CIA Assessment on Surviving Secondary

Screening at Airports While Maintaining Cover

WikiLeaks release: December 21, 2014

Keywords: CIA, airport, screening, passport, visa, Schengen, EU, customs,

security, border, Hungary, Bahrain, Mauritius, Bulgaria, Japan, Russia,
Chile, Czech, Zambia, Pakistan, South Africa, Venezuela, Mexico,
Kurdish, Turkish, Iraq, Israel, Egypt, Syria
Restraint: SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN (originator controlled)/(no foreign
nationals)
Title: Surviving Secondary: An Identity Threat Assessment of Secondary
Screening Procedures at International Airports
Date: September 2011
Organisation: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Author: CHECKPOINT Identity and Travel Intelligence Program, from the
Identity Intelligence Center (i2c) within the Directorate of Science and
Technology
Link: http://wikileaks.org/cia-travel
Pages: 14
Description
This is a secret document produced by the CIA's CHECKPOINT Identity and Travel Intelligence Program
to explain and advise CIA operatives on how to deal with secondary screening at airports, as they travel
to and from covert CIA operations using false ID, including into and out of Europe. The document details
specific examples of operatives being stopped under secondary screening at various ariports around the
world; how and why the person was stopped and offers advice on how to deal with such circumstances
and minimise the risks if stopped to continue maintaining cover. The document was created for
distribution within the organisation and other officials who hold appropriate clearances at Executive
Branch Departments/Agencies of the US Government. The document's overarching predominant advice
is to maintain cover, "no matter what".
SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

CL BY: 2313665
CL REASON: 1.4(c), (d)
DECL ON: 20360926
DRV FROM: LIA s-06, Multiple Sources

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Introduction (U)

Secondary screening—a potentially lengthy and detailed look by airport officials at

passengers not passing initial scrutiny—can significantly stress the identities of
operational travelers. Border-control officers at international airports use primary screening
to quickly evaluate arriving passengers and identify those that may not be admissible, such as
illegal immigrants, narcotics traffickers and other criminals, terrorists, or intelligence officers.
For countries with authoritarian regimes, airport officials may also want to deny entry to
foreign political activists or nongovernmental organization (NGO) officials. Security or customs
inspectors can refer travelers to secondary when they find weapons, drugs, or other contraband
on their persons or in their baggage. (C//NF)

Referral to secondary screening can occur if irregularities or questions arise during

any stage of airport processing—immigration, customs, or security—and regardless
of whether the traveler is arriving, in transit, or departing. Officials may also randomly
select travelers. The resulting secondary screening can involve in-depth and lengthy
questioning, intrusive searches of personal belongings, cross-checks against external
databases, and collection of biometrics—all of which focus significant scrutiny on an operational
traveler. (S//NF)

This study examines triggers for secondary selection used at various international airports, the
range of subsequent scrutiny of identity, and traveler responses that are most likely to pass
secondary inspection with cover intact. For the study, CHECKPOINT researched available
all-source intelligence reporting but also incorporated a number of secondary screening
experiences from operational travelers. The information cut-off date is 31 May 2010. (S//NF)

NOTE: Although the information available is sufficient to provide general insights into the
secondary screening criteria and procedures that travelers may experience at foreign airports,
it is insufficiently detailed, comprehensive, and timely to provide tactical intelligence
for operational travelers using nonofficial cover. Moreover, the examples cited in the study
illustrate the range of potential experiences but do not evaluate specific airports. (S//NF)

This finished intelligence product contains reporting that carries the ORCON dissemination
control but has been pre-approved by the originator for distribution to officials who hold
appropriate clearances at Executive Branch Departments/Agencies of the US Government.
Sharing this product with other Executive Branch Departments/Agencies of the US Government
does not require contacting CHECKPOINT or reporting originators before dissemination.
Recipients must obtain originator approval prior to written or verbal communication of any portion
of this product to State, Local, Tribal, and Private Entities and for all other uses not pre-approved
by the originator. (U//FOUO)

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Pre-Arrival Screening information. Countries requiring advance

