BIOSECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRACTICE, AND SCIENCE

Volume 4, Number 2, 2006

© Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.

Meta-Leadership and National Emergency Preparedness:

A Model to Build Government Connectivity

LEONARD J. MARCUS, BARRY C. DORN, and JOSEPH M. HENDERSON

Effective emergency preparedness and response requires leadership that can accomplish perceptive
coordination and communication amongst diverse agencies and sectors. Nevertheless, operating
within their specified scope of authority, preparedness leaders in characteristic bureaucratic fashion
often serve to bolster the profile and import of their own organization, thereby creating a silo effect
that interferes with effective systemwide planning and response. This article describes a strategy to
overcome traditional silo thinking: “meta-leadership,” overarching leadership that intentionally
connects the purposes and work of different organizations or organizational units. Thinking and op­
erating beyond their immediate scope of authority, meta-leaders provide guidance, direction, and
momentum across organizational lines that develop into a shared course of action and a commonal­
ity of purpose among people and agencies that are doing what may appear to be very different work.
Meta-leaders are able to imaginatively and effectively leverage system assets, information, and ca­
pacities, a particularly critical function for organizations with emergency preparedness responsibili­
ties that are constrained by ingrained bureaucratic patterns of behavior.

T HE ACUTE THREAT of internationally driven and

homeland-directed terrorism has changed the rules
and expectations for government action, interaction, and
lagged far behind shifts in organizational form and man-
date.3 The 2005 Hurricane Katrina response was the first
major, complex catastrophic event to test DHS capabili­
willpower. Unprecedented coordination of resources, in- ties, and the results revealed profound system weak-
formation, and expertise is required, both in the face of nesses. The difficulties in creating effective response ca­
new hazards emanating from an elusive yet active and pacity are alarming given the enormity of the threats
well-organized network of hostile terrorist cells,1 as well along with the consequences of less-than-optimal pre-
as in managing naturally occurring events, a possible vention, emergency preparedness, and response. How
global avian flu pandemic chief among them. While the can the resistance and slow pace of change be under-
period since 9/11 has witnessed a spate of government re- stood, and what can be done strategically to accelerate re­
organization and restructuring—the most visible in the alization of full national preparedness potential?
speedy consolidation of 22 agencies to form the Depart- The vast literature and experience on the difficulties of
ment of Homeland Security (DHS) and the 9/11 Com- accomplishing any sort of quick organizational overhaul
mission’s recommended revamping of intelligence agen- need not be recounted here.4 Suffice it to say that the silo
cies2—the hoped-for change in behavior and impact has or “stovepipe” effect of distinct and deeply ingrained bu-

Leonard J. Marcus, PhD, is Co-Director, National Preparedness Leadership Initiative, Harvard School of Public Health and the
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Boston, Massachusetts. Barry C. Dorn, MD, MHCM, is Associate Director, Program for
Health Care Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston. Joseph M. Henderson, MPA, is Senior
Management Official, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, New York State Department of Health/Office of the Com­
missioner, and Former Director, Office of Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response, CDC.

