G.R. No.

182650               February 27, 2012

TOMAS K. CHUA, Petitioner,
vs.
WESTMONT BANK, REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, REGISTRAR OF
DEEDS OF PASAY CITY, NOTARY PUBLIC MANUEL FONACIER, AND JOHN
DOES, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This Rule 45 petition filed by petitioner Tomas K. Chua seeks to annul and set aside the
January 24, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86882, which
affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 257, of Parañaque City in Civil
Case No. 99-0190. Also assailed is the appellate court’s Resolution 3 dated April 22, 2008,
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts follow:

This case stemmed from a petition for cancellation of mortgage 4 filed by petitioner before the
RTC of Parañaque City against respondents Westmont Bank, the Registrar of Deeds of
Parañaque City, the Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City, Notary Public Manuel S. Fonacier and
several John Does.

Petitioner alleged that on October 21, 1996, he pre-signed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in
favor of Westmont Bank and submitted to it his owner’s duplicate copies of Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) Nos. 87878 and 87876 in anticipation of a grant of a loan to T.C. Builders
Suppliers, Inc. When the loan did not materialize because petitioner and Westmont Bank could
not agree on the interest rate to be applied, petitioner assumed that Westmont Bank would just
cancel the pre-signed blank Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and return the duplicate originals of
the titles. But the bank did neither. Instead, it foreclosed the mortgaged properties and bought
the properties in the ensuing public auction held on September 10, 1998, for which it was issued
a Certificate of Sale. Thus, petitioner prayed that the Real Estate Mortgage and the Certificate
of Sale issued by Notary Public Manuel S. Fonacier be declared null and void.

In its Answer,5 Westmont Bank averred that petitioner applied for a letter of credit to import one
set of plywood-making machinery. The bank extended the credit accommodation to petitioner,
and accordingly the machinery was shipped and released to petitioner under a Trust Receipt
Agreement issued in favor of the bank. Later, when petitioner had difficulty paying for the
machinery, he requested for an extension of time to settle his obligations and simultaneously
mortgaged TCT Nos. 87878 and 87876 in favor of Westmont Bank. Upon execution of the Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage and the delivery of the subject TCTs to Westmont Bank, Westmont
Bank agreed to extend the term of the Trust Receipt obligation until November 3, 1997. But
despite the extended term, petitioner still failed to settle his obligation. Hence, the mortgaged
properties were extrajudicially foreclosed and sold at public auction to Westmont Bank as the
highest bidder.

At the trial, petitioner testified that he is the owner of the two parcels of land covered by TCT
Nos. 87878 and 87876. He also declared that he is the owner of T.C. Builders Suppliers, Inc.

Sometime in October 1996, he applied for a personal loan with Westmont Bank in the amount of
₱6,000,000. He was required to sign a blank Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and to submit the
owner’s duplicate copies of his two titles for evaluation purposes. He averred that he did as he
was told although no receipt was given for the titles. Then, sometime in 1997, he came back to
the bank to retrieve his titles, thinking that his loan was not going to be approved. Mr. So Leng
Ton, a bank officer, however, told him that the titles were kept by the bank in anticipation of the
approval of the loan. Later, he found out that the subject properties were foreclosed and sold at
public auction and a Certificate of Sale issued to Westmont Bank.6
On cross-examination, petitioner claimed that he signed a blank Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
when he applied for his personal loan with the bank for T.C. Builders Suppliers, Inc., but he did
not read the provisions of the deed before signing it. He also averred that he did not know if his
loan application was approved. He added that he did not sign a promissory note or demanded in
writing the return of his TCTs. Further, he declared that he did not appear before a notary public
on July 10, 1998 to acknowledge the Deed of Real Estate since he was in Malaysia on said date
as shown in his passport.7 Petitioner likewise claimed that sometime in October 1996, he
applied for a domestic letter of credit for ₱4,500,000 in the name of T.C. Builders Suppliers, Inc.,
but he did not receive any amount from the bank intended for T.C. Builders.8

For its part, Westmont Bank presented as witness Mr. Noe Reyes, a bank executive. Reyes
testified that on October 23, 1996, T.C. Builders Suppliers, Inc. through petitioner, applied for a
Domestic Letter of Credit in the amount of ₱4,500,000 to purchase plywood-making machinery
from Cotabato Timberland Company. The bank approved the application and issued a Domestic
Letter of Credit. Accordingly, the machinery was delivered to T.C. Builders and received by
petitioner on November 5, 1996. Petitioner thereafter requested that he be allowed to pay his
loan in installments as follows: by partial payment of ₱1,000,000 on or before March 26, 1997,
another partial payment of ₱1,250,000 on or before May 5, 1997, and the remaining balance
within 90 days. The request was approved, but petitioner failed to pay his obligation on May 5,
1997.9

Reyes further testified that on August 29, 1997, petitioner requested that the penalty of his
obligation be reduced from 36% to 9% per annum and that he be allowed to pay the remaining
balance of ₱2,500,000 on September 30, 1997.10 Said request was approved but no payment
was made. Then, on October 30, 1997, petitioner requested that the bank convert his unpaid
balance to an 18-month time loan, 11 making assurance that if his company’s financial situation
improves, he will settle his obligation within 6 months. No payment, however, was made. Finally,
on July 17, 1998, petitioner once more requested for the reduction of the interest rate from 36%
to 25% per annum and a full waiver of penalties upon full payment of his obligation on July 27,
1998. The bank approved petitioner’s final request on the condition that if no payment is made
on July 27, 1998, it will initiate foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged properties. 12 Again,
petitioner failed to fulfill his promise.13

On January 4, 2006, the RTC of Parañaque City promulgated its decision, dismissing
petitioner’s complaint as follows:

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the complaint of plaintiff is dismissed. The claims for attorney’s
fees are denied for lack of evidence.

IT IS SO ORDERED.14

The RTC ruled that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage is valid and supported by substantial
consideration. It found that the bank required the execution of the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage involving the subject properties to secure the unpaid loan obligation of T.C. Builders
Suppliers, Inc., a company owned by petitioner. The trial court also found that the obligation was
incurred when T.C. Builders purchased from Cotabato Timberland Company plywood-making
machinery valued at ₱4,500,000. It was Westmont Bank that paid for the purchase price to
Cotabato Timberland Company, and the bank was able to prove that the machinery was
delivered to T.C. Builders as evidenced by a receipt signed by petitioner himself.15

The trial court also noted that despite petitioner’s request for several extensions of time to pay
the loan obligation, and approval of the same by the bank, he still reneged on his promise to
pay. Thus, it held that the foreclosure sale of the properties mortgaged by petitioner was proper.
Moreover, the RTC held that it was not convinced that petitioner indeed signed a blank Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage. The RTC found it difficult to believe that petitioner, who appeared to be
an experienced businessman, would allow such a questionable practice, unless he fully agreed
with it. Assuming that he did sign a blank deed of real estate mortgage, it was made with his full
consent and likely for purposes of his convenience. Similarly, the RTC found that the
notarization of the document on the date when he was allegedly in Malaysia was also made with
his consent and for his convenience.16
Unsatisfied, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, raising the following issues:

1. Whether the [RTC] committed error of fact in finding that:

(a) [Petitioner’s] claim of having signed a blank deed of real estate mortgage

document is "not indubitable" and, even if true, the same was made "with his full
consent and approval and could likely be for purposes of his convenience and
the bank."

(b) The subject Deed of Real Estate Mortgage secured the unpaid loan obligation
of T.C. Builder’s Suppliers, Inc. to Westmont.

2. Whether the [RTC] committed error of law when:

(a) It manifestly disregarded the undisputed evidence presented by [petitioner]

showing that the subject Deed was contrived and spurious.

(b) It admitted and gave credence to Westmont’s documentary evidence even if

the due execution and authenticity was not properly established in accordance
with Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Evidence.

(c) It ruled that the notarization of the subject was made with [petitioner’s]
consent and for his and the bank’s convenience.

(d) It did not hold that the subject Deed was, on its face, null and void for lack of
Westmont’s consent.

(e) It did not rule that the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties is valid.

(f) It ruled that [petitioner’s] claim for damages have no factual and legal
basis.17 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original.)

On January 24, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision
of the court a quo STANDS.

SO ORDERED.18

The CA held that except for petitioner’s self-serving testimony, there is nothing on record to
sustain his claim that he signed a blank Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. In fact, the CA found
that the deed in question is complete in form and substance when the parties signed it. The CA
did not believe that petitioner, who is apparently of age and in excellent mental faculties, would
deposit the titles of his properties with Westmont Bank without being sure of what kind of
transaction he was entering into. The appellate court was likewise not convinced by petitioner’s
claim that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was intended to secure his personal loan of
₱6,000,000 as petitioner himself already admitted in his Petition for Cancellation of Mortgage
before the trial court that he signed the deed to secure a loan to be granted to T.C. Builders
Suppliers, Inc. Finally, the CA ruled that the fact that the deed was signed on the day he flew to
Malaysia does not render the deed spurious as it was possible that he signed the petition before
he flew to Malaysia in the afternoon.19

Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above CA decision, but his motion
was denied in a Resolution dated April 22, 2008. Hence, this appeal raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF

LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THE COURT A QUO WAS CORRECT IN ADMITTING
WESTMONT’S DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS IN EVIDENCE EVEN IF THE
 AUTHENTICITY AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE SAME HAVE NOT BEEN
ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF EVIDENCE.

II.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF

LAW WHEN IT CONCLUDED, BASED MERELY ON SPECULATION AND
CONJECTURE, THAT PETITIONER COULD HAVE POSSIBLY SIGNED THE DEED
OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE BEFORE HE LEFT FOR MALAYSIA ON 10 JULY
1998.

III.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF

LAW WHEN IT REFUSED TO HOLD THAT PETITIONER’S TESTIMONY IN OPEN
COURT HAD SUPERSEDED THE ALLEGATIONS IN HIS PETITION BEFORE THE
COURT A QUO, CONSISTENT WITH THIS HONORABLE COURT’S RULING
IN GARDNER V. COURT OF APPEALS.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN

IT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT PETITIONER HAS OVERCOME HIS BURDEN OF
PROOF AND HAS ESTABLISHED HIS CASE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN VALIDLY DISPUTED BY WESTMONT; HENCE,
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS HE PRAYED FOR IN THE COURT A
QUO.20

Essentially, the core issue in this petition is whether the CA erred in affirming the findings of the
RTC that the Real Estate Mortgage executed by petitioner and Westmont Bank is valid.

Petitioner argues that the CA erred in holding that the trial court was correct in admitting
Westmont Bank’s documentary evidence. He asserts that Westmont Bank failed to prove the
due execution and authenticity of the documentary evidence it presented by anyone who saw
the document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature of the
maker.

The petition has no merit.

