UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD

MAC DILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

9 September 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Central Command, 7115 South Boundary
Boulevard, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 33621

SUBJECT: Report oflnvestigation (Crash ofCH-47D Aircraft in Wardak Province,

Afghanistan on 6 August 2011)

On 7 August 2011, you appointed me to conduct an investigation into the circumstances

surroWlding the crash of a CH-47D helicopter in Wardak Province, Afghanistan, on 6 August
that resulted in the death of all aircrew members and passengers. I have completed my
investigation and transmit my report, along with all of its supporting documents and exhibits, by
enclosure to this memorandum.

10 Encls N.COLT
A. Memo, CENTCOM, 7 Aug 11 i er General, U.S. Army
B. Memo, 10 Report, 9 Sep 11 nvestigating Officer
C. Memo, Unclassified EXSUM (Draft)
D. Memo, Classified EXSUM, 9 Sep 11
E. Exhibit Index
F. Witness Interview List
G. Investigation Team
H. Chronology of Events
1. Memo, CCJA. 9 Sep 11
J. DoD News Release - Casualty List, 11 Aug 11

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(b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(2) (b)(6), (b)(2)

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(S
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(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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 (S)//REL USA, ISAF, NATO
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(S)//REL USA, ISAF,

NATO
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(S
)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)
US
A

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)

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 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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 (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(S)//REL USA, ISAF,

NATO
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)

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 (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

USA, ISAF,
NATO
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(U
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(S)//REL USA, ISAF,
NATO

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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 (S)//REL USA, ISAF,
NATO

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)(b)(1)1.4c,
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)(b)(1)1.4c,
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a,
(b)(6) (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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 (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(6), (b)(2)

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 UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
1115 SOUTH BOUNOARY BOULEVARO
I.IACOlll AIR FORCI! SASE. fl ORIDA 33621·5101

9 Scptcmbi."T 20 II

MEIIIORAND UM FOR Co mmander, United Stutes Centra l Command. 7115 South Boundary
BoulCI'ard, 1'o tncDill Ai r Forcc B:lSc. Floridu 33621

SUBJECT: Summary (Crash ofCH·47D Aircraft in Warda!: rro l·ince. Afgh:misHm

o n 6 Augus(201 1)

I. Il1l"csligation. On 7 August 2011. U.S. Central Command. General Jomes N.

MUH is. appoimed mc to invest igHte the circullIl; llmces surrounding the crash ofa CH·470
hclicopK"T in Warda!: I'rovince. Afghnni stan on 6 Augusl 201 1. which in the deaths of
all JS persons on board. team to Afghanistan and thc nircroft wreckage.
rcviewed vo lumes of documents with the crnsh. reviewed hours o f aircraft
fu ll mot ion li deo, and cooducted over intcn·i;,:ws. incl ud ing those who witncssed the shoot·
down and its aftennath . .After com/llcling my im'f'sligation. I Ira,.e dClcrminrd lirflll/ris mission.
and lire tactics oml resollrccs {'nlployed in ils cxccwion, nwe COnSislcnl " i lll prCl'iollS U.S.
special opcrmiOIlS mjSSiOlIS and lire sirike fo rces seleeled 10 e.trcw<, tI.t· ",issjon "t're
IIpproprime. I "Iso delel"",illt.,llltw Ihe ClI·.I7D was shol dO lm I,;/It II roekel·propelled gr" IIm/(;
(RPG) fired by" T"fji!t", fig lrlCY as rlre Ire/r"coplfr /learcd irs lalldillg ; 0 11('. I hriefcd Ihe
Co mmander. United States Centml Conunnnd, o n the results ormy in"cstigOlion on 7
201 J. and submitt ed my final rcpon to hi m lOr his cons itk..,.alion and appl"Qval on 9
2011. For the fnm ilics, mends, and fellow wnrrionr of lhe fallen. American and Afghan. the
loss of thesc and oourogoous men was a tragedy for which this repon CM provide lit tle
comfo n. I my deept"Sl oondolcnct:s. personally nod on beha lf ofm)' invtsligal i,'c lealll. 10
oflOOsc \\"00 mourn the loss ofthcse brave men.

2. BllckgrOll",l. U.S. militnry inte lli gence el1am Ihe likely prcscnce of Qari
Tahir. an Afghan who had assumed the ro le of senior Taliban fur the TllIlgi Valley in
Warda!: Pro vince. A fgrumi stan. This individual 11.1d probable tics tu $• ."nio r Talib nrl irl
Pakistan. includ ing the Talilxln's shadow SO\'ernorof Warda!:. Based o n this infoTllUllion. U.S.
and Afshan forces began planning a mission to capture or !:ill him during tllo; night of 5·6 AugUSt
20 11.

