SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-5405. January 31, 1956.]

ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, Pe oner, vs. ROSARIO GUEVARA and PEDRO C. QUINTO, Respondents.

DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a pe on for review by cer orari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The per nent facts are set forth in said
decision, from which we quote: ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

“This case being the sequel to, and a ermath of, a previous li ga on between the par es that reached the Supreme
Court, through the former Court of Appeals, it becomes necessary to restate the essen al antecedent facts to view
the issues in proper perspec ve. For this purpose, it is important to recall that on August 26, 1931, Victorino L.
Guevara, a resident of Bayambang, Pangasinan, executed a will (Exhibit A), distribu ng assorted movables and a
residen al lot among his children, Rosario and Ernesto Guevara, and his stepchildren, Vivencio, Eduvigis, Dionista,
Candida, and Pio Guevara. To his second wife Augus a Posadas, the testator bequeathed, in addi on to various
movables, a por on of 25 hectares to be taken out of a 259 odd hectare parcel outlined in Plan Psu-68618, plus
another five (5) hectares in se lement of her widow’s usufruct. The balance of the 259 odd hectares he distributed as
follows: ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

100 hectares reserved for disposal during the testator’s life me and for payment of his debts and family expenses;
108.0854 hectares to his legi mate son Ernesto Guevara, including therein 43.2342 hectares by way of mejora;
21.6171 hectares to ‘mi hija natural reconocida Rosario Guevara.’
Ernesto Guevara was appointed executor without bond.
On July 12, 1933, the same testator executed a deed of sale in favor of Ernesto Guevara, conveying to the la er the
southern half of the 259-hectare lot heretofore men oned, and expressly recognized Ernesto Guevara as owner of
the northern half.
Prior to this sale, on November 1, 1932, Victorino and his son Ernesto had jointly applied for registra on of the big
parcel (case No. 15174), but in view of the sale from the former to the la er, the decree was issued in the name of
Ernesto Guevara exclusively and for the whole tract, a cer ficate of tle (No. 51691 of Pangasinan) being issued in his
sole name on October 12, 1933.
Fi een days previously, i.e., on September 27, 1933, Victorino Guevara died, but his will was not filed for probate.
About four years later, Rosario Guevara, claiming to be a recognized natural child of the deceased Victorino, and on
the assump on that he had died intestate, brought suit against Ernesto Guevara to recover 423,492 square meters of
the tract covered by cer ficate of tle No. 51691 as the por on that should correspond to her (Rosario) by way of
legi me.
The case reached the former Court of Appeals in due course and was decided in Rosario Guevara’s favor (Exhibit E); ch an

but upon cer orari, the Supreme Court modified the judgment in December, 1943, as follows (Exhibit F);
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‘Wherefore, that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which declares in effect that notwithstanding exhibit 2
and the issuance of original cer ficate of tle No. 51691 in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara, one-half of the land
described in said cer ficate of tle belongs to the estate of Victorino L. Guevara and the other half to Ernesto M.
Guevara in considera on of the la er’s assump on of the obliga on to pay all the debts of the deceased, is hereby
affirmed; but the judgment of said court insofar as it awarded any relief to the Respondent Rosario Guevara in this
ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

ac on is hereby reversed and set aside, and the par es are hereby ordered to present the document Exhibit A to the
proper court for probate in accordance with law, without prejudice to such ac on as the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan
may take against the responsible party or par es under sec on 4 of Rule 76. A er the said document is approved and
allowed by the court as the last will and testament of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, the heirs and legatees
herein named may take such ac on, judicial or extrajudicial, as may be necessary to par on the estate of the
testator, taking into considera on the pronouncements made in part II of this opinion. No finding as to costs in any of
the three instances.’ (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 13-14.)
Claiming to act pursuant to the foregoing decision, Rosario Guevara commenced on October 5, 1945, special
proceedings No. 2646 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for the probate of the will of Victorino Guevara. In
paragraph 10 of the pe on, it was alleged: ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

