Company Law Sample Mark Scheme
Company Law Sample Mark Scheme
Company Law Sample Mark Scheme
Company Law
Sample mark scheme 2019
2 Yes – directors can decline to register a share transfer, but only where:
they are granted this power in the articles (1); and
they provide reasons within 2 months (s.771). (1)
9 Answers should evaluate the validity of Alina and Mary’s actions and so should primarily focus
25 marks on the validity of the issue and allotment of shares, the potential breaches by the directors’ of
their duties and the unlawful payment of the dividend.
Allotment of shares
Swan is a private limited company with only one class of share so the directors will have the
authority to allot shares, subject to any restriction in the articles (s.550 Companies Act 2006).
However, the issue of new shares will dilute the holdings of the existing members (in fact this
is the reason for the issue), so any new shares should first be offered to the existing
members in proportion to their existing shareholding in accordance with the rules on pre-
emption rights set out in s.561.
It appears that the pre-emption provisions have been breached, so although the allotment is
valid, Alina and Mary will be liable to compensate any shareholders who have lost out.
Directors’ duties
Alina and Mary have a duty to exercise their powers only for the purposes for which they
were conferred (s.171(b)).
If they have exercised the power to allot shares for the purpose of diluting Shaun’s
shareholding and preventing him from voting them out of office, this amounts to a breach of
the s.171(b) duty.
Where directors act for multiple purposes, the duty can still be breached if the dominant
purpose was an improper one.
Mary may be in breach of the duties in s.173 (independent judgement) and s.174 (duty to
exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence) by going along with the proposal to pay a
dividend without question.
Alina and Mary are also likely in breach of the general duty in s.172. The duty requires
directors to act in good faith to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its
members as a whole. Answers may query whether the good faith duty has been discharged.
If the allotment was made for a purpose other than to promote the success of the company,
this may also amount to a breach. Section 172(1) also requires directors to have regard to
the interests of various stakeholders, the long term consequences of decisions and the
company’s reputation for high standards of business conduct. Arguably these aspects of the
duty have also been breached.
Payment of dividend
The Model Articles permit dividends to be paid following a recommendation by the board and
a declaration by the company made by an ordinary resolution. There is no evidence on the
facts of a board meeting having taken place. Alina, Mary and Timothy have enough shares
between them to pass an ordinary resolution declaring the dividend, but if the proper
procedure has not been followed, the process for declaration does not comply with Model
Articles.
10 (a) The first part of the answer should briefly explain the meaning of corporate personality and then
10 marks discuss when the veil of incorporation has been lifted at common law, with reference to relevant
cases. Answers in both parts should not be penalised for being overly descriptive; an answer which
is largely descriptive or narrative may still achieve a pass grade under the criteria below. In order to
merit higher marks, there should be an attempt at evaluation, critique or analysis of the case law.
Corporate personality
Corporate personality refers to the fact that in law, a company has a legal personality
separate from that of its founders and members. As such it has many of the same rights and
attributes as natural persons. A company can own property, enter into contracts, borrow
money, employ staff, sue and be sued in its own right.
The significance of the company’s separate legal personality is explored in Salomon v
Salomon [1897]. The House of Lords judgment in that case strongly upholds the clear
separation between the company and its personnel, re-stating that directors and members
are not liable for the debts of the company beyond their original capital contribution. Thus,
corporate personality (also called the corporate veil) can be used to shield the company’s
personnel from liabilities incurred by the company.
Trading via a corporation with a separate legal personality is appealing because it protects
the company’s directors from acquiring legal responsibility for the company’s debts and
other liabilities. However, it is also open to abuse. The courts therefore have the power to
disregard corporate personality at common law (also called lifting the veil of corporate
personality). Historically howeverthey have been reluctant to dismantle corporations which
have been properly set up in accordance with the law.
Instances where the corporate veil has been pierced include the following.
The company is being used as a vehicle to effect a fraud, or as a façade or sham as in Gilford
Motor Home Co v Horne [1933].
Where an agency relationship existed between a parent company and its subsidiary such as
Smith Stone and Knight Ltd v Birmingham Corporation [1939].
10 (b) A narrative/descriptive answer should receive a pass mark provided it is accurate and complete.
15 marks Higher marks (Level 3) should be awarded where there is an attempt at analysis, critique or
evaluation.