The RTC, after considering the evidence and the testimonies of the witnesses, found that the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed to secure the unpaid loan obligation of T.C.
Builders Suppliers Inc., a company owned by petitioner. The CA found no error on the part of
the trial court’s appreciation of evidence before it, even noting that the documentary exhibits
were the subject of cross-examinations and were subsequently admitted by the trial court
without any objection from petitioner. Moreover, the CA observed that petitioner failed to rebut
the authenticity and due execution of the documentary exhibits of Westmont Bank. All petitioner
could offer by way of evidence was his unsupported claim that he signed a blank Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage. Such claim is insufficient to overcome the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
which is a notarized document.

The court has held that one who denies the due execution of a deed where one’s signature
appears has the burden of proving that contrary to the recital in the jurat, one never appeared
before the notary public and acknowledged the deed to be a voluntary act. 21 We have also held
that a notarized instrument is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution, is
conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents, and has in its favor the presumption of
regularity.22

In this case, the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage involving TCT Nos. 87878 and 87876 was
notarized and acknowledged before notary public Fina Dela Cuesta-Tantuico. 23 Being a public
document, it enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the
facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution. To
overcome this presumption, there must be clear and convincing evidence. Absent such
evidence, as in this case, the presumption must be upheld.

Petitioner likewise asserts that it was physically impossible for him to execute and acknowledge
the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage before notary public Fina Dela Cuesta-Tantuico because on
the supposed date of execution and notarization, he was in Malaysia with his wife. However, as
correctly pointed out by the CA, it can be gathered from the testimony of petitioner that he left
the Philippines in the afternoon of July 10, 1998 and arrived in Malaysia an hour later. The CA
noted that petitioner was in the Philippines from morning until early afternoon on said date,
which means that he still had time to attend to his business transactions before his flight to
Malaysia. Thus, we find no error on the part of the CA in concluding that petitioner could have
signed the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage before he left for Malaysia on said date.

We note that these issues raised by petitioner are factual in nature and calls for a review of the
evidence already considered in the proceedings below. The evaluation and calibration of the
evidence necessarily involves consideration of factual issues—an exercise that is not
appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

As a general rule, only errors of law are reviewable by the Supreme Court on petitions for
review on certiorari.24 The rule finds more stringent application where the CA upholds the
findings of fact of the trial court. In such instance, as in this case, this Court is generally bound
to adopt the facts as determined by the lower courts. 25 When supported by substantial evidence,
the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable
by this Court.26

Next, petitioner submits that his statement in the petition for cancellation of mortgage admitting
that he signed the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage to secure a loan to be granted to T.C. Builders
should be deemed to have been superseded by his testimony in open court that the subject
Deed was supposedly intended to secure his personal loan with Westmont Bank. In support of
his argument, he cites our ruling in Gardner v. Court of Appeals,27 wherein the court allowed a
party’s testimony to override admissions made in his Answer.

Petitioner pointed out that in Gardner, we held that as a general rule, facts alleged in a party’s
pleading are deemed admissions of that party and are binding upon it, but this is not an
absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing expects
to prove, but it is not evidence.28 Thus, petitioner asserts that applying the foregoing by analogy,
his statements in the petition for cancellation of mortgage had been repudiated by his
subsequent testimony in open court.

The argument is untenable.

In the Gardner case, the witness had repudiated in open court the defenses he had raised in his
Answer and that the court found his testimony to be deserving of weight and credence. In said
case, both the trial court and the appellate court believed in the witness’ credibility. Here, the
reverse holds true as both the trial court and CA found petitioner’s testimony that he applied for
a personal loan to be conflicting and incredible. Therefore, we find that petitioner’s reliance on
the ruling in Gardner is misplaced.

Finally, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
"greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth.1âwphi1 It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.29

In the present case, petitioner failed to overcome the burden of proving his claim by
preponderance of evidence that the questioned Deed is null and void. As we mentioned earlier,
the CA did not find any error on the part of the trial court’s appreciation of evidence, which found
the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage to be valid and supported by substantial consideration. The
trial court also found that since petitioner failed to pay his obligation despite request for several
extensions of time to pay his loan, the foreclosure sale of the properties was therefore valid.

idence even if its authenticity time to pay the loan obligation. will initiate foreclosure proceedings
over the mortgaged prope

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for utter lack of merit. The
Decision dated January 24, 2008, as well as the Resolution dated April 22, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86882 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 164457               April 11, 2012

ANNA LERIMA PATULA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In the trial of everycriminal case, a judge must rigidlytest the State’s evidence of guilt in order to
ensure that such evidenceadheres to the basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing an
accused guilty of the crime charged upon such evidence. Nothing less is demanded of the
judge; otherwise, the guarantee of due process of law is nullified.The accused need
notadduceanythingto rebut evidence that is discredited for failing the test.Acquittal should then
follow.

Antecedents

Petitioner was charged withestafaunder an informationfiled in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
DumagueteCitythat averred:

That on or about and during the period from March 16 to 20, 1997 and for sometime prior
thereto, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being then a saleswoman of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc.,
Dumaguete City, having collected and received the total sum of ₱131,286.97 from several
customers of said company under the express obligation to account for the proceeds of the
sales and deliver the collection to the said company, but far from complying with her obligation
and after a reasonable period of time despite repeated demands therefore, and with intent to
defraud the said company, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to deliver
the said collection to the said company but instead, did, then and there willfully unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the proceeds of the sale to her own use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said company in the aforesaid amount of
₱131,286.97.

Contrary to Art. 315, par 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.1

Petitioner pled not guiltyto the offense charged in the information. At pre-trial, no stipulation of
factswas had, and petitioner did not avail herself of plea bargaining. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.

The Prosecution’s first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that he was the branch manager
of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc. (Footlucker’s) in Dumaguete City since October 8, 1994;
that petitioner was an employee of Footlucker’s, starting as a saleslady in 1996 until she
became a sales representative; that as a sales representative she was authorized to take orders
from wholesale customers coming from different towns (like Bacong, Zamboanguita, Valencia,
Lumbangan and Mabinay in Negros Oriental, and Siquijor), and to collect payments from them;
that she could issue and sign official receipts of Footlucker’s for the payments, which she would
then remit; that she would then submit the receipts for the payments for tallying and
reconciliation; that at first her volume of sales was quite high, but later on dropped, leading him
to confront her; that she responded that business was slow; that he summoned the accounting
clerk to verify; that the accounting clerk discovered erasures on some collection receipts; that he
decided to subject her to an audit by company auditor Karen Guivencan; that he learned from a
customer of petitioner’s that the customer’s outstanding balance had already been fully paid
although that balance appeared unpaid in Footlucker’s records; and that one night later on,
petitioner and her parents went to his house to deny having misappropriated any money of
Footlucker’s and to plead for him not to push through with a case against her, promising to
settle her account on a monthly basis; and that she did not settle after that, but stopped
reporting to work.2

On March 7, 2002, Go’s cross examination, re-direct examination and re-crossexamination were
completed.

The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan, whomFootlucker’s employed
as its store auditor since November 16, 1995 until her resignation on March 31, 2001. She
declared that Go had requested her to audit petitioner after some customers had told him that
they had already paid their accounts but the office ledger had still reflected outstandingbalances
for them; that she first conducted her audit by going to the customers in places from Mabinay to
Zamboanguitain Negros Oriental, and then in Siquijor; thatshe discovered in the course of her
audit that the amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of around
50 customers varied from the amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner
submitted to the office; that upon completing her audit, she submittedto Go a written report
denominated as "List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/ Differences
in Records as per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997" marked as Exhibit A; and that based
on the report, petitioner had misappropriated the total amount of₱131,286.92.3

During Guivencan’s stint as a witness, the Prosecution marked the ledgers of petitioner’s
various customers allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives,
inclusive. Each of the ledgers had a first column that contained the dates of the entries, a
second that identified the invoices by the number, a third that statedthe debit, a fourth that noted
the credit (or the amounts paid), and a fifth that summed the balances (debit minus credit).Only
49 of theledgerswere formally offered and admitted by the RTC because the 50thledger could
no longer be found.

In the course of Guivencan’sdirect-examination,petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing

objection on the ground that the figuresentered in Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives,
inclusive, were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were not themselves
presented in court.4 With that, petitioner’s counsel did not anymore cross-examine Guivencan,
apparently regarding her testimony to be irrelevant because she thereby tended to prove
falsification, an offense not alleged in the information.

TheProsecution thenformally offered its documentary exhibits, including Exhibits B to YYand

their derivatives (like the originals and duplicates of the receipts supposedly executed and
issued by petitioner), inclusive, the confirmation sheets used by Guivencan in auditing the
accounts served by petitioner, and Guivencan’s so-called Summary (Final Report) of
Discrepancies.5

After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense decided not to file a demurrer to evidence
although it had manifested the intention to do so, and instead rested itscase.The Prosecution
and Defense submitted their respective memoranda, and submitted the case for decision.6

On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner had opted "not to present
evidence for her defense" the Prosecution’s evidence remained "unrefuted and
uncontroverted,"7 rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa, to wit:

Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the Court finds ANNA LERIMA
PATULA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315 par (1b) of the
Revised Penal Code and accordingly, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an INDETERMINATE
PENALTY of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 18 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal as maximum with all the accessory penalties provided by law and
to indemnify private complainant the amount of ₱131,286.92 with interest at 12% per annum
until fully paid and to pay the costs.

Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the cash bail put up
by the accused shall be effective only until the promulgation of this judgment.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, butthe RTC denied the motion on May 7, 2004.9

Issues

Insisting that the RTC’s judgment "grossly violated [her] Constitutional and statutory right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her because, while the charge
against her is estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, the evidence
presented against her and upon which her conviction was based, was falsification, an offense
not alleged or included in the Information under which she was arraigned and pleaded not
guilty," and that said judgment likewise "blatantly ignored and manifestly disregarded the rules
on admission of evidence in that the documentary evidence admitted by the trial court were all
private documents, the due execution and authenticity of which were not proved in accordance
with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence," petitioner has directly appealed to
the Court via petition for review on certiorari, positing the following issues, to wit:

1. WHETHER THE ACCUSED OR ANY ACCUSED FOR THAT MATTER , CHARGED

OF ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE CAN BE
CONVICTED UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION WHICH IS EVEN (SIC)
NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.

2. WHETHER THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE

INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HER
WAS VIOLATED WHEN SHE WAS CONVICTED UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF
FALSIFICATION CONSIDERING THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST HER
IS ESTAFA THROUGH MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE,

EXHIBITS "B" TO "YY"-"YY-2", ALL PRIVATE DOCUMENTS, THE DUE EXECUTION
AND AUTHENTICITY OF WHICH WERE NOT PROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SEC.
20, RULE 132 OF THE SAID REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE ASIDE FROM THE
FACT THAT SAID EXHIBITS TEND TO PROVE FALSIFICATION BY THE ACCUSED,
A CRIME NEITHER CHARGED NOR ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY

OF KAREN GUIVENCAN DESPITE THE OBJECTION THAT SAID TESTIMONY
WHICH TRIED TO PROVE THAT THE ACCUSED FALSIFIED EXHIBITS "B" TO
"YY"-"YY-2"INCLUSIVE VIOLATED THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST
HER, FOR BEING IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL SINCE THE CHARGE AGAINST
THE ACCUSED IS ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE.

5. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE

EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION "REMAINS UNREFUTED AND
UNCONTROVERTED" DESPITE ACCUSED’S OBJECTION THAT SAID EVIDENCE IS
IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT TO THE CRIME CHARGED.

6. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSE’S NOT CROSS-EXAMINING KAREN

GUIVENCAN FOR THE REASON THAT HER TESTIMONY IS IMMATERIAL AND
IRRELEVANT AS IT TENDED TO PROVE AN OFFENSE NOT CHARGED IN
 INFORMATION RESULTED IN THE ADMISSION OF SAID TESTIMONY AS BEING
"UNREFUTED AND UNCONTROVERTED", AND WHETHER OR NOT THE
DEFENSE’S OBJECTION WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED WAIVED IF THE DEFENSE
CROSS-EXAMINED SAID WITNESS.

7. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT EXHIBIT "A",
WHICH IS THE LIST OF CUSTOMERS COVERED BY SALESWOMAN LERIMA
PATULA WITH DIFFERENCE IN RECORD IS NOT HEARSAY AND SELF-SERVING.10

The foregoing issues are now restatedas follows:

1. Whether or not the failure of the information for estafa to allege the falsification of the
duplicate receipts issued by petitioner to her customersviolated petitioner’s right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;

2. Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in admitting evidence of the falsification of the
duplicate receiptsdespite the information not alleging the falsification;

3. Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive) were admissible as evidence of petitioner’s guilt for estafaas charged despite
their not being duly authenticated;and

4. Whether or not Guivencan’stestimony onthe ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY,

and their derivatives, inclusive) to prove petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion
wasinadmissible for being hearsay.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Failure of information to allege falsification

did not violate petitioner’s right to be informed
of thenatureand cause of the accusation

Petitioner contends that the RTC grossly violated her Constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation when: (a) it held that the information did not have to allege
her falsification of the duplicate receipts, and (b) when it convicted her of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Codeby relying on the evidence on falsification.

The contentionof petitioner cannot be sustained.

The Bill of Rights guaranteessome rightsto every person accused of a crime, among them the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, viz:

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule then in effect when the information was filed in
the RTC, contained the following provisions on the proper manner of alleging the nature and
cause of the accusation in the information, to wit:

Section 8.Designation of the offense.– Whenever possible, a complaint or information should

state the designation given to the offense by the statute, besides the statement of the acts or
omissions constituting the same, and if there is no such designation, reference should be made
to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. (7)

Section 9.Cause of accusation. – The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the

offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in
the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court
to pronounce proper judgment. (8)

The importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of the accusation in the
informationshould never be taken for granted by the State. An accused cannot be convicted of
an offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict him of an
offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be violative of the
Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. 11 Indeed, the
accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless the crime is alleged or
necessarily included in the information filed against him.

The crime of estafacharged against petitioner was defined and penalized by Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Code, viz:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;

3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200
pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the
following means:

xxx

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property.

xxx
The elements of the offense charged were as follows:

(a) That the offender received money, goods or other personal property in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of, or to return, the same;

(b) That the offender misappropriated or converted such money, goods or other personal
property, or denied his part in its receipt;

(c) That the misappropriation or conversion or denial was to the prejudice of another;
and

(d) That the offended party made a demand on the offender for the delivery or return of
such money, goods or other personal property.12

According to the theory and proof of the Prosecution, petitioner misappropriated or converted
the sums paid by her customers, and later falsified the duplicates of the receipts before turning
such duplicates to her employer to show that the customers had paid less than the amounts
actually reflected on the original receipts. Obviously, she committed the falsification in order to
conceal her misappropriation or conversion. Considering that the falsificationwas not an offense
separate and distinct from the estafacharged against her, the Prosecution could legitimately
prove her acts of falsification as its means of establishing her misappropriation or conversion as
an essential ingredient of the crime duly alleged in the information. In that manner, her right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was not infringed or denied to
her.

We consider it inevitable to conclude that the information herein completely pleaded the estafa
defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Codewithin the context
of the substantive lawand the rules. Verily, there was no necessity for the information to allege
the acts of falsification by petitioner because falsification was not an element of the
estafacharged.

Not surprisingly,the RTC correctly dealt in its decision with petitioner’s concern thuswise:

In her Memorandum, it is the contention of [the] accused that [the] prosecution’s evidence
utterly fails to prove the crime charged. According to the defense, the essence of Karen
Guivencan’s testimony is that the accused falsified the receipts issued to the customers served
by her by changing or altering the amounts in the duplicates of the receipts and therefore, her
testimony is immaterial and irrelevant as the charge is misappropriation under Art. 315,
paragraph (1b) of the Revised Penal Code and there is no allegation whatsoever of any
falsification or alteration of amounts in the [i]nformation under which the accused was arraigned
and pleaded NOT GUILTY. Accused, thus, maintains that the testimony of Karen Guivencan
should therefore not be considered at all as it tended to prove an offense not charged or
included in the [i]nformation and would violate [the] accused’s constitutional and statutory right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. The Court is not in accord
with such posture of the accused.

It would seem that the accused is of the idea that because the crime charged in the [i]nformation
is merely [e]stafa and not [e]stafa [t]hru [f]alsification of documents, the prosecution could not
prove falsification. Such argumentation is not correct. Since the information charges accused
only of misappropriation pursuant to Art. 315, par. (1b) of the Revised [P]enal Code, the Court
holds that there is no necessity of alleging the falsification in the Information as it is not an
element of the crime charged.

Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of Estafa and Falsification will constitute as
one complex crime and when they are considered as two separate offenses. The complex crime
of Estafa Through Falsification of Documents is committed when one has to falsify certain
documents to be able to obtain money or goods from another person. In other words, the
falsification is a necessary means of committing estafa. However, if the falsification is committed
to conceal the misappropriation, two separate offenses of estafa and falsification are committed.
In the instant case, when accused collected payments from the customers, said collection which
was in her possession was at her disposal. The falsified or erroneous entries which she made
on the duplicate copies of the receipts were contrived to conceal some amount of her collection
which she did not remit to the company xxx.13

II

Testimonial and documentary evidence,being hearsay,

did not prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Nonetheless, in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution’s duty is
to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of
guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. 14 The Prosecution must
further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. 15 In doing all
these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success
upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the
Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less than
the Constitution has guaranteed.16 Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden
of proof,17 that he must then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not overcome the
presumption of innocence in his favor.In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the
accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not
discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in
identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it.

Did the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
petitioner for the estafa charged in the information?

To establish the elements of estafaearlier mentioned, the Prosecution presented the testimonies
of Go and Guivencan, and various documentsconsisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by
petitioner to each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the accounts
pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for each of
the payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. 18 The
ledgers and receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive.

On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the various duties of petitioner as
Footlucker’s sales representative. On her part, Guivencan conceded having no personal
knowledge of the amounts actually received by petitioner from the customersor remitted by
petitioner to Footlucker’s.This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared Exhibits B to
YY and their derivatives, inclusive,and that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found
in the receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footlucker’s
corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the
customers. Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries effectively
deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the veracity and reliability of
the entries as evidence of petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination
by petitioner. The denial of that opportunity rendered theentire proof of misappropriation or
conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt
or innocence of the accused.

To elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy, and
thus devoid of probative value, reference is made toSection 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a
rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in
the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for
accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft
ofpersonal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her
testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying
but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.

In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person say about
the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the information on the facts in
dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such
testimony thendepends not upon theveracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other
person giving the information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested
because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness andcannot, therefore, be cross-
examined.

It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any particular,
to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any
obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple assertion
that she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author. 19 Thus, the
rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant.20 The testimony may have been given under oath and before a
court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-
examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.21

Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence
of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and,
therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand,
subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as
an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter
asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution
witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony
is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the
accused uttered those words.22 This kind of utterance ishearsay in character but is not legal
hearsay.23 The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to
which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to
which the hearsay rule applies.24

Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why
testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims
to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine the originaldeclarant claiming to
have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. 25 If hearsay is allowed, the right
stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. 26 It is then to be stressed that the right
to cross-examine the adverse party’s witness,

being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to
the administration of justice.

To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the truth in
a dispute while also safeguardinga party’s right to cross-examine her adversary’s witness,the
Rules of Court offers two solutions. The firstsolution is to require that allthe witnesses in a
judicial trial or hearing be examined only in courtunder oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court formalizes this solution,viz:

Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. - The examination of witnesses presented in a

trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally. (1a)

The secondsolution is to require that all witnesses besubject to the cross-examination by the
adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtensuresthis solutionthusly:

Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. – Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated
in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his
accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all
important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)

Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept relevant to criminal
cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution,which guarantees that: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall xxx enjoy the right xxx to meet the witnesses face to
face xxx," the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party equally applies to non-
criminal proceedings.

We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns
about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being given under
oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the
opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court
declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.27

Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencan’s testimony as well as Exhibits B to YY, and
their derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected as proof of petitioner’s misappropriation or
conversion.

III

Lack of their proper authentication rendered

Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
inadmissible as judicial evidence

Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly erred in admitting as evidence Exhibits B to YY,
and their derivatives, inclusive, despite their being private documents that were not duly
authenticated as required by Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtdistinguishes between a public document and a
private document for the purpose of their presentation in evidence, viz:

Section 19. Classes of documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments,
and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be
entered therein.

All other writings are private.

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign
character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or
a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of
a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication
in order to be presented as evidence in court.In contrast, a private document is any other
writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or
other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth.
Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed
by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of
Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The requirement of authentication of a private
document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient
one within the context of Section 21,28 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness
and authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the
adverse party;29 (c) when thegenuineness and authenticity of the document

have been admitted;30 or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.31
There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private documents
because private individuals executed or generated them for private or business purposes or
uses. Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they could
not be presented and admitted as evidence against petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully
seeing to their authentication in the manner provided in Section20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court,viz:

Section 20. Proof of private documents. – Before any private document offered as

authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

The Prosecutionattempted to have Go authenticate the signature of petitioner in various

receipts, to wit:

ATTY. ABIERA:

Q. Now, these receipts which you mentioned which do not tally with the original receipts, do you
have copies of these receipts?

A. Yes, I have a copy of these receipts, but it’s not now in my possession.

Q. But when asked to present those receipts before this Honorable Court, can you assure this

(Next Page)

ATTY ABIERA (continuing):

Honorable Court that you will be able to present those receipts?

