594617

research-article2015
PLT0010.1177/1473095215594617Planning TheoryAlexander

Essay

Planning Theory
1­–13
There is no planning—only © The Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/1473095215594617
Notes for spatial planning plt.sagepub.com

theories

Ernest R Alexander
University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, USA; APD–Alexander Planning & Design, Israel

There is no planning—only planning practices

“What is Planning?” is the question John Friedmann (1987) revisits in a recent paper1
that tells how he arrived at his (now popular) definition of planning as the link between
knowledge and action (pp. 38–44). This question has engaged others, focusing on more
specific traits: planning as rational choice (Davidoff and Reiner, 1962), as controlling the
future (Wildavsky, 1973), or as framing subsequent decisions (Faludi, 1987: 116–128).
Forester (1989) defined “planning (as) the guidance of future action” (p. 3); later, we
find planning as storytelling about the future (Throgmorton, 1992; Van Hulst, 2012:
301), as “the premeditation of action” (Harris, 1996: 483), as expectation management
(Hartmann, 2012: 243), and as a “language game” (Lord, 2014: 37–39). The problem
with all these definitions is not that they are not true; it is that they are too abstract for
closure.2
Vickers’ (1968) definition, “Planning is what planners do,” looks like a tautology, but
it offers a pragmatic answer to the question. One of its merits is that it closes an infinite
regress of debate.3 As an old party in this debate, I have come to the conclusion that the
effort to define “planning” is futile.4 Platonic definitions may make interesting theory,
but realism demands a contingent, not a universal, definition of planning. Vickers’ defi-
nition’s other merit is its validation principle, the social construction of knowledge.
Expanding Vickers in the light of this principle: “Planners” are the people who a particu-
lar community acknowledges are involved in a process it recognizes as “planning.”
This leads to an interesting discovery: only one set of people talks about “planning” with-
out any qualification—planning theorists. Everyone else refers to “planning” with a substan-
tive descriptor (implicit or explicit). The referent may be disciplinary or professional: city and
regional—or town and country planning, economic planning or transportation planning; or

Corresponding author:
Ernest R Alexander, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI, USA. APD-alexander Planning &
Design, 41 Tagore St. #11, Tel-Aviv 6920343, Israel.
Email: eralexander96@gmail.com

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2 Planning Theory 

refer to the object of practice: spatial or territorial planning, urban planning, land use plan-
ning, social planning, community planning, economic development planning, or environ-
mental planning; or delimit the planning domain: regional planning, State planning, corporate
planning; or it may refer to a form of practice: strategic planning, advocacy planning, e-plan-
ning; but the qualifier is universal.
This rule applies in academe, where discussions of planning programs, curricula,
staffing, and accreditation revolve around specific planning areas of expertise or prac-
tice. It applies to planning professionalization, qualifications, and the institutionalization
of planning practice. It applies in planning practice (e.g. recruitment, plan elements,
planning objects, and projects) and it applies everywhere else one can think of: politics,
legislation, the media, and common conversation. Nobody talks about “planning,” or
really means generic planning if she does use the word.
What does this imply for planning? If planning theorists are the only ones who refer
to “planning” and talk to “planners,” perhaps there is no planning at all—if “planning” is
understood as a recognizable practice. The futility of defining planning hints at this, as
some planning theorists recognize.5
But the issue of whether “planning” is a recognizable practice begs the question:
what is a practice?6 This question has no simple answer: there are various definitions
depending on the kind of practice that is the subject of discussion. One broad approach
rejects any single or simple definition, but recognizes hierarchies of practices, some
more powerful and distinct than others—for example, capitalism, cooking, or medicine
as practices—each identifiable by its particular set of “constitutive rules” (Swidler,
2001: 81–83).
Another approach identifies two basic concepts of practice: one descriptive,
which sees practices as behavioral regularities, and the other normative (Rouse,
2001: 183–189). In the normative sense, “actors share a practice if their actions are
answerable to norms of correct or incorrect practice” (p. 189).7 In this sense, prac-
tices are “the patterns and regularities … [that] people learn … are the best ways …
toward the fulfillment of their purposes” (Turner, 2001: 130).8
Schatzki (2001: 48–53) turns Rouse’s dichotomy into a tripartite division, between
practices as defined and organized nexuses of activity, for example, cooking practices
and banking practices, and practices as specifications of what people do: a set of activi-
ties linked by common understandings and abilities—its “teleoeffective structure.”
Finally, there is practice as “institution of meaning”: knowledge-centered practice.9
The knowledge-centered practice is “a set of doings and sayings organized by a pool
of understandings, a set of rules … and common and collective ends, projects, emotions
and beliefs” (p. 53). These practices are “socially recognized forms of activity, done on
the basis of what members learn … capable of being done well or badly, correctly or
incorrectly” (Barnes, 2001: 19) and endowing their “membership with the power to
perform” (p. 20).10
This is an “epistemic practice” (Knorr-Cetina, 2001: 175). Here, practice means more
than simple skill or routine task-performance, but involves specialized knowledge and
expertise. Epistemic practices can operate in various fields, each with its distinct epis-
temic culture. These fields are not limited to the exact sciences, but relate to their specific
“epistemic objects,” which may be real-objective natural things or cognitive-cultural