128
META-LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 129

reaucratic cultures, budgets, and narrowly focused ca­ The country does not at present have the luxury of pa­
reer ascendancy compels government agencies toward tiently waiting while agencies take their time to adjust
self-protectiveness, insularity, and allegiance to their operating procedures and protocols: Progress in achiev­
own agency-based advocacy and independence. There ing a protected homeland needs to be quicker and deeper
also are long-standing traditions of rivalry and palpable than what would occur in the normal course of govern­
struggles for control, especially among organizations mental change and response.12 Documents and declara­
with similar or overlapping missions and scope of re­ tions alone will not foment the necessary change. There
sponsibility.5 These rivalries, when imposed on pre­ is, after all, significant danger facing the country—from
paredness for and the response to an unprecedented ter­ both manmade and natural threats—and the slow pace of
rorist attack, can compound what is already disastrous, preparedness itself increases national vulnerability. What
as was seen in New York on 9/11 between the fire and will it take to accelerate the pace?
police departments, two interdependent agencies with a
history of antagonism. Once first responders arrived on
the scene, radios could not communicate, separate com­ AN EXPANDED NOMENCLATURE FOR
mand centers were established, and information was not LEADERSHIP: META-LEADERSHIP
shared. In the heat of the moment, that lack of coordina­
tion translated into higher mortality and morbidity fig­ One critical ingredient is competent leadership. Orga­
ures for firefighters at the World Trade Center. Closely nizational change occurs slowly, and it offers solutions to
observing the flaming buildings from an NYPD heli­ problems in the long run, as a gradual, evolutionary pro­
copter, police officers foresaw the collapse of the tow­ cess. Similarly, on paper, plans and protocols may not fit
ers and radioed police to evacuate. The message, be­ the unique contingencies of a particular emergency, or
cause connections had not previously been established, even, as was in part the case during the Katrina response,
never reached firefighters, who continued to stream into those prearranged procedures may be disregarded. Indi­
the flaming structure.6,7 vidual people—capable leaders—however, can and
A similar failure of connectivity and coordination oc­ should be more agile and adaptive in the short run, able
curred in March 2005, when suspected anthrax at a De­ to prompt the sort of resilient and flexible organizational
partment of Defense post office was confirmed without response required for quick and immediate change.13
first informing and validating with the Department of The problem, of course, is that well-intended leaders—
Homeland Security, the Centers for Disease Control practicing what they believe is effective leadership—
and Prevention, and local officials. The subsequent could be just as much part of the problem as they are part
alert, which caused hundreds of employees to be placed of the solution. Leadership could work—and it has—to
on preventive antibiotic treatment, turned out to be a fortify the bureaucratic silo mentality of agencies—this
false positive.8 despite the fact that it is the coordinated action of many
Since the initial shock of 9/11, there certainly have agencies working together that is essential to advancing
been important efforts to improve cooperation. For ex­ the national preparedness effort. It was that lack of coor­
ample, the February 2003 adoption of Homeland Security dinated action among local, state, and federal leadership
Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) establishes “a single, just before and in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane
comprehensive national incident management system.”9 Katrina that significantly amplified the destructive im­
HSPD-5 led to adoption of the National Response Plan pact of the winds and the devastating aftermath of the
(NRP), built on the template of the National Incident New Orleans levee failures. Leadership, as commonly
Management System (NIMS).10 Despite this progress, understood, works to build the capacity within organiza­
there remains a troublesome possibility that during a tions. We premise here that a different brand of leader­
mass casualty incident, emergency responders once again ship is necessary to get beyond that silo thinking to
will clash, the public will be given conflicting informa­ achieve the cross-agency and cross-government coordi­
tion, and lives will be unnecessarily lost simply because nation of strategy and effort required for national terror­
agency leaders now, in the pre-event preparatory period, ism and emergency preparedness.
did not come to terms with the critical need to achieve a The answer to that question could very well lie in what
versatile capacity for connectivity: that bigger and coher­ is introduced in this article as “meta-leadership.” The
ent picture of distinct, consistent, and overlapping roles prefix “meta” as used here refers to overarching leader­
and responsibilities necessary to counter and defuse ter­ ship that connects the purposes and the work of different
rorist challenges.11 On matters of leadership decision- organizations or organizational units. Just as “meta-re­
making and agency interaction, precise plans and refined search” refers to identification of broader themes and
models have yet to be uniformly established, tested, and conclusions that emerge from a body of related investiga­
deeply ingrained. tion, and “meta-analysis” refers to a frame of reference
130 MARCUS ET AL.

that joins diverse thinking into a coherent framework, ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND

“meta-leadership” refers to guidance, direction, and mo­ SYSTEM META-LEADERSHIP:

mentum across organizational lines that develops into a COMMONALITIES AND DISTINCTIONS

