Lao, the owner of the diesel fuel, and that Candelaria abused the
confidence reposed upon him by Lao, as his employer.

Candelaria maintains that he should be acquitted considering that his conviction was based merely on
circumstantial evidence, as well as on hearsay evidence, i.e., Lao's testimony with regard to the allegation of
the deceased helper Romano that Candelaria poked a balisong at him on August 23, 2006. 31

The Court is not convinced.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 32 Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an
accused only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person; the circumstances
proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and, at
the same time, inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt. Corollary thereto, a conviction
based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with innocence. 33

Here, the RTC, as correctly affirmed by the CA, found that the attendant circumstances in this case,
as duly established by the prosecution's evidence, amply justify the conviction of Candelaria under the
evidentiary threshold of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances are: (a) on August
23, 2006, Viron ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel from Lao's Unioil; (b) as driver of Unioil, Candelaria was
given the task of delivering the same to Viron in Laon Laan, Manila; (c) Candelaria and his helper Romano
left the company premises on the same day on board the lorry truck bearing plate number PTA-945
containing the diesel fuel; (d) at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Viron informed Lao
that its order had not yet been delivered; (e) Candelaria failed to reply to Lao's phone calls; (f) later in the
day, Romano returned to the Unioil office sans Candelaria and reported that the latter threatened him
with a weapon; (g) Lao reported the incident to the MPD and Camp Crame; (h) the missing lorry truck was
subsequently found in Laguna, devoid of its contents; and (i) Candelaria had not reported back to Unioil
since then. 34

Threading these circumstances together, the Court perceives a congruent picture that the crime of
Qualified Theft had been committed and that Candelaria had perpetrated the same. To be sure, this
Page 87 of 102
determination is not sullied by the fact that Candelaria's companion, Romano, had died before he could testify
as to the truth of his allegation that the former had threatened him with a balisong on August 23, 2006. It is a
gaping hole in the defense that the diesel fuel was admittedly placed under Candelaria's custody and remains
unaccounted for. Candelaria did not proffer any persuasive reason to explain the loss of said goods and merely
banked on a general denial, which, as case law holds, is an inherently weak defense due to the ease by which
it can be concocted. 35 With these, and, moreover, the tell-tale fact that Candelaria has not returned or
reported back to work at Unioil since the incident, the Court draws no other reasonable inference other than
that which points to his guilt. Verily, while it is true that flight per se is not synonymous with guilt, 36
unexplained flight nonetheless evinces guilt or betrays the existence of a guilty conscience, 37 especially when
taken together with all the other circumstantial evidence attendant in this case. Thus, all things considered,
Candelaria's conviction for the crime of Qualified Theft stands.

The imposable penalty for the crime of Qualified Theft depends upon the value of the thing stolen. To
prove the value of the stolen property for purposes of fixing the imposable penalty under Articles 309 and 310
of the RPC, as amended, the Court explained in People v. Anabe 38 that the prosecution must present more
than a mere uncorroborated "estimate." 39 In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such
estimate, the courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the
property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case. 40 In Merida v. People (Merida), 41 which
applied the doctrine enunciated in People v. Dator (Dator), 42 the Court deemed it improper to take judicial
notice of the selling price of narra at the time of the commission of its theft, as such evidence would be
"unreliable and inconclusive considering the lack of independent and competent source of such information."
43

However, in the more recent case of Lozano v. People (Lozano), 44 the Court fixed the value of the
stolen magwheels at P12,000.00 as the "reasonable allowable limit under the circumstances," 45
notwithstanding the uncorroborated testimony of the private complainant therein. Lozano cited, among
others, the case of Francisco v. People 46 (Francisco) where the Court ruled that "the trial court can only take
judicial notice of the value of goods which are matters of public knowledge or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration," 47 further explaining that the value of jewelry, the stolen items in the said case, is neither a
matter of public knowledge nor is it capable of unquestionable demonstration. 48

In this case, Candelaria has been found guilty of stealing diesel fuel. Unlike in Francisco, where the
Court had no reference to ascertain the price of the stolen jewelry, or in Merida and Dator, where the Court
refused to take judicial notice of the selling price of lumber and/or narra for "lack of independent and
competent source" of the necessary information at the time of the commission of the theft, the value of diesel
fuel in this case may be readily gathered from price lists published by the Department of Energy (DOE). In this
regard, the value of diesel fuel involved herein may then be considered as a matter of public knowledge which
falls within the purview of the rules on discretionary judicial notice. 49 To note, "judicial [notice], which is
based on considerations of expediency and convenience, displace[s] evidence since, being equivalent to proof,
it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to achieve." 50

