No. L-30523. April 22, 1977.

LEE BUN TING and ANG CHIA, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE A. ALIGAEN, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Capiz, 11th Judicial District, Branch II; ATTY. ANTONIO D. AMOSIN, as court-
appointed Receiver; RAFAEL A. DINGLASAN, FRANCISCO A. DINGLASAN, CARMEN A.
DINGLASAN, RAMON A. DINGLASAN, LOURDES A. DINGLASAN, MERCEDES A. DINGLASAN,
CONCEPCION A. DINGLASAN, MARIANO A. DINGLASAN, JOSE A. DINGLASAN, LORETO A.
DINGLASAN, RIZAL A. DINGLASAN, JIMMY DINGLASAN, and JESSE DINGLASAN, respondents.

Res judicata; A case that has become final and executory cannot be re-opened on account of a decision
of the Supreme Court subsequently promulgated enunciating a different doctrine regarding the effects of
a sales of lands to aliens.—The issue posed before us is whether the questions which were decided in
Rafael Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al., supra, could still be re-litigated in Civil Case No. V-3064,
in view of the subsequent decision of this Court in Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She, supra. We
resolve the issue in the negative. The decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-5996, “Rafael Dinglasan, et al.
vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al.” constitutes a bar to Civil Case No. V-3064 before the respondent, court. Said civil
case, therefore, should have been dismissed because it is a mere relitigation of the same issues
previously adjudged with finality, way back in 1956, between the same parties or their privies and
concerning the same subject matter. We have consistently held that the doctrine of res judicata applies
where, between a pending action and one which has been finally and definitely settled, there is identity of
parties, subject matter and cause of action.

Same; Posterior changes in the Supreme Court’s doctrine cannot be applied retroactively to nullify a prior
final ruling.—Contrary to the contentions of private respondents, there has been no change in the facts or
in the conditions of the parties. Neither do we find our ruling in the Philippine Banking Corporation case
applicable to the case at bar, considering the rule that posterior changes in the doctrine of this Court
cannot retroactively be applied to nullify a prior final ruling in the same proceeding where the prior
adjudication was had, whether the case should be civil or criminal in nature. The determination of the
questions of fact and of law by this Court on June 27, 1956 in case No. L-5996 has become the law of the
case, and may not now be disputed or relitigated by a reopening of the same questions in a subsequent
litigation between the same parties and their privies over the same subject matter.

Same; Stability must be accorded to final judgments of the highest court.—Reasons of public policy,
judicial orderliness, economy and judicial time and the interests of litigants, as well as the peace and
order of society, all require that stability be accorded the solemn and final judgments of the courts or
tribunals of competent jurisdiction. There can be no question that such reasons apply with greater force
on final judgments of the highest Court of the land.

ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari with preliminary injunction.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Norberto J. Quisumbing and Humberto V. Quisumbing for petitioners.

     Rafael A. Dinglasan for respondents.

ANTONIO, J.:

Petition for certiorari to annul the Orders of respondent court dated October 10, 1968 and November 10,
1968 and other related Orders in Civil Case No. V-3064, entitled Rafael A. Dinglasan, et al., vs. Lee Bun
Ting, et al., with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. The antecedent facts are as
follows:

On June 27, 1956, this Court rendered judgment in G. R. No. L-5996, entitled Rafael Dinglasan, et al. vs.
Lee Bun Ting, et al.,  1 In that case, We found that:
 In the month of March, 1936, petitioners-appellants sold to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen,
predecessor in interest of respondents-appellees, a parcel of land situated on the corner
of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Capiz (now Roxas City), Capiz, designated as lot 398
and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389. The cost was P6,000.00 and soon
after the sale Lee Liong constructed thereon a concrete building which he used as a
place for his lumber business and in part as residence for himself and family. Petitioners
had contended that the sale was a conditional sale, or one with the right of repurchase
during the last years of a ten-year period, but the trial court and the Court of Appeals
found that the sale was an absolute one. Another contention of the petitioners-appellants
is that the sale is null and void as it was made in violation of the provision contained in
the Constitution (Article XIII, section 5), but the Court of Appeals found that the purchaser
was not aware of the constitutional prohibition while petitioners-appellants were because
the negotiations for the sale were conducted with the knowledge and direct intervention
of Judge Rafael Dinglasan, one of the plaintiffs, who was at that time an assistant
attorney in the Department of Justice. ... (P. 42-Q)

In reply to the contention of appellants therein that as the sale to Lee Liong is prohibited by the
Constitution, title to the land did not pass to said alien because the sale did not produce any juridical
effect in his favor, and that the constitutional prohibition should be deemed self-executing in character in
order to give effect to the constitutional mandate, this Court said:

