Del Rosario vs. Ferrer
Del Rosario vs. Ferrer
Del Rosario vs. Ferrer
20, 2010
The Facts
On August 27, 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a
document entitled "Donation Mortis Causa" in favor of their two children, Asuncion and
Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of their predeceased son, Zoilo)
covering the spouses’ 126-square meter lot and the house on it in Pandacan, Manila in
equal shares.
It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be
respected by the surviving spouse.
Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in September 1968. A few months later or on
December 19, 1968, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a deed of assignment of
his rights and interests in subject property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died in
June 1972.
In 1998 Jarabini filed a "petition for the probate of the August 27, 1968 deed of
donation mortis causa" before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Asuncion
opposed the petition, invoking his father Leopoldo’s assignment of his rights and
interests in the property to her.
RTC:
Finding that the donation was in fact one made inter vivos, the donors’ intention being
to transfer title over the property to the donees during the donors’ lifetime, given its
irrevocability.
Consequently, said the RTC, Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and
interest in the property was void since he had nothing to assign. The RTC thus directed
the registration of the property in the name of the donees in equal shares.
CA:
Reversed. The CA held that Jarabini cannot, through her petition for the probate of the
deed of donation mortis causa, collaterally attack Leopoldo’s deed of assignment in
Asuncion’s favor. The CA further held that, since no proceeding exists for the allowance
of what Jarabini claimed was actually a donation inter vivos, the RTC erred in deciding
the case the way it did.
Issue Presented
Whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe’s donation to Asuncion, Emiliano,
and Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was denominated, or in fact a donation
inter vivos.
That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is
not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this
character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
The Court said that the express "irrevocability" of the donation is the "distinctive
standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos." Here, the donors
plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and
shall be respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation
irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the
irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter
vivos.
The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and
administration of the property" and made the donation operative upon their death. But
this Court has consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an
irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted with their naked title,
maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived.
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance
the deed required. This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the
donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of
donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be accepted by
the donee during the donor’s lifetime.
Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative
and final. The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the
moment the donor learned of the donee’s acceptance of the donation. The acceptance
makes the donee the absolute owner of the property donated.
Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter vivos, Leopoldo’s
subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property to Asuncion should be
regarded as void for, by then, he had no more rights to assign. He could not give what
he no longer had. Nemo dat quod non habet.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the assailed December 23, 2008
Decision and March 6, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 80549, and
REINSTATES in toto the June 20, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
19, in Sp. Proc. 98-90589.