Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Order: Reflections on the 200th Anniversary of

Kant's "Perpetual Peace"

Author(s): David Held
Source: Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1995), pp. 415-429
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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 20 (1995),415-429
Alternatives

CosmopolitanDemocracy
and theGlobal Order:
on the200thAnniversary
Reflections
ofKant's "PerpetualPeace"

David Held*

The backdropofthisarticleis therecentrapidgrowth in thecomplex

interconnectionsamong states
and societies.Part Í exploresthenew
contextof politicsin the lightof thç end of the Cold War and the
challengesto the natureand efficacy of politicalcommunities from
of
processes globalization. Part 2 discussesthe limitations of democ-
ratictheory,emphasizingitsfailureto questionwhetherthe nation-
statecan remainat thecenterofdemocraticthoughtand practice.In
Part3, Kant'sunderstanding ofpoliticalcommunity, cosmopolitanism,
and cosmopolitan law is examined,and througha critiqueof Kant's
viewsan alternativeconceptionof therequirement ofdemocracy and
thedemocratic good is setout:cosmopolitan democratic law. Part3 also-
aftercontrastingKant's conceptionof cosmopolitanlaw with the
notionof cosmopolitandemocraticlaw- focuseson institutional dif-
ferences.Then Part4 elaboratesan institutional programfora cos-
mopolitandemocracy - a formofdemocracy, itis argued,thatcan ad-
dressthelimitations ofnationaldemocraciesin a globalera and point
to someinstitutionalsolutions,bothshorttermand long term.In the
spiritofKant,thecase is made fora newcosmopolitanism - butwith
different
a substantially understandingof the componentsof law,
order,and accountability thancan be foundin hiswritings.1

The New Constellationof Global Politics

changeshaveoccurredin in-
In thespaceofa fewyears,extraordinary
ternational Foralmosthalfa century,
politics. a system
ofgeogovernance

ofPoliticsand Sociology,
*Professor UK.
The Open University,

415

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416 Cosmopolitan andtheGlobal
Democracy Order

organizedaround the bifurcationof East and Westdominatedthe

planet.Almostat a strokeit disintegrated, leavingfewclues as to
whatalternative systemmight takeitsplace. Now,on thethresholdof
the newmillennium, international
relationsface newopportunities
and newdangers.
The politicalopportunities thatnowpresentthemselves are still,
in themain,waitingto be exploited.If fora Pole, a Chilean,a Cam-
bodian, a SouthAfrican,or a Palestinian,the end of the Cold War
fostersnewhopes forthefuture,fora Bosnian,a Somali,an Iraqi,a
Kurd,or a Rwandan,the benefitsof the so-callednewworldorder
are stilla long wayoff.Althoughit is stillveryearlyto takestockof
the advantagesand disadvantagesof the terminationof the Cold
War,in reflecting on the natureof the currentglobal order,three
crucialquestionscan usefully be posed:

1. Whatare therepercussions on domesticregimesoftheend of

the Cold War?
2. Whatalterationsare takingplace in thestructure ofinterstate
relations?
3. Whichinstitutionscan offera basisfordeliberationover,and
actionupon, global (i.e., transcontinental
and intercontinen-
tal) problems?

To clarifythe contextof thisarticle,I willintroduceeach ques-

tionand thesetof issuesit raises.

Domesticissues. Among the domesticpoliticalchanges of recent

yearshas been the remarkableincreasein the numberof liberalde-
mocraticstates.In the East,South,and Northmanystateshave ei-
therrestoredor newlyacquired a democraticsystem.For the first
timein theirlives,manymillionsof people have enjoyedthe quint-
liberaldemocraticexperienceof participation
éssentially in political
discoursewithoutfearofcoercionand ofvotingin freeelections.Al-
thoughthefirststepstowarddomesticdemocracyhavein manycases
been tentativeand riddledwithuncertainties, the firsthalfof the
1990sdeservesto be remembered as an era ofdemocracy. The desire
fordemocracyhas been so strongthatsome commentators- - partly
out of optimism,partlyout of ignoranceof the historicalrecord-
have venturedthe hypothesisthatwe are approachingthe "end of
history."2Yet,despitethe increasein the numberof liberaldemo-
craticregimes,it is also worthemphasizingthatformillionsof peo-
ple therehas been no noticeableimprovement - and in some cases
-
a drasticreduction in thequalityof theirpoliticalassociations.

