FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 187677. April 17, 2013.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT

OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) , petitioner, vs . HON.
ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 105, Quezon City, and SPOUSES WILLIAM AND
REBECCA GENATO , respondents.

DECISION

SERENO , C.J : p

This is an appeal via a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 dated 19 June 2009
assailing the Decision 2 and Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. SP No.
93227 which a rmed the Orders 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 105, Quezon
City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44595. The RTC barred petitioner from presenting evidence to
prove its claim of ownership over the subject property, as the presentation thereof would
constitute a collateral attack on private respondents' title.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 13 July 2001, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), led a Complaint against several
defendants, including private respondents, for the expropriation of several parcels of land
affected by the construction of the EDSA-Quezon Avenue Flyover. 5 Private respondents,
Spouses William and Rebecca Genato, are the registered owners of a piece of land
("subject property") covered by Transfer Certi cate of Title (TCT) No. RT-11603 (383648)
6 and having an area of 460 square meters.

During the pendency of the proceedings, petitioner received a letter dated 14 June
2002 from Engr. Patrick B. Gatan, Project Manager IV of the DPWH-NCR, reporting that the
subject property was "government land and that the transfer certi cate of title of the said
claimant [respondent] . . . is of dubious origin and of fabrication as it encroached or
overlapped on a government property." 7 As a result, petitioner led an Amended
Complaint on 24 June 2002, 8 seeking to limit the coverage of the proceedings to an area
conforming to the findings of the DPWH:
4. To accomplish said project, which is to be undertaken by the
Department of Public Works and Highways [DPWH], it is necessary and urgent for
plaintiff to acquire in fee simple portions of the following parcels of land
belonging to, occupied, possessed, and/or the ownership of which are being
claimed by the defendants, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx

[c] Defendants William O. Genato and Rebecca G. Genato. —

xxx xxx xxx

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 5. The portion of the above properties that are affected by the project
and shaded green in the sketch plan hereto attached and made integral part
hereof as Annex E, consisting of an area of: . . . [c] 460 square meters of the
aforedescribed property registered in the name of defendants spouses William
and Rebecca Genato; . . . . (Emphasis in the original)

On 18 July 2002, petitioner led a Manifestation and Motion 9 to have the subject
property "declared or considered of uncertain ownership or subject to conflicting claims."
In an Order dated 10 December 2002, 1 0 the RTC admitted petitioner's Amended
Complaint, deferred the release to respondents the amount of eighteen million four
hundred thousand pesos (P18,400,000) deposited in the bank, equivalent to the current
zonal valuation of the land, and declared the property as the subject of conflicting claims.
While petitioner was presenting evidence to show that the subject property actually
belonged to the Government, private respondents interposed objections saying that
petitioner was barred from presenting the evidence, as it constituted a collateral attack on
the validity of their TCT No. RT-11603 (383648). The RTC then required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda.
Upon receipt of the Memoranda, the trial court issued on 12 July 2005 an Order 1 1
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court nds that the issue of the
validity of the TCT No. 11603 (383648) can only be raised in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose and not in this instant proceeding. Accordingly,
plaintiff is barred from presenting evidence as they [sic] constitute collateral
attack on the validity of the title to the subject lot in violation of Sec. 48 of P.D.
1529.

On 4 August 2005, petitioner seasonably led a Motion for Reconsideration, 1 2 but

the motion was denied by the RTC in an Order dated 17 November 2005. 1 3
On 4 January 2006, private respondents led a Motion for the payment of just
compensation amounting to twenty million seven hundred thousand pesos (P20,700,000)
and for the release of eighteen million four hundred thousand pesos (P18,400,000)
deposited in the Land Bank-South Harbor Branch as partial payment. 1 4 This Motion
remains pending in the RTC to date.
On 9 February 2006, petitioner led with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 1 5
The appellate court ruled that since the subject property was covered by a Torrens
title, Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529),
necessarily nds signi cance. Thus, it held that the RTC rightly applied Sec. 48.
Accordingly, the CA issued its 29 September 2008 Decision, 1 6 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE , the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The prayer for the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is accordingly DENIED.

On 29 October 2008, petitioner led a Motion for Reconsideration, 1 7 but the motion
was also denied in a Resolution dated 27 April 2009. 1 8
Hence, the instant Petition.
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 A Comment 1 9 on the Petition was led by private respondents on 1 September
2009, and a Reply 2 0 thereto by petitioner on 27 January 2010.
ISSUE
From the foregoing, the sole issue submitted for resolution before this Court is
whether petitioner may be barred from presenting evidence to assail the validity of
respondents' title under TCT No. RT-11603 (383648).
THE COURT'S RULING
Petitioner argues that under Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, if the ownership
of a property to be expropriated is uncertain, the court in the same expropriation
proceeding is also given authority to make a proper adjudication of the matter. Section 9
of Rule 67 reads:
SECTION 9. Uncertain Ownership. Con icting Claims. — If the
ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are con icting claims to any
part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for
the property to be paid to the clerk of the court for the bene t of the persons
adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall
require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the
clerk before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use
or purpose if entry has already been made.

