THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE IN

HEGEL'S SYSTEM

The Philo..opby of Nature has beeD dlscredit~d by maDy

contemporary pbilosophers as spurious. The oDly genuine
knowledge of nature they aver is to be had from the natural
sciences and any speculatlon on the part of the pbllosopher
about Nature or the wotld in general would fall outsif . e
proper province of philosopby. Sucb a view itself presu es
a conception of tbe nature of reallty wbieh requires de ence.
lt is a coneeptioD for wbleb DO evldence can be obtained from
the natural sdences - tbougb it is, for the most part. presup·
posed also by the seientist - but if the philosophers who main-
tain it were to attempt to defend lt they would be forced to
embark upoD just such a transgression of tb~ alleged limit•
of their subject as tbey are tbemselves at palns to condemn.
Y et unless the view o( reality whieb they presuppose can be
substaDtiated thelr argumeDt agaln.s t the Phllosophy o( Nature
merits DO conolderation, and In the followlng dtscussion o!
Hegel's pbilosophy 1 inteDd to ignore 1t and to allow those
argumeDts to stand by wblcb he held that he bad dealt with
and disposed of that view of the real on the basis of whkh
bis pbllosopby is nowadays frequently ruled out of court. My
object in tbls paper u to consider Hegel's tbeory from bis own
polnt o( vlew and to auggest an interpretation of lt wblch 1
believe lo be at least Dear to what he himself intended and which
will remove an interna) contradiction from bis philosophy
that has been alleged even by those who have been most in
agreement wilh his teaching.
The Encgclopadie det Philosophischen Wiuenschaften
contalns what is rlghtly called the system of Hegel's phi-
Josophy, bis otber treatises belng, in tbe main, more detailed
devclopments of certain sections of the Encgclopadit. Por hlm
tbe body of phllosophical knowledge consists of three main
divisions. Logic, Nature-p.hilosophy and the Pbilosophy of
Spirlt, forming the supreme triad of tbe Dlalectlc and conti-
nuous with each olher in the dialectical movement o( thought.
r 2131
2li Erro/ E. Harris

Tbe Pbllosopby of Nalure, bowever, has been beld suspect

tven by followers of Hegel wbo adhere to tht doctrine o f
Absolule Idealism; in fact. by sorne of his mosl ardent disciples.
Por tbe dtvelopment of tht vitw by both conttmporary and
laler lbinkers has led to a posítlon according to whlch Hegel's
excurslon inlo Nature-pbllosopby appears inconsistent witb bis
own idealism. Whether the alleged ínconsístency is suppostd
lo affect lhe Philosophy of Spírll also is not dear, bul it does.
al least. lhrow doubt upon the claim of the second science of
the Encyclopredia to be a genu.ine branch of pbUosophy. The
view wbkh ltads to this condemnation of the Naturphilosophie
was 6rst voiced by Schelling, bul it follows also from wbat wiÚ
be called, in the seque!, the 'Bradleian · veuion of Absolutism.
thougb thls should nol be taken to lmply that Bradley was
responsible for the slatemenl of it whJcb follows or that he
voiced the objection lo Hegel's philosophy bere considered.1
Tbe arguments relevant to the matter In hand may be
brlelly summarlsed as follows. The opposition of subject to
obje<t in knowledge is characteristic of a conceptJon of reality
which breaks down under criticism. Hegel bas shown thal tbis
conceplion is provisional. belonging only to a ctrtain ltvcl of
thought. In a bigber conception il ls transcended and the oppo-
sltion is overcome. Tbis higber conception is the notion o f self-
conscious mind (in Hegel's Logic, ' the Idea') and it is neither
mtrely s ubjective nor mertly objective. It is an experience
whlcb is lts own object, an experience which ls inAnlte and all•
inclusive. Such an in6nite and all·inclusive experience is the
lrue nature of reality, bul witbin it there are stages of devtlop-
ment of mind at wbich the real appears under categorles more