3. Mission Planning.

a. AI a f()Tward in ne3rhy Lot:-1r I'rov in ce. the special operatioll.'! task force
co mmaooer n:spons ihlc for Ihe in Tnng i Va lley 011 5·6 Augu st one of his
nssault forces. built IIIOUnd n U.S. Army Rangl"T platoon. including an (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)

nnd n Cultural Supporl Team memb!:f, to conduct tllo; miss ion to c:lpture ur kill the Qari Tahir. '
AS pm o f thc planlling for that mission. another of the sp«:i:al operat ions tnsk force

I " Cllltllli\ Sol"",," T ",<", be< ;1 • f""uk ",hUfa! ad,,_ '';<1>(0)1;1;00 .n "'1?£CttI""1l' ",rh
AfGh:m ""il;>II'. 10 AfSb>ll "'"OIl"'" Md , hil dt"" .

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SU BJECT: Executive SUn1nlJry (Crash o f C II-47 D Aircraft in Warll ak Pro l·ince. Afghani stan
on 6 August 201 I)

conunander's assault forces, bu ill around II troop ofNal')' SEALs.. was illcnt ified as an
RI.'X lion Force (I RF) 10 suppor\ Illc opct"alion. if llC'Cessary. T he Ranger- led assa ult
fo rce was suppon ed by two C H-470 Chinook helicoptl.T:S IIJld 111'0 AH-M Ap;1ehe all aek
helicoptcr5. Illong with an AC- l 30 gunship. anll II rclativel)' robuSI team of intelligence.
surveill ance aOO reconJUlissance (ISR) lnc 111'0 C H-4 7Ds wo ukl ai rlift\he :LSSau lt force
10 II land in g zone in the vicini ty of the eompounll believed to contuin Qari Ta hir. the T :mgi
Valley Ta liban leall er. The assmdt fo rce wo ul d move in to surrouTKI 'he compounll. clear
unll sec ure it. conlluct tactica l io nin g 0 f llct ainecs. and oolket i1ems of int elli gence value.

b. Each C H-47 D ercwmember assignl-.:l lo fly thi s mission wus fully trainl-d nnll qll:ll ified to
pi.-rfonn the arnew du ti es to which he II'IIS assignct!. Due to near-zero illuminmio n conditions.
the comprCSSl-d planning timeline uooer which spccilll o perations forces rout inely op;.-rmed. and
lhe experience 11.'1'1.'1o f one non- pilot crew chief. the C H-4 70 Air Mission his
ll\'ial ion Insk force comm:andl"T detemlilll-d Ihe mission 10 be high risk . Bcrausc o f lhe high-risk
assessment. the mission h3d 10 be approl'ed b), Ihe hig her hl.'adq uaners commllnder lOr the
special operations Insk force and b), the suppon ing al-;at ion brigade commllndCT.

4. ;\fissioIJ Exccmioo.

11. Afler Ilircrcw members and Ilss:\Ull force members conducted their pre-miss io n briefings.
'he Ranger- led nssmll, force depaned fro m their forwmd opCTa1 ing base o nboard thc two C II-
47 D heli co pt ers to oonducttheir mi ssio n in the T angi Va lle y. At 2258: o n 5 August. both C Il-
470s touched down simuh ancousl), ntthe hel ico ptCT lalKling w ne. ofT-londl-d the :lSsauh force.
lind to the forw llfll opl.'l'ating 10 refucl and a\\'lIit the ClKl of lhe mission extraction
o r poss ible et\:lualty e''IIcullIion. WhcI11he assault force arrived at Ihe !UrgC! compound.
overheoo manned and aircraft obs.:r\'ed sc l'<'ra1 ])CfSOllnd dep:u1 ing the IllfgCl nrca.
At 2330. lhe AH-M Apache allack and posit i\'ely idenl ifi\-d SWpccled
Talib.3n fighlers:umcd \\'ith AK-4 7 rifles and RI'G l3uncocT:S wa lking in a si ngle ti le
Ilppro:timatcl)' 400 mclers nonhwest orthe largd compound. AfI('f elearance to fire.
onc AH-64 cond ucted two engagement s w ith i1 S 30mm gun. ult imatc1y rcsult ing in six enemy
killed . 1be twO rcm'lining!l.TTllCd encmy disappeared into a >land o f ln:es and WCTe
newr IoClll\'tl. At the same l ime. n second Sl,'pamtc group of suspc-cted Tnliban were
continuously monitored by the team oflSR nircraft o\'erhc!ld. B)' 0245 on 6 ,\uguSI. the Ranger-
!cod assault force had cleared and secur,'Il all build ings in 'he largctllrea. dL1aincd severa l
pcl'SQ nncl. and were eo nlluct ing Metical questioning.