‘10. Que dicho testamento, o sus disposiciones testamentarias, ha sido de jure revocado, o revocados, en cuanto a la
parcela de terreno de 259 hectareas descrita en dicho testamento, por haber el testador enajenado o dispuesto
intervivos de la misma en la forma mencionada en las tres decisiones supra-mencionadas; y que la solicitante pide ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

la legalizacion de dicho testamento tan solo para los efectos del reconocimiento de hija natural hecha en dicho
testamento a favor de la demandante y en obediencia al mandato de la Corte Suprema en su decision supra.’ (Record
on Appeal, p. 5.)
No ce of the pe on having been duly published pursuant to Rule of Court 77, sec on 4, Ernesto Guevara appeared
and opposed the probate. Pedro L. Quinto, counsel for Rosario in the former li ga on, was allowed to intervene in
view of his duly recorded a orney’s lien.
On January 31, 1946, Ernesto Guevara, through counsel, filed a mo on to dismiss the pe on on the grounds that (a)
the pe on itself alleged that the will was revoked; ( b) that ‘whatever right to probate the par es may have has ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

already prescribed’ (Record on Appeal, p. 14); and (c) that the purpose of the probate was solely to ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

have Pe oner Rosario declared an acknowledged natural child of the deceased.

By order of December 9, 1946, Judge Sotero Rodas denied the mo on to dismiss; but upon mo on of ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

reconsidera on, Judge Mañalac of the same court, on June 23, 1937, reconsidered and set aside the previous
resolu on and ordered the pe on dismissed on the ground that Rosario Guevara’s pe on did not ask for the
probate in toto of the will, contrary to the order of the Supreme Court; that her right to pe on for the probate of ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

the testament of Victorino L. Guevara had prescribed; and that her ac on for judicial declara on of acknowledgment ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

had likewise prescribed.

An amended pe on for the probate of the will in toto and another pe on to reconsider the previous order were
subsequently denied; the former on the ground that there was a radical change of theory from that embodied in the
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original pe on, and the second for the same reasons stated in the order of June 23, 1947. Rosario L. Guevara and
Pedro L. Quinto thereupon brought the case on appeal to this Court, assigning no less than twenty (20) alleged errors
commi ed by the court below.” (Guevara vs. Guevara, C.A. — G. R. No. 5416-R, promulgated December 26, 1951; see ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

Appendix to brief for the Pe oner-Appellant, pp. 1-6.)

The disposi ve part of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads as follows: ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

“The order of dismissal of the pe on for probate is reversed and the court of origin ordered to reinstate the
pe on, and to hear and decide whether the will of Victorino Guevara, deceased, should be allowed to probate.
Costs against Appellees in both instances.” (Ibid.)
In his appeal therefrom, Pe oner Ernesto M. Guevara raises the following ques ons, to wit: (a) ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

Did Respondents herein duly perfect their appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan? (b)
Did the Court of Appeals have jurisdic on to entertain said appeal? (c) Is the pe on for probate of the alleged will of
the deceased Victorino L. Guevara barred by the statute of limita ons?
(1) With reference to the first ques on, Pe oner has submi ed the following statement 1 of the steps taken since
June 23, 1947, date of the resolu on of Judge Mañalac, dismissing the pe on for probate of the last will and
testament of Victoriano L. Guevara: ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

