642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Saure vs. Pentecostes

*
No. L-46468. May 27, 1981

FRANCISCO SAURE, petitioner, vs. HON. PRUDENCIO

S. PENTECOSTES, Municipal Judge of Camiling, Tarlac,
DEPUTY SHERIFF VIVENCIO PALANCIO, SPOUSES
TELESFORO GALANG and NIEVES GALANG,
respondents.

Lease; Ejectment; Pres. Decree No. 20 is a police power

measure.—It bears repeating that the legislation or decree of the
above character is a police power measure intended to alleviate
the plight of lessees occupying premises with a monthly rental of
less than P300.00. The construction that should be given to it
therefore should be of a liberal character. Otherwise, its
beneficent purpose could be frustrated. Nor could any doubt be
entertained that the decree applied to leases entered into prior to
its issuance.
Same; Same; It is not the location of the leased premises in a
commercial district, but the actual use thereof as a dwelling unit
by the lessees that is decisive in determining the applicability of
Pres. Decree 20 to the ejectment case.—It is not the location but
the use of the premises in question that is decisive. Nor is the
application of the Decree defeated by the fact that there is a small
photo shop owned by

________________

* SECOND DIVISION

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VOL. 104, MAY 27, 1981 643

Saure vs. Pentecostes

petitioner. Again, what calls for the setting aside of a decision is

the fact that respondent Judge disregarded the evidence which
showed that petitioner and his family had lived in such place for
the last ten years. Under the circumstances, to refuse to recognize
that the case for petitioner comes within the operation of the
Decree is to disregard and ignore its command. Whatever doubt
there may be on that score is removed by this definition of a
residential unit in Batas Pambansa Blg. 25: “A residential unit—
refers to an apartment, house and/or land on which another’s
dwelling is located used for residential purposes and shall include
not only buildings, parts or units thereof used solely as dwelling
places, except motels, motel rooms, hotels, hotel rooms, boarding
houses, dormitories, rooms and bedspaces for rent, but also those
used for home industries, retail stores or other business purposes
if the owner thereof and his family actually live therein and use it
the owner thereof and his family actually live therein and use it
principally for dwelling purposes: Provided, That in the case of a
retail store, home industry or business, the capitalization thereof
shall not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000.00): and Provided,
further, That in the operation of the store, industry or business,
the owner thereof shall not require the services of any person
other than the immediate members of his family.” There is
testimony, unrefuted, that the capital of the photo shop was in the
amount of P2,500.00. Nor can there be any doubt that the services
of a person other than the immediate members of petitioner’s
family were not required.
Same; Same; Attorneys; Counsels should advise their clients
to deposit their accumulating rentals in court to avoid suffering.
The adverse consequences of such failure while the case is pending
in court.—In this case, however, the failure of petitioner to deposit
the rental is mitigated by the fact that he did offer to pay the
former rental, but private respondents made it clear that they
would not accept. Counsel for petitioner ought to have advised
him to make the necessary consignation. This is one instance
however where the client should not be made to suffer for the
omission of counsel. At any rate, it can be stated legally that the
action for ejectment not being allowable in law at all, and a clear
case of jurisdictional infirmity being apparent, such failure could
be considered excusable. Petitioner, however, must pay all the
back rentals due and owing. In according him justice through law,
no injustice should be visited on private respondents.

644

644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Saure vs. Pentecostes

PETITION for certiorari and prohibition proceeding from

the order of the Municipal Court of Camiling, Tarlac.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
It is readily discernible from the records of this certiorari
and prohibition proceeding why the Citizens Legal
Assistance Office of the Ministry of Justice took such pains
to nullify and set aside a decision of respondent Municipal1
Judge Prudencio S. Pentecostes of Camiling, Tarlac
ejecting petitioner as lessee from the building owned by
private 2 respondents, the spouses Telesforo and Nieves
Galang, as well 3
as his order denying a motion for relief
from judgment. The point stressed, and rightly so, is that
respondent Judge disregarded the plain command of
Presidential Decree No. 20 which suspended indefinitely
the filing of ejectment cases except when the lease is for a
definite period and which prohibited the increase in rentals
of dwelling units where the monthly rentals do not exceed
P300.00 a month. There is no evidence whatsoever that
disproves the allegation that petitioner Saure is occupying
the premises in question as his residence. The fact that he
has a small photography shop undoubtedly to supplement
his income does not transform it into a commercial
establishment. Moreover, no period had been fixed for the
duration of his occupancy. As a matter of fact, it could not
be denied that the only reason of private respondents for
seeking his ejectment was his refusal to submit to an
increase in rentals from P50.00 to P180.00, the
Presidential Decree notwithstanding. In the light of the
undisputed facts, the jurisdictional infirmity of the
actuation of respondent Judge is quite obvious. It is
surprising how he could have decided the matter the way
he did. The explanation, but not the justification,
apparently lies in the fact that the building in question, a
unit of which is the residence of

_________________

1 Deputy Sheriff Vivencio Palancio was likewise named respondent, a

writ of execution having been issued.
2 Petition, Annex C.
3 Ibid, Annex E.