b. 111!oughoutlhc eXL'Cul ion of the mi ssion. lhe ol'erhead ISR airc raft eOnliJWL-d 10 lrack the
movement ofnoo lhl.'I' group 0 f SUSpcCl l-d T ulibnn fighlers. This group (o m ...-.:l around tWO
personnel who WCTe ObSCTYed moving oo"hwcst from the immed iate " ieinit ), o f the I:USl'l W'e:J..
befo re Ihe Ranger- led assau ll fo rce had l1ITi\'oo. These 111'0 suspected T alib.3n fighl CTS WL-re
b)' otncr suspected cncmy p..-rso!Ul\.'1 as the), conlinued 10 mol·1.' away from Ihl.' Ranlo'1.-r-It.'Il
lISS3u ll fo ree. By 02 15. this group which had grown 10 approximatdy 9- 10
suspected T nliban ii ghlers had spl it into 111'0 sub-groups: l!tree o f them in a sl311d o fl r«s. while
' he olher six o r SC\<en remained inside lIealby bui lding locall'll 2 kilomctCJs fro m

Page 33
SU!)JECT: Surrunary (Crash ofCI I· -I 7D in Wardak
on 6 2011)

the originn l targct compound. Back Dt tlte forward opcn!ting blse. tile spcc inl opcr:ltions task
force commander and Immed ime Rcnction Fore<: commnnder continuously monitoroo the
situ:uion. As the number o f 5U5pected Tal iba n lighters grew. the special opermion5 tDsk
commander and Immediatc Reaction Forcc commander discussed thc tactical situat ion and.
belicving that the TfU1gi Vallcy Toliban leader. Qari Tahir. might be among the group of9·10
5USpccted Taliban fighters. initially dL'Cided to employ a 17·man Immediate Reaction Force
(IRF). Navy SEALs.

5. IIW Employmelll

a. At 0100 the aviation plannl'T rccci\'Lxl a warning ordL'T to ins<.-r1 the Reaction
Force's (I RF) by helicopler and begnn eoordin.m xl miss ion planning with the l RI:'s op,,'r ations
o Oicer. The pl:mn.."Tll needed to find a he licopler landing zone closc to the group o f9· 10
suspected Taliban fighlers 10 prevent their escape and suitable for DC H·4 7D land ing ass:lull
forcc:s. The a\i:llion and IRF plalllll.'T$ ultimately selttled a bnding ZOIlC Ihal \\':lS sludkd and
approved for 0 previous mission. but ne\'L'T uS<.' d. ,\I 0 150. the Aviation Brigade Commander
approved Ihe landing zooc. ,'1.10200. the special operalions lask comm:mdcr and the IRF
C()mmandl'T considered the number of enemy pc!'SOMel. the need to i!1(;rease the immediate
reaction force' s capab ilities wilh an (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3) and addit1ol1ll1 :lS!I.3ult support
elements. !lfId Ihe prolxlbility of a daylight movement OUI of the area after a success fu l assa ult 10
be pichxl up by hclicopK"1'S Ih e following night (6-7 AUgu5t). BaSlxl upon tho se considcrmious.
the opera tions t!lSk fo rce increased the I RF's 51ze from 17 to 32 pt.'Tsonncl. including 17
Navy SEAL team members. lil"c NO\'a l Specinl Operations support persctUld. Ihree U.S. Air
Force Special Tactics Ainnen. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3) and a military working dog. With the
addilion of an interprder. the [RF aIT1>'ed allhe nircra ft with }} passenger.;. ACl'Ording to tile
a\'iation task fo rce commander immedi ately responsible for tile helieoptl'f support. an in formlxl
t:x1 ica l II':IS made \0 load all IWt'SOl1I'II:l on one aircraft because the I RF COlllmander
10 mass lroops quic kly. and 10 mil igate the increased risk to a 5e(:ond helicoptl'T
the land ing zooc.

b. At 0222. bolh C H-47D hclil'OptCTS dl1latlOO Ihe forwarding opcl';lting bas<: wilh (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) tl)'ing the le3d C hinook III:'lieopter. The hclil'Optcrs
too k a differenl route to cnll'T Ihe Tang; Valle)' from Ihe roule Ihey had 110wn earlil'T that night 10
in sert Ihe Rnngl'T assau lt force. Instead of enlering the vo Ilcy fwmthe sc ulh. Ihe CIl·" 7D
carrying lh c IRF would enter from the nort hwest. 11\e flew "blacked out" (wilhout
any visibl e lighting or e;o;tl'TTlal beacons 10 r1Imk their locations). \\1\cn bolh uircrntl were 5ix
minut c:s from the landing 7.011e. the tfnil aircraft. empty c;o;cept for its alrcre\\'. circling at a
pre·determined hold ing point to awaitthc lead helieopter' s r<:lum. The lead C H·47D cominued
to the area mak ing standard rad io call s to update ils flight progreSl! \0 fire support and
sur.cillaocc aireraft o\·erhead . A ft cr nuking ils "on.: minulc" OUi radio Ihe helicopter
earr)ing the IRF descended 10 Dppro;o;imDlely 100 - ISO fttl abovc ground !c:\'cl and slowed to
50 knols (58 mph) 115 it !1(;3rlxlthe land ing zooc from the nol1hWI:SI. A pre\10usly
undctecled group o f suspected Taliba n fighlcrs fired 1"'0 or Ihrcc Rl'Gs in rapid succession fro m
the: lower om two·5\Ory mud·brick build ing appro;o;imately 220 south oftllO; C H·4 70 .
The ftrst RPG missed Ihe helicopter. but the Sl'CO OO RI'G struck one of the blad es on the aft rotor
asscmbl)' and e;o;plodOO. compromising the siructurol integrily and causing 3 rnpid chain