While it is true that the prosecution had only presented the uncorroborated testimony of the private
complainant, Lao, to prove that the value of the diesel fuel stolen is P497,000.00, the Court — taking judicial
notice of the fact that the pump price of diesel fuel in August 2006 (i.e., the time of the commission of the
crime) is within the range of P37.60 to P37.86 per liter 51 — nonetheless remains satisfied that such amount
must be sustained. As the value of the goods may independently and competently be ascertained from the
DOE's price publication, adding too that the defense had not presented any evidence to contradict said finding
Page 88 of 102
nor cross-examined Lao anent her proffered valuation, the Court, notwithstanding the solitary evidence of the
prosecution, makes this determination following the second prong set by case law — and that is, to fix the
value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case. Verily, such circumstances
militate against applying the alternative of imposing a minimum penalty and, more so, the CA's arbitrary
valuation of P14,000.00, since the basis for which was not explained. Therefore, for purposes of fixing the
proper penalty for Qualified Theft in this case, the value of the stolen property amounting to P497,000.00
must be considered. Conformably with the provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, the proper penalty to
be imposed upon Candelaria is reclusion perpetua, 52 without eligibility for parole, 53 to conform with
prevailing law and jurisprudence. 54

A final word. Courts dealing with theft, as well as estafa cases, would do well to be mindful of the
significance of determining the value of the goods involved, or the amounts embezzled in said cases as they do
not only entail the proper resolution of the accused's civil liability (if the civil aspect has been so integrated)
but also delimit the proper penalty to be imposed. These matters, through the trial court's judicious direction,
should be sufficiently passed upon during trial and its finding thereon be amply explained in its verdict.
Although an appeal of a criminal case throws the entire case up for review, 55 the ends of justice, both in its
criminal and civil senses, demand nothing less but complete and thorough adjudication in the judicial system's
every level. Truth be told, the peculiar nature of these cases provides a distinctive opportunity for this ideal to
be subserved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 31, 2013 and the Resolution dated
September 3, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 34470 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS in that petitioner Mel Carpizo Candelaria is: (a) sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole; and (b) ordered to indemnify private complainant Jessielyn Valera Lao
the amount of P497,000.00 representing the value of the stolen property.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, *Leonardo-de Castro and Reyes, ** JJ., concur. 

Footnotes
*Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1899 dated December 3, 2014.
**Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1892 dated November 28, 2014.
1.Rollo, pp. 12-27.
2.Id. at 33-44. Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon with Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Myra V. Garcia-
Fernandez, concurring.
3.Id. at 46-47.
4.Id. at 34-35.
5.Id. at 35.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8.Id.
9.Id. at 34 and 63.
10."Montalbo" in some parts of the records.
11.Rollo, p. 36.
12.Id. at 36 and 64.
13.Id. at 56.
14.Id. at 56-57.
15.Id. at 63-65. Penned by Judge Amor A. Reyes.
16.Id. at 64-65.

Page 89 of 102
17.Id. at 65. In the Petition, Accused-Appellant's Brief, and CA Decision, it was mentioned that the abandoned lorry truck was found
3-4 days after the incident. (Id. at 15, 35, and 53.)
18.Id.
19.Through a Notice of Appeal dated September 14, 2011. (CA rollo, p. 12.)
20.Rollo, pp. 33-44.
21.Id. at 39.
22.Id. at 41.
23.Cariaga v. CA, 411 Phil. 214 (2001).
24.Id. at 230.
25.Rollo, pp. 42-43.
26.On March 13, 2011; id. at 81-84.
27.Id. at 46-47.
28.Art. 310. Qualified theft. — The crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the
property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation, fish
taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
29.Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
  1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal,
as the case may be.
  2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos
but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
  3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than 200
pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
  4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50
pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
  5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
  6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
  7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3
of the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the
provisions of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
  8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and
the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself
or his family.
30.Zapanta v. People, G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 25, 33-34.
31.Rollo, pp. 20-22.
32.See Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.
33.People v. Anabe, G.R. No. 179033, September 6, 2010, 630 SCRA 10, 21, citing People v. Castro, 587 Phil. 537, 544-545 (2008).
34.Rollo, pp. 63-64.
35.See People vs. Watiwat, 457 Phil. 411, 425 (2003).
36.Cf. People v. Villareal, G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013, 693 SCRA 549, 560.
37.People v. Turtoga, 432 Phil. 703, 720 (2002); citation omitted.
38.Supra note 33.
39.See id. at 31-32, citing Merida v. People, 577 Phil. 243, 258-259 (2008).
40.Id. at 32.
41.Supra note 39.
42.398 Phil. 109 (2000).
43.Supra note 39, at 259 (see footnote 43 therein).
44.G.R. No. 165582, July 9, 2010, 624 SCRA 596.
45.Id. at 613.
46.478 Phil. 167 (2004).
47.Id. at 187, citing People v. Marcos, 368 Phil. 143, 167-168 (1999).