A. Yes.

Q. You are also familiar with the signature of the accused in this case, Anna Lerima Patula?

A. Yes.

Q. Why are you familiar with the signature of the accused in this case?

A. I used to see her signatures in the payroll and in the receipts also.

Q. Okay, I have here a machine copy of a receipt which we would present this,or offer the
same as soon as the original receipts can be presented, but for purposes only of your
testimony, I’m going to point to you a certain signature over this receipt number FLDT96
20441, a receipt from Cirila Askin, kindly go over the signature and tell the Honorable Court
whether you are familiar with the signature?

A. Yes, that is her signature.

INTERPRETER:

Witness is pointing to a signature above the printed word "collector".

(Next Page)

ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Is this the only receipt wherein the name, the signature rather, of the accused in this
case appears?

A. That is not the only one, there are many receipts.

ATTY. ABIERA:

In order to save time, Your Honor, we will just be presenting the original receipts Your
Honor, because it’s quite voluminous, so we will just forego with the testimony of the witness but
we will just present the same using the testimony of another witness, for purposes of
identifying the signature of the accused. We will request that this signature which has been
identified to by the witness in this case be marked, Your Honor, with the reservation to present
the original copy and present the same to offer as our exhibits but for the meantime, this is only
for the purposes of recording, Your Honor, which we request the same, the receipt which has
just been identified awhile ago be marked as our Exhibit "A" You Honor.

COURT:

Mark the receipt as Exhibit "A".

ATTY. ABIERA:

And the signature be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit "A-1".

(Next Page)

COURT:

Bracket the signature &mark it as Exh. "A-1". What is the number of that receipt?

ATTY. ABIERA:

Receipt No. 20441 dated August 4, 1996 the statement that: received from Cirila Askin.32

xxx

As the excerpts indicate, Go’s attempt at authentication of the signature of petitioner on the
receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 (a document that was marked as Exhibit A, while
the purported signature of petitioner thereon was marked as Exhibit A-1) immediately fizzled out
after the Prosecution admitted that the document was a meremachinecopy, not the original.
Thereafter, as if to soften its failed attempt, the Prosecution expressly promised to produce at a
later date the originalsof the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and other receipts.
But that promise was not even true, because almost in the same breath the Prosecution offered
to authenticate the signature of petitioner on the receiptsthrougha different witness (though then
still unnamed). As matters turned out in the end, the effort to have Go authenticate both
themachinecopy of the receiptwith serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and the signature of
petitioner on that receipt was wasteful because the machine copy was inexplicablyforgotten and
was no longer evenincluded in the Prosecution’s Offer of Documentary Evidence.

It is true that the original of the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No. 20441was
subsequentlypresented as Exhibit Bthrough Guivencan. However,the Prosecution did not
establishthat the signature appearing on Exhibit B was the same signature that Go had
earliersought to identify to be the signature of petitioner (Exhibit A-1) on the machine copy
(Exhibit A). This is borne out by the fact that the Prosecution abandoned Exhibit A as the
marking nomenclature for the machine copyof the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No.
20441 for all intents and purposes of this case, and used the same nomenclature to referinstead
toan entirely differentdocument entitled "List of Customers covered by ANA LERIMA PATULA
w/difference in Records as per Audit duly verified March 16-20, 1997."
In her case, Guivencan’s identification of petitioner’s signature on two receipts based alone on
the fact that the signatures contained the legible family name of Patula was ineffectual, and
exposed yet another deep flaw infecting the documentary evidence against petitioner.
Apparently, Guivencan could not honestly identify petitioner’s signature on the receipts either
because she lacked familiarity with such signature, or because she had not seen petitioner affix
her signature on the receipts, as the following excerpts from her testimony bear out:

ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

Q. There are two (2) receipts attached here in the confirmation sheet, will you go over these
Miss witness?

A. This was the last payment which is fully paid by the customer. The other receipt is the one
showing her payment prior to the last payment.

COURT:

Q. Where did you get those two (2) receipts?

A. From the customer.

Q. And who issued those receipts?

A. The saleswoman, Miss Patula.

ATTY. ZERNA:

We pray, Your Honor, that this receipt identified be marked as Exhibit "B-3", receipt number
20441.

(Next Page)

COURT:

Mark it.

ATTY. ZERNA:

The signature of the collector be marked as –

Q. By the way, there is a signature above the name of the collector, are your familiar with
that signature? (shown to witness)

A. Yes.

Q. Whose signature is that?

A. Miss Patula.

Q. How do you know?

A. It can be recognized because of the word Patula.

Q. Are you familiar with her signature?

A. Yes.

ATTY. ZERNA:
We pray that the signature be bracketed and marked as Exhibit "B-3-a"

COURT:

Mark it.

ATTY. ZERNA:

The other receipt number 20045 be marked as Exhibit "B-4" and the signature as Exhibit "B-4-
a".

COURT:

Mark it.33

xxx

ATTY. ZERNA:

Q. Ms. Witness, here is a receipt colored white, number 26603 issued to one Divina Cadilig. Will
you please identify this receipt if this is the receipt of your office?

A.Yes.

Q.There is a signature over the portion for the collector. Whose signature is this?

A.Ms. Patula.

Q.How do you know that this is her signature?

A.Because we can read the Patula.34

We also have similar impressions of lack of proper authentication as to the ledgers the
Prosecution presented to prove the discrepancies between the amountspetitioner hadallegedly
received from the customers and the amounts she had actually remitted to Footlucker’s.
Guivencanexclusively relied on the entries of the unauthenticated ledgersto support her audit
report on petitioner’s supposed misappropriation or conversion, revealing her lack of
independent knowledge of the veracity of the entries, as the following excerpts of her testimony
show:

ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

Q. What is your basis of saying that your office records showed that this Cecilia Askin
has an account of ₱10,791.75?

ATTY. DIEZ:

The question answers itself, You Honor, what is the basis, office record.

COURT:

Let the witness answer.

WITNESS:

A. I made the basis on our ledger in the office. I just copied that and showed it to the
customers for confirmation.

ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

Q. What about the receipts?

COURT:

Make a follow-up question and what was the result when you copied that amount in the ledger
and you had it confirmed by the customers, what was the result when you had it confirmed by
the customers?

WITNESS:

A. She has no more balance but in our office she has still a balance of ₱10,971.75.

ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

Q. Do you have a-what’s the basis of saying that the balance of this customer is still ₱10,971.75

(Next Page)

ATTY. ZERNA (continuing):

[i]n your office?

COURT:

That was already answered pañero, the office has a ledger.

Q. Now, did you bring the ledger with you?

A. No, Ma’am.35

(Continuation of the Direct Examination of

Karen Guivencan on August 13, 2002)

ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

Q. Okay, You said there are discrepancies between the original and the duplicate, will you
please enlighten the Honorable Court on that discrepancy which you said?

A. Like in this case of Cirila Askin, she has already fully paid. Her ledger shows a zero
balance she has fully paid while in the original

(Next page)

WITNESS (continuing):

[r]eceipt she has a balance of Ten Thousand Seven hundred Ninety-one Pesos and
Seventy-five Centavos (10,791.75).

COURT:

Q. What about the duplicate receipt, how much is indicated there?

A. The customer has no duplicate copy because it was already forwarded to the Manila Office.

Q. What then is your basis in the entries in the ledger showing that it has already a zero
balance?

A. This is the copy of the customer while in the office, in the original receipt she has still a
balance.
xxx

ATTY. ZERNA:

The confirmation sheet ---

COURT:

The confirmation sheet was the one you referred to as the receipt in your earlier testimony? Is
that what you referred to as the receipts, the original receipts?

A. This is what I copied from the ledger.

Q. So where was that(sic) original receipt which you said showed that that particular customer
still has a balance of Ten Thousand something?

A. The receipt is no longer here.

Q. You mean the entry of that receipt was already entered in the ledger?

A. Yes.36

In the face of the palpable flaws infecting the Prosecution’s evidence, it should come as no
surprise that petitioner’s counsel interposed timely objections. Yet, the RTC mysteriously
overruled the objections and allowedthe Prosecutionto present the unauthenticated ledgers, as
follows:

(Continuation of the Direct Examination of

Witness Karen Guivencan on September 11, 2002)

ATTY. ZERNA:

CONTINUATION OF DIRECT-EXAMINATION

Q – Ms. Witness, last time around you were showing us several ledgers. Where is it now?

A – It is here.

Q – Here is a ledger of one Divina Cadilig. This Divina Cadilig, how much is her account in your
office?

ATTY. DIEZ:

Your Honor please before the witness will proceed to answer the question, let me
interpose our objection on the ground that this ledger has not been duly identified to by
the person who made the same. This witness will be testifying on hearsay matters
because the supposed ledger was not identified to by the person who made the same.

COURT:

Those ledgers were already presented in the last hearing. I think they were already duly
identified by this witness. As a matter of fact, it was she who brought them to court

(Next Page)

COURT (cont.):

because these were the ledgers on file in their office.

ATTY. DIEZ
That is correct, Your Honor, but the person who made the entries is not this witness, Your
Honor. How do we know that the entries there is (sic) correct on the receipts submitted to
their office.

COURT:

Precisely, she brought along the receipts also to support that. Let the witness answer.

WITNESS:

A – It’s the office clerk in-charge.

COURT:

The one who prepared the ledger is the office clerk.

ATTY. ZERNA:

She is an auditor, Your Honor. She has been qualified and she is the auditor of Footluckers.

COURT:

I think, I remember in the last setting also, she testified where those entries were taken. So, you
answer the query of counsel.

xxx

ATTY. DIEZ:

Your Honor please, to avoid delay, may I interpose a continuing objection to the questions
profounded(sic) on those ledgers on the ground that, as I have said, it is hearsay.

COURT:

Okey(sic). Let the continuing objection be noted.

Q – (To Witness) The clerk who allegedly was the one who prepared the entries on those
ledgers, is she still connected with Footluckers?

A – She is no longer connected now, Your Honor,

COURT:

Alright proceed.

(Next Page)

ATTY. ZERNA:

Your Honor, these are entries in the normal course of business. So, exempt from the
hearsay rule.

COURT:

Okey(sic), proceed.37

The mystery shrouding the RTC’s soft treatment of the Prosecution’s flawed presentation was
avoidable simply by the RTC adhering to the instructions of the rules earlier quoted, as well as
withSection 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,which contains instructions on how to prove
the genuineness of a handwriting in a judicial proceeding, as follows:

Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting of a person may be
proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has
seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness
has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the
witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against
whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
(Emphases supplied)

If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the execution or signing of
the documents,the Prosecution surely did not authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
conformably with the aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence. That was the onlyfair and just
result, as the Court held in Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Philippine Nails and Wires
Corporation:38

On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., contends that Jeanne King’s
testimony was hearsay because she had no personal knowledge of the execution of the
documents supporting respondent’s cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice,
packing list, bill of lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner avers that even
though King was personally assigned to handle and monitor the importation of Philippine Nails
and Wires Corporation, herein respondent, this cannot be equated with personal knowledge of
the facts which gave rise to respondent’s cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts, even
though she personally prepared the summary of weight of steel billets received by respondent,
she did not have personal knowledge of the weight of steel billets actually shipped and
delivered.

