Digests in Wills and Succession

SBU - SY 2020-2021
Gail Ulysse G. Campos

Articles 774-803

1. PNB v Garcia (G.R. No. 182839, June 2, 2014)

Doctrine: What is considered as conjugal property is determined at the time such property was
acquired even if such property is registered under the name of one spouse only.

FACTS:
- Jose Sr., and Ligaya Garcia purchased a parcel of land during their marriage. They had four
children: Nora, Jose Jr., Jimmy, and Bobby. They are the respondents in this case.
- Spouses Rogelio and Celedonia Garcia obtained a loan from petitioner, PNB. They had
increased their loan and eventually Jose Sr agreed to accommodate spouses Garcia by offering
the parcel of land he and his wife had purchased as additional collateral security for the latter’s
increased loan. However, during all of these transactions, such were done without the knowledge
and consent of Jose Sr’s children.
- On the maturity of the loan, Spouses Garcia failed to pay their loan to the petitioner bank despite
repeated demands.
- The respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for Nullity of the Amendment of the REM,
with damages against spouses Garcia and the petitioner bank. They claimed that such instrument
was null and void as respondents were not parties to the contract.
- They alleged that the subject property was a conjugal property of Jose Sr and his deceased
spouse, Ligaya as it was acquired during their marriage; and that upon Lohaya’s death, Jose Sr
together with his children becam co-owners of the subject property.
- Spouses Garcia alleged that Jose Sr was indebted to them in the amount of P133, 800. To settle
this indebtedness, Jose Sr volunteered to give the subject property as additional security for the
spouses loan to PNB.
- While PNB, on the other hand, claimed that the mortgage was made in good faith and for value,
and mainatained that the respondents’ complaint stated no cause of action against it.

RTC: Ruled in favor of respondents and held that the subject property was conjugal property as
it was acquired by Jose Sr during his marriage with his deceased wife.
CA: Upheld RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are co-owners of the disputed property.

SC RULING: YES. Although the property was registered in the name of Jose Sr., registration of
a property alone in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. What is material
is the time when the property was acquired. The registration of the property is not conclusive
evidence of the exclusive ownership of the husband or the wife. Although the property appears to
be registered in the name of the husband, it has the inherent character of conjugal property if it
was acquired for valuable consideration during marriage. It retains its conjugal nature. The subject
property was part of conjugal property and therefore upon the death of Jose Sr’s wife, his children
became co-owners of the parcel of land.

Upon the death of Ligaya on January 21, 1987, the conjugal partnership was automatically
dissolved and terminated pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, 13 and the successional
rights of her heirs vest, as provided under Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that "[t]he
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."

Consequently, the conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary coownership
between the surviving spouse, on the one hand, and the heirs of the deceased, on the other.

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Therefore, they cannot be bound by the Amended REM as they have not consented to the
contract.

As provided in Article 493 of the NCC: Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall
be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership .

Thus, on the basis of such article, Jose Sr’s right to mortgage is merely his share in the property
owned in common with his children.

2. Ining v Vega (G.R. No. 174727; August 12, 2013)

Doctrine: One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and
cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot affect a
repudiation of the co-ownership o the estate that was formed among the decedent’s heirs.

FACTS:
- Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menez, is the owner of a parcel of land in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon
and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived his siblings Romana Roldan and Gregoria
Roldan Ining, who are now both deceased.
- Romana’s heirs are herein respondents and the petitioners are Gregoria’s heirs.
- Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan for the partition, recovery
of ownership and possession against Gregoria’s heirs. He alleged that on several occaions, he
demanded the partition of the property but Gregoria’s heirs refused and claimed sole ownership
of the property and portions of the property were sold which must be collated and included as part
of the portion to be awarded to Gregoria’s heirs. Leonardo prayed that he be declared the owner
of half of the subject property and that the same be partitioned after collation and determination
of the portion he is entitled to.
- Gregoria’s heirs claimed that they have become the sole owners of the subject property and had
acquired in good faith through the sale effected by Leon and Lucimo Sr. and that Leonardo was
aware of this fact, and that Leonardo’s claim is barred by estoppel and laches.
- During the course of the proceedings Leonardo passed away and was substituted by his heirs,
the respondents herein.

RTC: dismissed the complaint on the ground that the respondents right of action has long
prescribed. It had also concluded that Leon never sold the property and that it remained in Leon’s
estate at the time of his death and thus his siblings inherited the subject property in equal shares.
Leonardo and the respondents are entitled to Romana's share as the latter's successors.

