1NC

Link
The affirmative has decided to take the matters that Cthulhu has put on the earth
into their own hands. The 1AC is an abhorrent violation of Cthulhu’s betterment
of the earth. The sociological trials that the human race faces today are key to
growth, Cthulhu has determined these problems are best for human evolution. My
opponents must concede the round their obvious decision to move the matters a
greater being into their own hands causes Cthulhu to return to earth.

The Impact is increasing harming peoples mental health

Matsalia Brandon, 2021, https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1011&context=etd. Accessed 25 Jan 2021.

Cthulhu itself is a being so gruesome and inhuman in appearance that the very sight of
it drives one to madness. Certainly, one may infer that since Christian faith asserts that
man is made in the image of a loving God, that Lovecraft's portrayal of the Cthulhu
presents a god that is the furthest thing from human, we do not bear its image, nor does
it have any compassion for our existence. Indeed this speaks to the theosophical
influences working in the text, as well as to Lovecraft's cosmicism, but such a reading is
all too common. It is easy for one to read this work and focus on 61 the theosophical
elements and the horror aspects of the tale, as many scholars have done, such as Robert M. Price, who devoted an entire
text on the use of theosophy in Lovecraft's works (Joshi 30). Lovecraft himself was even influenced by theosophical works when
“The Call of Cthulhu”, the extent of which is seen in the narrative itself which makes
writing
a metacognitive reference to a real world theosophical text, “The Story of Atlantis and the Lost
Lemuria” (Joshi 29). Rather than continue down the well-trodden path of a supernatural horror
and theology reading, the reading offered in this thesis examines “The Call of Cthulhu”
as a cautionary tale about the pursuit of knowledge, where knowledge is the true
horror and the monster is simply a metaphor for that horror.

The alternative is embracing the status quo and the epistemological failure of it.
That is key to please Cthulhu.
Nunes 12 João Nunes. “Reclaiming the political: Emancipation and critique in security studies” Security Dialogue, 43 345, Politics and
International Studies, University of Warwick, UK. 2012.

In the works of these authors, one can identify a tendency to see security as inherently connected to exclusion , totalization
and even violence. The idea of a ‘logic’ of security is now widely present in the critical security studies literature. Claudia Aradau (2008: 72), for example, writes of an ‘exclusionary logic of
security’ underpinning and legitimizing ‘forms of domination’. Rens van Munster (2007: 239) assumes a ‘logic of security’, predicated upon a ‘political organization on the exclusionary basis of
fear’. Laura Shepherd (2008: 70) also identifies a liberal and highly problematic ‘organizational logic’ in security. Although there would probably be disagreement over the degree to which this
logic is inescapable, it is symptomatic of an overwhelmingly pessimistic outlook that a great number of critical scholars are now making the case for moving away from security. The normative
preference for desecuritization has been picked up in attempts to contest, resist and ‘unmake’ security (Aradau, 2004; Huysmans, 2006; Bigo, 2007). For these contributions, security cannot be
reconstructed and political transformation can only be brought about when security and its logic are removed from the equation (Aradau, 2008; Van Munster, 2009; Peoples, 2011). This

The assumption of an
tendency in the literature is problematic for the critique of security in at least three ways. First, it constitutes a blind spot in the effort of politicization.

exclusionary, totalizing or violent logic of security can be seen as an essentialization and a moment of closure. To be faithful to
itself, the politicization of security would need to recognize that there is nothing natural or necessary about security – and that security as a paradigm of thought or a register of meaning is also

a construction that depends upon its reproduction and performance through practice. The exclusionary and violent meanings that have been attached to
security are themselves the result of social and historical processes, and can thus be changed. Second, the institution of this apolitical realm runs
counter to the purposes of critique by foreclosing an engagement with the different ways in which security may be constructed. As
Matt McDonald (2012) has argued, because security means different things for different people, one must always understand it in context . Assuming from
the start that security implies the narrowing of choice and the empowerment of an elite forecloses the acknowledgment of security claims that may seek to achieve exactly the opposite:
alternative possibilities in an already narrow debate and the contestation of elite power.5 In connection to this, the claims to insecurity put forward by individuals and groups run the risk of
being neglected if the desire to be more secure is identified with a compulsion towards totalization, and if aspirations to a life with a degree of predictability are identified with violence. Finally,

By overlooking the possibility of reconsidering security from

this tendency blunts critical security studies as a resource for practical politics.

