Chanrob1es Virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Chanrob1es Virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Chanrob1es Virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Graft Law, mere receipt of a gift or any other benefit is enough, even without any
express demand for it. The duration of the possession is not controlling. Important are
the appellant’s words, action and reactions showing acceptance thereof. These are
factual in nature and, absent any arbitrariness, abuse of discretion, or palpable error,
the trial court’s assessment of their presence or absence is generally binding on
appellate review.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Case
On August 28, 1992, the two accused, assisted by their respective lawyers, 7 were
arraigned. Both pleaded not guilty. 8 On April 24, 1998, after full trial, the
Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner of the offense charged, but acquitted his co-
accused.
Issues
"I. That the Sandiganbayan erred in finding that petitioner demanded and received the
envelope with the boodle money; chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"II. That the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting the petitioner on the basis of the lone
testimony of Dr. Feliciano, an admittedly discredited witness;
"III. That petitioner was denied his right to equal protection of the law." 13
Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended)
provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
x x x
"(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage,
or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in
his official capacity has to intervene under the law. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
x x x"
The elements of this offense were summed up in Mejia v. Pamaran, 15 and we restate
them here: (1) the offender is a public officer (2) who requested or received a gift, a
present, a share, a percentage, or a benefit (3) on behalf of the offender or any other
person (4) in connection with a contract or transaction with the government (5) in
which the public officer, in an official capacity under the law, has the right to intervene.
We are not convinced. Section 3(b) of RA 3019 penalizes three distinct acts — (1)
demanding or requesting; (2) receiving; or (3) demanding, requesting and receiving"
any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit for oneself or for any other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the government and any other
party, wherein a public officer in an official capacity has to intervene under the law.
These modes of committing the offense are distinct and different from each other. Proof
of the existence of any of them suffices to warrant conviction. 16 The lack of demand is
immaterial. After all, Section 3(b) of RA 3019 uses the word or between requesting and
receiving.
Averring that the incident in complainant’s clinic was a frame-up, petitioner contends
that there could not have been any payoff, inasmuch as there was no demand. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw library
Like bribery, this crime is usually proved by evidence acquired during an entrapment,
as the giver or briber is usually the only one who can provide direct evidence of the
commission of this crime. Thus, entrapment is resorted to in order to apprehend a
public officer while in the act of obtaining undue benefits. 17 However, we have to
distinguish between entrapment and instigation.
In "instigation," officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure the
accused into committing an offense, which the latter otherwise would not commit and
has no intention of committing. In "entrapment," the criminal intent or design to
commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused, and the law
enforcement officials merely facilitate the commission of the crime. 18
Frame-up, like alibi, is invariably viewed with disfavor because, as a line of defense in
most criminal prosecutions of this nature, it is easily concocted, common or standard.
19
Petitioner denies that he received payoff money from complainant. According to him,
receive, as contemplated in the offense charged, connotes a voluntary act coupled with
knowledge. Hence, where the giving of the money affords the accused no opportunity
either to refuse or to return it to the giver, no punishable offense ensues. 20 Petitioner
claims that the 40 seconds or less that the boodle money was in his hands was merely
a momentary possession that could not prove "receipt," which the law requires for the
offense charged to be consummated. cralawlibrary : red
Furthermore, the Court held in the said case that there must be a clear intention on the
part of the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider it as his or her own
property from then on. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign,
circumstance or act to show acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude
that the crime has been committed. To hold otherwise would encourage unscrupulous
individuals to frame up public officers by simply putting within their physical custody
some gift, money or other property. 23
The duration of the possession is not the controlling element in determining receipt or
acceptance. In the case at bar, petitioner opened the envelope containing the boodle
money, looked inside, closed it and placed the envelope beside him on the table. Such
reaction did not signify refusal or resistance to bribery, especially considering that he
was not supposed to accept any cash from the taxpayer. The proximity of the envelope
relative to petitioner, as testified to by NBI Agent Ragos, also belies petitioner’s
contention that he refused the bribe. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
A person found in possession of a thing taken from the recent execution of a wrongful
act is presumed to be both the taker and the doer of the whole act. 24
"While the Court is reluctant to consider this declaration of the offended party as
satisfactory proof that the accused [therein petitioner] requested or demanded . . . the
sum of P200,000 not only because it was vehemently denied by the accused but
likewise considering the nature and character . . . [or] person of the said offended party
(Exhibit 14 to 18), we are at a loss why in the ensuing event, particularly in the
entrapment laid out by the complainant and the NBI agents, this accused was present
and . . . a brown envelop[e] containing the ‘boodle money’ was retrieved [from him]. . .
.25cralaw:red
Obviously, the anti-graft court did not tag complainant as a discredited witness. It
simply said that his testimony by itself was not sufficient evidence of the commission of
the offense. But, taken together with the other pieces of corroborating evidence, it
established a quantum of evidence strong enough to convict petitioner. While the case
is weakened by the many suits filed for and against complainant, the court a quo did
not say that he was not at all worthy of belief. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
We see no cause to fault the lower court. The assessment of the credibility of a witness
is primarily the function of a trial court, which had the benefit of observing firsthand the
demeanor or deportment of the witness. It is well-settled that this Court will not
reverse the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses in the absence of
arbitrariness, abuse of discretion or palpable error. 26
It is within the discretion of the Sandiganbayan to weigh the evidence presented by the
parties, as well as to accord full faith to those it regards as credible and reject those it
considers perjurious or fabricated. 27
Petitioner further contends that he tested positive for fluorescent powder because the
NBI agents had pressed the envelope to his body.
We are not persuaded. Petitioner failed to ascribe to the NBI agents any ill motive to
deliberately implicate him. No malice was imputed, either, to the chemist who had
examined and found him positive for the chemical; thus, we see no cogent reason to
disbelieve her testimony. In the absence of any controverting evidence, the testimonies
of public officers are given full faith and credence, as they are presumed to have acted
in the regular performance of their official duties. 28
Petitioner asserts that he should be accorded the same treatment and, thus, acquitted
because of his right to the equal protection of the law. After all, the Sandiganbayan
believed the testimony of Buenafe that the latter had not asked for any payoff money;
and he was, thus, cleared of the charge against him.
We disagree. Petitioner alludes to the doctrine that if the conviction of the accused rests
upon the same evidence used to convict the co-accused, the acquittal of the former
should benefit the latter. 29 Such doctrine does not apply to this case. The strongest
pieces of evidence against petitioner were the ones obtained from the entrapment, in
which Buenafe was not involved. Hence, the evidence against petitioner and that
against his co-accused were simply not at par with each other. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
All in all, petitioner failed to show that Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible
error. Quite the contrary, it had acted judiciously and correctly. Hence, this recourse
must fail.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.