This view is allegedly supported by Republic v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga,

presided formerly by Judge L. Pasicolan 2 1 (Republic) in which the trial court hearing the
expropriation proceeding was also allowed to resolve the issue of ownership.
Petitioner further argues that the original Complaint was amended "precisely to
re ect the fact that herein private respondents, albeit ostensibly appearing as registered
owners, are to be considered as mere claimants of one of the properties subject of the
expropriation." This is the reason why the RTC issued an Order declaring the property
subject of conflicting claims.
Moreover, this being an in rem proceeding, "plaintiff Republic of the Philippines
seeks the relief, both in the original and amended complaints, to transfer to plaintiff the
titles to said parcels of land together with their improvements free from all liens and
encumbrances. For this particular purpose, the expropriation suit is essentially a direct
proceeding." 2 2
Private respondents, on the other hand, invoke Section 48 of P.D. 1529, viz.:
SECTION 48. Certificate Not Subject to Collateral Attack. — A certificate
of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modi ed, or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

It is their contention that by allowing petitioner to present adversarial evidence, the

court is in effect allowing respondents' Torrens title to be collaterally attacked — an action
prohibited by P.D. 1529.
We rule that petitioner may be allowed to present evidence to assert its
ownership over the subject property, but for the sole purpose of determining
who is entitled to just compensation.
I
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 Proper interpretation of Section 9, Rule 67
Proceeding from the principle of jus regalia, the right to eminent domain has always
been considered as a fundamental state power that is inseparable from sovereignty. 2 3 It
is described as the State's inherent power that need not be granted even by the
Constitution, 2 4 and as the government's right to appropriate, in the nature of compulsory
sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. 2 5
Expropriation, or the exercise of the State's right to eminent domain, is proscribed
by the restraints of public use and just compensation. 2 6 It is governed by Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court, which presents procedural guidelines for the court to ensure that due
process is observed and just compensation rightly paid to the private owners.
Indeed, this Court rst had the occasion to interpret Section 9, Rule 67 in the case of
Republic. In addressing the issue of "whether or not the court that hears the expropriation
case has also jurisdiction to determine, in the same proceeding, the issue of ownership of
the land sought to be condemned," the Court answered in the affirmative:
The sole issue in this case, i.e., whether or not the court that hears the
expropriation case has also jurisdiction to determine, in the same proceeding, the
issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned, must be resolved in the
a rmative. That the court is empowered to entertain the con icting claims of
ownership of the condemned or sought to be condemned property and adjudge
the rightful owner thereof, in the same expropriation case, is evident from Section
9 of the Revised Rule 69, which provides:
SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership. Con icting claims. — If the
ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are con icting claims
to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as
compensation for the property to be paid to the clerk of court for the
bene t of the persons adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled
thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums
awarded to either the defendant or the clerk before the plaintiff can enter
upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has
already been made.
In fact, the existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the person or
persons claiming ownership of the properties to be expropriated would not
preclude the commencement of the action nor prevent the court from assuming
jurisdiction thereof. The Rules merely require, in such eventuality, that the entity
exercising the right of eminent domain should state in the complaint that the true
ownership of the property cannot be ascertained or specified with accuracy. 2 7

We arrived at the same conclusion in Republic v. Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc., 28 in

which we held thus:
The trial court should have been guided by Rule 67, Section 9 of the 1997
Rules of Court, which provides thus:

SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership; con icting claims. — If the

ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are con icting claims
to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as
compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the bene t of the
person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the
judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either
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 the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property,
or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made.
Hence, the appellate court erred in a rming the trial court's Order
to award payment of just compensation to the defendants-intervenors.
There is doubt as to the real owner of Lot No. 3080. Despite the fact that
the lot was covered by TCT No. T-61963 and was registered under its name, the
Rural Bank of Kabacan manifested that the owner of the lot was no longer the
bank, but the defendants-intervenors; however, it presented no proof as to the
conveyance thereof. In this regard, we deem it proper to remand this case
to the trial court for the reception of evidence to establish the present
owner of Lot No. 3080 who will be entitled to receive the payment of
just compensation. (Emphases supplied)

However, the authority to resolve ownership should be taken in the proper context.
The discussion in Republic was anchored on the question of who among the respondents
claiming ownership of the property must be indemnified by the Government:
Now, to determine the person who is to be indemni ed for the
expropriation of Lot 6, Block 6, Psd-2017, the court taking cognizance of the
expropriation must necessarily determine if the sale to the Punzalan spouses by
Antonio Feliciano is valid or not. For if valid, said spouses must be the ones to be
paid by the condemnor; but if invalid, the money will be paid to someone else. . . .
. 29