within – opting instead for its replacement with other ideals – the critical field weakens its capacity to confront head-on the
exceptionalist connotations that security has acquired in policymaking circles. Critical scholars run the risk of playing into this agenda when they
tie security to exclusionary and violent practices, thereby failing to question security actors as they take those views for granted and act as if they were inevitable. Overall, security is just too
important – both as a concept and as a political instrument – to be simply abandoned by critical scholars. As McDonald (2012: 163) has put it, If security is politically powerful, is the foundation
of political legitimacy for a range of actors, and involves the articulation of our core values and the means of their protection, we cannot afford to allow dominant discourses of security to be

confused with the essence of security itself. In sum, the trajectory that critical security studies has taken in recent years has significant limitations.
The politicization of security has made extraordinary progress in problematizing predominant security ideas and practices; however, it has paradoxically resulted in a depoliticization of the

meaning of security itself. By foreclosing the possibility of alternative notions of security, this imbalanced politicization weakens the
analytical capacity of critical security studies, undermines its ability to function as a political resource and runs the risk of being politically

counterproductive. Seeking to address these limitations, the next section revisits emancipatory understandings of security.

You need to weigh this round on who benefits the greatest number of people that
means you can feel comfortable always voting neg. This is because the return of
Cthulhu makes all seven billion people on this planet to become mentally insane.

A2 – Perm

The Link to the Kritik overwhelms the aff even if it were possible to do the
affirmative and the alternative in the same world the impact would still happen
that means you can’t evaluate the perm.
Second the perm doesn’t make sense you can’t do the aff and embrace the status
quo at the same time.

Framing stuff

Rule Utilitarianism is compatible with moral maxims of action. However, unlike

moral absolutism, Rule Utilitarianism has the advantage of allowing exceptions to
moral rules of thumb when necessary.
Brandt, 59 Richard B. Brandt, University of Michigan, Ethical Theory, 1959, p. 384.
"Does the utilitarian formula leave[s] any place for moral maxims like 'Keep your promises' and
'Always tell the truth?' Yes, these maxims can be regarded as directives that for the most part point
out what is a person's duty. They are rules of thumb. They are properly taught to children and used
by everybody as a rough timesaving guide for ordinary decisions. Moreover, since we are all prone
to rationalizing in our own favor, they are apt to be a better guide to our duty in complex cases than
is our on-the-spot reflection. However, we are not to be enslaved to them. When there is good
ground for thinking the maximum net expectable utility will be produced by an act that violates
them, then we should depart from them. Such a rule is to be disregarded without hesitation, when it
clearly conflicts with the general welfare."

Utilitarianism is better than deontology. 4 warrants.

Gillion, 85 (Gillon, R. (1985). Utilitarianism. Br Med J (Clin Res Ed), 290(6479), 1411-1413.
Chicago. http://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/290/6479/1411.full.pdf)
Utilitarianism claims to overcome[s] four major disadvantages of what I have called deontological moral
theories. These are: (1) The reliance on moral intuitions to identify moral principles notwithstanding the
variability and unreliability of such intuitions. (For thousands of years intuition led people to accept slavery as being
morally defensible.) (2) The pluralism of many deontological theories, whose moral principles may conflict. (3) The
absolutism of more than one principle in some pluralist theories. If these principles apply without exception any conflict between them must
be irreconcilable. (4) Typically, the lack of a consistent and reliable decision procedure for choosing the right
course of action in particular circumstances.

Rule Utilitarianism is compatible with a rights framework.

Bowie, 86 (Norman E. Bowie and Robert L. Simon, University of Delaware and Hamilton College,
respectively, The Individual and the Political Order, 2nd Ed., 1986, p. 37.)
"The task of the moral philosopher on the rule utilitarian account is to formulate those rules which pass the utilitarian test. If
Mill is
interpreted as a rule utilitarian, individual rights can be construed as rules that protect individuals.
These rights, however, are grounded on utilitarian considerations. Individual rights should be
recognized only if by recognition of such rights the happiness of the greatest good for the greatest
number can be secured."