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48.Id.
49.Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
 SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
50.People v. Martinez, 340 Phil. 374 (1997).
51.See Prevailing Retail Prices of Petroleum Products in Metro Manila As of August 8, 2006 <https://www.doe.gov.ph/retail-pump-
prices/retail-pump-prices-metro-manila?start=75> (visited November 4, 2014). At the very least, therefore, the value of the 14,000
liters of diesel fuel stolen from Lao amounted to P526,400.00, pegged from the minimum price of P37.60 per liter.
52.People v. Mirto, G.R. No. 193479, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 796, 814, citing People v. Mercado, 445 Phil. 813, 828 (2003).
53."[U]nder Resolution No. 24-4-10, those convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua are disqualified from the benefit
of parole." (See People v. Manicat, G.R. No. 205413, December 2, 2013) See also Rule 2.2 of Resolution No. 24-4-10 entitled "RE:
AMENDING AND REPEALING CERTAIN RULES AND SECTIONS OF THE RULES ON PAROLE AND AMENDED GUIDELINES FOR
RECOMMENDING EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY OF THE 2006 REVISED MANUAL OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE."
54.[P]ursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 [entitled AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE
PHILIPPINES] which states that 'persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
"Indeterminate Sentence Law," as amended'." (See People v. Gunda, G.R. No. 195525, February 5, 2014.)
55."[A]n appeal in criminal cases throws open the entire case for review and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct
any error, as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether assigned as an error or not." (People v. Balacano, 391 Phil. 509, 525-
526 [2000], citing People v. Reñola, 367 Phil. 415, 436 [1999] and People v. Medina, 360 Phil. 281, 299 [1998].)

REPUBLIC V. SCIENCE PARK OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. NO. 237714, [NOVEMBER 12,
2018]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SCIENCE PARK OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
herein represented by its Executive Vice-President and General Manager, MR. RICHARD
ALBERT I. OSMOND, respondent.

SECOND DIVISION: [G.R. No. 237714. November 12, 2018.]: DECISION: PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated October 12,
2017 and the Resolution 3 dated February 9, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 108099,
which affirmed the Decision 4 dated August 10, 2016 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Malvar-Balete,
Batangas (MCTC) in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-129, granting respondent Science Park of the
Philippines, Inc.'s (SPPI) application for original registration in accordance with Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1529, 5 otherwise known as the "Property Registration Decree."

The Facts

On November 20, 2014, SPPI filed with the MCTC an Application 6 for original registration of a
7,691-square meter (sq. m.) parcel of land denominated as Lot 5809, Psc-47, Malvar Cadastre, located in
Barangay Luta Norte, Malvar, Batangas (subject land). 7 SPPI claimed that: (a) the subject land formed part
of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b) it and its predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of
ownership prior to June 12, 1945; 8 (c) the subject land is not mortgaged or encumbered, nor claimed or

Page 91 of 102
possessed by any person other than itself; 9 and (d) it bought the land from Cenen D. Torizo (Cenen) as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale 10 dated October 17, 2013.
To prove its claim that the subject land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, SPPI presented a certification 11 dated February 26, 2016 issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of
Batangas City (CENRO) stating that the land is within the alienable and disposable zone under Project No.
39, Land Classification (LC) Map No. 3601, based on DENR Administrative Order No. 97-37 (DAO 97-37)
issued by then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos on December 22, 1997, 12 as well as certified photocopies
13 of LC Map No. 3601 and DAO 97-37. 14 CAIHTE
On the other hand, to support its claim of possession in the concept of owner prior to June 12,
1945, it presented documentary and testimonial evidence that: (a) the subject land was previously owned
by Gervacio Lat (Gervacio), 15 who held a 1955 tax declaration in his name; 16 (b) Gervacio was assisted by
his tenant in cultivating the land and harvesting the crops thereon; 17 (c) Gervacio was succeeded by his
daughter, Ambrocia Lat, who sold the subject land to Spouses Raymundo Linatoc and Maria Reyes (Sps.
Linatoc) through a "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa" dated April 25, 1968; 18 (d) after Sps.
Linatoc's demise, their heirs executed an "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver and Renunciation
of Rights" on June 4, 1995, waiving their rights, interests, and participation in the subject land in favor of
Ernesto Linatoc (Ernesto); 19 (e) Ernesto subsequently sold the same land to Cenen on March 13, 2012 by
virtue of a "Kasulatan ng Ganap na Bilihan;" 20 and (f) the subject land is now owned by SPPI which
purchased the same from Cenen. 21