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 DavidHeld 417

whilethe numberof countriesgovernedon the

Paradoxically,
basis of democraticprincipleshas expanded,civilwarhas returned
to othersin whichitwasbelievedto havedisappearedforgood. The
eventsunfoldingin theformerYugoslavia,theformerSovietUnion,
and partsof sub-SaharanAfricarevealjust howtraumaticthe transi-
tionfromone regimeto anothercan be. The horrifying civilwarsin
progressare the tipof an icebergof unrestto whicheven the most
consolidatednation-states
historically are vulnerable.Ethnicconflict
and the re-emergenceof nationalismin Germany,Italy,Spain,
Poland,and elsewhereleave littleroomforan unqualifiedoptimism
abouttheabilityofnation-states to keep twoof theirmostimportant
promises:the maintenanceof domesticpeace and the protectionof
thesafety and propertyof theircitizens.
Viewedfromthe perspectiveof domesticpolitics,the emerging
worldorderis twofaced. On the one hand, it has fosteredthe ex-
tensionof democracy;on the other hand, it has revealed,and in
some cases detonated,tensionsin nation-states.Byimposinga form
of limitedautonomyon the vast majorityof states,the Cold War
managed to suppressmanyformsof domesticconflict - at least in
Europe. When the Cold Warended, some of the woundsprovoked
bydomesticdiscordreopened.
Internationalrelations.The currenthistoricaljuncturehas not only
posed new problemsfordomesticpolitics;it has presented,firstand
foremost, problemsforthe organizationof interstate
new relations.
When the old, explicitlyestablishedhierarchyof statescollapsed,
dangerouspowervoidsopened in the managementof international
affairs.Democraticcountrieshave reactedto thisnew situationin
contradictory ways.On occasion,theyhavecapitalizedon theirrival
bloc's depleted power by actingunlawfully - as, for instance,the
UnitedStatesdid whenitintervenedin Panama.In othercases,most
notablyin Kuwaitand Iraq, theyhavesought,in principle,a consen-
sus of the internationalcommunity and its institutions
beforeun-
dertakingspecified actions.
In general,however, thattheincreasein thenumber
itis striking
of democraticstateshas not been accompaniedbya corresponding
increasein democracyamongstates.Policymaking in institutions
like
the UN SecurityCouncil and the InternationalMonetaryFund, as
well as in more informalsettingssuch as the G7 summits,have
changedlittlesincethecollapseof theBerlinWall.Nationalgovern-
ments,both the powerfuland the less powerful,have continuedto
act on thebasisof theirownreasonsofstate.The explanationforthis
has partlyto do withan uncertainty overtheappropriaterules,values,

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418 Cosmopolitan andtheGlobal
Democracy Order

and institutionsnecessaryto establishgreateraccountability among

nations.But it has also to do withthe reluctanceof democraciesto
extendtheirmodelofgovernanceto-interstate relations;thatis,with
theirreluctanceto be called to account in mattersof securityand
foreignand international affairs.

Theinstitutional dilemma.The mostconspicuousfeatureof the new

international situationis the emergenceof issuesthattranscendna-
tional frontiers.Processes of economic internationalization, the
problemof theenvironment, and theprotectionof therightsof mi-
noritiesare increasingly matters fortheworldcommunity as a whole.
The limitson nationalautonomyimposedbythe balance of terror
have now been supplementedby a much subtler,more structural
formof erosion caused by the processesof environmental, social,
and economicglobalization;thatis, byshiftsin the transcontinental
or interregional scale of humansocial organizationand theexercise
ofsocial power.
A numberoffundamental disjunctures haveopened up between
democraticpoliticsand the late-twentieth-century world:disjunc-
turesin therelationsbetweencitizens,individualstates,and theeco-
nomicsystemat the regionaland globallevel.Atleastthreedisjunc-
turesare worthnotinghere.3
First,thereis a disjuncturebetweentheformaldomainof politi-
cal authority and the actualeconomicsystemof production,distrib-
ution,and exchange that,withits manyregionaland global net-
works,servesto limitor underminethe actual powerof national
politicalauthorities. Second, thereis a disjuncturebetweentheidea
of the stateas an independentactorand the vastarrayof interna-
tionalregimesand organizations thathavebeen establishedto man-
age whole areas of transnational activity(trade,the oceans, space,
and so forth).New formsof multinational politicshave been estab-
lished,and withthemnew formsof collectivedecision makingin-
volvingstates,intergovernmental organizations, and a wholevariety
of internationalpressuregroups.Third,thereis a disjuncturebe-
tweenthe idea of membershipof a national politicalcommunity
(i.e., citizenship,whichbestowsupon individualsbothrightsand du-
ties) and the developmentof regionaland internationallaw,which
subjects individuals, nongovernmental organizations,and govern-
mentsto newsystems ofregulation.Rightsand dutiesare recognized
in international law,moreover, whichtranscendtheclaimsofnation-
states,and which,althoughtheymaylack coercivepowersof en-
forcement, havefar-reaching consequences.
Democraticpoliticshas traditionally presupposedthe idea of a
"nationalcommunityof fate"- a communitythat rightlygoverns