Although selection for secondary passenger information include Australia,
screening frequently occurs while Canada, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, India,
travelers are at the airport answering Japan, Mexico, South Korea, South Africa,
questions from immigration officers, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, the
authorities may also preselect passengers United Kingdom, and the United States. PNR
because of some flags in their visa information comes from airline reservation
applications or airline records. Many systems and contains personal information
countries issue visas upon arrival, however, such as credit card number, e-mail address,
nearly 50 countries require US tourist- and seating preference. (U)
passport holders to submit visa applications Security services lacking APIS or PNR
before travel. For holders of US diplomatic information may have other arrangements to
or official passports, the number of countries receive passenger manifests ahead of time.
requiring visas before arrival rises to over For example, the Airport Police Intelligence
120. Security and intelligence services Brigade (BIPA) of the Chilean Investigative
participating in vetting visa applications, either Police does not routinely obtain advance
comprehensively or on an ad hoc basis, passenger manifests but can request the
include those of Georgia, Libya, Pakistan, information from airlines on an ad hoc basis
Russia, Syria, and Uzbekistan. (S//OC/NF) to search for targets of interest. Strict privacy
Available reporting does not detail the laws covering Danish citizens extend to all
criteria with which security services passengers traveling through Copenhagen
screen visa applications, but confirmed airport such that the Danish Police
or suspected government or military Intelligence Service (PET) cannot legally
affiliation almost certainly raises the obtain routine access to flight manifests.
traveler’s profile. Applications can be However, if one of PET’s four cooperative
extensive to assist with the vetting process for airline contacts is on duty, the service can
immigration authorities and the intelligence unofficially request a search on a specific
and security services. For example, Russia’s name, according to August 2007 liaison
visa application form requires employer name, reporting. (S//OC/NF)
address, telephone number, supervisor’s Airport Primary Screening
full name, and applicant’s position for the
current and past two places of employment. In primary inspections, immigration inspectors
The application also requires military dates examine passports and visas, if visas are
of service, rank, occupation, specialized required, for validity and authenticity and to
skills; experience with nuclear, biological, or verify individuals’ identities. They frequently
chemical activities; and all professional, civil, query watch lists or other databases for
and charitable organizations of which the immigration violations, criminal records, or
applicant is or was a member, contributed to, national security concerns and ask basic
or worked with. (S//OC/NF) questions pertinent to admissibility. The entire
process usually lasts no more than a few
Immigration officials may also receive minutes to enable airports to keep up with the
advance information on arriving passengers flow of incoming travelers. If there is a watch-
from airlines through an advance passenger list match or inspectors decide that travel
information system (APIS) or passenger documents are suspect or have some reason
name records (PNRs). APIS information, to doubt a passenger’s stated reason for
which enables an advance check against travel, they refer the passenger to secondary
watch lists, includes passenger name, date screening. Officials at US airports on average
of birth, sex, passport details, and contact

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send about one in 30 foreign tourists and Watch-list Hit

business travelers to secondary although Border-control officials in many countries
particular airports may impose higher use watch lists—national, regional, and
percentages for certain groups. For example, international—to screen travelers. For
US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) example, the Schengen Information System
agents in 2007 imposed secondary screening (SIS), an EU-wide database, contains one
on 20 percent of Cubans arriving at Miami million alerts on persons wanted by the police,
International Airport. Available reporting does subject to entry bans, or missing. Most SIS
not indicate secondary selection percentages entries deal with other immigration issues
for foreign airports. (U) such as visa denials or expulsions, and only
2.5 percent are criminal-related. Elsewhere,
With the exception of Israel’s Ben Gurion the watch list focus may be different. For
airport and a few others, immigration example, the overwhelming majority of names
inspectors conducting primary screenings on the Directorate General for Immigration
generally lack the time and tools to conduct (DGI) watch list at Soekarno-Hatta
in-depth examination of travelers’ bona fides. International Airport in Jakarta, Indonesia, are
EU norms stipulate that passport checks nationals suspected of corruption or financial
take no longer than 20 seconds per traveler. crimes. (S//OC/NF)
Dutch Royal Military Police (KMAR) officers
at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam are under
instruction to spend no more than 10 seconds Good Preparation Is Key (U)
evaluating each passport although few Travelers can minimize the possibility of sec-
officers achieve this speed, according to July ondary by knowing how to prepare for and
2009 liaison reporting. (S//OC/NF) navigate the primary inspection and by avoiding
to the extent possible the various triggers for
Triggers for Secondary Screening secondary. (S//OC/NF)