The MCTC Decision

In a Decision 22 dated August 10, 2016, the MCTC granted SPPI's application for original
registration, holding that it was able to establish that: (a) it has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land in the concept of owner even prior to June 12,
1945, tacked to the possession of its predecessors-in-interest; and (b) the land is alienable and disposable
per verification by the forester of the DENR CALABARZON Region, CENRO, Batangas City from the land
classification map issued pursuant to DAO 97-37. 23 While the legal custodian of the DENR's official
records, Chief of the Records Management and Documentation Division, Jane G. Bautista (Ms. Bautista), 24
was not presented to identify the certified copy of DAO 97-37 presented before the court, the MCTC took
judicial notice of the authenticity of DAO 97-37 on the basis of a stipulation in LRC No. N-127 25 (a land
registration case filed by SPPI involving a different parcel of land previously heard and decided by the same
MCTC) between the same handling Government Prosecutor 26 and the same counsel for the applicant, to
dispense with the presentation of Ms. Bautista. 27
Petitioner the Republic of the Philippines, herein represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(petitioner), moved for reconsideration but was denied in an Order 28 dated October 14, 2016. 29 Hence,
it appealed 30 to the CA, arguing that the MCTC erred in granting SPPI's application for land registration
despite the latter's failure to prove that: (a) the subject land forms part of the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain since no DENR official had confirmed that DAO 97-37 was authentic and still in
force at the time; 31 and (b) it and its predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, and exclusive
possession of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945, since the
earliest possession was shown to have started only in 1955, and it failed to identify its predecessors prior
to that time. 32 DETACa

Page 92 of 102
 The CA Ruling

In a Decision 33 dated October 12, 2017, the CA affirmed the MCTC Ruling. It declared that the land
is alienable and disposable, and held that the MCTC properly took judicial notice of DAO 97-37 in view of
the acquiescence of the handling Government Prosecutor after the trial judge announced that the parties
in LRC No. N-127 had already stipulated on dispensing with the presentation of Ms. Bautista, and after
satisfying himself that the copy of DAO 97-37 presented was certified. 34 It also ruled that SPPI adequately
proved through testimonial and documentary evidence that it and its predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the subject land in the concept of
owner since June 12, 1945. 35
Petitioner sought reconsideration 36 but was denied in a Resolution 37 dated February 9, 2018;
hence, this petition.

The Issue before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA was correct in upholding the MCTC's grant
of SPPI's application for land registration.

The Court's Ruling

In an application for land registration, it is elementary that the applicant has the burden of proving,
by clear, positive, and convincing evidence that its alleged possession and occupation were of the nature
and duration required by law. 38
In the instant case, SPPI essentially asked the MCTC for judicial confirmation of its imperfect title
pursuant to Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, which provides:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. aDSIHc
Under the said provision, the applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish that: (a)
the land or property forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain at the time of
the filing of the application for registration; (b) it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (c) the possession is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. 39
Verily, the applicant has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the State owns the land
applied for, and proving that the land has already been classified as alienable and disposable as of the
time of the filing of the application. 40 To prove the alienability and disposability of the land sought to be
registered, an application for original registration must be accompanied by two (2) documents, i.e., (1) a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal

Page 93 of 102
custodian of the DENR's official records; and (2) a certificate of land classification status issued by the
CENRO or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR based on the
land classification approved by the DENR Secretary. 41
In the present case, petitioner maintains that SPPI failed to prove that the subject land is within the
alienable and disposable portion of the public domain since DAO 97-37 was never properly identified in
court, and the MCTC should not have taken judicial notice of the record of other cases even when the said
other cases have been heard or pending in the same court. 42
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without
proof because they already know them. 43 Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides:
Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on
its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice
of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
"As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding
the fact that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. However, this
rule is subject to the exception that in the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience to all
parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of the case filed in its archives as
read into the records of a case pending before it, when with the knowledge of the opposing party,
reference is made to it, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated. Thus, for said exception to apply, the party concerned must be given an opportunity to object
before the court could take judicial notice of any record pertaining to other cases pending before it." 44
As correctly ruled by the CA, the conditions necessary for the exception to be applicable were
established in this case. Notably, the handling Government Prosecutor (a) did not object to the
dispensation of the testimony of the DENR legal custodian of official records, Ms. Bautista, in view of the
similar stipulation between him and the same counsel of SPPI in LRC No. N-127 previously heard and
decided by the MCTC, 45 and (b) satisfied himself that the copy of DAO 97-37 presented was duly certified
by Ms. Bautista. Only then was the photocopy of the certified copy duly marked as exhibit. 46 ETHIDa
Moreover, contrary to petitioner's protestation, 47 the land sought to be registered need not have
been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier in order for the applicant for
registration to secure the judicial confirmation of its title. Such contention had already been declared as
absurd and unreasonable in Republic v. Naguit. 48 Registration under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529 is based
on possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain since June 12,
1945 or earlier, without regard to whether the land was susceptible to private ownership at that time.
"The applicant needs only to show that the land had already been declared alienable and disposable at any
time prior to the filing of the application for registration," 49 which SPPI was able to do.
However, notwithstanding the alienability and disposability of the subject land, the Court finds that
SPPI failed to present convincing evidence that its alleged possession and occupation were of the nature
and duration required by law.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529 proof of specific acts of
ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land subject of the application. Actual possession consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own
property. 50 Possession is: (a) open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious, and not clandestine; (b)