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 DavidHeld 419

itselfand determinesitsfuture.This idea is certainlychallenged,if

not increasingly undermined,by the natureof the patternof re-
gional and globalinterconnections. Nationalcommunities do notex-
clusively"programme the action and decisions of governmental and
parliamentary bodies,"and the latterby no means simply determine
whatis rightor appropriatefortheirowncitizens.4
Of course,thereis nothingnewabout the emergenceof global
problems.Althoughtheirimportancehas recentlygrownconsider-
ably,manyhave existedfordecades, or longer.Some global chal-
lengeswereignoredbecause theywereregardedas insolubleduring
the Cold War due to the rivalrybetweenthe greatpowers.Others
havebeen addressedon thebasisof distinctly undemocraticcriteria
and outsidetheframework of accountableinstitutions. Politicaland
strategicdecisions,such as those on nuclear weapons,have been
takenat US-USSR summits;economic issues,concerninginterest
ratesand tradebalances,forexample,havebeen consideredat meet-
ingslike thatof the G7. The institutions of theUnitedNationshave
generally been marginalized; their function has been more one of
discussionand representation thanofeffective management ofpress-
ingstrategic or socioeconomic questions.
Now that the old confrontationbetween East and West has
ended,regionaland globalproblemshavebeen placed on theinter-
nationalpoliticalagenda- we can cite the environment, the spread
ofAIDS, the debt burdenof the ThirdWorld,the flowof financial
resourcesthatescape nationaljurisdiction,the drug trade,and in-
ternational crime.Nonetheless,profoundambiguity stillreignsas to
whichinstitutions shouldtakesupranational decisionsand according
to whatcriteria.
Politicaltheory'sexplorationof emergingglobal and regional
problemsis in itsinfancy.Althoughdemocratictheoryhas examined
and debatedat lengththechallengesto democracythatemergefrom
withinthe boundariesof the nation-state, it has not seriouslyques-
tionedwhetherthenation-state itselfcan remainat thecenterofde-
mocraticthought.The questionsposed bythe rapidgrowthof com-
plex interconnectionsand interrelationsbetween states and
societies,along withthe evidentintersectionof nationaland inter-
nationalforcesand processes,remainlargelyunexplored.

The Limitsof DemocraticTheory

Throughoutthe nineteenthand twentiethcenturies,therehas been

an assumptionat theheartofliberaldemocraticthoughtconcerning
a "symmetrical" and "congruent"relationshipbetween political

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420 Cosmopolitan andtheGlobal
Democracy Order

decisionmakers and therecipientsofpoliticaldecisions.In fact,sym-

metry and congruenceare assumedat twocrucialpoints:first,be-
tweencitizen-voters and the decisionmakers whomtheyare,in prin-
ciple, able to hold to account; and secondly,betweenthe "output"
(decisions,policies,etc.) of decisionmakers and theirconstituents -
ultimately, "the people" in a delimited territory.5It has been as-
sumed,in otherwords,bydemocratictheorists(orthodoxand radi-
cal), that"the fateof a nationalcommunity" is largelyin its own
handsand thata satisfactory of
theory democracycan be developed
by examiningthe interplayabove all between"actors"and "struc-
tures"in the nation-state.
At the centerof thisapproachto democraticpoliticsis a taken-
for-granted conceptionof sovereignty and an uncritically appropri-
ated conceptof politicalcommunity. The difficulty withthesecon-
cepts is thatpoliticalcommunitieshave rarely-if ever- existedin
isolation as bounded geographicaltotalities,and theyare better
thoughtof as multipleoverlappingnetworksof interaction.These
networks of interactioncrystallizearound different sitesand forms
of power- economic,political,military, and cultural,among oth-
ers- producingpatternsof activitythatdo not correspondin any
straightforward wayto territorial boundaries.6The spatialreach of
the modernnation-state did not fiximpermeablebordersforother
networks, the scope and reach of whichhave been as muchlocal as
internationalor global. Politicalcommunitiesare locked into a di-
versity of processesand structures thatrangein and throughthem,
and
linking fragmenting them in complexconstellations. It is no sur-
prise then that national communities by no means make and deter-
minedecisionsand policiesexclusively forthemselves, and thatgov-
ernmentsby no means determinewhat is rightor appropriate
exclusively fortheirowncitizens.
The assumptionthatone can understandthe natureand possi-
bilitiesof politicalcommunity byreferring merelyto nationalstruc-
turesand mechanismsof politicalpoweris unjustified. Althoughit
is a mistaketo concludefromthe seemingfluxof contemporary in-
teractionnetworks thatpoliticalcommunitiestodayare withoutdis-
tinctive degreesof divisionor cleavageat their"borders,"theyhave,
overtime,been shaped bymultipleinteractionnetworks and power
systems. Thus, questions are raised both about the fate of the idea of
the politicalcommunity and about theappropriatelocus forthe ar-
ticulationof the democraticpoliticalgood. If the agentat the heart
of modernpoliticaldiscourse- be it a person,a group,or a collec-
tivity-islockedintoa variety of overlappingcommunities, ("domes-
tic"and "international")thenthe properhome of politicsand de-
mocracybecomesa puzzlingmatter.