CA: reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. It agreed with the trial court that such sale
was null and void and thus Leon’s siblings inherited the subject property. However, it did not
agree that Leonardo’s action for partition was barred by prescription. It declared that prescription
began to run not from Leon’s death, but from the execution of the affidavit of ownership by virtue
of the supposed sale which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with
Leonardo. It applied the rule on co-ownership which provides that “no prescription shall run in
favor of a co-owner of co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes co-ownership. Jurisprudence provides that possession by a co-owner will
not be presumed to be adverse to the other co-owners but will be held to benefit all, and that a

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co-owner or co-heir is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in
representation of his co-owners or co-heirs if he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with
the obligation to deliver the same to his co-owners or co-heirs, as is the case of a depositary,
lessee or trustee.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents, Romana’s heirs, are entitled to a share in the property.

SC RULING: YES. It has been settled that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr and thus
the property remained part of Leon’s estate at the time he died. Also, Leon had died without issue
and thus his siblings must inherit the property in equal shares. As provided in Article 777 of the
NCC, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death.

SC also clarified that for prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. “A
co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing."

it is clear that the trial court erred in reckoning the prescriptive period within which Leonardo may
seek partition from the death of Leon. Article 1141 and Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that
prescription shall begin to run in favor of a co-owner and against the other co-owners only from
the time he positively renounces the co-ownership and makes known his repudiation to the other
co-owners.

It had escaped the RTC and CA’s notice that while it may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed
acts that may be characterized as a repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-
owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo's son-in-law,
being married to Antipolo's daughter Teodora. Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property;
Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the co-ownership, which he
was never part of. For this reason, prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo, and his
right to seek a partition of the property has not been lost.

3. Calalang-Parulan v Calalang (G.R. No. 184148; June 9, 2014)

Doctrine: For property to form part of the conjugal property, it must have been acquired during
the subsistence of the marriage. The fact that the title to such property possesses the civil status
of the owner at the time of its registration is not material when it can be shown that such property
was not acquired during the marriage.

FACTS:
- Respondents assert their ownership over a certain parcel of land against petitioners. According
to respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his lifetime. The first
marriage was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio. During the subsistence of this marriage,
their parents acquired the abovementioned parcel of land from their maternal grandmother
Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession of the land, however, their parents
failed to register the same. On June 7, 1942, the first marriage was dissolved with the death of
Encarnacion Silverio.
- Pedro then entered into a second marriage with Elvira Calalang, the mother of petitioners. It was
only during this time that Pedro filed an application for free patent over the parcel of land with the
Bureau of Lands. They claimed that Pedro committed fraud in such application by claiming sole

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and exclusive ownership over the land and concealed the fact that he had three children with his
first spouse.
- Pedro had also sold the said parcel of land to his daughter from the second marriage, Nora.
Accordingly, a TCT was issued in her name. A few years after the sale, Pedro died.
- Respondents assail the validity of the TCT on two grounds. First, the respondents argued that
the sale of the land was void because Pedro Calalang failed to obtain the consent of the
respondents who were co-owners of the same. As compulsory heirs upon the death of
Encarnacion Silverio, the respondents claimed that they acquired successional rights over the
land. Thus, in alienating the land without their consent, Pedro Calalang allegedly deprived them
of their pro indiviso share in the property. Second, the respondents claimed that the sale was
absolutely simulated as Nora B. Calalang-Parulan did not have the capacity to pay for the
consideration stated in the Deed of Sale.
- Petitioners then argue that the parcel of land was acquired during the second marriage of Pedro
to Elvira and stressed that the title itself stated that it was issued in the name of “Pedro Calalang,
married to Elvira Berba Calalang.” Thus, the property belonged to the conjugal partnership of the
second marriage. They also deny that such sale was simulated.

RTC: rendered the decision in favor of respondents and agreed that such parcel of land formed
part of the conjugal property of the first marriage of Pedro and that respondents acquired such
according to the laws of succession upon the death of their mother. It allocated half of the property
to the respondents and half to Pedro and ordered that Pedro’s share be given to Nora on account
of the sale.

CA: reversed the factual findings of the RTC and held that Pedro Calalang was the sole and
exclusive owner of the subject parcel of land. It held that there was insufficient evidence to prove
that the property was jointly acquired during the first marriage and that although it was issued in
the name of "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]" this phrase was merely
descriptive of the civil status of Pedro Calalang at the time of the registration of the disputed
property. Thus upon the death of the respondent’s mother, the former did not acquire any
successional rights to the parcel of land. The CA ordered the petitioners to reconvey in favor of
the respondents their rightful shares to the land. The CA ruled that the sale by Pedro Calalang to
Nora B. Calalang-Parulan was fraudulent and fictitious as the vendee was in bad faith and the
respondents were unlawfully deprived of their pro indiviso shares over the disputed property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Pedro was the sole and exclusive owner of the disputed property.

SC RULING: YES. It agreed with the CA that Pedro is the sole and exclusive owner of the
property. However, it did not agree that the sale of the property to Nora was done in bad faith and
unlawfully deprived the respondents of their shares to the property. As Pedro has already been
established to be the sole owner, he had the right to convey his property in favor of Nora by
executing a Deed of Sale.