“June 23, 1947 —

Date of Resolu on appealed from.
July 14, 1947 —
Date of Joint Pe on for Reconsidera on filed by Appellants.
July 25, 1947 —
Date of Amended pe on for probate of will.
July 25, 1947 —
Mo on for admission of Amended Pe on.
August 2, 1947 —
Appellants’ mo on to postpone hearing on pe on for reconsidera on and mo on for admission of Amended
Pe on.
August 10, 1947 —
Appellants’ urgent mo on for con nuance of hearing on joint pe on for Reconsidera on as well as Mo on to Admit
Amended Pe on.
August 25, 1947 —
Mo on for extension of me to file memorandum.
September 1, 1947 —
Memorandum for Appellants submi ed.
October 7, 1947 —
Memorandum for Appellee submi ed.
October 14, 1947 —
Appellants’ pe on for ten (10) days to file reply memorandum.
November 1, 1947 —
Appellants’ pe on to file reply memorandum on or before November 9, 1947.
November 8, 1947 —
Appellants’ pe on for extension to file reply memorandum.
November 18, 1947 —
Verified reply of Appellant Rosario Guevara.
November 24, 1947 —
Reply memorandum of Pedro C. Quinto filed.
January 12, 1948 —
Court denies both pe ons of July 14 and 25, 1947.
January 24, 1948 —
No ce of appeal to Supreme Court and pe on for thirty (30) days’ extension by Appellant Rosario Guevara.
January 29, 1948 —
Order gran ng pe on for extension.
February 1, 1948 —
Another no ce of appeal to Supreme Court and mo on for thirty (30) days extension by Appellant Rosario Guevara.
February 28, 1948 —
Appellants’ ex-parte pe on for further extension.
March 6, 1948 —
Original joint Record on Appeal filed. (This was so defec ve and incomplete it consisted of mere disjointed sheets of
paper intercalated with one another and was a mere token record on appeal.)
March 8, 1948 —
Another joint pe on for reconsidera on of Appellants.
March 11, 1948 —
Appellee’s objec on to record on appeal.
March 17, 1948 —
Verified reply of Appellants to objec on.
March 18, 1948 —
Appellee’s objec on to joint pe on for reconsidera on.
June 19, 1948 —
Appellants’ memorandum in support of the joint pe on for reconsidera on.
July 23, 1948 —
Order of denial of Joint Pe on and disapproving original record on appeal as incomplete and
giving Appellants within 10 days from no ce.
July 26, 1948 —
Amended No ce of Appeal to the Court of Appeals instead of to the Supreme Court.
July 28 and 29, 1948 —
Appellants received copy of order of July 23, 1948.
August 1, 1948 —
Pe on for five (5) days extension to file amended Record on Appeal filed by Appellant Pedro C. Quinto.
August 10, 1948 —
Appellants’ Joint Pe on for last extension of two (2) days.
August 10, 1948 —
Filing of amended joint record on appeal. (This is also again so defec ve and incomplete as to cons tute another
mere token record on appeal as required by the Rules.)
August 24, 1948 —
Appellants’ pe on for ten (10) days period to reply to objec on, if any was to be filed.
August 27, 1948 —
Appellee’s objec on to amended record on appeal.
September 8, 1948 —
Appellants’ reply to objec on.
October 20, 1948 —
Court order sustaining objec on and gives Appellants fi een (15) days from no ce to redra record on appeal.
November 3, 1948 —
Appellants’ joint pe on to reconsider order of disapproval of Amended Record on Appeal.
November 3, 1948 —
Appellants file re-amended joint record on appeal. (This again disregarded the orders of the court regarding the
contents of the record on appeal.).
November 22, 1948 —
Appellee objected to approval of re-amended joint record on appeal and prayed that order appealed from be
declared final.
March 22, 1949 —
Court sustains Appellee’s objec on to record on appeal denying pe on for reconsidera on and Appellants given
fi een (15) days from no ce to sa sfy requirements of court’s previous order.
April 8, 1949 —
Appellants file in Supreme Court pe on for cer orari and mandamus a acking order of June 23, 1947.
April 11, 1949 —
Appellant Quinto’s pe on for fi een (15) days extension to file Re-amended Record on Appeal.
April 12, 1949 —
Supreme Court denies pe on off-hand.
April 16, 1949 —
Appellant Rosario Guevara’s mo on for fi een (15) days extension for the same purpose.
April 21, 1949 —
Court granted extension prayed for to expire May 1, 1948.
April 21, 1949 —
Second Re-Amended Record on Appeal filed.
June 11, 1949 —
Appellee’s opposi on to ‘Second Re-Amended Record on Appeal’.
June 29, 1949 —
Appellants’ joint no ce of hearing on Second Re-Amended Record on Appeal for July 12, 1949.
July 10, 1949 —
Appellants’ joint reply to opposi on.
July 12, 1949 —
Ac on on record on appeal deferred on pe on of A y. Quinto.
September 3, 1949 —
Appellant Quinto’s no ce of hearing on Second Re-Amended Record on Appeal for September 28, 1949.
September 28, 1949 —
Order of court approving same.
December 8, 1949 —
Clerk of lower court sends records to appellate court.
December 10, 1949 —
Appellant Quinto’s mo on ex-parte to have records sent up to appellate court.”
(Pe oner-Appellant’s Brief, pp. 41-47.)
Based upon the foregoing, Oppositor and Appellee Ernesto M. Guevara filed, with the Court of Appeals, a mo on
praying that the appeal be dismissed: ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

“(a) Because due to the Appellant’s many and repeated dilatory tac cs, the prosecu on of their appeal has been
unduly and unreasonably delayed for a period which should strike anyone as totally without jus fica on. The
resolu on appealed from was dictated by the lower court on June 23, 1947, so that a period of over two (2) years and
nine (9) months un l the date of this wri ng has elapsed, thus establishing a record-holding delay which should not
be sanc oned by the Courts as prejudicial to the administra on of jus ce.
“(b) Because Appellants, in viola on of Rule 48, sec on 3, did not diligently prosecute their appeal by failing to have
the record sent up to this Honorable Court within thirty (30) days from the me their Second Re-amended Record on
Appeal was approved on September 28, 1949; and it was only so transmi ed on December 8, 1949, that is a er the ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

lapse of two (2) months and ten (10) days.