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 DavidHeld 421

The Requirementof the DemocraticGood:

CosmopolitanDemocracy
Iffreedomis threatenedbythebehaviorof othernationsand states,
whatis rightfora politicalcommunity, Kantargued,cannotprevail.
Bycontrast, "right"can prevail,he held,iftheruleoflawis sustained
in all statesas wellas in international relations.7Withinthe termsof
theargumentpresentedhere,thisis an important contention,butit
needs to be recastto meetthe conditionsof democracyin the con-
textof interconnectedness - national,regional,and global.Accord-
ingly, it can be maintained,democracycan prevailin a politicalcom-
munityif,and onlyif,it is unimpededby threatsarisingfromthe
action (or nonaction) of otherpoliticalcommunities,or fromthe
networks of interaction thatcut acrosscommunity boundaries.
Although the threats to freedom derive,in Kant's view,from
many forms of violence, above all they stem from war and theprepa-
rationforwar.He wrote:"The greatestevilswhichaffectcivilisedna-
tionsare broughtabout bywar,and not so muchbyactual warsin
thepastor thepresentas byneverendingand indeedcontinually in-
creasingpreparations for war."8A violentabrogation of lawand right
in one place has seriousconsequencesforthosein manyotherplaces
and can be experiencedeverywhere.9 In Kant'saccount,the estab-
lishmentofwhatis rightrequiresthe abolitionofwaras a meansof
politics.The "spirits"of commerceand of republicanismprovidea
clear impetusto thispossibility - because commercegeneratesnet-
worksof mutualself-interest thatbecome hostileto the disruption
caused bywar and war efforts;and because republicanismcreates
politiesthatdepend on consent,and thatlead citizensnotonlyto be
highlycautiousabout war (since all itscalamitiesfalldirectlyupon
them),butalso to respectotherswhoserepublicsare also consensual
and law-abiding.10
The threatsto autonomyfromwarand directcoercionare hard
to overestimate, but theyconstituteonlyone elementin the chal-
to
lenge self-government or self-determination in the politicalcom-
munity:(1) because such challenges can come fromanyof the di-
verse sources of power and domination - economic, political,
cultural,military - and powerin anyone of thesespherescan erode
theeffective entrenchment of democracy;(2) because challengesto
democracy can arisenot onlyfromwithinthepowerdomainsofpar-
ticularcommunities butalso fromthosethatcutacrossthem.Sitesof
powercan be national,transnational, and international. Accordingly,
democracy within a politicalcommunity requiresdemocracyin the
international sphere.To put thepointdifferently, a nationaldemoc-
raticstate,upholdinga nationaldemocraticpubliclaw,needs to be

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422 Cosmopolitan andtheGlobal
Democracy Order