shared course of action and a commonality of purpose

among people and agencies that are doing what appears What is the difference between organizational leader­
to be very different work. ship and system meta-leadership?21
Achieving quick and effective national preparedness Leaders derive their power and influence first from
requires an array of government and nongovernment bu­ their formal job descriptions and authority. For example,
reaucracies to coordinate their planning, collaboration, an organizational leader who has budget authority is able
and response to anticipated terrorist acts.14 Leaders who to significantly command the behavior and compliance
are able to influence and accomplish such collaboration of his or her direct reports. Power and influence is to
of effort across organizations—multi-jurisdictional, some extent embedded into the structure and operation of
multi-agency, and public-private—are termed “meta- the organization.22
leaders.” These leaders connect with, influence, and inte­ Meta-leaders work in a far less scripted fashion. They
grate the activities of diverse agencies, thereby motivat­ seek to influence what happens in other organizations,
ing interaction, enhancing communication, and though this effort is in large measure a matter of effective
engendering the sort of cross-organizational confidence negotiation and the development of personal and organi­
necessary for effective terrorism preparedness and emer­ zational credibility that stretches across organizational
gency response.15 lines. It is easiest to establish cross-organizational influ­
They are able to legitimately and productively reach ence when bringing something of value to the table, as
beyond their scope of authority and responsibility and, in would generally occur in a formal negotiation. In
the process, are able to generate linkages of purpose and essence, one can begin the process of achieving connec­
activity that amplify their outcomes and impact.16 They tivity by purchasing it—through a business deal or mem­
leverage information and resources across agencies, ex­ orandum of understanding—as part of a contractual deal
tending what any unit alone could accomplish, by reduc­ between entities.
ing interagency friction and creating a synergy of It is far more difficult when the meta-leader is advocat­
progress.17 These meta-leaders achieve “connectivity,” ing adherence to a set of common goals and purposes for
defined here as a seamless web of people, organizations, which there may be little or no direct compensation. And
resources, and information that can best catch (detect and it is even more difficult when those shared purposes re­
report), respond (control and contain), and return to pre- quire sacrifice, the reduction of autonomy and indepen­
event normal (recover) from a terrorist incident. Connec­ dence, or a change in culture or operating procedures.23
tivity—among agencies, organizations, and people with Such is sometimes the case for those who seek to ad­
complementary missions—is one by-product of meta­ vance cross-agency or multi-jurisdictional coordinated
leadership.18 governmental action to achieve national preparedness, a
Meta-leaders require a distinct mindset, a unique set of mission that while laudatory flies in the face of the polit­
skills, and a network to encourage cross-agency thinking, ical culture to which agencies, their Congressional over­
risk taking, and productivity.19 Meta-leadership compels seers, and career staff have become accustomed.
those who practice it to go beyond their job descriptions, Finally, it is most difficult when efforts to accomplish
since achieving unprecedented and groundbreaking connectivity involve creating new relationships among
cross-organizational collaboration is itself beyond the ex­ traditionally competitive agencies. Deeply embedded an­
perience, mission, and task of any single organization or tagonisms and powerful proclivities to contest control
agency alone. and authority complicate any effort to enhance collabora­
The actions of the U.S. Coast Guard during the Hurri­ tion. The meta-leader risks not only failure of the effort.
cane Katrina response exemplified these qualities. Rec­ There is beyond that the professional peril that one’s col­
ognizing the plight of New Orleans residents stranded leagues can grow skeptical of this consorting with the
on the roofs of their homes, the Coast Guard immedi­ “enemy,” while the “enemy” delights in the failure of ef­
ately dispatched a continuous stream of helicopter forts to create a shared enterprise. This phenomenon of
search and rescue missions, not impeded by though in social and collegial distancing occurs both on the hori­
coordination with other government agencies. Eventu­ zontal plane as well as vertically between different levels
ally, overall leadership of the response effort was trans­ of government. When agency leaders with critical and
ferred to a Coast Guard Vice Admiral, who, by the time overlapping preparedness functions are prevented by de­
the second hurricane (Rita) descended on the area, had partment leadership in Washington from meeting with
opened new and more credible lines of communication one another, opportunities for connectivity are thwarted
and cooperation.20 and those people who reach out are frustrated. The pur­
META-LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 131