Page 34
SU BJECT: ExecuTive Summ.1ry (Crnsh ofC H·47D Aircraft in Wan.lak Province. Afghanislan
on 6 August 2011)

resulling in Ihe loss of over 10 feel of The TOlor blade. With in a man er o f sccor.ds. while the
aircrafl spun \·io lendy. Tile aft. Iht'll forwanl TOlor blade sysTems SCp.uatl-d from The airerofl. and
Ihe main fuselage dropped \'er1ically into a dry creek bcd. The airframe WlU imml-d iaTcly
engulfed in n l:u-gc fireball . causing mulliplc Sl"Condary explosions o f fuel and muniTions until the
aircf3fi burned OUI scvernl hours The dest ruction oflhe CH·47D roTor S)'STe m from The
roch1 pro('IClIcd grenade until the helicopTer et!lSh into Ihe creck Ix.-d. lik ely InsTl-d le s9 than 5
seconds. Fire suppon and surveill ance assCiS immediaTely shifted focus TO The crash site. lind one
of A 11·64 Apache helicoptCTS fired 30 mm ro ulld s just west of The RI'G poinT of origin
to suppress nny potenTial enemy aCTil'ily in The l'icini Tyof lm: crash sileo

6. Rcc()\'cl')' Operations, Following the shool·oown. lhe Ranger-led assnull force bl!gan a rapid
foot rt1O\'ementto the ernsh site. "t 04 12. Ihe assault force was the first elcrnel\! 10 amI'" aTtbe
crash sile, establ ished a securit y perimeter around it. wId hcgan SC!lrching for survivors. The
aSSllult force in itially d isl;o\'ered twch-e frknd ly rem!lins. but could not imml-d iately
re«lwry efron s due to secondary cllplo5ions from within the wrI."Ckage. Wilhin minuTCS. The 20-
man Pathfinder clement (downed aircJaft rl"SCUe and recovery unil) from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c joined the asS3ult force to :lSSist in sit e sccurit y and rL'CO\'Cf}' o f renuins from Ihe

wrc<:kBge. By 1038, eight hours aller tn.: CTllsh. the Ranger Platoon Leader had acoounTcd for all
38 frie!ldly remains, as well as Ihe mi1iT!lI)' workin g dog, While The RangL'1' platoon and
I'!llhfindcr clemenT were recovering lhe relnainiii. a U.S. ground con\'oy was dril'ing towards Ihe
crosh si te 10 assist in recol'Cf}' efforts. clearing sel'eral imprOl'iSl-d dCl'icl's a long Ihe
rou tc. At ap prollimalely 1625, all 0 f Ihe remains were loaded abomd the gIOuml oonl'o), lind
dri ven away from the crash sitc 10 the securi ty of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Complicating
recovcry eflorts on the !lftcmoon o f 6 "ugUS! 2011 . a Ilash 1100d swcptthrough the creek bt.-d 10
a of 4·5 feCI. washing parts of the wreckage up 10 200 IlI<."1CTS downslre!lllL On 1m: night of
6 AugUSt. a st.'COnd Rangl' f platoon. a four·man Combat Search and Rescue Tea ll\,!lnd an
Eliplosi\'e Ordl\llnce Dispo$:ll spedal ist rd;e\'ed the first Rangl'r-JL'd ns.s:ault force. which had
been in the \':)l1e), sinec Iheir helicopter insenion Ihe pr;."I'ious night. '\ 5 unn)' as 140 pcrsolUlCI
\I-ere present to :lSSisl in recovCf}' efforts. On 9 J\ugusl 2011. U.S, forces removal of
the aircrafl wreckage.

7, Cuuse o/th" DC(J/h. As oflhe dateof lh is rcpon. the final autopsies for eaeh of lhe casualties
ha l'e enterallheir final rel'iew. As a result of Ill)' discussions wi! h Ihe r-.lcdic!ll ElIUIl!incr aT
DOI'l'1' Air Force Base. [ ass;.'Ss Ih:lt I he injuries susta ined by nI l 38 Jl<.'TSOnnel 1I'0ul(1 hal'e
them and were mo stlikcly rJpidly fmal.

8. Fimllllgs. The findings of this ;nl'esTigal ion fn ll inTO three m:lin aI"C!ls.

a. Cuuse oflhe crash. The CH·47D h-clicoptCf was shot oown with:m RPG firal by a
SUSpI."Cled Taliban fighler lU the IlI:licoplcr ncarl-d its landing 7.oflt'. The dec ision to load Ihe IRF
onlOOllc CH-47D in order to mitigate ris.): b)' min imizing nircrall ellpo5urc 10 ground fire 1100 to
mass the lISSllu lT force \\'as t3CIica ll y solUld. The shoot down was 1101 The rcsull o f a b.liT ro
ambush. but rather the result o f The enemy hoeing a heightl"l\;.-d stale o fa len dlle to 3 Y, hours of
ongoing coal ition air oper.ltions ol'er the nonhwestern ponion of lhe Tangi \Inlier.