Page 94 of 102
 continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken, and not intermittent or occasional; (c) exclusive when the
adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use
and benefit; and (d) notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the
public or the people in the neighborhood. 51
To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in it possession and occupation of the
subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier, SPPI presented, among others, the testimony of Nelia Linatoc-
Cabalda (Nelia). Nelia, who was born in 1936, claimed to have known of Gervacio's ownership and
cultivation of the subject land when she was about seven (7) years old, or around 1943, as she and other
children her age would frequent the subject land where they played and gathered fruits. 52 However, such
testimony was insufficient to establish possession in the nature and character required by law that would
give right to ownership. In a number of cases, the Court has repeatedly held that to prove open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of owner, the claimant
must show the nature 53 and extent of cultivation 54 on the subject land, or the number of crops planted
or the volume of the produce harvested from the crops supposedly planted thereon; 55 failing in which,
the supposed planting and harvesting of crops in the land being claimed only amounted to mere casual
cultivation which is not the nature of possession and occupation required by law. Consequently, SPPI failed
to satisfy the requisite exclusivity and notoriety of its claimed possession and occupation of the subject
land because exclusive dominion and conspicuous possession thereof were not established. cSEDTC
Furthermore, SPPI's evidence were insufficient to prove that its possession and occupation were for
the duration required by law. The earliest tax declaration in Gervacio's name presented by SPPI, i.e., Tax
Declaration (TD) No. 6243, dates back to 1955 56 only, short of the requirement that possession and
occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership should be since June 12, 1945 or earlier. That TD No.
6243 cancels a prior tax declaration, i.e., TD 1052, would not help SPPI's cause in view of the absence of
any evidence (a) identifying Gervacio or any other prior possessor as the declared owner under TD 1052,
and (b) indicating its effectivity date. Thus, the Court cannot subscribe to the CA's conclusion that it can be
"reasonably assumed that before the issuance of [TD] No. 6243, the subject [land] had already been
occupied by [Gervacio] or other prior claimants." 57 The payment of realty taxes and declaration of the
subject land in the name of Gervacio in 1955 gives rise to the presumption that he claimed ownership and
possession thereof only in that year. 58
In sum, the Court finds that SPPI's unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of possession and
occupation do not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the
subject land of the nature and duration required by Section 14 (1) of PD 1529. Accordingly, the CA erred in
affirming the MCTC's grant of SPPI's application for original registration of its imperfect title over the
subject land. AIDSTE
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. A new judgment is hereby entered REVERSING and
SETTING ASIDE the Decision dated October 12, 2017 and the Resolution dated February 9, 2018 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 108099, and accordingly, DENYING respondent Science Park of the
Philippines, Inc.'s (SPPI) application for original registration of the subject land.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Caguioa, A.B. Reyes, Jr. and J.C. Reyes, Jr., * JJ., concur.
 
Footnotes
*Designated Additional Member per Special Order No. 2587 dated August 28, 2018.
1.Rollo, pp. 15-32.

Page 95 of 102
2.Id. at 38-51. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez and Ramon Paul L.
Hernando (now a Member of the Court), concurring.
3.Id. at 53-54.
4.Id. at 56-64. Penned by Presiding Judge Charito M. Macalintal-Sawali.
5.Entitled "AMENDING AND CODIFYING THE LAWS RELATIVE TO REGISTRATION OF PROPERTY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (June 11,
1978).
6.In Re: Application for Original Registration of Title dated November 18, 2014. Rollo, pp. 69-75.
7.Id. at 76.
8.See id. at 70.
9.See id. at 70-71.
10.Id. at 80-84.
11.Not attached to the rollo.
12.See rollo, pp. 41-43.
13.See id.
14.See id. at 60.
15.See id. at 40 and 58.
16.See id. at 43 and 60.
17.See id. at 40 and 58.
18.See id. at 40-41 and 58.
19.See id. at 41 and 58-59.
20.See id. at 41 and 59.
21.See id.
22.Id. at 56-64.
23.See id. at 62-63.
24.See id. at 45 and 60.
25.See id. at 48.
26.See id. at 199-200.
27.See id. at 49.
28.Not attached to the rollo.
29.See rollo, p. 44.
30.See Brief for the Oppositor-Appellant dated May 2, 2017; id. at 90-99.
31.See id. at 94.
32.See id. at 97.
33.Id. at 38-51.
34.See id. at 48-50.
35.See id. at 50-51.
36.See Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated October 12, 2017) dated November 29, 2017; id. at 65-68.
37.Id. at 53-54.
38.See Dumo v. Republic, G.R. No. 218269, June 6, 2018.
39.See Espiritu, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 219070, June 21, 2017, 828 SCRA 77, 88; and Republic v. Estate of Santos, 802 Phil. 800, 811-
812 (2016).
40.See Dumo v. Republic, supra note 38; citing Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, 605 Phil. 244, 269 (2009).
41.See Dumo v. Republic, id.; citing Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 578 Phil. 441, 452-453 (2008).
42.See rollo, p. 23.
43.See Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 195876, December 5, 2016, 812 SCRA 1, 50.
44.See id. at 52; underscoring supplied.
45.See rollo, pp. 49-50.
46.See id.
47.See id. at 27.
48.489 Phil. 405, 413-414 (2005). In the said case, the Court held:
   Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14 (1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used
in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bona fide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict
or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.