suit of meta-leadership under such circumstances can be By contrast, meta-leaders operate without many of
professionally dangerous and even painful.24 these supports, linking organizations and people often
Another distinction between traditional leadership and without the benefit of established authority, precedent,
meta-leadership as it pertains to national preparedness is and consensus on what should be done or exactly how it
that the former is focused on a known and time-honored should be accomplished. The ambition as well as the art
tradition of organizational direction and accomplish­ of meta-leadership thrives in the creation of something
ment. While leaders traditionally have been responsible new and something that is mission driven.28 As it pertains
for steering the course of their organizations, meta-lead­ to matters of national preparedness, leaders often very
ers must chart a new course in coordination with a range capably harness organizations to pursue their traditional
of other agencies generally outside the purview of prior missions and allegiances. By contrast, where there has
organizational experience or responsibility. This is par­ been a synergy of effort and true innovation across agen­
ticularly relevant for the evolving Homeland Defense cies, it has been meta-leaders who encouraged people
section of the Department of Defense as it charts a new and organizations to extend beyond their traditional
domestic mission, assisting in the response to a terrorist scope of interest and activity.
incident or massive emergency within United States bor­ These qualities were in evidence among those who,
ders, and requiring development of new roles, relation­ during the December 2003–January 2004 “orange alert”
ships, interactions, and activities. declared by the Department of Homeland Security, were
Organizations, like cultures, provide a source of famil­ able to strategically organize available intelligence into
iarity, support, and even comfort for those accustomed to specific categories of risk, develop a plan to respond to
working within them. More than may be generally ac­ each, and then obtain buy-in across the responsible agen­
knowledged, people fancy the known and safe zone of cies.29 These meta-leaders have risen from provincial
their chosen profession or career.25 Leadership, credibil­ thinking to drive preparedness as a systems endeavor,
ity, and experience grow within the time-honored and fashioning innovative, complex, adaptive, and flexible
conventional confines of that work. It can then be un­ governmental capabilities essential now in responding to
comfortable to engage outside of that known sphere of the emerging threats.30 They further recognize that pre­
influence. Meta-leaders are able to accomplish the task, paredness is not merely a government function, and that
feeling and acting at ease even when engaging with peo­ the private sector, to include multinational corporations
ple beyond their professional domain or expertise, able to and nongovernmental organizations, must also be ac­
act comfortably in someone else’s space and making oth­ tively engaged in the endeavor. In so doing, the meta­
ers feel welcomed and accepted in theirs. leader is able to leverage an outcome that is far bigger
In May 2003, this mindset was in place in New Sweden, than the sum of its parts.
Maine, where churchgoers fell ill after drinking arsenic- The practice of meta-leadership and the accomplish­
laced coffee. Benefiting from just-introduced preparedness ment of its objectives, as laudable as they may be, are
staffing and cross-agency training in the state, first respon­ complicated by the fact that its execution is outside tradi­
ders, public health epidemiologists, and law enforcement tional lines of organizational advancement, that it does
officials were able to coordinate efforts to identify the not always provide reward for its achievement, and that it
toxic agent and mount a prompt medical response. has an uncomfortably public quality to it. What does it
Metaphorically, it could be said that meta-leaders are able take in practice to be an accomplished meta-leader?
to speak multiple languages, are fluent in their own profes­
sional lingo, and are able to talk the talk of others.26 They
absorb and credibly apply concepts, facts, and vocabulary THE ART AND PRACTICE OF

particular to other fields of work and are therefore in a bet­ META-LEADERSHIP: UNIQUE SKILLS,

ter position to encourage a connectivity of effort. CAPACITIES, AND PERSPECTIVES

The most important distinction between leaders and

meta-leaders is their relative breadth of focus and inter­ For the meta-leader, “out-of-the-box” is a frame of ref­
cession. “Leaders” as used and distinguished here refers erence and way of thinking. The “box” and all that goes
to those working within organizations that authorize and with it—sanction, authority, the known, and the comfort­
condone their leadership. That leadership is buttressed by able—are of relatively less importance than the com­
the many cohesive and defined rudiments of organiza­ bined potential achievable by the system if it were to
tional structure: the organizational chart, policies, proce­ operate as an intentionally interwoven network of con­
dures, rules, lines of authority, measurable outcomes, nected parts.31 The meta-leader perceives that potential.
standards, behavioral expectations, and sanctions for vio­ He or she endeavors to give that image meaning, pur­
lations of the above. These artifacts provide the frame­ pose, and a conduit toward achievement.
work through which the leader leads.27 The art of meta-leadership derives from the capacity to
132 MARCUS ET AL.

