SUBMITTED TO:

ATTY. FAHAD CANDAO

SUBMITTED BY:
FATMA NOR ALJANNA MACOG

TORTS AND
DAMAGES CASES
SUBMITTED TO: ATTY. FAHAD CANDAO
 1. G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., INC., petitioner,

FACTS:
An action for damages was filed by private respondent spouses against petitioner Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company for the injuries they sustained when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and
fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground
conduit system. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which
was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. Gloria Esteban
and Antonio Esteban were both injured.
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were
the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte
and Company, an independent contractor which undertook the construction of the manhole and the conduit
system. Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte.
Barte claimed that it was not aware nor was it notified of the accident involving respondent spouses and that it
had complied with the terms of its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate standard
signs in the vicinity of the work site, with barricades at both ends of the excavation and with red lights at night
along the excavated area to warn the traveling public of the presence of excavations.

ISSUE: Whether PLDT or Barte was negligent.

RULING:
NO. Prescinding from the aforesaid procedural lapses into the substantive merits of the case, we find
no error in the findings of the respondent court in its original decision that the accident which befell private
respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to
negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. Such findings were reached after an exhaustive assessment
and evaluation of the evidence on record, as evidenced by the respondent court's resolution of January 24,
1980 which we quote with approval:
First. Plaintiff's jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had remained on that inside lane,
it would not have hit the ACCIDENT MOUND.
Second. That plaintiff's jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could
have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south of the ACCIDENT MOUND.
Third. Plaintiff's jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff-husband claimed. At that speed, he
could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. The jeep would not have
climbed the ACCIDENT MOUND several feet as indicated by the tire marks. The jeep must have been
running quite fast. If the jeep had been braked at 25 kilometers an hour, plaintiffs would not have been thrown
against the windshield and they would not have suffered their injuries.
Fourth. If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for some
reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the ACCIDENT MOUND, then
plaintiff-husband had not exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident.
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory
to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its
determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known
to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care and prudence,
respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming
arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of petitioner. Furthermore, respondent Antonio
Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he
imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost every day and had
knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and
his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.
 2. G.R. No. L-53401 November 6, 1989
THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
v.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES,
VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA JUAN, respondents.

FACTS:
In the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon by the code name
"Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake.
Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967, after the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were
beginning to recede the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the house of her
son-in-law, Antonio Yabes and proceeded northward towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of
which she was the owner and proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein that might have been
damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at
the Five Sisters Grocery and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema. Aida and Linda
walked side by side at a distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased. Suddenly, the deceased
screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from
doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and
moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the
house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away from her he turned back
shouting that the water was grounded. Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help from Antonio Yabes at
the YJ Cinema building which was four or five blocks away. When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto
that his mother-in law had been electrocuted, he acted immediately. With his wife Jane, together with Ernesto
and one Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the people of defendant
INELCO to cut off the electric current.
An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250,000 was instituted by the heirs of the
deceased with the aforesaid CFI on June 24, 1968. In its Answer (Vide, Record on Appeal, p. 55, Rollo),
petitioner advanced the theory, as a special defense, that the deceased could have died simply either by
drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner INELCO is negligent.

RULING:
YES. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may
be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the
intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place.
Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the
general public"... considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of
electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this
high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be" (Astudillo vs.
Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself
from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God
combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the
injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" (38 Am. Jur., p. 649).

Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar.
It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a
roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong, the deceased,
accompanied by the former two, were on their way to the latter's grocery store "to see to it that the goods were
not flooded." As such, shall we punish her for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by
imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not.
For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a
known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property
of another is in peril (65A C.S.C. Negligence (174(5), p. 301), or when he seeks to rescue his endangered
property (Harper and James, "The Law of Torts." Little, Brown and Co., 1956, v. 2, p. 1167). Clearly, an
emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending
loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to
be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private
respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by
petitioner's negligence (ibid., p. 1165, 1166).
 3. G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918
AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant,
v.
FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee.

FACTS:
Amado Picart was riding on his pony over Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union When Smith
approached from the opposite direction in an automobile with rate of speed of about ten or twelve miles per
hour. As the Smith neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it
appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile and heard the warning signals. Being perturbed by the rapid approach of the
vehicle, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the
left. The bridge is about 75 meters and a width of only 4.80 meters. The vehicle approached without slowing
down. Smith quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing
where it as then standing; but due to the automobile’s close proximity to the animal, the animal became
frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it has struck on
the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken.
The horse fell and its rider was thrown off. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

ISSUE: Whether Smith was guilty of negligence and liable for civil obligations

RULING:
YES. We are of the opinion that he is so liable. As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the
right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the
center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment
have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the
nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from
this moment it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of
greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either
to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the
other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this,
the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse.
A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course
which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the
rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant
the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was
also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly
responsible. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.
Test of Negligence:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence.
“Last clear chance” rule is applicable. In other words, when a traveler has reached a point where he cannot
extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the injury, his negligence in reaching that position
becomes the condition and not the proximate cause of the injury and will not preclude a recovery.
 4. People of the Philippines v Danny Delos Santos Y Fernandez
GR 135919

FACTS:
Eye witnesses have positively identified Danny Delos Santos as the perpetrator over the death of Rod
Flores. According to their statements, they saw Delos Santos stab from the back Rod Flores multiple times
which resulted to the latter’s death. A doctor testified that the death of Flores was caused by multiple stab
wounds in different parts of the latter’s body including those which were done in his back. In his defense,
Delos Santos said that he was 40 meters away from the crime scene when the incident happened.
RTC found Delos Santos guilty of murder and was condemned by the court to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased for the victim’s death. This was challenged, however, on the ground that the guilt of Delos
Santos was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether the order to indemnify the heirs of the deceased was proper.

RULING: Yes, the order is proper. The Supreme Court ruled: the positive identification, where categorical
and consistent without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter,
prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative and self-
serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.
 5. Belgian Overseas v Philippine First Insurance
GR 143133

FACTS:
CMC Trading A.G. shipped on board the M/V Anangel Sky at Hamburg, Germany 242 coils of
various Prime Cold Rolled Steel Sheets for transportation to Manila consigned to the Philippine Steel Trading
Corporation. On July 28, 1990, M/V Anangel Sky arrived at the port of Manila and within the subsequent
days, discharged the subject cargo. Four coils were found to be in bad order, and the consignee declared the
same as total loss.

ISSUE: Whether the carrier liable.

RULING: Yes. Well-settled is the rule that common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence and vigilance with respect to the safety
of the goods and the passengers they transport. Thus, common carriers are required to render service with the
greatest skill and foresight and "to use all reason[a]ble means to ascertain the nature and characteristics of the
goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including such methods as
their nature requires." The extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally
placed in the possession of and received for transportation by the carrier until they are delivered, actually or
constructively, to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them.

Mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a common carrier and of their arrival in bad order at their
destination constitutes a prima facie case of fault or negligence against the carrier. If no adequate explanation
is given as to how the deterioration, the loss or the destruction of the goods happened, the transporter shall be
held responsible.
 6. Sps Africa and Heirs of Dominga Ong v Caltex Philippines
L-12986

FACTS:
A fire broke out a Caltex service station. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck
into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was
inserted. The fire spread to and burned several houses. The owners, among them petitioner spouses Africa and
heirs of Ong, sued respondents Caltex Phil., Inc., the alleged owner of the station, and Mateo Boquiren, the
agent in charge of its operation, for damages.

The CFI and CA found that the petitioners failed to prove negligence of the respondents, and that
there was due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees.

ISSUE: Whether res ipsa loquitur doctrine is applicable to hold the respondents liable.

RULING:
Yes, the doctrine is applicable.
Res ipsa loquitur literally means “the thing or transaction speaks for itself.” For the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur to apply, the following requisites should be present: (a) the accident is of a kind which ordinarily
does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing conduct which would
make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. In the case at bar, the gasoline station, with all its appliances,
equipment and employees, was under the control of respondents. A fire occurred therein and spread to and
burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were
respondents and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable
inference that the incident happened because of want of care. The negligence of the employees was the
proximate cause of the fire, which in the ordinary course of things does not happen. Therefore, the petitioners
are entitled to the award for damages.
 7. G.R. No. L-52732 August 29, 1988
F.F. CRUZ and CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, GREGORIO MABLE as substituted by his wife LUZ ALMONTE
MABLE and children DOMING, LEONIDAS, LIGAYA, ELENA, GREGORIO, JR., SALOME,
ANTONIO, and BERNARDO all surnamed MABLE, respondents.

FACTS: The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner was situated adjacent to the residence of private
respondents. The private respondent Gregorio Mable first approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to
request that a firewall be constructed between the shop and private respondents' residence. The request was
repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears. Then, fire broke out in petitioner's shop. The fire spread to
private respondents' house. Both the shop and the house were razed to the ground. The cause of the
conflagration was never discovered. Private respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case?

RULING: Yes. The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine, considering that in the
normal course of operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips,
sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found thereon.
It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of petitioner or its employees was not
merely presumed. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed to construct a firewall between its shop
and the residence of private respondents as required by a city ordinance; that the fire could have been caused
by a heated motor or a lit cigarette; that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the shop; and that
workers sometimes smoked inside the shop [CA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 33.]
Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner's failure to construct a firewall in
accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of negligence.
In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty of negligence since it had failed
to construct a firewall between its property and private respondents' residence which sufficiently complies
with the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations
had been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence. The Court of Appeals, therefore, had more than adequate
basis to find petitioner liable for the loss sustained by private respondents.
 8. G.R. No. L-3240-R, September 20, 1949
ESPIRITU, petitioner vs. PHILIPPINE POWER AND DEVELOPMENT CO., respondent

FACTS: In the afternoon of May 5, 1946 while the plaintiff-appellee and other companions were loading
grass, an electric transmission wire, installed and maintained by the defendant Philippine Power and
Development Co., Inc., alongside the road suddenly parted, and one of the broken ends hit the head of the
plaintiff as he was about to board the truck. As a result, plaintiff received the full shock of 4,400 volts of the
wire. The electric charge coursed through his body and caused extensive and serious multiple burns from skull
to eyes, leaving the bone exposed in some parts and causing intense pain and wounds that were not
completely healed when the case was tried on June 18, 1947, over one year after the incident. Defendant
disclaimed such liability on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show any specific act of negligence.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent is liable for damages.

RULING: Yes. While it is the rule, as contended by the appellant, that in case of non-contractual negligence,
or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish that the proximate cause of injury was
the negligence of the defendant, it is also a recognized principle that ‘where the thing that causes injury,
without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not occur as if he having such control used proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from the defendant’s want of
care.’ And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he had observed due diligence and care.
This rule is known by the name of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself), and is peculiarly
applicable to the case at bar, where it is unquestioned that the plaintiff had every night to be on the highway,
and the electric wire was under the sole control of the defendant company. In the ordinary course of events,
electric wires do not part suddenly in fair weather and injure people, unless they are subject to unusual strain
and stress or there are defects in their installation, maintenance and supervision, just as barrels do not
ordinarily roll out of the warehouse windows to injure passers-by, unless someone is negligent (which is
admittedly not present), the fact that the wire snapped suffices to raise a reasonable presumption of negligence
in its installation, care and maintenance. Thereafter, as observed by Chief Baron Pollock “if there are any facts
inconsistent with negligence, it is for the defendant to prove.”
 9. G.R. No. L-44748, SECOND DIVISION, August 29, 1986, PARAS, J.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC. (RCPI). petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and LORETO DIONELA, respondents.

FACTS: Loreto Dionela filed a complaint of damages against Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.
(RCPI) due to the telegram sent through its Manila Office to the former, reading as follows:
176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO DIONELA CABANGAN
LEGASPI CITY WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF
CHECK-PER 115 PM SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-KANG PADALA
DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO
Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him wounded his feelings,
caused him undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business because other people have come to
know of said defamatory words. RCPI alleges that the additional words in Tagalog was a private joke between
the sending and receiving operators, that they were not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did
not form part of the telegram, and that the Tagalog words are not defamatory. The RTC ruled that the
additional words are libelous for any person reading the same would logically think that they refer to Dionela,
thus RCPI was ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of P40, 000.00. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision ruling that the company was negligent and failed to take precautionary steps to avoid the
occurrence of the humiliating incident, and the fact that a copy of the telegram is filed among other telegrams
and open to public is sufficient publication; however, reducing the amount awarded to P15, 000.00
ISSUE: Whether RCPI shall be held liable.
RULING: Yes. Petitioner's contentions do not merit our consideration. The action for damages was filed in
the lower court directly against respondent corporation not as an employer subsidiarily liable under the
provisions of Article 1161 of the New Civil Code in relation to Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The cause
of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code. As well as on
respondent's breach of contract thru the negligence of its own employees. Petitioner is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting messages. Everytime a person transmits a message
through the facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the
petitioner undertakes to transmit the message accurately. There is no question that in the case at bar, libelous
matters were included in the message transmitted, without the consent or knowledge of the sender. There is a
clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent
to the private respondent.
As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence the acts of its employees in
receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not liable
directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner's business is to deprive the general public
availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy. In most cases, negligence must
be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However, since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some
cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering the
presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.
 10. G.R. No. 184905               August 28, 2009
LAMBERT S. RAMOS, Petitioner,
vs.
C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION, Respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner Ramos is the employer of Rodel Ilustrisimo. While Rodel was driving the Ford Expedition
of petitioner an accident ensued, wherein it bumped with a Corrolla Altis driven by Aquilino Larin and owned
by Respondent COL Realty. Due to the impact of the vehicular mishap, the passenger of the sedan was
injured.
A case was filed against Ramos making him solidarily liable with his driver.  Ramos in his opposition
argued that he cannot be held solidarily liable since it is Aquilnio's negligence that is the proximate cause of
the accident. He further argued that when the accident happened, Aquilino violated an MMDA order, i.e.
prohibiting the crossing is the place where the accident happened.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner can be held solidarily liable with his driver, Rodel Ilustrisimo, to pay respondent
C.O.L. Realty of actual damages suffered in a vehicular collision.

RULING: No. There is no doubt that Aquilino’s violation of the MMDA prohibition against crossing
Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate cause of the accident. It becomes apparent
therefore that the only time a plaintiff, the respondent herein, can recover damages is if its negligence was
only contributory, and such contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. It has been
clearly established in this case, however, that respondent’s negligence was not merely contributory, but the
sole proximate cause of the accident.
As culled from the foregoing, respondent was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Respondent’s
vehicle should not have been in that position since crossing the said intersection was prohibited. Were it not
for the obvious negligence of respondent’s driver in crossing the intersection that was prohibited, the accident
would not have happened. Assuming, however, that petitioner’s driver was indeed guilty of any contributory
negligence, such was not the proximate cause of the accident considering that again, if respondent’s driver did
not cross the prohibited intersection, no accident would have happened. No imputation of any lack of care on
Ilustrisimo’s could thus be concluded. It is obvious then that petitioner’s driver was not guilty of any
negligence that would make petitioner vicariously liable for damages.
As the sole proximate cause of the accident was respondent’s own driver, respondent cannot claim
damages from petitioner.
It was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article
2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of
his injury, he cannot recover damages.  

Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel’s contributory negligence, since it
cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the
accident. Rodel’s contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from
respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating
the award of damages in his favor. In other words, an assertion of contributory negligence in this case would
benefit only the petitioner; it could not eliminate respondent’s liability for Aquilino’s negligence which is the