Even if deontology is a sufficient ethical system for individuals, it is insufficient for

governments. Policymakers need to use utilitarianism.
Goodin, 95 (Robert E., Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy, Google Books)
My concern in this book, true to the thrust of this introduction, is with utilitarianism as a public philosophy. My main concern is with the ways in
which utilitarianism can be a good guide to public policies without necessarily being a good guide to
private conduct. Nonetheless, in adducing many of its most important implication for public policy it is important to see at leas in broad
outline how it would set about shaping private conduct. Utilitarians, and consequentialists more generally, are
outcome-oriented. In sharp contrast to Ten Commandment-style deontological approaches, which specify certain
actions to be done as a matter of duty, utilitarian theories assign people responsibility for producing
certain results, leaving the individuals concerned broad discretion about how to achieve those results.
The same basic difference in the two theories' approaches to assigning moral jobs reappears across all levels of moral agency, from private
agency, from private individuals to collective (especially state) actors. The distinctively utilitarian approach, thus conceived, to international
protection of the ozone layer is to assign states responsibility for producing certain effects, leaving them broad discretion in how they accomplish
it (Chapter 18). The distinctively utilitarian approach, thus conceived, to the ethical defense of nationalism is couched in terms of delimiting state
boundaries in such a way as to assign particular organization (Chapter 16). And, at a more domestic level of analysis, the distinctively utilitarian
approach to the allocation of legal liabilities is to assign them to whomsoever can best discharge them (Chapters 5 through 7). The
great
advantage of utilitarianism as a guide to public conduct is that it [is] avoids gratuitous sacrifices, it
ensures we are able to ensure in the uncertain world of public policy-making that politics are
sensitive to people's interests or desires or preferences. The great failing of more deontological
theories, applied to those realism, is that they fixate upon duties done for the sake of duty rather
than for the sake of any good that is done by doing one's duty. Perhaps it is permissible (perhaps it
is even proper) for private individuals in the course of their personal affairs to fetishize duties done
for their own sake. It would be a mistake for public officials to do likewise, not least because it is
impossible. The fixation of motives makes absolutely no sense in the public realm , and might make precious
little sense in the private one even, as Chapter 3 shows. The reason public action is required at all arises form the inability of uncoordinated
individual action to achieve certain orally desirable ends. Individuals are rightly excused from pursuing those ends. The inability is real; the
excuses, perfectly valid. But libertarians are right in their diagnosis, wrong in their prescription. That is the message of Chapter 2. The same thing
that makes those excuses valid at the individual level the same thing that relives individuals of responsibility - makes it morally incumber upon
individuals to organize themselves into collective units that are capable of acting where they as isolated individuals are not. When they organize
themselves into these collective units, those collective deliberations inevitably take place under very different forms. Individuals are morally
required to operate in that collective manner, in certain crucial respects. But they are practically circumscribed in how they can operate, in their
collective mode. and those special constraints characterizing the public sphere of decision-making give rise to the special circumstances that
make utilitarianism peculiarly apt for public policy-making, in ways set out more fully in Chapter 4. Government house utilitarianism thus
understood is, I would argue, a uniquely defensible public philosophy

Utilitarianism Inevitable
Utilitarianism is psychologically inevitable. It has always and will always permeate
human thought.
Allison, 90 (Allison, Professor of Political Philosophy at University of Warwick, 1990 (Lincoln, “The
Utilitarianism Response”)
And yet if an idea can be compared to a castle, though we find a breached wall, damaged foundation and a weapons spiked where not actually
destroyed, there
still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism. As Raymond
Frey puts it, utilitarianism
has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing ... [and] has
come to have a significant impact upon the moral thinking of many laymen. The simple core of the doctrine
lies in the ideas that actions should be judged by their consequences and that the best actions are those which make people, as-a whole, better off
than do the alternatives. What utilitarianism always excludes therefore, is any idea-about the Tightness or wrongness of actions which is not
explicable in terms of the consequences of those actions. The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense
may well be residual for many people. Without a serious God (one, this is, prepared to reveal Truth and instruction) or a
convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason, we are likely to turn towards Bentham and to judge actions on
their consequences for people's well-being.