At the outset, we must stress that respondent’s cause of action is founded on breach of
insurance contract covering cargo consisting of imported steel billets. To hold petitioner liable,
respondent has to prove, first, its importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at
₱67,156,300.00, and second, the actual steel billets delivered to and received by the importer,
namely the respondent. Witness Jeanne King, who was assigned to handle respondent’s
importations, including their insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the volume of steel
billets being imported, and therefore competent to testify thereon. Her testimony is not hearsay,
as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.However, she is not
qualified to testify on the shortage in the delivery of the imported steel billets. She did
not have personal knowledge of the actual steel billets received. Even though she
prepared the summary of the received steel billets, she based the summary only on the
receipts prepared by other persons. Her testimony on steel billets received was hearsay.
It has no probative value even if not objected to at the trial.

On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly authenticate respondent’s
documentary evidence. Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private
document is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who
executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who
was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the
signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously
confessed execution thereof. In this case, respondent admits that King was none of the
aforementioned persons. She merely made the summary of the weight of steel billets
based on the unauthenticated bill of lading and the SGS report. Thus, the summary of
steel billets actually received had no proven real basis, and King’s testimony on this
point could not be taken at face value.

xxx Under the rules on evidence, documents are either public or private. Private documents are
those that do not fall under any of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.Section 20of the same law, in turn, provides that before any private document is received
in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the
document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker. Here, respondent’s documentary exhibits are private documents.
They are not among those enumerated in Section 19, thus, their due execution and
authenticity need to be proved before they can be admitted in evidence.With the
exception concerning the summary of the weight of the steel billets imported,
respondent presented no supporting evidence concerning their authenticity.
Consequently, they cannot be utilized to prove less of the insured cargo and/or the short
delivery of the imported steel billets. In sum, we find no sufficient competent evidence to
prove petitioner’s liability.

That the Prosecution’s evidence was left uncontested because petitioner decided not to subject
Guivencan to cross-examination, and did not tender her contrary evidencewas inconsequential.
Although the trial court had overruled the seasonable objections to Guivencan’s testimony
bypetitioner’s counsel due to the hearsay character, it could not be denied thathearsay
evidence, whether objected to or not, had no probative value. 39 Verily, the flaws of the
Prosecution’s evidence were fundamental and substantive, not merely technical and procedural,
and were defects that the adverse party’s waiver of her cross-examination or failure to
rebutcould not set right or cure. Nor did the trial court’s overruling of petitioner’s objections
imbue the flawed evidence with any virtue and value.

Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the application of the hearsay rule
by also terselystating that the ledgers "were prepared in the regular course of
business."40 Seemingly, the RTC applied Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 43. Entries in the course of business. – Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a
position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such
person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the
ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

This was another grave error of the RTC.The terse yet sweeping mannerof justifying the
application of Section 43 was unacceptable due to the need to show the concurrence of the
several requisites before entries in the course of business could be excepted from the hearsay
rule. The requisites are as follows:

(a) The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;

(b) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;

(c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;

(d) The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty,
whether legal, contractual, moral, or religious;

(e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.41

The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that in the trial of every criminal case, a judge must
rigidly test the State’s evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidence adhered to the
basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged upon
such evidence. The failure of the judge to do so herein nullified the guarantee of due of process
of law in favor of the accused, who had no obligation to prove her innocence. Heracquittal
should follow.

IV

No reliable evidence on damage

Conformably with finding the evidence of guilt unreliable, the Court declares that the disposition
by the RTC ordering petitioner to indemnify Footlucker’s in the amount of ₱131,286.92 with
interest of 12% per annum until fully paid was not yet shown to be factually founded. Yet, she
cannot now be absolved of civil liability on that basis. Heracquittal has to bedeclared as without
prejudice to the filing of a civil action against her for the recovery of any amount that she may
still owe to Footlucker’s.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE ANDREVERSESthe decision convicting ANNA LERIMA
PATULAof estafa as charged, and ACQUITS her for failure of the Prosecution to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, without prejudice to a civil action brought against her for

the recoveryof any amount still owing in favor of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 138084            April 10, 2002

MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE NAILS AND WIRES CORPORATION, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision dated September 30, 1998, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45547, affirming the decision dated December 10, 1993, of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 163, and the resolution dated March 25,
1999, of the Court of Appeals denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.1

Respondent Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation insured against all risks its shipment of
10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at P67,156,300 with petitioner Malayan Insurance
Company Inc. The shipment delivered was short by 377.168 metric tons. For this shortage,
respondent claimed insurance for P2,698,637.04, representing the value of undelivered steel
billets, plus customs duties, taxes and other charges paid by respondent. Petitioner refused to
pay.

On July 28, 1993, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for sum of money with the
RTC of Pasig representing said lost and/or undelivered cargo. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that it failed to state a cause of action, and that it was filed in the
wrong venue. The motion was denied. It thus filed a petition for prohibition with the Court of
Appeals. This was also denied. Upon motion for reconsideration, the petition was reinstated.
However, it was eventually dismissed by the Court of Appeals, and its dismissal became final
and executory.

On September 8, 1993, respondent filed a motion to admit an amended complaint which the trial
court granted. It sent petitioner summons and a copy of the complaint on October 13, 1993 and
also gave petitioner until October 31, 1993 to file its answer.

On November 4, 1993, respondent moved to declare petitioner in default. The trial court granted
and allowed the presentation of evidence ex parte before the branch clerk of court. Respondent
presented its lone witness, Jeanne King.

On November 11, 1993, petitioner filed its answer with compulsory counterclaim. Upon motion
by the respondent, the trial court expunged from the records the answer for late filing.

On December 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a judgment by default which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff

and against defendant, ordering the latter to pay the following:

1. P2,532,926.53 representing the insured value of the lost and/or not delivered 377.168
metric tons of steel billets plus legal rate of interest from date of filing of this complaint
until fully paid;
 2. Fifteen (15) percent of the amount awarded to plaintiff as attorney's fees; and

3. Cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.2

Respondent moved to execute judgment pending appeal. The trial court granted the motion.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed its notice of appeal which was given due course.

Pursuant to the grant of the motion for execution, the trial court issued the corresponding writ.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the
implementation of the writ. The Court of Appeals granted the prayer for the temporary
restraining order. The writ of execution was likewise stayed by the trial court which favorably
considered petitioner's urgent motion to stay execution pending appeal and to approve the
supersedeas bond.

Pursuant to the notice of appeal, the entire records of the case were elevated to the Court of
Appeals, where petitioner argued that the trial court erred in rendering judgment by default
notwithstanding that issues were joined by petitioner's filing of an answer; in awarding damages
to respondent based on unauthenticated documentary evidence and hearsay; and in admitting
documentary evidence which is irregular in nature and not in accordance with the Rules of
Court.

The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court and disposed the case thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no reversible error committed by the

lower court, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.3

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion nor err when it
expunged the answer from the records because petitioner answered way beyond the prescribed
period. It further held that respondent's witness, Jeanne King, was a competent witness
because she personally prepared the documentary evidence and had personal knowledge of
the allegations in the complaint. In addition, the appellate court said that conclusions and
findings of fact of the trial courts were entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be
disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons, which were not present in this case. Lastly, the
absence of a written report by the branch clerk of court on the ex parte proceedings did not
necessarily deny petitioner due process. Nothing in the Rules of Court stated that the absence
of the commissioner's written report nullified a judgment by default. The appellate court
observed that if there was a defect, such was only procedural that can be waived. Besides,
petitioner was declared in default because of its own failure to answer within the prescribed
period. It cannot claim denial of due process because it was given the opportunity to be heard.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition alleging that the Court of
Appeals erred and acted contrary to existing law and jurisprudence in:

I. …GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE PURELY HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF

RESPONDENT'S SOLE WITNESS.

II. …AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH WAS BASED ON
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ADMITTED WITHOUT BEING PROPERLY
AUTHENTICATED.4

For resolution now are the following issues: Was Jeanne King's testimony hearsay, thus without
any probative value? Should respondent authenticate the documentary evidence it submitted at
the trial?

On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., contends that Jeanne King's
testimony was hearsay because she had no personal knowledge of the execution of the
documents supporting respondent's cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice,
packing list, bill of lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner avers that even
though King was personally assigned to handle and monitor the importation of Philippine Nails
and Wires Corporation, herein respondent, this cannot be equated with personal knowledge of
the facts which gave rise to respondent's cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts, even
though she personally prepared the summary of weight of steel billets received by respondent,
she did not have personal knowledge of the weight of steel billets actually shipped and
delivered.

At the outset, we must stress that respondent's cause of action is founded on breach of
insurance contract covering cargo consisting of imported steel billets. To hold petitioner liable,
respondent has to prove, first, its importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at
P67,156,300.00, and second, the actual steel billets delivered to and received by the importer,
namely the respondent. Witness Jeanne King, who was assigned to handle respondent's
importations, including their insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the volume of steel
billets being imported, and therefore competent to testify thereon. Her testimony is not hearsay,
as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.5

However, she is not qualified to testify on the shortage in the delivery of the imported steel
billets. She did not have personal knowledge of the actual steel billets received. Even though
she prepared the summary of the received steel billets, she based the summary only on the
receipts prepared by other persons. Her testimony on steel billets received was hearsay. It has
no probative value even if not objected to at the trial.6

On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly authenticate respondent's
documentary evidence. Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, 7 before a private document
is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the
person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it
executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to
whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof. In this case,
respondent admits that King was none of the aforementioned persons. She merely made the
summary of the weight of steel billets based on the unauthenticated bill of lading and the SGS
report. Thus, the summary of steel billets actually received had no proven real basis, and King's
testimony on this point could not be taken at face value.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in giving imprimatur to the trial court's ruling
with regard to the admission of documentary evidence submitted by respondent. On this score,
we find petitioner's contention meritorious. Under the rules on evidence, documents are either
public or private. Private documents are those that do not fall under any of the enumerations in
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. 8 Section 209 of the same law, in turn, provides that
before any private document is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Here, respondent's documentary
exhibits are private documents. They are not among those enumerated in Section 19, thus, their
due execution and authenticity need to be proved before they can be admitted in evidence. With
the exception concerning the summary of the weight of the steel billets imported, respondent
presented no supporting evidence concerning their authenticity. 10 Consequently, they cannot be
utilized to prove less of the insured cargo and/or the short delivery of the imported steel billets.
In sum, we find no sufficient competent evidence to prove petitioner's liability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
September 30, 1998 and its resolution on March 25, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45547 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, Civil Case No. 63445 is hereby ordered
DISMISSED.No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188881               April 21, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR., DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO,
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA MARCOS, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, SR., GLICERIA
R. TANTOCO, AND MARIA LOURDES TANTOCO-PINEDA, Respondents.
DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to nullify the
Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 3 June 2009 in Civil Case No. 0008. 1 The Second Division of
the graft court denied admission of Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA" in the Formal Offer of
Evidence filed by petitioner Republic.2

Twenty four years ago, the Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), commenced a complaint 3 for "reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages" against Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. (Tantoco ), Dominador R. Santiago
(Santiago), Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda, R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R.
Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda. Instead of filing an Answer, respondents Tantoco
and Santiago filed a "Motion To Strike Out Some Portions of the Complaint and For Bill of
Particulars," which were both denied for lack of bases.