1 t have stactd the: argumeota Jn support of thi.t objtction t4 my own

way but have: ba.sed my state:m.eot \!pon persona) discuSSions whld1 J have
had In the past witb two promlnent tbinlcers ol tbe B111dlelan •<hool (namdy
tbe !Jote Profs. H. H. )oathim and ) . A. S10itb). Tbe objectloo IJ almila•.
aJao. to C~Wt's crltfctam of the NaturplúloMlphh in What U Living ttnd
What i• Dtod in tloc PhliOM>phg ol Heg</. though tbat critlcl>m ls -~ lo•
d1ffe~nt rqsons. A stparate discus!ion would be ne:ctasary to de:al wttb
Croct's posltloo and what ls sald he:re: can have, et most, ao lndltKt beartng
on hls vit"W.
 Phílosophy of Nature in flegel's System 215

or less inadequate to its proper character. Bradley represeots

this development as falling broadly into three phases of which
the lowest is 'imme:diate:', unreftective experience. or 'feeling'.
Next there is ' mediate' expuiuce. the sphere of rational think-
ing in which distinctions are made within the whole and ab-
stractiO'ns from it. To this level belong the distinction between
subject and objec1 and the conception of Nature as lbe object of
scienlific knowledge set over against the knowing mind. Finally.
beyond and above rationa l thinking there is a third leve! of ex-
perience which the human mind knows only in general terms:
in its fulness it is unattainable by man. who has. at bes1. only
occasiona1 premonitions of it.
On this view. Nature. regarded as an object in opposition
toa knowing subject . is held to be an abstraction. an appearance
and not the reality. lt ls a notion havlng a measure of truth
but one which is not ultimately self-consistent and which is
s ublated in a higher conception. namely lhat o f realíty as an
experieoce which is al once both subjeclive and objective.
Now the Logic of Hegel is a detailed critica) account of
all the pbases of experience lrom 1he most rudimentary to the
most explidl. In 1he course of 1he dialectic. !hose categories
which science uses in its treatment of Nature a,s an object
externa! to mind are passed and transcended. The Onal and the
truest view of reality is tbe Absolute Idea in whlch 1he dialectic
ol the Logic culminates. As. for tbe Bradleian. experlence is
reality. there should be no more to be said upon the subject.
A philosophlcal science. lherefore. wbich professes to go beyond
Logic a nd lo expound the syst<.m ol Nature as the Idea 'in the
form of other-being • seems nol only un.necessary but spurlous.
The true pbilosophical account of Nature has already been
given. Nature ís an ideal constructíon. a partía! view of the
real which cannot be maintained without displaying interna!
contradiction. lt belongs toan assigned leve! of thought and has
already been trtated and disposed ol in the Logic.
Whatever may be tbe fault< of the Bra dleian positlon.
this crilicism ol Hegel to which it gives rise is at least plausible
in 1he light ol sorne of Hegel's own statements. P or instance.
216 Errol E. Harri$

in the Encyclopiidie ( §6) , he says that 'actua/Uy is that core ol

truth which, originally produced and produdng itsell within
the precincts of the mental lile. has ~come tbe wor/d, tbe in·
ward and outward world of consciousness'.' One migbt think
that an actuality 'produced and producing itself' in this manner
was something very Uke Bradley's ' ideal construction ·. Nature,
it would seem is part - the 'outward' part - of this 'world'.
Further. Hegel points out in the same section. that in bis Logic
he 'has treated, among other things, of actuality', whkh is
indeed tbe case. Why the.n go ~yond the Logic for a separate
account of Nature 1 Clearly the Naturphilo•ophie is not in·
tended to ~ a recapitulation in exten•o ol a section of the
Logic. This is apparent lrom what we read in Sections 15 to 18
ol the Encyclopiidie, and the conclusion of the Logíc itself
should leave us in no doubt that the Phllosophy ol Nature is
lntended to ~ a further stage of the dialectical movement ol
thought and not a simple development of part of the l.ogic.'
Moreover, the categorles In the Naturphi/osophie are not the
same as those of the Doctrine ol Essence ( Wesen ) - in which
actuality is trcated - or any secUon ol lt, as che categories, loe
instan«,, of the Philosophie des Rechts are the same a s those
of the second part of the Philosophie des Geislu. Quite dearly
the Naturphilosophie c:overs the whole of reallty in one aspect
(so to speak) - that of 'extemality'. Surtly then. its very
existence in Hegel's system is an inconsistency. for the state-
mtnts quoted above. that 'actuality' produces itself 'within
tht predncts of the mental )!fe' and that lt has ~en treated
In the l.ogic scem to render it superBuous.
Nevertheless, it ís my belief that a Bradleian interpreta!ion
of Hegel , leading as it does to this apparent inconsistency, is

