Lagman Vs Pimentel III
Lagman Vs Pimentel III
Lagman Vs Pimentel III
February 6, 2018
ISSUE:
Can the Petitioners invoke the expanded jurisdiction of the SC (Sec. 1, Art. VIII of Constitution) in
seeking review of the extension of Proclamation no. 216.
Position of Petitioners:
Petitioners question the manner that the Congress approved the extension of martial law in
Mindanao and characterized the same as done with undue haste. Petitioners premised their
argument on the fact that the Joint Rules adopted by both Houses, in regard to the President's
request for further extension.
Petitioners argue that given its critical role in the system of checks and balance, the Court should
review not only the sufficiency of the factual basis of the re-extension but also its accuracy. They
assert that the standard for scrutiny for the present petitions is sufficiency of factual basis, not grave
abuse of discretion. The former is, by constitutional design, a stricter scrutiny as opposed to the
latter. Moreover, the Court is allowed to look into facts presented before it during the pendency of
the litigation. This includes, for example, admissions made by the Solicitor General and the military
during oral arguments, as they attempted to show compliance with the constitutional requirements.
Petitioners insist that clear and convincing evidence is necessary to establish sufficient factual
basis for the extension of martial law instead of the "probable cause" standard set in Lagman. In
comparison to the initial exercise of the extraordinary powers of proclamation of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, their extension must have had the
benefit of sufficient time to gather additional information not only on the factual situation of an
actual rebellion, but also the initial exercise of the Executive during its initial implementation.
The invocation of this Court's expanded jurisdiction under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution is
misplaced. As held in Lagman, the "appropriate proceeding" in Section 18, Article VII does not refer
to a petition for certiorari filed under Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII, as it is not the proper tool to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or extension.
The Court reiterated their earlier ruling in Lagman case where they emphasized that the Court’s
jurisdiction under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII (is special and specific, different from
those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. It was further stressed therein that the standard
of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions,
whereas under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the President’s exercise of emergency powers.
Hence, the Court concluded that a petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article
VIII is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The Court added that to apply the standard of review in a petition for certiorari will emasculate the
Court’s constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII, which was precisely meant to provide an
additional safeguard against possible martial law abuse and limit the extent of the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief.
Finally, the Court held that a certiorari petition invoking the Court’s expanded jurisdiction is not the
proper remedy to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the Congress’ extension of the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.