... In answer we state that granting the sale to be null and void and can not give title to
the vendee, it does not n necessarily follow therefrom that the title remained in the
vendor, who had also violated the constitutional prohibition, or that he (vendor) has the
right to recover the title of which he has divested himself by his act in ignoring the
prohibition. In such contingency another principle of law sets in to bar to equally guilty
vendor from recovering the title which he had voluntarily conveyed for a consideration,
that of pan delicto We have applied this principle as a bar to the present action in a series
of cases thus:

xxx xxx xxx

We can, therefore, say that even if the plaintiffs can still invoke the Constitution, or the
doctrine in the Krivenko case, to set aside the sale in question, they are now prevented
from doing so if their purpose is to recover the lands that they have voluntarily parted
with, because of their guilty knowledge that what they were doing was in violation of the
Constitution. They cannot escape the law. As this Court well said: A party to an illegal
contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objects carried out.
The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds
them. The rule is expressed in the maxims: Ex dolo malo non oritur actio and In pari
delicto potior eat conditio defendentis ....

It is not necessary for us to re-examine the doctrine laid down by us in the above cases.
We must add in justification of the adoption of the doctrine that the scope of our power
and authority is to interpret the law merely, leaving to the proper coordinate body the
function of laying down the policy that should be followed in relation to conveyances in
violation of the constitutional prohibition and in implementing said policy. The situation of
these prohibited conveyances is not different from that of homestead sold within five
yearn from and after the issuance of the patent, (Section 118, C.A. 141, otherwise known
as the Public Land Law), for which situation the legislature has adopted the policy, not of
returning the homestead sold to the original homesteader but of forfeiting the homestead
and returning it to the public domain again subject to disposition in accordance with law.
(Section 124, Id.)
 The doctrine of in pari delicto  bars petitioners-appellants from recovering the title to the
property in question and renders unnecessary the consideration of the other arguments
presented in appellants brief.

There is one other cause why petitioner' remedy cannot be entertained, that is the
prescription of the action. As the sale occurred in March, 1936, more than ten years had
already elapsed from the time the cause of action accrued when the action was filed
(1948). (pp. 431-432)

Noting the absence of policy governing lands sold to aliens in violation of the constitutional prohibition,
We further said:

We take this occasion to call the attention of the legislature to the absence of a law or
policy on sales in violation of the Constitution; this Court would have filled the void were
we not aware of the fact that the matter falls beyond the scope of oar authority and
properly belongs to a co-ordinate power. (P. 432)

Accordingly, the petition in the foregoing case was denied.

Twelve (12) years later, on the basis of the decision of this Court in Philippine Banking Corporation vs.
Lui She, 2 private respondents Rafael A. Dinglasan, et al. filed a complaint on July 1, 1968 for the
recovery of the same parcel of land subject matter of the first-mentioned case. Said complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. V-3064 before respondent court. Private respondents (plaintiffs before the
court a quo) reiterated their contention that the sale made to Lee Liong, predecessor-in-interest of
petitioners (defendants a quo), was null and void for being violative of the Constitution, and prayed that
plaintiffs be declared as the rightful and legal owners of the property in question; that defendants be
ordered to vacate the premises, to surrender possession thereof to plaintiffs and to receive the amount of
P6,000.00 from the plaintiffs as restitution of the purchase price; and that defendants be ordered to pay
damages to the plaintiffs in the amount of P2,000.000 a month from the time of the filing of the complaint
until the property is returned to them, as well as the costs of suit.

A motion to dismiss, dated September 23, 1968, was filed by defendants- petitioners on the ground of res
judicata, alleging that the decision in the case of "Rafael Dinglagan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al.",
supra,  promulgated on June 27, 1956, has definitely settled the issues between the parties. An opposition
thereto was filed by plaintiffs, with the averment that the decision in the prior case "cannot be pleaded in
bar of the instant action because of new or additional facts or grounds of recovery and because of change
of law or jurisprudence. 3 In support of the change in jurisprudence asserted, the decision of this Court
in Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She, supra, was advanced, upon the contention that said
decision warrants a reopening of the case and the return of the parcel of land involved to the plaintiffs, A
reply to the opposition was filed by defendants by registered mall on October 16, 1968, alleging that the
decision in Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She, which was promulgated in 1967, "cannot affect
the outcome of the instant case. Said 1967 decision cannot be applied to the instant case where there
had been already a final and conclusive determination some twelve years earlier. While a doctrine laid
down in previous cases may be overruled, the previous cases themselves cannot thereby be reopened.
The doctrine may be changed for future cases but it cannot reach back into the past and overturn finally
settled cases. 4

However, on October 10, 1968, before the filing of the above reply, respondent court had issued an Order
denying the motion to dismiss. The court said:

A copy of the decision rendered in the case of Rafael Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting,
et al., G. R. No. L-5996 is attached to the motion to dismiss.
 In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that both parties violated the constitutional
prohibition (Article XIII, see. 9) for the purchaser was an alien and prohibited to acquire
residential lot while the vendors, Filipino citizens, can not also recover the property for
having violated the constitutional prohibition, under the principle of pari delicto. The
vendee cannot own the property, neither ran the vendor recover what he sold.