Page 35
SU BJECT: Ex«ulh'c Summary (Crash 0[CI-I·47 D Airl:r.lfi in Wardak Pro,·ince. 1\ i"ghanisHIIl
o n 6 August 20] 1)

b. Airerc", qlllllijiCfJliol1S 1I11llllircraft C/lfXlbililil.".f. (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)were the pilot s on board the (]ownoo CH·47D nircratl, wi th (b)(3), (b)(6)
serving 09 the
Pilot-in-Co mmand (PC) that night. Although recent ly a C II·470 PC, (b)(3), (b)(5)

was;) well·respecteU 3iJd c."Ipcricncoo pilOl with ol o[ tOlnl time and ne:u- I)' 100
hours of combat time in the prel'ious two months. (b)(3), (b)(6) \\' as also paired wit h a hiGhly
experienced C U·47D Chinook pilot. Although I\Ot conclusi,'c. the evidcn«:" ruggl"StS(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)w!lS t1}'ing the aircrull . (b)(3), (b)(6) WIIS alllOng the Army National Guard's most
ul'intors with 4,600 hours of total l1 igl11 t ime in 'mious aircraft. inelmi ing more
than 2, 100 hours in CH·47D C hinoo k helicopters. (b)(3), (b)(6) W:IS Il lso an experienced combat
pilot llSSigncd as the unit's Senior Instructor Pitot in 2006·07 in support ofOIF, wherc he
accumulated 719 hours of combat time. Each erc\\'nICmhcr was IUlly qun lified to perform the
:lirerew duties to which he W:IS :tSSigned. The en:'w flairing re llccted a conscious commJnd effort
to mitigate risk by using the best possible crews DVDibble rather than adh.."TinS to unit or
co mponem alignment. This mitignt ion measure Ii Iso flrovided greater long·tenn stability and
allowed for the oominuit y 0 f suppon rdat ions hlflS het \\"een the 31'Iotiol1 tagk fo rce al1d the special
opcT:ltions task force. The C H·47D lcad uirer:lll. \\"1lS Full>' Mis.sio n ( FMC) on the l1i!!:ht
of 5 - 6 August 2011. The hclicOflllT W:lS equipped \\"ith all of the thenl er·req uired Threat
CountmllclSUres S}"litctTLY AirCl1l11 Sur.. Eq uipnu."1lt (ASE). Ain.TlIfi pcr[orm:lncc was
more th:m adeq uate to complete the us.signed mi ssion.

e. Plwming. The invcsligUlion disclosed that the spec ial oper:ltiol1s t\l.Sk forcc comm:lllder
did not realioc:lte the intelligence, survei ll ance and (ISR) aircrall. to ell.'lure
surveillllnce OOVlTllgC for ongoin!!: (Rllllger· :lssauh force) und tile inbound Immcdiutc
Reaction Force (IRF) mission. While this finding oot a cause orille ShOol-down or cr:lSh, ;t
is II notc\\"onhy aspca of the colllflfessed pl:l11n ing process thai should be addressed in future tRF
missions. The evidence al so d isclosed that the enlplQ}mCm of airct:lfl O"cyhcad prior to II
heliooplcr in scnio n should be belter s}Tlehroniz.cll to minimize possible carty \\":lming to the
CTlcmy of immine11\ ground opcrnt

9. POSIIIll'CSliglllion Reql'ireml'l1Is, T he investigation repon h:15 b<.-..:n pro" id C"d to, und uccl"ptOO
by. Co mm:ln(kT, US Centra l COllUnaoo. Once aflflro,·cd. I will flro" ide a dc:taill-d f:lmily briei:

10. The point o f comaC1 for this act ion is the undersigned.

V!tl-
KCO LT
US . Anny
Ir i • Officer

Page 36
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 37
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 38
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 39
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 40
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(2), (b)(6)

Page 41
 SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO

Exhibit Index
Exhibit
Document Title/Description TAB
Number

1 TF(b)(1)1.4a& TF(b)(1)1.4aINVESTIGATION TEAM IN-BRIEF TESTIMONY (S//NF) 1

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , TF , TF
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , TM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6) , 1/B PLT LDR, 1/B PLT SGT, TF
2 2
, 1/B
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c RECCE, JTAC) INTERVIE

3 CONOP (TF – TM(b)(3), (b)(6) LEFTY GROVE PR (06AUG11) (S//REL FVEY)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 3