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Alexander 3

artifacts—in Knorr-Cetina’s term, “scientifically-generated objects” (pp. 175–178). It

follows that understanding and identifying a particular epistemic practice involve learn-
ing and defining its relevant “expert–object relationship” (Knorr-Cetina, 2001: 187).
Now we can revisit the original question: is planning a recognizable practice, to ask:
is planning a knowledge-centered “epistemic” practice? The previous discussion gives a
conclusive answer: no. Planning may be a practice in Schatzki’s (2001: 57–59) broader,
descriptive, sense: planning is what planners do—just as cooking is a practice: a broad
specified set of activities, linked by common understandings and abilities, of what cooks
do when they are cooking.
Planning does not exist as an “epistemic” practice because it is not related or limited
to any identifiable “epistemic object.”11 Specific knowledge-based planning practices do
exist: the commonsense recognition of these planning practices identifies them by their
epistemic objects: spatial, regional, environmental, transportation, social, strategic, or
e-planning.
At a more concrete level, particular identifiable planning practices (per Schatzki’s
definition) also exist: a set of diverse planning practices that are definable, observa-
ble, and researchable. Partitioning the life-world of planning, we can think of a large
(but finite) number of such practices in various planning contexts that differ in sig-
nificant ways. Imagine a large three-dimensional matrix combining the dimensions of
planning purpose/content (identified by sector) with planning scope/institutionaliza-
tion (associated with level or domain) and including some differentiation between
relevant socio-economic, political, and cultural traits, perhaps (for practical purposes)
summarized by country.
Such a matrix yields planning practices that are readily recognizable as real-life situ-
ations. At the local level, they range from advocacy planning for a Colombian barrio,
through community planning in a US inner city, to municipal planning for a European
metropolis (e.g. Frankfurt or Stockholm) or an Asian one like Bangkok or Shanghai.
At intermediate levels (metropolitan, regional), diverse planning practices can be dis-
tinguished in sectoral terms. General spatial–territorial or land use planning appears in
many regional polities, and various kinds of sectoral planning, such as infrastructure,
energy, and environmental planning, are practiced in regional agencies. So we find struc-
ture planning for a UK planning region, metropolitan–regional planning for Abidjan,
environmental planning in the Los Angeles Area Air Pollution Control Agency, and
transportation planning for the Mexican Distrito Federál.
Other planning practices can be identified at the national, transnational (e.g. Benelux,
EC), and international (e.g. UN agencies) levels. Most countries have some form of
national planning in some (sometimes all) of the various sectors, from territorial–spatial
planning through infrastructure to economic planning and industrial policy. At the supra-
national level, examples include Netherlands-Flemish transborder economic develop-
ment planning, EU TEN (Trans Europe Network) transportation planning and project
evaluation, and World Bank development planning (Alexander, 2005).
This review, juxtaposing planning with prevailing concepts of practice, confirms my
previous intuitive conclusion. There is no planning, in the sense of a definable and iden-
tifiable “planning” practice, but “planning” exists as a set of different and diverse plan-
ning practices. These can be grouped in a rough hierarchy.