To fill the void, the Supreme Court pointed out that the coordinate body — Congress of
the Philippines — can pass remedial legislation.

But Congress failed to act, Neither was there any proceeding after almost twenty years
for escheat or reversion instituted by the Office of the Solicitor General after
the Krivenko  decision which prohibits the transfer to aliens of any private agricultural land
including residential lands whatever its origin might have been.

But the Supreme Court took a decisive step and in bold relief dispelled darkening clouds
in the case of Philippine Banking Corporations vs. Lui She, promulgated September 12,
1967, ... .

The concurring opinion of Justice Fernando is very enlightening and elucidating. ...

The Court wishes to refer to the concurring opinion of Justice Fernando as an additional
authority supporting the herein order.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds the motion to dismiss unmeritrious and holds
that the same be as it is hereby DENIED. 5

A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Order was filed by defendants, alleging that their reply to
plaintiffs' opposition to the motion to dismiss was not even considered by the court a quo because the
Order was issued before said reply Could reach the court, Further, it was asserted that the Philippine
Banking Corporation vs. Lui She case had the effect of annulling and setting aside only the contracts
subject matter thereof "and no other contracts, certainly not contracts outside the issues in said judgment
as that in the instant case", and of ordering the return only of the lands involved in said case, and not the
land subject of the present action. Moreover, it was averred that "Nowhere in the majority opinion nor in
the concurring opinion in said decision of Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She  does there appear
any statement which would have the effect of reopening and changing previously adjudicated rights of
parties and finally settled cases" and that the principle enunciated in such case "should apply after, not on
or before, September 12, 1967". The motion for reconsideration was found to have not been well taken
and, consequently, was denied by respondent court on November 9, 1968. Defendants were given ten
(10) days from receipt of the Order within which to file their answer to the complaint, Which defendants
complied with.

Defendants' answer, dated December 5, 1968, contained the following allegations, among others:

(a) The sale of the parcel of land involved was made in 1935 before the promulgation of
the Constitution.

(b) Said conveyance ' as an absolute sale, not subject to any right or repurchase ...

(c) Upon the purchase of the said parcel of land by the deceased Lee Liong, he and
defendant Ang Chia constructed thereon a camarin for lumber business and later a two-
storey five door accessoria with an assessed-valuation of P35,000.00, which said
improvements were destroyed during the Japanese entry into the municipality of Capiz in
April 1942, thereafter, the same improvements were rebuilt.
 (d) In July 1947, the said Lee Liong being already deceased, defendants as his legal
heirs entered into an extrajudicial settlement of said property, there being no creditors or
other heirs, and by virtue of said extra-judicial settlement, approximately two-thirds of
said property was adjudicated to defendant Ang Chia and Lee Bing Hoo as co-owners
and the remaining one-third to defendant Lee Bun Ting

(e) The deceased Lee Liong and defendants have been declaring and paying real estate
taxes on the said property since 1935 and up to the present year.

xxx xxx xxx

In addition to the foregoing, defendants reiterated their defense of res judicata, on the basis of the
decision of the Supreme Court of June 27, 1956. It was, therefore, prayed that the complaint be
dismissed, with counterclaim for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation or, in case of adverse
judgment, that plaintiffs be ordered to pay the reasonable equivalent of the value of the property at the
time of the restoration, plus reimbursement of improvements thereon.

A reply and answer to the counterclaim, dated December 14, 1968, was filed by plaintiffs. On March 31,
1969, respondent court issued an Order denying a motion filed by petitioners for simplification of the
issues and for the striking out from the records of the declaration of Rafael Dinglasan under the
Survivorship Disqualification Rule. A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Order was denied on
May 7, 1969.

