THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is
hereby declared valid."[2]

Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her

"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G.
Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab
initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic]
in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52
relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare
of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of
respondent.

"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig
City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and
the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this
Decision.

"SO ORDERED."

The Facts
 The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982
which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A);
and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command
Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-
1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).

"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he
was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos
Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps
under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a
discharge from the military service.

"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace,
she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand
Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became
sweethearts.

"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss,
Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when
she was still single.

"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in
different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to
look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a
good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel
and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him
despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake
and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their
cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.

"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While
she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to
Malacaang.When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her
business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able
to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development
Corporation.

"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter
quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house
anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted
him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came
to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought
refuge in her sister's house.

"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong
Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss
unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After
knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even
[beat] her driver.

"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella,
Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.

"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their
father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).

"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological
evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.

"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent
attitude towardsappellee and their children, x x x."[3]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:

"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's
psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently
proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties
to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220
to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged
in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.

"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric
evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan
were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any
one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he
or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he
offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root
cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically
identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert.Similarly, there is no
evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was]
psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations
he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was]
incurable."[4]

Hence, this Petition.[5]

In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional
Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should
be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."[7]

The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were
submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations
of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply
because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA
should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on
other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of
respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation
of psychological incapacity  referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code[9] were laid down by this Court as
follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally
'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.

x x x x x x x x x
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

x x x x x x x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."[10]

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[11]  "psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do
not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the
present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's
sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
 We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion
of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
"defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his
job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during
this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These
marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need
not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.[12] At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid
down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has
not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of
petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines
outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except
that portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a
finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.