The leading current authority on piercing the veil is that of the Supreme Court in Petrodel
Resources Ltd v Prest [2013]. The case concerns the distribution of assets in a divorce
settlement and as the court found that the assets concerned were held on trust for the
claimant spouse, there was no need for the court to pierce the corporate veil in this case.
However the judgment does contain clear guidelines (albeit obiter) on when a company’s
corporate personality may be disregarded. The guidelines are very restrictive. Lord
Sumption explains that the only instance when the courts can disregard a company’s
corporate personality is where the ‘evasion principle’ applies. This is where “a person is
under an existing legal obligation or liability or subject to an existing legal restriction which
he deliberately evades or whose enforcement he deliberately frustrates by interposing a
company under his control”. He also explains that piercing the veil is a remedy of last resort
and should not be used unless no other means exists to reach the required outcome.
Although the Justices in Prest were not unanimous in their views on disregarding corporate
personality, subsequent decisions such as that in Wood v Baker [2015] indicate that the
restrictive approach endorsed by Lord Sumption is likely to be followed in the future.
11 (a) In order to bring a successful claim, Mercy must first establish that James has breached one or
17 marks more of his duties as a director. Directors owe their duties to the company, so she must then satisfy
the statutory tests to gain permission to bring a derivative claim on the company’s behalf. Answers
should deal briefly with directors duties before turning to concentrate on the statutory process for
bringing a claim.
Directors’ duties
The statutory derivative claim is available under the Companies Act 2006. The claim does
not overrule the rule in Foss v Harbottle but it does allow shareholders to bring a claim on
the company’s behalf, subject to the strict criteria set out in s.260.
The grounds for a claim are set out in s.260(3). A claim may only be brought where there is
negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by a director. Applying this to the facts,
there are several breaches here which could potentially justify a claim.
Under s.261(1), Mercy can apply for permission to bring a claim if she can demonstrate that
there is a prima facie case. As she is a member and has prima facie evidence of breaches
of duty by James, she is likely to satisfy this test.
The court must refuse permission to proceed with the claim if any of the conditions in
s.263(2) are satisfied, namely if a hypothetical director acting in accordance with s.172
would not seek to continue it, or that the act complained of has been authorised by the
company. On the facts the claim appears to be in the company’s best interests.
Finally the court has discretion to refuse to allow the claim to continue under s.263(3) and
(4). The Act directs the court to consider certain specific factors (e.g. cost and likelihood of
recovering compensation) and also to have regard to the views of the members. Here, the
views of Michael will be relevant – if he agrees the claim should go ahead, this will make the
court more likely to grant permission.
In general, the courts have been reluctant to grant permission for derivative claims to
proceed – see cases such as Franbar Holdings v Patel and Mission Capita v Sinclair.
11(b) The question requires discussion of what ratification is and whether it is applicable here, and if so,
8 marks the likely consequences.
Ratification
12 The question requires candidates to discuss the course of action the liquidator will take. Answers
25 marks should therefore begin by explaining the role of the liquidator, which is to collect the assets of the
company, convert them into cash and use the resulting funds to pay the company’s debts.
Fenella must then distribute any remaning assets to those entitled to them in a statutorily
prescribed order.
Fenella must consider how to ensure she has increased the pool of assets as far as possible,
and then decide how to distribute them.
Collecting assets
Fenella will start by collecting all the company’s cash and non-cash assets including
plant and machinery, vehicles, stock etc.
She should also look to see whether she can increase the size of the asset pool by
requiring anyone to make a contribution to the company’s assets.
Directors may be required to repay any assets wrongly distributed prior to the liquidation.
In this case answers should consider wrongful trading and the creation of a preference.
Wrongful trading
Wrongful trading occurs where the company has gone into insolvent liquidation, and at
some time before the commencement of the winding up, a director knew or ought to
have known that there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation
(s.214 IA 1986).
The fact that the company continued to trade whilst technically insolvent does not
automatically mean that wrongful trading has occurred; the question is whether the
directors knew there was no reasonably prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation.
On the facts, the auditor’s advice in January 2018 appears to indicate that they ought to
have known liquidation was inevitable.
If Desi and Ethan have engaged in wrongful trading, they can be required to make a
contributrion to the company’s assets as the court thinks proper.
Creation of a preference