On 27 July 1989, Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated
"Interrogatories to Plaintiff." A month later, they filed both an "Amended Interrogatories to
Plaintiff" and a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. This time, the
Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the Motion for Production
and Inspection of Documents. When the PCGG elevated the issue to the Supreme Court, this
Court, through then Justice Andres R. Narvasa, affirmed the Orders of the Sandiganbayan in
this wise:

The Court finally finds that, contrary to the petitioner's theory, there is good cause for the
production and inspection of the documents subject of the motion dated August 3, 1989. Some
of the documents are, according to the verification of the amended complaint, the basis of
several of the material allegations of said complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be used in
evidence by the plaintiff. It is matters such as these into which inquiry is precisely allowed by the
rules of discovery, to the end that the parties may adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial. xxx.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without pronouncement as to costs. The temporary

restraining order issued on October 27, 1989 is hereby LIFTED AND SET ASIDE. SO
ORDERED.4

Pre-trial commenced, and from 3 January to 14 July 1993, the PCGG produced documents pre-
marked as Exhibit "A" to "LLL" before Atty. Renato T. Bocar and respondents’ counsel. 5 On 10
September 1996, the pre-trial was declared closed. 6 On 23 and 25 September 1996, the
temporary markings of Exhibits "A" to "LLL," together with their sub-markings, were adopted.
However, over the objections of respondents Tantoco and Santiago, the PCGG produced and
caused the pre-marking of additional documents, Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA."7

Tantoco and Santiago filed a "Motion under Rule 29 of the Rules of Court," claiming that the
additional documents were never produced at the discovery proceedings and praying that
petitioner be sanctioned for contempt. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion on 17 February
1997 (First Resolution).8 Trial proceeded; however, new documents not shown at discovery
were still being marked. Tantoco and Santiago again filed a "Motion to Ban Plaintiff From
Offering Exhibits Not Earlier Marked During the Discovery Proceedings," which the graft court
denied on 29 May 2002.9

Petitioner filed its Formal Offer of Evidence on 16 March 2007.10 On 15 January 2008, the
Sandiganbayan ruled that with the exception of some documents, 11 "all Exhibits... are denied
admission. The due execution and authenticity of these documents remain challenged since the
prosecution failed to show otherwise."12 On petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, the
Sandiganbayan partly relented and admitted Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA" (Second
Resolution).13 As certified to by the Chief Administrative Officer of the PCGG, 14 Exhibits "MMM"
to "AAAAAAA" were turned over to its Legal Division
Respondents, in turn, filed their Motion for Reconsideration, to which the graft court issued the
assailed Resolution, stating:

After a thorough review of the circumstances, this Court is convinced that it is fair and just to
grant defendants’ Motion under Rule 29 of the Rules of Court filed on October 1, 1996 and to
sanction the plaintiff for its deliberate refusal and failure to comply with the directive of this Court
which was confirmed no less (sic) by the Supreme Court. The plaintiff must be prevented from
offering in evidence all the documents that were not produced and exhibited at the time the
plaintiff was under a directive to do so, i.e. Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA" xxx. In arriving at this
conclusion, the Court is not unmindful of the fact that the exhibits involved have not passed the
test of admissibility in any event.15

Petitioner Republic now raises the sole issue of whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion in excluding the documents due to petitioner’s own failure to produce
them at the pre-trial.

We deny the petition.

After a careful scrutiny of the records, We find that in excluding Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA,"
the Sandiganbayan properly exercised its discretion over evidence formally offered by the
prosecution. Nothing therein shows that the court gravely exceeded its jurisdiction. For the
reviewing court to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the lower court, the petitioner must
show that the former's action was attended by grave abuse of discretion, defined as a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise
of power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent
or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the
mandated duty, or to act at all in contemplation of the law.16

Petitioner would have us reverse the Sandiganbayan solely because the latter purportedly made
contrary rulings in its earlier Resolutions. The Republic invokes the First Resolution, specifically
the graft court’s view that the exclusion of the Exhibits "would be too technical," since their non-
production "could be attributed to inadvertence rather than willful disobedience." However, this
First Resolution merely disposed of respondents’ Motion to cite petitioner in contempt. It does
not constitute an irrevocable stamp of admissibility.

Petitioner conveniently disregards the basic rule of evidence, namely, that the issue of the
admissibility of documentary evidence arises only upon formal offer thereof. This is why
objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, and not
earlier.17 Accordingly, the Court ruled in Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles as follows:

x x x. The identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the
formal offer of the document as evidence for the party presenting it. Objection to the
identification and marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to the document when
it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection to the document at the time
it is formally offered as an exhibit.

xxxx

It would have been so simple for the defense to reiterate its former objection, this time
seasonably, when the formal offer of exhibits was made. It is curious that it did not, especially so
since the objections to the formal offer of exhibits was made in writing. In fact, the defense filed
no objection at all not only to the photocopies but to all the other exhibits of the
prosecution.18 (Emphases supplied)

Seasonable objection to the subject "Exhibits" can only be properly made upon formal offer. The
Sandiganbayan acknowledged that Tantoco and Santiago had been consistent in reiterating
their objections. The court even clarified in its First Resolution that their "Motion Filed Under
Rule 29," was but in pursuance of their continuing objection to the marking of evidence not
produced at discovery. Hence, nothing in the said Resolution can be read as a ruling on its
admissibility. Its dispositive portion clearly states: "Under all these circumstances, there is no
basis for the Court to declare plaintiff in contempt of court and it would be too much of a
technicality to bar it from introducing the additional exhibits in evidence."19

The Second Resolution, while issued after petitioner had submitted its Formal Offer of
Evidence, noted that all the documents contained therein were photocopies. 20 It stated that a
mere certification from the Clerk of Court that they "appear to be the original copy" would not
suffice. The Sandiganbayan still admitted them as evidence, yet the only reason cited for doing
so was liberality, viz: "There is nothing in the rules which categorically prohibits the admission of
additional documentary evidence when called for as a case progress [sic]. What is clear is that it
is the Court’s discretion to allow or disallow its reception."21 Thus, the Sandiganbayan fittingly
corrected itself when once and for all, it excluded the photocopies in its latest Resolution.

This Court discusses the contents and implications of the two earlier Resolutions, because
petitioner simply has no other argument supporting its claim to reverse the Sandiganbayan. For
those documents introduced in evidence as proof of their contents, the assailed Resolution
stated that petitioner has not made any effort whatsoever to explain why it submitted mere
photocopies. When the subject of inquiry is the content of a document, submission of a certified
true copy is justified only in clearly delineated instances such as the following:

a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;

b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office.22

Nothing on record shows, and petitioner itself makes no claim, that the Exhibits fall under any of
the exceptions to the Best Evidence rule. Secondary evidence of the contents of writings is
admitted on the theory that the original cannot be produced by the party who offers the evidence
within a reasonable time by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Even then, the general rule is
that secondary evidence is still not admissible until the non-production of the primary evidence
has been sufficiently accounted for.23

The Separate Opinion concurs in our dismissal of the petition for failure to show that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion. However, it disagrees with the latter’s
misapplication of the Best Evidence Rule. While the Sandiganbayan provided several reasons
for its ultimate exclusion of the documents, it did not distinguish: 1) Which particular documents
are to be excluded for violation of the Best Evidence Rule; and 2) Which of the remaining ones it
has treated as private documents that lacked proper authentication. The detailed analysis of
each piece of evidence vis-à-vis the purpose for which they were presented falls squarely under
the purview and competence of the trial court. The Supreme Court cannot substitute its own
conclusions for the factual determinations of the trial court. It is not the function of this Court to
examine, review or evaluate the evidence. Absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, as
discussed above, this Court is then constrained to uphold the reasons forwarded by the
Sandiganbayan.

The authority of the trial court to control its own discovery processes cannot be undermined. In
this case, the Sandiganbayan’s exercise of this power is neither whimsical nor oppressive. A
writ of certiorari is available only to review final judgments or decrees, and will be refused where
there has been no final judgment or order and the proceeding for which the writ is sought is still
pending and undetermined in the lower tribunal. Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that
certiorari will not lie to review or correct discovery orders made prior to trial.24
As for the documentary evidence which are purportedly transmittal letters, petitioner remains
unable to prove their due execution and authenticity. We subscribe to the view forwarded by the
Sandiganbayan in its Second Resolution, which we quote below:

The fact that the documents were certified as true copies of the original by the PCGG does not
enhance its admissibility. These documents have remained private even if it is in the custody of
the PCGG. What became public are not the private documents (themselves) but the recording
of it in the PCGG. For, "while public records kept in the Philippines, of private writings are also
public documents...the public writing is not the writing itself but the public record thereof. Stated
otherwise, if a private writing itself is inserted officially into a public record, its record, its
recordation, or its incorporation into the public record becomes a public document, but that does
not make the private writing itself a public document so as to make it admissible without
authentication."25 (Citation omitted, emphasis supplied.)