It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of
the New Civil Code provides that "the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent." Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang that his heirs
acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole
estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet
bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the
sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in effect an inofficious
donation inter vivos), the respondents have no right to question the sale of the disputed property
on the ground that their father deprived them of their respective shares.

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4. Alvarez v IAC (G.R. No. 68053; May 7,1990)

Doctrine: Transmissible obligations also form part of the inheritance and thus the heirs cannot
escape the liabilities incurred by the decedent, except with respect to monetary obligations.
However, they are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance.

FACTS:
- Aniceto Yanes left his children two lots. He was survived by his children Rufino, Felipe and
Teodora. Herein private respondents are the children of Rufino and Felipe.
- It is on record that Fortunato Santiago was issued a TCT covering a portion of one of the lots.
Santiago then sold such to Monico Fuentebella and consequently TCTs were issued in the latter’s
name. After his death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratix requested
authority to sell the lots sold to Fuentebella by Santiago. The court granted the motion and it was
sold to Rosendo Alvarez.
- Two years later, Teodora and Rufino filed a complaint for the return of ownership of the lots.
During the pendency of the case, Alvarez sold the lots to Dr. Siason and TCTs were then issued
to Siason who declared the lots in his name.
- Jesus Yanes, son of Rufino, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other plaintiffs filed a
manifestation is such case stating that they “renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (any claim, monetary
or otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection with the above
entitled case."
- The CFI rendered a decision ordering Alvarez to reconvey the lots and deliver possession of
said lots to them. However, execution the decision was unsuccessful with respect to one of the
lots and the sheriff had discovered that it had been subdivided and were in the name of Siason
who had purchased them from Alvarez and could not be delivered as Siason was not a party to
the case.
- The private respondents then petitioned for the issuance of a new certificate of title and for a
declaration of nullity of those TCTs issued to Alvarez. The court then required Siason to produce
the certificates of title covering the lots he had purchased. However, Siason then stated that he
had purchased such lots in good faith and for a valuable consideration without any knowledge of
any lien or encumbrances against said properties.

RTC: The lower court found that Siason, who purchased the properties in question thru an agent
as he was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a valuable
consideration. Although the Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a notice of lis pendens
"before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to protect their rights over the property
in question" in the case, equity demanded that they recover the actual value of the land because
the sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason was without court approval.

CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of such lots to
Siason could be legally passed or transmitted by operation of law to petitioners.

SC RULING: YES. As ruled in the case herein, the Yaneses have been illegally deprived of
ownership and possession of the lots in question. However, as subject lots can no longer be
reconveyed to private respondents Yaneses, the same having been sold during the pendency of
the case by the petitioners' father to Dr. Siason who did not know about the controversy, there
being no lis pendens annotated on the titles. Hence, it was also settled beyond question that Dr.
Siason is a purchaser-in-good faith.

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Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of lots made by Rosendo Alvarez
to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after
his death. However, such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this
jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his
legitimate children and heirs.

Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That
petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction,
the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we
have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts
of the estate.

5. Gevero v IAC (G.R. No. 77029; August 30, 1990)

Doctrine: Successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent, therefore
there is no legal bar to a successor disposing of his hereditary share immediately after such death,
even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the
estate.

FACTS:
- Ricardo Gevero sold a parcel of land to Luis Lancero in 1952. In 1966 Teodorica Babangha’s
heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement and partition of her estate consisting of two lots. By
virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition, Ricardo Gevero was adjudicated lots registered
with the LRC. Private respondents herein filed an action with RTC to annul such partition made
by the heirs of Teodorica insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired from Luis
Lancero who purchased the same from Ricardo Gevero.

RTC: Ruled in favor of herein respondents and it’s dispositive portion adjudicated portions of the
lots provided in the extra-judicial settlement.

CA: Affirmed RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial settlement and partition of Teodorica’s estate should be
annulled.

SC RULING: YES. The deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero to Luis Lancero is valid and
was executed with all the legal formalities of a public document. Thus, the claim that the signature
of Ricardo in the 1952 deed of sale was forged is improper. Petitioners failed to rebut the legal
presumption of the regularity of the notarized document.

Petitioners also aver that the deed of sale executed by Ricardo did not include the share of
Ricardo, as inheritance from Teodorica, because the deed did not recite that she was deceased
at the time it was executed. However, the court ruled that the hereditary share in a decedents'
estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of the 'causante' or
predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a
successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary share immediately after
such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent
liquidation of the estate.

Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession were
transmitted from the moment of her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in 1966,

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the date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his share in the lot as inheritance from
his mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over the lot that share which he inherited
from Teodorica was also included unless expressly excluded in the deed of sale.

6. Locsin v CA (G.R. No. 89783; February 19, 1992)

Doctrine: Only property existing at the time of the death of the decedent form part of the hereditary
estate.