2 WaUJce'a translation.
s cf. Ene.. f t8 : .The di!~rtnctS of tht s.tpar--• te phll0.$0phlcal sdtnees
are sJmply rhe dtttrmlnatJons of the ldu itself, and ir i.s tbU alone that
prt&ents hself in theu difcorent aspecu ( B/emrnten). In Nature it ls not
anythrno other than the Idea whlc.h t.s to be: dl!ICtrned. hut htre tht Idea ''
in the form ol uternality; ..o also In Sptrit lt· ls the Sllmt Idea. as exlstino
for itseU and btcoming ab)S()Jute ( an und lür s;eh) .'
 Philosophy of Nature in Hegel's System 217

~ot the right interpretation. The passages which have be~

quoted are se~ in a dílf<r~t light if taken along wíth what
Hegel says elsewhere and are consisten! with a dilferent inter-
pretatíon of the Hegelian philosophy as a whole whkh does not
give rise to the Bradleian difficulty concerning the Philo$0phy of
Nature. A conception of Nature is possible dilferent lrom that
ol which Bradley ( for instance) treat$ in Appearance and
Reality.• a conception consisten! with a thorough-golng idealism
and more truly Hegelian. one which justi6e.s Hegel's treatment
of Nature as the 'other' of the Idea.
We may help ourselves to begln with by taklng a view of
the world similar to that which Alexander holds. We have
6rst the physico-chemical world in space-time (accordlog to
Alexander the former ls ·emergent' from the latter); then life
emerges lrom special conllguratíons of physical matter; from
lile we get the emergent quality ol cor.sclousness. and so on.
Though 1 have used Alexander's terms, 1 am lar lrom wlshing
to commit myself lo agreement with the del~il of bis theory. 1
am simply attempting to outline a view ol the world as a pro-
ces• ol evolurion or 'emergence' in which the d ilferent forms of
existing things are different stages.
Now it ought to be clear that if something emerges lrom
sornething e:lse. it must ftrst be present. in some way or other.
in that lrom which it emerges. Otherwise it cannot emerge. but
must come into being independently of what appears to be the
lormer stage. The butterlly is said to emerge from the chrys-
alis only because ir has all along been present in the chrysalis.
even though it has I!Ot always been present in tbe same form.
However difficult to understand the notion of becoming or
development may be. so much seems plain, that if a process
of becoming i• to be truly continuous. what emerges at the end
ol the process must have been present in sorne form or in sorne
degree at the beginning. lt is the element of continuity which
is important. and. incidentally. it is one to which Alexander
does insullldent justice. This does not mean tbat development

•O. XXII.
218 Erro/ E. Harris

is no more than a kind of growth, that what appears in the

end was originally included or contained. in sorne diminutive
form. withln that out of whieh it has grown, as an embryo ls
contained in and grows out of an egg. Wbat it does mean is
that there must be some special kind of identity running through
a process of development so that the 6rst pbase in sorne sense
is what it has in it to become. The dilllculty of understanding
the conception is just the difficulty ol explaining in what sense
this is true. the dil!lculty ol explaining what kind of idenlity
runs through the process. As it is a difllculty. however. that
has deleated the efiorts of better men than l. perhaps 1 may
be excused il 1 pass lt ove.r here. Nor is it necessary for my pre-
sent purpose to discuss it. Al! that need be conceded is tbat
thero can be no process o f becoming unless there is an identity
running tbrougb it sulllcient lor us to say that, at every phase.
what develops is always the same thing and is therefore, in some
sense, degree or form. wbat will evenrually emerge. There
will. of course, be a correlative s~nse in which each phase is
not what it is about to become; oth~rwise development will be
equally impossible.
lf tbis contention is allowed. it follows that, as tbe process
of natural evolution results in the final emergence of mind.
mind must be present throughout its course. Sorne thinkeu (T.
H. Creen, for lnstance) deny that consciousness can be a pro-
duct of natural evolution, but they do so on the ground that
what is in no seose mind cannot generate mind. 1!. however.
we assume that the entire process is one of mind's own develop-
ment. we are not subject to this critidsm. Green protesls against
the vlew that consciousness is somehow produced out ol a
material wbich is totally olher than mlnd aod whic:b later
becomes the object of consciousness.• In tl.is he ís right. for il
constiousness is not in some way in the material. it cannot
develop out of it. On the other hand, if we can regard the
material as itself a form or manífestation (calling it that for
lack ol a better word) of mínd, the dilllculty does not arise.
There would then be no foreign material and in every phase of

'Cl. Prolegomena lo Ethk,, Bk. l .