Thus, such ndings of ownership in an expropriation proceeding should not be

construed as nal and binding on the parties. By ling an action for expropriation, the
condemnor (petitioner), merely serves notice that it is taking title to and possession of the
property, and that the defendant is asserting title to or interest in the property, not to prove
a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. 3 0
If at all, this situation is akin to ejectment cases in which a court is temporarily
authorized to determine ownership, if only to determine who is entitled to possession. This
is not conclusive, and it remains open to challenge through proper actions. 3 1 The
consequences of Sec. 9, Rule 67 cannot be avoided, as they are due to the intimate
relationship of the issue of ownership with the claim for the expropriation payment. 3 2
II
Inapplicability of Section 48, P.D. 1529
Verily, our interpretation of Sec. 9, Rule 67 does not run counter to Section 48 of P.D.
1529. Under Sec. 48, collateral attacks on a Torrens title are prohibited. We have explained
the concept in Oño v. Lim, 3 3 to wit:
An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is
to nullify the title, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the title
was decreed. The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such
judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or
collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment
is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.

In several instances, we have considered an Answer praying for the cancellation of

the plaintiff's Torrens title as a form of a collateral attack. 3 4 We have afforded the similar
treatment in a petition questioning the validity of a deed of sale for a registered land, 3 5
and in a reformation of a deed of sale to include areas registered under the name of
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 another party. 3 6 But a resolution on the issue of ownership in a partition case was
deemed neither to be a direct or collateral attack, for "until and unless this issue of co-
ownership is de nitely and nally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of
the disputed properties." 3 7
Here, the attempt of petitioner to present evidence cannot be characterized as an
"attack." It must be emphasized that the objective of the case is to appropriate private
property, and the contest on private respondents' title arose only as an incident to the
issue of whom should be rightly compensated.
Contrary to petitioner's allegations, the Complaint and Amended Complaint cannot
also be considered as a direct attack. The amendment merely limited the coverage of the
expropriation proceedings to the uncontested portion of the subject property. The RTC's
Order declaring the property as subject of con icting claims is a recognition that there are
varying claimants to the sums to be awarded as just compensation. This serves as an
authority for the court to conduct a limited inquiry on the property's ownership.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review on Certiorari and the
prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93227, as well as the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 105, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44595, are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to the RTC to hear the issue of ownership for the
purpose of just compensation.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 34-76.

2.Id. at 22-32; CA Decision dated 29 September 2008, penned by Associate Justice Monina
Arevalo-Zenarosa and concurred in by Associate Justices Regalado Maambong and
Marlene Gonzales-Sison.
3.Id. at 8-10, CA Resolution dated 27 April 2009, penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-
Zenarosa and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of
this Court) and Marlene Gonzales-Sison.
4.Id. at 115-118, 125-126; RTC Orders dated 12 July 2005 and 17 November 2005, penned by
Presiding Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad.
5.Id. at 77-82.
6.Id. at 183-184.
7.Id. at 83.

8.Id. at 48-49, cited in the Petition for Review.

9.Id. at 85-88.
10.Id. at 91-96.
11.Id. at 115-118.
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 12.Id. at 120-124.

13.Id. at 125-126.
14.Id. at 128-130.
15.Id. at 132-162.
16.Id. at 163-172.
17.Id. at 174-180.

18.Id. at 187-189.
19.Id. at 198-213.
20.Id. at 240-255.
21.Id. at 242-245; Reply dated 26 January 2010; 144 Phil. 643; 648-650 (1970).

22.Id. at 65; Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 19 June 2009.

23.Moday v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1057, 1062 (1997); Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus, 40
Phil. 550, 559 (1919).

24.Republic v. Tagle, 359 Phil. 892, 903 (1998).

25.Moday v. Court of Appeals, supra.
26.Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 443 Phil. 603, 610 (2003).
27.Supra note 21, at 649.

28.G.R. No. 185124, 25 January 2012, 664 SCRA 233, 251-252.

29.Id.
30.Republic v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Luis Santos, 433 Phil. 106, 118-119 (2002).
31.Refugia v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 982, 1006 (1996); Sps. Padilla v. Velasco, G.R. No.
169956, 19 January 2009, 576 SCRA 219, 229.
32.Heirs of Mario Pacres v. Heirs of Cecilia Ygoña, G.R. No. 174719, 5 May 2010, 620 SCRA
213, 230-231.
33.G.R. No. 154270, 9 March 2010, 614 SCRA 514, 521.
34.Cimafranca v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 231 Phil. 559 (1987); Natalia Realty Corp. v.
Valdez, 255 Phil. 510 (1989); Magay v. Estiandan, 162 Phil. 586 (1976); Co v. CA, 274
Phil. 108, 116 (1991).
35.Vicente v. Avera, G.R. No. 169970, 20 January 2009, 576 SCRA 634; Zaragoza v. Court of
Appeals, 395 Phil. 516 (2000).
36.Toyota Motors Philippines Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102881, 7 December 1992,
216 SCRA 236.
37.Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., G.R. No. 165427, 21 March 2011, 645 SCRA 677.

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