“(c) Because, at any rate, the first Amended Joint Record on Appeal was filed beyond the extension granted by the
Court and, consequently, the Appellants’ right to appeal has lapsed.” (Exhibit A, pp. 1-2).
The Court of Appeals denied said mo on to dismiss for the following reasons: ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

“A preliminary ques on was posed by the Appellee who prayed for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground
that Pe oners-Appellants had unreasonably delayed the perfec on of the appeal, as the Second Re-amended Joint
Record on Appeal was not cer fied to this Court un l December, 1949. A er considering the voluminous record, and
the arguments of both par es, we are of the opinion that both par es have contributed to the delay with lengthy
memoranda, and repeated mo ons and objec ons. Moreover, the points in ques on are important enough to
deserve adequate considera on upon the merits. Wherefore, the mo on to dismiss the appeal should be and is
hereby, overruled and denied.” (Appendix to Brief for the Pe oner-Appellant, pp. 6- 7.)
It is urged by Pe oner herein that Respondents’ appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
had not been duly perfected because: (a) the original of the record on appeal did not comply with the Rules of ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

Court; ( b) the record on appeal was filed a er the lapse of the reglementary period; ( c) there has been an
ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

unprecedented delay in the filing of a sa sfactory record on appeal; and (d) the appeal should be deemed ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

abandoned for viola on of Rule 48, sec on 3, of the Rules of Court.

The first ground is predicated upon the fact that, instead of transcribing the mo ons, pe ons, orders and resolu ons
incorporated in the original record on appeal, Respondentsherein merely a ached to the original copy of said record
on appeal, filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, their own copies of said mo ons, pe ons, orders and
resolu ons. Accordingly, the copy of said record on appeal furnished to Pe oner herein did not contain or enclose
the aforemen oned parts of the record. It appears, however, that the Respondentswere given several extensions of
me within which to comply with the per nent provisions of the Rules of Court and that Respondents eventually did
so. There being no ques on about the authority of the court of first instance to grant said extensions of me, it is
clear that the first ground, relied upon by Pe onerherein, is untenable.
In support of the second ground, it is alleged: (a) that the original record on appeal was filed by Pedro C. Quinto ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

only, and does not inure to the benefit of Rosario Guevara; and (b) that Respondents had lost their right to appeal by ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

the lapse of the reglementary period. As regards the first proposi on, Pe onerasserts that Respondent Pedro C.
Quinto had withdrawn his appearance as counsel for Respondent Rosario Guevara; that Quinto had, therea er, ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

intervened in the case in his own behalf, in order to enforce his a orney’s lien, as former counsel for Rosario
Guevara; that, consequently, the original record on appeal and the pe ons for extension of me to file an
ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

amended record on appeal, filed by Pedro C. Quinto, were good only insofar as he is concerned, and cannot profit
Rosario Guevara, she having ceased to be his client long before the filing of said original record on appeal and
pe ons for extension of me; that this interest in the case arises from his rights as former a orney
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for Respondent Rosario Guevara, and, as such, is subordinate to, and dependent upon, the interest therein of said
Rosario Guevara and the success of her claim therein; and that, her appeal not having been duly perfected, his ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

appeal must be deemed to have no legal effect. There is no merit in this pretense, for it appears, at the foot of said
record on appeal, that Pedro C. Quinto had filed the same, “for himself as Appellant and in behalf of Rosario Guevara,
who authorized him to perfect the appeal for both Appellants,” and that similar statements were made in the body
and at the foot of said pe ons for extension of me. It is clear, therefore, that the aforemen oned record on appeal
and mo ons should be deemed submi ed, also, by Respondent Rosario Guevara. The posi on then held by Pedro C.
Quinto, as special prosecutor in the office of the Solicitor General, did not nullify his aforesaid acts on behalf of
Rosario Guevara. Besides, said acts would seem to have been performed by him, more as a orney-in- fact than as
counsel for Rosario Guevara, and this merely in connec on with the perfec on of her appeal. We do not find therein
anything objec onable, either legally or morally, in the light of the circumstances surrounding the case.
The second proposi on is based upon the following reasons: ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