Page 96 of 102
   Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner's position. Absent a legislative amendment, the
rule would be, adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before
June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.
Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect
even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would
even be aggravated[,] considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
   Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14 (1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as
already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is
made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is
still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in
this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
49.Republic v. Heirs of Spouses Ocol, 799 Phil. 514, 529 (2016).
50.Republic v. Remman Enterprises, Inc., 727 Phil. 608, 625 (2014).
51.Republic v. Estate of Santos, supra note 39, at 814.
52See rollo, p. 50.
53.See Republic v. Estate of Santos, supra note 39, at 816.
54.See Republic v. Candy Maker, Inc., 525 Phil. 358, 380 (2006).
55.See Republic v. Remman Enterprises, Inc., supra note 50, at 626.
56.See rollo, pp. 43 and 60.
57.See id. at 50.
58.See Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., supra note 41, at 457-458.

TRINIDAD Y BERSAMIN V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 239957, [FEBRUARY 18, 2019])

JESUS TRINIDAD y BERSAMIN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

SECOND DIVISION: [G.R. No. 239957. February 18, 2019.]: DECISION: PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by petitioner Jesus Trinidad y Bersamin
(Trinidad) assailing the Decision 2 dated January 25, 2018 and the Resolution 3 dated May 31, 2018 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 39598, which affirmed the Decision 4 dated November 7, 2016 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 67 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 155678 and 155679 finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition under
Section 28 (a) in relation to Section 28 (e) (1), Article V of Republic Act No. (RA) 10591. 5

The Facts

On December 12, 2014, an Information 6 was filed before the RTC charging Trinidad with violation
of RA 10591, the pertinent portion of which reads:
On or about November 14, 2014, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, being then a private person, without any lawful authority,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in [his] possession and under
[his] custody and control one (1) unit [c]aliber .38 revolver marked Smith & Wesson with
serial number 833268 with markings "RJN," a small arm, loaded with six (6) pieces live
ammunitions of caliber .38 with markings "1RN, 2RN, 3RN, 4RN, 5RN and 6RN," without first
securing the necessary license or permit from the Firearms and Explosives Office of the
Philippine National Police, in violation of the above-entitled law.
Page 97 of 102
 Contrary to law. 7
The prosecution alleged that at around 8:30 in the evening of November 14, 2014, members from
the Philippine National Police (PNP)-Pasig Police Station conducted a buy-bust operation, with Police
Officer (PO) 1 Randy S. Sanoy (PO1 Sanoy) as the poseur buyer and PO1 Rodrigo J. Nidoy, Jr. (PO1 Nidoy) as
the back-up arresting officer, to apprehend a certain "Jessie" who, purportedly, was involved in illegal drug
activities at Aurelia St., Barangay Bagong Ilog, Pasig City. 8 After the alleged sale had been consummated,
PO1 Nidoy arrested Trinidad, frisked him, and recovered from the latter a 0.38 caliber revolver loaded with
six (6) live ammunitions tucked at his back, as well as a 0.22 caliber rifle loaded with seven (7) live
ammunitions and two (2) magazines (subject firearms and ammunition) which were found beside the gate
of his house. 9 When asked if he has any documentation for the same, Trinidad claimed that they were
merely pawned to him. After marking the seized items, they proceeded to the nearby barangay hall and
conducted inventory and photography thereof, and then went to the police station where the request for
ballistic examination was made. 10 Finally, the seized items were brought to the crime laboratory, where,
after examination, it was revealed that "the firearms are serviceable and the ammunitions are live and
serviceable." 11 During trial, Trinidad's counsel agreed to the stipulation that Trinidad has no license to
possess or carry firearms of any caliber at the time of his arrest. 12 DHITCc
For his part, Trinidad denied the accusations against him, claiming, among others, that aside from
the present case, he was also charged with the crime of Illegal Sale and Possession of Dangerous Drugs,
which arose from the same incident, but was, however, acquitted 13 therein for, inter alia, failure of the
prosecution to prove that Trinidad was validly arrested thru a legitimate buy-bust operation. He then
formally offered in evidence the said acquittal ruling, which was objected by the public prosecutor for
being immaterial and irrelevant to the present case. 14 The RTC admitted said evidence only as part of
Trinidad's testimony. 15