Referral to secondary screening can occur

Watch lists maintained by security services
for concrete reasons, such as a watch-
can also include names of confirmed or
list match or discovery of contraband,
suspected intelligence officers, according to
because of random selection, or because
reporting from several clandestine sources
the inspector suspects that something about
and the US Embassy in Dushanbe.
the traveler is not right. According to the
CBP, inconsistencies or conflicts identified • Austria’s Federal Office for the Protection
in the interview or documentation, including of the Constitution and Counterterrorism
catching the person in a false statement, (BVT) and Singapore’s Internal Security
unreasonable explanation for travel, or Department (ISD) list Russian intelligence
anomalies in ticketing or reservations will officers.
prompt a referral to secondary screening.
Travelers from specific countries arriving at • Colombia’s Administrative Department
international airports are more likely to receive of Security (DAS) lists Iranian and
heightened scrutiny, and referral to secondary Venezuelan intelligence officers.
screening, than other travelers. Behavior,
dress, and demeanor also factor into an • Tajikistan’s State Committee for National
inspector’s decision. However, no traveler is Security (GKNB) lists intelligence officers
immune from the possibility of secondary— belonging to unidentified Western
many foreign airports have an administrative countries. (S//OC/NF)
requirement for a minimum number of random Available reporting does not confirm the
selections. (U) presence of names of suspected or confirmed

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US intelligence officers on foreign watch traveling to Turkey. Possession of three

lists; however, this probably should be passports––Iranian, Israeli, and Italian––
assumed. Hostile and probably even allied prompted the apprehension in Frankfurt in
services seek to identify US and other foreign January 2008 of an Iranian citizen. Inspectors
intelligence officers. (S//NF) at Baghdad International Airport specifically
look for appropriate customs and immigration
Discovery of Contraband stamps to ensure travelers are not using
Security and customs officials have wide multiple passports. (S//OC/NF)
latitude to search passengers and their
checked and carry-on baggage for weapons, Immigration inspectors may look for evidence
drugs, and contraband. Although drugs are of fraud even with e-passports. Media
a common target of customs inspectors, reports indicate that computer researchers
the definition of contraband is country- have inserted fraudulent digital images into
dependent. For example, travelers at Imam e-passports. Although falsified e-passports
Khomeini Airport in Tehran, Iran, found with will not have the correct digital signature,
videos or photographs of protests or other inspectors may not detect the fraud if the
opposition activity are directed to a secondary passports are from countries that do not
questioning room where they undergo full participate in the International Civil Aviation
searches of laptop computers and other Organization’s Public Key Directory (ICAO
electronics. Bahrain International Airport PKD). Only 15 of over 60 e-passport-issuing
security officials refer to secondary screening countries belong to the PKD program, as of
travelers carrying unusual electronic December 2010. (U)
equipment. (S//OC/NF)
Suspicious Signs
Passport Irregularity
Problems with passports, the main travel Airport inspectors can also refer to secondary
document worldwide, are a frequent cause of screening individuals who arouse suspicion
referral to secondary. Fraudulent passports, but for whom there is no substantive cause
possession of multiple passports, and for denying entry. An airport screening
passports containing data in conflict with visas procedures manual published for internal
may prompt secondary scrutiny. Most users of use in 2004 by International Consultants on
fraudulent documents seeking to enter Europe Targeted Security (ICTS) International, an
are illegal migrants from poor countries. For Israeli-founded company and world leader
example, the majority of counterfeit passports in profiling techniques, lists suspicious signs
uncovered in Ireland are from Brazil, China, in passenger behavior, documentation,
and Romania. Officials also focus on tickets, or baggage. Although dated, the ICTS
fraudulent use of genuine passports. Falsified guidelines probably are typical and remain
travel documents intercepted at Santiago valid. (S//NF)
International Airport in Chile are usually
Behavior
genuine Bolivian, Colombian, and Peruvian
Foreign airports use cameras and undercover
passports but with counterfeit EU or US visas.
officers to identify passengers displaying
Illegal travelers may carry stolen passports
unusually nervous behavior. Physiological
and attempt to pass themselves off as the
signs of nervousness include shaking or
person in the photograph. (S//OC/NF)
trembling hands, rapid breathing for no
The Turkish National Intelligence Organization apparent reason, cold sweats, pulsating
(TNIO) assesses that possession of multiple carotid arteries, a flushed face, and avoidance
passports is indicative of an individual of eye contact.
attempting to obscure their real reason for