(a) The aforemen oned record on appeal and mo ons for extension of me filed by Quinto on behalf of Rosario
Guevara did not inure to her benefit, for which reason the reglementary period to appeal had expired before the
perfec on of her appeal. For the reasons already adverted to, this argument is clearly untenable.
(b) The pe on for reconsidera on filed by Respondents on July 14, 1947, did not suspend the running of the period
to perfect the record on appeal, because said pe on did not comply with the provisions of Rule 37, sec on 1, of the
Rules of Court, reading as follows: ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

“Within thirty days a er no ce of the judgment in an ac on, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside
the judgment end grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affec ng the substan al rights
of said party:
ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by
reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights;
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered, and produced at
the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result;
(c) Because excessive damages have been awarded, or the evidence was insufficient to jus fy the decision, or it is
against the law.”
Said pe on for reconsidera on appears, however, to be predicated, in effect, upon the ground that the evidence is
insufficient to jus fy the decision of the court of first instance, and that said decision is contrary to law. It partakes,
therefore, of the nature of a mo on for new trial, sta ng specifically the reasons in support thereof, and, hence, it
suspended the period to appeal un l the determina on of said mo on.
Rela ve to the alleged unprecedented delay in the filing of a sa sfactory record on appeal, we agree with the finding
of the Court of Appeals to the effect that the delay was due to the acts of the Respondents, as well as of
the Pe oner herein, for both had asked several postponements and extensions of me, filed memoranda and reply
memoranda, and raised or provoked a number of other issues or incidents which necessarily delayed the perfec on
of the appeal. Obviously, Pe oner should not be allowed to profit by said delay, to which he had ac vely
contributed. 1
Lastly, Pe oner maintains that, although the record on appeal had been approved on September 28, 1949, it was not
forwarded to the Court of Appeals un l December 8, 1949. Sec on 3 of Rule 48 of the Rules of Court provides: ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

“If the record on appeal is not received by the Court of Appeals within thirty days a er the approval thereof,
the Appellee may, upon no ce to the Appellant, move the court to grant an order direc ng the clerk of the lower court
forthwith to transmit such record on appeal or to declare the same abandoned for failure to prosecute.”
Considering that Respondents herein were not no fied of the approval of the record on appeal un l December 8,
1949, on which date the record on appeal was forwarded to the Court of Appeals, and that the aforemen oned
provision of the Rules of Court does impose upon said court the mandatory duty to declare the appeal abandoned for
failure to prosecute, we believe that no error was commi ed in giving due course to the appeal and that the same
has been duly perfected.
(2) Did the Court of Appeals have jurisdic on to try the case, on appeal from the decision of the court of first
instance? Pe onermaintains the nega ve, upon the ground that the appeal involved only ques ons of law. This is
not correct, for the very mo on for reconsidera on adverted to above, indicated that the appeal raised some issues
of fact, such as, for instance, whether or not the will in ques on was in the possession of Respondent Rosario Guevara
and whether Respondent Quinto had been authorized by her to perfect the appeal on her behalf. At any rate, the case
is now before us and, upon examina on of the record and considera on of all the issues therein raised, we are of the
opinion that, had the appeal been forwarded directly to this Court, we would have disposed of it in the manner set
forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the review of which is sought by herein Appellant.
(3) The last ques on for determina on in this case is whether or not the pe on for probate of the will of Victorino L.
Guevara is barred by the statute of limita ons, considering that the testator died on September 27, 1933, and that the
pe on for probate of said will was filed twelve (12) years later, or, to be exact, on October 5, 1945. The Court of
Appeals resolved the ques on in the nega ve, upon the following grounds: ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray
“We are of the opinion that the Court below was in error when it declared that the pe on for probate of the will of
Victorino Guevara was barred by prescrip on. The provision of Ar cle 756 of the old Civil Code (1042 of the New) and
of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, reitera ng those of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), point out that the
presenta on of a decedent’s will to the competent court has always been deemed by our law as more of a duty than
a right, and the neglect of such obliga on carries with it the corresponding penalty and it is inconsistent with that
policy that the court should refuse to admit wills to probate, without inquiry into their validity. The authority given to
testators to dispose freely of a por on of their estate would be imperfectly safeguarded, unless adequate measures
were provided by the state to assure that the wishes of the deceased would be carried out. Because the decedent
may no longer act to have his testamentary disposi ons duly executed, the state authority must take over the
opposite vigilance and supervision, so that free testamentary disposi on does not remain a delusion and a dream.
This was expressly recognized by the Supreme Court in its previous decision, G. R. No. 48840 (Exhibit E) when it said: ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