FACTS:
- Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Juliana and Magdalena, and his estate was
divided among them.
- The properties of Mariano and his wife, Catalina were registered and those that Mariano
inherited from his father were registered in the name of “Mariano Locsin married to Catalina
Jaucian.”
- Mariano executed a last will and testament instituting his wife as the sole and universal heir of
all their properties. They agreed that their properties, after both of them shall have died should
revert to their respective sides of the family (Mariano’s properties to his Locsin relatives and those
of Catalina to her Jaucian relatives).
- After Mariano died, Catalina carried out the terms of their agreement and hence, nine years after
his death she began transferring, by sale, donation, or assigment, Mariano’s, as well as her own,
properties to their respective nephews and nieces.
- Four years before Catalina’s death she made a will affirming the transfers she had made during
her lifetime and when she died, the relatives decided there was no need to submit the will to
probate because the properties devised under the will had already been conveyed when she was
still alive.
- Six years after Catalina’s death, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already
received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate filed an action in the RTC to recover
properties which were conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances
were in officious, without consideration, and intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession.

RTC: Ruled against herein petitioners, Locsins, and ordered such to reconvey ownership and
possession of all such properties to herein private respondents.

CA: Affirmed RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Locsins are entitled to the properties conveyed to them by Catalina
during her lifetime.

SC RULING: YES. The SC ruled that the RTC and CA erred in declaring the private respondents
entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more than ten years before
her death. For those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate. Property which Catalina
had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her
estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the
property that remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even
if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain
circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos
does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced)
heirs.

There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doña Catalina, in transferring the
properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to

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circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents' rights to her succession. Said
respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any such, hence
there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property during
her lifetime.

7. Opulencia v CA (G.R. No. 125835; July 30, 1998)

Doctrine: Judicial approval or declaration of heirship is not required for the heir to acquire a
substantive right to sell the whole or a part of their share in the estate of the decedent.

FACTS:
- Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven, herein respondents, alleged that Natalia Carpena
Opulencia executed in their favor a Contract to Sell of a lot, to which respondents paid a
downpayment of P300,000 but defendant failed to comply with her obligations under the contract.
- Opulencia, herein petitioner, admitted the execution of the contract and receipt of the
downpayment. However, she put up the defense that the property subject of the contract formed
part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena, her father and that at the time the contract was executed
the parties were aware of the probate proceedings. She stated that the contract to sell was not
approved by the probate court and realizing the nullity of the contract offered to return the
downpayment but the respondents had refused and petitioner had chosen to rescind the contract.
She maintained that the contract was null and void for want of approval of the probate court.

RTC: Dismissed the case.

CA: Decided that RTC erred in concluding the contract to sell was null and void, there being no
approval of the probate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not approval of the probate court is necessary for Opulencia to enter into a
contract to sell with private respondents.

SC RULING: NO. The contention of the petitioner has no merit. As correctly ruled by the Court of
Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, because petitioner entered
into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the
estate. In the contract, she represented herself as the "lawful owner" and seller of the subject
parcel of land.

Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent's death.
Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus,
the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has
the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father.

Also, the Contract to Sell does not prejudice the administration of the estate. The Contract to Sell
stipulates that petitioner's offer to sell is contingent on the "complete clearance of the court on the
Last Will Testament of her father." Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was perfected
between the petitioner and private respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings,
the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the private
respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the termination and
outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner's apprehension that
the Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the
estate. Indeed, it is settled that "the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject
to the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration."

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8. Emnace v CA (G.R. No. 126334; November 23, 2001)
Doctrine: Appointment as administrator executor is not needed for an heir to sue in behalf of the
decedent’s estate. The decedent’s rights are transmitted from their moment of death.

FACTS:
- Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a
business conern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. In January 1986, they decided to dissolve
their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership
properties among them, consequent to Jacinto’s withdrawal from the partnership.
- Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicent’s death, petitioner failed to
submit to Vicente’s heir any statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and render and
account of the partnerships finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to
Tabanao’s heirs the deceased’s 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership, amounting to
P30,000,000, or the sum of P10,000,000, despite formal demand of payment thereof.
- Vicente’s heirs, respondents herein, filed against petitioner an action for accounting, payment of
shares, division of assets and damages.

RTC: Ruled in favor of the respondents and stated that the heirs had a right to sue in their own
names in view of Article 777 of the NCC.

CA: Affirmed decision of RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no legal capacity to sue as
she was never appointed admistratix or executrix of his estate.

SC RULING: NO. The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or
administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are complainants
in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao's
death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights
to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.

Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were
transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode
of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of
the inheritance of a person are transmitted. Moreover, respondents became owners of their
respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died.