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VOL. 104, MAY 27, 1981 645

Saure vs. Pentecostes

petitioner, is located in the commercial district of Camiling,

Tarlac. That does not suffice.
There is merit to the petition. 4
1. The ruling in the recent case of Salaria v. Buenviaje.
the opinion being penned by Justice Guerrero, is quite
categorical. Where Presidential Decree No. 20 calls for
application, the fact that the lessor needed the premises for
his personal use could not defeat its application.
Accordingly, it was categorically held that the lessee
“cannot be ordered to vacate the premises of the 5
land in
question” pursuant to the applicable law. Private
respondents could not even allege such purpose. All they
were interested in was that the rentals be increased,
contrary to what is ordained by Presidential Decree No. 20.
The case for petitioner is thus much stronger.
2. In a6
still later decision of this Court, Gutierrez v.
Cantada, the same approach was followed. In that case,
the decision of the then respondent Judge Santiago O.
Tanada was upheld, a suit for certiorari against him filed
by the lessor being dismissed. Such special civil action was
filed in this Court as a suit for ejectment against the tenant
did not prosper. It was pointed out in the opinion that
Presidential Decree 7
No. 20 as well as the previous act
regulating rentals which it amended “had a common
objective to remedy the plight of the lessees, Presidential
Decree No. 20, moreover, having a constitutional sanction
in that it is specifically referred to in the fundamental law
as part of ‘the law of the land.’ Under the former statute,
actions for ejectment were ‘suspended from two years from
the effectivity’ thereof. * * * Such a period was made
indefinite by Presidential Decree No. 20 thus: ‘Except when
the lease is for a definite period, the provisions of

______________

4 L-45642, February 28, 1978, 81 SCRA 722.

5 Ibid, 727.
6 L-36797, May 3, 1979, 90 SCRA 1.
7 Republic Act No. 6359 entitled An Act to Regulate Rentals for Two
Years of Dwelling Units or of Land on Which Another’s Dwelling is
Located and Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes.

646

646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Saure vs. Pentecostes

paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code of the

Philippines insofar as they refer to dwelling unit or land on
which another’s dwelling is located shall be suspended
until otherwise provided; but other provisions of the Civil
Code and the Rules of Court of the Philippines on lease
contracts, insofar as they axe not in conflict with the
provisions of this Act, shall apply.’ Under paragraph (1) of
Article 1673 of the Civil Code, one of the grounds for
judicially ejecting the lessee is the 8expiration of the period
fixed for the duration of the lease.” It bears repeating that
the legislation or decree of the above character is a police
power measure intended to alleviate the plight of lessees
occupying premises with a monthly rental of less than
P300.00. The construction that should be given to it
therefore should be of a liberal character. Otherwise, its
beneficent purpose could be frustrated. Nor could any
doubt be entertained that the decree applied to leases
entered into prior to its issuance. There is relevance to this
excerpt from Gutierrez v. Cantada: “The applicability
thereof to existing contracts cannot be denied. From
Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Public Service
Commission, such a doctrine has been repeatedly adhered
to by this Court. As was held in Ongsiako v. Gamboa,
decided in 1950, a police power measure being remedial in
character covers9
existing situations; otherwise, it would be
self-defeating.”
3. As was pointed out earlier, the only explanation for
this failure to abide by Presidential Decree No. 20 must
have been the belief of respondent Judge that the premises
in question, being located in a commercial section of the
town of Camiling, was outside the operation of the Decree.
Such a belief is unjustified. Petitioner was occupying only
one of the units in the building in question, all of which
served as the dwelling places of the lessees. They therefore
fall within the explicit language of the Decree. It is not the
location but the use of the premises in question that is
decisive. Nor is the application of the Decree defeated by
the fact that there is a small photo shop owned by
petitioner. Again, what calls for the setting aside of a
decision

________________

8 90 SCRA 1, 2-3.
9 Ibid, 5-6.

647

VOL. 104, MAY 27, 1981 647

Saure vs. Pentecostes

is the fact that respondent Judge disregarded the evidence

which showed that petitioner and his family had lived in
such place for the last ten years. Under the circumstances,
to refuse to recognize that the case for petitioner comes
within the operation of the Decree is to disregard and
ignore its command. Whatever doubt there may be on that
score is removed by this definition of a residential unit in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 25: “A residential unit—refers to an
apartment, house and/or land on which another’s dwelling
is located used for residential purposes and shall include
not only buildings, parts or units thereof used solely as
dwelling places, except motels, motel rooms, hotels, hotel
rooms, boarding houses, dormitories, rooms and bedspaces
for rent, but also those used for home industries, retail
stores or other business purposes if the owner thereof and
his family actually live therein and use it principally for
dwelling purposes: Provided, That in the case of a retail
store, home industry or business, the capitalization thereof
shall not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000.00): and
Provided, further, That in the operation of the store,
industry or business, the owner thereof shall not require
the services of any person 10
other than the immediate
members of his family.” There is testimony, unrefuted,
that the capital of the photo shop was in the amount of
P2,500.00. Nor can there be any doubt that the services of a
person other than the immediate members of petitioner’s
family were not required.
4. There is, however, this matter to consider. Petitioner
did not deposit during the pendency of this litigation the
monthly rental of P50.00 agreed upon. It could be argued
that in Salaria, there was at least a deposit of P200.00
during the pendency of the litigation. Admittedly, such
amount was not enough, as shown by the last sentence of
its dispositive portion: “The petitioner is, however, ordered
to pay back rentals for the period of his stay on the land at
the rate 11of P10.00 a month, which is not covered by the
deposit.” In this case, however, the failure of petitioner to
deposit the rental is mitigated by the fact that he did offer
to pay the former rental,