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ICTS Profiling Guidelines (U)

Behavior
• Unusual nervousness or anxiety by passenger or those accompanying the passenger.
• Secret contact with other passengers lacking apparent ties.
• Appearance of lying or withholding information.

Passport
• Lack of familiarity with passport entries (biographic page, previous travel).
• Stamps or visas from a terrorism-sponsoring country.
• Inability to speak the language of the passport-issuing country.

Ticket
• Unusual itinerary.
• Purchase manner unusual to the place of issue.
• Purchase or itinerary change within 24 hours of the scheduled flight.

Baggage
• Baggage or contents inconsistent with the passenger’s appearance, profession, or ticket class.
• Contents inconsistent with passenger’s description of contents.
• Amount of baggage unusual for the ticketed itinerary. (S//OC/NF)

Source: ICTS International NV CSA Tasks, Nov 04, Confidential Proprietary

• At Budapest’s Ferihegy Airport in signs of nervousness or other suspicious

Hungary, security officers use closed- behavior. (S//OC/NF)
circuit television (CCTV) and one-way
mirrors to monitor passengers for signs of Suspicious behavior includes continuously
nervousness. switching lines or studying security
procedures. Officials at Abidjan International
• The Bahrain National Security Agency Airport in Cote d’Ivoire noticed a male
(BNSA) deploys undercover officers in passenger frequently switching lines to
the arrivals lounge of Bahrain Airport to avoid processing at a particular booth and
actively look for travelers who appear to referred the traveler to secondary screening.
be nervous. If officials at Narita Airport in Tokyo, Japan,
notice someone who appears to be studying
• Officers of the National Security Service the customs inspection process, they assume
(NSS) in Mauritius use video cameras to that someone in that group of passengers
observe arriving passengers as they exit must be attempting to smuggle drugs or other
the aircraft and retrieve their baggage, contraband and intensify their inspection
zooming on individuals’ faces to study efforts. (S//OC/NF)
their expressions.
Country of Origin
• During passenger arrival procedures at Immigration and customs officials at various
Burgas International Airport in Bulgaria, airports associate specific countries with
multiple border police officials, including at illegal immigration, terrorism, or drugs and
least one officer behind the passengers at are more likely to refer those travelers to
passport control, monitor passengers for secondary screening. (U)

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Travel Pattern secondary interviews. Zambian immigration

A travel history that indicates possible officers suspect that a pattern of short-stint
association with narcotrafficking, Islamic trips between Zambia, Pakistan, and
extremism, or illegal immigration can prompt a South Africa indicates possible drug
referral to secondary. A review of clandestine smuggling. (S//OC/NF)
reporting reveals examples of what various
countries consider to be suspicious. The Ticket and Baggage
Chilean Investigative Police (PICH) considers Ticket purchase anomalies can result in
travel originating in East Asia with multiple a referral to secondary. Czech Airlines
stops as potentially suspicious. The Gambian (CSA), the primary screening authority for
National Intelligence Agency (NIA) considers passengers departing Ruzyne Airport in
frequent travel to Nigeria and Guinea-Bissau Prague focus on reservation details such as
as suspicious. Israel’s security personnel cash payment, ticket purchased at the airport
focus on frequent travel to Islamic countries. or on the travel date or the day before, one-
Venezuela’s Office of National Identification way travel, and lack of checked baggage. For
and Foreign Status (ONIDEX) flags foreign example, CSA preselected a Nigerian national
travelers who travel to Venezuela five or with one-way ticket and no checked baggage
more times a month for subsequent in July 2009 for secondary screening,

