Santos v. Yatco

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[No. L-13932. December 24, 1959.

JOSE V. DE LOS SANTOS, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON.


NICASIO YATCO, ET AL., respondents.

JUDGMENT; EXECUTION OF; JURISDICTION OF


COURT TO QUASH WRIT OF EXECUTION.·A judge has
jurisdiction to quash a writ of

746

746 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

De los Santos, et al. vs. Hon. Yatco, et al.

execution issued by him, especially where it was improvidently


issued. In the case at bar, although the court has already issued the
order of execution, there being opposition on the part of the
defendant, who alleged and proved a subsequent verbal agreement
amending the compromise agreement, execution could not validly
be decreed without a hearing.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and


Mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Anacleto P. Bernardo for petitioners.
Talileo P. Brion for respondents.

BENGZON J.:

Petition for certiorari to revoke the order of the respondent


judge cancelling his previous order of execution. For the
reasons stated, hereinaf ter, it should be denied.
It appears that in Civil Case No. Q-2664 of Quezon City
Court of First Instance, the parties submitted on December
9, 1957, a compromise agreement whereby, referring to the
sale by installment of a parcel of land made by plaintiffs
Pacita V. de los Santos and Jose V. de los Santos to
defendant Francisco Mendoñez, they asked the court to
render a judgment subject to the following conditions:
"a. On or before December 26, 1957, defendant shall
pay to plaintiffs the amount of P1,000.00;
b. Defendant shall pay P300.00 monthly installment
within the first five days of every month beginning
January, 1958, until the balance shall have been
paid in full;
c. The balance shall bear interest at 10% per annum;
d. That failure of defendant to pay P1,000.00 on or
before December 26, 1957 and/or any two (2)
successive monthly installments shall be cause for
plaintiffs to demand of defendant to immediately
vacate the premises with forfeiture in plaintiffs
favor of all previous payments made; that if
defendant will refuse to voluntarily vacate,
plaintiffs can ask for execution of judgment against
the defendant;
e. That plaintiffs shall execute the necessary
ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE of the lot, Lot No. 4,
Block No. 13 C of T.C.T. No. 25094, Quezon City
Registry, in favor of defendant upon payment in full
of the balance."

747

VOL. 106, DECEMBER 24, 1959 747


De los Santos, et al. vs. Hon. Yatco, et al.

Wherefore, the court issued on December 10, 1957, a


decision approving the agreement, and saying "judgment is
hereby rendered in accordance with the terms and
conditions set forth therein, for the parties to comply
therewith * * *."
On March 10, 1958, plaintiffs in the same case filed a
motion for execution, because defendant had allegedly
neglected to pay monthly installments since January 1958.
Plaintiffs set the motion for hearing on March 15, 1958.
However, on March 14, 1958, defendants moved (with the
conformity of plaintiffs' counsel) for postponement to March
22, 1958 "to give the parties sufficient time to come to a
more just, fair and equitable agreement." (Annex "E") And
the judge postponed, as requested.
It is not clear what happened at the hearing on March
22, 1958. According to plaintiffs, Mendoñez admitted he
violated the agreement, asked for, and was granted, two
days to settle with plaintiffs, but he failed to do so.
According to defendant there was a misunderstanding at
that hearing. The fact is, the court issued on March 25,
1958, an order of execution. However, defendant Mendoñez
filed on April 17, 1958, an urgent motion to quash the writ
of execution, asserting under oath that "immediately after
the execution of the compromise agreement * * * plaintiff
Pacita V. de los Santos and defendant Francisco Mendoñez
entered into a verbal agreement whereby the former
assured and led defendant to believe that provided he could
pay in full and at one time the balance of his indebtedness
to her through a GSIS (Government Service Insurance
System) loan which she is willing to facilitate for
defendant, she would execute the necessary deed of
absolute sale in favor of the defendant for Lot No. 4, Block
No. 13-C, Pcs-3312-AMD of T.C.T. No. 25094 of Quezon
City and would consider the terms and conditions favorable
to her in their compromise agreement unenforceable
against defendant. * * *."

748

748 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED


De los Santos, et al. vs. Hon. Yatco, et al.