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision 16 dated November 7, 2016, the RTC found Trinidad guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two (2) counts of violation of RA 10591, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of ten (10) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day, as
minimum, to eleven (11) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count. 17
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, considering that: (a) PO1 Nidoy positively identified the firearms
presented before the court as the same firearms seized and recovered from Trinidad's possession; and (b)
Trinidad admitted that he is not a holder of any license or permit from the PNP Firearms and Explosives
Unit. It gave credence to the positive, clear, and categorical testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses
rather than Trinidad's defenses of denial and alibi. 18 It likewise held that Trinidad's acquittal in the drugs
charges is immaterial to this case, opining that the ground for his acquittal is neither unlawful arrest nor
unlawful search and seizure, but the procedural flaw in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs. 19
Aggrieved, Trinidad appealed 20 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

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 In a Decision 21 dated January 25, 2018, the CA affirmed Trinidad's conviction with modification,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, for each count. 22 The CA ruled that the evidence for the prosecution convincingly
established all the elements of the crime charged as Trinidad: (a) was caught in possession and control of
two (2) firearms, consisting of one (1) .38 caliber 23 revolver loaded with six (6) live ammunitions and one
(1) .22 caliber rifle loaded with seven (7) live ammunitions, as well as two (2) magazines during the
conduct of the buy-bust operation; and (b) failed to show any permit or license to possess the same,
simply claiming that the said firearms were pawned to him. 24 It likewise noted that Trinidad's counsel
agreed to the stipulation that Trinidad has no license to possess or carry the subject firearms at the time of
his arrest. 25 Finally, it agreed with the RTC's opinion that Trinidad's acquittal in the drugs charges was due
to the prosecution's failure to prove the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs, and not due to his
supposed questionable arrest. 26
Dissatisfied, Trinidad moved for reconsideration, 27 but was denied in a Resolution 28 dated May
31, 2018; hence, this petition.

The Issue before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Trinidad's
conviction for the crime charged.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