 Philosophy of Nature in Hegefs System 219

natural evolution we should have actually a form of mind. AIJ

forms ol ~xisting things In s¡><~ce-time will be regarded as
ways in wbicb mind manifests itsell - in the Hegelian phrase
- 'in the lorm o! externality'.
The dif!lculties presented by thls view may be great; never-
thdess. the true Hegelian conceptlon of Nature ls, 1 belleve:.
of a world, in every detail of which mind is immanent and
throughout whlch mind comes to consdousness in and by
means o! a process ol sell-evolution. On the one hand. mind
is not viewed as something merely ' subjective' or merely psy-
chical. and on the other hand. matter is not viewed, simply as
a matrlx In whlch U!e and mlnd come into exlstence at certain
points, but as itself a !orm ol the Idea, a manilestation, that is.
ol mind. Accordingly tbe dialectical principie active in tbe
sphere ol thought. is also the principie ol natural development.
Hegel. it is true. confines development in the proper sense ol the
word, entírely to the sphere of the Notion:' but he also says of
Oialectic that 'it is the principie of all movement, all lile and
all effectiveneS! (Betiltigung) in the actual world'.' This shows
that whlle he regarded Oialectic as the universal principie o!
movem~nt and evolutionary process. it i.s only in the activity
o! tbought that he recognises tbe true forrn o! development
propet.
Tbe evolutionary process goes through numerous pbases
wh.ich constitute tbe range of existing things in the material
world. eventually bringing mind. which has been imrnanent al!
along. to consciousness of itsell - or. to say the same thing
in different words (M material things are mani!estations ol
mind). bringing the world to explidt consciousness in the sell-
~wareness of mind.

This must oot be taken to mean, however. that all things

are conscíous minds~ in tbe sen,se, at any rate, that our mlnds are
conscious. That would be a doctrine both unwarranted and

• B!IC. i t6t
'Brn:. 1 St. Zu••tz 11)
220 Erro/ E. Harris

unhelpful.' We can say no more than that there must be in

things sorne germ of mlod if mind is to develop from them.
What form this germ talces. what kind of inchoate or rud!·
mt-ntary consdousnes.s is in 'inanimate· nature. we bave. no
means of knowing. lt is the continuity of the process of develop·
ment which makes it necessary to assert that some form of mind
is present in lowet nature. and H the process is, in lact. not
continuous the assertion will not follow - at least. not by
the same reasoning. Again. íf mind is not present throughout,
the process cannot be continuous. In the present discussion,
however. we may assumc that the process is continuous. for we
bave good reason to believe that, In a very de6nite malUier,
Hegel thought it so.
Viewiog the process of evolution as a wbole, in accordance
wíth the above accounl of Nature. we see the emergcnce of
life and consciousness as slages in the development of mind.
The process of mental development to which thal ph rase ( 'dc-
velopmeot of mlnd') is commonly applied is now to be regarded
as includiog only tbc higher phases of a larger development
which reaches dow'n into spheres of existe:nce where explícit
consciousness. as we know it. is not present. In this process the
higher phases do not merely replace the lower but they carry
them up to a higher plane of existeoce. Matter is oot lost in
life nor life in consciousness. but just as the end is immanent
in all tbe stages of the process, so the process is involved and
sublated in the end. All the lower phases are held in the higher
phase, as Hegel would say. aufgehoben - that !s, at once an-
nulled and transcended and yet maintained as an ekment or
moment in the higher reality. They are annulled and trans-
cended in so far as they have been supersedcd: maintaincd, in
so far as they are invo]ved in and necessary to Lhe emerge.nce
of the higher phase and their inherent possibilities are fullilled
in it. The coming to consciousness of mind, therefore. is the
bringing to con:s<:.iousness of the process of development. In
becomlng conscious the miod becomes aware of the process