‘ We hold that under sec on 1 of Rule 74, in rela on to Rule 76, if the decedent le a will and no debts and the heirs
cralw

and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial par on of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for
probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless
those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the presenta on of the will to the court for
probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the
will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and no ce thereof given to the whole world, the
right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is a empted to be done in the
instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated
of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the par on of the estate among
themselves to the exclusion of others.’ (Italics supplied)
“In holding the statute of limita ons applicable to the probate of wills, the court below failed to no ce that its
doctrine was destruc ve of the right of testamentary disposi on and viola ve of the owner’s right to control his
property within the legal limits. The appealed order in fact leaves wills at the mercy and whim of custodians and
heirs interested in their suppression. The lower court would in effect abdicate the tutelary power that passed to the
Republic from the former sovereigns, that ‘potestad suprema que en mi reside para velar por el puntual
cumplimiento de las ul mas voluntades’, asserted as one of the royal preroga ves in the ‘Real Cedula’ of March 18,
1776.
“It is not without purpose that Rule of Court 77 prescribes that any ‘person interested in the estate may, at any me
a er the death of the testator, pe on the court having jurisdic on to have the will allowed’. Taken from the Code of
Procedure of California, this provision has been interpreted as meaning that the statute of limita ons has no
applica on to probate of wills. In the case of In re Hume’s Estate, 179 Calif. 338, 176 Pac. 681, the California Supreme
Court ruled that:ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

‘The chapter of the Code rela ng to the probate of wills does not provide for opposi on to such probate on the
ground of the bar of the statute of limita ons, but, in effect, excludes it from the category of grounds allowed as a
basis for such opposi on. Sec on 1299 declares that any person interested in the estate ‘may at any me a er the
death of the testator, pe on the court having jurisdic on to have the will proved.’ This implies that there is no
arbitrary me limit.’
As addi onal reasons, the same Court stated: ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

‘ Sec on 1317 declares: If the court is sa sfied, upon the proof taken or from the facts found by the jury that the will
cralw ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

was duly executed and that the will testator at the me of its execu on was of sound and disposing mind and not
ac ng under duress menace fraud, or undue influence, a cer ficate of the proof and the facts found, signed by the
judge and a ested by the seal of the court, must be a ached to the will.’
‘This excludes the bar of the statute of limita on from considera on as one of the ma ers which may be shown in
opposi on to the probate. This is further emphasized by sec on 1341, which, in substance, declares that, if upon the
verdict of the jury the facts men oned in sec on 1317 as aforesaid appear to be established, the court ‘must’ admit
the will to probate. Sec on 1314 thus makes it impera ve that the court shall admit the will to probate if the
execu on is proven and the grounds of opposi on authorized by sec on 1312 are not established. This clearly implies
that no grounds of opposi on other than those enumerated in sec on 1312 may be set up, and it leaves no place for
the applica on of the statute of limita ons.
‘It is further to be observed that, notwithstanding the posi ve and comprehensive language of sec ons 343 and 369,
if taken literally, there can be no doubt that they cannot apply to all special proceedings of a civil nature. Proceedings
for a change of name, or in arbitra on, or for voluntary dissolu on of a corpora on, or for guardianship, or for a
married woman to become a sole trader, are all within the defini on of the phrase, and each is enumerated, classed,
and defined as such proceeding by the Code. If the statute of limita ons applied, it would begin to run against such
proceedings as soon as the right to ins tute them accrued. Yet from the very nature of these proceedings it is obvious
that neither of them could be subject to such limita on.
‘This construc on of these Code provisions is confirmed by the long-con nued and uniform prac ce and the universal
understanding of the bench and bar of the state on the subject.’
xxx xxx xxx
‘Ac on to quiet tle frequently involve wills of persons who have died many years before the ac on was begun. The
sec on contemplates that such a will, although not yet probated, may be construed in the ac on and may be
a erwards probated, and it clearly shows that the Legislature did not understand that the right to probate such will
would be barred if the testator had died more than four years before the pe on for probate was filed.
‘This uniform prac ce and understanding of the bench and bar, and of the legisla ve department of the state also, is a
strong argument to the effect that the statute of limita ons does not apply to such proceedings. The authori es on
the effect of such long acquiescence are numerous.’
“The Statute of Limita ons upon which the court below has relied, sec ons 38 to 50 of the old Code of Civil
Procedure, Act 190, undertakes to fix limits for the filing of ‘civil ac ons’, but none for ‘special proceedings’ of which
probate is admi edly one. The dis nc on is not purely verbal, but based on differences that make the limita on to
‘ac ons’ inapplicable to ‘special proceedings’. In this regard, the Supreme Court of New York has adequately
remarked (In re Canfield’s Will, 300 NYS 502): ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