A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix or
administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue. As successors
who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can commence any action
originally pertaining to the decedent. From the moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to
demand fulfillment of petitioner's obligations as outlined in their dissolution agreement were
transmitted to respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the court's
intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.

9. Rabadilla v CA (G.R. No. 113725; June 29, 2000)

Doctrine: The transmissible rights and obligations belonging to the decedent are transmitted to
the heirs from the moment of his death.

FACTS:

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- In a codicil appended to the last will and testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadila,
predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee
of a parcel of land. The said codicil, which was duly probated and admitted contained a provision
that states: “Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of
Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.” It also stated, “Should
Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly,
the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza on the month of December of each year.”
- Pursuant to the same codicil, the lot was transferred to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla and a TCT was
issued in his name. He died in 1983 and was survived by his children, herein petitioners.
- Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint against the heirs of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of the subject codicil. She prayed that judgment be
rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return the lot to the heirs of the late Aleja Belleza,
the cancellation of TCT in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a
new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
- Private respondent and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee
of the property and acting as attorneyin-fact of defendant heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement
and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of
sugar. However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except
for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988-1989.

RTC: Dismissed the complaint as no cause of action against herein petitioners has yet arose in
favor or private respondents.

CA: Reversed decision of RTC ordered the reconveyance of the lot together with its fruits and
interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

ISSUE: Whether or not reconveyance of the lot in dispute is proper on the basis of the codicil
provisions and its non-compliance thereto.

SC RULING: YES. The disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the
private respondent had a legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject
Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.

It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.
The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or
widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs
of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need
of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of
death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla

Whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced
heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of
the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.

The Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One Hundred (100) piculs
of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir,

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Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease,
mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that in the
event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall
seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of
the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the
testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only
on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix
in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his
successors-in-interest.

10. Tañedo v CA (G.R. No. 104482; January 22, 1996)

Doctrine: No contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law.

FACTS:
- In 1962, Lazaro Tañedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in favor of his eldest brother,
Ricardo Tañedo, and the latter's wife, Teresita Barera, private respondents herein, whereby he
conveyed to the latter a parcel of land. The said property being his future inheritance from his
parents. Upon the death of his father, Lazaro executed an affidavit of conformity with respect to
the sale to Ricardo and his wife.
- However, Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his children, petitioners herein,
through a deed of sale in 1980. Private respondents recorded the deed of sale in their favor in the
registry of deeds and the corresponding entry was made in a TCT.
- Petitioners filed a complaint for rescission of the deeds of sale executed by Lazaro in favor of
private respondents covering the property inherited by Lazaro from his father. They claimed that
Lazaro executed an Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of his ten children his allotted portion under
the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Matias, which deed included the land in
litigation.

RTC: Decided in favor of private respondents.

CA: Affirmed decision of RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale by Lazaro to private respondents is valid.

SC RULING: YES. Although the sale of future inheritance under the NCC is void. It is not truly the
issue here. The said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of any right nor
the creator of any obligation between parties. Hence, the affidavit of conformity executed in 1980
is also useless, and void. However, the deed of sale of January 13, 1981 in favor of private
respondents covering Lazaro's undivided inheritance and the deed of sale in 1980 in favor of
petitioners covering the same property are critical to the resolution of this case. These two
documents were executed after the death of Matias (and his spouse) and after a deed of extra-
judicial settlement of his (Matias') estate was executed, thus vesting in Lazaro actual title over
said property. In other words, these dispositions, though conflicting, were no longer infected with
the infirmities of the 1962 sale.

Critical in determining which of these two deeds should be given effect is the registration of the
sale in favor of private respondents with the register of deeds on June 7, 1982. The property in
question is land, an immovable, and following the above-quoted law, ownership shall belong to
the buyer who in good faith registers it first in the registry of property. Thus, although the deed of

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sale in favor of private respondents was later than the one in favor of petitioners, ownership would
vest in the former because of the undisputed fact of registration. On the other hand, petitioners
have not registered the sale to them at all.

11. Santos v Lumbao (G.R. No. 169129, March 28, 2007)

Doctrine: Property which forms part of the inheritance must be that existing at the time of death
of the decedent.

FACTS:
- On two occassions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject
property which is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria Catoc, who died
intestate.
- After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession
thereof and erected thereon a house which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up to
the present. As the exclusive owners of the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao made
several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, for
them to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of
respondents Spouses Lumbao insofar as the subject property is concerned. Respondents
Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao
she could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire property inherited by her
and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned.
- Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one
another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, adjudicating and partitioning among
themselves and the other heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the subject property
already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao and now covered by TCT.
- Despite repeated demands, petitioners failed and refused to reconvey the subject property to
the respondents. They also denied the allegations that the subject property had been sold to the
spouses.

RTC: The complaint was denied for lack of merit and the trial ruled in favor of herein petitioners.