buttressedand supportedbyan international structureof such law,

or bywhatI willsimplycall cosmopolitan democratic law.Bycosmopoli-
tandemocraticlawI mean,in thefirstinstance,a democraticpublic
law- establishingthe accountability of powersystems - entrenched
withinand acrossborders.
Cosmopolitandemocraticlawis mostappropriately conceivedas
a domainof law different in kindfromthe law of statesand the law
made betweenone stateand another(thatis,international law). For
Kant,theforemost interpreter oftheidea of a cosmopolitanlaw,cos-
mopolitanlaw is neithera fantastic nor a Utopianwayof conceiving
law,but a "necessarycomplement"to theunwritten code of existing
nationaland internationallaw,and a meansto transform the latter
intoa publiclaw of humanity.11 Kantlimitedthe formand scope of
cosmopolitanlaw to theconditionsofuniversalhospitality, bywhich
he meanttherightof a strangeror foreigner "notto be treatedwith
hostility" in someoneelse's country.12 He emphasizedthatthisright
extended to the circumstancesthat allow people to enjoy an ex-
changeof ideas and goods withthe inhabitantsof anothercountry,
butthatit did notextendas faras therightto be entertainedor the
rightto permanentsettlement, let alone therightof citizenship.13 A
foreigner ought not to suffer anyenmity long"so as he behaves in a
peaceful manner," although he can be turned away "if this can be
done without causinghisdeath."14 The rightofhospitality is,in short,
a rightto presentoneselfand to be heard- theconditionsnecessary
"to attempt to enterintorelationswiththenativeinhabitants."15
Cosmopolitanlaw,thusunderstood,transcendsthe particular
claimsofnationsand statesand extendsto all in the "universalcom-
munity." It connotesa rightand dutythatmustbe acceptedifpeople
are to learnto tolerateone another'scompanyand to coexistpeace-
fully.In Kant'shands,theseargumentsalso lead to a striking rejec-
tion of colonialism:he refersto "the inhospitable conduct of the
civilisedstatesof our continent,especiallythe commercialstates"
and "theinjusticetheydisplayin visiting foreigncountriesand peo-
ples (which in theircase is thesame as conquering them),"16For Kant,
universalhospitality is, therefore, the conditionof cooperativerela-
tionsand ofjust conduct.ButwhileKant'soppositionto colonialism
and argumentsforuniversalhospitality are noteworthy, theydo not
elaborateadequatelythe conditionsof such hospitality. For without
conceivingof cosmopolitanlaw as cosmopolitandemocratic law,the
conditionsfortheprotectionoffreedomand autonomyforeach and
all cannotbe satisfactorily envisaged.
The pursuitin diverselocales ofindividualor collectiveprojects,
withinthe contextof a commitment to universal"good neighborli-
ness,"requirestheanatomyof powerand dominationto be grasped

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 DavidHeld 423

in order that the legitimateboundariesof one's own and of an-

other'sautonomycan be appreciated.Universalhospitality mustin-
volve,at the minimum, both the enjoyment of a certain autonomy
and respectforthenecessaryconstraints on autonomy;thatis to say,
it mustcomprisemutualacknowledgment of, and respectfor,the
equal and legitimaterightsof othersto pursue theirown projects
and life-plans.Moreover,in a highlyinterconnected world,"others"
include notjust those foundin the immediatecommunity but all
thosewhosefatesare interlockedin networks ofeconomic,political,
and environmental interaction. Universalhospitality is not achieved
if,foreconomic,cultural,or otherreasons,thequalityof the lifeof
othersis shaped and determinedin near or far-off lands without
theirparticipation, agreement,or consent.The conditionof univer-
sal hospitality(or,as I wouldratherput it,of a cosmopolitanorien-
tation)is not cosmopolitanlaw narrowly conceived- followingKant
- butrathera cosmopolitandemocraticpubliclawin whichpoweris,
in principle,accountablewhereverit is located and howeverfarre-
moveditssourcesare fromthosewhomit significantly affects.
A commitment to thisformof cosmopolitanism entailsa dutyto
worktowardtheestablishment of an international community ofde-
mocraticstatesand societiescommittedto upholdingdemocratic
public law both withinand across theirown boundaries:a cosmo-
politandemocraticcommunity. In Kant'saccount,theestablishment
of a cosmopolitancommunity dependson the creationof a "pacific
federation" or "union";thatis, a treaty, amonga steadilyexpanding
numberofstates,to preventwarpermanently. Kantdistinguished be-
tweenunionsbased on federalstructuresand thosebased on con-
federalstructures. A federalassociationis based, "like thatof the
AmericanStates,... on a politicalconstitution and is thereforein-
dissoluble";whereas a confederal structure signifies merely"a volun-
tarygathering of various states which can be dissolved at anytime."17
These termscan be refinedfurther byconceiving of federalism as a
politicalunion in which there are common finance,foreign, and mil-
itarypolicies- one withoutexit clauses for "sub-federal"entities;
confederalism, bycontrast,connotesa union in whichnationsand
statesretainseparatefinancial,foreign,and military policies,along
withexitclauses thatcan bringto an end negotiated,coordinated
relations.
Kantarguedfirmly on behalfof confederalism in international
affairs,on the grounds that a single stateof all peoples- a stateof
nationsor an internationalstate- is an impracticaland potentially
dangerousobjective.Nonetheless,the idea of a democraticcos-
mopolitanorderis not compatibleonlywiththe idea of confederal-
ism.The establishment of a cosmopolitandemocracyrequiresactive