Defendant further alleged, also under oath, among other


things, that he applied for and secured the necessary loan
from the GSIS; that plaintiffs had been so advised on
March 28, 1958; but plaintiff Pacita V. de los Santos
"arbitrarily and illegally demands and continuous
demanding of defendant that before she complies with the
content of said (verbal) agreement, defendant should pay
her P1,000.00 by way of attorney's fees plus the balance of
defendant's indebtedness computed by her in the amount of
P14,363.00, excluding interest yet, all to be taken from
defendant's GSIS loan as approved, and that the P1,000.00
already paid by defendant to her as stated in paragraph 4,
supra, is considered by her forfeited in her favor. * * *."
This urgent motion was taken up on April 19, 1958.
After listening to the parties, the judge in open court
ordered; "In view of the statement of counsel for plaintiffs
that they are still open to an amicable settlement, action on
the motion to quash writ of execution of the defendant is
held in abeyance for two (2) weeks during which period
they can settle the case amicably and report to the Court
whatever agreement they may have reached."
On April 28, 1958, defendant manifested in writing that
he conferred with plaintiff Pacita V. de los Santos on April
22, 1958, that he made known to her "that he is ready to
pay and is offering her the sum of P13,563, his balance
indebtedness to her, in accordance with their verbal
agreement on December 9, 1957 * * *. Plaintiff Pacita V. de
los Santos brushed aside defendant's offer of payment, and
instead, stated that she will abide by their said agreement
only if she will be paid P14,500.00. She added that she is
demanding now, P14,500.00 after she has forfeited the
P1,000.00 already paid by defendant to her, and that she
can not allow the P1,000.00 be deducted from the
remaining balance of P14,563.00."
The judge called the parties to a pre-trial or conference
on June 2, 1958. Noting defendant's insistance on
nonviolation of the compromise agreement, he set the case

749

VOL. 106, DECEMBER 24, 1959 749


De los Santos, et al. vs. Hon. Yatco, et al.

for hearing on June 3, 1958. On said date according to the


Judge, Atty. Bernardo (for plaintiffs) refused to attend the
hearing, and defendant proved the material allegations of
his urgent motion as hereinabove set forth.
Wherefore, convinced that there was no justification for
the issuance of the writ of execution, the Hon. Nicasio
Yatco, Judge, quashed it by his order of June 4, 1958.
Hence this petition for certiorari to revoke that
particular order, which petition must necessarily
1
be based
on lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion.
There is no question in this country that a judge has
jurisdiction to quash a writ of execution issued by him,
particularly where it was improvidently issued. (Dimayuga
vs. Raymundo, 76 Phil., 143, 42 Off. Gaz., 2121). See also
Garcia vs. Muñoz, 103 Phil., 628.
Was there abuse of discretion? We think not In the first
place, there being opposition on the part of the defendant,
who alleged and proved a subsequent verbal agreement
amending the compromise, execution could not validly be
decreed without a hearing. As we said in Co. vs. Lucero,
100 Phil., 160, 52 Off. Gaz., (17), 7255, when under similar
circumstances a breach of the compromise agreement is
alleged, "there arises a cause of action which must be
passed upon by the court requiring a hearing2 to determine
whether such breach had really taken place."
In the second place, the allegations proved by Mendoñez
about their verbal agreement, his having secured a loan
from the GSIS and his consequent ability to discharge his
obligation seemingly justified the court's refusal to
_______________

1 The corollary request for mandamus to compel execution depends


upon the petition for certiorari.
2 A further issue might possibly be tender ed concerning the effect of
plaintiffs' repeated readiness "to come to a more just, fair and equitable
agreement" (Annex E) or an "amicable settlement" (Annex X). Did this
amount to a waiver of the right to demand execution as a condonation of
the default? Cf. Dimayuga vs. Raymundo, supra.

750

750 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED


Ocampo-Cañiza vs. Hon. Martinez, et al.

eject defendant from the premises (on execution) with the


consequent forfeiture in favor of the plaintiffs of more than
P12,000.00 already paid by defendant as previous
instalments of the purchase price, 3 not to mention the loss
of defendant's use of the house and theatre erected on that
parcel of land. Upon the other hand, the respondent judge's
action caused no irreparable or undue harm to plaintiffs,
because the latter still have the judgment that may be
enforced upon any further default of defendant Mendoñez.
Note particularly that their unpaid credit continuous to
earn 10 % interest.
Wherefore, as the court had jurisdiction and has
committed no grave abuse of discretion, the writ of
certiorari may not be issued.
Petition denied, with costs against petitioners.

Parás, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo,


Labrador, Endencia, Barrera, and Gutiérrez David, JJ.,
concur.

Petition denied.

____________

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