_______________

10 Section 2 (b) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25. (1979).

11 81 SCRA 722, 729.

648

648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Saure vs. Pentecostes

but private respondents made it clear that they would not

accept. Counsel for petitioner ought to have advised him to
make the necessary consignation. This is one instance
however where the client should not be made to suffer for
the omission of counsel. At any rate, it can be stated legally
that the action for ejectment not being allowable in law at
all, and a clear case of jurisdictional infirmity being
apparent, such failure could be considered excusable.
Petitioner, however, must pay all the back rentals due and
owing. In according him justice through law, no injustice
should be visited on private respondents.
 5. Moreover, Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 affords private
respondents some degree of relief. As therein set forth:
“Upon the effectivity of this Act and for a duration of five
years thereafter the monthly rentals of all residential units
and exceeding three hundred pesos shall not be increased,
for any one year period, by more than ten percent (10%) of
the monthly rentals existing at the time of the approval of
this Act. The12 yearly increases authorized herein shall be
cumulative.” The Act took effect on April 10, 1979.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted
nullifying the decision of respondent Judge dated
November 17, 1976 and the writ of execution issued on
December 15, 1976 by virtue thereof. The order of March
10, 1977 of respondent Judge denying the petition for relief
from the aforesaid decision is likewise declared of no force
and effect. The writ of prohibition is granted enjoining
respondent Judge and respondent Deputy Sheriff Vivencio
Palancio or any person acting on their stead or behalf from
taking any further action in connection with Civil Case No.
3066 of the Municipal Court of Camiling between the
spouses Telesforo and Nieves Galang, now private
respondents, as plaintiffs, and Francisco Saure, now
petitioner, as one of the defendants. The restraining order
issued by this Court on July 18, 1977 is hereby made
permanent. Petitioner Francisco Saure is granted a period
of ninety days within which to pay the back rentals. No
costs.

     Barredo, Aquino, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ.,

concur.
     Concepcion Jr., J., is on official leave.

______________

12 Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25. (1979).

649

VOL. 104, MAY 27, 1981 649

Saure vs. Pentecostes

Petition granted.

Notes.—A lease for a determinate time ends on the day

fixed without need of a demand. (Vda. de Roxas vs. Court of
Appeals, 63 SCRA 302)
A stipulation authorizing the sublessor to take
possession of leased premises, without resorting to court
action, upon failure of the sublessee to comply with the
terms and conditions of the contract is valid and binding.
(Consing vs. Jamadre, 64 SCRA 1)
 Improvements made by tenants can be taken away
provided there can be no damage or injury to the leased
property. (Cortez vs. Manimbo, 3 SCRA 382)
A trial court may not fix the rate of the lease for the
back rental at a rate lower than what the lessee himself
was willing to pay. (Imperial Insurance, Inc. vs. Simon, 14
SCRA 855)
A lessor of a cold storage plant may be held responsible
for the deterioration of the foodstuffs stored in its cold
storage plant because said foodstuffs were gnawed by
rodents. (United States Lines Co. vs. San Miguel Brewery,
10 SCRA 805)
An illegally constructed house in defendant’s lot
becomes legal upon the acceptance of rental by the plaintiff
for there shows permission to establish a lessor lessee
relationship. (City of Manila vs. Ebay, 1 SCRA 1086)
It is the ministerial duty of the Municipal Court to
execute its decision pending appeal in an ejectment case if
the lessee fails to comply with the rules for staying
execution. (Base vs. Leviste, 99 SCRA 575)
In ejectment case the petitioner in whose favor the case
is decided is entitled to the fair rental value of the
property. (Ganadin vs. Ramos, 99 SCRA 613)
A complaint is one for ejectment and not one raising the
issue of ownership where it is alleged that the plaintiff
bought the house and lot from the defendant; that the
defendant leased the same; and failed later to pay the
rentals. (Judith vs. Abragan, 66 SCRA 600)
650

650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Castro vs. Reyes

The extension by a trial court for a period of seven years, of

a lease contract that had expired, despite the unwillingness
of the lessor to extend the same, is completely devoid of
legal bases. (Gindoy vs. Tapucar, 75 SCRA 31)
A lessor may seek rescission of lease contract and
ejectment of lessee simultaneously in a single action for
illegal detainer. (Dayao vs. Shell Company of the Phils., 97
SCRA 407)

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