• Cf. 8oSANOUBT. Principie o/ Tnd;uid••lltg (; ... Cbs.

va~ 111 & IV.
 Philosophy of Nature in Hegef's System 221

ol ~coming - i.e .. of the world. But this consciousness is no!

in the 8rst instance. expbdtly of a world known to ~ the pro·
cess of mind's own evolution. At 8rst it i.s vague and confused.
probably a mere awareness of ·something'. with no very deS ni te
character. Later. when consdousness has ~come more devel-
oped, the world as an ordered system ls taken to be an object
externa! or 'closed' to mind. wbich now regards itsell as some-
bow attached to one entity in a world ol others. the others ~ing
the objects ol its consdousness. lt is not until the higher stage
ol sell-consdousness is reached and only alter a critica) reftec-
tion upon the nature ol knowledge. that the mind comes to
know itsell as the union of subject and object. This critica)
reftection is logic.
We must pause: htre: to stre:s.s three important points: -
(a) that the development of conscious experience is a process
of growing self-consciousness:
( b) that conscious experience. on which we reftect in
logic, is not generated (as it were) in vacuo. but is itself the
fruit of a long evolutionary process in Nature. As Bosanquet
puts it: 'lt is plain that whatever our ultimate view may ~ as
to the posltlon ol mlnd In the unlverse. it does not come before
us In the animal world, except as something wbich arises. so
to speak. on top of a vast evolution and presupposes a long
development of connections and formation of dlspositlons by
help ol wbich alone the principie which lar down operates as
if it were thought, can erute lor itself a field ol consclousness
and a self whích is lormed and full ol determinations ~fore
it is aware ol them or ol its own distlnct existence'.'
(e) Tbe third point to notice is that the process ol evolution
in Nature is not recognized as the process ol sell-development
ol Mind, at any leve) ol intellectual lile ol which logic is the
interpretation except tbat cr!Ucal reAeclfon which ls itsd! phi-
Josopby. In Hegel's Logic the theory ol this reflective leve) ol
thought is not even the whole ol the Doctrine ol the Notion:

' Tlont Chaptm on the Noturt ol Mlnd, j London. 1923) page 86.
222 Erro/ E. H artis

lt comes only in its llnal consummation, l.h e Absolute ldea, 1•

and even there it amounts lo no more Iban the explicit rec-
ognitlon of tbe unlty of subject and objecl.
The 6rsl of these three points raises the question, Does
the process of growing self-consciousness come to an end al
the poinl where the sell-conscious mind is able lo rdlecl oo
and to expound a theory o( its owo koowledge - is the Logic
the last phase of tbe process ? The second draws our attentioo
to the fact that the crltical study of explícit, conscious knowl-
edge ís not directly the sludy of the whole of realíty, for even
if all realily is mind il is not all mind in tbe form of explicil
consciousness. Nalure has its own place in reality. not merely
as a more or less erroneous conception of tbe world, but as an
actual form of m!nd's manifestation. The thlrd poinl shows that
lhe accounl btrt given ol Nature is not cbaracterislic ol any
stage of knowledge prior. in the scale of !ntellectual develop-
ment, to lhe Logic itself. lt is nol pact o! the Logic and should.
therefore. fall wlthln a sphere of speculative study beyond and
other than logic. For logic is reO<ction upon experieoce: and in
lhe lower pbases of experlence Nature ls not recognised as
the manifestation, 'under the form o( externality', of Mind.
Nature In these phases is regarded asan object set over against
the koow!ng subject, and thougb their identity is impliclt all
along. it only emerges in explicit lorm as the Rnal result of
critica) re8ection. The condusion of tbe Logic ls. therefore. pre-
supposed by the phllosophic account ol Nature, and it ls neces-
sary to go on from lhe recognition o! the unity of subject aod
object ín lcnowledge to show just bow lhe world ls actually
and in fact mlnd.
The belief held by sorne. that this demonstration is already
accomplisbed in tbe Logíc. is probably due to the influence of
Kant. They have considered it sufficient to show that the con-