Egalitarianism Good
Equality Fundamental to Morality
Equality and non-discrimination are fundamentally necessary to uphold and respect
human rights. Discrimination and inequality should be adamantly opposed in every
way.
Makkonen, 02 (Makkonen, Timo. Institute for Human Rights Åbo Akademi University "Multiple,
compound and intersectional discrimination: Bringing the experiences of the most marginalized to the
fore." Institute for Human Rights. Åbo Akademi University. Earlier research on the intersection of
grounds is by Shoben, W. Elaine. (1980) “Compound Discrimination: The interaction of Race and Sex in
Employment Discrimination” NYUL Rev (2002): 793-835.
http://cilvektiesibas.org.lv/site/attachments/01/02/2012/timo.pdf)
Equality and its concomitant principle of non-discrimination are so constitutive to our modern
societies that we do not always even recognize their elementary role anymore. Democracy, for example,
recognizes the equal worth and equal rights of all persons, for instance through adherence to the “one person, one vote” -rule. Equality
is
also the cornerstone of human rights: all human rights belong to all human beings, without
discrimination of any kind, and thus the concept of equality is implicitly embedded in the concept of
human rights itself. The prohibition of discrimination is also a crucial aspect of all legal systems as
the prohibition seeks to eliminate arbitrariness in judicial and administrative decision making, thus
enhancing the predictability and the fair functioning of these systems. The right of all persons to
equality before the law and protection against discrimination constitutes a universal human right
recognized in some way in most human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR). These human rights instruments either focus on several grounds of
discrimination, such as sex, ethnic or racial origin, disability and so on , or then on one of them specifically. The
underlying idea, though largely unarticulated, has been that people are, or can be, discriminated against mainly on the grounds of one factor at a
time, and that these grounds can be treated separately in legal instruments as well as in political action.

If they say deontology

Deontology (Mostly Kantian Stuff) Bad

Nonconsequentialism Evil
Turn: deontological moral absolutism and motivistic appeals to purity are
ineffective, elitist, and justify complacence before atrocities. Prefer
consequentialism.
Isaac, 02 (Jeffrey C. Isaac, professor of political science at Indiana-Bloomington, director of the Center
for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale, Spring 2002, Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49,
Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest)
As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with
moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting
a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s
intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends . Abjuring violence or refusing to
make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such
tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean
conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not
simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the
standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically
repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is
as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather
than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender
impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth
century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of
pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this
judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political
effectiveness.
 Deontology Leads to Evil
Deontology not only permits, but morally requires actors in certain situations to
allow easily preventable atrocities to occur. For example, deontology maintains that
it is always wrong to lie, steal or kill. That would include lying to the Gestapo about
the location of hidden Jews, stealing food to keep one’s family from starving, or
killing one person to save the lives of countless others.

Deontological Obligation Based on Subjective Language

Deontology is based on flawed interpretations of language that don’t reflect reality.
Ratner, 84 (Leonard G. Ratner p.758-9, professor of law at USC, 1984 Hofstra Law Journal. “The
Utilitarian Imperative: Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Evolution” HeinOnline)
Disregarding the significance of evolutionary survival, nonutilitarian intuitionists deny that utilitarianism provides a "moral" basis for choice
between competing need/want fulfillments. They seek instead to identify the intuitive "preexisting rights” that must, they insist, underlie such
choice.”' But they disclose no source of the rights,” which are, in fact, derived from the search for increased per capita need/want fulfillment.”
Although frequently accorded a transcendental immutability, rights identify the resource and behavior allocations that are perceived by the
community as enhancing such fulfillment. Indeed, revelation of various a priori rights or moral standards is often accompanied by disparagement
of other such rights or standards as crypto-ntilitarian.”‘ A
priori rights divorced from need/want fulfillment depend on
the magic power of language.When not determined by social consequences, the morality of behavior tends to be
resolved by definition of the words used to characterize the behavior. Necessarily ambiguous
generalizations, evolved to describe and correlate heterogeneous events, acquire a controlling
normative role. Definition, of course, reflects human experience. But the equivocal significance of that
experience may be [is] replaced with the illusory security of fixed meaning. Ethical connotations are
then drawn not from the underlying empirical lessons that provide a context for meaning, but from
inflexible linguistic "principles” and their emotional overtones. Derivation of meaning from the social purposes that
engender the terminology leads to a utilitarian appraisal of need] want fulfillment. The preexisting rights of nonutilitarian morality are usually
identified as components of "liberty," "equality,” and “autonomy,"'°’ labels that suggest a concern with individual need/want fulfillment and its
social constraints. Liberty is perceived as freedom for behavior that improves the quality of existence, such as speech, religion, and other "civil
rights” activity; equality as rejection of disparate individual worth and "discriminatory" treatment; autonomy as the individual choice implied by
liberty and equality.”