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4 Planning Theory 

At the highest level of abstraction and generality, there is a “planning” practice that
can be described and theorized. This is planning as “an organized nexus of activity”
generating actions that intervene in the world (Schatzki, 2001: 46, 48). As planning
theory is supposed to be a theory of practice (De Neufville, 1983; Harrison, 2014: 68),
theories of this “planning” practice will be at the same level of abstraction as the subject
practice.12
At the next level, “planning” is a diverse set of specific knowledge-centered practices,
each identifiable by its domain or subject of concern—its “epistemic object” (Knorr-
Cetina, 2001: 187). In contrast to generic “planning” practice, these knowledge-based
planning practices are normative, not just positive-descriptive subjects. It is these “epis-
temic” planning practices, therefore, that must be the subject of (epistemic object) plan-
ning theories, prescriptions, and methodologies.
At the most concrete level of real-life planning, we again find diverse identifiable
planning practices, defined as descriptions of what these planners do: identifiable sets of
actions linked by common understandings (Schatzki, 2001: 46, 53). These contextuated
planning practices can be the subject of study, research, and generalizations that form the
building blocks of constructive theory. This will be at a mid-level of (something) plan-
ning theories, where “(something) planning” refers to a specific “epistemic” planning
practice.
The examples of conventional qualifiers of the generic term “planning” can serve as
a tentative list of such particular planning practices. These include substantive fields, for
example, spatial–territorial planning, transportation planning, environmental planning;
planning domains, for example, State planning, metro-regional planning; and forms of
practice, for example, advocacy planning, e-planning. Any of those is a potential field for
such “(something) planning theories.”
How can we define or identify these particular planning practices? Perhaps there is no
need: any generalization in “planning” theory or research could be framed in contingent
terms, that is, as applying to regional planning, environmental planning, or insurgent
planning,13 to realize the benefits of this approach. But more rigor might demand evi-
dence that a specific “(something) planning” practice really exists, and is not just some
academics’ normative aspiration or theoretical construct, before considering “(some-
thing) planning theories.”
Evidence can come from several sources:

•• Tools: the (something) planner’s distinctive contribution in the co-construction of

knowledge for collective decision-making and action;
•• Object (for practices in substantive fields, for example, spatial planning, environ-
mental planning, transportation planning, community planning): the specific
object of planning intervention related to the (something) planning practice;
•• Practice (for types or forms of planning practice, for example, advocacy planning,
insurgent planning, e-planning14): the distinctive elements characterizing the real-
life practice of (something) planning;
•• Context: the typical arenas in which (something) planning is practiced and the
specific institutional contexts of (something) planning practice, with special atten-
tion to (something) planners’ real-life workplaces. The institutionalization of

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Alexander 5

(something) planning itself is sufficient (but not necessary) evidence in knowl-

edge diffusion (e.g. journals), education (e.g. specialized programs), profession-
alization (e.g. professional associations), and practice (e.g. recruitment).

Next, I will argue that spatial planning is such a practice, presenting the kinds of evi-
dence listed above. Then, I will offer a tentative framework for developing and integrat-
ing a set of theories of spatial planning. While “planning” theory has often disappointed,
theories of spatial planning may be useful.

The case for spatial planning

Proving the need for and existence of the spatial planner as a socially acknowledged and
institutionalized expert professional makes the case for spatial planning. In this way, we
can recognize spatial–territorial planning in general, subsuming land use planning and
development control in particular, as a specialized practice of planning.
The case for the expert spatial planner draws on three kinds of evidence:

•• Tools: the spatial planner’s contribution of expertise in co-construction of

knowledge;
•• Object: the human–social life space that is the object of spatial planning can be
approximated as land–property markets; these need spatial planning;
•• Context: planning institutions are the context of land–property markets and the
locus of most spatial planning practice.