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424 Cosmopolitan andtheGlobal
Democracy Order

consent- the activeconsentof peoples and nations:initialmember-

ship can onlybe voluntary. It would be a contradictionof the very
idea ofdemocracyitselfifa cosmopolitandemocraticorderwerecre-
ated nonvoluntarily- thatis,coercively. If theinitialinaugurationof
a democraticinternational orderis to be legitimate,it mustbe based
on consent.However,thereafter, in circumstances in whichpeople
themselvesare not directlyengaged in the processof governance,
consentoughtto followfromthe majoritydecisionof the people's
representatives,so long as they- the trusteesof the governed- up-
hold cosmopolitandemocraticlawand itscovenants.

The InstitutionalProgram

Againstthe backgroundof thesearguments, howshoulddemocracy

be understood?The problemof democracyin our timesis to specify
howdemocracycan be securedin a seriesof interconnected power
and authority centers.Democracyinvolvesnotonlytheimplementa-
tion of a clusterof civil,political,and social rights(freedomof
speech,press,and assembly, the rightto votein a freeand fairelec-
tion,a universaleducation,and so on), but also thepursuitand en-
actmentof these rightsin transnationaland intergovernmental
power structures.Democracycan be fullysustainedonly in and
throughtheagenciesand organizations thatforman elementof,and
yet cut across,the territorial
boundaries of thenation-state. The pos-
of
sibility democracytoday must, in short, be linked to an expand-
ingframework ofdemocraticstatesand agenciesbound by,and com-
mittedto, democraticpublic law. How should thisbe understood
froman institutional pointofview?To addressthisquestionwe must
unpack whatI am calling"thecosmopolitanmodel ofdemocracy."
To beginwith,thecosmopolitanmodelrequires,as a transitional
measure,that the UN systemactuallylive up to its charter.This
wouldinvolve,amongotherthings,pursuingmeasuresto implement
keyelementsofrightsconventions, enforcing theprohibitionon the
discretionary right to use force,and activating thecollectivesecurity
systemenvisaged in the charter itself.In addition, if the charter
model wereextended- forexample,byprovidingmeansof redress
in the case of humanrightsviolationsthrougha newinternational
humanrightscourt,or bymodifying thevetoarrangement in theSe-
curity Council and rethinking representation on it to allow forade-
quate regionalaccountability - a basis might be established forthe
chartersystem to generatepoliticalresourcesofitsown,and to act as
an autonomousdecisionmaking center.

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 DavidHeld 425

However,althougheach movein thisdirectionwouldbe signifi-

cant,particularly in enhancingthe prospectsof a more enduring
peace, itwould stillrepresent, at best,a movetowarda verypartialor
incomplete form of democracyin international life.Certainly,
each
statewouldcome to enjoygreaterequalityin theUN system, and re-
gionalinterests wouldbe betterrepresented.But the dynamicsand
logicoftheinterstate system wouldstillrepresentan immensely pow-
erfulforcein global affairs;the massivedisparitiesof powerand
asymmetries of resourcein the global politicaleconomywould be
leftvirtually unaddressed;ad hocresponsesto pressinginternational
and transnationalissueswould remaintypical;therewould be no
forumforthepursuitofglobalquestionsdirectly accountableto the
subjectsand agenciesofcivilsocieties;and thewholequestionofthe
accountabilityof internationalorganizationsand global bodies
wouldremainunresolved. •
Thus,hand in handwiththechangesalreadydescribed,thecos-
mopolitanmodel of democracywouldseek the creationof regional
parliaments(forexample,in LatinAmericaand Africa),and theen-
hancementof the role of such bodies wheretheyalreadyexist(the
European Parliament)in orderthattheirdecisionsbecome recog-
nized, in principle,as legitimateindependentsourcesof law.The
modelanticipates, in addition,thepossibility ofgeneralreferendaof
groupscutting across nations and nation-states on issuesas diverseas
energypolicy, the balance between public and privatetransportation,
and the organizationof regionalauthorities, withconstituencies de-
finedaccordingto the natureand scope of controversialtransna-
tionalissues.
Furthermore, thecosmopolitanmodel of democracywouldseek
theentrenchment of a clusterof rights, includingcivil,political,eco-
nomic, and social rights, in order to provideshape and limitsto de-
mocraticdecisionmaking.18 This requiresthat theybe enshrined
withintheconstitutions ofparliaments and assemblies(at thenational
and international level), and that the influence ofinternational courts
be extendedso thatgroupsand individuals havean effectivemeansof
suingpoliticalauthorities fortheenactmentand enforcement of key
both
rights, within and beyondpolitical associations.
An ultimateobjectivewouldbe theformation ofan authoritative
assembly of all democratic statesand - a
agencies reformedGeneral
Assembly of the United Nations, or a complementto it. Agreement
on the termsof referenceof an internationaldemocraticassembly
wouldbe difficult to attain,to saytheleast.Amongthedifficulties to
be facedwouldbe therulesdetermining theassembly's representative
base (One country, one vote?Could majorinternational functional