Area of
Airport Travelers’ Countries of Origin
Concern

Western Africa; portions of Eastern Europe;

Portela International Airport,
former Portuguese colonies of Angola, Brazil,
Lisbon, Portugal
Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique
Illegal
Simon Bolivar Airport,
Immigration Cuba
Caracas, Venezuela

Soekarno-Hatta International
Afghanistan and Iran
Airport, Jakarta, Indonesia

Eleftherios Venizelos Airport,

Egypt, Iran, and Iraq
Athens, Greece

Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran,

Terrorism Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Sri Lanka

Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and the

Saudi Arabia (various)
Palestinian territories

Eleftherios Venizelos Airport, Afghanistan, India, the Netherlands, and

Athens, Greece Pakistan
Drug
Narita Airport, Tokyo, Japan Amsterdam and Bangkok
Trafficking
Seychelles Airport, Victoria,
Nigeria
Seychelles

This table is SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN.

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according to a Czech Airlines official. The • Camera quality not matching the traveler’s
South African Immigration Liaison (SAIL) team profile or camera memory card insufficient
at Johannesburg airport examines departing for a lengthy tourist trip. (S//OC/NF)
travelers for one-way tickets, same-day ticket
purchase, ignorance of final destination, Other Factors
or travel rationales that do not appear to A review of clandestine reports suggests
be bona fide, the US Embassy in Pretoria that a passenger’s language capability, age,
reported. A Dutch Government investigation appearance, or background may all factor
of the failed 2009 Christmas Day bombing into a security official’s decision to refer the
concluded that the suspect should have been traveler to secondary.
sent to secondary screening because of his • In an operation to screen for Hizballah
cash ticket payment, ticket issuance in a third members traveling from Venezuela, the
country, and lack of baggage. (S//OC/NF) Mexican Center for Investigation and
April 2007 reporting resulting from a liaison National Security (CISEN) planned to take
exchange with the Hungarian Special Service into secondary screening Venezuelan
for National Security (SSNS) provides passport holders without a mastery of
insights into factors considered by officers at Spanish.
Ferihegy airport in Budapest, Hungary when • To identify operatives or sympathizers
examining tickets. Officers check whether of the Kongra Gel (KGK, formerly PKK),
the traveler used a business-class ticket for Kurdish passengers with a Turkish or
tourist travel, whether the ticket fare code Iranian accent arriving at Irbil airport in
represents a government or military discount, Iraq are automatically sent to secondary.
or whether a government travel agency
booked the ticket. Hotel and car reservations • Security personnel at Ben Gurion
are similarly examined for unusual discounts Airport in Tel Aviv, Israel, commonly
or government affiliation. (S//OC/NF) refer military-aged males traveling alone
with backpacks to secondary screening,
An unexplained lack of baggage probably regardless of their nationality or skin color.
would raise suspicions. SSNS officers
conducting baggage inspection at Ferihegy • Salvadoran security services identified
airport may also further investigate a a suspected Venezuelan Government
passenger if they found: courier on the basis of a military style
haircut, physical fitness, casual dress, and
• An amount of baggage inappropriate for little baggage.
the length of stay
• Japanese customs officials pay careful
• Multiple new items, such as alarm clocks attention to single travelers, especially
or notebooks, in baggage. young Westerners, because they may be
• Carelessly packed baggage when drug couriers.
passenger is purportedly an experienced • Chilean Investigative Police (PICH)
business traveler. officers pay close attention to male
• Unopened and unmarked maps, travelers from China, particularly those
guidebooks, or other literature. Maps of between the ages of 16 to 28 because of
unrelated cities in baggage for a purported illegal immigration concerns.
tourist traveler. • Egyptian security officials at Cairo airport
regularly select visitors of certain ethnic