During the pendency of the trial, plaintiffs filed a petition for the appointment of a receiver "to receive,
collect and hold in trust all income of the property in the form of monthly rentals of P2,000.00", on the
premise that defendants have no other visible property which will answer for the payment of said rentals.
This petition was opposed by defendants, alleging that plaintiffs will not suffer any irreparable injury or
grave damage if the petition for receivership is not granted, particularly as defendants are solvent and
further considering that defendants have a building on the parcel of land, the value of which must likewise
be considered before plaintiffs can be awarded possession of the land. The matter of receivership was
heard by respondent court and on May 17, 1969, it issued an Order appointing respondent Atty. Antonio
D. Amosin, Deputy Clerk of Court, as receiver with instructions to take immediate possession of the
property in litigation and to preserve, administer and dispose of the same in accordance with law and
order of the court, upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P500.00. On May 17, 1969, the appointed
receiver took his oath. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners herein pray that judgment be rendered annulling and setting aside respondent court's
complained of Orders (rated October 10, 1968. November 9, 1968, March 31, 1969, May 7, 1969 and
May 17, 1969, and ordering the dismissal of Civil Case no. L-3064 of respondent court on the ground
of res judicata  Petitioners further prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
respondent court from proceeding with the scheduled hearings of the case, and respondent receiver from
executing the order to take immediate possession of the property in litigation.

On June 16, 1969, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, restraining respondent
court from continuing with the scheduled trial of the case and respondent receiver from executing the
order to take immediate possession of the property in litigation and/or otherwise discharging or performing
his function as receiver.

The issue posed before Us is whether the questions which were decided in Rafael Dinglagan, et al. vs.
Lee Bun Ting et al., supra, could still be relitigated in Civil Case No. V-3064, in view of the subsequent
decision of this Court in Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She, supra.

We resolve the issue in the negative. The decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-5996, "Rafael Dinglasan,
et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al."  constitutes a bar to Civil Case No. V-3064 before the respondent court.
Said Civil case, therefore, should have been dismissed because it is a mere relitigation of the same
issues previously adjudged with finality, way back in 1956, between the same parties or their privies and
concerning the same subject matter. We have consistently held that the doctrine of res judicata applies
where, between a pending action and one which has been finally and definitely settled, there is Identity of
parties, subject matter and cause of action.

The concept of res judicata as a "bar by prior judgment" was explained in Comilang vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., promulgated on July 15, 1975, 6 thus:

The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties
ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that, when a right or
fact has been jurisdically tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as is remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or
estate. ...

xxx xxx xxx

This principle of res judicata is embodied in Rule 39, Sec. 49(b) and (c) of the Rules oil'
Court, as follows;

(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or
as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between
the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of
the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same title and in the same capacity.

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in- interest, that
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face
to have been so adjudged, or was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.

Sec. 49(b) enunciates that concept of res judicata known as 'bar by prior judgment' while
Sec. 49(c) refers to 'Conclusiveness of judgment.' There is bar by prior judgment' when,
between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case which is
sought to be barred, there is Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. The
judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. It is final
as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with
them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the
claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered
for that purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case. But where
between the first and second cases, there is Identity of parties but no Identity or cause of
action, the first judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved
therein. (pp. 76-78).

A comparison between the earlier case of "Rafael Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al."  (G. R. No. L-
5996) and the case pending before respondent court 7 reveals that the requisites for the application of the
doctrine of res judiciata are present. It is undisputed that the first case was tried and decided by a court of
compentent jurisdiction, whose decision was affirmed on appeal by this Tribunal. The parties to the two
cases are substantially the same, namely, as plaintiffs, Rafael A. Dinglasan, Carmen A. Dinglasan,
Francisco A. Dinglasan, Jr., Ramon A. Dinglasan, Lourdes A. Dinglasan, Mercedes A. Dinglasan,
Concepcion A. Dinglasan, Mariano A. Dinglasan, Jose A. Dinglasan, Loreto A. Dinglasan, Manuel A.
Dinglasan, Rizal A. Dinglasan and Jimmy Dinglasan (the differences being the inclusions of the minor
Vicente Dinglasan in L-5996 and Jesse Dinglasan in the case before respondent court), against
defendants Lee Bun Ting and Ang Chia, in her capacity as Widow of the deceased Lee Liong (and
Administratrix of his estate in L-5996). The subject matter of the two actions are the same, namely, that
"parcel of land, Cadastral Lot No. 398, located at Trece de Agosto Street, now Roxas Avenue, corner of
Pavia St., in the municipality of Capiz, now Roxas City, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389 of
the Office of Register of Deeds of Capiz in the name of ... Francisco Dinglasan and originally declared
under Tax (Declaration) No. 19284 also in his name in the municipality of Capiz, but now declared as
Cadastral Lots Nos. 398-A and 398-B respectively under Tax Declarations Nos. 7487 and 7490 in the City
of Roxas in the names of Ang Chia Vda. de Lee and Lee Bun Ting respectively ... " The causes of action
and the reliefs prayed for are identical — the annulment of the sale and the recovery of the subject parcel
of land.