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426 Democracyand theGlobalOrder
Cosmopolitan

organizationsbe represented?)But if its operatingrules could be

agreed- in an internationalconstitutionalconvention,for exam-
ple- the newassemblywouldbecome an authoritative international
centerforthe considerationand examinationof pressingglobal is-
sues,e.g., healthand disease;foodsupplyand distribution; the debt
burdenof theThirdWorld;theinstability of currency- hundredsof
billionsofdollarscirculatetheglobe daily;ozone depletion;and the
reductionof the risksof nuclearand chemicalwarfare.
The cosmopolitanmodel of democracypresentsa programof
possibletransformations withshort-and long-term politicalimplica-
tions.It does not'presentan all-or-nothing choice, but ratherlays
downa directionofpossiblechangewithclearpointsoforientation.
These include:
t
Short-Term Long-Term
Reformof UN Security Council Entrenchment of cosmopolitan
to givedevelopingcountriesa democraticlaw:newcharterof rights
voice
significant and obligationslockedintodifferent
domainsof political,social,and
economicpower

Creationof a UN secondchamber Globalparliament(withlimited

an international
(following revenue-raisingcapacity)connected
constitutional
convention) to regions,nations,and localities.

Enhancedpoliticalregionalization Interconnected globallegal system,

(EU and beyond)and theuse of embracingelementsof criminal
transnational
referenda and civillaw;establishmentof an
internationalcriminalcourt

Compulsory jurisdictionbefore Separationof politicaland

theinternationalcourt;creation economicinterests; publicfunding
of a newinternationalhuman of deliberative
assembliesand
rightscourt electoralprocesses
Foundationof a newcoordinating Establishment of theaccountability
of
economicagencyat regionaland internationaland transnational
globallevels economicagenciesto parliaments
and assembliesat regionaland
globallevels
Establishment ofan effective, Permanentshiftofa growing
accountable,international, proportionof a nation-state's
militaryforce coercivecapabilityoverregionaland
withtheultimate
globalinstitutions,
aim of demilitarization
and the
transcendence of thewarsystem

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 DavidHeld 427

If thehistory and practiceof democracyhas been centereduntil

nowon theidea oflocalityand place- thecity-state, thecommunity,
the nation- is it likelythatin the future,ifit is to be centeredany-
whereat all, it willbe centeredexclusivelyon the internationalor
globaldomain?To drawtheconclusionthatan affirmative answeris
being suggestedwould be to misunderstand the natureof contem-
poraryglobalizationand thearguments beingpresentedhere.Glob-
alizationis, to borrowa phrase,"a dialecticalprocess";local trans-
formationis as much an element of globalizationas the lateral
extensionof social relationsacrossspace and time.19New demands
are unleashedforregionaland local autonomyas groupsfindthem-
selvesbuffetedbyglobal forcesand byinappropriateor ineffective
politicalregimes.Althoughthesecircumstances are clearlyfraught
withdanger,and withtheriskofan intensification ofa sectarianpol-
itics,theyalso portenda newpossibility: therecovery ofan intensive
and participatory democracyat local levelsas a complementto the
deliberativeassembliesof the widerglobal order.In otherwords,
theyportenda politicalorderof democraticassociations,cities,and
nations,as wellas one of regionsand global networks.