Tools
The co-construction of knowledge looks at how different kinds of knowledge are gener-
ated and applied by particular interests and actors in real-world contexts (Gibbons et al.,
1994). Originating in the field of science and technology studies (Jasanoff, 2004), the
concept of co-construction of knowledge radically changes how we view planning pro-
cesses and how expert and “lay” knowledge can and should be deployed and integrated
in planning practice (Rydin, 2007).
It appears that the relative contribution of non-expert actors’ appreciative knowledge
in the planning process varies in relatively predictable ways across different types of
planning. As the scale of governance rises and planning moves into sectoral and more
specialized domains, appreciative knowledge loses some of its value and systematic
knowledge gains importance (Alexander, 2005). These differences in the status of the
various forms of knowledge reflect differences between planning practices, with changes
in the cast of actors in the planning process as these parameters—level of governance
and sectoral specialization—change.15
Spatial planning at the local–municipal scale and higher levels of governance demand
substantial systematic knowledge, besides the performative knowledge and skills practi-
tioners need to be effective. Spatial planners’ professional expertise, then, is their contri-
bution to the co-construction of planning knowledge in the multi-actor and dialogic
planning process.

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6 Planning Theory 

Object
The ideal object of spatial planning is the totality of human and social activities in space,
to create desirable built and natural environments. Spatial planning is not new: cities and
human settlements have been planned since the dawn of time (Morris, 2013; Rapoport,
1979). Traditional societies formed their built environments through their institutions—
religion, tribal organization, theocratic regimes, autocratic regimes, and democratic
regimes—that inculcated norms, promulgated codes, and enacted the laws that made up
the “tool-kit” of traditional spatial planning.
With modernization, and paralleling the evolution of modern planning, another social
institution came into being: markets. Social and economic historians differ on the causes
and chronology of the development of markets, but since the 19th century, economic
market exchange has become society’s prevailing transactional mode (North, 1977). In
modern societies, markets and their actors are arguably the main factor influencing con-
temporary human–social geography.
Markets have usually been juxtaposed to planning as alternative social ordering sys-
tems, in a debate that continues unresolved (Alexander et al., 2012). But we can come to
some conclusions for specific planning practices: spatial planning is the case here, and
its relevant market is the market for land and real-estate property.
Land–property markets can be a surrogate for the ideal object of spatial planning
because the market values of land and property are a useful approximation of its social
value.16 This enables empirical analysis of the interactions between land–property mar-
kets and spatial planning, to answer some questions. Are land and property “normal”
market goods, in the same way that off-the-shelf products and services are? If they are
not, what are the differences and how do these affect the operation of land–property
markets and the forms of governance they need? Do these differences produce poten-
tially negative consequences, which warrant public intervention to avoid—and if so,
what forms should such intervention take to be effective?
My analysis tested whether land and real-estate meet a set of preconditions for trad-
able goods that includes substitutability, resource replaceability, and use value (rather
than an investment asset). The conclusion that land–property does not meet these require-
ments is irrefutable. The most important attribute of land–property is its location. This
limits its substitutability, sometimes even to zero (generating locational monopolies with
which we are familiar). Locational advantages combine with expected demand to make
land–property an investment asset, creating speculative markets. Negative externalities
demand public intervention, and transaction characteristics affect market governance.
Land–property markets are a special case that needs planning for market or administra-
tive support. In terms of its object, then—territory, land, the location of activities in
space, and created, built, and natural environments—spatial planning is essential, even if
only as a complement to the market.

Context
Several factors in the way land–property markets work create the need for spatial plan-
ning. Relative location—the interdependence between locations and land uses—raises