"Tht theory ol 'tht Objtet' ID tht tbird Jl'lrt of tbe Loglc ls oot 011
account of tht lcka 'in. the: form of other-bting', It t~ets of certaln. ldtat
made un of tn Jcltoce whicb are hight.r in the order of concretenes.s tban
tht: contlatlons (t. g. 'c•use and efect', 'whole •nd part', etc..) whlch a.rt
truttd In the Doctri.M of Es:smu.
 Philosophy of Nattlre in Heget"s System 223

dítions ol any coberent experienc~ ol Nature are logical con·

ceptions ioherent in tbougbt; so that Nature comes to be re-
garded as an ideal construction, a phenomenon or system ol
phenomena dependen! for its cbaracter on the way we tbink.
But Hegel asserted tbat tbe concepts ( the categoríes) of logic
were not only the principies whicb made tbe world intelligible
but were 'at the same time the real essenc~ ol tbingi .L1 Su eh
an assertion may. admittedly, be taken in eíther ol two ways.
lt may mean that the world's esse is inteUígi. o.r it may mean
that tbe actual lorms of existence in Nature are manikstationo
ol mind. One who speaks of 'the Reason in being - Actuality'
('die seiende Vernunft'), 11 ls hardly likely to hold tbe former
view, and. if the latter is tbe right interpretation of the phrase
1 hav~ quot~d. the Kanlian argum~nt is insufficient to ~xplaín
fully the real identity ol mind and the world. A philosophical
sci~nc~ to demonstrat~ in detail the immanence ol mind in Na-
ture is not only legltimate but necessary.
Ther~ is a further stag~ in tb~ du~lopment ol self-con·
sciousness tban that reached in the Logic. The Logic ís, from
ooe point o f view ( i.e .. considered as the ddíverance of reftec·
Uve self-consdousness) the result of a long course of develop·
ment ( though from anotber point ol view, that of its conteo t.
it ls not) . lt ls the polnt at which the mind comes to know
ítsell as identícal with its world. as the 'world come to con-
sciousness'." But the miod goes further, to know itsell as the

11 Bnc,. § 11 . z...,. (2)

'' Ertt:., 1 6.
u That this is Heoe:J's vlew: that tbe 'thioklng s:tudy' which 1.s phi..
losophy comu only after a long ~rk>d of inttllectual dcvelopment. is deat
f:rom what hc .says il1 thc Encyclop&dle a.s well a.s ftom what be .says
else...,•here i.Q his writings. Cf. Ene., § 2 ·...In rcligiou.s, legal and moral
matttr1, tblo..king, under the gu1n of f«llng, btlJef or mental tm.ge, has
not been inactive. hs attivlty and productions an p.rt"nt and contaJned
thtrtln'. Also. Logilt: Prtface to the 2nd Editlon, whert he saya that the
ntet.Wty of coocernlng ontulf wltb pure thought pruupposu a loog de--
velopmt>nt whlch the human spi.rit must ha.vt undugone. Hete, also ht
sptaks of the cattgorit:s btl.ng 'put to use' ln tht activitfu of evtrycby
IIft. Flnally thtrt ls thr famou.s pas.sage a.bout thc: Owl of Minuv~ ~tting
lot(h oc its Rlght oo.ly afttr somt form of lifc ha$ grown old..
221 Erro/ E. Harris

spirit immanent in and developlng throughout the proeess

of evolution which is Nature, and which brlngs itself to con-
sciousness in knowledge. Tbe mind 6rst sees itseli as the
world come to consciousness and then sees the world as the
process in and by mea os of which that eoming to consciousness
is brought about. Having found its own identity with the world
in knowledge, mind goes back to the world as Nature to view
it as the process in and througb which knowledge comes to ~.
and which, at the same time, comes to be the object ( or con-
ten!) of knowledge. As the process is tbroughout one of grow-
ing self-consdousness. it is a process at once of tbe emergence
of the knowing mind and of the world's ( the process itself)
becoming known. Mind. in sbort, discovers its owo immanent
presence in Nature. This is how 1 propose to lnterpret the very
obscure passage at the end of Hegel's Logic. which Schelling
so strongly attacked. where we read of the Idea 'resting in
ltself, and 'secure in ltself', 'resolving' to let ' tbe moment of its
particularity go forth out of itself freely as Nature'.
The posltion, as a whole, may ~ outlined as follows: -
Re8ecting on the nature of Knowledge. we are brougbt in the
Logre. to the condusion that the knowlng subject is ldentical
with its object. This discovery is a turnlng-point in the growth
of self-consciousness. Here thought. wbich bas hitherto n.o t
been recognlsed as the lmmanent principie of things. but has
~en regarded as something only 'subjective'. is found to be
'at the same time the real essence of things. In other words.
mind has ~come conscious of itself as the spirit immanent in
Nature, and so has reached a new plane ol self-consclousness.
The Philosophy ol Nature develops this position in detail.
dlsplaying Nature in every phase as a manifestation of mind
(in the form ol externality). up to that point at which con-
sciousness emerges in its proper form. At this point, as the
Idea went over into Nature in the course of the development
of self.-.consciousness. so now Narure passes over iota Spirit.
Consciousoess tucos back upon itself to know itself absolutely.
This it does in the conclusion of the Philosophie des Gtistes.
Absolute Spiril.
 Philosophy of Nature in Heget's System 22S