Notwithstanding the mode of action taken by private respondents, We find that in the ultimate analysis,
Civil Case No. V-3064 is but an attempt to reopen the issues which were resolved in the previous case.
Contrary to the contentions of private respondents, there has been no change in the facts or in the
conditions of the parties. Neither do We find Our ruling in the Philippine Banking Corporation  case
applicable to the case at bar, considering the rule that posterior changes in the doctrine of this Court
cannot retroactively be applied to nullify a prior final ruling in the same proceeding where the prior
adjudication was had, whether the case should be civil or criminal in nature. The determination of the
questions of fact and of law by this Court on June 27, 1956 in case No. L-5996 has become the law of the
case, and may not now be disputed or relitigated by a reopening of the same questions in a subsequent
litigation between the same parties and their privies the same subject matter. Thus, in People vs.
Olarte, 8 We explained this doctrine, as follows:

Suffice it to say that our ruling in Case L-13027, rendered on the first appeal, constitutes
the law of the case, and, even if erroneous it may no longer be disturbed or modified
since it has become final long ago. A subsequent reinterpretation of the law may be
applied to new cases bat certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively determined
(People, vs. Pinuila, G. R. No. L-11374, May 30, 1958; 55 O.G. 4228).

Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former
appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably
established the controlling legal rule of decision Between the same
parties in the same case continues to 1)(, the law of the case whether
correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
court. (21 C.J.S. 330). (cited in Pinuila case, supra).

As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to

be the law of the case whether that decision is right or wrong, the remedy
of the party being to seek a rehearing. (5 C.J.S. 1277). (also cited in
Pinuila case)

It is also aptly held in another case that:

It need not be stated that the Supreme Court, being the court of last resort, is the final
arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any given
case constitutes the law of that particular case. Once its judgment becomes final it is
binding on all inferior courts, and hence beyond their power and authority to alter or
modify Kabigting vs. Acting Director of Prisons, G. R. No. L-15548, October 30, 1962).

More categorical still is the pronouncement of this Court in Pomeroy vs. Director of Prisons, L-14284-85,
February 24, 1960:
 It will be seen that the prisoner's stand assumes that doctrines and
rulings of the Supreme Court operate retrospectively and that they can
claim the benefit of decisions in People vs, Hernandez; People vs.
Geronimo,  and People vs. Dugonon  (L-6025-26, July 18, 1956; L-8936,
Oct. 31, 1956; and L-8926, June 29, 1957, respectively), promulgated
four or more years after the prisoner applicants had been convicted by
final j judgment and started serving sentence. However, the rule adopted
by this Court (and by the Federal Supreme Court) is that judicial
doctrines have only prospective operation and do not apply to cases
previously decided (People vs. Pinuila, L-11374, promulgated May 30,
1958)

In the foregoing decision, furthermore, this Court quoted and reiterated the rule in the
following excerpts from People vs. Pinuila, G.R No. L-11374, jam cit.:

The decision of this Court on that appeal by the government from the order of dismissal,
holding that said appeal did not place the appellants, including Absalong Bignay in
double jeopardy, signed and concurred in by six justices as against three dissenters
headed by the Chief Justice, promulgated way back in the year 1952, has long become
the latter of the curse. It may be erroneous, judge by the law on double jeopardy as
recently interpreted by this same. Tribunal. Even so, it may not be disturbed and
modified. Our recent interpretation of the law may be applied to new cases, but certainly
not to an old one finally and conclusively determined. As already stated, the majority
opinion in that appeal is now the law of the case.

The same principle, the immutability of the law of the case notwithstanding subsequent
changes of judicial opinion, has been followed in civil cases:

Fernando vs. Crisostomo, 90 Phil. 585; Padilla vs. Paterno, 93 Phil. 884; Samahang

Magsasaka, Inc. vs. Chua Guan, L-7252, February, 1955.

It is thus clear that posterior changes in the doctrine of this Court can not retroactively be
applied to nullify a prior final ruling in the same proceeding where the prior adjudication
was had, whether the case should be civil or criminal in nature. 9

Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy and judicial time and the interests of litigants, as
well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability be accorded the solemn and final
judgments of the courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. There can be no question that such reasons
apply with greater force on final judgments of the highest Court of the land.

WHEREFORE, certiorari is granted, the Orders complained of are hereby annulled and set aside, and
respondent Judge is directed to issue an Order dismissing Civil Case No. V-3064. With costs against
private respondents.

Barredo, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

Castro, C.J., concurs in the result.

Fernando, J., took no part.