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Alexander 7

the need for predictive planning and information. Servicing—the interdependence

between land uses and infrastructure, especially transportation—demands indicative
planning. Land–property markets need governance to reduce opportunism, to ensure
transparency, and to define and allocate property and development rights.
Spatial planning intervenes in land–property markets in various ways: the institu-
tional arrangements that frame market actors’ transactions. Planning in bilateral govern-
ance supports future development and property market transactions, involving public
and private agents in various combinations. These include minimal indicative planning
of public infrastructure and facilities; planning by the landowner-developer, who can be
a public or private sector entity; public–private partnerships; and large-scale, long-range
land use planning done by private firms: development corporations owning tracts of land
large enough to ensure their control over their relevant environment. Here, private agents
take over development control, through contractual covenants and restrictions (CCRs)
that are an integral part of every parcel’s deed of sale.
Third-party governance—regulatory planning and development control—invokes
zoning, growth controls, building regulations, and regulation in other areas affecting land
development: environmental regulations, hazard mitigation (e.g. floodplain development
constraints), and special area designations such as coastal management areas and histori-
cal zone designations. Spatial planning is involved in third-party governance of land–
property markets at every scale: local governments and municipalities, collaborative
metropolitan governance, and metropolitan–regional and national statutory planning
(Alexander, 2014a). These institutional frameworks are also the real-life context of spa-
tial planning practice: they are made up of the public agencies, firms, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and other involved organizations that are the practicing spatial
planners’ workplaces.

Framing theories of spatial planning

The two basic aspects of theories of spatial planning are the material object of spatial
planning and spatial planning processes (Needham, 2013). Disaggregating these pro-
duces three dimensions that parallel (not by coincidence) the types of evidence discussed
above. But one more dimension is needed, to contain the normative aspects of theories
that transcend methodology. Adding this produces the following:

1. (What?) The object of spatial planning is human activities in space and their
environment, but for practical purposes the land–property market can serve as
a surrogate. The land–property market, which is not a “normal” market and
needs spatial planning to work, is the object of spatial planners’ practice
(Alexander, 2014a) and one of the subjects of empirical spatial planning
theories.
2. (Where?) The context is the social–institutional environment of spatial planners’
practice. Spatial planning institutions, spanning the public, private, and “third”
sectors alike in various combinations (Alexander, 2001), are most planners’
workplaces. This suggests analysis of the relevant institutional environment and
demands institutional design of spatial planning institutions and processes.

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8 Planning Theory 

3. (How?) The tools are the concepts, methods, skills, and competencies needed for
effective practice.17 These are the expert spatial planner’s contribution to the
social co-construction of knowledge involved in all planning processes. Spatial
planning concepts and methodologies are a central theme of spatial planning
theories, although many of them are transferred from related disciplines, for
example, social and urban geography, urban economics, and sociology.
4. (What for?) The purpose of planning is the topic of much preceding “planning”
theory, but prescribing roles for “planners” has not been very useful. For practic-
ing spatial planning, integrating the above dimensions suggests that spatial plan-
ners’ proper role is as expert professionals intervening in the public interest in the
land–property markets that are in their remit (Alexander, 2013).

Disaggregating “planning” theory to frame theories for spatial planning, as I suggest here,
has two advantages. One is the retreat from categorical normative generalizations (at high
levels of abstraction) toward bounded statements that relate to our actual life experiences and
the contingencies of real-world practice. The other is that this framework can produce theo-
ries, hypotheses, or findings that are debatable. When statements for theories of spatial plan-
ning are offered in a form that enables informed discussion and logical argument, they may
contribute more than universal prescriptions, which can only be in ideological dispute.
The assertions in this essay can demonstrate this, starting with the last. Some of my
friendliest colleagues will properly contest my definition of spatial planners’ purpose and
question my identification of land–property markets as the concrete subject of their efforts.
As progressives—which I am too (Alexander, 2008)—they may not like markets, but that
is immaterial. Their argument may empirically refute the assumption that makes market
values a valid surrogate for individual and social utilities,18 but if they succeed (a necessary
condition for winning this debate), they must also offer a viable substantive alternative, for
example, concrete criteria for evaluating the results of spatial planners’ practice.19 Others
may argue for a radical alternative, to see spatial planning “as a place for condensation of
social relations” (Holgersen, 2015: 5); their case may persuade if it can help practitioners.
Procedural norms for spatial planning practice, which are popular and widely espoused
(e.g. Fischler, 2012), have proved inadequate as realistic prescriptions for good practice.
Another contestable assertion made above is my case for spatial planners’ expertise.
The argument follows from my suggestion that different types and forms of planning
practice invoke different mixes of systematic (experts’) and appreciative-experiential
(“peoples’”) knowledge in the social co-construction of knowledge that is involved in
planning (Alexander, 2005). Although they pay lip service to professional expertise,
“mainstream” planning theorists’ generalizations implicitly deny this, drawing more on
ideologically based norms than on empirical observation. Perhaps my argument will
open the door to more informed discussion and debate.

Implications for planning theory and spatial planning

Planning theory
Mainstream planning theory has some problematic concepts. One is generic “planning,”
with dubious definitions that resist closure and give planning an unlimited domain.

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Alexander 9

Another is the prescription of universalizing normative roles for planning, such as “plan-
ning as moral action” (Friedmann, 1978) or “planning as a philosophy” (Marcusen,
2000: 264–274).20 The validity of any prescription is questionable because generic
“planning” is not a normative practice. These exhortations are problematic because they
create a dilemma: the patent contradiction between “planning” in theory and real-world
planning practices.
My proposals resolve this dilemma, abandoning abstract generalizations about “plan-
ning” to develop mid-level theories for particular planning practices such as spatial plan-
ning. Such mid-level theories can be based on realistic empirical analysis and case studies
of contextuated planning practices, relate to epistemology that fits the relevant epistemic
practice, and develop contingent prescriptions for good practice usable in that context.
Institutionalizing this approach in the development and propagation of (something)
planning theories may be difficult, but worthwhile. Planning journals are a case in point:
all those covering substantive areas of planning (e.g. Land Use Policy, Evaluation) or
defined sub-fields—essentially particular planning practices (e.g. Town Planning Review,
Journal of Environmental Planning & Management, International Journal of E-Planning
Research)—have adopted it already.
But others see (generic) “planning” in their titles and contents as an undifferentiated
field. In some, this reflects the institutional form of their parent organizations (e.g. Journal
of the American Planning Association, European Planning Studies, Journal of Planning
Education & Research), whereas in others (e.g. Planning Theory, International Planning
Studies, Planning Theory and Practice), it expresses the journal’s explicit editorial orien-
tation, consistent with prevailing “planning” theory. For these journals to break down
their contents into regular sub-sections for defined planning practices would be construc-
tive, but such a radical change is too much to expect. A feasible move in the right direction
would see editors demanding more focus from contributors, to identify their articles’ real-
world contexts, limit their findings or prescriptions to relevant contingencies, and name
(best already in the title)21 the particular planning practice(s) they address.

Planning education
The dilemma is especially acute for planning education in the conflict between the
demand for a universal core of general “planning” knowledge and the need for special-
ized knowledge and skills to equip students to become effective practitioners. Now
“planning” schools can openly do what they have been doing all along: offer programs
designed for specific planning practices. Curriculum design for spatial planning can ask,
“What do spatial planners need to know?” “Which courses and experiences will make
their students better practitioners?”22 These may include developing the political “smarts”
that spatial planners need, asking what specific “technical rules” (Chiodelli, 2012) they
need to know, and asking how they should address “City Form” (Ellis, 2005).

Planning practice
Recognizing spatial planning as a special planning practice has no implications for plan-
ners’ behavior or actions; that is what spatial planners are and what they do.23 But there are
consciousness-raising implications for them. Planners’ frustration at the contrast between

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10 Planning Theory 

their aspirations and the realities of their experiences in practice is well known and not
surprising. It is difficult to reconcile a spatial planner’s prescribed role as a “moral actor”
in the public agency where he works with his actual practice or for her to enact the “planner
as social change agent” in deliberating on a development proposal.
These frustrations can be avoided if spatial planning has a more pragmatic role. Then,
practitioners will not have to aspire to transform society, but can content themselves with
a more mundane—but still challenging—task. Essentially, this is to deploy their techni-
cal knowledge and skills as expert professionals representing the public interest24 (linked
to the politics of planning governance) in intervening in the land–property markets that
are in their remit.