The much disputed transition from the Logic to tbe Phi·

losophy of Nature is, tberefore, slmply the passage from one
stage to the ntxt in the development of self-consciousness.
Miod comes to know ltself even more fully a nd completely
and in the higher stages of the developinent it is coostantly
turniog back upon itself, malting ltself In the prior pbase lts
object. 14 lt maltes itself, as knowledge, its own object in Jogic;
it makes itself. as object identical with subject. as mind imma-
nent in tbe 'externa!' world ( the conception wbicb forms tbe
consummation of the Logic) its own object in Nature·philo-
sophy: and it makes itself. as the emergent from Natutt, lts
own object In the Philosopby of Spirlt.
There are passages in Hegel which are admittedly diffi-
cult to recondle with the view here suggested. especially that
In which he expressly repudiares the Idea of evolutfon In Na-
ture as a process of continuous change from one phase to another.
' Nature', he says, 'is to be regarded as a system of grades of
which one arises necessarily out of the other and is the proxi-
mate truth of tbat from which lt results. but not in sucb a way
that ooe is engendered naturaUy out of the other. but In the
inoer Idea constitutíng the reason ( Grund) of Nature'." He
regards it • • a sign of the essential opposition of N a tu re to
tbe Idea that 'it leaves the differences starkly side by side'. The
proverb 'lo Nature there are no leaps' is true, he says, only of
the Idea." Bu t. on tbe other hand. he does conceive Nature
in accordance witb sorne notion of development. The dlalectlc.
which is continuous throughout the system. does run tbrougb
all tbe forms of natural exlstence. and lhere are passages which
indicate the view that this stark externalfty of particulars in
Nature is itself to be explained as consequent upon the low stage
of mind's development in Nature. 'Nature', we are told, 'is only
implicitly the Idea. therelore Schelling called it "petrifled"
and otbHs "frozen intelligence". But God does not rtmain
stony and dead: the stones cry out and raise themselves to

"Cf. Ene.. ¡¡ 413 and +t3, and JHOulm.

"Ene.. §2-19.
"e..,.. §2'19. ZuWt.
226 Erro/ E. Harri$

Spirit"." Not only is mind immanent in the petri6ed image.

but it cannot rest in su eh petrilaction. it cannot ·rtmrun stony
and de.a d', but is urged by its inhtrwt nlsus to develop - to
come alive ond conscious. The repudiation of the idea of evolu·
tion in Nature is due to the fact 1hat in Hegel's day the idea
had not comt to be. as it has today. almost a commonplace.
To Hegtl it must have seemed a very dubious hypothesls and
bis rejection of it, therefore, is really a sigo of bis sincerily,
lor il would have beeo a very convenlent 1heory lor him to hold
and might have enabled him lo avoid a number of difficulties.
Another apparent inconsistency of my interpretation with
what appears in Hegel's wrilings is tbe view of tbe Logic wbich
1 have suggested. h may be said that Hegel could not bave
admitted al al! that the Logic was a phase in a Iarger develop·
ment. The logic is. lor him. 'The Word' of the opening verses
ol St. John's Gospel. Hegel bimself describes il as •tbe mind
ol God before the creation of Nature and Fioite Spirit"." The
inconsis tency. however. is only apparent. Tbe logic may be
regardcd in two different ways both ol wbich are legitimate.
each from one point of view. lt may. (in fact it must) on the
one hand, be regarded as the product ol human tbought or
what the human miod is capable of thinking at a certain levd
of development. lt may, on the other hand, be regarded lrom
tho point of view of its content as the system of universal
concepts which constitute the intelligible, the eterna!. essence
of the world. That Hegel did not disregard the 6rst ol tbese
aspects has already been shown." and it is in the second only
that we might describe Logic. ideally. as ' the mind of God'.••

u Ene.; f247, Zus.at%.