4 TF INVESTIGATION TEAM IN-BRIEF (15AUG11) (S//NF)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
4

5 TASK FORCE NVESTIGATION TEAM IN-BRIEF (15AUG11) (S//REL ACGU)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
5

6 UNIT CREW AND AIRCRAFT BACKGROUND NARRATIVE.24AUG11 (S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO) 6

7 FLIGHT RECORDS (IATF-IFRF) (U//FOUO) 7

8 ALERT AND MOB ORDER FOR B7-138 (USAR) NEW CENTURY KS AND B2-138 (CONEARNG) (S) 8

9 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (CDR, S3, TACOPS, INTEL ANALYST, S-2 NCOIC) INTERVIEW (S) 9

10 AAAR FOR CH-47C 69-17113 (1974) (U//FOUO) 10

11 AAAR FOR CH-47D 69-17113 (1981) (U//FOUO) 11

12 AAAR FOR CH-47D 84-14175 (1986) (U//FOUO) 12

13 AAAR for CH-47D 84-14175 (1990) (U//FOUO) 13

14 AAAR FOR CH-47D-84-14175 (2000) (U//FOUO) 14

15 AAAR FOR CH-47D 84-14175 (2003) (U//FOUO) 15

TH
16 TF
(b)(1)1.4a, 10
(b)(1)1.4c CAB WSV MOA (11DEC10) (S//NF) 16

17 (S) TAIL NUMBER FOR EXTORTION (S) 17

18 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE HISTORY SUMMARY (U//FOUO) 18

19 SITE C POST-FLOOD PHOTOS (U//FOUO) 19

TH
20 10 CAB S2 INTERVIEW (S) 20

21 TF ASPS CJ2 CHOPS INTERVIEW (S)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
21

Derived from: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO

Page 42
 SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO

22 TF
(b)(1)1.4a, TEAM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2
(b)(1)1.4c INTERIEW (S) 22

23 JSOAD INTEL INTERVIEW (S) 23

24 TF
(b)(1)1.4a, CSG
(b)(1)1.4c ANALYST INTERVIEW (S) 24

25 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c S2 CONOP SUMMARY (18AUG2011) (S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO) 25

TF
(b)(1)1.4a, CJ2
(b)(1)1.4c CHOPS OBJECTIVE LEFTY GROVE ASSESSMENT (17AUG11) (S//REL USA, ISAF,
26 26
NATO)
TH
27 10 CAB S2 SAFIRE SUMMARY STORYBOARDS (17AUG11) (S//REL ACGU) 27

28 TM (b)(3), (b)(6) CONOP BRIEF OBJ LEFTY GROVE (051800ZAUG11) (S//REL FVEY) 28

29 TF (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, A AVIATION DISPOSITION CAO 09AUG11 (S//REL ACGU) 29

30 IJC FRAGO 112_2010 (DS RW SPT) (NATO/ISAF SECRET) 30

31 IJC FRAGO 614_2010 (b)(1)1.4a,

(TF DS RW SPT) 28OCT10 (NATO/ISAF SECRET)
(b)(1)1.4c 31

32 IJC FRAGO 614.MODI 2010 (b)(1)1.4a,

(TF DS RW SPT) 26NOV10 (NATO/ISAF SECRET)
(b)(1)1.4c 32

33 1 PLT B CO PLT LDR AND PLT SGT INTERVIEW (17AUG11) (S) 33

34 TF
(b)(1)1.4a, MISSION
(b)(1)1.4c SUMMARY HIGH RISK MISSION PROVINCES (18AUG11) (S) 34

35 OBJ LEFTY GROVE 5 AUG 2011 (b)(1)1.4a,

_ TF (b)(1)1.4c
CONOP-ACMB (S//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL, POL) 35

36 WARNO TEAM (b)(3), (b)(6) OBJ LEFTY GROVE (S) 36

37 (b)(3), (b)(6) SWORN STATEMENT (062200LAUG11) (U//FOUO) 37

38 (b)(3), (b)(6) SWORN STATEMENT (062200LAUG11) (U//FOUO) 38

39 NOT USED 39

40 INITIAL AC-130 AIRCREW INTERVIEW (S) 40

41 TF
(b)(1)1.4a, ISR SYNCH
(b)(1)1.4c MATRIX (5AUG11) (S//REL ACGU) 41

42 ISR SYNC MATRIX (5AUG11) (S//REL ACGU) 42

43 ISR SYNC MATRIX (6AUG11) (S//REL ACGU) 43

44 TF
(b)(1)1.4a, TM (b)(3), (b)(6) OBJ
(b)(1)1.4c LEFTY GROVE SENSOR TASKING SUMMARY (S//REL ACGU) 44

SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO

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45 1-B (PL, PSG, RECCE TL, JTAC) &(b)(1)1.4a,

TF SEA) INTERVIEW (S)
(b)(1)1.4c 45

46 EXTORTION CREW INTERVIEW (S)

(b)(3), (b)(6) 46

47 TF (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, JOC LOGS 5-7 AUG 11 (S) 47

48 TF (CDR, J3, SEA & TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J3) INTERVIEW (S)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
48