In Conclusion

The establishment of a cosmopolitanconceptionof democracyis a

of to
way seeking strengthen democracy"within"communitiesand
civil associationsby elaboratingand reinforcingdemocracyfrom
"outsicle"througha networkof regionaland international agencies
and assembliesthatcut acrossspatiallydelimitedlocales. The impe-
tus to the pursuitof this networkcan be found in a numberof
processesand forces,including:
• The developmentoftransnational, grassrootsmovements with
clear regionalor global objectives,such as the protectionof
naturalresourcesand theenvironment, and thealleviationof
diseaseand ill-health
• The elaborationof newlegal rightsand dutiesaffecting states
and individualsin connectionwiththe "commonheritageof
humankind," theprotectionof the "globalcommons,"thede-
fenseof humanrights,and the deployment offorce
• The emergenceand proliferation in the twentiethcenturyof
internationalinstitutions to coordinatetransnationalforces
and problems,rangingfromthe UnitedNationsand itsagen-
cies to regionalpoliticalnetworksand organizations.20

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428 Cosmopolitan andtheGlobalOrder
Democracy

Accordingly,it can be argued,a politicalbasis existsupon whichto

build a moresystematic democraticfuture.This futureoughtto be
conceivedin cosmopolitanterms - a newinstitutional complexwith
globalscope,givenshape and formby reference to a basic democra-
tic law,whichtakeson the characterof governmentto the extent,
and only to the extent,thatit promulgates,implements,and en-
forcesthislaw.
Howeverthisfuture'sinstitutionsare preciselyenvisaged,it is a
futurebuilt upon the recognitionthatdemocracywithina single
community and democraticrelationsamongcommunities are deeply
interconnected, and thatneworganizationaland legal mechanisms
mustbe establishedifdemocracyis to surviveand prosper.

Notes

1. The themespresentedhere are explored at greaterlength in

DanieleArchibugi
and DavidHeld,eds., Cosmopolitan
Democracy
(Cambridge,
UK: Polity Press, 1995); and Held, Democracyand theGlobal Order:Fromthe
ModernStateto Cosmopolitan Governance(Cambridge, UK: PolityPress, 1995).
2. See FrancisFukuyama,TheEnd ofHistory and theLastMan (London:
HamishHamilton,1992); cf.DavidHeld, "Liberalism, Marxismand Democ-
racy,"Theory and Society22 (1993); David Held, "Anything but a dog's life?
further commentson Fukuyama, Callinicosand Giddens,"Theory and Society
22 (1993).
3. See David Held, "Democracy,the nation-state and the global sys-
tem,"in David Held, ed., PoliticalTheory Today(Cambridge:PolityPress,
1991).
4. Claus Offe,Disorganized Capitalism (Cambridge:PolityPress,1985),
pp. 286 ff.
5. See Held, note 3.
6. See Michael Mann, TheSourcesofSocialPower, vol. 1 (Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversity Press,1986), chap. 1.
7. See ImmanuelKant,in H. Reiss,ed., Kant'sPoliticalWritings (Cam-
bridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,1970), pp. 107-108;also see Reiss's"In-
troduction," ibid.,pp. 33-34.
8. Quoted in Reiss,note 7, "Introduction," p. 34.
9. Kant,note 7, pp. 107-108.
10. Kant,note 7, pp. 100 and 114.
11. Kant,note7, p. 108.The exactmeaningofRants conceptionofcos-
mopolitanlaw has, of course,long been controversial* but thiscontroversy
willnot be the directfocushere. For a representative rangeof viewssee F.
Hinsley,Powerand thePursuitofPeace (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press,1963), chap. 4; M. W. Doyle,"Kant,liberallegacies and foreignaf-
fairs,"parts1 and 2, PhilosophyandPublicAffairs 12, nos. 3 and 4 (1983); M.
"An
Wight, anatomy of internationalthought," Review ofInternationalStudies
13 (1987); and Daniele Archibugi, "Modelsof international organizationin
perpetualpeace projects,"Review ofInternationalStudies18 (1992).

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 David Held 429

12. Kant,note 7, p. 105.

13. Kant,note 7, pp. 105-108.
14. Kant,note 7, pp. 105-106.
15. Kant,note 7, p. 106.
16. Ibid.
17. Kant,note 7, p. 171.
18. It is beyondthe scope of thisarticleto set out myconceptionof
whichI linkto thenotionofa "commonstructure
rights, ofpoliticalaction":
thenecessaryconditionsforpeople to enjoyfreeand equal politicalpartici-
pation.See Held,note3, pp. 227-235;and,particularly, Held, note 1, Part3.
19. AnthonyGiddens,TheConsequences ofModernity (Cambridge,UK:
Press,
Polity 1990), p. 64.
20. See RichardFalk,"Positiveprescriptionsforthenearfuture," World
OrderStudiesProgramOccasionalPaperno. 20 (Princeton:PrincetonUni-
Press,CenterforInternational
versity Studies,1991).

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