u l.oglk. El•ltlflmg.
"Vidt p. 223, n. 13.
10 Ht-gd'• dbc.usslon of che queaUon cooc.trnlog tht" tttmJty of the

world u::nc.. 1 247. Zu.satz) should makr it cltar that thU dtscription of thr
~ic is not lntudcd to be more than e metaphor - if indttd the whole
Jpirit of hia doctrint is not evJdtnce enough. At lust, he would nt"Ver Mve
m•iptnlntd chat 'the mind of Cod' was UttralJy prior in time. lts priority i.s
purrly logiul. After aJl, the Idea is only one a.sptcl of che ru!; Naturf' is
anothtr. Thf two are unlttd lo conc.rett Spirit (Cf. Bnc .. § l8) .
 Philosophy of Naturc in Hegel's System 227

Nor are the two views inconsistent. for though Logic is indeed
the ideal system which is the intelligible essence of the world
and is not subject to the limitations of space and time. it may
still be true tbat this essential nature of reality comes to con-
sciousness only at a certain de6nile leve! in tbe evolution of
mind - !mplicit tbough it is in aU the prior stages.
No doubt il is exceedingly dífficult lo say jusi how mind
can be immanent in physical nalure and by no means easy to
explain tbe nalure of lhe process o! devdopment. No doubl
it does seem extraordinary that mlnd, having ecssentially a self-
conscious nature. sbould manlfest ítself in forms which are
utterly inadequate to its true cbaracler and so be compelled to
develop out o! these forms and to go tbrough a long and arduous
process o! evolution in order to bring itself to consciousness.
But the purpose o! lhis paper is to try to show tbat an inler-
pretation of Hecgel's philosophy is possible which will justify
lhe place in bis syslem of the N aturphi/osophie. and for lhal
purpose it is nol necessary to discuss these special difficulties
or to attempt to meel them. Neverlheles.s. 1 do nol believe thal
they are Snally insurmountable, and much thal Hegel has
written indicates lhe Une o! attack lo be laken. Nor. in any
case. are tbey greater than the difficulties which beset rival
theories. s uch as tbose. for instance, of Bergson, Alexander and
Whítehead, The notion of Space-Time as a matrix is no
stranger {especially after Alexander's account o! it) lhan of
mind universally immane.nt in Nature. Dureé and Be:rgson's
éiJOiution créatrice are no more intelligible than what has ber.
been described as tbe process of mind's development. through
naturaJ forms. to eventual self-consciousnt.ss. And nothing in
the view here suggested is more difllcult lo understand than the
det\nition given by Whilehead of Nature as ·a procus ol ex-
pansive development. necessarily transitional from prehension
to prehension'."
The theory 1 have tr!ed to outline follows naturally from
Hegel's main idealistic position. for he declares tltat the rational

u Scltn<t and th< Modorn WO<Id. (Cambrldgt. 1930) . p. 90.

228 Erro/ E. H arris

fs the real. tbat thought is objecrive and tbat 'tbe truth fs

actual and must exist'.11 'lt is the highest and 6.nal aim of phi-
losopbic science', he says, 'to bring about ... the reconcillation
of self-conscious reason with the reason which is in being. with
Actualioy'." lf Hegel ls serfous In these statements he must be
prepared lo demonstrate the ' reason which is in being'. He
must show how ' the truth is actual' and how it can 'exist'. The
fulfilment of tbese requitements is the Naturphilosophie. wblch.
so lar from being inconsistent with bis idealism, ls required
by it. And if this be accepted as the Hegelian view of Nature,
it shows the Logic in a new light and overcomes tbe difllculty
wbich the Bradleian finds in the Naturphilosophie.

ERROL E. HARRIS

Uniuersíty o[ the Witwatersrand,