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or work backgrounds for secondary undergo a wait, inspectors conduct “soft” or

questioning to ascertain the nature of “hard” secondary processing. Soft secondary,
their business. US-Arabs, particularly which is usually brief, is normally directed at
US-Egyptians, garner a high amount of legitimate travelers who require additional
scrutiny. Other backgrounds attracting processing, such as travelers arriving with
increased scrutiny include Christian- immigrant visas. Inspectors most likely
Arabs or Jews, human rights or other conduct additional database checks on the
humanitarian workers, and individuals with travelers’ names, dates and places of birth,
advanced scientific degrees. (S//OC/NF) and passport numbers and may search the
travelers’ personal belongings and baggage.
Random Selection Failure to pass soft secondary or suspicion
Even if operational travelers do everything on the part of the inspector that criminality
correctly, the possibility remains that is involved will invoke hard secondary. In
airport officials will select them for extreme cases, hard secondary screening can
secondary screening. The Department of involve a multi-hour, in-depth interrogation
Homeland Security (DHS) estimates that with forensics-level examination of personal
about 12 percent of US-bound passengers electronics, detailed inspection of personal
are randomly selected for additional screening effects, and use of external databases to
at overseas airports. Random selection corroborate traveler stories. (S//OC/NF)
is a significant component of the security
measures employed by the US Transportation Airport authorities generally use their most
Security Administration (TSA). (U) experienced inspectors or intelligence
personnel to conduct secondary inspections.
Airport officials may also randomly select For example, a small cadre of experienced
travelers for the purpose of extorting bribes. interviewers from the Police Intelligence
April 2010 clandestine reporting from a source Prefecture of the Chilean Investigative Police
with secondhand access indicates that the conducts secondary inspection at Santiago
manager of the Mogadishu International
Airport in Somalia made a habit of selecting Secondary Screening in Syria (U)
at least one passenger from each flight
A Syrian airport officer removed a US
for secondary inspection, accusing the
businessman from the immigration line at
passenger of illegal activity, and forcing the
Aleppo International Airport and questioned the
passenger to pay a bribe for release. Although businessman in secondary for approximately
official passport holders at Chittagong airport one hour. The officer explained the need to
in Bangladesh receive expedited processing obtain additional information as standard
and minimal scrutiny, tourist-passport procedure for all US citizens. Although
holders are frequently subject to secondary other officials examined the businessman’s
questioning lasting an hour until a $50 bribe is passport and mobile telephone, the airport
paid. (S//OC/NF) officer questioned the businessman on his
Arabic-language proficiency, reason for
Secondary Screening traveling to Syria, identities of those with
whom the businessman planned to meet,
The combination of procedures available the businessman’s employment with an
in secondary, a stressful experience emphasis on whether he was an employee
for any traveler, may pose a significant or owner, where the US passport was issued,
and whether someone was meeting the
strain on an operational traveler’s ability
businessman at the airport. Syrian officials also
to maintain cover. Individuals singled
demanded that the businessman telephone his
out during primary inspection are sent to Syrian point of contact and asked the contact
a secondary holding area. After travelers the same questions. (S//OC/NF)

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International Airport. Some officers have of access to their embassy or to other