49 (b)(3), (b)(6) INTERVIEWS (S) 49

50 TF
(b)(1)1.4a, JOC
(b)(1)1.4c LOG (S) 50

51 (b)(3), (b)(6) (AH-64D AWT) GUN TAPE (S) 51

52 TF
(b)(1)1.4a, LEFTY
(b)(1)1.4c GROVE CONOP APPROVAL TIMELINE (S) 52

53 AH-64D ATTACK WEAPONS TEAM ( (b)(3), (b)(6)

AIRCREWS INTERVIEW (S) 53

54 TRANSCRIPT - AH-64 FMV (GUN2 – TAPE5) (S) 54

DETAILED OBJ LEFTY GROVE EXTORTION 17 CRASH STORYBOARD (092300ZAUG11) (S//REL

55 55
USA, ISAF, NATO)

56 TF
(b)(1)1.4a, JOC
(b)(1)1.4c LOG 9AUG11 (S) 56

TH
57 HHC 10 CAB TOC LOG 122200ZAUG11.ABSTRACT.EXTORTION17.CRASH (U//FOUO) 57

58 TIMELINE – 22 AUG 2011 EMAIL FROM JBAD FLIGHT LEAD (U//FOUO) 58

59 TF
(b)(1)1.4a, JOC
(b)(1)1.4c LOG 8AUG11 (S) 59

60 ASDAT 2011-08-05 CH47D EX17 DRAFT 3 (25 AUG 11) (S) 60

61 EMAIL FROM (b)(6) TO BG COLT W.ATTACH.24 AUG 11 (U//FOUO) 61

62 TF
(b)(1)1.4a, CSG
(b)(1)1.4c POST INCIDENT THREAT VHF SUMMARY (7AUG11) (S//REL FVEY) 62

63 TF
(b)(1)1.4a, CSG
(b)(1)1.4c POST INCIDENT THREAT VHF SUMMARY (8AUG11) (S//REL FVEY) 63

64 INVESTTMINTEL ENEMY VHF PTT TIMELINE SUMMARY 20110819 (S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO) 64

65 PATHFINDER INTERVIEW (S) 65

66 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CONSOLIDATED TIMELINE (S) 66

67 (b)(3), (b)(6) (AH-64D AWT) GUN TAPE (S) 67

SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO

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68 TF
(b)(1)1.4a, GENERAL
(b)(1)1.4c TIMELINE (MACRO) OBJ LEFTY GROVE 20110820 (S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO) 68

69 WARNO (TF TM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)
OBJ LEFTY GROVE (05AUG11) (S) 69

70 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c DUTY LOG (U//FOUO) 70

71 OBJ LEFTY GROVE-EXTORTION 17 ISR LINE-UP (S) 71

72 NOT USED 72

73 PATHFINDERS AAR (UNSIGNED) 06AUG11 FALLEN ANGEL EXTORTION 1-7 (U//FOUO) 73

74 CONOP BRIEF TIME(b)(1)1.4a,

TO CDR (S//NF)
(b)(1)1.4c 74

75 NOT USED 75

76 MC-130H OPSUM VER 3.4 (S) 76

77 KNEEBOARD PLANNED LOGAR ROUTE (S) 77

78 CH ERAW EPA 6 AUG (S) 78

TH
79 10 CAB ILLUMINATION GUIDELINES 20110820 (U//FOUO) 79

80 AH (b)(3), (b)(6) ERAW 5AUG (S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO) 80

81A TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

JOC LOG 04AUG1 (U//FOUO) 81

81B TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c JOC LOG 04AUG2 (U//FOUO) 82

81C TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c JOC LOG 04AUG3 (U//FOUO) 83

81D TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

JOC LOG 05AUG1 (U//FOUO) 84

81E TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

JOC LOG 05AUG2 (U//FOUO) 85

81F TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c JOC LOG 06AUG1 (U//FOUO) 86

81G TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

JOC LOG 06AUG2 (U//FOUO) 87

81H TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c JOC LOG 06AUG3 (U//FOUO) 88

82 SR05 5AUG2011 STORYBOARD (S) 89

83 AC-130 AIRCREW RE-INTERVIEW (S) 90

SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO

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84 (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR-PSG INTERVIEW (S) 91

85 TF
(b)(1)1.4a, COLLECTION
(b)(1)1.4c MANAGER INTERVIEW (S) 92

86 TF CDR INTERVIEW (S)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 93

87 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (CDR & S3) SECOND INTERVIEW (S) 94

88 (b)(3), (b)(6) RE-INTERVIEW (S) 95

89 TF
(b)(1)1.4a, HARC
(b)(1)1.4c CHIEF INTERVIEW (S) 96

SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO

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CONTAINS PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

CH-47 CRASH INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW WITNESSES

TASK FORCE(b)(1)1.4a, BAGRAM AIR BASE, AFGHANISTAN

EXHIBIT REPORT ID RANK SERVICE NAME (LAST, FIRST)

2 TF J2 USA
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
1 TF J3 USA
1 JSOAC CDR USA
1 JSOAD CDR (b)(3), (b)(6) USA (b)(6), (b)(3)