CA: RTC decision was set aside and reversed. It ordered the petitioners to reconvey the disputed
parcel of land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lot sold to the Spouses Lumbao still formed part of the hereditary
estate of petitioners mother.

SC RULING: NO. When the estate of petitioners’ mother had been partitioned by virtue of a deed
of extra-judicial settlement, the lot sold by the mother to respondents spouses should have been
deducted from the total lot inherited by them. The lot had already been sold to respondents and
can no longer be inherited by petitioners because the same was no longer part of their inheritance
as it was already sold during the lifetime of their mother.

The heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their
predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting
their common ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased
mother. They only succeed to what rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against
her is also valid and binding as against them. The death of a party does not excuse
nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right and the rights and obligations
thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is

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not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in the subject
matter of the contract.

In the end, despite the death of the petitioners' mother, they are still bound to comply with the
provisions of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Consequently,
they must reconvey to herein respondents Spouses Lumbao the lot which they bought from Rita,
petitioners' mother.

12. NHA v CA (G.R. No. 162784; June 22, 2007)

Doctrine: The death of the decedent does not extinguish their interest over the property but is
merely transmitted to the heirs/estate.

FACTS:
- The Land Tenure Administration awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land.
Margarita had two daughters, Beatriz (who had predeceased her) and Francisca. Francisca, the
remaining child of the late Margarita, executed a deed of self-adjudication claiming that she is the
only remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed to
be the exclusive legal heir of Margarita. The deed was based on a sinumpaang salaysay allegedly
executed by her mother.
- The surviving heirs of Beatriz filed a case for annulment of the deed of self-adjudication and the
court declared that the deed was null and void.
- During the trial, Francisca filed an application with the NHA to purchase the same lots submitting
the sinumpaang salaysay executed by her mother. Private respondent Almeida, heir of Beatriz,
protested the application. However, NHA granted the application made by Francisca whereby it
stated that the office finds Francisca has a better preferential right to purchase the lots in question.
- Private respondent appealed to the Office of the President and the NHA resolution was affirmed.
- When Francisca died, her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they
submitted to the NHA and the latter executed several deeds of sale in favor of the heirs of
Francisca and title were issued in ther favor.
- Private respondent Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in
favor of the heirs of Francisca. Almeida invoked her forty-year occupation of the disputed
properties, and re-raised the fact that Francisca Herrera's declaration of selfadjudication has been
adjudged as a nullity because the other heirs were disregarded.

RTC: Declared that the deeds of sale executed by NHA in favor of Herrera’s heirs null and void.

CA: Affirmed RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sinumpaang Salaysay is a will.

Whether or not the NHA acted arbitrarily in granting Francisca the lots.

SC RULING: YES. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted
that the effectivity of the said document commences at the time of death of the author of the
instrument; in her words "sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay. . ."

The NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering that
the initial applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights and obligations to the estate
including whatever interest she has or may have had over the disputed properties. To the extent
of the interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate.
Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon

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her demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirs — in accordance with a
will or by operation of law.

The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita
Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise,
this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on
both parties — Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are transmissible. Margarita Herrera's
obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by operation of
law.

If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the
decedent should transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the
NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another contract to sell to other parties of a property
already initially paid for by the decedent. Such would be an act contrary to the law on succession
and the law on sales and obligations.

When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as the
next "person" likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price. The
opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera should have put the NHA on
guard as to the award of the lots. Further, the Decision which rendered the deed of self-
adjudication null and void should have alerted the NHA that there are other heirs to the interests
and properties of the decedent who may claim the property after a testate or intestate proceeding
is concluded. The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots.

13. People v Umali (G.R. No. 84450; February 4, 1991)

Doctrine: The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account
Article 821 of the Civil Code which states that persons "convicted of falsification of a document,
perjury or false testimony" are disqualified from being witnesses to a will."

FACTS:
- Francisco Manalo was given four marked P5.00 bills to buy marijuana from sources known to
him. He was instructed to return to bring back the prohibited drug purchased by him to the police
headquarters. Manalo returned with two foils of dried marijuana which allegedly bought from the
accused Gloria Umali. Thereafter, he was asked by the police investigators to give a statement
on the manner and circumstances of how he was able to purchase two (2) marijuana foils from
accused Gloria Umali. With the affidavit of Francisco Manalo, supported by the two (2) foils of
marijuana, the Chief of the Investigation Division petitioned the Court for the issuance of a search
warrant as a justification for them to search the house of Gloria Umali. The search resulted in the
confiscation of a can of milo, containing sixteen (16) foils of dried marijuana leaves which were
placed in a tupperware and kept in the kitchen where rice was being stored.
- RTC found Umali guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating RA 9165.
- Umali appealed to the CA. She alleged that witness Francisco Manalo is not reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable and that his words should not be taken on its face value. Furthermore, he
stressed that said witness has several charges in court and because of his desire to have some
of his cases dismissed, he was likely to tell falsehood.