‘A Respondent in a private proceeding owes no legal duty or obliga on to the proponent as such, wherefore it is
impossible for him to violate such non-existent obliga on. Furthermore such a proceeding is not ins tuted for the
vindica on of any personal right to the proponent. The subject-ma er is therefore wholly absent which could give
rise to any ‘cause of ac on’ against any Respondent therein.
‘The primary purpose of the proceeding is not to establish the existence of the right of any living person, but to
determine whether or not the decedent has performed the acts specified by the per nent statutes which are the
essen al prerequisites to personal direc on of the mode of devolu on of his property on death. There is no legal but
merely a moral duty res ng upon a proponent to a empt to validate the wishes of the departed, and he may and
frequently does receive no personal benefit from the performance of the act.
‘One of the most fundamental concep ons of probate law, is that it is the duty of the court to effectuate, in so far as
may be compa ble with the public interest, the devolu onary wishes of a deceased person (Ma er of Watson’s Will,
262 N.Y. 284, 294, 186 N.E. 787; Ma er of Marriman’s Estate, 124 Misc. 320, 325, 208 N.Y.S. 672; Foley, S. affirmed 217
ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

App. Div. 733, 216 N.Y.S. 842; Ma er of Lensman’s Estate, 137 Misc. 77, 78, 243 N.Y.S. 126, Henderson, S., Ma er of
ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

Drake’s Estate, 160 Misc. 587, 598, 290 N.Y.S. 581). To that end, the court is, in effect, an addi onal party to every
li ga on affec ng the disposal of the assets of the deceased. Ma er of Van Valkenburgh’s Estate, 164 Misc. 295, 296,
298 N.Y.S. 219. A determina on, therefore, that the mere non-ac on of a person upon whom no legal duty rested in
this regard, could have the effect of subver ng the wishes of one who was no longer able to protect his own
unques onable rights, would strike at the very founda on of all concep ons of jus ce as administered in probate
courts.’
“These decisions are of high persuasive value (Cu vs. Republic, G. R. L-3018, July 18, 1951); they represent the trend ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

of authority (57 Am. Jur. 585), and enable us to conclude that reason and precedent reject the applicability of the
Statute of Limita ons to probate proceedings, because these are not exclusively established in the interest of the
surviving heirs, but primarily for the protec on of the testator’s expressed wishes, that are en tled to respect as an
effect of his ownership and right of disposi on. If the probate of validly executed wills is required by public policy, as
declared by the Supreme Court in the previous case, G.R. 48840 (Exhibit E), the state could not have intended the
statute of limita ons to defeat that policy.
“It is true, as ruled by the trial court, that the rights of par es ‘should not be le hanging in uncertainty for periods of
me far in excess of the maximum period of ten years allowed by law’; but the obvious remedy is for the other ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray
interested persons to pe on for the produc on of the will and for its probate, or to inflict upon the guilty party the
penal es prescribed by Rule 76 or declare the unworthiness of the heir under the Civil Code for concealing or
suppressing the testament; but not to dismiss the pe on for probate, however belatedly submi ed, and thereby
ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