"At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide
open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties
raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite
the proper provision of the penal law." 29 cEaSHC
"Section 2, 30 Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable
cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes 'unreasonable' within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), 31
Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence
obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted
and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree." 32
"One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected is a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest
before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed." 33
A lawful arrest may be affected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, a warrantless
arrest may be done when, inter alia, the accused is caught in flagrante delicto, 34 such as in buy-bust
Page 99 of 102
operations in drugs cases. 35 However, if the existence of a valid buy-bust operation cannot be proven,
and thus, the validity of the in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest cannot be established, the arrest
becomes illegal and the consequent search incidental thereto becomes unreasonable. 36 Resultantly, all
the evidence seized by reason of the unlawful arrest is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. 37
In this case, Trinidad essentially anchors his defense on the following contentions: (a) his arrest
stemmed from a purported buy-bust operation where the illegal drugs and the subject firearms and
ammunition were allegedly recovered from him; (b) this resulted in the filing of three (3) Informations
against him, two (2) of which are for violations of RA 9165 38 (which were tried jointly), while the other
pertains to the instant case; and (c) his acquittal 39 in the drugs cases should necessarily result in his
acquittal in this case as well. In finding these contentions untenable, the courts a quo opined that the
resolution in the drugs cases is immaterial in this case as they involve different crimes 40 and that "the
ground for the acquittal x x x is neither unlawful arrest nor unlawful search or seizure, but the procedural
flaw in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs." 41
However, a more circumspect review of the decision absolving Trinidad of criminal liability in the
drugs cases reveals that he was acquitted therein not only due to unjustified deviations from the chain of
custody rule, 42 but also on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a valid buy-
bust operation, thereby rendering Trinidad's in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest illegal and the
subsequent search on him unreasonable. 43 Thus, contrary to the courts a quo's opinions, Trinidad's
acquittal in the drugs cases, more particularly on the latter ground, is material to this case because the
subject firearms and ammunition were simultaneously recovered from him when he was searched
subsequent to his arrest on account of the buy-bust operation.
The Court is aware that the findings on the illegality of Trinidad's warrantless arrest were made in
the drugs cases, which are separate and distinct from the present illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition case. Nevertheless, the Court is not precluded from taking judicial notice of such findings as
evidence, and apply them altogether for the judicious resolution of the same issue which was duly raised
herein. To be sure, the general rule is that the courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases. However, this rule admits of exceptions, such as when the other
case has a close connection with the matter in controversy in the case at hand. 44 In Bongato v. Spouses
Malvar, 45 the Court held:
[A]s a general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the
same judge. There are exceptions to this rule. Ordinarily, an appellate court cannot refer to
the record in another case to ascertain a fact not shown in the record of the case before it,
yet, it has been held that it may consult decisions in other proceedings, in order to look for
the law that is determinative of or applicable to the case under review. In some instances,
courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely
connected to the matter in controversy. These cases "may be so closely interwoven, or so
clearly interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial notice." 46 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) CTIEac
Here, an examination of the ruling 47 in the drugs cases (which Trinidad offered as evidence and
the RTC admitted as part of his testimony) 48 confirms that the drugs cases and this case are so
interwoven and interdependent of each other since, as mentioned, the drugs, as well as the subject
firearms and ammunition, were illegally seized in a singular instance, i.e., the buy-bust operation. Hence,
the Court may take judicial notice of the circumstances attendant to the buy-bust operation as found by
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 the court which resolved the drugs cases. To recall, in the drugs cases, the finding of unreasonableness of
search and seizure of the drugs was mainly based on the failure of PO1 Sanoy's testimony to establish the
legitimacy of the buy-bust operation against Trinidad as said testimony was found to be highly doubtful
and incredible. 49 This circumstance similarly obtains here as in fact, the testimonies of both PO1 Nidoy 50
and PO1 Sanoy 51 in this case essentially just mirror on all material points the latter's implausible narration
in the drugs cases. In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the subject firearms and ammunition
are also inadmissible in evidence for being recovered from the same unreasonable search and seizure as in
the drugs cases. Since the confiscated firearms and ammunition are the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged in this case, Trinidad's acquittal is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 25, 2018 and the Resolution
dated May 31, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 39598 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Jesus Trinidad y Bersamin is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any
other reason.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Caguioa, J.C. Reyes, Jr. and Hernando, * JJ., concur.
Footnotes
*Designated Additional Member per Special Order Nos. 2629 and 2630 dated December 18, 2018.
1.Rollo, pp. 12-31.
2.Id. at 35-47. Penned by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez with Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Maria
Elisa Sempio Diy, concurring.
3.Id. at 49-51.
4.Id. at 87-97. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Maria Paz R. Reyes-Yson.
5.Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE LAW ON FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF," otherwise known as the "COMPREHENSIVE FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION
REGULATION ACT," approved on May 29, 2013.
6.Dated December 12, 2014; rollo, pp. 59-61.
7.Id. at 59-60.
8.See id. at 36-37.
9.See id. at 37-38.
10.See id. at 38.
11.Id.
12.See id.
13.See Joint Decision dated March 1, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 154 in Criminal Case Nos.
19814-D-PSG and 19815-D-PSG penned by Presiding Judge Achilles A. A.C. Bulauitan; id. at 200-210.
14.See id. at 39.
15.See id. at 92.
16.Id. at 87-97.
17.Id. at 96.
18.See id. at 94.
19.See id. at 95.
20.See Brief for the Accused-Appellant dated July 24, 2017; id. at 66-85.
21.Id. at 35-47.
22.See id. at 47.
23.Erroneously indicated as ".22 caliber revolver" in the CA Decision; id. at 42.
24.See id.
25.See id. at 43-44.
26.See id. at 44-45.
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27.See motion for reconsideration dated February 20, 2018; id. at 52-58.
28.Id. at 49-51.
29.People v. Comboy, 782 Phil. 187, 196 (2016), citing Manansala v. People, 775 Phil. 514, 520 (2015).
30.Section 2, Article III of the 1987 CONSTITUTION reads:
   Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
31.Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 CONSTITUTION reads:
   Section 3. x x x.
   (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
32.Sindac v. People, 794 Phil. 421, 428 (2016).
33.See id.
34.Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE provides:
   Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — x x x.
   (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense[.]
35.See People v. Amin, G.R. No. 215942, January 18, 2017, 814 SCRA 639, 646. See also People v. Rivera, 790 Phil. 770,
779-780 (2016).
36.See People v. Lim, 435 Phil. 640, 664 (2002).
37.See id.
38.Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 7, 2002.
39.See rollo, pp. 200-210.
40.See id. at 45.
41.See id. at 95.
42.See id. at 207-209. See also People v. Paming, G.R. No. 241091, January 14, 2019; People v. Bambico, G.R. No.
238617, November 14, 2018; People v. Mama, G.R. No. 237204, October 1, 2018.
43.See rollo, pp. 205-207. See also Sindac v. People, supra note 32; People v. Manago, 793 Phil. 505 (2016); Comerciante
v. People, 764 Phil. 627 (2015).
44.See Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, 757 Phil. 376, 390 (2015), citing Tiburcio v. People's Homesite & Housing
Corporation, 106 Phil. 477, 483-484 (1959).
45.436 Phil. 109 (2002).
46.Id. at 117-118; citations omitted.
47.See rollo, pp. 200-210.
48.In T'Boli Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. v. Solilapsi, (442 Phil. 499, 513 [2002]), the Court held:
   Courts may be required to take judicial notice of the decisions of the appellate courts but not of the decisions of the
coordinate trial courts, or even of a decision or the facts involved in another case tried by the same court itself, unless
the parties introduce the same in evidence or the court, as a matter of convenience, decides to do so. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
49.See rollo, pp. 206-207.
50.TSN, August 17, 2015, pp. 3-22 and TSN, May 16, 2016, pp. 16-46.
51.TSN, June 13, 2016, pp. 1-9.

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