specific regional and cultural knowledge, outside assistance. (S//OC/NF)
particularly on Peru and Bolivia, which they
can bring to bear in verifying interviewees’ Lengthy secondary interrogation provides
bona fides. At the Sri Lanka airport, only time for security officials to verify or refute
the Sri Lankan Immigration and Emigration the traveler’s story and raises the pressure
Department’s chief immigration officer and the on passengers attempting to hide illegal
duty officer manager can conduct secondary behavior. Officers can use the time to
interviews. Directorate for Border Security and consult external sources, collect additional
Immigration (Direction des Frontieres et des information, and conduct an in-depth search
Etrangers, DEF) officers from the intelligence of passengers and their baggage. (S//NF)
unit, not regular immigration officers, staff Verification of Travelers’ Stories
secondary interrogation areas at Tunisian As part of their investigation of travelers,
airports. (S//OC/NF) officials can telephone their contacts. At
Inspectors focus on body language during Ambouli airport in Djibouti, the senior
questioning. The Hungarian National Security immigration officer’s secondary investigation
Office (NSO) officers conducting secondary of a suspect traveler included telephoning
screening at Budapest’s Ferihegy Airport the traveler’s sponsor. Officials at the
read the body language, behavior, and Tripoli airport scrutinized 21 males with a
mannerisms of those being interrogated specific given name who entered Libya from
to conclude if they are lying or withholding Tunisia, making telephone calls to verify their
information. During interrogations, officers information. (S//OC/NF)
question travelers on their travel reasons and Officials can also access national and
arrangements to see if they appear plausible. international databases and the Internet.
They also examine baggage, tickets, and Immigration databases at many ports
reservations. The Chilean Investigative Police of entry allow border officials to retrieve
trains its secondary interviewers to look for previous travel to the country as part of
nonverbal cues during interviews in addition their investigation. For example, Brazilian
to evaluating general appearance, clothing, Federal Police (DPF) officers conducting
and carry-on effects. If travelers at Irbil airport secondary screenings at Guarulhos Airport
in Iraq are deemed evasive, screeners return in Sao Paulo can access travelers’ travel
them to their city of origin. (S//OC/NF) histories. Chilean Investigative Police (PICH)
Travelers can legally be held in secondary inspectors conducting secondary screenings
screening for hours, if not longer. Officials conduct real-time searches of Interpol
can detain travelers in secondary screening records by name, date of birth, or passport
at the Tbilisi International Airport in Georgia number. Estonian Border Guard Service
for up to three hours. Turkey can hold (BGS) officers access the Internet to locate
foreigners in secondary screenings for up hotels, conferences, or companies identified
to 24 hours. Indian authorities in January by passengers to confirm or discredit their
2011 held a Chinese national at New Delhi story. Internet access also allows airport
airport for 36 hours, according to media security officials to examine travelers’ social
reporting. The Brazilian Federal Police and business network accounts to confirm
(DPF) can detain travelers at Sao Paulo’s that their Web presence corresponds with
Guarulhos International Airport for up to 48 their persona. For example, Foursquare and
hours. Travelers undergoing secondary Linked-In are business equivalents to the
inspection most likely have no right Facebook social network. Security officials
might also expect a sales or marketing