ISSUE: Whether or not Francisco Manalo is disqualified from being a witness.

SC RULING: NO. As provided in Rule 130, Section 20 of the Rules on Evidence: “Except as
provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving can make
known their perception to others may be witnesses. Religious or political belief, interest in the

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outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a
ground for disqualification."

The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account Article
821 of the Civil Code which states that persons "convicted of falsification of a document, perjury
or false testimony" are disqualified from being witnesses to a will."

Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to
disqualify him as a witness and this case does not involve the probate of a will, We rule that the
fact that said witness is facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way
disqualify him as a witness.

14. Torres v Lopez (G.R. No. 146569; February 26, 1926)

Doctrine: The presumption of mental capacity is inverted when the testator is found to be under
guardianship.

FACTS:
-Tomas Rodriguez died in Manila City leaving a considerable estate. Shortly after his death,
Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will, asked that the will of Tomas be allowed.
Opposition was entered by Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the deceased on the grounds: (1)
That the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of the execution of the supposed will
he was suffering from senile dementia and was under guardianship; (2) that undue influence had
been exercised by the persons benefited in the document in conjunction with others who acted in
their behalf; and (3) that the signature of Tomas Rodriguez to the document was obtained through
fraud and deceit.
- As to testamentary capacity, for a long time Tomas was in feeble health. His breakdown was
undoubtedly due to organic weakness, to advancing years, and to an accident which occurred in
1921. Ultimately, on August 10, 1923, on his own initiative, Rodriguez designated Vicente F.
Lopez as the administrator of his property and he was also named as the guardian of Tomas.
- Tomas Rodriguez was taken to the Philippine General Hospital on November 27, 1923. There
he was to remain sick in bed until his death. The physician in charge during this period was Dr.
Elias Domingo. In the clinical case record of the hospital under the topic "Diagnosis (in full)," we
find the following: "Senility; Hernia inguinal; Decubitus".
- Santiago Lopez states that on one occasion when he was visiting Tomas Rodriguez in the
hospital, Rodriguez expressed to him a desire to make a will and this information was
communicated to Vicente Lopez who the interviewed Maximino Mina, a practicing attorney in the
City of Manila for the purpose of securing him to prepare the will. Mina prepared the will and read
the same to Tomas and the former scheduled a day wherein witnesses would be present and the
will would be signed.
- Several witnesses, as well as the subscribing witnesses and doctors present at the hospital,
testified that at the time of the execution of the will, Tomas was of sound mind. Although, some
doctors surmised that his memory was week, however, his intellectual faculties are sound.
- The will was attacked on the further ground of undue influence exercised by the persons
benefited in the will in collaboration with others.
- Tomas Rodriguez voluntarily named Vicente F. Lopez as his administrator. The latter
subsequently became his guardian. There is every indication that of all his relatives Tomas
Rodriguez reposed the most confidence in Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de
Bueno. Again, it was Vicente F. Lopez who, on the suggestion of Rodriguez, secured Maximino
Mina to prepare the will, and it was Luz Lopez de Bueno who appears to have gathered the
witnesses and physicians for the execution of the will. This faction of the Lopez family was also

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shown a favor through the orders of Doctor Domingo as to who could be admitted to see the
patient.

ISSUE: Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possess sufficient mentality to make a will
which would meet the legal test regarding testamentary capacity, and have the proponents of the
will carried successfully the burden of proof and shown him to be of sound mind on that date?

SC RULING: YES. Two of the subscribing witnesses to the will, one a physician, testified clearly
to the regular manner in which the will was executed and to the testator's mental condition. The
other subscribing witness, also a physician, on the contrary testified to a fact which, if
substantiated, would require the court to disallow the will. The attending physician and three other
eminent members of the medical fraternity, who were present at the execution of the will,
expressed opinions entirely favorable to the capacity of the testator. As against this we have the
professional speculations of three other equally eminent members of the medical profession who,
however, were not included among those present when the will was executed. The advantage on
these facts is all with those who offer the will for probate.

With special reference to the definition of testamentary capacity, we may say this: On January 3,
1924, Tomas Rodriguez, in our opinion, comprehended the nature of the transaction in which he
was engaged. He had had two conferences with his lawyer, Judge Mina, and knew what the will
was to contain. The will was read to him by Mr. Legarda. He signed the will and its two copies in
the proper places at the bottom and on the left margin.

The will was short. It could easily be understood by a person in physical distress. It was
reasonable, that is, it was reasonable if we take into account the evident prejudice of the testator
against the husband of Margarita Lopez.

The testator comprehended the manner in which the instrument distributed the property among
the objects of his bounty. His conversations with Judge Mina disclosed an insistence on giving all
of his property to the two persons whom he specified.