envision a new connectivity of strategy and effort and In order to accomplish the task, with so much to per­
then to find a way to communicate, inspire, and persuade ceive and so much to integrate, the meta-leader engages
broader participation.32 It is a creative and, most impor­ imaginative multidimensional problem solving. This
tant, a transformational endeavor. The meta-leader must mind-set requires looking at a problem and its considera­
often impart significance to a vision or objective that tions from all key angles. It has the meta-leader seeking
does not already exist. Exceptional talent is required to pertinent questions and then surveying a wide breadth of
describe that bigger picture and then imbue it with mean­ information relevant to the mission at hand, often then
ing that alters what others think and do. It is a difficult reaching well beyond his or her range of expertise and di­
task. Through their behavior and actions, meta-leaders rect experience. Who are the key stakeholders? And
are able to motivate people to follow along, a particularly since each of these stakeholders likely defines the pre­
impressive feat given the fact that they operate without senting problem very differently, what are each of their
the direct power or authority to “order” others to follow. unique interests and perspectives on the relevant chal­
Abstract goals and objectives of preparedness and home­ lenge or question? Given the many takes on what needs
land security—for example, cross-agency preparations to be done, what is it that must be accomplished, both for
for a special national security event such as a highly visi­ each of the individual constituents as well as for solving
ble sporting competition or political gathering33—as­ the bigger problem? How does this newly forming con­
sume tangible meaning, and, with that, the meta-leader is ceptualization break down into a reasonable set of priori­
able to mold actions toward the most important outcomes ties? What obstacles or frictions must be accounted for?
and impact. And how can success be defined and redefined in terms
To accomplish this feat, the meta-leader appreciates that are reasonable, achievable, and acceptable to the ar­
the distinct values, goals, motives, and missions of the ray of concerned stakeholders?
different organizational silos that are recruited to coordi­ Effective multidimensional problem solving describes
nated action. He or she grasps how those differences “situational awareness” at its very best, seeing both the
could actually complement one another, even as they are problems to be resolved as well as the people and assets
generally seen as the rationale for waging battles for con­ that can be constructively brought to bear. The meta­
trol. How is this accomplished? leader is a quick study, accurate and efficient in collect­
The meta-leader connects disparate groups by aligning ing, analyzing, and packaging data into strategic themes
core interests and motivations, redefining success not as a of action and interaction. This assembled multidimen­
silo-driven objective but rather as a product of the com­ sional assessment is readily synthesized and packaged
bined action and interaction of the multiple silos working into a form and format that has wide applicability and
in a coordinated synchronization. In other words, each of meaning for those who are the intended audiences.
the parts recognizes that its individual success is derived in Most important, the meta-leader is able to get people
some measure from the success of the whole endeavor.34 on board by helping them make sense of widely cast and
By aligning goals and objectives, the meta-leader is disparate information, putting it into a coherent message
able to encourage—sometimes diplomatically nudge— that serves to unite the people whom the meta-leader
movement toward achievement of those newly discov­ must recruit as followers. In this way, it is both the per­
ered and overlapping motivations and, with that, creates sona and the perspective of the meta-leader that engages
a synergy of effort, a reduction of competition and waste, people in the message and direction of the leadership
and a new efficiency of coordination and cooperation.35 agenda. It is our contention that the potential meta-leader
A meta-leader not only comprehends the bigger pic­ can be identified, trained, and institutionalized, as dem­
ture: By virtue of setting the stage for effective under­ onstrated by the work of the National Preparedness Lead­
standing and communication, the meta-leader is able to ership Initiative, a joint program of the Harvard School
persuade others as well to see and be motivated by that of Public Health and the Kennedy School of Government
enlarged vision for what needs to be done and how it can at Harvard University.
be achieved. An example of this principle in practice is
the establishment of “coordinating centers” by the Cen­
ters for Disease Control and Prevention. These new func­ CONCLUSION: META-LEADERSHIP

tions, such as the Coordinating Center for Infectious Dis­ AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY

eases, and the people who direct them have the task of PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY

integrating the heretofore separate scientific endeavors of

the many Centers that comprise the agency, linkages that What are the personal and professional qualities neces­
will be critical in coordinating the response to a bioterror­ sary to achieve the model of system-based leadership in­
ist incident or pandemic flu. Whether or not these new troduced here? Meta-leaders with emergency prepared­
functions prove to be effective is yet unknown. ness responsibilities are able not only to effectively span
META-LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 133

organizations and weave important connections amongst 2. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
them. Just as important, meta-leaders are able to incorpo­ United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. New York:
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