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traveler to have a Twitter account. The working to obtain fingerprint readers for use
absence of such business-related Web in secondary with repatriated deportees and
accounts probably would raise a business other travelers of interest, primarily those
traveler’s profile with officials. (S//OC/NF) suspected of association with organized crime
or Central American gangs. (S//OC/NF)
Collection of Additional Data
Officials can collect additional biographic or In-depth Search of Belongings
travel data to flesh out the traveler’s story. Customs officials conducting secondary
In July 2009, airport officials in Shiraz, Iran, screening at Narita Airport in Tokyo, Japan,
used a screening questionnaire in secondary may ask individuals to remove all items
screening to collect detailed information on from their accompanying baggage for
US-Iranians holding dual nationality. An officer closer examination. Secondary screening
verbally translated the questionnaire for the by immigration officials at Bole International
non-Farsi speaking travelers, transcribing Airport in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia includes an
the responses in Farsi onto the questionnaire. examination of pocket litter. (S//OC/NF)
Required information included name, date
and place of birth, current address, length Inspections can include examining belongings
of time living there, other addresses, places for traces of explosives. At Ben Gurion
traveled, telephone number, reason for living airport in Israel, the secondary screening
in the United States, occupation, reason room contains trace-detection equipment
for visiting Iran, field of study (for students), for explosive residue; tools for dismantling
address in Iran, name and telephone number passengers’ personal items for inspection,
of host, the host’s relation to the traveler, particularly items unfamiliar to security
and other areas to be visited. Tehran airport officers; and a disrobing area, divided by
security personnel also request that visiting privacy curtains, to conduct strip searches of
US-Iranians log into their personal e-mail individuals, if necessary. (S//NF)
accounts and the officers then review Officials can copy or confiscate a traveler’s
the contacts and types of e-mails in the personal electronics. Ireland’s Garda can
accounts. (S//NF) image or copy electronic devices, including
Officials can collect fingerprints or other telephones, once individuals are taken into
biometrics, and determine if the passenger secondary screening. Russian customs
has a past record. In secondary inspection agents at Sheremetyevo airport in Moscow
at Singapore airport, officials fingerprint and confiscated without explanation a laptop
photograph suspect individuals and run computer, thumb drive, and removable hard
queries against the Biometrics Database for drive belonging to a Department of Energy
Immigration Clearance (BDIC). The database official. (S//OC/NF)
contains 10 fingerprints for previously
deported expellees and other criminals.
In addition to using fingerprints to identify
immigration offenders who attempt to re-enter
Singapore using different identities, in early Personal Electronics (U)
2009, the BDIC system also incorporated Smart phones, iPods, and MP3 players, can
face-recognition capabilities to allow pose a vulnerability to alias travel because of
Singapore Immigration and Customs Agency their requirement for subscriptions. If border-
(ICA) officers to match travelers against control officials can establish a link between
photographic images of black-listed persons. the device and the traveler’s true name,
According to August 2009 clandestine this could present a difficulty for someone
traveling in alias. (S//OC/NF)
reporting, the Salvadoran Government is

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Secondary

Dealing with Secondary • Exhibit psychosomatic behavior such as

swallowing, lip biting, perspiring, deep
Consistent, well-rehearsed, and plausible breathing, frequent clothing adjustments,
cover is important for avoiding secondary or lint picking.
selection and critical for surviving it. A
frequent operational CIA traveler to Asia • Qualify sentence meanings with words
and Europe advises that the most effective like “typically,” “normally,” “often,” “maybe,”
prevention of secondary is to have simple and or “almost” or phrases like “to be honest,”
plausible answers to the two most frequently “the truth is,” or “swear to God.”
asked questions, “Why are you here,” and
“Where are you staying.” Travelers should • Provide overly specific responses. (U)
also ensure before traveling that everything Travelers who avoid providing
that officials can use to examine their bona unnecessary details probably shorten
fides—passports, travel history, baggage, secondary interviews. May 2009 FBI
personal electronics, pocket litter, hotel reporting indicates that a Chinese network
reservations, Web presence—is consistent security company advises its employees in
with their covers. (S//OC/NF) secondary to avoid appearing nervous,
Mental preparation almost certainly helps keep answers simple, and not volunteer
travelers pass secondary scrutiny. Although additional information, such as details on US
a certain degree of nervousness is expected, contacts. (S//NF)
persistent indications of deceptive behavior
will almost certainly extend the secondary
interview. According to a financial forensics
expert in the commercial sector, deceptive
persons:

• Allow a significant pause between a

question and the response, or use
delaying sounds, like “ah” or “um.”

The Importance of Maintaining Cover––No Matter What (S//NF)

Even when the traveler does everything right, the best protection during secondary screening is to
be well-prepared with a cover story, according to an experienced CIA traveler. In one incident during
transit of a European airport in the early morning, security officials selected a CIA officer for secondary
screening. Although the officials gave no reason, overly casual dress inconsistent with being a
diplomatic-passport holder may have prompted the referral. When officials swiped the officer’s bag
for traces of explosives, it tested positive, despite the officer’s extensive precautions. In response
to questioning, the CIA officer gave the cover story that he had been in counterterrorism training in
Washington, DC. Although language difficulties led the local security officials to conclude that the
traveler was being evasive and had trained in a terrorist camp, the CIA officer consistently maintained
his cover story. Eventually, the security officials allowed him to rebook his flight and continue on his
way. (S//OC/NF)

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