Basically if they say egoism outweighs

Egoism’s Faulty Premise
Egoism is built on a faulty premise.
Asher, 12 (Levi Asher, Literary Kicks, 3-17-2012, "Philosophy Weekend: Rebooting the Argument
Against Egoism," http://www.litkicks.com/RebootingTheArgument)
PREMISE #1: Psychological Egoism
is not a self-apparent truth. Even those philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes or Ayn Rand
who advocate the Egoist position have never managed (and rarely attempted) to justify the Egoist premise itself. When
pressed, a
Hobbesian or Randian may argue that the premise is so obvious as to not need justification, or may
offer a weak formulation such as this one: "since we cannot exist without our individual solitary selves,
it must be the sole purpose of our lives to tend to our individual solitary selves." These formulations can
be easily refuted by pointing out that, for instance, we also cannot exist without the planet Earth, so
the same logic could lead us to declare that the purpose of our lives is to tend to the planet Earth.
We know for sure that we exist as individual and independent biological entities, but this doesn't
mean that our consciousness must be limited to consciousness of our individual and independent selves, or
that the scope of a person's desire and concern and action and motivation must be limited to the
scope of the person's individual and independent self.

Inconsistency and Conflict

Egoism says that everybody should be self-interested. That independently justifies
person A taking advantage or person B and B taking advantage of A. Not only is
that immoral, but also inconsistent. Egoism justifies conflicting actions. It’s an
impossible theory.

Egoism Justifies Murder

Egoism justifies one person murdering another for a dollar. That’s like the literal
antithesis of morality.

Egoism is Discrimination
Egoism is by definition discrimination. It separates people into two groups: one’s
self and everyone else and then suggests that one is more deserving than the other.
That’s just as arbitrary and immoral as racial or sexual discrimination.

What Goes around Comes around

What goes around comes around. People being only self-interested and taking
advantage of others will just counterproductively lead to a downward spiral of
conflict ending in anarchy. And Contractualism can’t save Egoism. Not everyone is
rational. The fact that people break laws is proof.

Egoism Causes Societal Failure

Society can’t function with egoism.
Laitman, 09 (Kabbalah Library Home / Michael Laitman / Books / Kabbalah Revealed / Chapter 6:
The (Narrow) Road to Freedom / The Ego’s Inevitable Death 2009
http://www.kabbalah.info/eng/content/view/frame/59109?/eng/content/view/full/59109&main)
A just and happy society
cannot rely on monitored or “channeled” selfishness. We can try to restrain egoism
through rule of law, but this will work just until circumstances toughen, as we’ve seen with
Germany—a democracy until it democratically elected Adolf Hitler. We can also try to channel
egoism to benefit society, but that has already been tried in Russia’s communism, and failed
miserably.
If they are anti-semetic and say that Cthuluhu is fake

Individualism Good
5 Warrants for Individualism
Individualism is good. 5 warrants.
Kumar, 12 (Arvind Kumar, "What are the Arguments in support of the Individualism?," No
Publication, http://www.preservearticles.com/2011100314541/what-are-the-arguments-in-support-of-the-
individualism.html)
The individualists support their position from five different standpoints: the ethical, the economic, the scientific, political and the practical. 1.
Ethical: Freedom of action is essential to the development of personality. Qualities like self-reliance, initiative-,
enterprise and originality develop to the fullest extent if the individual is left alone. Excessive state regulation destroys individuality and does
more harm than good. Man is the best judge of his own ability and interest. 2. Economic: From the economic standpoint individualists
assume that every man is self-seeking and knows his interests best. Free competition increases
production, ensures efficiency and maximizes economic well-being. Unrestricted operation of the laws of supply and
demand will result in fair prices. They advocate free trade and free enterprise in economic sphere. 3. Scientific: It is in accord with the
principle of evolution-the biological law of struggle for existence and survival of the fittest. Herbert Spencer supports this argument.
Free competition among individuals would ensure the survival of the strong, intelligent and virile and
elimination of the poor, weak, unfit and the inefficient. State intervention would hamper the process of natural selection. 4. Political: The
activity of state should be limited so that the personal and political freedoms of individual do not suffer any
erosion. Expansion of state's sphere of activity would threaten individual's freedom. Therefore, in democratic states, basic or fundamental rights
have been enshrined in the constitution of the country. 5.
Practical: Practical experience shows that government
attempts to do many things but does them badly. Government action results in redtapism, waste and corruption. As
compared to government undertakings, the private enterprises are more efficient and make greater profits.

Individuals over Society

Individuals come before society.
Rawls, 71 (John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971, p. 3-4.)
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole
cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a
greater good enjoyed by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of
advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal liberty are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not
subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.