PEDRO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner, vs. CA

PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF
APPEALS and ERNESTO CENDAÑA, respondents.
FACTS
1. Ernesto is a junk dealer; buys bottles and scrap materials in Pangasinan and resells in Manila; Owns 2
6-wheeler truck for hauling materials.
Manila – Pangasinan: he would load his vehicles with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered
to various establishments in Pangasinan; charges freight rates commonly lower than regular commercial
rates.
2. Petitioner Pedro De Guzman is a merchant and authorized dealer of General Milk Company in
Urdaneta; contracted Ernesto for hauling 750 cartons of Liberty filled milk from a warehouse in Makati
to petitioner’s establishment in Urdaneta.
3. 150 cartons loaded in a truck driven by Ernesto himself; 600 loaded in a truck driven by Manuel
Estrada (respondent’s employee)
4. Only 150 boxes of Liberty filled milk were delivered to petitioner. Other 600 never delivered; the truck
was hijacked along McArthur hwy in Paniqui Tarlac by armed men who took the truck with the cargo
and driver& helper.
5. An action was filed by Pedro demanding payment of the value of the lost merchandise plus
damages (22K)
Contention:
Being a common carrier, having failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of him by law,
should be held liable for the value of undelivered goods.
6. Ernesto denied being a common carrier and that he’s responsible since the loss was due to force
majeure.
TC: Private respondent is a common carrier; liable for undelivered goods
CA: considered the contention of Ernesto that he is not a common carrier; the transportation of cargo
was only a casual occupation – a sideline to his scrap iron business; and not as a common carrier.
ISSUE: WON private respondent was a common carrier & WON liable for the undelivered cargo
RULING
A. He is a common carrier.
1. Definition: Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms, or associations, engaged in the business
of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering
their services to the public.
Emphasized in class
2. The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying
of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom,
as “a sideline”).
The same article avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis.
Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the “general public,” i.e.,
the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population.
3. PUBLIC SERVICE ACT
the concept of “common carrier” under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with the notion of
“public service,” under the Public Service Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which at least partially supplements the law on common
carriers set forth in the Civil Code.
Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the

Public Service Act, “public service” includes:
“x x x every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for
hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental,
and done for general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street railway, traction railway,
subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and whatever
may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express service, steamboat, or steamship
line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight or both,
shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system,
gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply and power petroleum, sewerage system, wire or
wireless communications systems, wire or wireless broadcasting stations and other similar public
services. x x x.” (Italics supplied)
4. It appears to the Court that private respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even
though he merely “back-hauled” goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although
such backhauling was done on a periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled manner, and
even though private respondent’s principal occupation was not the carriage of goods for others.
5. The Court of Appeals referred to the fact that private respondent held no certificate of public
convenience, and concluded he was not a common carrier. This is palpable error.
A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the Civil Code
provisions governing common carriers.
6. That liability arises the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier, without regard to whether
or not such carrier has also complied with the requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and
implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or other franchise.
To exempt liability would be offensive to sound public

policy; that would be to reward private respondent precisely for failing to comply with applicable
statutory requirements.
7. common carriers, for reasons of public policy,” are held to a very high degree of care and diligence
(“extraordinary diligence”) in the carriage of goods as well as of passengers. The specific import of
extraordinary diligence in the care of goods transported by a common carrier is, according to Article
1733, “further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735 and 1745, numbers 5, 6 and 7” of the Civil Code.
1733 is a closed list. Causes falling outside the foregoing list, even if theyappear to constitute a species
of force majeure, fall within the scope of Article 1735.
B. WON liable (not liable)
1. Applying the above-quoted Articles 1734 and 1735, we note firstly that the specific cause alleged in
the instant case— the hijacking of the carrier’s truck—does not fall within any of the five (5) categories
of exempting causes listed in Article 1734.
It would follow, therefore, that the hijacking of the carrier’s vehicle must be dealt with under the
provisions of Article 1735, in other words, that the private respondent as common carrier is presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by
proof of extraordinary diligence on the part of private respondent.
2. We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by “grave
or irresistible threat, violence or force.” (1745 par 6)
The decision of the trial court shows that the accused acted with grave, if not irresistible, threat,
violence or force. Three (3) of the five (5) hold-uppers were armed with firearms.
The robbers not only took away the truck and its cargo but also kidnapped the driver and his helper,
detaining them for several days and later releasing them in another province (in Zambales). The hijacked
truck was subsequently found by the police in Quezon City. The Court of First Instance convicted all the
accused of robbery, though not of robbery in band.
3. In these circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite
beyond the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event.
4. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of
travel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or
are inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary
diligence.

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PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs.

TC: Private respondent is a common carrier; liable for undelivered goods

3. PUBLIC SERVICE ACT

Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the

To exempt liability would be offensive to sound public

B. WON liable (not liable)

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