refuse sanc on to testamentary disposi ons executed with all the formali es prescribed by law, incidentally
prejudicing also those testamentary heirs who do not happen to be successors ab intestato. That in this par cular
case the appealed rule may not work injus ce would not excuse its adop on as a general norm applicable to all cases.
“It is likewise reasonable to assume that if the Supreme Court had considered the ten-year limita on applicable to
probate proceedings, it would not have ordered the par es on December 29, 1943 ‘to present the document Exhibit A
to the proper court for probate in accordance with law’, because the ten years from the death of the testator expired
in September of that same year, two months before the decision. It is safe to assume that the high Court would not
order a useless step. The reasoning that the phrase ‘in accordance with law’ was a qualifica on signifying ‘if s ll
legally possible’, appears to be far-fetched and unjus fied. The plain import of the words employed by the high Court
is that the probate should follow the procedure provided for the purpose.”
xxx xxx xxx
“The other reasons advanced by the court a quo in support of its order dismissing the pe on are also untenable. The
allega on contained in paragraph 10 of the original pe on, that ‘the will, or its testamentary disposi ons, had been
de jure revoked in so far as the parcel of 259 hectares described in said will’ is concerned, does not jus fy the finding
that the probate would be pointless. What is alleged is a par al revoca on, only as to the parcel of land affected; but ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

as previously shown, the will disposed of other property besides that one. And even gran ng that the next allega on
to the effect that Plain ff sought to probate ‘only for the purposes of her acknowledgment as natural child in said
will’, cons tutes an averment that the will had been fully revoked, the same would at the most cons tute a
conclusion or inference that the lower court was not bound to admit. Because the Appellant claimed or believed that
the revoca on of the will as to the large parcel of land, cons tuted a total revoca on of the testament is no reason
why the court should concur in the same belief or conclusion, especially when the will itself, appended to the
pe on, showed that there were other proper es and other heirs or legatees, and the trial court had before it the
decision of the Supreme Court ordering the filing of the will for its probate because, as stated in its decision, such a
step was enjoined by law and public policy. Moreover, the defect, if any, incurred in failing to ask for the probate in
toto of the will, was subsequently cured and corrected in the amended pe on, where not only the objec onable
statements were eliminated, but others added indica ng the existence of a par ble estate.
“Assuming that the original pe on violated the order of the Supreme Court in so far as it did not ask for the
allowance of the en re will, the court below erred in dismissing the pe on, for it thereby sanc oned further
disobedience to the order of the superior court. Once again, it must be repeated that the order of dismissal failed to
take into account that the case involved not only the interests of Rosario Guevara, and those of the AppelleeErnesto
Guevara and the other legatees, but specially the express desires of the testator; and that the protec on and ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

defense of the la er developed upon the court itself, since no one else made any move to enforce them.
“Even if the other heirs had failed to show interest in the case (a fact not properly inferable from their non-
interven on in the case, because the order of publica on of the pe on only called for those interested to ‘appear to
contest the allowance’ and not to support it) (Rec. on App., p. 7), and even if the other heirs had already received
their shares, the order refusing the probate remains indefensible. If the other heirs were not interested, there
remained the wishes of the testator to be supported and protected, if validly expressed. If the heirs had distributed
the estate, the distribu on was illegal and improper unless the will be first probated. The Supreme Court so ruled in
its previous decision (G. R. 48840) heretofore quoted.
‘Even if the decedent le no debts and nobody raises any ques on as to the authen city and due execu on of the
will, none of the heirs may sue for the par on of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its
allowance or probate by the court: first, because the law expressly provides that ‘no will shall pass either real or
ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court; and, second, because the probate of a will,
ch an ro b le svirtu alw lib ray

which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with and subs tuted by any other proceeding, judicial or
extrajudicial, without offending against public policy designed to effectuate the testator’s right to dispose of his
property by will in accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the
means provided by law, among which are the publica on and the personal no ces to each and all of said heirs and
legatees. Nor may the court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an ac on for par on, which is
one in personam, any more than it could decree the registra on under the Torrens system of the land involved in an
ordinary ac on for revindicacion or par on.’
“From whatever angle the case is viewed, a hearing on the allowance of the will is unavoidable. The persistent, albeit
obnoxious, a empts of Rosario Guevara to sidetrack the will are not remedied by dismissing the pe on for probate
of will, and allowing Ernesto to retain a greater interest than that intended by the testator.” (Appendix to brief for
the Pe oner-Appellant, pp. 7-15, 17-20.)
We are fully in accord with these findings which we adopt as ours.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
the Pe oner.
Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bau sta Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.