Notes
  1. “What is Planning?” draft of invited lecture at the National University of Chile, Santiago,
Chile (2014) circulated to Editorial Board, Planning Theory.
  2. We can see this by simply substituting another term for “planning,” for example, “Plumbing
links knowledge with action,” “Law as framing subsequent decisions,” or “Politics as a lan-
guage game.”
  3. For example, the debate on “What is planning for?” and what is planning? (Alexander, 1987,
1989; Allison, 1986, 1988).
  4. See Alexander (2005), on which some of this essay is based, for a fuller discussion.
  5. But fail to accept the implications. Calling “planning” an “empty signifier” (Gunder and
Hillier, 2009: 4) in a book on planning is one example; another is the Introduction to a plan-
ning theory compendium that acknowledges a variety of definitions, with different referents
in diverse specialist theories and approaches (Hillier, 2010: 3–5).
  6. For the following section on practice, I am indebted to Benjamin Davy.
  7. This fits well into our discussion of planning later, suggesting that we can identify practices
by their sets of common norms.
 8. The common purposes in this definition are an important factor for identifying specific
(“epistemic”) practices, as elaborated below.
  9. The first two fall under Rouse’s descriptive category; the last is normative.
10. These definitions of a knowledge-centered practice are very relevant to our discussion, lead-
ing straight to the concept of “epistemic practices” (below). They imply social identification
of such practices, the existence of an identifiable institutionalized framework associated with
a specific knowledge-centered practice, and learned expertise that enables performance.
11. This is obvious if we review the “objects” that definitions associate with (generic) planning,
for example, knowledge and action, decisions, the future, rational choice.
12. For example, the “planning” addressed in such planning theories may be any practice in
the public domain that links knowledge with action. Undoubtedly, some “planning” theories
and paradigms at this level of abstraction have enhanced our understanding. But since this
“planning” is not a normative or “epistemic” practice, their normative validity or utility for
practitioners is questionable.
13. This offers a happy resolution of an argument I had with the authors of a Journal of
Planning Education and Research article featuring “stories of insurgent planning” (Sweet
and Chakars, 2010), in which I questioned whether their stories were about “planning”
at all or really about action. Today I agree with the response to my comment (Alexander,
2011; Sweet, 2011), which was that my effort to bound “planning” and distinguish it from
other forms of action was irrelevant, and citing an impressive body of “insurgent plan-
ning” theory and literature.

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Alexander 11

14. E-planning as a particular planning practice is discussed in Alexander (2014b).

15. These can be observed in the illustrative cases of diverse planning practices presented above.
16. According to land economics, land value is the capitalized value of a property’s expected rents
and to a varying extent (which is the subject of extensive research) reflects all the amenities
that the property enjoys attributable to its intrinsic characteristics and location (Albouy, 2009).
17. What makes “effective practice” is not self-evident: how much of it is technical or political; this
also affects what we consider spatial planners’ necessary or relevant tools. In general, it is plausible
to conclude that it is both, in different mixes that vary according to planners’ roles and contexts—
that is, (again) the specific planning practice concerned. Here, Mazza’s (1995, 2002) analytical
differentiation between (technical) planning practice and (political) planning governance is useful.
18. See Note 16 above.
19. The “New Urbanists” do this, and the debate over their model (e.g. Ellis, 2002; Fulton, 1996;
Lund, 2003; Talen, 1999) is a constructive contribution to spatial planning theories.
20. Marcusen (2000: 261–262) recognizes planning as a profession, but her prescription for plan-
ning as a philosophy (opposing neo-classic economics in public policy discourse) expands the
domain of planning in a way that is problematic for professional education and practice.
21. This is already prevailing good practice in these journals.
22. Making “better practitioners” must not limit a program to instrumental training. Including the
normative and/or ideological dimensions of planning, implicit in definitions (which I have
admittedly disparaged) such as “planning as moral action in the public domain” and “plan-
ning as a philosophy,” in spatial planners’ education, is well warranted. The problem is only
when these are the main basis for prescribing the practitioner’s role.
23. For spatial planners’ actual practices and intervention in land–property markets, see, for
example, Adams and Tiesdell (2010).
24. Concepts of the public interest vary (Alexander, 2002); deciding for themselves what this
is, and when and how to represent it, is where spatial planners’ personal and acquired val-
ues, ideology, and ethics interact with the practical application of their substantive-technical
knowledge and skills.

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Author biography
Ernest R Alexander is emeritus Professor of Urban Planning at the University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, USA, and currently practises in Israel. His research interests include rationalities,
organizations, planning processes and institutions, and institutional design.

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