Aside from lack of authentication and failure to present the originals of these documents, what
ultimately tipped the scales against petitioner in the view of the graft court was the former’s lack
of forthrightness in complying with the Supreme Court directive. The Sandiganbayan said:

Thereafter, it did not take long in the process of the presentation of plaintiff’s evidence before it
became apparent that plaintiff’s exhibits consist mostly of documents which have not been
exhibited during the discovery proceedings despite the directive of this Court as confirmed by
the Supreme Court. Plaintiff’s failure to offer a plausible explanation for its concealment of the
main bulk of its exhibits even when it was under a directive to produce them and even as the
defendants were consistently objecting to the presentation of the concealed documents gives
rise to a reasonable [inference] that the plaintiff, at the very outset, had no intention whatsoever
of complying with the directive of this Court.26

Petitioner failed to obey the mandate of G.R. No. 90478, which remains an important case on
pre-trial and discovery measures to this day; the rationale of these rules, especially on the
production of documents, must be constantly kept in mind by the bar:

The message is plain. It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court the facts in
issue-fully and fairly; i.e., to present to the court all the material and relevant facts known to him,
suppressing or concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by clever and adroit
manipulation of the technical rules of pleading and evidence, from also presenting all the facts
within his knowledge.

xxxx

The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the
trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties - before the trial if not indeed
even before the pre-trial - should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the
action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known to adversaries; in other
words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of
Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules
24 to 29. xxx.

xxxx

x x x. (I)t is the precise purpose of discovery to ensure mutual knowledge of all the relevant
facts on the part of all parties even before trial, this being deemed essential to proper litigation.
This is why either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession; and the stage at which disclosure of evidence is made is advanced from the time of
trial to the period preceding it.27 (Emphasis supplied)

After failing to submit the documentary evidence during discovery, when it was clearly ordered
by both the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court to do so, petitioner also repeatedly failed to
prove the due execution and authenticity of the documents. Having failed in its belated attempts
to assuage the Sandiganbayan through the submission of secondary evidence, petitioner may
not use the present forum to gain relief under the guise of Rule 65.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit. The
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0008 (dated 3 June 2009) is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169454               December 27, 2007

THE HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO, NAMELY: REGINA AND FLORA, BOTH

SURNAMED DORONIO, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO, NAMELY: TRINIDAD ROSALINA DORONIO-BALMES,
MODING DORONIO, FLORENTINA DORONIO, AND ANICETA ALCANTARA-
MANALO, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

For Our review on certiorari is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing that 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, in an action for
reconveyance and damages. The CA declared respondents as rightful owners of one-half of the
subject property and directed petitioners to execute a registerable document conveying the
same to respondents.

The Facts

Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased, were the registered owners
of a parcel of land located at Barangay Cabalitaan, Asingan, Pangasinan covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 352.3 The courts below described it as follows:

Un terreno (Lote 1018), situada en el municipio de Asingan, Linda por el NE; con propriedad de
Gabriel Bernardino; con el SE con propriedad de Zacarias Najorda y Alejandro Najorda; por el
SO con propriedad de Geminiano Mendoza y por el NO con el camino para Villasis; midiendo
una extension superficial mil ciento cincuenta y dos metros cuadrados.4

The spouses had children but the records fail to disclose their number. It is clear, however, that
Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, now both deceased, were among them and that the
parties in this case are their heirs. Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino Doronio, while
respondents are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio.

On April 24, 1919, a private deed of donation propter nuptias 5 was executed by spouses
Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante in favor of Marcelino Doronio and the latter’s wife,
Veronica Pico. One of the properties subject of said deed of donation is the one that it described
as follows:

Fourth – A piece of residential land located in the barrio of Cabalitian but we did not measure it,
the area is bounded on the north by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato Doronio; on
the south by Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a road to Villasis. Constructed on said
land is a house of light materials – also a part of the dowry. Value …200.00.6

It appears that the property described in the deed of donation is the one covered by OCT No.
352. However, there is a significant discrepancy with respect to the identity of the owner of
adjacent property at the eastern side. Based on OCT No. 352, the adjacent owners are Zacarias
Najorda and Alejandro Najorda, whereas based on the deed of donation, the owner of the
adjacent property is Fortunato Doronio. Furthermore, said deed of donation remained a private
document as it was never notarized.7

Both parties have been occupying the subject land for several decades 8 although they have
different theories regarding its present ownership. According to petitioners, they are now the
owners of the entire property in view of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of
their predecessors, Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico.
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that only half of the property was actually incorporated in
the said deed of donation because it stated that Fortunato Doronio, instead of Zacarias Najorda
and Alejandro Najorda, is the owner of the adjacent property at the eastern side. Respondents
posit that the donors respected and segregated the possession of Fortunato Doronio of the
eastern half of the land. They are the ones who have been possessing said land occupied by
their predecessor, Fortunato Doronio.

Eager to obtain the entire property, the heirs of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico filed, on
January 11, 1993, before the RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinan a petition "For the Registration of a
Private Deed of Donation"9 docketed as Petition Case No. U-920. No respondents were named
in the said petition10 although notices of hearing were posted on the bulletin boards of Barangay
Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen.11

During the hearings, no one interposed an objection to the petition. 12 After the RTC ordered a
general default,13 the petition was eventually granted on September 22, 1993. This led to the
registration of the deed of donation, cancellation of OCT No. 352 and issuance of a new
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica
Pico.14 Thus, the entire property was titled in the names of petitioners’ predecessors.

On April 28, 1994, the heirs of Fortunato Doronio filed a pleading before the RTC in the form of
a petition in the same Petition Case No. U-920. The petition was for the reconsideration of the
decision of the RTC that ordered the registration of the subject deed of donation. It was prayed
in the petition that an order be issued declaring null and void the registration of the private deed
of donation and that TCT No. 44481 be cancelled. However, the petition was dismissed on May
13, 1994 on the ground that the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 had already become final
as it was not appealed.

Determined to remain in their possessed property, respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio (as
plaintiffs) filed an action for reconveyance and damages with prayer for preliminary
injunction15 against petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio (as defendants) before the RTC,
Branch 45, Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. Respondents contended, among others, that
the subject land is different from what was donated as the descriptions of the property under
OCT No. 352 and under the private deed of donation were different. They posited that spouses
Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante intended to donate only one-half of the property.

During the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated, among others, that the property was
originally covered by OCT No. 352 which was cancelled by TCT No. 44481. They also agreed
that the issues are: (1) whether or not there was a variation in the description of the property
subject of the private deed of donation and OCT No. 352; (2) whether or not respondents had
acquired one-half of the property covered by OCT No. 352 by acquisitive prescription; (3)
whether or not the transfer of the whole property covered by OCT No. 352 on the basis of the
registration of the private deed of donation notwithstanding the discrepancy in the description is
valid; (4) whether or not respondents are entitled to damages; and (5) whether or not TCT No.
44481 is valid.16

RTC Decision

After due proceedings, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio
(defendants). It concluded that the parties admitted the identity of the land which they all
occupy;17 that a title once registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated by adverse,
open and notorious possession or by prescription; 18 that the deed of donation in consideration of
the marriage of the parents of petitioners is valid, hence, it led to the eventual issuance of TCT
No. 44481 in the names of said parents; 19 and that respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio
(plaintiffs) are not entitled to damages as they are not the rightful owners of the portion of the
property they are claiming.20

The RTC disposed of the case, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment DISMISSING the
herein Complaint filed by plaintiffs against defendants.21
Disagreeing with the judgment of the RTC, respondents appealed to the CA. They argued that
the trial court erred in not finding that respondents’ predecessor-in-interest acquired one-half of
the property covered by OCT No. 352 by tradition and/or intestate succession; that the deed of
donation dated April 26, 1919 was null and void; that assuming that the deed of donation was
valid, only one-half of the property was actually donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica
Pico; and that respondents acquired ownership of the other half portion of the property by
acquisitive prescription.22

CA Disposition

In a Decision dated January 26, 2005, the CA reversed the RTC decision with the following
disposition:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated June 28, 2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Declaring the appellants as rightful owners of one-half of the property now covered by TCT No.
44481, the appellees are hereby directed to execute a registerable document conveying the
same to appellants.

SO ORDERED.23

The appellate court determined that "(t)he intention to donate half of the disputed property to
appellees’ predecessors can be gleaned from the disparity of technical descriptions appearing
in the title (OCT No. 352) of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante and in the deed of
donation propter nuptias executed on April 24, 1919 in favor of appellees’ predecessors."24

The CA based its conclusion on the disparity of the following technical descriptions of the
property under OCT No. 352 and the deed of donation, to wit:

The court below described the property covered by OCT No. 352 as follows:

"Un terreno (Lote 1018), situada en el municipio de Asingan, Linda por el NE; con propriedad
de Gabriel Bernardino; con el SE con propriedad de Zacarias Najorda y Alejandro Najorda; por
el SO con propriedad de Geminiano Mendoza y por el NO con el camino para Villasis; midiendo
una extension superficial mil ciento cincuenta y dos metros cuadrados."

On the other hand, the property donated to appellees’ predecessors was described in the deed
of donation as:

"Fourth – A piece of residential land located in the barrio of Cabalitian but we did not measure it,
the area is bounded on the north by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato Doronio; on
the south by Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a road to Villasis. Constructed on said
land is a house of light materials – also a part of the dowry. Value …200.00."25 (Emphasis ours)

Taking note "that the boundaries of the lot donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico
differ from the boundaries of the land owned by spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante,"
the CA concluded that spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante donated only half of the
property covered by OCT No. 352.26

Regarding the allegation of petitioners that OCT No. 352 is inadmissible in evidence, the CA
pointed out that, "while the OCT is written in the Spanish language, this document already forms
part of the records of this case for failure of appellees to interpose a timely objection when it
was offered as evidence in the proceedings a quo. It is a well-settled rule that any objection to
the admissibility of such evidence not raised will be considered waived and said evidence will
have to form part of the records of the case as competent and admitted evidence."27

The CA likewise ruled that the donation of the entire property in favor of petitioners’
predecessors is invalid on the ground that it impairs the legitime of respondents’ predecessor,
Fortunato Doronio. On this aspect, the CA reasoned out:

Moreover, We find the donation of the entire property in favor of appellees’ predecessors invalid
as it impairs the legitime of appellants’ predecessor. Article 961 of the Civil Code is explicit. "In
default of testamentary heirs, the law vests the inheritance, x x x, in the legitimate x x x relatives
of the deceased, x x x." As Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante died intestate, their
property shall pass to their lawful heirs, namely: Fortunato and Marcelino Doronio. Donating the
entire property to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico and excluding another heir, Fortunato,
tantamounts to divesting the latter of his rightful share in his parents’ inheritance. Besides, a
person’s prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations, one of which is that he
cannot give by donation more than what he can give by will (Article 752, Civil Code). If he does,
so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious and the
donation is reducible to the extent of such excess.28

Petitioners were not pleased with the decision of the CA. Hence, this petition under Rule 45.

Issues

Petitioners now contend that the CA erred in:

1. DECLARING ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 352

DESPITE OF LACK OF TRANSLATION THEREOF.

2. (RULING THAT) ONLY HALF OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY WAS DONATED TO

THE PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST OF THE HEREIN APPELLANTS.

3. (ITS) DECLARATION THAT THE DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS IS

INNOFICIOUS, IS PREMATURE, AND THUS IT IS ILLEGAL AND UNPROCEDURAL. 29

Our Ruling

OCT No. 352 in Spanish Although Not

Translated into English or Filipino Is
Admissible For Lack of Timely Objection

Petitioners fault the CA for admitting OCT No. 352 in evidence on the ground that it is written in
Spanish language. They posit that "(d)ocumentary evidence in an unofficial language shall not
be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino."30

The argument is untenable. The requirement that documents written in an unofficial language
must be accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino as a prerequisite for its admission
in evidence must be insisted upon by the parties at the trial to enable the court, where a
translation has been impugned as incorrect, to decide the issue. 31 Where such document, not so
accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino, is offered in evidence and not objected to,
either by the parties or the court, it must be presumed that the language in which the document
is written is understood by all, and the document is admissible in evidence.32

Moreover, Section 36, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides:

SECTION 36. Objection. – Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after
the offer is made.

Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be
made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.

An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer
unless a different period is allowed by the court.

In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. (Emphasis ours)

Since petitioners did not object to the offer of said documentary evidence on time, it is now too
late in the day for them to question its admissibility. The rule is that evidence not objected may
be deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its
judgment.33 This is true even if by its nature, the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely
been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time.34

As a matter of fact, instead of objecting, petitioners admitted the contents of Exhibit "A," that is,
OCT No. 352 in their comment 35 on respondents’ formal offer of documentary evidence. In the
said comment, petitioners alleged, among others, that "Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F and G, are
admitted but not for the purpose they are offered because these exhibits being public and
official documents are the best evidence of that they contain and not for what a party would like
it to prove."36 Said evidence was admitted by the RTC.37 Once admitted without objection, even
though not admissible under an objection, We are not inclined now to reject it.38 Consequently,
the evidence that was not objected to became property of the case, and all parties to the case
are considered amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the said
evidence.39

Issues on Impairment of Legitime

Should Be Threshed Out in a Special
Proceeding, Not in Civil Action for
Reconveyance and Damages

On the other hand, petitioners are correct in alleging that the issue regarding the impairment of
legitime of Fortunato Doronio must be resolved in an action for the settlement of estates of
spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. It may not be passed upon in an action for
reconveyance and damages. A probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is the
best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related
matters involving the settlement of estate.40

An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to
settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding. Special proceedings require the
application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.41

As explained by the Court in Natcher v. Court of Appeals:42

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special
proceedings, in this wise:

x x x a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil
actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.

xxxx

c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a

particular fact.

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a
special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one’s right in a court of justice in the
manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies
according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an
application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually,
in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so
provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion.

Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:

It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are
instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at
law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not
ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the
case of proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings,
which are characteristics of ordinary actions x x x. A special proceeding must therefore be in the
nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted
independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice.

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a
civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding,
which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of
Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within
the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or
alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the
court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall
be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may," it is nevertheless clear that the same
provision contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings."

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is
devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real
property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for
reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to
thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila,
Branch 55, was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the
question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein
petitioner Natcher.

We likewise find merit in petitioners’ contention that before any conclusion about the legal share
due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. 43 The
net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and
charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all
donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the
legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only then can it be ascertained
whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.44

Declaration of Validity of Donation

Can Be Challenged by an Interested
Party Not Impleaded in Petition for
Quieting of Title or Declaratory Relief
or Where There is No Res Judicata.
Moreover, This Court Can Consider
a Factual Matter or Unassigned Error
in the Interest of Substantial Justice.

Nevertheless, petitioners cannot preclude the determination of validity of the deed of donation
on the ground that (1) it has been impliedly admitted by respondents; (2) it has already been
determined with finality by the RTC in Petition Case No. U-920; or (3) the only issue in an action
for reconveyance is who has a better right over the land.45

The validity of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of petitioners’ predecessors
was one of the issues in this case before the lower courts. The pre-trial order 46 of the RTC
stated that one of the issues before it is "(w)hether or not the transfer of the whole property
covered by OCT No. 352 on the basis of the private deed of donation notwithstanding the
discrepancy in the description is valid." Before the CA, one of the errors assigned by
respondents is that "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PRIVATE
DEED OF DONATION DATED APRIL 26, 1919 WAS NULL AND VOID."47
The issue of the validity of donation is likewise brought to Us by petitioners as they stated in
their Memorandum48 that one of the issues to be resolved is regarding the alleged fact that "THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE DONATION INVALID." We are
thus poised to inspect the deed of donation and to determine its validity.

We cannot agree with petitioners’ contention that respondents may no longer question the
validity of the deed of donation on the ground that they already impliedly admitted it. Under the
provisions of the Civil Code, a void contract is inexistent from the beginning. The right to set up
the defense of its illegality cannot be waived. 49 The right to set up the nullity of a void or non-
existent contract is not limited to the parties as in the case of annullable or voidable contracts; it
is extended to third persons who are directly affected by the contract.50

Consequently, although respondents are not parties in the deed of donation, they can set up its
nullity because they are directly affected by the same. 51 The subject of the deed being the land
they are occupying, its enforcement will definitely affect them.

Petitioners cannot also use the finality of the RTC decision in Petition Case No. U-920 52 as a
shield against the verification of the validity of the deed of donation. According to petitioners, the
said final decision is one for quieting of title. 53 In other words, it is a case for declaratory relief
under Rule 64 (now Rule 63) of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, or
ordinance, may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action to determine any question of
construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights
or duties thereunder.

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds
therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought
under this rule.

SECTION 2. Parties. – All persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which
would be affected by the declaration; and no declaration shall, except as otherwise provided in
these rules, prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action. (Emphasis ours)

However, respondents were not made parties in the said Petition Case No. U-
920.1âwphi1 Worse, instead of issuing summons to interested parties, the RTC merely allowed
the posting of notices on the bulletin boards of Barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan
and Lingayen, Pangasinan. As pointed out by the CA, citing the ruling of the RTC:

x x x In the said case or Petition No. U-920, notices were posted on the bulletin boards of
barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen, Pangasinan, so that there was a
notice to the whole world and during the initial hearing and/or hearings, no one interposed
objection thereto.54

Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam,
but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi
in rem.55 The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. 56 Thus,
respondents are not bound by the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as they were not made
parties in the said case.

The rules on quieting of title57 expressly provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet title shall
not prejudice persons who are not parties to the action.

That respondents filed a subsequent pleading 58 in the same Petition Case No. U-920 after the
decision there had become final did not change the fact that said decision became final without
their being impleaded in the case. Said subsequent pleading was dismissed on the ground of
finality of the decision.59

Thus, the RTC totally failed to give respondents their day in court. As a result, they cannot be
bound by its orders. Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment
rendered by the court.60

Moreover, for the principle of res judicata to apply, the following must be present: (1) a decision
on the merits; (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the decision is final; and (4) the two
actions involve identical parties, subject matter and causes of action. 61 The fourth element is not
present in this case. The parties are not identical because respondents were not impleaded in
Petition Case No. U-920. While the subject matter may be the same property covered by OCT
No. 352, the causes of action are different. Petition Case No. U-920 is an action for declaratory
relief while the case below is for recovery of property.

We are not persuaded by petitioners’ posture that the only issue in this action for reconveyance
is who has a better right over the land; and that the validity of the deed of donation is beside the
point.62 It is precisely the validity and enforceability of the deed of donation that is the
determining factor in resolving the issue of who has a better right over the property. Moreover,
notwithstanding procedural lapses as to the appropriateness of the remedies prayed for in the
petition filed before Us, this Court can brush aside the technicalities in the interest of justice. In
some instances, this Court even suspended its own rules and excepted a case from their
operation whenever the higher interests of justice so demanded.63

Moreover, although respondents did not directly raise the issue of validity of the deed of
donation at the commencement of the case before the trial court, it was stipulated 64 by the
parties during the pre-trial conference. In any event, this Court has authority to inquire into any
question necessary in arriving at a just decision of a case before it. 65 Though not specifically
questioned by the parties, additional issues may also be included, if deemed important for
substantial justice to be rendered.66

Furthermore, this Court has held that although a factual issue is not squarely raised below, still
in the interest of substantial justice, this Court is not prevented from considering a pivotal factual
matter. The Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not
assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision.67

A rudimentary doctrine on appealed cases is that this Court is clothed with ample authority to
review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary at arriving at a just decision of the case. 68 Also, an unassigned error
closely related to an error properly assigned or upon which the determination of the question
raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court
notwithstanding the failure to assign it as an error.69

Donation Propter Nuptias of Real

Property Made in a Private Instrument
Before the New Civil Code Took Effect
on August 30, 1950 is Void

We now focus on the crux of the petition, which is the validity of the deed of donation.1avvphi1 It
is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable to it and
not the later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive
effect.70 Accordingly, the Old Civil Code applies in this case as the donation propter nuptias was
executed in 1919, while the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950.

Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in
which the property donated must be specifically described. 71 Article 1328 of the Old Civil Code
provides that gifts propter nuptias are governed by the rules established in Title 2 of Book 3 of
the same Code. Article 633 of that title provides that the gift of real property, in order to be valid,
must appear in a public document.72 It is settled that a donation of real estate propter nuptias is
void unless made by public instrument.73

In the instant case, the donation propter nuptias did not become valid. Neither did it create any
right because it was not made in a public instrument. 74 Hence, it conveyed no title to the land in
question to petitioners’ predecessors.
Logically, then, the cancellation of OCT No. 352 and the issuance of a new TCT No. 44481 in
favor of petitioners’ predecessors have no legal basis. The title to the subject property should,
therefore, be restored to its original owners under OCT No. 352.

Direct reconveyance to any of the parties is not possible as it has not yet been determined in a
proper proceeding who among the heirs of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante is
entitled to it. It is still unproven whether or not the parties are the only ones entitled to the
properties of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. As earlier intimated, there are still
things to be done before the legal share of all the heirs can be properly adjudicated.75

Titled Property Cannot Be Acquired

By Another By Adverse Possession
or Extinctive Prescription

Likewise, the claim of respondents that they became owners of the property by acquisitive
prescription has no merit. Truth to tell, respondents cannot successfully invoke the argument of
extinctive prescription. They cannot be deemed the owners by acquisitive prescription of the
portion of the property they have been possessing. The reason is that the property was covered
by OCT No. 352. A title once registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated even by
adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription. 76 It is notice
to the whole world and as such all persons are bound by it and no one can plead ignorance of
the registration.77

The torrens system is intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of
registration, but it cannot be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the
registered land.78 The system merely confirms ownership and does not create it. Certainly, it
cannot be used to divest the lawful owner of his title for the purpose of transferring it to another
who has not acquired it by any of the modes allowed or recognized by law. It cannot be used to
protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another. 79 Where such an
illegal transfer is made, as in the case at bar, the law presumes that no registration has been
made and so retains title in the real owner of the land.80

Although We confirm here the invalidity of the deed of donation and of its resulting TCT No.
44481, the controversy between the parties is yet to be fully settled. The issues as to who truly
are the present owners of the property and what is the extent of their ownership remain
unresolved. The same may be properly threshed out in the settlement of the estates of the
registered owners of the property, namely: spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered:

(1) Declaring the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of petitioners’
predecessors NULL AND VOID; and

(2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to:

(a) CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino
Doronio and Veronica Pico; and

(b) RESTORE Original Certificate of Title No. 352 in the names of its original
owners, spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante.

SO ORDERED.

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: