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of Huddersfield Repository
Heptinstall, Thomas
From SniderEnfield, to MartiniHenry, to the Magazine LeeMetford: An Historical and Technical
Overview of the Development of British Military Rifles from 1866 to 1895
Original Citation
Heptinstall, Thomas (2016) From SniderEnfield, to MartiniHenry, to the Magazine LeeMetford:
An Historical and Technical Overview of the Development of British Military Rifles from 1866 to
1895. Masters thesis, University of Huddersfield.
This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/30321/
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From Snider-Enfield, to Martini-Henry, to the Magazine Lee-
Metford: An Historical and Technical Overview of the
Development of British Military Rifles from 1866 to 1895
A dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for:
AX501 - History MA by Research (Music Humanities and Media) FT
Thomas Heptinstall BA (Hons)
U1258695
September 2016
Word Count: 30603
1
Academic Tutors:
Reverend Paul Wilcock BEM, BA Hons, MA, PhD, FHEA, Director, Arms and Armour Research
Institute
Peter Smithurst, Visiting Research Fellow, University of Huddersfield,
Curator Emeritus, Royal Armouries
Dr Steve Burt, Visiting Professor, University of Huddersfield
Acknowledgements:
This thesis would not have been possible without the help of the acknowledged experts that
were kind enough to provide primary materials, published research, topic specific
knowledge and advice that contributed to its development. This includes Ian Skennerton,
who was kind enough to share a lifetime’s work and offer to accommodate me on my
travels. It also includes Peter Smithurst, Malcolm Cobb and Andrew Appleby who offered
continued help that was invaluable my research. I would also like to credit York Army
Museum and its staff for their assistance and the Royal Armouries staff at both the library
and the National Firearms Centre for their support and expertise.
2
Copyright Statement:
i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns
any copyright in it (the “Copyright”) and he has given The University of Huddersfield the
right to use such Copyright for any administrative, promotional, educational and/or teaching
purposes.
ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts, may be made only in accordance with the
regulations of the University Library. Details of these regulations may be obtained from the
Librarian. This page must form part of any such copies made. Postgraduate Research
Degrees: Guidelines for the submission of work for examination Page.
iii. The ownership of any patents, designs, trademarks and any and all other intellectual
property rights except for the Copyright (the “Intellectual Property Rights”) and any
reproductions of copyright works, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which
may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by
third parties. Such Intellectual Property Rights and Reproductions cannot and must not be
made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant
Intellectual Property Rights and/or Reproductions.
iv. The candidate confirms that this work is their own and appropriate reference has been
given where reference has been made to the work of others.
3
Contents
List of Tables 5
Introduction 7
Methodology 10
Breech-Loaders for all: The .577 Snider-Enfield Rifle
- Introducing the Arm 13
- Choosing the Snider-Enfield 16
- A technical overview of the Snider-Enfield 33
- The Snider in battle 46
- Conclusions 53
The search for the 'Perfect Arm': The .450/577 Martini-Henry Rifle
- The search for a 'Perfect Arm': The ‘Faux Pas’ of the Sub-Select Committee 58
- Back to the drawing board: The Martini-Henry is born 66
- A technical overview of the Martini-Henry 76
- A symbol of imperialism: The Martini-Henry in battle 94
- Conclusions 101
Transitioning into modernity: ‘The Magazine Rifle, .303’
- Keeping up with the continent: Adopting magazine arms Into the Infantry 106
- A technical overview of ‘The Rifle, Magazine, .303’ 117
- A revolution unnoticed: the Lee-Metford In battle 137
- Conclusions 146
Conclusions 148
Bibliography 151
4
List of Tables
Breech-Loaders for all: The .577 Snider-Enfield Rifle
- Introducing the Arm
Table 1. Selected designs for further trial with attached notable features 20
Table 2. Rifle speed tests (06/02/1865) 22
Table 3. Rifle accuracy tests (06/02/1865) 23
Table 4. Accuracy tests on the Snider with revised ammunition 23
Table 5. Stoppages after 270 rounds of ammunition
The search for the 'Perfect Arm': The .450/577 Martini-Henry Rifle
- Introducing the Arm
Table 1. Accuracy at 300 yards, Special Sub-Committee of the Ordnance 60
Select Committee report
Table 2. Accuracy at 500 yards, Special Sub-Committee of the Ordnance 60
Table 3. Mean Elevation of trials rifles firing at 300 yards, Special Sub- 61
Committee of the Ordnance Select Committee report
Table 4. Rapidity test of trials rifles, Special Sub-Committee of the Ordnance 61
- The search for a 'Perfect arm': The ‘Faux Pas’ of the Sub-Select Committee
Table 1. Snider-Enfield comparison trials with contemporary muzzle-loaders 68
Table 2. Accuracy trials at 300 and 500 yards 69
Table 3. Accuracy trials at 800 and 1000 yards 69
Table 4. 1869 Breech competition finalists 70
Table 5. Initial troop responses after firing ten rounds from the Martini-Henry 74
rifle
5
Transitioning into modernity: ‘The Magazine Rifle, .303’
- Keeping up with the continent: Adopting magazine arms Into the Infantry 102
Table 1. Smith's Committee finalists 108
Table 2. Trials rifle contenders 1887 111
Table 3. Comparison of small bore rifling trials results 8th June 1887. 113
- A technical overview of ‘The Rifle, Magazine, .303’
Table 1. Magazine Lee-Metford Mark I testing to establish service life, 1890. 130
6
An Introduction
In the period from 1866 to 1895, Britain was the leading world power whose Empire
stretched from Canada to India to New Zealand. Although it was one of the first
industrialised nations, other countries such as France and the United States were beginning
to challenge its dominance, particularly in terms of technological change. The British Empire
could only survive if it retained a dominant military position which meant supporting the
most powerful army and navy in the world. To achieve this, it was essential that the
weaponry carried by these armed forces was as technologically advanced as possible.
In the early 1860s, British and colonial armed forces numbered around 220,000 men.1 Given
the state of continuous expansion, many of these forces were engaged in a continuous cycle
of colonial conflicts. They required the best equipment available and this was sourced from
the Ordnance Department, which from 1855 onwards was part of the War Office, with a
financial budget second only to that of Her Majesty's Treasury.2 In 1866, this stood at
£26,100,000, or thirty-nine percent of all government spending.3 Standing alongside the
regular army was a volunteer force, which in 1862 numbered 162,681 available men.4
Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, this force was slowly absorbed into
the Army in the form of reserves. These volunteer forces were required to fund and provide
their own equipment, and so had a vested interest in acquiring the most modern arms
available. By law these weapons had to be provided by the War Office, and so were also
supplied by the Ordnance Department.
There was consequently a clear interest in procuring the finest rifles possible. To achieve
this, special Ordnance Committees were assembled by the War Office. These Committees
consisted of small teams of veteran officers, who were also firearms enthusiasts
themselves. They were tasked with sourcing the best rifles they could find through a series
of rifle trials. As the period from 1866 to 1895 coincided with a major technological
1
This was quite small when compared to France with 400,000 men in 1860 or Russia with 1,132,000 men in
1864. Unlike most countries on the continent, the British army was not conscripted.
2
N. Skentlebery, Arrows to atom bombs: a history of the Ordnance Board (London, 1975)
3
B. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics (London, 2011)
4
H. Cunningham, The Volunteer Force: A Social and Political History 1859-1908(London, 1975), p. 22
7
revolution and the development of mass production techniques, changes to small arms
advanced at an unprecedented rate. In the early 1860s, military firearms were slow, single
shot, muzzle-loading rifles (powder and shot were manually poured down and packed into
the barrel of the rifle). Yet just thirty years later the British military had access to small-bore,
magazine fed, rapid fire breech-loading rifles (loading the rifle by means of a cartridge in the
breech). Due to these rapid changes, the Ordnance Committees were locked in an almost
endless process of rifle trials, selecting the best competitors for use in British service. Across
this period, these selections were the Snider-Enfield, the Martini-Henry and the Lee-
Metford.
Despite such enormous effort by the War Office it is worth noting that rifles issued to the
military in this era lagged behind those that were available on the commercial market. For
example, in America in 1860, Benjamin Henry developed the Henry repeating rifle that was
breech-loading, had self-contained cartridges and was also magazine fed.5 Although
ingenious in their design, rifles such as these were never fit for the general infantry as they
were regarded as unsafe, unreliable or underpowered. Conversely, military rifles had to be
durable, reliable, accurate, fast and powerful, and it was only from 1866 to 1895 that this
became possible. This technological advancement in small arms will be charted in this thesis
which will focus on the development of the Ordnance Committee's three selections: the
Snider-Enfield of 1866, the Martini-Henry of 1874 and the Lee-Metford of 1888.
This analysis will be broken into three sections and will highlight why a new rifle was
required for the British Army and how the relevant Committee went about selecting it. First,
the selection process of each rifle is examined. This involves the rigorous trial process each
rifle underwent. For example, when selecting the Snider-Enfield, forty-three rival designs
were submitted which had to be processed.6 In examining this Committee activity, it can be
shown that the Snider-Enfield, Martini-Henry and Lee-Metford were all the most
technologically advanced, financially viable and the best option available to the Committees
at the time.
Each specific rifle will then be analysed from a technical aspect, in an assessment of how the
Snider-Enfield, the Martini-Henry and the Lee-Metford would be operated by a soldier.
5
D. Butler, United States Firearms The First Century 1776-1875 (New York, 1971), p.229
6
Ordnance Select Committee Report, Breech-Loading Small Arms 1859-1864 (12/10/1864)
8
These chapters also discuss how each rifle actually worked, by looking at the functions of
each component part. In doing so, this will show how small arms were developed over time,
with each new design implemented across the era being simpler to operate and capable of
firing faster than its predecessor. Once issued, each individual rifle also underwent a
constant process of improvement, either to remedy inherent flaws of the rifles or to
improve them further. As this is part of how the rifles actually functioned, the development
of each rifle will also be provided in the technical overview.
The final section of each chapter will then show how, once issued to the British Army, the
Snider-Enfield, the Martini-Henry and the Lee-Metford actually performed on the
battlefield. By analysing the role of the rifle in a range of scenarios, from small colonial
conflicts, to huge theatres of battle, the historical impact of each rifle can be shown. The
significance of each weapons system will also be proven as all three saw extended use once
they had been officially replaced. In combining the original selection process of each rifle
with the technical overview and impact on the battlefield, the historical importance of each
rifle can ultimately be shown.
9
Methodology
This thesis is based on a wide range of primary and secondary sources. The first line
of enquiry focused on the existing secondary literature available. Although there were
extensive sources for rifles such as the Martini-Henry and the Lee-Metford, there was a
paucity of material for the Snider-Enfield. The secondary literature on the topic was
instigated by the historian Ian Skennerton in the late 1970's, with works such as 'A Treatise
on the Snider, The British Soldier's Firearm 1866-c.1880'.7 Skennerton's work subsequently
dominated the historiography on British military small arms for over thirty years. It is only in
the past decade that the dynamic has changed, and new literature has been introduced,
such as Martin Pegler's 'The Lee-Enfield Rifle' in 2012.8 Some works, like that of Stephen
Manning's 'The Martini-Henry Rifle' were published as late as 2013.9 Others are yet to be
published, such as Martin Cobb's upcoming book on the Snider-Enfield.
These publications all focus on one rifle of the period, and are excellent sources for detailed
statistical information on each separate rifle. They provide an insight into where each rifle
was used, what it was capable of and other statistical information such as the rifle's weight
or size. They were therefore useful in forming a basic knowledge on the subject. In focusing
on just one rifle, however, they all failed to assess the small arms development over the
period as a whole. The only literature that achieves this, such as Christopher Roads' 'The
British Soldier's Firearm, 1850-1864', is based around a completely different period in
time.10 There was therefore a substantial gap in the historiography on the subject.
In order for the thesis to fill this gap, and present a detailed analysis of small arms
development over time, it was crucial to meet the acknowledged experts in the field, in
order to discuss how my research could build upon their work. As Ian Skennerton had been
the principle historian on the subject, in December 2015 I travelled to the Gold Coast in
7
I. Skennerton, A Treatise on the Snider, The British Soldier's Firearm 1866-c.1880 (Margate, AU, 1977)
8
M. Pegler, The Lee-Enfield Rifle (Oxford, 2012)
9
S. Manning, The Martini-Henry Rifle (Oxford, 2013)
10
C. Roads, The British Soldier's Firearm, 1850-1864, from Smooth-Bore to Small-Bore (London, 1964)
10
Queensland, Australia to discuss my thesis with him, and spent three weeks assessing how
my research would develop. Other historians were then consulted upon my return to
England, including Malcolm Cobb who wrote 'The Martini-Henry Notebook' and is an expert
on British and South African small arms.11 Interviews were also conducted with the historian
Andrew Appleby, who is currently writing the book 'Thomas Wilson his Patents, Arms and
Ammunition' and is acknowledged as an expert in nineteenth century small arms.12
These consultations proved to be incredibly useful. Through engaging with the experts in
the field, or by consulting other secondary literature, I gained a great deal of factual
information on the topic, as well as gaining access routes to previously unused primary
documents. Through these discussions, another gap in the published research was
beginning to present itself. Whilst some of these texts did look at how each rifle was chosen
by each Committee, they did not ask why, or by whom, or provide a level of detail to
ascertain why it was an important choice as part of the wider context. Changes and
developments in the rifles had always been recorded, but the reasons behind these
developments seemed to be missing.
Instead of simply stating that a change took place, as the secondary sources tend to do, the
focus of the thesis developed to establish why it took place, for example, with the Martini-
Henry, later models had a thumb rest added and a lengthened butt which is described in
Skennerton's 'Treatise on the Martini' series, but what is not explained is why the War Office
needed to change it in the first place.13 By going back to the primary source documents,
such as troop reports on the Martini-Henry, it was found that this was done because young
soldiers were injuring themselves when firing the rifle as its recoil was too great. Similarly, in
the Martini-Henry trials Skennerton documents that Mr Westley Richards withdrew his rifle
from the competition. When looking at the original reports as to why it happened, it was
11
M. Cobb, The Martini-Henry Notebook, The Life and Times of a Grand Old Rifle (Gillette, New Jersey 2007)
12
A. Appleby, Thomas Wilson, his Patents, Arms and Ammunition, Research Press, Historical Breechloading
Small Arms Association (2008)
13
B. Temple, I. Skennerton, A Treatise on the British Military Martini, The Martini-Henry 1869-C1900 (London,
UK, 1983)
11
found that Mr Westley Richards had actually had a disagreement with the Small Arms
Committee, causing him to angrily back out of the competition.14
Returning to the primary sources to establish why developments actually took place in this
manner forms a large part of the thesis. The first section of all three chapters deals with the
trials process leading to the selection of a particular rifle, which is based almost entirely on
primary documents, such as minutes, reports, tables and newspaper articles, which was
accessed at the Royal Armouries archives and the Royal Armouries National Firearms Centre
in Leeds. Once supplemented with the existing secondary literature, a detailed assessment
of the trials process could be achieved. After finding out how a rifle was selected, and how it
was operated, it was necessary to establish how it actually performed in the field. Again,
whilst secondary sources provided some information relating to their use in various
conflicts, it was only through primary research that soldiers’ assessments of the rifles could
be gained. As well as the Royal Armouries, this line of research required research trips to
locations such as York Army Museum, to find previously unpublished documents such as
soldier’s diaries and military handbooks.
It is this large variety of original research that allows this thesis to provide a detailed insight
into the process of development of British military small-arms from 1866 to 1895. The three
chapters on the main rifles of the era, the Snider-Enfield, the Martini-Henry and the Lee-
Metford combine to produce an original overview on the progression of British military
small arms, that not only shows the significance of each separate rifle, but also the historical
significance of their development at a time when Britain successfully retained its position as
a dominant world power.
14
Report on rifle selection for service, Special Committee on Breech-Loading rifles (11/02/1869)
12
Breech-Loaders for all:
The .577 Snider-Enfield Rifle
15
15
I. Skennerton, Snider Enfield and Snider Enfield Cavalry Carbine with Armourers tools, the Bob Farris private
firearms collection
13
The story of the Snider-Enfield has often been overlooked in British military history. After all,
breech loading rifles had been in military service on the continent for decades with Prussian
Dreyse and the French Chassepot rifles. Nor was the concept of converted rifles anything
novel. Many other countries in the world were using converted muzzle-loaders, such as the
French with the Tabatiere rifle and the Russians with the Tula rifle.16 Prior to the British
trials, the Snider had been rejected by the United States ordnance department, opting
instead for conversion of their Springfield rifles, which caused Jacob Snider Jr and Eugene
Schneider to take out their joint patent and look for markets in Europe instead.17
Furthermore, the Snider-Enfield only officially served from 1866 to 1871 before it was made
'obsolete' by the Martini-Henry.
The following overview will change this perspective by means of a step-by-step analysis of
the rifle to show why the Snider-Enfield was a historically significant rifle. The first step
comes with the adoption of the Snider-Enfield. The decision to adopt a breech-loader into
British military service was not taken lightly and, even after the decision had been made, it
took almost two years to find a suitable rifle. The analysis of this adoption process is
extremely important from a historical perspective, as every single modern rifle of the day
came together in direct competition with one another. Of the forty eight different rifles that
were submitted, none could compete with the Snider-Enfield, proving that it was the best
rifle available to the British Army at the time.18
Many other aspects of the Snider-Enfield must be considered to prove it was much more
than a 'stop-gap' rifle. A technical overview of the Snider-Enfield's design and manipulation
is incredibly important when assessing this capability. Therefore, the design and operation
of the rifle must be reviewed, alongside the various upgrades the rifle was given throughout
its service life, to show how capable the rifle really was. Finally, an overview of the conflicts
in which the Snider-Enfield was actually involved in will give weight to the fact that it was
indeed a quality, first-class rifle. It was ultimately victorious over older muzzle-loaders in
every single campaign and the Snider's introduction was demonstrably a huge technological
advancement for the British Army.
16
R. Pauly, Firearms: The Life Story of a Technology (London, 2004)
17
I. Skennerton, .577 Pattern 1853 Rifle Musket & Snider Enfield, Small Arms Identification Series (Labrador,
QLD, AU, 2005), p. 16
18
M. Cobb, Cinderella Snider - Unpublished (21/02/2016)
14
The Snider-Enfield was much more than a quick 'stop-gap' solution and by the end of its
official service life alone over 690,000 of them had been produced. 19 It had seen service in
every single continent in the world and of the pitched battles it had been involved in, it had
a 100 percent success rate. The Snider's excellent reputation should not be forgotten. In the
words of Colonel Dixon of the Royal Artillery: 'Three years of use by the soldier have most
satisfactorily established the character of this weapon - superior to any breech loading arms
of any foreign army today. '20
19
I. Skennerton, .577 Snider-Enfield Rifles & Carbines, British Service Longarms 1866-c.1880 (Labrador, AU,
2003), p. 220
20
Skennerton, .577 Snider-Enfield Rifles & Carbines, British Service Longarms 1866-c.1880, p. 220
15
Choosing the Snider-Enfield
This committee, composed of practical officers, unanimously report in favour of arming

the infantry with breech loading rifles. The question must be dealt with in two ways -
either by ascertaining the speediest and cheapest mode or by determining the most
perfect arm to be used by the infantry. We must first adopt the readiest means for
converting existing arms of service. Having thus armed the troops, we should proceed to
enquire fully and deliberately what form of rifle would be most perfect.
De Grey's official statement 11 July 186421
The formal decision to adopt a universal breech-loader into British service in 1864
had not been made lightly. To re-equip the army would be an expensive venture, made
worse by the fact that the Britain had produced over 1,500,000 pattern 1853 rifles that
would become immediately obsolete. It was, however, an unavoidable decision. The
Prussian army had utilised breech-loading Dreyse rifles incredibly successfully with their
victory in Schleswig-Holstein just five months earlier. Worse still, the Emperor of France had
already declared that his troops were to be equipped with breech-loaders as quickly as
possible.22 Britain had been considering breech-loading concepts for general infantry use
since the late 1850s, but the two major developments on the continent sparked the arms
race which ultimately led to the adoption of the Snider-Enfield.
The question can be raised as to why the Committee did not simply copy existing
continental infantry rifles and remove the need to hold a competition. The answer is
twofold. Firstly, cost was a major issue. To immediately switch to a brand new rifle would be
far too expensive for the Committee. Secondly, the War Department had already reviewed
and rejected existing breech-loaders, such as the Dreyse and the Chassepot. The Dreyse was
found to be unsuitable for service because of its serious gas leakage issues.23 The Chassepot
was also scorned as it required a rubber seal which wore away after as little as thirty rounds,
21
De Grey, Ordnance Select Committee Report, Breech-Loading Small Arms 1859-1864 Official Statement
(01/08/1864)
22
De Grey, Ordnance Select Committee Report
23
M. Cobb, The Martini and its Place in History: A Historical Perspective - Unpublished (02/02/2016)
16
which also led to gas leakage.24 Christopher Roads demonstrates this problem perfectly in
his BBC 2 documentary, The Gun: Riflemen All:
Figure 1. Burn damage on the thumb from firing the Chassepot. 25
Developed simultaneously to the infantry rifles were smaller carbines, intended for cavalry
use. The most technologically advanced of this genre of rifles was the American breech-
loading Spencer carbine. The Spencer was a repeating rifle, as it stored extra ammunition in
a tubular magazine in the butt. More importantly, it also made use of the newly developed
self-contained metallic cartridge. The Committee were impressed with the Spencer as 'it did
not require capping as there was a ring of fulminate in the copper cartridge.'26
Unfortunately, the Spencer had too many drawbacks to be considered for general infantry
use. Its main drawback was its inherent lack of power. This was because the Spencer rifles
ammunition performed poorly at long range due to its low velocity.
In Britain, cavalry carbines still required the use of percussion caps, like the .58 Sharps
carbine. The Sharps was an excellent choice for cavalry units. As De Witt Bailey notes, 'it can
be loaded by the right hand, without removing it from the position of which it is usually
carried at the side of the horse.'27 Unfortunately, this rifle also had its drawbacks, such as
issues with gas leakages. The amount of gas escaping at the breech was enough to damage
the eyes of the user. This is again exemplified by Roads, who places a white handkerchief
24
De Grey, 3rd Meeting, Ordnance Select Committee Report, Breech-Loading Small Arms 1859-1862
25
C. Roads, The Gun: Riflemen All, BBC 2 1980'S Film Footage - 2 minutes 54 seconds
26
De Grey, 1st Meeting, Ordnance Select Committee Report, Breech-Loading Small Arms 1859-1864
(09/11/1859)
27
De Witt Bailey, The Sharps In England, 1853-1881, HSBA Journal, Volume 2., p. 4
17
over the breech of the Sharps carbine and then fires it. The resultant fouling on the
handkerchief is the result of just one shot, shown below.
Figure 2. Placing a white handkerchief over the Sharps Carbine's breech.28
Figure 3. Captured gas leakage after firing the Sharps Carbine.29
It is therefore not difficult to understand why the carbine wasn't considered suitable for
general infantry use. Other cavalry issued capping breech loaders in British military service
were also inherently unsuitable for infantry use. The British Westley-Richards carbine was
also trialled but considered unsuitable. This was because the lubrication it required caused
'decomposition of the rifle which affects its performance.'30
As nothing suitable had been discovered, the following Committee meeting brought into
question the need for the British army to even use breech-loaders at all. The multitude of
28
Roads, The Gun: Riflemen All - 3 minutes 56 seconds
29
30
1st Meeting, Ordnance Select Committee Report (09/11/1859)
18
problems they presented were currently outweighing the positives. Furthermore, it was
discovered that the Prussian army now carried up to 120 rounds of ammunition on their
person, which was double the amount that the British soldier currently carried.31 It was
therefore decided that breech-loaders used too much ammunition to be practical arms. This
is shown by committee member Major Young, who claimed that breech-loaders should
never be used by the general infantry, as they present a temptation to fire away all of their
ammunition, instead, they should be used only by 'trained men on special occasions'.32
Subsequent meetings by the Committee took place whenever a new breech-loader was
produced, and were equally pessimistic. Wilson's rifle was shunned on 26th March 1861
because it required a piece of felt wad to stop any gases escaping the breech, which then
had to be fired out by the following shot, which caused inaccuracy.33 The Committee had
some positive comments to make about the Montgomery Storm rifle, believing that its
breech action had its merits. After prolonged testing however, this rifle too was dismissed
because of its inherent accuracy problems. In April 1861 it was reported 'at 300 yards the
Storm is very bad, at 500 it is very bad and at 800 it is positively wild.'34 From this plethora
of rejections, there didn't seem to be any real viable option for the British army's future
breech-loader.
Hope was eventually found in one particular weapon system. On the 2nd August 1860 the
Committee reported that they had 'observed a great merit possessed by one system at least
- which is very different in character from the Storm's and in no way copies it. No
encouragement should be received to the maker to mislead him as to the probability of the
future adoption of his new arm.'35 The rifle was that of Mr Jacob Snider. Major Young's
Committee was so impressed that they were considered implementing the Snider rifle into
service four years before they had even decided that a breech-loader was a requirement of
the general infantry.
31
De Grey, 2nd Meeting, Ordnance Select Committee Report, Breech-Loading Small Arms 1859-1864
32
Major Young, 2nd Meeting, Ordnance Select Committee Report, Breech-Loading Small Arms 1859-1864
33
Ordnance Select Committee Report, Wilson's Rifle Trials, Breech-Loading Small Arms 1859-1864
(26/03/1861)
34
Ordnance Select Committee Report, Mont Storm's Rifle Trials, Breech-Loading Small Arms 1859-1864
(16/04/1861)
35
Ordnance Select Committee Report, Snider's Rifle Trials, Breech-Loading Small Arms 1859-1864
(02/08/1860)
19
By 1864 it can therefore be shown that little had been achieved by the Committee in terms
of finding a breech-loading rifle for the general infantry. Whilst the Committee had a broad
overview on what existed elsewhere, nothing rugged or powerful enough for British service
had been found. As events on the continent caused an increasing need for change, it was at
this point that the Committee leader, De Grey, offered the question to the general public.
Subsequently, on 23rd August 1864, the Secretary of State for War announced the desire to
'receive communications from gun-makers and others on the subject of the best means of
converting the Enfield rifle into a breech-loader.'36 The best way to inspire this innovation is
undoubtedly by means of reward, and so the War Office introduced a competition to find a
new breech-loading rifle for the infantry with a 'bounty' of £5000. The competition had two
main prerequisites - that the arm does not 'exceed the cost of £1', and that the arm 'should
not be inferior to that of an unaltered arm when shooting'.37
The response from British gun makers was outstanding. In just one month forty three rifles
were received by the committee, and by mid-October a further four latecomers had been
submitted.38 Of these, nine were automatically chosen for testing and eleven were marked
for reconsideration. The rest were collectively rejected. Unfortunately, the Dixon rifle was
withdrawn by its designer, leaving eight rifles for initial testing.39 As a rule, these eight rifles
could be split into two distinct categories, those of the old system that still required
percussion caps and those that had self-contained cartridges. The rifles which utilised self-
contained cartridge were preferred by the Committee, as by dispensing with the percussion
cap, the process of firing could be sped up. The selected rifles were outlined on the
following table.
36
J. St George, Director of Ordnance, Trials of Breech-Loading Small-Arms 1864-67, Ordnance Select
Committee (23/08/1864)
37
Muzzle Loaders Association of Great Britain (MLAGB), Transitional Rifles <http://www.enfield-
snider.com/Transitional%20Rifles.htm> [Accessed: 12/11/2015]
38
Ordnance Select Committee Report (12/10/1864)
39
Ordnance Select Committee Report (12/10/1864)
20
Order of
Rifle Means of Ignition Notable Features
Preference
Joint between barrel and chamber secured with an
Montgomery
1 Percussion cap expanding thimble. Operates with a front hinge
Storm
secured by a bolt.
2 Shepards (b) Percussion cap Percussion cap, long hammer to reach the nipple.
Westley Same design as the carbine, utilises a hook at the
3 Percussion cap
Richards end of the plunger for cartridge withdrawal.
Barrel that opens at the top, uses a plunger on a
4 Wilsons Percussion cap bolt. The bolt is rubber sealed to prevent gas
leakage.
Noted from 1863 trials, uses a rotating plunger to
5 Greens Percussion cap
secure breech.
New system. Very simple conversion that dispenses
6 Snider Ignition in cartridge
with percussion caps.
First noted in 1861 trials. Hinged breech partially
7 Joslyn's Ignition in cartridge
ejects empty cases.
First noted in 1864 trials, breech locks in the centre

8 Shepards (a) Ignition in cartridge
of the stock. Only original part retained is the barrel.
Table 1. Selected designs for further trial with attached notable features. 40
Before testing the ability of the top eight rifles, the eleven rifles earmarked for
reconsideration first had to be reviewed. It seems that this process was more of a search for
problems rather than a search for the merits as a wide array of flaws were found with the
reconsidered rifles. Of the eleven, the designs by Adams, Clarks and Manceaux were
rejected as they were considered too complicated to operate. The designs submitted by
Goodman, Benjamin and the two examples given by a Colonel C. were all rejected as they
had parts liable to 'derangement and disjoinment'.41 Wentworth, Needham and Storer's
designs had various breech issues, such as problems with gas escaping and rust. Finally,
Matthew's rifle was rejected simply because it was a 'worse version of the Westley
40
Brig. General Lefroy, Royal Artillery, Snider-Enfield: Report of Ordnance Select Committee on Trials, The War
Office (06/02/1865)
41
Ordnance Select Committee Report, Systems Set Aside but Summarily Rejected, Breech-Loading Small Arms
1859-1864 (12/10/1864)
21
Richards.'42 Unfortunately, this meant that of the not one rifle was selected to face the
other eight in the trials competitions, which were set to commence as quickly as possible.
It was a matter of months, however, before the rifles actually arrived for testing. As the
Committee announced, the delay of competitors in providing their rifles 'retarded the
commencement of the trials', and it was only by 6th February 1865 that the first serious
trials began.43 Despite the late start, only seven of the eight selected rifles actually made it
to Woolwich for testing because the Joslyn rifle never arrived in time. Joslyn was based at
the Joslyn Firearms Company, which operated out of Stonington, Connecticut, in the United
States.44 This meant that once constructed, his rifles had to be shipped overseas.
Unfortunately due to permit troubles in New York, his rifles could not leave the United
States. The rifle therefore could not be considered in the trials.
Worse still for the Committee, of the seven rifles that actually arrived, only five were
actually safe for operation. It was reported that when making the initial inspection of the all
the received arms and their corresponding ammunition, the cartridges for both of the
Shepards rifles literally fell apart when they were picked up. The rifles were immediately
deemed too dangerous to load and so were 'abandoned before a single shot could be
fired.'45
Due to these early eliminations, the Snider rifle was now the only competitor to utilise self-
contained cartridges. As the contemporary magazine, The Mechanic described, 'Mr Snider
now has it all his own way.'46 Unfortunately for Snider, the ammunition he provided was not
of required quality, which proved to be an issue as the trials progressed. It was decided that
once better cartridges could be sourced, the Snider would be re-tested.47 The Committee
still decided to include the Snider in the trials with the other rifles to gain an idea of how it
compared to them even with faulty ammunition.
42
Ordnance Select Committee Report, Systems Set Aside but Summarily Rejected (12/10/1864)
43
Snider-Enfield: Report of Ordnance Select Committee on Trials (06/02/1865)
44
Joslyn 1864 Carbine <http://www.horsesoldier.com/products/firearms/carbines/4323> [Accessed:
11/10/2015]
45
46
Converted Enfield Rifles, The Mechanic's Magazine (08/09/1865)
47
22
The first test was set to gauge which of the weapons systems could be operated the fastest.
Each system was to fire twenty shots at a medium sized target at 100 yards. As the primary
objective of the Committee was to find an improved rifle to the Pattern 1853 Enfield, an
example of the current issue arm would also be trialled alongside the contenders.
Time taken to fire twenty shots at 100 yards

Rifle
(minutes and seconds)
Green 2:26
Wilson 2:44
Snider 2:46
Storm 3:01
Westley Richards 3:29
Pattern 1853 Enfield 6:52
Table 2. Rifle speed tests (06/02/1865).48
The results for the first trial were as expected. All of the breech-loading arms fired twice as
fast as their muzzle-loading competition. The Snider rifle was able to achieve a mid-table
result despite its faulty ammunition. When the Snider was re-tested, with ammunition that
was not faulty, it scored a time of just two minutes, rendering it faster than any other trials
rifle.49
Rapidity of fire alone is irrelevant on the battlefield if absolutely nothing can be hit. The
second trial therefore tested the accuracy of the selected rifles to which extremely
disappointing results were found, shown in Table 3.
48
Brig. General Lefroy, Royal Artillery, 1st Trial Results, Royal Artillery, Report of Ordnance Select Committee
on Trials, The War Office (06/02/1865)
49
Skennerton, .577 Snider-Enfield Rifles & Carbines, British Service Longarms 1866-c.1880
23
Rifle Accuracy Deviation at 500 yards (feet)
Pattern 1853 Enfield 1.64
Westley Richards 1.81
Wilson 2.10
Storm 2.58
Green 3.59
Snider 5.00
Table 3. Rifle accuracy tests (06/02/1865).50
Disappointingly for the Committee, none of the rifles could beat the current service arm in
terms of accuracy. As a general rule, the systems which could fire the fastest appeared to be
the systems that were inherently the most inaccurate. That said, even the slower systems
failed provide suitable results. The poor accuracy of the Snider was not solved until much
later in the Committee's trials when its ammunition was modified by Colonel Boxer. This
modification housed the ammunition in a cartridge made of two brass coils with a covering
of white paper.51 Once this change had been made, the Snider became capable of beating
the Pattern 1853 Enfield in terms of accuracy at 500 yards, a feat no other rifle could
accomplish. Table 4. Shows the results of the revised accuracy tests once Boxer's
ammunition for the Snider rifle had been developed:
Rifle Accuracy deviation at 500 yards (feet)

Snider 1.06
Table 4. Accuracy tests on the Snider with revised ammunition. (Note the Pattern 1853 accuracy has changed
due to different shooting conditions.)52
The accuracy of the Snider had been markedly improved. This does raise the point, however,
that if the other weapon systems had received equal amounts of help from the War Office
to perfect their rifle and ammunition, their systems too could also be dramatically
improved. The Wilson rifle, for example, also had ammunition problems that were never
50
Brig. General Lefroy, 2nd Trial Results, Royal Artillery, Report of Ordnance Select Committee on Trials, The
War Office (06/02/1865)
51
Brig. General Lefroy, Royal Artillery, Snider's Converted Enfield Rifles, 2nd Progress Report, Ordnance
52
Lefroy, Snider's Converted Enfield Rifles, 2nd Progress Report (09/05/1866)
24
solved before the trials process ended.53 It must therefore be noted that these later
accuracy trials were allowed for the Snider system only as a means of fixing its flaws. It had
already been selected for the merits it possessed.
A key trial made by the Committee was that of reliability, as a military arm is useless if it
cannot withstand the strains of constant military use. The reliability trials therefore
examined the probability that each rifle will misfire, as well as how strong and durable it
was when beaten about. In order to test the probability of a misfire, 270 rounds were fired
consecutively from each rifle, and the amounts of stoppages were recorded, shown below.
Rifle Misfires After 270 Rounds

Green 0
Storm 0
Westley Richards 1
Wilson 1
Pattern 1853 Enfield 1
Snider 8
Table 5. Stoppages after 270 rounds of ammunition.54
Once again, the Snider finished with terrible results. As the trend shows, this problem was
attributed entirely to the ammunition. Further testing of the Snider by Brigadier General
Lefroy took place and 5500 rounds were fired with only one misfire, thus redeeming the
Snider.55
A rifle needs to be strong and durable to survive general infantry use. To test this the rifles
were exposed to the elements; they were dropped, submerged in water, covered in dirt and
sand and left in the rain. It was during this testing that the stocks of both the Wilson's and
Green's rifles were found to break, rendering them useless. Combined with their relatively
poor performances in the earlier accuracy tests, both of these systems failed to be
recommended for use.56
53
Excellent and Extremely Rare Wilson's Patent Rifle
<https://www.collegehillarsenal.com/shop/product.php?productid=1186> [Accessed 11/09/2015]
54
55
56
Brig. General Lefroy, Royal Artillery, Second Ordinance Select Committee Report, Ordnance Committee
(14/03/1865), p. 13
25
On top of its poor initial results in the trials, it was found that when the older Pattern 1853s
were converted to Snider's system, their barrels became damaged in the manufacture
process due to being 'raised to a red heat.'57 As the main purpose of the original
competition was for a quick solution to be found, this left just two viable systems for
selection: The Westley Richards and the Storm rifle. Each one had identifiable advantages;
The Westley Richards had beaten the other rifles in the original accuracy competitions,
'giving superior figures in accuracy all the way out to 800 yards.'58 On the other hand, the
Storm rifle was a cheaper option as its ammunition was interchangeable with the older
pattern 1853 Enfields. Overall, however, the Storm possessed the most advantages. It could
be fired faster than the Westley Richards and was much more reliable. It was on this basis
that the Storm rifle was chosen as the 1864 competition winner. An initial order for 3000
Montgomery Storm rifles was placed in early 1865.59
The Montgomery Storm system was a relatively simple conversion of the Pattern 53 Enfield
rifle. The breech was cut away at the top, with a chamber attached to a hinge at the front.
The inner layer of the chamber, called the thimble, expanded upon firing, sealing the breech
and preventing gas escape. The cartridge was inserted into the chamber facing the user, and
flipped over to reattach the chamber to the breech. Like the Pattern 53 Enfield, it still relied
on percussion caps as a means of igniting the cartridge. The cartridge was made of a thin
layer of animal skin, which would be burnt away by the ignited cap, thus igniting the
powder. The main distinguishing feature from the original Enfield was the visible hinge
between the cock and the foresight, as shown below with the sealed Pattern Montgomery
Storm.
57
Lefroy, Second Ordinance Select Committee Report (14/03/1865), p. 14
58
Lefroy, Second Ordinance Select Committee Report (14/03/1865), p. 14
59
Cobb, The Martini and its Place in History: A Historical Perspective
26
Figure 4. Sealed Pattern Montgomery Storm rifle.60
In their rush to find a winner for their prize competition, the Ordnance Select Committee
failed to realise that the rifle was riddled with fundamental flaws. For a start, the nature of
the rotating chamber confused soldiers when first presented with the rifle. As they forgot to
load the skin cartridges backwards, the rifle inevitably misfired.61 Once the breech is
opened, as shown in figure 5, the cartridge is inserted facing the user, as shown in the
armourer's drawing in figure 6.
60
Mont-Storm Rifle with seal visible, Britain, Rifle, Sealed Pattern .577 Montgomery Storm Breech Loading
Rifle (1860), Royal Armouries National Firearms Centre Gunhall [Photo taken 09/08/16]
61
27
Figure 5. Sealed Pattern Montgomery Storm rifle with open breech.62
Figure 6. Armourer's drawing of a Montgomery Storm rifle. Note how the nose of the round protrudes towards
the user.63
62
Mont-Storm rifle with open breech, Britain, Rifle, Sealed Pattern .577 Montgomery Storm Breech Loading
Rifle (1860), Royal Armouries National Firearms Centre Gunhall [Photo taken 09/08/16]
63
Mont-Storm diagram with open breech, Mont Storm's Breech Loading Rifle, Illustrated Times (23/08/1862)
28
Once loaded, the chamber would be swung shut and the ammunition would sit the correct
way around, shown below.
Figure 7. Armourer's drawing of a Montgomery Storm rifle, loaded, but un-cocked.64
Whilst this problem could indeed be ironed out by means of rigorous training, the rifle did
have more serious problems which related to its ammunition. By utilising animal skin, the
ammunition became very expensive and difficult to source; it was impossible to stock
enough ammunition for the first 3000 rifle contract alone.65 Worse still, the fact that the
Montgomery Storm required percussion caps was considered a major flaw. Committee
member Major General Hay shows this in his reports, announcing that 'it is not justified to
propose the Montgomery Storm for conversions despite its leading of the trials. This is
entirely due to the external percussion cap.'66 The Committee ideally wanted a rifle that
contained its own ignition in its ammunition, and so it was decided that only 2000 of the
proposed 3000 Montgomery Storm rifles would actually be converted until better system
64
Mont-Storm rifle internals diagram, Mont Storm's Breech Loading Rifle, Illustrated Times (23/08/1862)
65
66
Maj. General Hay, Second Ordinance Select Committee Report, Ordnance Committee (14/03/1865), p. 14
29
could be sourced.67 It was due to these flaws that the Montgomery Storm rifle had such a
short service life.
The question could be raised as to why the Mont Storm was chosen in the first place if the
Committee knew that it was unsuitable for service issue. Ultimately, it had been chosen as a
temporary measure as there was some scepticism over the advantages of self-contained
cartridges. The biggest fear was that if one was to ignite accidentally in stores, the entire
store could be liable to explosion. It was also thought that poor weather conditions could
damage the cartridges causing a misfire. Colonel Dixon presented this problem during the
early Committee meetings, stating that these 'cartridges were both dangerous and
susceptible to weather damage if stored incorrectly.'68 These concerns seemed justified with
the early problems with Snider's ammunition. After the implementation of the Mont Storm
however, the War Office had officially revoked these concerns, and were instead advertising
these kind of cartridges as the 'sine quâ non' of acceptability.69 This was excellent news for
Snider: his system was the only trials rifle that utilised self contained ammunition. It was
therefore decided that the Snider rifle would replace the Montgomery Storm.
Upon hearing this news, Snider's reaction was one of joy, proclaiming, 'This is excellent
news! They have given in at last!'70 The only task left for Snider was to design a successful
cartridge that performed better than the one in the Committee's trials. Snider first tried to
use a thin brass plate wrapped in paper or calico to provide a solid cartridge case. Due to
constant monetary problems, all he could produce was 'rough and clumsy.'71 The task fell
towards Colonel Boxer of the War Office, who had 'all the machinery and resources of
Woolwich' at his disposal.72 After perfecting a cartridge, named the 'Boxer cartridge', the
Snider was re-trialled. Included in these final trials were stress tests where the barrel was
fired so continuously it became hot enough to 'char the stock and turn water into steam.' 73
It was found that manipulation of the rifle was very simple and that after 1000 firing rounds
without cleaning, the Snider's 'accuracy and facility of loading' remained exactly the same.
67
68
De Grey, 2nd Meeting, Breech-Loading Small Arms 1859-1864
69
J Scoffern, Jacob Snider's death, Belgravia: A London Magazine, Volume. 1, p. 184
70
Scoffern, Jacob Snider's death, Belgravia, p. 184
71
72
Scoffern, Jacob Snider's death, Belgravia: A London Magazine, p. 184
73
30
On the 23rd May 1866, the Ordnance Select Committee officially recommended the
adoption of the Snider as a result of this re-trial.74 The Duke of Cambridge and Commander
in Chief of the British army concurred on 5th July and by August, contracts had been
established and an order for the sealed pattern Snider produced.75 Unfortunately for Jacob
Snider, it quickly became apparent that he would not be paid for the pending adoption of
his rifle, despite the original competition offering the £5000 bounty. His patent had no legal
force against the crown, and so the joy of having his weapon selected for use was quickly
shattered. Any payments for his invention would have to come by means of a bounty. The
War Office solicitor, Mr. Clode, refused to offer Snider a bounty for his design because he
believed Snider's rifle 'could still prove to be a failure,' as had been the case with the
Montgomery Storm.76 Instead, a paltry £1000 was granted in September 1866 and Snider
was cast away by the War Office. Of this money, every last penny was immediately given to
his creditors to satisfy many of the debts gained by obtaining parts for his rifles and
ammunition.77 Snider, already stuck down by illness, could only react with impotent rage;
'People here are either china or crockery. I am crockery, of the yellow clay. A nobody, an
adventurer; the pledged honour of England take no heed of me. Damn the china that is the
War people, the mean beggars! Let me write my book, I will shame them to their shoes the
mean beggars!'78
Nevertheless, the Snider rifle was officially adopted on 18th September 1866. In the list of
changes this was marked as 'Change 1327, Musket Rifled, Enfield, Pattern 53 Converted to a
breech-loader on Snider's principle (Pattern I). Proposed by Mr Jacob Snider Jr.' 79 The base
version, first accepted for service, weighed nine pounds four ounces.80 Thus, the Snider-
Enfield Mk I was born and conversion of the old muzzle-loaders would commence
immediately. For many, there was a great deal of scepticism over whether or not the best
74
The Snider Enfield <http://www.britishempire.co.uk/forces/armyarmaments/rifles/sniderhistory.htm>
[Accessed 13/09/2015]
75
76
C. Purdon, Jacob Snider's Action & E.M. Boxer's Cartridge: The Snider-Enfield Rifle, Historical Arms Series,
Number. 24 (Bloomfield, Canada, 1990), p. 25
77
Purdon, Jacob Snider's Action & E.M. Boxer's Cartridge, Historical Arms Series No .24, p. 25
78
79
I. Skennerton, List of Changes in British War Material in Relation to Edged Weapons, Firearms and
Associated Ammunition and Accoutrements, Volume I, 1860-1886 (1979), p. 39
80
Brig. General Lefroy, Royal Artillery, Snider's Converted Enfield Rifles, 1st Progress Report, Ordnance
31
rifle had been found. After all, what was meant to be a quick cheap upgrade had taken the
best part of two years to complete. The Committee's indecisiveness was shown with the fait
accompli of the Mont Storm, and their ultimate decision to adopt the Snider was tainted by
the mistreatment of its inventor.
The question of whether the Ordnance Select Committee was successful or not in choosing
the Snider-Enfield would only be answered with time. For the moment, the pressure of
modernising the infantry with an effective breech-loading conversion of the old Enfield arms
had been completed and a stop-gap measure had been ultimately lifted. This was no means
the end of the road for the Ordnance Select Committee, as only the first of their two tasks
had been completed and the purpose built breech-loader was yet to be found.
32
A technical overview of the Snider-Enfield
The application of a needle moving at an oblique

angle, as described, or piston to pierce or percuss
the fulminate contained in the cartridge; as herein
set forth, as applicable to the transformation of all
firearms heretofore made upon various systems in
use ignited by an ordinary cap or nipple.
J. Snider describing his patented principle. 81
Jacob Snider's rifle was so successful militarily because it was reliable, robust, and most
importantly, simple to use. Of all the rifles described in the competition trials to find the first
official breech loader for general infantry use, the Snider retained the most features of the
old, Pattern 1853 Enfield. It also removed the smallest amount of wood from the stock,
making it a very strong rifle.82 To understand why the Snider was such a technical leap
forward, an assessment must be made of its manufacture and internal workings.
Furthermore, the rifle was subject to a huge amount of development, from Mk I and II
converted Enfields, to the Mk III systems that were made from scratch. As well as the official
infantry rifles, the Snider was also used for cavalry and artillery carbines.
Across all the different variants of Snider-Enfield, from carbine to long rifle, the basic breech
loading principle remained the same. A small part of the breech end of the barrel and its
surrounding stock was removed and replaced by a chamber to house the new breech block.
This was known as the 'shoe', which was screwed onto the rifle's barrel after the rear
portion had been cut away. The shoe carries a breech block that is attached via a hinge on
the right, allowing the breech block to swing open and shut. Before opening the breech, the
rifle had to be put onto half cock, demonstrated below.
81
82
G. Pfeiffer, The Snider Rifle (2009) <oldbritishguns.com/the-snider-rifle> [Accessed: 15/09/2015]
33
Figures 1. and 2. Putting the Snider Rifle onto half cock. 8384
The next step was to open the breech. On the original rifles, the breech would simply flip
open. After 1869, a locking latch was introduced to help secure the breech block. 85 This
would be opened by pressing a left mounted lever with the thumb and forefinger and
pulling to the right, thus opening the breech. A cartridge would then be inserted.
Figure 3. Charging the Snider-Enfield Rifle.86
83
The Mk III Snider-Enfield: An Introduction (21/02/2016) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DJ-
f11hM4Sk> [Accessed: 22/02/2016]
84
The Mk III Snider-Enfield: An Introduction
85
List of Changes in British War Material, change number 1759 (13/01/1869)
86
34
The block would then be swung shut, in doing so automatically locking the breech block into
the shoe. The rifle would then be put onto full cock.
Figure 4. Putting the Snider-Enfield onto full cock.87
The user would then aim at his target and fire the rifle. To fire, the trigger was pulled,
releasing the external hammer causing it to fly forward, hitting the striker at speed. In an
ordinary Pattern 1853 Enfield this would ignite a cap; however, on the Snider it hits a long
pin that runs through this entire breech block. Snider described this pin as 'passing obliquely
through from the nipple to the centre of the front of the block.'88 This pin, known as the
firing pin, would pierce the cap in the base of the cartridge. A surrounding spring would
then restore it to its original position. Thus the force of the pin would cause the cartridge to
ignite, projecting the bullet through the barrel.
Once the cartridge has been discharged, the breech block is once again opened by
compressing the lever and swinging the hinge to the right. A useful innovation in the Snider
rifle is the cartridge extractor, which is attached to the hinge on the shoe. By pulling the
breech block backwards towards the user with the thumb and forefinger, the rim of the
cartridge moves backwards a portion, removing it, but not ejecting it, from the chamber.
87
88
I. Skennerton, A Treatise on the Snider, The British Soldier's Firearm 1866-c.1880 (Margate, AU, 1977), p. 56
35
Figure 5. Ejecting the spent cartridge.89
The user then releases the breech block, which is driven back to its original position by
another spring on the hinge itself. At this point the cartridge is only partially ejected, so
must be either pulled, shaken, or flipped out of the rifle by the user. Officially, this had to be
done by rotating the rifle to the right. Proficient users could achieve upwards of ten rounds
per minute by firing in this manner, which was three times faster than the muzzle-loaders of
a now obsolete era.
Figure 6. Ejecting the spent cartridge from a Snider-Enfield.90
Although a lengthy process compared to modern standards, this method was much faster
and easier than loading the Pattern 53 Enfield, requiring much fewer steps. Some of the
Enfield's key features were retained however. The barrel was exactly the same, using early
Enfield rifling, causing the Snider to become known as the Snider-Enfield rifle. The most
notable feature was the external percussion lock, making the Snider the last British infantry
rifle to utilise an external lock. The lock itself was undoubtedly the most complex part of the
89
90
36
rifle, requiring the most parts and the most complex construction methods. Whilst all troops
were expected to know how to operate the rifle, only armourers would know how to
dismantle, fix and rebuild the Enfield lock. Figure 7. shows a labelled drawing of all the
components that went into the lock's working parts.
Figure 7. Enfield Percussion lock with nomenclature.91
The Snider's lock was almost identical to the lock of the Pattern 1853 Enfield, with the only
difference being the hammer's function; instead of striking a percussion cap, it now drove a
firing pin. When the rifle is uncocked, this hammer sits vertically on the rifle and there is no
pressure on any of the internal springs.
91
P. Smithurst, The Pattern 1853 Enfield Rifle (Oxford, 2011), p. 13
37
Figure 8. A Mk III Snider-Enfield percussion lock in an uncocked position..92
Like the Pattern 1853 Enfield, the Snider-Enfield had the capability to be held in a half-cock
position. Originally, half-cock was designed to allow the user to prime the pan in flintlock
mechanisms, or to stop the hammer resting on the cap in the percussion system it derives
from. In the Snider, the position was used more as a safety precaution. By being held at half-
cock, the chances of accidental premature fire were reduced as there was no pressure on
the firing pin. (Although this was always a possibility if the sear was damaged, hence the
term 'going off at half cock'). To put the rifle onto half cock, the hammer was drawn
backwards. This compressed the mainspring a fraction, pushing the tumbler upwards via the
stirrup on the left, causing the tumbler to rotate clockwise. As it rotated, the sear would
slide along its curved edge and fall neatly into the first of two notches, named 'bents' cut
into the tumbler. These bents stop the spring pressure from rotating the tumbler and
releasing the hammer, shown below in a simplified depiction of the tumbler's function.
92
I. Skennerton, Snider-Enfield 'b-Lock uncocked', Snider-Enfield Picture collection (16/12/2015)
38
Figure 9. Sear slotted into a tumbler on the first notch, or half-cock position.93
A sear spring is required in order to force the sear to engage with the bents in the tumbler
in this manner. The resultant half-cock configuration can be shown below.
Figure 10. A Mk III Snider-Enfield percussion lock in a half cock position.94
When the cartridge is loaded into the rifle, and the breech is closed, the hammer is drawn
back to full cock before firing. This action is merely an extension of the half-cock procedure,
except much more pressure is put onto the mainspring and the sear falls into a second,
much smaller notch on the tumbler.
93
Visual description of how sears and tumblers function
<http://britishmilitariaforums.yuku.com/topic/16487/My-577-Snider-will-fire-at-
HalfCock?page=1#.Vv_QVKQrJnQ> [Accessed: 22/09/2015]
94
I. Skennerton, Snider-Enfield 'b-Lock full cocked',Snider-Enfield Picture collection (16/12/2015)
39
Figure 11. Sear falling into a tumbler at full cock position. 95
This second bent is much smaller, and so the sear spring again functions to hold the sear in
place. Once in place, the lock is now fully cocked.
Figure 12. Mk III Snider-Enfield lock at full cock.96
All that is left to do for the user is pull the trigger. The trigger engages with the sear, and so
when the trigger is pulled, the sear is released. This releases the pressure on the mainspring,
95
96
I. Skennerton, Snider-Enfield 'b-Lock half-cocked', Snider-Enfield Picture collection (16/12/2015)
40
as it pulls down on the tumbler, simultaneously causing the hammer to fly forward with
enough force to drive the firing pin forward to ignite the cartridge's primer.
In terms of technological development, the Snider-Enfield's lock design was very intricate
and required a great knowledge of precision engineering. Conversely, the lock was also
incredibly easy to operate and repair. Unfortunately for the Snider, the rifle represented the
end of an era, as this was the last British rifle to utilise an external lock.
The means of operating the Snider remained the same throughout its service life, but, like
the majority of British small arms, it underwent several key modifications. All rifles up to Mk
III were conversions of older rifles, whilst after Mk III the rifles were constructed from
scratch. The first of these changes was something of an embarrassment for the War Office,
occurring just three months after the Snider had been introduced into service. There were
growing concerns about the Snider's breechblock being blown open, due to a combination
of poorly designed ammunition and breech locking mechanism. There is a reason that there
are no records of this happening, as it would appear that the War Office attempted to
suppress this rather significant problem. Historian Ian Skennerton makes reference to some
official correspondence regarding the issue: 'As regards Canada, the Committee think it
would be best to say nothing about the defect of ammunition, but at the earliest possible
period to send out new ammunition and withdraw what is there, at the same time altering
the breech recesses to form Mk I*. As regards Ireland, the same course should be pursued.'
97
The problem must have been much greater than the War Office would care to admit. To
initiate ammunition recalls and rifle adjustments was a major undertaking, given that by this
point over 14,000 rifles had been produced. The remedy for the rifles, however, was
somewhat minor. The only things changed were the rim profiles at the start of the chamber.
Instead of being rounded, they became squared. By squaring the edges of the chamber,
there was less chance of gas escaping from the base of the cartridges. This also served to aid
cartridge extraction after firing.
97
I. Skennerton, The Mk I* Snider Short Rifle Cover up, Historical Arms Series
41
Figure 13. Comparison of Mk I Snider with later versions. 98
This change was applied on 11th December 1866 as a 'slight alteration to the breech
mechanisms in the form of a squared countersink'.99 All existing rifles were known as Mk Is,
but once they had their breeches altered they were re-stamped as Mk I*s. Newly converted
rifles now had to have this 'squared countersink' so were automatically stamped as Mk II*s.
To confuse matters further, there were recurrent problems with ammunition extraction as
cartridges failed to extract from the rifle. In 1867, The Inspector General of Musketry, Hay,
complained that 'the rifle constantly fouled and jammed.'100 This problem had already been
registered by the War Office, as on 11th December 1866 some rifles already had the 'shape
and dimensions of the extractor' modified.101 Rifles updated in this way were stamped Mk
II**, however, not all subsequent rifles built were made to this mark.
The only changes to the converted rifles from this point onwards were in ammunition. By
1869, all suitable muzzle loaders in stores marked for conversion had been used up. Even
stores of rifles that were not Pattern 1853 Enfields had been converted to the Snider
principle (such as the Lancaster rifles), numbering some 290,000 rifles by the end of
98
Skennerton, The Mk I* Snider Short Rifle Cover up
99
Skennerton, List of Changes in British War Material, Volume I, p. 39
100
J. Peel, Army Sneider Breech Loading System - Copy of Reports by Inspector General of Musketry C. Hay
(19/02/1867)
101
42
production.102 As no more rifles could be converted, new rifles were subsequently made at
Enfield. Apart from being brand new rifles, they differed from the older marks with two
main features.
The first feature is that they were built from steel instead of iron: earning the Snider rifle the
accolade of being the first steel rifle in British infantry service.103 The second change was a
locking bolt attached to the breech block. This was because even after the initial
modifications, reports to the War Office were still coming in about gas escapes. In his
reports of 1867, Inspector General Hay was horrified to find 'an escape of gas amongst other
rifle problems.'104 To remedy this, the breeches became fixed in place when closed with a
new locking latch designed by Edward Bond of the London Small Arms Company in the form
of a bolted breech. To operate, it had to be pressed inwards to release the latch.
Figure 14. An overview of the Snider's breech development. Note the locking latch on the Mk III to the right. 105
This new purpose built Snider-Enfield arrived in service officially on 13th January 1869 as
the Mk III.106 Other modifications included a more squared-off hammer, as the former
Pattern 53's hammer was slightly recessed so as not to prevent pieces of percussion cap
102
103
Apart from being stronger, steel was also more resistant to corrosion, increasing the rifle's service life.
104
Peel, Army Sneider Breech Loading System (19/02/1867)
105
I. Skennerton, Snider-Enfield 'IMG_0642', Snider-Enfield Picture collection (16/12/2015)
106
Skennerton, List of Changes in British War Material in Relation to Edged Weapons, Volume I, p. 39
43
from flying off once struck. More metal was also added underneath the shoe for strength.
The armourers drawing below shows the Mk III.
Figure 15. Armourer's drawing of the Snider-Enfield Mk III.107
This final development of the Snider ensured its success as a British military rifle; it far
surpassed its original intended purpose. Snider-Enfields were first designed purely as a
conversion, to modernise the army to the standards of the continent whilst a purpose-built
breech-loader could be discovered. Instead, the Mk III shows that they were so good that
they were worth building from scratch; a true testament to the rifle's quality.
The technical overview of the Snider-Enfield therefore shows that the rifle was extremely
important historically for two key reasons. Firstly, the speed at which the arm could be fired
outclassed any rifle the general infantry had fielded before it, and the ease of operation is
entirely due to Jacob Snider's design. The second key factor is the mechanics of the rifle. The
107
The Snider-Enfield Mk III, armourer's drawing, The War Office (January, 1869)
44
Snider-Enfield represented a complex piece of technology of the era; from the design of the
lock, to the means of ignition via a firing pin. It was the first ever general infantry rifle to use
a self-contained cartridge. The combination of these factors ultimately resulted in an arm
that was perfectly suited to military service, causing Colonel Dixon of the War Office to
remark: 'Three Years of use by the soldier have most satisfactorily established the character
of this weapon - superior to any breech-loading arms of any foreign army.'108
108
45
The Snider in battle
Colonel Cameron also watched intently, gauging the range and speed of movement
of the enemy. He was an experienced soldier who knew his business and he wanted
the first blast of musketry to be a devastating one, so that although the Snider was
effective at 500 yards he waited resolutely. When the approaching line was some
250 yards away he judged the time ripe. In a clear, unhurried voice, he gave the
order to fire. Three hundred blue barrels came up together and three hundred
hammers clicked back to full cock. The first burst of fire ran down the line with a
noise like a great tearing of canvas and a wide gap appeared abruptly in the centre
of the Abyssinian line as the storm of fire hit it. The British were firing
independently and by the time the more deliberate shots had fired their first rounds
the quicker were ready with their second.
Extract taken from George Alfred Henty's 'The March to Magdala'.109
Just as its inventor was cast away and forgotten, the Snider-Enfield is something of a
forgotten weapon of the nineteenth century. Its use in battle is, for the most part, poorly
recorded. Whilst its successor, the Martini-Henry became an icon of the British Army in
popular culture due to its part in films such as 'Zulu' and 'Zulu Dawn', the Snider-Enfield
holds no such fame, and has subsequently been cast aside. In-fact, it is recorded as merely a
stop-gap; something temporary to be thrown away as quickly as possible.110 In reality,
however, the Snider was much more than a temporary solution. Although poorly
documented, it played its role in battles across the British Empire. Furthermore, it saw
continued use well past its official service life all over the globe. Moreover, the fact that
Snider-Enfields reappeared in the hands of British soldiers even as late as World War One
demonstrated that it vastly outlived its perceived 'stop-gap' role. It can be therefore be
argued that the Snider-Enfield is a vastly underrated technological development in both
British history and military history as a whole.
The first major British use of the Snider rifle was at the Battle of Arogi during the Abyssinian
campaign of 1868. This saw a pitched battle between the 4th Kings Own Regiment -
numbering over 300 rifles against a mass of up to 7000 Abyssinian warriors. The Abyssinians
charged en masse and the effectiveness of the Snider became all too apparent, shocking
109
G. Henty, The March to Magdala (London, 1868)
110
Cobb, Cinderella Snider
46
both sides. The Abyssinian warriors had expected pauses between each volley so that they
could advance, but the speed of operation of the Snider meant that there was none. The
result was a massacre. For the British troops, they too were used to volley fire and so for the
first time the British army's eyes had been opened to the true power of the breechloader.
Outside of the general infantry, the Snider rifle was used most extensively by the Canadian
army. Sniders were first requested to quell a Fenian uprising in 1866; however, the first
rifles only arrived for use in 1867.111 On the 25th May 1870 the Snider rifle was involved in
two entirely unique scenarios in two different Canadian provinces. The first was the
'Wolseley expedition', which was part of the wider Red River campaign. As United States
Colonists attempted to expand into Canadian territory, the British led a Canadian army in
the campaign to remove the colonists. As during the Wolseley expedition the colonists were
armed with muzzle-loaders, whilst Wolseley's unit possessed Snider-Enfield rifles, the result
was a decisive victory for the Canadians. 112
On the same day, the battle of Eccles Hill was fought in Huntingdon, Quebec. The Fenian
brotherhood had launched a raid into Canadian territory, which was easily fought off by
Canadian militiamen and their Snider-Enfields.
111
112
M. Cobb, Online interview with Malcolm Cobb regarding Snider and Martini Rifles and their use
(23/02/2016)
47
Figure 2. Canadian militiamen armed with two-band sergeants Snider-Enfields posing with a dead Fenian.113
Even after the official adoption of the Martini-Henry rifle in 1871, the era of the Snider-
Enfield endured. In the 1873 to 1874 Ashanti campaigns, the short two-band Snider-Enfield
loaded with buckshot was the preferred arm of many soldiers, as for jungle fighting at
ranges of often less than fifty metres it was a perfect weapon.114 British colonies were also
armed with Snider-Enfields once the general infantry had received their Martini-Henrys. This
extended the service life of the Snider still further, a result of which was its continued use
on the North-West frontier against the Burmese from 1885 right through into the 1890s.
As the Martini-Henry carbine was not introduced until 1877 for cavalry and artillery use the
Snider remained in service with the British Army even longer still. In the 1879 Zulu wars,
British Cavalry were still using Snider rifles, so much so that after the defeat at Kambula,
more Sniders were recovered by the Zulus than Martinis.115 The final official recorded use of
the Snider on the battlefield is during the Transvaal wars of 1880-1881, when forts in
Pretoria were surrounded by the Boers. In a desperate attempt to increase British firepower
the Snider-Enfield was issued to town guards.116 The Snider's final official distribution to
113
Battle of Echoes Hill <http://britishmilitariaforums.yuku.com/topic/11886/Canadian-Soldiers-w-Snider-
Enfields-Photo#.Vwe6raQrJnR> [Accessed: 25/09/2015]
114
Cobb, Online interview with Malcolm Cobb
115
116
48
British forces was a full eighteen years later in 1899 when it was still being issued as
personal protection for wagon drivers.117
This was not the end for the Snider. It was the primary arm of one of Japan's most
significant military events, the Satsuma rebellion. In 1877, Snider-Enfield rifles, sold out of
service by the British, were the primary arm of the Imperial Japanese Army. Interestingly,
they were also the primary firearm of the Satsuma rebels, the last of the famous Samurai
who revolted against this Imperial army. The Imperial army numbered around 90,000, of
which upwards of 45,000 were armed with Snider rifles, with around 63,000,000 rounds of
ammunition available to use in battle. In comparison, the Samurai rebels numbered around
30,000 and were armed with both Snider and Pattern 1853 Enfield rifles, with just 3,000,000
rounds of ammunition.118 It was ultimately this imbalance of numbers that led to the
Samurai's defeat.
During the conflict the Imperial army fired on average 322,150 rounds of small arms
munitions every single day. So much smoke was generated that in some cases units engaged
fire at distances of less than ten yards.119 In comparison, at the midpoint of the campaign,
the Samurai withdrew their Snider rifles, being forced to use the less efficient Pattern 1853s
to slow down their ammunition expenditure to prevent them from running out.120 If nothing
else, these figures alone demonstrate how powerful the Snider-Enfield could be, and how
much more efficient an arm it was when compared to the muzzle loaders that came before
it.
117
118
J. Buck, The Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, from Kagoshima through the siege of Kumanoto castle, Monumenta
Nipponica, Volume. 28, Number. 4 (1973), p. 430
119
Buck, The Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, p. 440
120
Buck, The Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, p. 443
49
Figure 3. Artists rendition of Imperial Troops at the battle of Tabaruzaka. Note the great clouds of smoke
limiting visibility.121
The oldest guns used by the British forces in World War One were Snider-Enfields. As many
first class arms as possible were in use at the front, little was left for training purposes. As
historian Richard Gajda describes, 'they were much better than marching with
broomsticks.'122 This means that technically, Snider-Enfields did not serve the British Army
as a short stop-gap rifle for five years until the introduction of the Martini-Henry...they were
actually used by the British for over forty-eight years! Film footage even exists of British
soldiers using Snider rifles during inspection under the watchful eye of Lord Kitchener.
121
Battle of Tabaruzaka <https://rekishinihon.com/2014/06/07/battle-of-tabaruzaka/> [Accessed:
26/09/2015]
122
R. Gajda, The Use of Blackpowder Cartridge Rifles, Carbines and Handguns in WWI, Film footage, 34
Minutes 0 Seconds
50
Figure 4. Lord Kitchener inspecting home guard units of the British Army c.1914. Note the combination of rifles
visible, including Lee-Metfords, Martini-Henrys and Snider-Enfields.123
Figure 5. Enlargement a veteran home guard soldier carrying his Snider-Enfield.124
In British military service the Snider-Enfield therefore vastly exceeded expectations. Its first
use at Arogi proved its devastating effects. Its continued use even after its official service life
123
Home Guard inspection by Lord Kitchener c.1914, BBC Film footage,
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/p01nprmc/Britains_Great_War_War_Comes_to_Britain/>, 28
Minutes 0 Seconds
124
Home Guard inspection by Lord Kitchener c.1914, 28 Minutes 0 Seconds
51
ended proved that the rifle was much more than a temporary solution. The rifle appeared in
the hands of volunteers over for forty years after it had been declared obsolete. It was also
used extensively outside of the British Empire and Commonwealth nations such as Japan,
Nepal, Denmark, Holland, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey and Egypt.125 Belgium and the United
States even manufactured their own copies of the rifle.126 The Snider-Enfield is therefore a
vastly underrated weapons system which deserves more credit than it has been given in
terms both arms and technological development, as well as the wider world of military
history.
125
Skennerton, .577 Pattern 1853 Rifle Muskets & Snider Enfield, p.19
126
Skennerton, .577 Pattern 1853 Rifle Muskets & Snider Enfield, p.19
52
Conclusions
Sergeant's Two-Band Snider rifle and Snider carbine, courtesy of Ian Skennerton. 127
Many people think of the Snider-Enfield as something 'not quite right that was offloaded as
quickly as possible by the troops.'128 This overview has challenged that assumption, by
demonstrating the quality of the rifle. From its original selection in the 1866 breech-loading
'competition' to its manufacture, operation and modifications, the development of its
ammunition and ultimately its performance in the field.
In the prize 'competition', the Snider was ultimately victorious. During the trials, it proved its
worth as a cheap and easy conversion of the Pattern 1853 Enfield, leading to its formal
adoption on 23rd May 1866.129 Its successes during War Office trials were continued
through into 1867, where in an effort to upgrade the rifle of the general infantry to a
'purpose built breechloader', the Snider-Enfield finished on top of its competition.130 This
proves that the Snider-Enfield was indeed the best choice of rifle available to the War
Office.
The technical overview of the Snider-Enfield also proves that it was an adept military rifle. It
was simple and quick to operate and could fire twenty rounds in little over two and a half
127
I. Skennerton, Snider Sergeant's rifle and Snider Carbine "Dscn6645bc", Snider-Enfield Picture collection
(16/12/2015)
128
129
130
53
minutes.131 Any flaws found in the rifles operation were quickly ironed out with the later
Marks, such as the addition of a locking latch for the Mk III's. Its historical significance lays in
the fact that it is the first general infantry rifle of the British army to use self-contained
ammunition. Furthermore, it can be shown that the problems did not lie with the rifle itself,
rather, it's early forms of ammunition.132 This is demonstrated by the fact that when the
Snider rifle was re-trialled, it produced much better results. This again emphasises the
quality of Jacob Snider's original design.
Finally, the use of the Snider-Enfield in British and indeed global military service provides
the strongest evidence to show that the rifle was much more than a 'stop-gap' measure, and
is therefore much more historically significant than previously assumed. Officially, it served
for a five years as a service weapon. In reality, however, it found almost half a century of
military use in various forms.
131
Snider Enfield Information <http://www.enfield-snider.com/.htm>
132
J. Hulla, Report of the Shooting of the Snider Breech-Loading long rifle with the No.3 pattern cartridges,
bullet weighing 480 grains, Journal of the Society of Arts, Volume .15, Number. 755 (10/05/1867), p. 401
54
The search for the 'Perfect Arm':
The .450/577 Martini-Henry Rifle
133
133
J. Sammon, The Martini-Henry Rifle and the Greatest Discovery of Antique Firearms Ever,
<http://www.guns.com/2012/01/31/the-martini-henry-rifle-and-the-greatest-discovery-of-antique-firearms-
ever/> (31/01/2012) [Accessed 22/05/2016]
55
Whilst the Snider-Enfield rifle has often been overlooked in British military history,
its successor, the Martini-Henry rifle, has been idolized. The rifle stands as a symbol of
British imperialism and has been made famous in recent years by movies such as 'Zulu'.
Officially, the rifle served the British army as a first class rifle from 1871-1888, and as a
second class rifle for a further fifty years, showing it to be an important weapon of the
British army. Yet does the Martini-Henry actually deserve to be revered over its predecessor
the Snider-Enfield? On a global scale, it was something of an anomaly. On the continent,
nations were beginning to turn towards bolt-action mechanisms.134 In America, repeating
arms were growing in popularity, yet were rejected in Britain as being too underpowered.135
In fact, the only other nation outside of British influence to officially adopt a similar rifle to
the Martini-Henry was Turkey, who bought in total 600,000 Peabody-Martini's.136 Some
historians, such as David Westwood, even claim that the Martini-Henry was 'not up to
scratch' and that 'all that the rifle achieved for Britain was to 'bridge the gap between
converted muzzle-loaders and bolt-actions.'137
The following technical overview of the Martini-Henry will analyse both historical
standpoints of the rifle via a step by step review of the rifle, and show that the rifle was
neither the stop-gap that Westwood describes, nor the perfect arm that its recent adulation
suggests. Instead, it will show that over time and with frequent altercation, the rifle
ultimately grew into the icon it is today. By analysing the rifle through the same process as
the Snider-Enfield, it can be compared directly to its predecessor. The first step will
therefore analyse the trials, tests that ultimately produced the Martini-Henry. The
complexity of this process goes some way to showing just how good the arm had to be to
survive selection, showing it to be historically significant, as well as showing the rifle's early
flaws.
A technical overview will then analyse how the rifle was operated and how it functioned
internally. This, when compared to the Snider-Enfield will show that the Martini-Henry was
in fact an improvement in almost every way. It was cheaper, more accurate, more powerful
and could even fire faster. Following this, an analysis of the rifle's development over time
134
The .43 Mauser Model 1871 for example was now being used by the Prussian Army.
135
Roads, The Gun: Riflemen All, 9 minutes 13 seconds
136
Gajda, The Use of Blackpowder Cartridge Rifles, Carbines and Handguns in WWI, 27 Minutes 0 Seconds
137
D. Westwood, Rifles: An Illustrated History of Their Impact (Santa Barbara, CA, 2005), pp. 60-61
56
will be made. This will show how the flaws of the rifle were eventually ironed out over time.
As the contemporary newspaper The Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art
described: We are forever being told it will break down, to which it goes on to not break
down.'138 Finally, an analysis of how the Martini-Henry was used on the battlefield will
evidence arguments for both the critics of the weapon and its supporters, by highlighting its
strengths and weaknesses whilst in service.
Ultimately, it will be shown that the Martini-Henry was indeed an important rifle that to an
extent deserves the adoration it receives today. Despite its faults, it was a definite leap
forward in small arms technology when compared to the Snider-Enfield, evidenced and
epitomized by battles such as Rorke's Drift. The Martini-Henry justifiably earned its respect.
In the words of Rudyard Kipling; 'When 'arf of your bullets fly wide in the ditch, don't call
your Martini a cross-eyed bitch. She's human as you are, you treat her as sich. An 'she'll fight
for the young British soldier.'139
138
The Martini-Henry Rifle, The Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art (December 1870)
Volume. 790, Number. 30, p. 778
139
R. Kipling, The Young British Soldier c.1889-1891 <http://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poems_youngbrit.htm>
[Accessed 20/05/2016]
57
The search for a perfect arm: the 'Faux Pas' of
the Sub-Select Committee
We invite all Gunmakers and Others to submit proposals for breech-

loading rifles, either repeating or not repeating, which may replace the
present service rifles in future manufacture.
War Office invitation to the public to provide a new breech-loading arm in 1864.140
Ever since the decision to adopt a breech-loader into military service with the War Office’s
declaration in August 1864, Britain had been meticulously hunting for a ‘perfect arm’ that
could compete with the modern breech-loading systems appearing across Europe. The first
task for the War Office was to find a quick breech-loading conversion for their current
Pattern 1853 service rifles. Despite taking much longer than anticipated, this was completed
with the introduction of the Snider-Enfield in 1866. The second task was to find an entirely
new breech-loading system to truly modernise the British Army. This task began with the
official opening of the trials competition on 22nd October 1866.141
The competition gave strict prerequisites for the submitted designs to adhere to. They could
not exceed nine pounds five ounces, or be longer than fifty one inches. They had to be
capable of firing at least twelve rounds per minute and also be extremely accurate: at 300
yards they could not have more than a six inch shot deviation and at 500 they could have no
more than twelve.142 A prize of £300 would be given to any competitors that passed the first
trial in order to to fund the production of six experimental rifles. On top of this, £1000
would be given to the best arm if selected for military use, or £600 would be given to the
140
The War Office, 1865 Invitation for new breech-loading arms (22/09/1865)
141
The Martini-Henry Rifle, The Engineer (12/03/1869), p. 181
142
Reports on Breech-Loading Arms by a Special Sub-Committee of the Ordnance Select Committee (1868)
58
best arm failing this. Further prizes were offered for the best cartridge submission, worth
£400 and the best magazine or repeating arm, worth £300.143
By 21st March 1867, the Committee reported that in response to this competition; no less
than 104 rifles had been submitted for testing. The Committee had categorised the rifle
submissions into two sections. The first section, 'Class I' contained thirty-seven rifles, and
was made up of rifles that passed the entry criteria. The sixty-seven that did not meet the
requirements were placed into 'Class II' - these were ineligible to win the top prizes, but
would be examined to discover any merits.144 No magazine arms were actually submitted to
the Committee, despite the competition being open to them. The War Office therefore
decided to test several prominent magazine arms, including the Ball and Lamson, Henry
repeating rifle and Spencer Carbines.
Once the categories had been established, initial testing began. As they had the potential to
become the next arm of the infantry, Class I rifles were tested first. Twenty-one of the
thirty-seven in the category were eliminated before they had even been fired. After firing
just twenty rounds from each of the remainder, a further seven were eliminated. All of
these rejections were due to undesirability or suspect safety, leaving just nine competitors.
On March 21st 1867 these finalists were recommended, with each maker rewarded £300
for their efforts. This reward was designed to be spent on the production of six rifles for
further testing to be carried out at Woolwich at a later date. The finalists were as follows:
The Albini-Braendlin, the Burton rifles number one and number two, the Fosbery, the Henry
(designed by Alexander Henry and not the cavalry carbine), the Joslyn, the Martini, the
Peabody and finally the Remington.145
The Class II arms were examined July 1867 and underwent a similar process. In the time it
had taken to begin this testing, however, another sixteen arms had been submitted,
meaning that eighty-three arms were processed. Within these trials, a poignant event
occurred which would alter the Committee's perceptions for the foreseeable future. When
firing one of the four bolt-action Carter and Edwards submissions, Sir Henry John Halford,
leader of the Lancaster volunteer movement and prized competition shooter, lost his
143
Reports on Breech-Loading Arms by a Special Sub-Committee of the Ordnance Select Committee
144
Captain Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, Committee Report (21/03/1867)
145
59
thumb. The accident happened when a cartridge to ignited prematurely as the bolt was
being closed.146 This had been the ultimate fear of the sceptics of bolt-action rifles, ever
since the Dreyse needle rifle had been tested almost two decades ago. Nevertheless, some
bolt-action rifles did make it through selection. The selected rifles from the Class II category
were as follows: The Berdan, Carter and Edwards No.3, Fosbery No. 4, Greve and Dowling
No.4, Hammond, Needham, Poultney, Westley Richards No. 1, Westley Richards No. 3b. (The
Sharp and Wilson rifle were later added following subsequent submissions.) As these rifles
were in Class II, they were not eligible for any prizes. They would, however, be examined in
the future for the merits of their breech mechanisms.
During these Class II trials, rifle named the Soper was tested. It did not merit further
selection because it was considered 'too complicated' and contained too many parts. But in
two independent tests, the Soper was recorded as firing sixty rounds per minute; a huge
feat for a single-loading arm.147 This rapidity of small arms in the British Army was only
beaten once self-loading arms were introduced in the 1950s. The Soper is therefore a prime
example of why the Class II trials were undertaken, as the War Office could gauge the
capability of all manner of firearms as a means of comparison.
For the Class I arms that complied to competition regulations, trials did not commence until
28th November 1867. The delay was due to the fact that Mr Burton had to produce twelve
rifles instead of six, given that he had two designs in the finals.148 Furthermore, the Martini
rifles, in their journey from Switzerland, were detained in a French customs house. Once the
rifles had arrived, daily trials were undertaken where factors such as accuracy, rapidity,
recoil, reliability and trajectory were taken into account. The first tests for the finalists were
those of accuracy. Four of the six rifles of each contender fired twenty rounds at targets of
distances set at 300, 500, 800 and 1000 yards, with the current service arm, a Snider-Enfield
being included for comparison. Table 1. Shows the first test at the short 300 yard distance,
with the rifles being placed in order of merit:
146
147
148
Captain Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, Trials of 9 Descriptions of Breech-Loading Rifles Accepted for
Competition in Accordance with the terms of the War Office Advertisement of 22/10/1866 (12/02/1868)
60
Mean deviation of the four rifles tested
Weapons System
in feet at 300 yards
Burton No. 2 0.63
Albini and Braendlin 0.69
Burton No. 1 0.76
Henry 0.85
Martini 1.16
Fosbery 1.23
Remington 1.58
Peabody 1.67
Joslyn 1.74
Snider Naval (For Comparison) 0.75
Table 1. Accuracy at 300 yards, Special Sub-Committee of the Ordnance Select Committee report. 149
These results disappointed the Sub-Committee. The 1866 competition prerequisites stated
that the rifles could not deviate more than half a foot at 300 yards. No rifle even came close
to these figures. Worse still, the Fosbery, Remington, Peabody and Joslyn rifles deviated by
more than a foot, which was the maximum deviation allowed for the larger 500 yard trial.
Disappointed with the results, the Sub-Committee therefore disqualified the bottom four
from further accuracy trials. The next trial, at 500 yards only included five competition rifles,
as shown below in Table 2.
Mean deviation of the four rifles tested

Weapons System
in feet at 500 yards
Burton No. 2 1.27
Henry 1.41
Burton No. 1 1.52
Albini and Braendlin 1.53
Martini 2.01
Snider Naval (For Comparison) 1.37
Table 2. Accuracy at 500 yards, Special Sub-Committee of the Ordnance Select Committee report. 150
Once again, not one of the weapons systems complied with the standards set in the
competition. Embarrassingly, some of the results were even lower than the rifles trialled in
1865, where the Pattern 1853 Enfield, the Westley Richards and the Snider all scoring
149
Fletcher, Trials of 9 Descriptions of Breech-Loading Rifles Accepted for Competition (12/02/1868)
150
61
higher. The standard was equally poor out to 800 yards, where only one system, the Henry
rifle, managed to qualify. As shooting had been so poor, only the Henry and the Burton No.
2 were tested at 1000 yards. Neither rifle performed well enough at this range.
The only merits found during the accuracy trials were observed during the firing of the
Henry rifle at 1000 yards. As testing was made during a British winter, the weather across
the entire trial was described as 'frequently windy and unfavourable for shooting.'151 It was
found that this wind carried bullets fired from rifles such as the Snider and Burton No. 2 as
much as fifty feet to the right. In comparison, they noted that the bullets fired from the
Henry at this range would only be blown twenty feet. This was due to the Henry rifle's
smaller bore and large charge of powder, giving the bullet a much higher energy and
average velocity.
It was also observed by the Committee that bullets fired from the Henry rifle had a much
flatter trajectory than bullets fired from rifles such as the Snider, due to its smaller calibre.
(The Henry rifle was .45 in calibre compared to the .577 of the Snider). These observations
meant that the small bore rifles were advantageous at shorter ranges due to their
trajectory, but also at longer ranges due to their bullet's velocity, evidenced below.
151
62
Mean angle of bullet trajectory
Weapons System compared to a straight line path when
firing at 300 yards in arc minutes
Burton No. 2 220'
Albini and Braendlin 51'
Burton No. 1 130'
Henry 56'
Martini 51'
Fosbery 59'
Remington 53'
Peabody 34'
Joslyn 59'
Snider Naval (For Comparison) 70'
Table 3. Mean Elevation of trials rifles firing at 300 yards, Special Sub-Committee of the Ordnance Select
Committee report.152
Casting aside the poor accuracy of each of the contenders, the Sub-Committee carried on
with the trials process regardless. In a rather more successful test, trials for rapidity were
undertaken for each rifle, with the competition standard requiring a score of at least
fourteen rounds per minute. To test this, the time taken to fire twenty rounds from each
contender was recorded. This was then repeated with another firer to find an average, and
then converted into rounds fired per minute, as shown below.
Calculated number of rounds per

Weapons System
minute
Peabody 16
Henry 16
Fosbery 14
Albini and Braendlin 14
Burton No. 1 13
Burton No. 2 11
Joslyn 10
Snider Naval (For Comparison) 14
Table 4. Rapidity test of trials rifles, Special Sub-Committee of the Ordnance Select Committee report. 153
152
153
Sergeant Mcanlis, R.A, and Private Crofts, Rapidity Tests, Special Sub-Committee (12/02/1868)
63
Unfortunately, two weapons systems were omitted from these trials. The Martini was
removed from this test as its cartridges repeatedly exploded at the base, causing such an
escape of gas as to render the rifles unsafe. The Remington, on the other hand, was trialled,
but as its cartridges repeatedly broke causing delays which rendered its rate of fire
'worthless'.154 Nevertheless, in terms of rapidity at least, the majority of rifles were
successful.
Similar successes were found during exposure tests, made by pouring sand over every rifle
and then attempting to fire them. In this trial, every single rifle passed, except the
Martini.155 Further exposure tests were made by submerging the rifles in water and then
leaving them exposed to the winter weather for two weeks. Again, the results for this test
were mostly positive. The only flaws discovered were in the Joslyn and Martini rifles. The
Joslyn was found to be cracked at the tang, and the Martini had become plagued with a
multitude of problems such as having a broken extractor and being clogged with rust.156
Despite the Joslyn and Martini's issues, the majority of trials rifles were generally good at
withstanding the elements.
Unfortunately for the Sub-Committee, the success of the exposure trials was very short
lived. Amongst the final tests made were the increased charges and damaged cartridges
test.157 In the latter of these tests, cartridges were soaked in water or split partly open, to
simulate what conditions they could be exposed to in the field. During these trials, the
cartridges for the Remington, the Burton No.1 and the Joslyn rifle all burst, automatically
rendering them unsafe. It was also found during the damaged cartridge tests that the
current service arm, the Snider-Enfield, had its breech block blown open repeatedly.
Therefore, as a direct result of these trials, a locking latch was added to the Snider-Enfield in
early 1869.158
Moreover, it was found when increasing the charge of the Henry ammunition, that the
cartridges provided by Alexander Henry did not conform to competition standards due to
154
Mcanlis, Crofts, Rapidity Tests (12/02/1868)
155
156
157
This was made almost as a security measure, so that if faulty ammunition with a greater charge was ever
issued by mistake, the Committee could be sure that the rifles would not explode as a result.
158
64
the secret addition of extra lubrication.159 Rather embarrassingly, this therefore meant that
the Henry rifle had only been successful in previous trials because it had an unfair advantage
over all the others.
On 10th February 1868, due to the repeated failure of the trials rifles, the competition was
temporarily abandoned.160 The flaws of the trials rifles made it impossible for the
Committee to make a selection for military service. Not one rifle was accurate enough for
military use. Half of the rifles had too high a trajectory to be militarily efficient. The rifles
became dangerous if their ammunition was faulty, and often burst in the hands of the user.
The early rifle trials were therefore a complete disaster for the Ordnance Select Committee,
so much so that the top prize of £1000 was not given to any contender. Instead, they
declared the Henry rifle the 'winner', with Captain Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher stating:
Henry won the trials so should be issued the best breech mechanism award of £600. The
present service arm performed well enough to prove it as a sufficient military weapon.161
The competition therefore inadvertently paid homage to the Snider rifle and its capabilities
as a military arm. But it also showed the Committee that the current market for military
arms was not satisfactory. To devise an arm to meet their standard, they had to create their
own composite rifle, and so the question of sourcing a new arm was taken back to the
drawing board.
159
160
161
65
Back to the drawing board: the Martini-Henry
is born
Figure 1. Volunteer shooting event on Wimbledon common.162
Across the decade 1860-1870, firearms technology was advancing at such a rate that no
single committee could hope to find the best arm. The greatest embodiment of this
development can be shown through the volunteer movement that swept Britain at this
time, encompassing such firearms personalities as Alexander Henry, William Ellis Metford
and Sir Joseph Whitworth.
The volunteer movement in Britain mainly came as a reactionary response to Napoleon III's
expansionist policies in France.163 As a matter of fact, the push factors that resulted in the
War Office's call for modernisation in the military in 1864, were the exact same push factors
that increased civilian interest in rifles and shooting events.164 The key figures of this
162
163
164
A similar upsurge took place at the end of the eighteenth century as a result of the French Revolution.
66
volunteer movement were not satisfied with the .577 Enfield's produced by the
government, believing them to be 'gas pipes'.165 Instead, they strove to find new
innovations and improvements.
The greatest proponent to exemplify advancements in breech-loading rifles across the

decade was undoubtedly Alexander Henry of Edinburgh. His first major accomplishment in
firearms was his famous patented seven groove rifling.166 This rifling was so shallow that the
bullet was gripped by the entire circumference of the barrel, which allowed for much
greater accuracy. By 17th April 1865 he had designed his patented falling block action, that
won the £600 special committee prize in 1878. Henry became such a respected gun maker,
that in 1870, the Prince of Wales requested a private audience with him on a visit to
Scotland.167
In an era when breech-loading rifle designs were still being pioneered, muzzle-loading rifle
designs were now being perfected. The strongest example of this perfection of arms can be
shown by the joint efforts of Sir Henry Halford and William Ellis Metford, pictured below.
Figures 2. and 3. Sir Henry Halford (left) and William Ellis Metford (right). 168
165
166
D. Dallas, In the Gunroom, Alexander Henry, Triumph and Tragedy, Holts Auctioneers on Fine and Modern
Antique Guns (10/12/2015), p. 148
167
Dallas, In the Gunroom, Alexander Henry, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 147
168
67
In 1865, the British National Rifle Association held a competition for rifle shooting at 2000
yards, which was double the range of any War Office Committee tests. The only two
competitors were Halford and Metford.169 The competition was a draw, with both
competitors scoring eight hits out of twenty-five shots at a twenty-four by twelve feet
target.170 The following year there were five competitors, four using Metford's rifle and a
fifth using a Murcott rifle, that was withdrawn as it failed to hit the target.171 In terms of
range and accuracy, this clearly shows that Metford had perfected his designs for muzzle-
loading rifles. By the third year, the competitions at this range were discontinued, 'in view of
the subject being taken up by the War Office.'172 No longer concerned with ultra-long range
rifles, Metford then developed his own 'reduced-bore' rifling, with shallow grooves and a
bore diameter .461.173 This proved to be so accurate that the design was copied by gun
makers such as Rigby and the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield.
These 'reduced-bore' muzzle-loading rifles subsequently stole the show at every single
competition shoot conducted by the volunteer movement. The most notable of these was
the .451 muzzle-loading Whitworth rifle, designed by Sir Joseph Whitworth. He had been
employed by the War Office to produce a more accurate arm than the current service
Enfields. With the assistance of Mr Westley Richards and his patented octagonal rifling,
Whitworth designed his famous hexagonal designs.174 This prompted the War Office to
compare the current issue breech-loader, the Snider, with the more accurate muzzle-
loading arms. The results show just how accurate these civilian weapons systems actually
were:
169
Both competitors were using a fifteen pound rifle with telescopic sights attached that was designed by
Metford and manufactured in Bristol by George Gibbs.
170
The Telescopic Rifles, Western Daily Press (29/05/1865)
171
The Telescopic Rifles, Western Daily Press
172
D. Minshall, Metford's 2000 Yard Rifle, Long Range Rifle Fire, Research Press
<http://www.researchpress.co.uk/index.php/longrange/148-metford-2000> [Accessed 30/01/2016]
173
174
68
Mean Deviation at 500
Rifle Tested
yards (inches)
Snider-Enfield 12.02
Whitworth 10.05
Westley-Richards 9.65
Table 1. Snider-Enfield comparison trials with contemporary muzzle-loaders.175
The volunteer movement's rifles had now ultimately shown the War Office what could be
achieved in terms of accuracy, a standard which no rifle in the Sub-Committee's previous
trials could match. The solution, decided upon on the 11th February 1869, was that the
'perfect arm' could only be achieved if it was a composite arm.176 The rifling would be
considered in a completely separate trial to the breech. As the volunteer's competitions at
Wimbledon had shown, they decided that a .45 solid bullet would be preferable. The bullet
weight was set at 480 grains with an eighty-five grain charge.177 Thus, the revised trials
commenced.
As accuracy had been the greatest embarrassment of the earlier trials, the 'perfect arm's'
rifling was to be decided upon first, with a pool of muzzle-loading rifles already renowned
for their accuracy being trialled. As the Henry rifle had won the £600 offered from the
previous competition, the Henry breech would be attached to each rifle. The chosen
systems were those of Messrs, Henry, Lancaster, Metford, Rigby, Westley-Richards,
Whitworth and Enfield, with requests being sent to each gun maker to produce two rifles
with Henry breeches attached.178 Unfortunately, Mr. Metford declined participation in the
trial, and other rifles were absent from the trials. Testing was made with each rifle at the
standard distances of 300, 500, 800 and 1000 yards, with the shortest two ranges being
shown in Table 2. The longer two ranges are then shown in Table 3.:
175
Report on Small Arm Experiments, Woolwich, Royal Laboratory (17/09/1867)
176
Report of a Special Committee on Breech-Loading Rifles: Together with Minutes of Evidence (11/02/1869)
177
Special Committee on Breech-Loading Rifles: Together with Minutes of Evidence (11/02/1869)
178
Committee on Breech-Loading Rifles: Together with Minutes of Evidence (11/02/1869)
69
Deviation in feet at Deviation in feet at Deviation in feet at Deviation in feet at
Weapons System
300 yards (first 300 yards (second 500 yards (first 500 yards (second
Tested
rifle) rifle) rifle) rifle)
Enfield 0.62 0.61 1.27 1.03
Henry 0.62 0.68 1.06 0.90
Lancaster - - 1.08 -
Rigby - - 2.34 -
Westley-Richards - - 1.39 -
Whitworth 0.54 0.63 1.07 1.09
Snider .5 inch bore 0.59 0.63 1.02 1.16
Table 2. Accuracy trials at 300 and 500 yards. (Note that '-' indicates the shooting was deemed 'too
inaccurate'.)179
Weapons System Deviation in feet at Deviation in feet at Deviation in feet at Deviation in feet at
Tested 800 yards (first 800 yards (second 1000 yards (first 1000 yards (second
rifle) rifle) rifle) rifle)
Enfield 2.47 2.94 3.93 4.74
Henry 2.39 2.30 2.65 2.59
Lancaster - - - -
Rigby - - - -
Westley-Richards - - - -
Whitworth 2.91 - - -
Snider .5 inch bore 2.46 - - -
Table 3. Accuracy trials at 800 and 1000 yards. (Note that '-' indicates the shooting was deemed 'too
inaccurate'.)180
During these trials, the rifles had to comply with the regulation .45 ammunition decided
upon previously by the Committee. Upon seeing the poor results produced by his rifle, Mr.
Westley Richards claimed that it was impossible for his rifles to get any accuracy from the
ammunition provided and ultimately withdrew his rifle in disgust.181 Not that this altered
events in any way. From the results it was obvious that the Henry rifle was the resounding
winner of the accuracy competition. On top of its impressive accuracy, it was found that the
Henry rifle also had the flattest trajectory and had no fouling issues during shooting.182 On
179
Report of a Special Committee on Breech-Loading Rifles: Accuracy trials (11/02/1869)
180
Accuracy trials (11/02/1869)
181
182
Trials of Barrels in Respect to Accuracy, Trajectory, Penetration, War Office Report (11/02/1869)
70
this basis, the Henry barrel was selected for use for the future 'perfect arm', and the Sub-
Committee had finally made progress.
Now that the cartridge had been decided upon, and the rifling had been chosen, all that was
left to do was to find a suitable breech action for the new composite arm. Due to the fact
that a further forty-five new rifles had been submitted to the War Office since the 1868
trials, the Sub-Committee decided to start the competition afresh. After preliminary trials,
the majority of the submissions were quickly eliminated. The remainder were then divided
into two sub-groups based upon their actions: the bolt group and the block group, shown in
Table 4.
Bolt-action type breech-loaders chosen by the

Block type breech-loaders chosen by the Committee
Committee
Berdan Bacon
Henry Carter and Edwards
Martini Kerr
Money-Walker Wilson
Westley Richards (falling block)
Westley Richards (elevating block)
Table 4. 1869 Breech competition finalists.183
The rifles were then sent back to the gun makers to be modified to fit the regulation .45
service ammunition. Once all the rifles were returned, in depth testing began. It was evident
from the start that although they had been selected as finalists, the bolt-action rifles never
stood a chance as the next service arm as Sir Henry Halford's previous accident with a Carter
and Edwards rifle was still fresh in the Committee's minds.184 Indeed, their fears were met
with reality when the Wilson rifle's breech was blown back when being fired by Lord
Spencer.185 Despite this being an isolated incident, with all the other bolt-action rifles fairing
well in the tests, it was enough to reject the entire category of rifles due to potential safety
issues.
The following testing of the block type rifles replicated the earlier tests of 1868. During
exposure tests, the Berdan, the Money-Walker and the Westley Richards (elevating block)
183
Report on rifle selection for service, Special Committee on Breech-Loading rifles (11/02/1869)
184
Report on rifle selection for service (11/02/1869)
185
The Martini-Henry Rifle, The Engineer,p. 181
71
rifle all quickly failed. This left the only the Martini, the Henry and the Westley Richards
(falling block) rifles for consideration. After testing these rifles for accuracy, it was found
that the Westley Richards did not perform as well as the other two. Mr Westley Richards
claimed he could fix the shortfalls of his rifle, but was denied the opportunity.186 In
frustration, the Westley Richards (falling block) rifle was thus withdrawn from the
competition, with Mr Westley Richards claiming 'the committee have already made up their
minds.'187
For the final two rifles, the decision boiled down to issues of cost and manufacture as both
had performed equally well in the most recent trials. The Henry rifle required forty nine
separate parts, whilst the Martini required just twenty seven. This made production of the
Martini much cheaper. This, combined with the fact that the Martini cocked upon opening
the breech, whilst the Henry required a separate motion, ultimately swung the Committee
in favour of the Martini breech.188 This decision now meant that the composite arm had
been completed. The Martini breech would be attached to a Henry rifled barrel and would
fire the regulation .45 ammunition. Thus, the Martini-Henry was born.
This final choice was immediately met with a great deal of furore, as the public believed the
competition had been rigged in favour of the Martini. This was because whilst the other gun
makers had to modify their rifles themselves to fit the Committee's criteria, the Martini had
been sent to the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield for modification.189 At Enfield, the
design had been refined with many small features of the rifle being altered and improved,
such as the addition of a cocking indicator and a safety bolt, as well as having the sights
modified.190 There was a logic behind the Martini being improved by the War Office. Mr.
Martini was from Switzerland, and so communications between Martini and the War Office
were often slow and delayed. This issue became exacerbated by the fact that in earlier
competitions, Martini rifles and components had been held up in customs offices. To
186
Westley Richards proposed adding a special lubrication to the cartridge .45 cartridge, but was rebuffed as
the other trials rifles did not need this cartridge alteration.
187
188
The Martini-Henry Rifle, The Engineer, p. 181
189
190
The Martini-Henry Rifle, The Engineer, p. 181
72
prevent delays, the Martini was to be altered at Enfield.191 It was therefore practicality, not
bias, that prompted the decision.
Nevertheless, criticisms about bias continued, especially in the British press. Mr Wilson,
writing to The Engineer, attempted to expose this bias after his rifle had been rejected from
the competition: 'The Snider and the Martini have had their accidents; it is monstrously
unfair to brandish about the mishap of the Wilson without detailing the serious accident
which very recently occurred with the Martini... It is a scandalous injustice not to demerit
the Martini, especially after the accident occurred after two years of tinkering by the Royal
Laboratory.'192 It must be noted, however, that Mr. Wilson's comments came as a response
to the degradation of his rifle in a previous edition of The Engineer, not as an official
complaint against the Committee.
Further criticisms about the Martini-Henry were also sensationalised by the British press.
The Times, for example, claimed that the Martini 'misfired and failed to extract cartridges' at
a spectacular rate.193 In its claims, it failed to state that, the rate of misfires and extraction
problems with the Martini were below the averages of other rifles the reporter had
tested.194 The Times newspaper also posed the question: 'If the Martini-Henry is so good,
why do no other nations adopt it?'195 It must be noted, however, that no two nations on the
continent were using the same arm at this point.196
The public criticism of the Martini-Henry rifle was definitely not unfounded; the rifle was
riddled with problems. So much so, that despite being selected by the Committee in 1869, it
was not officially adopted as the arm of the British infantry until 1874. During this time, the
Mk I rifles went through three slightly different patterns as part of an almost endless cycle
of troop trials, negative feedback, attempted improvement and then further trial. For the
most part, troop feedback showed two problems. Firstly, that of recoil. The 'kick' from the
Martini-Henry was so great that it often injured the user. The second problem was that of
191
192
The Martini-Henry rifle, Wilson's letter and readers comments, The Engineer (26/03/1869), p. 222
193
The Martini and its Critics, The Pall Mall Budget (28/08/1874), p. 13
194
The Martini and its Critics, The Pall Mall Budget, p. 13
195
196
73
faulty component parts, such as the rifle's tumbler and striker, which broke and rendered
the rifle inoperable.
Regarding the recoil, the pressure from the large cartridge in the Martini-Henry caused its
recoil to be much larger than that of the Snider. Reports from officers and troops alike
indicated that this was far too great. Sergeant Major Davies, for example, commented that
'in regards to questions of recoil, it is go grave as to affect general shooting.' He also
reported that he 'does not think men like the new arm better than the Snider in this
regard.'197 From the perspective of the troops, the recoil was a problem as men were
injuring themselves whilst operating the rifle: 'The recoil funks the young soldiers - several
have bruised cheeks and fingers.'198 In response to the barrage of complaints, the Royal
Laboratory added a thumb rest on the rifle, in order to aid the soldier's grip. The recoil was
also worse with rifles with shorter butts (a feature of the original Martini-Henry was the
choice between a long or shorter butt stock), and so it was recommended that the butts
were to be lengthened an inch.199 When soliders continued to complain after these changes,
the overriding response from the War Office changed to one of 'troops will get used to it.'
Perhaps more pressing was the Martini-Henry's component breakages and faulty parts. For
example, after problems of breakages after troops trials in 1871, the War Office introduced
a new pattern strengthened striker with a reconfigured block to accept the a better
striker.200 Troops at the Cambridge Barracks at Woolwich were given these rifles in 1873 to
test the new strikers. The reports they responded with were damning as they simply stated
that 'strikers still break.'201 The War Office believed that by improving the manufacture of
each component part, this issue could be eradicated. Experience in the hands of the troops,
however, would prove the exact opposite. Even after the rifles official adoption, troop
reports almost unanimously highlighted component issues shown below in Table 5.
197
Sergeant Major Davies in, Ayde, Director of Artillery and Stores, Minutes of Conference held at the War
Office (24/10/1873)
198
Lieutenant Newman in, Ayde, Director of Artillery and Stores, Minutes of Conference held at the War Office
(24/10/1873)
199
J. Ayde, Director of Artillery and Stores, Minutes of Conference held at the War Office (24/10/1873)
200
Martini-Henry Mk I 1st and 2nd Pattern Rifle
<http://www.martinihenry.org/index.php?route=product/product&path=61_59&product_id=50> [Accessed
15/05/2016]
201
Report on Martini-Henry troop trials, Cambridge Barracks, Woolwich S.E. (27/08/1873)
74
Report Number Regiment Response
1 1st Regiment Edinburgh Arm generally approved: Lowness of trajectory,
accuracy and celerity of fire are all great
advantages. Many locks (Birmingham arms) too
highly tempered. Strikers are liable to fracture. All
rifles under sighted.
2 2nd Battalion 5th Regiment Jersey Excellent arm even in bad weather. Difficulties in
extraction - probably due to inexperience. Rifles
are under sighted.
4 Depôts 64th and 98th Glasgow Much preferred to the Snider but of our rifles five
strikers and two tumblers broke. All under
sighted.
Table 5. Initial troop responses after firing ten rounds from the Martini-Henry rifle.202
Despite its critics, whether it was from rival gun-makers, the press, the public or even the
soldiers who had to use it, the Martini-Henry was introduced into official service on 17th
July 1874. It was the composite product of one of the most complex processes of
implementation ever undertaken by the British government, and whether the public liked it
or not, it would officially the serve the British army for years to come. Its weaknesses were
obvious from the offset. Over time, however, the Martini-Henry would show its strengths
and justify its implementation as a service arm of the British Army.
202
Précis of Reports from regiments on the special firing of ten rounds from the Martini Henry, Special Army
Circular (26/11/1874)
75
A technical overview of the Martini-Henry
The bore of the barrel, the turn of the Rifling and the weight of the
Projectile, gave results in accuracy, trajectory, and penetration, and
rapidity of fire that could not be surpassed. The necessary movements
for loading and firing were reduced to a minimum; from seventeen to
eighteen shots per minute could be fired, and a good aim taken. The
principle of the falling block in the breech action, which was a previous
American invention, was the best arrangement for the purpose of closing
the breech, and has the great advantage of being completely enclosed in
the iron box which contains the lock arrangement, both when the breech
is opened for loading, and when closed for firing.
An overview of the merits of the Martini-Henry arm.203
Despite its shaky reception into British military service, the Martini-Henry was highly
successful as a military arm. It improved on the Snider-Enfield in almost every single respect.
It was more powerful, it had a flatter trajectory, it could fire faster and it had a greater
range. To evaluate this improvement, it is necessary to assess how the Martini-Henry was
operated and how it worked internally. Like the Snider-Enfield, the Martini-Henry was
subject to many pattern changes and improvements in its lifetime, from the early Mk I
versions through to the later Mk IV. There were also many different varients of Martini-
Henrys, such as cavalry carbines. Unlike the Snider, however, some Martinis were subject to
caliber changes, such as the experimental .402 and the later .303. These adaptations show
just how efficient a military arm the Martini-Henry ultimately became, as it constantly
adapted to keep up with small arms developments across the latter part of the nineteenth
century.
Regardless of its designated mark, all Martini-Henrys were operated in the same manner.
Like the Snider-Enfield, it was only capable of being a 'single-loader', that is, one round had
to be loaded, fired and ejected manually before a fresh round could be inserted. The key
203
W. Marshall, The Comparative Merits of the Martini Rifle and the Westley-Richards Rifle and Ammunition
(London, 1870), pp. 3-4
76
improvement over the Snider-Enfield by means of operation was its simplicity. This can be
shown across the analysis of the Martini-Henry's operation.
When firing from a standing position, the first step for the British soldier when operating a
rifle is to move into the 'ready' position. This ensures a stable base with which to fire from,
and is shown below.
Figures 2. and 3., The soldier moves his left foot ten inches, placing the feet at right angles. The weapon is
raised parrallel to the ground. 204 205
Once the soldier is in position, the rifle can then be loaded. This was to be done by 'placing
the thumb inside the loop of the lever and opening the breech with a strong downward
pressure.'206 This motion not only opens the breech of the rifle to allow loading, but it also
cocks the rifle. Compared to the Snider-Enfield with its external hammer, this allows the
soldier to effectively skip the process of half cocking and fully cocking the rifle, shown
below.
204
The War Office, Rifle Exercises & Musketry Instruction 1879, Her Majesty's Stationary Office (London, 1879),
p. 94
205
The Mk I Martini Henry: Rifle Exercises C.1879/1881, Britishmuzzleloaders (25/08/2015)
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RPNc5IAwp6g> [Accessed: 14/05/2016] 1 Minute 41 Seconds
206
Rifle Exercises & Musketry Instruction 1879, p. 96
77
Figure 5. The soldier in the ready position with an un-cocked rifle. Notice that the cocking indicator sits
vertically.207
Figure 6. The breech is opened and the rifle is cocked. The cocking indicator clearly shows this as it has rotated
forty-five degrees.208
Then, using the forefinger and thumb, a cartridge is inserted into the chamber with the right
hand, ensuring it is 'well home' by pressing it with the thumb.209 Once inserted, the breech
is closed by placing the fingers under the lever, resting the thumb on top of the rifle's butt
and squeezing the lever shut, shown below. This ensures that the thumb doesn't get
trapped inside the lever.
207
The MK I Martini Henry: Introduction, Britishmuzzleloaders (20/08/2014)
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DiT6Bzz2SP> [Accessed 15/05/2016] 2 Minutes 51 Seconds
208
The MK I Martini Henry: Introduction, Britishmuzzleloaders, 2 Minutes 52 Seconds
209
78
Figure 7. The cartridge is loaded into the chamber. 210
Figure 8. The lever is brought back up. Note the means of closing is different to that of opening the breech. 211
The next step was to adjust the sights on the rifle accordingly. The Rifle Exercises handbook
suggests that the officer should always name the distance required, however, often troops
judged the distance independently. The troops would have a good idea of gauging distance
from their musketry training shown in the drawing below.
210
211
79
Figure 9. British soldiers during musketry training, learning how to gauge distances, published in the Illustrated
London News.212
Figure 10. The soldier sets his backsight to the desired range. 213
The rifle would now be ready for firing. Upon the command 'present' the rifle is 'brought
sharply into the hollow of the right shoulder, pressing it to the shoulder with the left hand;
at the same instant the left elbow is brought nearly under the rifle and the right elbow
square to it.'214 The forefinger is placed on the trigger, without pressing it. The left eye is
also to be closed and the right fixed on the muzzle.
212
213
The Mk I Martini Henry: Rifle Exercises C.1879/1881, Britishmuzzleloaders, 2 Minutes 50 Seconds
214
80
Figure 11. The soldier places the rifle in the ready position, creating a stable shooting platform for himself. 215
When firing the rifle, the soldier would start with a lowered muzzle and raise it to fix the
sights on the target. As the trigger is pulled, breathing is to be restricted and every part of
the soldier must remain in the 'present' position. Once the rifle had been fired, the spent
cartridge would be ejected by pulling sharply on the lever.
Figure 11. The cartridge is ejected automatically as the breech is opened.216
Figure 12. The reality of the cartridge ejection. It was not uncommon for Martini-Henrys to eject quite weakly.
In this case, the cartridge must be removed by hand.217
215
The Mk I Martini Henry: Rifle Exercises C.1879/1881, Britishmuzzleloaders, 3 Minutes 5 Seconds
216
81
Once the soldier had fired all the rounds required and the final cartridge was ejected, this
would leave a cocked rifle with an open breech. This was closed by 'pressing the trigger
firmly without touching the lever' to de-cock the rifle and ease the springs.218
This firing process may look more complex than that of the Snider-Enfield, but in reality, it
was much quicker and simpler to perform. In the early rifle trials, the Martini-Henry
outperformed the Snider-Enfield on speed of operation by an average two shots per minute,
even before ergonomic additions such as the thumb rest and extended lever were added by
the War Office. It was this simplified process that made the Martini-Henry one of the
simplest breech-loading rifles of the era.
This simplicity could also be shown in the manufacture of the Martini-Henry, as it had less
components than the Snider-Enfield, having thirty parts to the Snider's thirty nine.219 This
meant that its internal workings were relatively simple, compared to the intricate external
lock of the Snider-Enfield. The rifle's designer, Friederich Von Martini stated that: 'This arm
unites great simplicity of construction with ease of repair, it is very durable, and little liable
to damage even in the most awkward hands.'220 The original patent for this simple Martini
action can be shown below in the configuration that was used in the 1868 trials.
217
218
219
B. Temple, I. Skennerton, A Treatise on the British Military Martini, The Martini-Henry 1869-C1900 (London,
UK, 1983), p. 33
220
Friederich Von Martini to Clinton Edgcumbe Brooman, Commissioner of Patents (22/07/1868)
82
Figure 13. Friederich Von Martini's original British patent. 221
The workings of this original action were repeatedly modified by the War Office throughout
the trials. Despite this, the basic operation of the Martini-Henry remained the same. For
example, the components in the armourer's drawings for the Martini-Henry in 1897 were
still very similar to this original, with the most obvious changes being the lengthened
extractor and the altered shape of the body.
221
Friederich Von Martini to Clinton Edgcumbe Brooman (22/07/1868)
83
Figure 14. Armourer's drawing of the Martini-Henry action (when closed and un-cocked).222
The functions of the different components to the rifle are as follows. The long metal bolt in
the wooden stock secured the breech tightly to the stock. The block contained inside the
breech drops down by means of a hinge towards the back of the breech. The top of this
block is slightly hollowed to assist in inserting cartridges into the chamber. Officially, this
groove was described as 'a hollow which corresponds with the aperture in the barrel when
it is in position for the cartridge to be placed in it.'223 Inside this block is the firing
mechanism, which comprises of a metal striker attached to a helical spring. When firing, the
tip of this striker passes through a hole in the block to ignite the cartridge.
To cock the rifle, the external lever is pushed downwards. The block subsequently drops
using a tooth-gear mechanism, thus allowing a cartridge to be loaded into the chamber,
shown below.
222
New South Wales Military Forces, Handbook for the Martini-Henry Rifle (1897), p. 65
223
84
Figure 15. Armourer's drawing of the Martini-Henry falling block mechanism.224
At the same time, the lever that causes the block to 'fall' revolves the tumbler, which in turn
pulls back the spring inside the block. As the lever is fully extended, the tumbler rotates far
enough to rest in a bent, which holds it and the spring in place, shown below.
Figure 16. Armourer's drawing of a Martini rifle as it is cocked. Note how the tumbler sits in a notch, shown in
the second and third images.225
224
Martini Block action, Notes on The Martini-Henry Rifle, Royal Armouries Archives, Courtesy of Chris Streek
[03/05/2016]
225
Process of cocking, Notes on The Martini-Henry Rifle, Royal Armouries Archives, Courtesy of Chris Streek
[03/05/2016]
85
Once the lever is closed, the notch ensures tumbler remains in its original position. Closing
the lever also pushes the breech block back upwards. The only thing holding the block in
place is the lever itself. As Martini described; 'The moveable breech during the discharge is
maintained in place by the lever only, and the short arm is so disposed that it is impossible
for the block to be displaced by the force of the explosion.'226
Figure 17. The Martini when it is cocked and the lever is closed.227
When the rifle is fired, the trigger is compressed. This rotates the trigger sear, to which the
notch holding the tumbler in place is attached. This causes the tumbler to rotate at speed
and releases the spring in the firing mechanism, causing the striker to fly forward with
enough speed to ignite the cartridge. The Martini-Henry at the point of ignition can be
shown in Armour's drawing below.
Figure 18. A Martini at the point of ignition. The striker and the tumbler have both shifted prominently
towards the chamber.228
226
227
Cocking the Martini, Breech-Loading Rifles, 1868-1871 Trials Rifles Armourer's Drawings, War Office (1871)
228
Firing the Martini, Breech-Loading Rifles, 1868-1871 Trials Rifles Armourer's Drawings, War Office (1871)
86
To extract the spent cartridge, two vertical arms are built into the sides of the barrel that
grip the rim of the cartridge. Upon opening the lever, a bent arm (shown by the letter E in
figure 18.) is pushed downwards. This rotates the vertical arms of the extractor, thus
removing the cartridge from the chamber.229
Although appearing quite complex, it must be noted that this rifle could be fired almost
twenty times a minute. As it contained so few parts, it could also easily be repaired by an
armourer. It does not mean to say that the Martini-Henry was 'perfect' from the offset. Like
the Snider, the Martini-Henry was subject to a great deal of improvement across its life in
service due to small flaws in the original designs that came in the form of different Marks.
Dealing with the Martini-Henry rifle alone, (omitting the carbine version), there were four
official marks across its life in service. To complicate matters, further variants existed, such
as the experimental Enfield Martini in .402 calibre and the Martini-Metford chambered for
.303 ammunition. A prototype of the first Martini-Henry rifle issued to troops, the Mk I, can
is shown below.
Figure 19. Martini-Henry, sample arm for production c.1875.230
The Martini-Henry Mk I had also been subject to constant change, moving through three
distinct patterns, the first of which even requiring its own 'long' ammunition.231 Despite the
Mk I consisting of three different patterns, inherent problems still existed, such as
229
230
Britain, Rifle .577/450 Martini-Henry Mk I Sample Arm, G&B LTD Leeds c.1875, Royal Armouries National
Firearms Centre Gunhall [Photo taken 25/05/16]
231
In this case, the different patterns were simply different versions of the same Mark as minor improvements
were made.
87
component issues. The change from Martini-Henry Mk I to Mk II sought to fix the faulty
components; it was fitted with a new tumbler, trigger and trigger guard. The extractor was
also altered so that it was parallel throughout. Finally, the sights were also changed to fix
the problem of rifles being under sighted.232 The Mk II designation was officially
implemented on 25th April 1877, shown below.
Figure 20. A Martini-Henry Mk II rifle.233
As the Martini-Henry carbine was in development simultaneously with the rifle, its parts
became minutely different. The alteration from the Martini-Henry Mk II to Mk III was
therefore implemented to standardise its components to that of the carbine, thus making
the components interchangeable. It therefore had a smaller striker, and had its screws
altered.234 If one of these components broke on the rifle, it could in theory be repaired by
parts built for the carbine. Martini-Henrys Mk IIIs were also fitted with a block that had a
wider fore-end to increase stability when firing, and the cocking indicator was also made
smaller. These changes were appeared in the list of changes on 22nd August 1879.235 The
sealed pattern Mk III can be shown below, with the smaller cocking indicator being the most
visible difference to its predecessors.
232
List of Changes in British War Material, change no. 3193
233
Britain, Rifle .577/450 Martini-Henry Mk II, NAA co. 1880, Royal Armouries National Firearms Centre
Gunhall [Photo taken 25/05/16]
235
88
Figure 21. Sealed Pattern Martini-Henry Mk III.236
In the interim period before the Martini-Henry Mk IV, experiments were made into 'the
production of a new improved rifle' based on the Martini-Henry.237 It was necessitated by
the fact that other countries were now using superior arms. In 1880, the War Office found
during testing at Dungeness that the American designed Berdan rifle used by the Russians
was superior to the Martini-Henry.238 It would have perhaps been wiser for the War Office
to look into developing a new arm, capable of holding a magazine, given that several other
nations were now using magazine arms, such as the Swiss with the Vetterli rifle.
Nevertheless, the result of these experiments saw many changes made to the Martini-
Henry. As well as altering the sights, it was also fitted with a new reduced .402 barrel and
utilised a new ratchet rifling system.239 In reducing the bore, the muzzle velocity could be
raised from 1315 feet per second to 1570, thus increasing the rifle's power.240 In 1886,
attempts were made at adding 'quickloaders' to the rifles in an attempt to increase the
speed of loading. These could, for a 'nimble man' shave four or five seconds off firing twenty
rounds compared to the older Mk III Martini-Henry.241 On 13th May 1886, a pattern 'B'
Enfield-Martini was introduced, with a longer lever to aid extraction. This version featured
236
Britain, Rifle .577/450 Martini-Henry Mk III Sealed Pattern 1879, Royal Armouries National Firearms Centre
237
R. McMahon, The .402 Enfield-Martini, from Cinderella to Pumpkin, Rifles at Random, International Arms
and Militaria Collector No. 25 (Labrador, AU, 2006), p. 30
238
K. Jones, D. Welch, A Cultural History of Firearms in the Age of Empire (Farnham, 2013), p. 243
239
The New Martini-Enfield Rifle, Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art, Volume. 57
(16/02/1884), p. 208
240
The New Martini-Enfield Rifle, Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art, p. 208
241
The New Martini-Enfield Rifle, Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art, p. 209
89
ultra-long range volley sights, which was to be a key characteristic of subsequent infantry
rifles such as the magazine Lee-Metford. This new Enfield-Martini meant that in theory, the
British now possessed rifle that was 'superior in every way to other nations', that is, in
accuracy, velocity and speed of operation.242
Figure 22. Experimental Enfield-Martini .402 with long ranged sights attached.243
In practise, this 'improvement' brought with it more problems than its introduction solved,
the most prominent of which was logistical. In 1886 the British army possessed 600,000
Martini-Henrys in stores alone, not counting those rifles held in service. Alongside these,
they had 45,000,000 rounds of .450/577 Martini-Henry ammunition. The Gatling-Gardner
machine gun ammunition in service at the time was also not interchangeable with Martini-
Henry rifles.244 Furthermore, the decision to adopt the .303 cartridge in later years sealed
the fate of the Enfield-Martini. The variety of calibres posed too much of a logistical
nightmare for the Enfield-Martini to ever be a practical choice. For that reason, the
experiment of the Enfield-Martini rifle was abolished, ultimately leaving 64,634 Enfield-
Martinis in store.245
242
McMahon, The .402 Enfield-Martini, from Cinderella to Pumpkin, Rifles at Random, p. 30
243
Britain, Rifle .402 Enfield-Martini W/Long Range Sights 1882, Royal Armouries National Firearms Centre
244
Enfield Martini .402" Mk1 Rifle Pattern A
<http://www.martinihenry.org/index.php?route=product/product&path=61_59&product_id=78>
245
McMahon, The .402 Enfield-Martini, from Cinderella to Pumpkin, Rifles at Random, p. 32
90
To solve these logistical problems, the Martini-Henry was restored to a .450/577 rifle, with
the Mk IV being introduced into service on 15th September 1887.246 Of the Mk IV's, the first
pattern, 'A's, were simply converted Enfield-Martini rifles. The safety catch and the quick-
loader were removed and the rifle was re-bored with the traditional Henry rifling at the
Sparkbrook factory.247 Pattern 'B' Mk IVs were also converted Enfield-Martinis, however,
these variants had been converted from the pattern 'B' rifles described above. The final
pattern, 'C' rifles, were those that were made entirely from scratch.
Like its immediate predecessor, the Enfield-Martini, the Martini-Henry Mk IV differed

drastically compared to the earlier Marks. These differences were the result of bitter
experience in battle. Reports from the frontiers of the Empire showed that the Martini-
Henry was plagued with problems. These issues had of course been inherent in the rifle
from the offset, but refusal deal with them left the rifle fundamentally flawed. On 16th
January 1882, for example, the Secretary of State for War, Hugh Childers, ruled out re-
examining the breech-system because of its flaws 'unless in case of urgent necessity.'248 This
decision proved to be disastrous. Reports from the Sudan found that in conflicts such as in
Tofrek in 1885 between twenty five and fifty percent of the Martini-Henrys used jammed in
action, causing the Dervish enemies to penetrate the British formations.249 The majority of
these problems based upon the rifle's extractor. The extractors on Martini-Henry rifles were
very weak, an issue that had been raised by troops throughout rifle's selection process.
As solid drawn cartridges were now being issued for the Martini-Henry, the need to alter the
extractor subsequently became paramount. The Mk IV sought to finally fix any extraction
issues, by strengthening the extractor and making it half an inch longer.250 Like the Enfield-
Martini, the Mk IV possessed a lever that was three inches longer. In mechanical terms, the
further away from the fulcrum (or pivot point) you apply the effort, the greater the resultant
force becomes on the load. For the Mk IV, this meant more force would be exerted on the
extractor when the lever is pushed downwards, increasing the chance the cartridge would
246
Martini Henry .450" Mk1V Pattern A
15/05/2016]
247
Martini Henry .450" Mk1V Pattern A
248
Jones, Welch, A Cultural History of Firearms in the Age of Empire, p. 243
249
250
91
eject successfully. Due to complaints that the rifle was too heavy, the rifle body was reduced
and the butt stock was narrowed, thus decreasing the overall weight of the arm.251 The
resultant Mk IV finally eradicated the inherent issues of the Martini-Henry.
Figure 23. Martini-Henry Mk IV.252
The final versions of the Martini-Henry came in the form of fitting new barrels to the rifles
to fit later .303 ammunition. This would help the British Army logistically, as fewer types of
service ammunition were needed. The first of these rifles were the Martini-Henry Mk V and
Mk VI, officially known as the Martini-Metford Mk I (sealed on 30th July 1889) and Mk II
(sealed on 12th March 1890) respectively.253 These rifles used the Metford rifling that came
standard to the Magazine Rifle, .303. Of the two, the Mk I's were either conversions of old
Mk III Martini-Henrys, or newly built variants made at Birmingham Small Arms company and
the Mk II's were conversions of Mk II Martini-Henrys. These rifles saw limited use in the
British army however, as only very few were issued to forces in places like Jamaica and
Zululand.254
As cordite was phased into use with the magazine rifles, causing them to switch to a more
robust Enfield rifling, converted Martini-Henrys followed suit in what was to be their final
service alterations. These, confusingly named Martini-Enfields Mk I and II were issued on
251
252
Britain, Rifle Martini-Henry Mk IV, 1887, Royal Armouries National Firearms Centre Gunhall [Photo taken
25/05/16]
253
Martini-Henry Rifle MkVI (Martini Metford MkII)
15/05/2016]
254
Martini-Henry Rifle Mk VI (Martini Metford MkII)
92
5th February 1896 and 11th February 1896.255 Like the Metford rifled variants, the Martini-
Enfields were simply re-barrelled Martini-Henrys. Unlike the Metford variants, these rifles
saw a much higher level of service and production, with 48,000 Mk Is and 10,000 Mk II's
being produced for use in commonwealth countries.
On this basis, it can be shown that although built around a simple and robust design, it took
an incredibly long time for the Martini-Henry to be truly fit for service. By the time it
resembled the 'perfect arm' that the War Office originally envisioned when advertising the
rifle trials, development of the Magazine Rifle .303 was already well underway. The value of
the Martini-Henry can be shown in that even after the Magazine Rifle .303 became standard
issue, it was constantly being adapted, ensuring that it retained its significance well into the
1890's.
255
Martini-Enfield Rifle Mk II
15/05/2016]
93
A symbol of imperialism: the Martini-Henry in
battle
Figure 1. The Defence of Rorke's drift.256
'The Colt Peacemaker may have been regarded to have 'tamed the west', but it was
the Martini-Henry that maintained order around the globe.'257 In popular culture, when the
vast majority of people think of the British Empire, they envisage a redcoat soldier clutching
his trusty Martini-Henry. But is the Martini-Henry worthy of this accolade? The rifle was not
without its flaws. In terms of technological development, it did not represent a state of the
art design, as the 'lead was firmly held in the hands of the Europeans.'258 The key reason for
the legacy of the Martini-Henry is colonial expansion. From the era of the Snider-Enfield in
1866 to the end of the Martini-Henry's service life with in 1888, the British Empire had
grown hugely, as territory was gained across Africa, Indonesia and the Middle East.
256
J. Askew, The Defence of Rorke's Drift, Help for Heroes Charity Commission (2011)
<http://www.yessy.com/jasonaskew/zulu.html?i=29786> [Accessed 03/02/2016]
257
P. Suciu, The Versatile Martini-Henry Rifle Was a Mainstay of the British Army During Queen Victoria's
Numerous 'Little' Wars, Military Heritage Magazine (August 2005)
258
Westwood, Rifles: An Illustrated History of Their Impact, p. 59
94
The number of conflicts that the British Empire was involved in directly correlated to the
amount of territory they possessed. This ensured that the Martini-Henry would be used in
far more conflicts than the Snider-Enfield. Some of the key conflicts where the Martini-
Henry was used will be analysed to show its effectiveness, from lesser known campaigns in
Malaysia to its iconic role in the Zulu campaigns, and its swan song appearances in both
World Wars.
The first deployment of the Martini-Henry was during the Perak campaign in Northern
Malaysia from 1875 to 1876.259 The 80th Staffordshire Regiment and the 3rd Royal East Kent
regiment were sent to the region from postings in India and Hong Kong to restore order
after the British Administrator James W. W. Birch was murdered. The Perak campaign was
based around armoured flotillas that traversed the Perak river to neutralise the hostile
Malay forces. The campaign ended when the rebel leaders were captured and hanged.260
These flotillas can be shown below.
Figure 4. General Colbourne's armoured flotilla in pursuit of rebel ex Sultan Ismail.261
The first serious conflict that involved the Martini-Henry was in Africa in 1878 in the 9th
Cape Frontier War. 450 British troops fought against almost 4000 Gcaleka warriors. On 7th
February 1878 at Centane, the Gcaleka troops charged the British position. Whilst they
succeeded in coming within 100 yards of the British line, the fast accurate fire of the
Martini-Henry caused them to retreat, resulting in 500 Gcaleka dead and not one British
259
S. Manning, The Martini-Henry Rifle (Oxford, 2013), p. 32
260
R. Zuljan, The Perak War 1875-76 (2016)
<https://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/c1800s/yr75/fperak1875.htm> [Accessed 20/05/2016]
261
The Perak War Dispatches, The Illustrated London News (26/02/1876)
95
soldier killed.262 The commander, Sir Cunningham remarked that 'at no time has the power
of the Martini-Henry been so conspicuously shown.'263 Against forces of natives, the
Martini-Henry truly was proving to be worthy of the reputation it holds today.
The early success story of the Martini-Henry against native forces continued in places such
as Afghanistan in 1880. Accounts like those at the battle of Mazina show the power of the
Martini-Henry: 'effective volley fire by both marksmen and companies was achieved at 400
yards on the left and 700 yards on the right. The enemy made a stand but the way was
ultimately cleared with the bayonet. They lost heavily to just two of our own killed.' 264
Battles such as these clearly exemplify the power of the Martini-Henry.
As the Martini-Henry's experience in battle grew, however, faults began to be reported. As

historian David Welch shows, 'campaigns in the Sudan brought sufficient complaint. Martini-
Henry's jammed in Tamai in 1884, Abu Khea in 1885 and Tofrek in 1885 (in the latter as
many as half of the British rifles jammed.)'265 In this light, doubt is cast over the true abilities
of the rifle. A case study must be therefore be made to examine whether the rifle is at fault
in these instances, or whether external factors contributed to its effectiveness.
As a case study, conflict across modern day South Africa from 1878 to 1881 with the Anglo-
Zulu War (1878-1879) and the First Transvaal War (1880-1881) highlight both the qualities
and failings of the Martini-Henry in battle. Despite both ending disastrously for British
forces, it can be shown that the rifle was not to blame, rather, it was the incompetence of
British leadership that led to disaster. Conversely, it can actually be shown that the Martini-
Henry often saved the British when on the brink of defeat.
The Anglo-Zulu War, although ending in victory for the British, was far too costly be
considered a success: 'It took 17,000 troops at a cost of £5,230,328 to defeat the Zulus who
were unsophisticated and could put no more than 29,000 men in the field. Seventy-six
officers, 1007 soldiers and 600 black auxiliaries were killed.'266 The British expected the
conflict to be similar to that of battles such as Centane. Once the British forces moved into
262
Manning, The Martini-Henry Rifle, p. 32
263
Manning, The Martini-Henry Rifle, p. 33
264
Captain H. O'Donnell, Historical records of the 14th Regiment, now the Prince of Wales' own (West Yorkshire
Regiment) from its formation in 1685 to 1892 (Devonport, 1920), p. 229
265
266
J. Laband, Lord Chelmsford's Zululand Campaign 1878-1879, Army Records Society (1994)
96
Zululand to engage the enemy, no defensive positions were made, with the British
commander Lord Chelmsford believing they would 'take a week to make.'267 At Isandlwana
on 22nd January 1879, a 4000 man strong Zulu force succeeded in outmanoeuvring and
massacring the British forces stationed there, whilst the main British force was away
searching for the Zulu army. The disaster, that resulted caused over 1300 deaths on the
British side, cannot be blamed on the Martini-Henry rifle. Most of the fighting occurred in
hand to hand combat, and the power of the rifle could not be brought to bear upon the
Zulus.
Interestingly, two of the key battles in which the Martini-Henry was deployed occurred on
the same day. Simultaneously to Islandlwana came the Battle of Rorke's Drift. The successful
defence of the small British contingent at Rorke's drift saw around 150 British troops repel
an army of 3000 Zulu warriors, losing just seventeen of their own and killing over 350.268 In
this instance, the film 'Zulu' categorically places the Martini-Henry as the reason for victory,
as Stanley Baker (playing the role of British commander Lt. John Chard), states 'victory
wasn't merely a miracle, but rather a short chamber, Boxer-Henry, .45 calibre miracle.'269
Whilst this statement was in all probability never actually made by Lt. Chard, it was not far
from the truth. Private Caleb Wood, for example, praises the Martini-Henry in his memoir of
the battle: "The pain of my burned fingers and aching shoulder was proof indeed that I was
still alive. I instinctively dropped the lever under the breech of my rifle, cursing the boiling
oil that seeped from the super heated walnut. I slid another heavy boxer round into the
chamber and steeled myself for the final, inevitable, last few minutes of my life. But the
Zulu’s host who had attacked again and again were to come no more."270 In the early stages,
volley fire at range from Martini-Henrys repelled the first waves of attack, whilst sustained
fire in the latter stages at close range helped prevent the defences from being breached.271
In this example, the Martini-Henry is therefore worthy of its reputation today.
267
F. Colenso, History of the Zulu War and its Origin (London, 1880), p. 294
268
Colenso, History of the Zulu War and its Origin, p. 304
269
Suciu, The Versatile Martini-Henry Rifle Was a Mainstay of the British Army During Queen Victoria's
Numerous 'Little' Wars
270
C. Wood, Account of Rorke's Drift, Nottingham Daily Express (23/07/1914)
271
A. Greaves, Rorke's Drift (London, 2002), p. 230
97
Figure 5. 'Defending the Biscuit Box Wall'272
The Martini-Henry was therefore perfectly suited for fighting against natives armed with
muzzle-loading rifles or close combat weaponry. But what if the conflict was against well-
armed troops that utilized field tactics rather than simply charging en masse? This was the
case in the Transvaal War of 1880-1881 which resulted in a loss for the British. Across a
series of skirmishes, the British forces lost over 400 soldiers, compared to the Boer's forty-
one.273 In this campaign, many problems were reported with the Martini-Henry. The rifle
often overheated, limiting its rate of fire to a mere six rounds per minute and reducing its
accuracy.274 The high British losses cannot be attributed to these flaws, however, as the
Boers were using similar weapons systems and did not experience any issues. As volunteer
militiamen, the Boers were only armed with what they could afford, and so carried a variety
of weapons systems that included Martini-Henrys, Snider-Enfields and Westley-Richards
rifles, as shown below.275
272
'Defending the Biscuit Box Wall' Battle of Rorke's Drift <http://www.britishbattles.com/zulu-war/rorkes-
drift.htm> [Accessed 30/05/2016]
273
G. Duxbury, David and Goliath: The First War of Independence, 1880–1881 (Johannesburg, South Africa,
1981)
274
J. Laband, The Transvaal Rebellion: The First Boer War, 1880-1881 (New York, NY, 2005), p. 29
275
Laband, The Transvaal Rebellion: The First Boer War, p. 17
98
Figure 6. Boer commandoes at the siege of Pretoria. 276
In this instance the high casualty rate was due to the poor British leadership. The British
were utilising conventional military tactics, whilst the Boers presented a more modern
approach. Whilst the British preferred to stand in lines and volley fire, the Boers favoured
concealed positions, sniping as if hunting.
Overall, the Martini-Henry does indeed deserve the status that modern military historians
attribute to it. It allowed the British army to win multiple conflicts in which they were
almost always outnumbered, and it prevented more serious defeats in the conflicts that
were not successful. Furthermore, like the Snider-Enfield, the Martini-Henry saw continued
use even after it had been made a second-class arm by the coming bolt action rifles. For
example, it served alongside the Snider-Enfield in the Home Guard during the First World
War. 277
Unlike the Snider-Enfield, the Martini-Henry also saw service with the Home Guard in the
Second World War. At the Lithgow factory in Australia new models were constructed into
the 1950s, and examples are still being recovered in modern day conflict areas such as
Afghanistan, as shown below.
276
277
Home Guard inspection by Lord Kitchener c.1914, BBC Film footage, 28 Minutes 0 Seconds
99
Figure 8. Note Martini-Henrys and Martini-Henry carbines amongst the weaponry.278
On this basis, the Martini-Henry is truly worthy of the reputation it gained that was hard
earned in countless conflicts across the globe.
278
I. Hogg, Afghan fighters at prayer shortly after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 1979, Janes Guns (1996)
100
Conclusions
Figure 1. BSA 1876 re-barrelled to .303 at Enfield in 1900 on a BSA military bicycle. 279
The Martini-Henry as a rifle has been subjected to a continuous flow of both criticism
and praise by military historians. To some, the Martini-Henry is nothing more than a rifle
built 'to bridge the gap between converted muzzle-loaders and bolt-actions.'280 To others,
the rifle represents the embodiment of the British Empire. From this overview, it can be
shown that the Martini-Henry is worthy of the latter view.
The complex process of trials that resulted in the adoption of the Martini-Henry shows that
these divisions existed from the offset of the rifle's implementation. For example, the press
originally branded the Martini-Henry as the result of War Office bias and incompetence.
Conversely, after proving its worth as a rifle, the overriding opinion grew that the War Office
279
1876 BSA Martini-Henry Rifle <http://www.oldbike.eu/museum/guns/1876-bsa-martini-henry-rifle/>
[Accessed 27/05/2016]
280
Westwood, Rifles: An Illustrated History of Their Impact, p. 61
101
was indeed successful in developing a competent arm. As the Manchester Guardian
proclaimed, the rifle was 'the most perfect in every respect that has yet to be invented.'281
The design and operation of the Martini-Henry also proved that the rifle deserved its
reputation. Even though it was a single-loader it was simpler and faster than its predecessor,
the Snider-Enfield. Its design was no major revolution in the development of firearms, and
was quickly obsolesced by other European nations. Nevertheless, it 'soldiered on
regardless.'282 The Martini-Henry did have its issues, but these were steadily resolved in
later marks of the rifle, ensuring that the Martini-Henry could be developed into an
incredibly successful weapon.
Finally, the extent to which the Martini-Henry was used in British service gives testament to
how important a military arm it actually was. The range of conflicts it was successfully
involved in occurred in almost every single British colony around the world, 'from the
deserts of Egypt, to the rainforests of Africa.'283 The case study of South African conflicts
shows that despite encountering some issues with the rifle, the Martini-Henry still served
the British forces well. The extended service life of the Martini-Henry evidences this, with its
continued use into the twentieth century.. Indeed, in the words of Suciu, 'the Martini-Henry
is the embodiment of the Victorian, last of the line, English through-and-through
persona.'284
281
M. Delmard, The Martini-Henry Rifle, The Manchester Guardian (22/02/1875)
282
N. F. Magazine Fed Martinis (25/02/2015) <www.thefirearmblog.com> [Accessed 15/10/2015]
283
D. Lewis, Martini-Henry .450 Rifles & Carbines (Latham, NY, 1996), p. 6
284
Suciu, The Versatile Martini-Henry Rifle was a Mainstay of the British Army During Queen Victoria's
102
Transitioning into modernity:
the Magazine Rifle, .303
285
285
G. James, Britain's Black-Powder .303, The Lee-Metford, Guns Digest (09/02/2015)
103
Men fall to the shrill whisper of a bullet, the sound of which has not time to
reach their ears, fired by an invisible foe at great distance. There death is
merely the quod erat demonstrandum of mathematical and mechanical
proposition.
War correspondent George Lynch on the capabilities of the Lee-Metford.286
The adoption of the .303 magazine Lee-Metford in British military history is little
known, especially when compared to its progeny, the Lee-Enfield. On a global scale, its
adoption into British service in 1888 was by no means unique. In the late 1880s every single
world power adopted a small bore, bolt-action repeating rifle: The 1886 French Lebel, the
German Mauser, the Japanese Type 22, the American Krag-Jørgensen and even the Russian
1891 Mosin-Nagant.287 James Paris Lee's original bolt action design too, was almost a
decade old by the time the British adopted his rifle, having been rejected by both British and
United States governments simultaneously in its original 1879 format.288 Furthermore, the
rifle was troubled with endurance problems due to the corrosive effects of a new explosive
named cordite, that caused it to be replaced by the Lee-Enfield in 1895.
Despite these factors, the Lee-Metford was indeed an extremely important rifle for the
British army. It represented a leap forward in firearms technology that was so great that the
officers of the day could not adapt to the new tactics it allowed. In the view of historians
Temple and Skennerton, 'the advent of the magazine rifle was to render all single-shot rifles
obsolete. Even 'quick-loading' systems were abandoned almost as soon as they achieved
operational status.'289 Its direct descendant, the Lee-Enfield, served the British army well
into the late 1980s, and the box magazine in general is now standard feature on many
modern firearms.
The importance of the arm can first be shown through the rifle's selection process. Like the
Snider-Enfield and Martini-Henry, the Lee-Metford rifle came as a result of a rigorous trials
286
G. Lynch, The Dance of Death: Impressions of a War Correspondent 1899-1902 (London, 1902)
287
James, Britain's Black-Powder .303, The Lee-Metford
288
S. Small, A Decision Deferred: The Bolt-Action Rifle and The U.S. Army (1870-1892), Small Arms Review
(September, 2013)
289
B. Temple, I. Skennerton, A Treatise on the British Military Martini, the .40 & .303 Martinis 1880-c1920
(London, 1989), p. 338
104
process.290 By assessing how the rifle was operated, first by the soldier using it and then
how its internal parts functioned, a clearer picture can then be gauged of just how advanced
the rifle actually was from both engineering and historical perspectives.
The Lee-Metford rifle needed to be tested in service to resolve any issues that it may have
possessed. An overview of how the Lee-Metford developed from the Rifle, Magazine .303
through to the Rifle, Magazine, Lee-Metford, Mark II* will therefore identify how any issues
were found how they were resolved. Despite having a very short official service life, the Lee-
Metford played a role in a large number of conflicts. An overview of some of these key
conflicts will also serve to present the view that the Lee-Metford was incredibly important
historically, as its effectiveness came to a fore on battlefields across the Empire.
The Lee-Metford was indeed a significant part of British military history. It presented an arm
with the potential to revolutionise the battlefield. In its later forms, it was more accurate,
more reliable, quicker and even theoretically more powerful that any of its predecessors.291
Ultimately, the Lee-Metford represented a small-arms revolution in Britain, and was part of
the much wider small arms revolution across the globe.
290
Shooting a Lee-Metford at 400 yards (12/06/2015)
291
A. Mallock, Vibrations in Rifle Barrels, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Volume. 68 (1901)
105
Keeping up with the continent: Adopting
magazine arms into the Infantry
We must now accept as fact that every European power has either
adopted a magazine rifle, or is about to do so. The Germans with the
converted "Mauser", the French with the "Normale", even the
Austrians with the "Schuloff" and the "Mannlicher". It falls upon the
committee to devote their labours to determine which system is best
adapted for our services.
Instructions to the committee of Small Arms 18th February 1887.292
Magazine arms were not a new concept when introduced to the British infantry in 1888.
Repeating Henry rifles, designed in 1860, had been used in the American civil war. In
Switzerland, tubular magazine rifles were issued to the general infantry as early as 1869
with the Vetterli rifle.293 The War Office themselves had even publicly offered prize money
for innovative magazine arms in their breech-loading competition of 1866. This shows that
the War Office were obviously aware of the continuous development of magazine arms. So
what caused such a delay to their adoption? In the view of the historian Webster, the
adoption of magazine arms lagged behind other commercial markets based on three main
principles; 'ruggedness, simplicity and reliability.'294 In other words, the flaws of the early
magazine arms outweighed their merits.
By the mid 1870s, however, viable magazine fed arms were slowly being filtered into service
across the globe and were proving their preponderance. The Winchester rifle in the Russo-
Turkish war served as an example of their devastating capabilities from 1877-1878.295 At the
same time, and being developed almost simultaneously to magazine arms, early machine
guns such as the Nordenfelt (designed in 1873) and the Gatling gun (first designed in 1862,
292
H. Northcote, Instructions to Committee of Small Arms (18/02/1887)
293
D. Webster, Military Bolt Action Rifles 1841-1918 (Alexandria Bay, NY, USA, 1993), p. xii
294
Webster, Military Bolt Action Rifles 1841-1918, p. ix
295
R. Beachey, The Arms Trade in East Africa in the Late Nineteenth Century, Journal of African History,
Volume. 3, Number. 3 (1962)
106
but first used by the British in battle in 1879) were making their first appearances on the
battlefield.296 As the War Office believed that magazine arms fell into the category of
'systems of machine guns' rather than that of small arms, on 23rd October 1879, the War
Office's Machine Gun Committee, led by Vice Admiral Boys were tasked with the question of
finding a viable magazine rifle for the infantry.297
By 23rd December 1880, Boys' Committee reported that they had trialled the prominent
magazine arms of the day, including the Kropatschek, Hotchkiss, Winchester, Lee, Gardner,
Green, Mauser and Vetterli.298 Interestingly, the iconic Winchester rifle, which had served
the Turks so well in the Russo-Turkish war, was found to be incredibly dangerous during
these trials. As it possessed a tubular magazine, the rifle is loaded via sliding cartridges into
the magazine 'bullet-to-base'. During the trials this process was done too fast which caused
the cartridges to explode in the magazine, thus seriously injuring the user.299 All tubular
magazine rifles were subsequently regarded as too dangerous, and were automatically
rejected from all future trials.
The only rifles the Committee thought held any merit were the German Mauser, the Lee and
the Green, and recommended them to the Colonel Fletcher's small arms Committee for
trial. Unfortunately, these three systems were all bolt-action rifles, which, owing to Sir
Henry Halford's accident during the Martini-Henry trials, was enough for the rifles to be
rejected before testing even began.300 The final nail in the coffin was the fact that the British
Secretary of State did not see the need for a new rifle at this time, believing instead that the
Martini-Henry should be further developed.301 Despite their ever-growing prevalence
overseas, the British Army's view to adopt a magazine arm was summarily deferred.
Across the Atlantic ocean, a similar decision regarding the Lee rifle was made by the United
States Army. When trialling bolt action rifles to replace the iconic trapdoor Springfield in
1881, Lee accidentally made a dimensions error in his design drawings. This resulted in a
296
B. Robson, The Road to Kabul: The Second Afghan War 1878-1881 (Stroud, 2007)
297
Colonel Slade, Trials of Magazine Rifles in England from 1879, A Memorandum, The War Office
(07/02/1887)
298
Slade, Trials of Magazine Rifles in England from 1879 (07/02/1887)
299
300
301
Précis on the steps which led to the introduction of a magazine rifle into Imperial service and subsequent
action relating thereto, The War Office (20/04/1888)
107
locking lug failure, causing the rifle to be rejected by the United States Ordnance
Department.302 It took another decade for the United States Army to adopt a magazine rifle,
in which they chose the Krag-Jørgensen on 15th September 1892.303 The Lee rifle was,
however, adopted by the navy in 1895. The rejection of the early magazine systems by both
the British and the Americans show that magazine systems were not ready for general
infantry use.
Despite their initial rejection, the benefits of magazine arms were far too compelling to be
ignored for long. By 1882, the Royal Navy requested trials into magazine arms be re-opened
so as not to be superseded in technology by other forces. In the same year, the Intelligence
Department at the War Office presented information to the government on the increasing
use of magazine arms by foreign powers, instantly making the War Office anxious to
develop a new, modern rifle.304 As a result, a brand new committee on small arms was
established, led by Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Smith of the Grenadier guards to establish a
suitable magazine rifle for issue to the Royal Navy.
Smith's small arms committee received thirty-one magazine rifles and seven quick loading
rifles for testing, which were trialled from 1882 until 31st October 1883.305 Conducted in a
similar manner to Boys' Committee in 1880, all forms of tubular magazine were rejected,
many, such as the Mauser, without being tested.306 In fact, all quick loading rifles were
rejected and only three magazine rifles survived Smith's committee's first trial. The first two,
the Owen Jones and the Lee qualified for continued trial, whilst the third, the Bethel Burton
was allowed to submit an improved version for testing on a later date. The Lee too would
undergo 'improvement', by attaching an Alexander Henry barrel to ensure it could fire
Gatling ammunition.307 Table 1. shows the three rifles that merited further consideration,
with supporting images below.
302
Small, A Decision Deferred: The Bolt-Action Rifle and The U.S. Army (1870-1892)
303
Small, A Decision Deferred: The Bolt-Action Rifle and The U.S. Army (1870-1892)
304
action relating thereto (20/04/1888)
305
306
I. Skennerton, The British Service Lee: The Lee-Metford and Lee-Enfield Rifles & Carbines (Australia, 1982), p.
6
307
Lieutenant Colonel Smith, Magazine Rifles Committee on Small Arms 1883-1890, 1st Progress Report
(31/10/1883)
108
Nature of Nature of
Arm Result of Trial Remarks
Action Magazine
Owen Jones Hinged block Hopper magazine Stood all tests Still under trial
Magazine Rifle
Lee Magazine Bolt Detachable under Stood all tests Still under trial
Rifle action
Bethel Burton Bolt Side hopper Extraction and ejection Improved action
Magazine Rifle unsatisfactory; proposed, but not yet
elevating spoon broke submitted. Rejected.
during firing.
Table 1. Smith's Committee finalists.308
Figure 1. The Owen Jones trials rifle with .402 Enfield barrel.309
Figure 2. The Improved Lee in .45 Gatling calibre.310
308
Skennerton, The British Service Lee: The Lee-Metford and Lee-Enfield Rifles & Carbines, p. 6
309
Britain, Experimental Rifle, Owen Jones .402 with side hopper magazine, 1886, Royal Armouries National
109
Figure 3. The Bethel Burton with .45 barrel.311
At this early stage it was clear that Smith's committee, the Royal Navy and even the Director
of Artillery all favoured the Owen Jones rifle. In their first report of proceedings, Smith
noted that 'no rifle possesses sufficient merit to render extended trials - Only the Owen
Jones possesses any serious merit.'312 This view remained prevalent once the 'improved'
Bethel Burton and Lee rifles had been manufactured for testing. On 19th June 1884 it was
found that both were inferior to the Owen Jones rifle, but were to remain in trials as their
'magazines were sufficient for consideration.'313
By the 31st July the following year, the 'improved' Bethel Burton had proved to be
unsatisfactory. The Lee too was considered a poor option as it had a detachable magazine,
which the Committee were worried would get lost. By November, it had also been deduced
that it would be impossible to convert the existing Martini-Henry into a magazine arm.314
For that reason, after reviewing the merits of the rifle, the committee recommended the
Owen Jones be produced for service trials on 11th November 1885.315
The War Office's Director of Artillery attempted to take out a contract at the Royal Small
Arms Factory at Enfield to provide the Royal Navy with 5000 Owen Jones rifles. In a strange
310
Britain, Experimental Rifle, .45GG" Improved Lee Trials Pattern with detachable box magazine, 1886, Royal
Armouries National Firearms Centre Gunhall [Photo taken 25/05/16]
311
Britain, Experimental Rifle, .45 Bethel Burton with side hopper magazine, 1883, Royal Armouries National
312
Smith, 1st Progress Report (31/10/1883)
313
Lieutenant Colonel Smith, Magazine Rifles Committee on Small Arms 1883-1890, 2nd Progress Report
(17/06/1884)
314
Temple, Skennerton, A Treatise on the British Military Martini, The .40 & .303 Martinis 1880-c1920, p. 344
315
Slade, Trials of Magazine Rifles in England from 1879, A Memorandum, The War Office (07/02/1887),p. 11
110
turn of events, the factory's superintendent refused, as he claimed that no rifles could be
made in time based upon their complexity.316 The superintendent of the factory at Enfield
clearly doubted the Committee's recommendations. After all, the trials process had only
ever tested one rifle at a time; to throw caution to the wind and build 5000 would be, in his
view, a dangerous move. In refusing the contract, he could absolve himself from the blame
if the Owen Jones rifles failed. Instead, he preferred the Lee as it was cheaper to produce
and easier to repair, and so suggested trialling both rifles in small numbers.317
The failure to establish a contract for the Owen Jones rifle prevented it from ever being
produced in volume or issued to troops. Upon re-evaluation of the Owen Jones, Smith's
suddenly discovered it to be unfit for service. When compared to the 'improved' Lee, it was
found that the Lee was much simpler, it jammed less frequently, could have its parts
replaced easier, that the detachable magazine was in fact an advantage and it had a much
more powerful extractor.318 The Committee then rescinded the recommendation of the
Owen Jones rifle.319
In the time it had taken to process the first trials rifles, a seventeen new designs had been
received by the War Office, such as the Schulhof and the Morris.320 A new Committee, this
time led by Sir Evelyn Wood, deemed the Schulhof too complicated and rejected the Morris
as it suffered from permanent excrescence.321 Once again, every rifle bar the Lee was
rejected. Given its success in these latest trials, the Lee bolt was finally recommended for
adoption and manufacture on 7th February 1887.322 The only question that remained was
whether it would be fitted with the corresponding Lee magazine, or the Burton magazine, as
the Burton magazine had shown merit in earlier trials. As a result just two rifles remained in
the trials process, both with the Lee bolt and a unique magazine design.
316
Slade, Trials of Magazine Rifles in England from 1879, A Memorandum (07/02/1887)
317
318
319
Lieutenant Colonel Smith, Magazine Rifles Committee on Small Arms 1883-1890 3rd Progress Report
(19/10/1887)
320
Lieutenant Colonel Smith, Magazine Rifles Committee on Small Arms 1883-1890, Final Report, Appendix B
(19/10/1887)
321
Field Marshall Sir Evelyn Wood, Committee on Special Small Arms (07/02/1887)
322
Wood, Committee on Special Small Arms (07/02/1887)
111
Feature Lee Burton Improved Lee
Length 4 feet 2 inches 4 feet 3 1/2 inches
Empty Weight 10 1/4 lbs 10 lbs
Barrel 30 inches 32 inches
Grooves 7 5
Twist 1 turn in 15 inches 1 turn in 20 inches
Calibre .402 .433
Charge 85 grains 87 grains
Bullet Weight 384 grains 375 grains
Magazine Type Side gravity fed magazine, raised to feed, Detachable magazine underneath the
lowered to safe. Can be used as a single action. Holds five cartridges.
loader when safe. Holds five cartridges.
Table 2. Trials rifle contenders 1887.323
As the experimental Enfield-Martini was still in development in its new .402 calibre, both of
the remaining trials rifles were re-barrelled to match on 18th February 1887. As the rifles
were now identical in all but the magazine system, it was deemed that the troops
themselves should have their say in which one they preferred. Therefore, once re-barrelled,
both weapon systems were sent for the first troop trials aboard the H.M.S. Excellent. In a
rare show of British military unanimity, it was found that the Lee magazine was superior to
the Burton.324 The two contenders can be shown below.
323
Lee Burton and Improved Lee: Memorandum relating to Magazine rifles issued for trial in 1887, The War
Office (1887)
324
112
Figure 4. The 'Enfield Lee' rifle in .402 calibre.325
Figure 5. The Lee Burton rifle, also in .402 calibre. 326
After five years of trials, a rifle had finally been selected for service, until developments on
the continent drew the entire process to a halt. A Swiss Rubin rifle, chambered for 'small-
bore' .298 ammunition, was brought into the War Office the 2nd December 1886. Under
trial, it was found that this rifle could beat the Enfield-Martini of 1886 in every aspect
including range, penetration and capability to inflict injury. This instantly placed all .402
rifles into a state of obsolescence.327 Furthermore, the invention of smokeless powder, used
in the ammunition for the French Lebel rifles in 1886 stood to make any new rifle introduced
into service immediately obsolete.
325
Britain, Experimental Rifle, .402 Enfield Lee trials pattern, 1886, Royal Armouries National Firearms Centre
326
Britain, Experimental Rifle, .402 Lee Burton trials pattern, 1886, Royal Armouries National Firearms Centre
327
Smith, 3rd Progress Report (Enfield, 19/10/1887)
113
In response, it was decided that if the Lee was to be adopted into military service, it had to
be equipped with a .3 inch calibre barrel. This smaller bore would give the rifle the range
and penetrating properties of the Rubin. It was also decided that the risk of adopting a nitro
compound was far too great, with black powder being preferred pending further nitro
trials.328 Several different small bore rifles were therefore quickly tested by the committee
and compared to the Enfield-Martini. This included the 'new' Enfield rifling and that of
William Ellis Metford. The testing, conducted in June 1887 found that Metford's rifling was
the best, as shown in Table 3.
Mean deviation after fifteen

Form of rifling used
shots at 1000 yards in inches
'New' Enfield 25.3
Metford 23.5
Table 3. Comparison of small bore rifling trials results 8th June 1887. 329
As Metford's rifling proved to be the most accurate, a 'specimen rifle' was built to compile
the developments of the varying trials. It utilised a Lee bolt and a Lee magazine, Metford's
rifling and a .303 cartridge designed by Major Rubin of Switzerland. This rifle was then
trialled until 21st September 1887, where it was found to be highly satisfactory.330
328
Lieutenant Colonel Smith, Magazine Rifles Committee on Small Arms 1883-1890 4th Report (11/01/1889)
329
Lieutenant Colonel Smith, Magazine Rifles Committee on Small Arms 1883-1890, Final Report, Appendix A
(08/06/1887)
330
114
Figure 6. Rifle, Experimental, .303 Lee Metford built for troop trials. 331
A preliminary group of 350 specimen rifles and fifty carbines were then constructed at
Enfield to be distributed to troops for service trials, to commence on the 28th December
1887.332 These trials immediately produced highly satisfactory results. For example, the
South Lancashire Regiment reported that: 'The rifle is as handy as the Martini-Henry, men
even state that it is more comfortable. Filling the magazine took just fifteen seconds. The
dial sights worked well even out to 1600 yards. It is greater than the Martini-Henry in
rapidity, accuracy (at all ranges), extraction, cleaning and recoil.'333
As is to be expected with prototypes many of the troops reported problems with the
specimen rifles, including breakages, misfires and gas leakages.334 To remedy this, several
quick alterations were made to the specimen rifle. The bolt and action body were
strengthened to prevent breakages or gas leakage and the bolt key was abolished.335 Once
these fixes had been applied, a pattern was sealed at Enfield on 1st November 1888.336 As
production started, the rifle appeared in the List of Changes on 22nd December 1888, as the
Rifle, Magazine (Mk I).337
331
Britain, Experimental Rifle, .303" Lee Metford Troop Trials rifle, chambered for the Rubin Cartridge, 1887,
Royal Armouries National Firearms Centre Gunhall [Photo taken 25/05/16]
332
Smith, 4th Report (11/01/1889)
333
South Lancashire Regiment Specimen rifle report , Magazine Rifles Committee on Small Arms 1883-1890
(11/01/1889)
334
South Lancashire Regiment Specimen rifle report (11/01/1889)
335
Smith, 4th Report (11/01/1889)
336
337
115
Thus, the British Army had finally adopted a magazine rifle into general service. This by no
means meant that the Martini-Henry became redundant. In 1888 Captain Harston of the
Royal Grenadiers, Toronto, approached the War office with a successful conversion of the
Martini-Henry to a magazine rifle. His idea was that of a spring-loaded magazine which
mechanically fed rounds into the rifle's breech.338 In doing so, Harston claimed that he
would be 'making an essential and large saving to the country by converting Martini-Henrys
to repeaters.'339
Figure 7. The Harston converted Martini-Henry Rifle.340
Although built around an extraordinary mechanism, the rifle was rejected by the War Office.
When compared to the Rifle, Magazine Mk I, it was overly complex and difficult to
manufacture. For that reason, in response to Harston, the War Office stated that: 'Your
invention, although ingenious, is not one which could, with advantage be brought into Her
Majesty's service.'341 The adoption of the rifle, Magazine Mk I was now complete. The
British Army would now possess a small-bore, magazine rifle that would revolutionise the
power of the general infantry as they knew it.
338
Nathanial F., Magazine Fed Martinis (25/02/2015)
339
Captain Harston to the War Office, Letter No. 34 (04/10/1888), Correspondence between War Office and
Captain C. Harston 1886-1889
340
Britain, Experimental Rifle, Martini-Henry, Harston conversion, 1888, Royal Armouries National Firearms
Centre Gunhall [Photo taken 25/05/16]
341
War Office to Captain Harston, Letter No. 45 (22/11/1888), Correspondence between War Office and
Captain C. Harston 1886-1889
116
A technical overview of ‘The Rifle, Magazine,
.303’
On the Persian frontier from Cochannes to Bashala there was very wild
country with no apparent signs of lawful government, or indeed, anything
much until Mount Ararat where three empires meet. On this road, my
eleven-shot sporting Lee-Metford attracted the most covetous envy, one
rich chief offering me untold gold and several good Russian rifles in
exchange for it. I was not waylaid as I expected to be after my refusal to
part with it - I was denied all excitement of attack wherever I passed
through this country with it.
Colonel Massey describing the value of his trusty magazine rifle. 342
The introduction of the magazine rifle into British service in 1888 was to be the first step
towards a revolution in British infantry tactics, as it considerably increased the capabilities
of the infantry. In order to assess the impact of this revolution in small arms technology, it is
necessary to see the different ways that the rifle could be operated, as well as how it works
internally. Following this, a technical overview of the rifle's development across various
improvements can then show that, once perfected, the Lee-Metford was one of the finest
rifles ever to be adopted by the British Army.
Regardless of its official nomenclature, all British .303 magazine rifles were operated in a
similar manner by means of its bolt-action mechanism. The Lee-Metford could be used as a
repeating rifle or a single-loader depending on the circumstances. The firing exercise below
is an example of when single shots are to be fired, so as to provide a comparison between
the magazine rifle and its single-loading predecessors. To use the Lee-Metford as a single-
loader, a magazine cut-off was applied, which was a small sheet of metal that simply
342
Colonel P. Massy, Exploration in Asiatic Turkey, 1896 to 1903, The Geographical Journal, Volume. 26,
Number. 3 (September 1905)
117
blocked the magazine off from the chamber of the rifle. When rapid fire was needed, this
was simply removed by pulling on the lip located on the right.
Figure 22. Magazine cut-off applied, the Robert W. Farris Collection. 343
Figure 23. Magazine cut-off removed to facilitate rapid fire, the Robert W. Farris Collection. 344
The commands given for individual fire when using the rifle, Magazine .303 were extremely
similar to those given to soldiers using the Martini-Henry. The first stage, moving into the
'ready' position, was exactly the same, as shown below.
343
Ian Skennerton, Magazine cut off applied, The Robert W. Farris Collection IMG_0136rbd
344
Ian Skennerton, Open Magazine cut off, The Robert W. Farris Collection IMG_0145bcd
118
Figure 1. The 'ready' position shown on the right and the 'present' position shown on the left. 345
In order to charge the rifle as a single-loader, on the command 'two', with his right hand, the
soldier would pinch the bolt between his forefinger and thumb, raise it, and draw it
backwards to its full length, opening the bolt.
Figure 3. Opening the bolt.346
A cartridge was then taken from the pouch and inserted into the chamber. The bolt was
then closed rapidly, using the palm of the soldier's right hand. It is this action that actually
cocks the rifle.
345
The War Office, Rifle and Carbine Exercises, Manual Exercise, Firing Exercise, Bayonet Exercise, Firing
Exercise for Webley Pistol and Instructions for Cleaning Arms, Her Majesty's Stationary Office (London, 1898)
346
The Mk I Lee Metford: The Firing Exercise, Britishmuzzleloaders (09/04/2016)
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SlBdVXrhFSk> [Accessed 10/04/2016], 5 Minutes 26 Seconds
119
Figure 4. The cartridge is inserted into the chamber. 347
The sights were then set to the required distance. For conventional shooting, this involved
simply moving the back-sight to the required range.
Figure 5. Setting the sights to the desired range.348
For conventional fire, there were three main 'zones'; long-range zones, from 800 to 1500
yards, medium-range zones from 800 to 500 yards and the 'decisive' zone that was anything
less than 500 yards. Usually, independent fire commenced within 200 yards of the enemy.349
The Lee-Metford also utilised ultra-long range sights, which had first been developed on the
Enfield-Martini in 1886. These sights consisted of a frontal dial sight and a flip up aperture
sight at the back end of the rifle. These allowed the soldier to sight his rifle up to 2800 yards.
347
The Mk I Lee Metford: The Firing Exercise, 6 Minutes 36 Seconds
348
349
Captain W. James, Handbook of Tactics, Gale & Polden's Military Series (Aldershot, 1895), p. 206
120
Firing in ranks, this would allow the a unit to act as a mobile artillery piece, suppressing
enemy forces at extreme ranges.
Figure 6. The rotating dial sight ranged to 2800 yards.350
Figure 7. The flip up rear aperture sight 351
When aligned, the rifle would be held at an obscure angle, as if aiming at the sky. At this
range, the soldier would not be able to see his target. The idea was that soldiers would fire
in ranks, creating a beaten zone that approaching forces had to traverse through. The sight
picture can be seen below.
350
351
121
Figure 8. The volley sight picture.352
To some, the concept of shooting out to 2800 yards with a black powder rifle designed in
1888 is ridiculous, given the fact that the longest confirmed sniper kill to date, achieved by
Corporal Craig Harrison in 2009 stands at 2474 metres (2706 yards) with a L115A3 sniper
rifle.353 There is evidence to show that volley firing at ultra long range was actually used
successfully. In the Second Boer War, at the Battle of Escourt in 1899, volleys delivered at
2900 yards by the Dublin fusilier's succeeded in 'clearing the Boers from the town, to which
several were killed or wounded.'354 Contemporary books on tactics even stated that 'even at
3000 yards marching in fours is dangerous.'355
To fire the rifle, on the order 'present', the arm was brought to the firing position. The
soldier would then aim at his target and fire on command by pulling the trigger.
352
Rifle and Carbine Exercises, Manual Exercise, Firing Exercise, Bayonet Exercise, Firing Exercise for Webley
Pistol and Instructions for Cleaning Arms (London, 1898)
353
Guiness World Records, Longest Confirmed Sniper Kill <http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/world-
records/longest-confirmed-sniper-kill> [Accessed 25/06/2016]
354
B. Burleigh, The Natal Campaign, Estcourt, 21st November 1899 (London, 1900)
355
Major C. Callwell, Tactics of To-Day (London, 1900)
122
Figure 9. The stance used for the 'Present' and 'Fire' commands.356
After firing, step two would be repeated, opening the bolt. By doing so the cartridge would
be simultaneously ejected. If no more shots were required, the command 'unload' was
given. The soldier would rapidly open and close the bolt to eject the cartridge, before then
pulling the trigger to ease the springs. If firing from the magazine, the process was the same,
except the magazine would be removed by pressing the magazine release catch and held in
the left hand as the cartridges were unloaded.357
The operation of the Lee-Metford was therefore very simple. Despite the simplicity of
operation, the actual construction of the Lee-Metford was quite complex based on the fact
that it was so much more technologically advanced than its predecessors. In fact, it was so
complex that required over double the components of the Martini-Henry.358 As there are so
many working parts, this overview will assess the Lee-Metford's bolt separately to the
magazine.
When firing, the bolt must first be manipulated in such a manner as to cock the rifle. The
main components that make up the this bolt are as follows:
356
357
Rifle and Carbine Exercises, Manual Exercise, Firing Exercise, Bayonet Exercise, Firing Exercise for Webley
Pistol and Instructions for Cleaning Arms (London, 1898)
358
Director General of Ordnance Factories, Report on Specimen magazine rifles 1888 (20/04/1888)
123
Bolt Head
Extractor Claw
Striker Spring
Striker
Cocking piece
Figure 11. Bolt components for a 'Lee' bolt. 359
A hollow tube with a cocking handle attached to the rear makes up the chassis of the bolt.
Attached to the end of this is the bolt head. Its angular shape provides locking lugs that lock
the bolt place for firing. Attached to this is the extractor claw, which simply grips the rim of
the cartridge base. When the bolt is pulled backwards, the cartridge is pulled out of the rifle.
Inside the bolt is the striker. This is the component that punches forward to ignite the
cartridge. This has a spring coiled around it and a cocking piece attached to the rear, that
sits below the bolt. The bolt assembly can be shown below.
359
Royal Small Arms Factory, Enfield Enforcer 7.62mm Sniper Rifle Handbook (Middlesex 1968)
124
Figure 12. Skeletonised Lee-Enfield showing the open bolt, with the visible cocking piece to the left.360
When loading the rifle, the bolt is opened and a cartridge is placed in the chamber. The bolt
is then closed by pushing the cocking handle forwards. Whilst the bolt assembly travels
forward, the cocking piece, which sits below the bolt, catches on the sear preventing it from
travelling forward with the rest of the bolt. This causes the striker spring to become
compressed. The cocking handle is then rotated downwards; locking the bolt head's lugs
into place and cams the bolt. Now that the rifle is cocked, the trigger assembly becomes
necessary in order to fire the rifle.
360
Ian Skennerton, Skeletonised Lee-Enfield, The Robert W. Farris Collection IMG_1277bc
125
1
3
Figure 13. 'Lee' trigger assembly components:

1. Cocking Piece
2. Trigger
3. Sear
4. Sear spring 361
As the user compresses the trigger (2), a downward pressure is inserted onto the sear (3).
The trigger has two visible protrusions on it. When compressed, the lowest bump engages
the sear first. As it compressed further, the second protrusion engages the sear. As the
trigger is pulled past the second protrusion it undergoes its full length of travel. This rotates
the nose of the sear clean off the cocking piece (1). The pressure of the compressed striker
spring then forces this piece forward at speed. As it is attached to the striker, the striker also
moves forward rapidly, with enough force to ignite the primer of the cartridge in the
chamber. This process can be shown below.
361
Royal Small Arms Factory, Enfield Enforcer 7.62mm Sniper Rifle Handbook
126
Figure 14. The firing process of a Lee bolt-action rifle (drawings shown use a No.7 Lee-Enfield).362
Once the rifle has been fired, the extractor claw will remove the spent cartridge as the bolt
is reopened, completing the process.
Working simultaneously to the bolt was the detachable box magazine. On the Lee rifle, this
was housed under the receiver body in a 'Z' shaped spring.363 The design can be seen in
Lee's original patent, where the magazine assembly is clearly visible:
362
Canadian Forces Technical Order, Rifle, Caliber .22, No.7 Mk I, National Defence HQ (Ottawa, CA,
14/09/1984)
363
M. Pegler, The Lee-Enfield Rifle (Oxford, 2012), p. 8
127
Figure 15. Lee's magazine rifle patent, first submitted in 1878.364
To charge the magazine, cartridges were pushed in against the force of the magazines
spring. When the bolt was opened, the uppermost cartridge would be pushed upwards by
the 'Z' shaped spring forcing it to protrude from the magazine. Small lips on the magazine
prevented the cartridge from springing out. The historian Petrillo describes how this
functions alongside the bolt: 'As it is closed, the forward motion of the bolt sweeps the
protruding top cartridge off the magazine and into the chamber. Once the cartridge is
ejected, the bolt travels back over the magazine and the process is repeated.'365
After perfecting the design of the box magazine, Lee then designed a means of securing the
magazine to the rifle itself, whilst also being able to easily remove it: ' The box may be held
364
J. Lee, Patent No. 221,328, James Paris Lee's Detachable Box Magazine Rifle Patent, United States Patent
Office (New York, 04/11/1879)
365
A. Petrillo, British Service Rifles and Carbines 1888-1900 (Latham, NY, 1994)
128
fast by any suitable means; but a very simple plan is to have a spring catch secured in the
stock or receiver. With this arrangement it is only necessary to shove the box into the
opening, and it is at once secured ready for operation. To detach it, it is only necessary to
draw back the catch and pull out the box.' 366
Like its predecessors, the Lee-Metford underwent a series of modifications throughout its
service life. The manner to which these changes came about, however, was markedly
different. For example, with rifles such as the Martini-Henry, modifications were made out
of bitter necessity, often following battles where the rifle had failed. With the Lee-Metford,
the War Office sought to avoid these issues. Anticipating teething problems with the new
arm, it was arranged that all of the rifles should undergo inspection by 'viewers'. 367 These
issues could therefore be dealt with collectively, instead of making multiple piecemeal
changes. These could then be fixed in one major overhaul with a Mk II arm that required no
further alteration.368 Unfortunately for the War Office, there were many more problems
with the rifle than they expected, and so by the end of its service life, six official variants had
been produced.
An intriguing idea for the future development of the Lee-Metford was also proposed in
1888, but was never adopted. The idea, submitted by a Mr Satterlee, was the electric
primer. A battery for the primer would be placed in the butt of the rifle, and when the
trigger was pressed a high voltage charge would electrically ignite the primer. This idea was
considered too dangerous and too expensive.369 What makes this idea significant is the fact
that the American arms company, Remington, attempted to introduce the exact same
mechanism in their R700 series of rifles in the year 2000, 112 years after Mr Satterlee's
original idea. Unfortunately, even in today the idea is still deemed far too expensive to ever
be practical.370
Innovative thought aside, the first official 'change' for the Lee-Metford saw no actual
difference to the structure of the rifle, rather, on 3rd October 1890, the issue of spare
366
J. Lee, Patent No. 221,328, James Paris Lee's Detachable Box Magazine Rifle
367
These were regular officers that were also employed by the War Office with the task of highlighting any
issues that occurred with the rifles.
368
369
Committee on Small-Arms Progress Report, the Rifle, Magazine Mk I, The War Office (1889)
370
C. Dunn, Electric Cartridge Primers: Gone but not lamented, The Truth About Guns (19/12/2013)
129
magazines was discontinued in an effort to reduce the rifle's cost.371 Similarly, the second
official 'change' was in nomenclature only, where the rifle was dubbed the Magazine, Lee
Metford Mark I.372 This original Lee-Metford can be shown below.
Figure 16. The Rifle, Magazine, Lee Metford Mark I.373
By this stage, the first of the 'viewer's' reports had been received by the War Office, which
showed that of the first 7402 rifles introduced into service, 851 rifles were already reported
as beyond an armourer's power to repair due to bulging, rusting and unavailability of
parts.374
In November 1890, The Times newspaper released an article which damned the production
of the Lee-Metford. It made a comprehensive list of any conceivable problem, real or
imaginary, claiming that: '(The) Mark I has serious defects which we are expected to believe
that (The) Mark II be perfection. The defects in the rifle are inherent. The new Mark would
have to differ so substantially as to be a new rifle. This nation can of course afford the
millions required for modification: but not for a faulty arm.'375
In order to save face, on 25th November, former Small Arms Committee Chairman P. Smith
published a report to defend the Lee-Metford. He claimed that the rifle's cost would be
reduced and that it had become favourable to the committee only after extensive trials.376
Committee member Sir Evelyn Wood also made his remarks on The Times article public. He
371
List of Changes In British War Material, change no. 6235
372
373
.303 Magazine Lee-Metford Mark I with wire breaker (Enfield, 1889), Serial No. 5329, Tag no. 18, The
Robert W. Farris Long arm Collection (December 2015)
374
375
'The Magazine Rifle', The Times (12/11/1890)
376
Major General Smith, Report on 'The Times' article of 12th November (25/11/1890)
130
attempted to dispute the claims that The Times had made, such as the bolt closing itself if
firing downhill, and also noted that 'if the future changes made make it a different rifle, then
surely the same can be said for the different versions of the Martini-Henry.'377 To the public
eye, it would therefore seem like The Times were merely being melodramatic.
In reality, however, the article published by the Times was closer to the truth than the War
Office were willing to accept. The official response given by Smith had actually been heavily
'revised' by the Secretary of State. For example, in his draft copy, the line 'experience has
proved that the rifle may in fact fall to pieces under stress of ordinary work' was etched out
in red ink. Curiously, also etched out was an admission of the 'flaws of the Martini-Henry in
the Sudan.'378
Nevertheless, the entire point of this 'wearing in period' of the rifle was to establish its
flaws, so that the War Office could remedy them. Alongside the viewers reports, they had
also been accumulating their own data on potential issues with the rifle, shown below.
Number of Rounds Fired (* Indicating a new barrel) Result

7350 Striker damaged
7628 Recoil stud of bolt broken
16050 Barrels too worn
15493* Extractor broke
16843* Bolt shield broke
Table 1. Magazine Lee-Metford Mark I testing to establish service life, 1890. 379
The Rifle, Magazine, Lee Metford Mark I* was introduced into service on 19th January
1892.380 It sought to modify existing Mark I rifles to absolve them of the problems found. As
was expected, it encompassed many changes. It omitted the safety catch, cleared the rifle's
body to the rear, modified the hand guard, added a disc for regimental markings, reduced
the dial sights to 2900 yards and altered the butt so the oil stopper wouldn't leak all over
377
Lieutenant General Sir Evelyn Wood, Remarks to 'The Times' Article to Henry S. Dodd, Staff Armourer-
Serjeant of the Ordnance State Depot (1890)
378
Major General Smith, Confidential Report on Times Article, Revised by Secretary of State (14/11/1890)
379
380
131
the user.381 The striker spring was also strengthened, sights were altered, and the magazine
spring was revised to facilitate faster loading.382 The resultant rifle is shown below.
Figure 17. The Rifle, Magazine, Lee Metford Mark I*.383
Eleven days later on 30th January 1892, the Rifle, Magazine, Lee Metford Mark II was
introduced into service for all newly built rifles. As well as encompassing all the alterations
of the Mark I*, the Mark II had a lightened barrel and modified magazine.384 The magazine
was no longer single stacked, but was now a double column magazine. Instead of having 'Z'
shaped springs it had a stronger 'C' shaped spring that could be charged much faster, and
could hold ten cartridges rather than eight.
381
382
383
.303 Magazine Lee-Metford Mark I*(Enfield, 1892), Serial No. 3286 S, Tag no. 21, The Robert W. Farris Long
arm Collection (December 2015)
384
132
Figures 18. and 19. Comparison between the old Mk I magazine on the left and Mk II magazine on the right.
385,386
The finger grooves on the hand guard were also omitted, as were the brass regimental disc
plates in another bid to reduce cost. Production costs therefore dropped from £5 16
shillings to just £5.387 The Mark II rifle is illustrated in detail below.
Figure 20. Armourer's drawing of the Mark II rifle. 388
Figure 21. The Rifle, Magazine, Lee Metford Mark II. 389
385
Mk I* Magazine, Lee-Metford Armourer's instructions, The War Office (1892)
386
Mk II Magazine, Lee-Metford Armourer's instructions, The War Office (1897)
387
Pegler, The Lee-Enfield Rifle, p. 16
388
Rifle, Magazine, Lee-Metford Mk II, Small Arms Instructions for Armourers, The War Office (London, 1897)
133
This great overhaul was to prove extremely successful. Following the changes, the War
Office stated that some rifles could now 'withstand up to 60,000 rounds of black powder
ammunition and still be uninjured.'390 Reliability issues using black powder ammunition had
been all but solved. In 1895, however, the change to a Mark II* was made that re-added the
safety catch and slightly lengthened the bolt assembly, as part of a minor update.391
The growing use of cordite ammunition was slowly becoming an issue for the Lee-Metford,
as it was a great deal more powerful than black powder. As Metford rifling was extremely
shallow, the greater forces in the barrel produced by cordite effectively stripped the rifling,
wearing the barrels away and rendering them unserviceable. Testing by the India Office
found that after an average of just 4200 rounds, the rifles were becoming useless.392 In a bid
to prolong the service life of the Lee-Metford, a new, deeper rifling was produced. This,
known as Enfield rifling, was introduced on 11th November 1895. As the rifle no longer
possessed its Metford rifling, the 'new' arm was given the official nomenclature of the Rifle,
Magazine, Lee-Enfield, Mark I.393
The final change implemented to Lee-Metford rifles was the conversion to charger loading
in 1907 for some rifles. It is a strange concept that although the rifle had a detachable
magazine, soldiers never actually used interchangeable magazines. The historian Erenfeict
raises this anomaly: 'Why the British Army even wanted magazines nobody knows because
extra magazines were never given to the rank and file Tommy.'394 This is made even stranger
by the ease at which the magazine could be removed and replaced, shown by Colonel Slade
at Woolwich in 1887 who claimed that the Lee rifle's magazine could be replaced 'even
quicker than loading a single Martini-Henry cartridge', which allowed him to fire off his full
magazine in just seven seconds.395 Why then was the issue of spare magazines discontinued,
389
.303 Magazine Lee-Metford Mark II (Sparkbrook, 1893), Serial No. 18597, Tag no. 23, The Robert W. Farris
Long arm Collection, Image Courtesy of Ian Skennerton (December 2015)
390
391
List of Changes In British War Material, changes made on 22 April 1895
392
D of A Minutes, Small Arms Extracts 1895-1898, Destructive Effects of Cordite, The War Office (1895)
393
394
L. Erenfeict, The Magazines, Small Arms Review (October 2005)
395
Colonel Slade, Lectures on Magazine Rifles, First Lecture (Woolwich, 1887)
134
with troops being forced to turn in all their spare magazines just three years later, in
October 1890?396
The problem was that of increased ammunition expenditure. For example, in Königgrätz
during the Austro-Prussian war in 1866, Prussian soldiers expended just twelve rounds per
man. Yet by 1888 Colonel Slade anticipated that with magazine arms, as many as 200 rounds
of ammunition per man would be required per conflict.397 To carry this much ammunition in
spare magazines would very difficult in terms of weight. It would also be far too expensive
to produce magazines to house all this ammunition when the rifle alone already cost over
£5 to manufacture, which was double that of a Martini-Henry.398 In fact, magazines for the
Lee-Metford were considered so valuable that originally they were physically chained to the
rifle so that they could never be lost or dropped.
In an effort to cut costs, charger-loading was eventually introduced. Instead of carrying

spare magazines, ammunition was held in a small metal clip, and pushed vertically into the
magazine well.399 The conversion process to facilitate charger-loading was relatively simple:
A metal bridge was connected across the rifle in an arch shape, with a cut away to
accommodate the charger clip. 400 This gave a solid platform for the clip to rest in as the
ammunition was loaded into the magazine. An early form of charger-loading was used on
the Lee Metford as early as 1902.401 It was only by 1907 that it was introduced officially, and
was not implemented with many units until as late as 1909.402 As a result, charger-loading
was the final development of the Lee Metford.
396
Skennerton, List of Changes in British War Material, Volume II 1886-1900
397
Colonel Slade, Lectures on Magazine Rifles, Second Lecture (Woolwich, 1887)
398
Skennerton, List of Changes in British War, Volume II 1886-1900
399
This concept was copied from existing designs such as the Mauser model 1895 that came fitted for charger
loading as standard.
400
S. Mowbray, Bolt Action Military Rifles of the World (Woonsocket, RI, 2009), p. 146
401
Knott, South Africa's National Museum of Military History
402
Mowbray, Bolt Action Military Rifles of the World, p. 147
135
Figure 24. Loading dummy rounds by means of a charger.403
The Lee Metford remained in official service until 1926.404 The War Office's plan to make
one grandiose overhaul was not entirely successful, as many changes were still required.
Despite this, once upgraded, the Lee Metford rifle become immensely popular. It formed
the basis for the Lee Enfield family of rifles to develop from, which would serve the British
Army until the 1980's. It was simple to use, quick to fire and extremely accurate, which
ensure that the rifle is extremely significant from both a technological and a historical
perspective.
403
Ian Skennerton, Charger loading, The Robert W. Farris Collection, IMG_0355bcd
404
ISkennerton, The Lee-Enfield Story, p. 74
136
A revolution unnoticed: The Lee-Metford in
battle
Figure 1. A Maxim gun detachment in British Colonial India in 1898. 405
Whilst its predecessor, the Martini-Henry, was idolised for its role in colonial conflicts, the
Lee-Metford rifle has been somewhat overlooked. If people have ever heard of the Lee-
Metford, typically they know it as the forefather of the Lee-Enfield, not as the revolutionary
small-bore, magazine fed rifle that it actually was. There are three key reasons the Lee-
Metford never gained the fame it deserved. The first is due to its longevity. In 1895, less
than seven years after its official adoption, the Lee-Metford was replaced by the Lee-
Enfield.406 When Lee-Metfords were upgraded or taken into repair, they too were fitted
with Enfield barrels.407 The second issue was based on problems found with the rifle. This is
shown by the historian Pegler, who claimed that 'difficulties in loading, barrel wear and
awkward magazine access led to further experimentation, and suspicion.'408 The final factor
was not to do with the rifle itself, rather, the ability of officers to adapt to the tactics that
405
British Maxim Gun Detachment. Chiteral Campaign. 1898. National Army Museum Copy (Printed
11/08/2012)
406
407
The War Office, Magazine Rifles in the Service, .303 Small Arms Armourer's Handbook (1917)
408
Pegler, The Lee-Enfield Rifle, p. 16
137
the magazine rifle made available. Even contemporary journals noted that 'the masters of
the art of war admit their inability to cope with modern invention.'409
Despite these three factors impacting negatively on the rifle, it nevertheless experienced a
huge amount of service in its short time in the British army. Even when officially replaced,
the Lee-Metford continued to see a great deal of use in British territories, and was even
brought back to life in limited numbers as a converted automatic rifle. Several key examples
of the Lee-Metford in battle will be outlined below, from both small and large-scale colonial
conflicts, through to the Second Boer War. Finally its military use once superseded by its
Lee-Enfield counterpart will be shown.
Like the Martini-Henry, the number of small campaigns across the globe that the Lee-
Metford was involved in was substantial. An example of just one of these many small wars
was the Battle of Taku forts during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. A coalition named the
'Eight-Nation alliance', numbering thirty five officers and 869 men besieged several forts
defended by over 2000 Chinese soldiers.410 The Battle of Taku forts was undertaken in order
to gain a military foothold in Northern China. The British contingent came in the form of a
detachment of marines from the H.M.S. Alacrity and led by Commander C. G. Cradock. A
section of these marines can be shown below, carrying Lee-Metford Mk II rifles.
409
E. Atkinson, The Brutality of War, The Advocate of Peace, Volume. 63, Number. 9 (September 1901)
410
R. Edgerton, Warriors of the Rising Sun: A History of the Japanese Military (London, 1997), p. 73
138
Figure 2. British Marines from H.M.S. Alacrity c.1900.411
After an artillery bombardment from the alliance's ships on 16th June 1900, the allied
brigade advanced to the attack. By four thirty a.m. on 17th June, the allies began to capture
the forts on the north side of the river. The British and Japanese led the attack, with the
Japanese commander being the first to scale the forts parapet.412 The siege was entirely
successful as it achieved its aims and the Taku forts were taken, with all bar two being
dismantled. The allies lost 172 soldiers, with the number of Chinese losses being
unknown.413
As well as serving in small colonial conflicts, the Lee-Metford was used huge set-piece
colonial battles, such as that at Omdurman in 1898. In this conflict, on 2nd September 1898
a force of 8200 British and 17,600 colonial troops under the command of Lord Kitchener,
armed with Maxim machine guns and Lee-Metford rifles fought against 60,000 'Dervishes'
fighting under the banner of the Sudanese Kalifa, Abdullahi. In the view of a young Winston
Churchill, these Dervishes were armed with weapons that 'resemble a twelfth century
411
British Marines c.1900 <http://www.forgottenweapons.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Lee-Metfor-
Alacrity-China.jpg> [Accessed: 10/07/2016]
412
The Service history of the Surprise Class Fleet, The Alacrity <http://www.battleships-
cruisers.co.uk/surprise_class.htm#HMS Alacrity> [Accessed: 10/07/2016]
413
Edgerton, Warriors of the Rising Sun, p. 73
139
crusader army'.414 Although they did possess upwards of 15,000 firearms, they were often
primitive and poorly maintained. The Dervishes charged against the British on 2nd
September after being heavily shelled throughout the night.
Figure 3. The Battle of Omdurman.415
The true might of the Lee-Metford finally came to a fore. Combined with the power of
Maxim machine guns, the battle lasted only five hours. 11,000 Dervishes were killed and a
further 16,000 were wounded. In comparison, British and Egyptian losses numbered only
500.416 It is in instances like this where the power of the magazine rifle can truly be shown,
proving it to be a revolutionary rifle. When it was introduced into service in 1888, the War
Office even stated that 'the disaster at Isandlwana would have been a victory if our troops
were in possession of these magazine rifles.'417
But what would happen if the tables were turned, and instead of facing large forces of
poorly equipped tribesmen, the British army faced a highly professional body of troops with
414
D. Shonfield, Battle of Omdurman, History Today, Volume. 48, Issue. 9 (September, 1998)
415
A. Fides, The Battle of Omdurman, against the Kalifa and the Ansar, 2nd September 1898 (Print made
28/02/2014) [Accessed: 10/07/2016]
416
Shonfield, Battle of Omdurman
417
Memorandum on Magazine and Small-Bore Rifles, The War Office (1888)
140
access to equally modern magazine arms? This was indeed the case in the Second Boer War
from 11th October 1899 until 31st May 1902.
The Boer was something of a master of the art of late nineteenth century warfare. They had
spent their entire existence in combat in various forms.418 As well as being experienced,
they were well equipped. In this period, the Mauser magazine rifle was considered the
predominant bolt-action design across the globe, as over 900,000 had been produced
between 1886 and 1889.419 The Boer president, Kruger, had ordered 70,000 of the latest
1895 variant of these Mausers, of which around 55,000 were delivered.420 They also had
access to Vickers-Maxim machine guns, which they used to great effect at great ranges.421
Even those Boers without access to the most modern small-arms of the day took their own
rifles with them. This included arms such as the Martini-Henry, to which the Boers owned
over 30,000 rifles.422
These factors ensured that the Second Boer War was disastrous for the British army.
Although ending in British victory, around 6000 British soldiers died in battle, whilst around
7000 Boers were killed. As both sides had access to modern weaponry, the War was fought
across scales that were previously unimaginable. For example, one soldier commented on
how he came under fire from the Boers at 2000 yards. He claimed that 'the bullets were
falling like hailstones. My right pouch was hit, cutting it in half. The force of the shot
knocked me flat.'423 In one conflict, the Boers set up a Maxim-Vickers gun at 1800 yards to
find the range of the British soldiers. Once the range was found 'musketry fire became very
effective and eleven British soldiers were killed.'424 In that particular battle, each British
soldier expended 300 rounds of ammunition and their machine gun expended 7500
rounds.425
418
H. Bolco, The Fighting Boers, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection (1900), p. 438
419
Webster, Military Bolt Action Rifles 1841-1918, p. 42
420
P. Scarlata, The Model 1893/95 “Boer Model” Mauser, The Shooting Times (September 2010)
421
Extract from Digest of Service of the 2nd Battallion Prince of Wales own West Yorkshire regiment in South
Africa, from 20th October 1899 to 4th August 1902 (York, 1903), p. 4
422
R. Knott, South Africa's National Museum of Military History, Small Arms Review (January, 2002)
423
Lieutenant H. Gilley, War Diary from West Yorkshire Regiment, South Africa 1899-1901 (18/02/1900)
424
Africa, p. 4
425
Africa, p. 4
141
Warfare had changed so much that British officers could not adapt to the technology that
they possessed in the same way that the Boers did. In some scenarios all the British
attempted to achieve was to get close enough to the Boers to finish the fight with bayonets,
often charging from hundreds of yards away. 'Our infantrymen gradually forge ahead till
within 200 yards of the enemy, when, with loud cheers and fixed bayonets they leap up and
rush forward to finish the fight with cold steel.'426 After all, the bayonet on the Lee-Metford
was extremely efficient. Sir Ernest Bennett noted that 'the deadliest tactic of all is the
bayonet thrust. Private St. John of the Grenadiers even thrust at a Boer with such force the
muzzle of his rifle went clean through the Boer.427
It cannot be argued that the bayonet was not effective. The issue lay in the fact that the
British troops could not get close enough to the Boers to use it. One can only imagine the
consequences of these bold charges across open ground towards machine guns and Boer
sharpshooters. Contemporary Boer, Lt. Colonel Pienaar, commented: 'In long thin lines they
ran across the plateau hoping to drive the Boers back - and so on for hour after hour the
lines of gallant men flung themselves into the open; only to fall from the crest's raging
fire.'428 If the Boers believed their positions would be compromised, they simply retreated
and found a new position to defend. The British were at a loss with how to actually fight the
Boers. At range they could not match the precision shooting of the Boers, but neither could
they close the distance.
In an attempt to find a solution, many ideas were posed by the British officer classes. Some,
blamed troop mobility. Burleigh, for example, stated that 'all that is needed is to increase
our number of mounted infantry so our average British Tommy can get near enough.'429
Most officers blamed their inadequacy in battle on the basis that they were 'outgunned' by
the Boers and that the Lee-Metford was not good enough. As Major C. Callwell described:
'The Boer's skill is not because of their use of cover, marksmanship or judgement but
because they are armed with Mausers: which is in many respects superior to our arms.'430
426
E. Bennett, With Methuen's Column on an Ambulance Train, Boer War Diary (London, 1900)
427
Bennett, With Methuen's Column on an Ambulance Train
428
Pienaar, With Steyn and De Wet
429
B. Burleigh, The Natal Campaign, Estcourt (21/11/1899)
430
Callwell, Tactics of To-Day, p. 4
142
Even if this was the case, only a fraction of the Boer commandos actually used the Mauser
rifle. Vast numbers were using a plethora of older weapons, such as the Martini-Henry and
quite tellingly, some were even using magazine Lee-Metfords, evidenced below.
Figure 4. Boer commandos armed with Lee-Metford Mk II rifles c. 1900.431
If Lee-Metfords really were the reason behind the high rate of British casualties, the
question can be raised as to why the Boers were happy to use them themselves. In this light,
small arms cannot be blamed for the disaster of the Second Boer War. Instead, it is the
inability of the British officers to adapt to the technology that their small arms offered them.
Even though the Lee-Metford became tainted by the experiences of the Second Boer War, it
was nevertheless an extremely efficient military arm.
Even after the Lee-Metford had been made obsolete by the Lee-Enfield, it still saw a large
amount of colonial use. For example, in 1910, Zululand police serving under British officers
were issued with Lee-Metford rifles.432 Like the Snider-Enfield and Martini-Henry, they were
431
J. Mckerihen, Boer Commandos, Boer War Memorabilia, Anglo-Boer War Museum Collection, 1900-1905
[Accessed 01/05/2016]
432
H. Rawson, Letter from Zululand to Britain, Journal of the Royal African Society, Vol. 9, No. 36 (July 1910), p.
452
143
also used for training and Home Guard purposes during the First World War. The 1917 '.303
handbook' for example, noted that there were still large amounts of Lee-Metfords in the
hands of colonial troops and the Royal Navy.433
Strangely, they were also issued to the New Zealand army in 1941, but in an assembly
known as the 'Charlton automatic rifle'. This was a conversion of older Lee-Metford and Lee-
Enfield rifles into a select-fire, automatic weapon. Although unreliable and unwieldy, it
provided New Zealand with a temporary automatic rifle.434 This odd adaptation can be
shown below.
Figure 5. The Charlton Automatic Rifle.435
It is interesting to note that after the first 257 Lee-Metford rifles were delivered to New-
Zealand for conversion in 1941, twenty rifles were classed as 'still good for service' and
returned to Britain.436 In this light the Lee-Metford also achieved what the Martini-Henry
failed to accomplish: be able to adapt successfully to the next generation of small arms
development.
Finally, The Lee-Metford still sees ceremonial use today. The Atholl highlanders are
recognised as Europes last 'private' army and number around eighty men and are equipped
with Lee-Metford rifles.
433
Magazine Rifles in the Service, .303 Small Arms Handbook
434
J. Huon, The Charlton Automatic Rifle, Small Arms Review (July 2012)
435
Britain, .303 Charlton Automatic Rifle, 1941, Royal Armouries National Firearms Centre Gunhall [Photo
taken by 'Forgotten Weapons' firearms Research group 09/10/2012]
436
Huon, The Charlton Automatic Rifle
144
Figure 6. Atholl Highlanders on parade with magazine Lee-Metfords.437
Overall, despite only officially being in service for a small period of time, the experiences of
the Lee-Metford in battle show that it was indeed a very capable arm. Despite several
external factors reducing its fame, it still proved to be an extremely important rifle of the
British army.
437
Atholl highlanders parade during the annual highland games (09/04/2010) <http://www.explore-highland-
perthshire.com/highland_games/blair_atholl_highland_games.htm> [Accessed 10/07/2016}
145
Conclusions
Bayonet Exercise, 7th V.B. the Royal Scots, Gordon, Haddington 438
Traditionally, the Lee-Metford is known as nothing more than the forefather of the Lee-
Enfield. After all, upon its implementation all other world powers already possessed their
own forms of magazine arms. Upon its introduction it was riddled with issues that came to a
fore in The Times newspaper article. This overview has shown that the Lee-Metford was
actually a very successful and significant rifle.
Its process of adoption is a clear indicator of this fact. In various trials that lasted seven
years, the Lee action repeatedly finished above its contenders. Once it had been modified
438
History of the P.1888 Lee-Metford bayonet, Bayonet exercise from the Royal Scots, Image from Mr. Gordon,
(Haddington, 12/07/2015) <http://www.bayonetsplus.com/images/Royal%20Scots.jpg> [Accessed:
10/07/2016]
146
and improved at Woolwich, it was the best choice of arm that the War Office could have
made when the first pattern was sealed on 1st November 1888.439
The design and operation of the Lee-Metford also stands testament to this fact. In the view
of the historian Skennerton, its action was mechanically 'second to none.'440 This view is
evidenced through the demonstration on how to operate the Lee-Metford and how its
internal parts functioned. Whilst it did indeed have its issues, these were ultimately resolved
with the gradual implementation of later variants.
Finally, although only experiencing a relatively short period of active service in the British
army, the experiences of the Lee-Metford in battle clarify its historical importance. It
represented such a technological improvement that the officers and men using it did not
even originally understand its capabilities. Like the Snider-Enfield and Martini-Henry before
it, it was recycled and reused continuously well into the twentieth century, standing
testament to its ability as a firearm.
Overall, whilst the Lee-Metford may not have been as cheap as the rifles that came before
it, and whilst it may have had teething issues with features such as its sighting and its
ammunition, it represented what was to be a small arms revolution in the British army. This
ensured that, if combined with its legacy rifle, the Lee-Enfield, it saw a century of service
under the British. In the view of Colonel Slade: 'No arm that has to come to the Small-Arms
Committee combines so many essentials of a military weapon as the one we are about to
introduce.'441
439
440
Skennerton, The Lee-Enfield Story, p. 5
441
Memorandum on Magazine and Small-Bore Rifles (June 1888)
147
From Snider-Enfield, to Martini-Henry, to the Magazine Lee-
Metford; A Historical and Technical Overview of the Development
of British Military Rifles from 1866 to 1895:
Concluding observations
Firearms are social instruments, first and foremost, the
creations of man in a set time, place and society. Without
understanding these factors, it is all too easy to make
assumptions that lead to a complete failure in the
assessment of the weapon.
De Witt Bailey, British Military Longarms, 1986.442
Overall, it is clear that each of these three rifles played an important role in the
development of military small arms, and are important to the wider technological revolution
as a whole. The need to for this development came as the result of a global arms race, in an
era of expansion and empires. This need first came to a fore in Britain with the prize
competition for a military breech-loader that culminated in the adoption of the Snider-
Enfield. It was then developed by the volunteer movement, who 'perfected' single-shot
breech loaders on the ranges at Wimbledon, leading directly to the adoption of the Martini-
Henry. As developments on the continent across the latter half of the nineteenth century
sparked a greater need to modernise, the British trialled and adopted the Lee-Metford. This
rifle, with its of small bore and detachable magazine, proved to be a truly revolutionary
weapons system. Throughout its entirety, this thesis has shown the importance of the three
main rifles of the technological revolution:
The Snider-Enfield of 1866 was the first true part of this technological revolution, and is
therefore a very important rifle in the assessment of the development of British military
small arms. Breech-loading rifles before the Snider-Enfield were too inefficient for general
infantry use. The lack of available cartridge technology left the British army lagging behind
442
D. W. Bailey, British Military Longarms 1715-1865 (London, 1986), p. 8
148
its European counterparts. The development of the Snider-Enfield therefore came as a
result of attempting to modernise the British Army to match these counterparts. The Snider-
Enfield was originally introduced as a simple conversion of the older Pattern 1853 Enfield,
until a purpose built rifle could be manufactured. It proved to be far more capable than
expected, serving the British army in various manners from 1866 to 1899, and serving in the
colonies and on the home front well into the twentieth century. 443 This thesis has shown
from both just how the Snider-Enfield achieved this legacy, from the trials that brought
about its adoption, through to how it operated and developed into later marks and models.
This, combined with its battlefield experience, shows that the Colonel Dixon's comment that
the Snider-Enfield was a 'better military arm than any possessed by any nation in the world'
in 1870 was very well founded.444
If Snider-Enfield was a rifle of firsts (the first general issue British military breech-loader and
the first self contained cartridge), then the Martini-Henry was a rifle of refinements.
Whereas the Snider-Enfield introduced the possibilities of a breech-loading arm, the
Martini-Henry perfected it. It took the most accurate rifling of the era, designed by
Alexander Henry, and attached it to the fastest, most efficient falling-block action of the
Martini rifle. Within this thesis it has been shown that the Martini-Henry did indeed fulfil
this role. The intense selection process that resulted in its adoption proves that it was
indeed the best breech-loader available to the War Office at the time. Mechanically, its ease
of operation and simplicity also prove it to have been an efficient military arm. Where there
were problems, these were eventually addressed through the various marks and
modifications of the rifle. This efficiency has ultimately been proved by the military
experience of the Martini-Henry, and its famous successes. In the view of the historian
Suciu, 'if the colt peacemaker tamed the west, the Martini-Henry maintained order around
the globe.'445
The technological revolution in small arms came full circle with the magazine Lee-Metford
rifle. The rifle was an embodiment of modernity: it was a small-bore, magazine-fed, high
velocity repeating rifle. Its implementation completed the development of Britain's early
443
Cobb, Cinderella Snider - Unpublished Book
444
Skennerton, A Treatise on the Snider, The British Soldier's Firearm 1866-c.1880, p. 170
445
Suciu, The Versatile Martini-Henry Rifle was a Mainstay of the British Army During Queen Victoria's
149
breech-loading rifles. This has been shown throughout this thesis, in the first instance with
the slow process of the adoption of the Lee-Metford, ensuring that it held all the qualities of
a military arm. From the mechanical overview it can be shown just how powerful, efficient
and effective the rifle eventually became. This has then been exemplified historically, from
the rifle's experiences in battle. A final example of the lasting legacy of the original Lee-
Metford is the fact that even today, Australia International Arms in Brisbane still
manufacture the latest version of the Lee magazine rifle as the 'M10' rifle, marketed as 'the
new Lee for the new millennium.', designed for Australian military and sporting markets.446
On this basis, all three of the key rifles from the period 1866 to 1895 offer a key
development towards the small arm capabilities of the British army, and all three rifles form
an intrinsic part of the wider technological revolution in Britain. Across the service lifetime
of just one soldier, military small arms evolved from slow muzzle-loading designs to truly
modern military rifles. The firepower of the individual soldier had increased so dramatically
that military tacticians could not begin to comprehend their effectiveness, the repercussions
of which would only truly be felt as Britain entered into the First World War.
Issues of longevity have ensured that this research project has been confined to the three
key infantry standard rifles of the era. A cavalry carbine counterpart of each of the three
rifles was also trialled, developed and deployed by the War Office across this period, each
with their own marks and modifications and even their own ammunition. Further research
could expand to accommodate these cavalry carbines.
A major research project that is as equally important to the development of the rifle is the
advancement of ammunition. At the beginning of the period 1866-1895, ammunition was
developed to fit a rifle design. For the Snider-Enfield for example, nine different marks of
ammunition were created. Yet by the end of the period, rifles were being developed to
accommodate new ammunition, such as the Lee-Enfield being issued due to the
implementation of cordite. As the rifle cannot work without the ammunition, the
development of service ammunition from 1866-1895 as a research project could be made to
expand my existing research.
446
I. Skennerton, The Fifth Generation of Lee-Enfield, International Arms and Militaria Collector, No. 25
(Labrador, AU, 2006), p. 64
150
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167

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University

A dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for:

AX501 - History MA by Research (Music Humanities and Media) FT

Thomas Heptinstall BA (Hons)

Word Count: 30603

Peter Smithurst, Visiting Research Fellow, University of Huddersfield,

Curator Emeritus, Royal Armouries

Dr Steve Burt, Visiting Professor, University of Huddersfield

The .577 Snider-Enfield Rifle

This committee, composed of practical officers, unanimously report in favour of arming

De Grey's official statement 11 July 186421

Figure 1. Burn damage on the thumb from firing the Chassepot. 25

Figure 2. Placing a white handkerchief over the Sharps Carbine's breech.28

Figure 3. Captured gas leakage after firing the Sharps Carbine.29

First noted in 1864 trials, breech locks in the centre

Time taken to fire twenty shots at 100 yards

Rifle Accuracy deviation at 500 yards (feet)

Rifle Misfires After 270 Rounds

Figure 7. Armourer's drawing of a Montgomery Storm rifle, loaded, but un-cocked.64

The application of a needle moving at an oblique

J. Snider describing his patented principle. 81

Figure 3. Charging the Snider-Enfield Rifle.86

Figure 4. Putting the Snider-Enfield onto full cock.87

Figure 6. Ejecting the spent cartridge from a Snider-Enfield.90

Figure 7. Enfield Percussion lock with nomenclature.91

Figure 10. A Mk III Snider-Enfield percussion lock in a half cock position.94

Figure 12. Mk III Snider-Enfield lock at full cock.96

Figure 15. Armourer's drawing of the Snider-Enfield Mk III.107

Extract taken from George Alfred Henty's 'The March to Magdala'.109

Figure 5. Enlargement a veteran home guard soldier carrying his Snider-Enfield.124

The .450/577 Martini-Henry Rifle

We invite all Gunmakers and Others to submit proposals for breech-

Mean deviation of the four rifles tested

Calculated number of rounds per

Figure 1. Volunteer shooting event on Wimbledon common.162

The greatest proponent to exemplify advancements in breech-loading rifles across the

Bolt-action type breech-loaders chosen by the

An overview of the merits of the Martini-Henry arm.203

Figure 11. The cartridge is ejected automatically as the breech is opened.216

Figure 19. Martini-Henry, sample arm for production c.1875.230

Figure 20. A Martini-Henry Mk II rifle.233

Like its immediate predecessor, the Enfield-Martini, the Martini-Henry Mk IV differed

Figure 23. Martini-Henry Mk IV.252

Figure 1. The Defence of Rorke's drift.256

Figure 4. General Colbourne's armoured flotilla in pursuit of rebel ex Sultan Ismail.261

As the Martini-Henry's experience in battle grew, however, faults began to be reported. As

the Magazine Rifle, .303

War correspondent George Lynch on the capabilities of the Lee-Metford.286

Instructions to the committee of Small Arms 18th February 1887.292

Figure 2. The Improved Lee in .45 Gatling calibre.310

Figure 5. The Lee Burton rifle, also in .402 calibre. 326

Mean deviation after fifteen

Figure 7. The Harston converted Martini-Henry Rifle.340

Figure 3. Opening the bolt.346

Figure 5. Setting the sights to the desired range.348

Figure 6. The rotating dial sight ranged to 2800 yards.350

Figure 7. The flip up rear aperture sight 351

Figure 13. 'Lee' trigger assembly components:

Figure 16. The Rifle, Magazine, Lee Metford Mark I.373