On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years, may have been
physically decrepit, may have been weak of intellect, may have suffered a loss of memory, may
have had a guardian, and may have been extremely eccentric, but he still possessed that spark
of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form a fißxed intention and to summon his enfeebled
thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms "testamentary capacity."

15. Aluad v Aluad (G.R. No. 176943; October 17, 2008)

Doctrine: A donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities of a will as required by Article
805 of the NCC.

FACTS:
- Petitioners' mother, Maria Aluad, and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless
spouses Matilde Alua, and Crispin Aluad. Crispin owned six lots and after he died, his wife Matilde
adjudicated the lots to herself. Matilde executed a document entitled "Deed of Donation of Real
Property Inter Vivos" in favor of petitioners' mother Maria covering all the six lots which Matilde
inherited from her husband Crispin. The deed contained a provision “to become effective upon
the death of the DONOR, but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the
present donation shall be deemed rescinded.”
- Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property.

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- Matilde executed a last will and testament, devising lots to Maria, and her "remaining properties"
including Lot No. 674 respondent.
- Matilde and Maria died. Maria’s heirs-herein petitioners filed before the RTC a complaint for
declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676 against
respoindent.
- Respondent contended that the deed of donation was forged and falsified, and if ever said
document does exist, the same was already revoked by Matilde whe she exercised all acts of
dominion over said properties until she sold Lot 676 to defendant and until her death with respect
to the other lots without any opposition from Maria Aluad.

RTC: Ruled that Matilde could not have transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to
respondent, she having previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation.

CA: Reversed the RTC decision. Holding that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis
causa, not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Thus,
it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and had no attestation
clause which is not in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conveyance to petitioner’s mother is a donation mortis causa.

SC RULING: YES. As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners' mother
one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power
in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the death of the
DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the
ownership of the six lots to petitioners' mother during her (Matilde's) lifetime.

The statement in the Deed of Donation reading "anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or
anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all
the parcels of land herein donated " means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and
reserved in her the right to dispose them.

The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but
they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805
of the Civil Code. Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause the execution of
which clause is a requirement separate from the subscription of the will and the affixing of
signatures on the left-hand margins of the pages of the will.

The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not having followed
the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to petitioners' mother. But even assuming
arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674
and 676 was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by
her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that her (Matilde's) will must be
probated.

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16. Gloria v Builders Savings (G.R. No. 202324; June 4, 2018)

Doctrine: Judicial declaration of heirship is not required for an heir to commence an action arising
from a right of their predecessor.

FACTS:
- Spouses Juan and herein petitioner Conchita Gloria are registered owners of a parcel of land
located in Kamuning, Quezon City. Petitioner Maria Lourdes Gloria-Payduan is their daughter.
Juan passed away in 1987.
- Conchita and Lourdes filed before the RTC against respondent Builders Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (Builders Savings), Benildo Biag, and Manuel F. Lorenzo for "declaration of null
and void real estate mortgage, promissory note, cancellation of notation in the transfer certificate
of title, and damages.” Petitioners claimed that Biag duped them into surrendering TCT 35814 to
him under the pretense that Biag would verify the title, which he claimed might have been
fraudulently transferred to another on account of a fire that gutted the Quezon City Registry of
Deeds; Biag instead used the title to mortgage the Kamuning property to respondent Builders
Savings; that Conchita was fraudulently made to sign the subject loan and mortgage documents
by Biag, who deceived Conchita into believing that it was actually Lourdes who requested that
these documents be signed.
- Builders Savings claimed that Maria Lourdes Payduan had neither the capacity to sue nor the
authority and interest to file the case a quo. She was merely an "ampon" or "palaki" of the Spouses
Juan and Conchita Gloria and was not legally adopted by them. Moreover, Conchita neither
signed the verification attached to the complaint nor executed a special power of attorney to
authorize her daughter Maria Lourdes to pursue the case a quo.

RTC: Dismissed petition for lack of merit but granted their motion for reconsideration.

CA: The appeal of respondent was granted. Maria Lourdes did not present any evidence to
establish her rights as heir or prove that Juan had no other heirs who are not parties in this case.
Maria Lourdes could not be considered a real party in interest to institute the action in the court a
quo to nullify the real estate mortgage executed by Conchita absent any proof to show that she
has an interest over the subject property.

ISSUE: Whether or not judicial declaration of heirship is required for an heir to commence an
action arising from a right of their predecessor.

SC RULING: NO. Maria Lourdes was proven to be the daughter of Juan and Conchita. Being the
daughter of the deceased Juan and Conchita, Lourdes has an interest in the subject property as
heir to Juan and co-owner with Conchita. The fact that she was not judicially declared as heir is
of no moment, for, as correctly argued by petitioners, there was no need for a prior declaration of
heirship before heirs may commence an action arising from any right of their predecessor, such
as one for annulment of mortgage. "No judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that
an heir may assert his or her right to the property of the deceased."

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