1 JSOAD DIR USA

1 TF (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, DEP J3 USA
23 JSOAC INTEL USAF

TASK FORCE(b)(1)1.4a, BAGRAM AIR BASE, AFGHANISTAN

EXHIBIT REPORT ID RANK SERVICE NAME (LAST, FIRST)

1 JSOTF CDR USA
1 JSOTF J2 USA
1 JSOTF J3 USA
85 JSOTF COLL MGR USMC
24 JSOTF CSG (b)(3), (b)(6) CIV (b)(6), (b)(3)

21 ASPS CIV
21 J2 CHOPS USAF
21 DEPUTY J2 CHOPS USAF
89 HARC CHIEF CIV

10TH COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE, BAGRAM AIR BASE, AFGHANISTAN

EXHIBIT REPORT ID RANK SERVICE NAME (LAST, FIRST)

49, 88 10 CAB CDR USA
49, 88 10 CAB DCO USA
20 10 CAB S2 USA
49, 88 10 CAB S3 (b)(3), (b)(6) USA (b)(6), (b)(3)

20 10 CAB ASST S2 USA

49 10 CAB SP USA
49 10 BDE CSM USA

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CONTAINS PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

CH-47 CRASH INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW WITNESSES

3/D RANGERS, FOB (b)(1)1.4a, AFGHANISTAN

EXHIBIT REPORT ID SERVICE NAME (LAST, FIRST)

84 3/D PLT LDR (b)(3), (b)(6)
USA
(b)(6), (b)(3)
84 3/D PSG USA

TASK FORCE (b)(1)1.4a, FOB (b)(1)1.4a , AFGHANISTAN

EXHIBIT REPORT ID RANK SERVICE NAME (LAST, FIRST)

2, 48 TF CDR USN
2 TF J2 USN
(b)(1)1.4a
2, 48 TF J3 USN
2, 45 TF SEA USN
22 TM (b)(1)1.4a J2 (b)(3), (b)(6) USN (b)(3), (b)(6)

2, 33, 45 1/B PLT LDR USA

2, 33, 45 1/B PLT SGT USA
2, 45 1/B SNIPER TL USA
2, 45 1/B JTAC USAF
*STATIONED AT FOB (b)(1)1.4a AFGHANISTAN.

TASK FORCE (b)(1)1.4a FOB (b)(1)1.4a

AFGHANISTAN

EXHIBIT REPORT ID RANK SERVICE NAME (LAST, FIRST)

9, 87 TF CDR USA
9, 87 TF S3 USA
(b)(1)1.4a
9 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) USA (b)(6), (b)(3)

9, 38 TF TACOPS USA
9 S-2 NCOIC USA

EXTORTION CREW, FOB

(b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a AFGHANISTAN

EXHIBIT REPORT ID RANK SERVICE NAME (LAST, FIRST)

37, 46 EXT FLT AMC USA
46 EXT(b)(1)1.4aPC USA
46 RIGHT DOOR (b)(3), (b)(6) USA (b)(3), (b)(6)

46 LEFT DOOR USA

46 RAMP USA

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CONTAINS PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

CH-47 CRASH INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW WITNESSES

(b)(1)1.4a AC-130 AIRCREW, BAGRAM AIR BASE, AFGHANISTAN

EXHIBIT REPORT ID RANK SERVICE NAME (LAST, FIRST)

40 AIRCRAFT USAF
COMMANDER
40 COPILOT USAF
40 NAVIGATOR USAF
40 ELECTRONIC USAF
WARFARE
(b)(3), (b)(6)
OFFICER (b)(6), (b)(3)

40 AERIAL GUNNER USAF

40 FIRE CONTROL USAF
OFFICER
40 TELEVISION USAF
SENSOR
OPERATOR

(b)(1)1.4a , AH-64 AIRCREWFOB (b)(1)1.4a AFGHANISTAN

EXHIBIT REPORT ID RANK SERVICE NAME (LAST, FIRST)

53 BACKSEAT USA
53 FRONTSEAT USA
(b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(6), (b)(3)
53 BACKSEAT USA
53 FRONTSEAT USA

TASK FORCE PATHFINDERS, FOB (b)(1)1.4a AFGHANISTAN

EXHIBIT REPORT ID RANK SERVICE NAME (LAST, FIRST)

65 PATH CO CDR USA
65 PATH PLT LDR (b)(3), (b)(6) USA (b)(3), (b)(6)

65 PATH PLT SGT USA

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 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
CONTAINS PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

CH-47 CRASH INVESTIGATION TEAM

REPORT ID RANK SERVICE NAME (LAST, FIRST) SSN
IO BG USA COLT, JEFFREY
IO-DEP USA
SME-JSOAC USAF
SME-GFN1 USN
LA-DEP USA
LA USAF
PAO USA
SME-GFA USA
SME-INTEL USA
IO-AIDE USA
ASDAT1 USA
SME-MH47 USA (b)(6), (b)(3)
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
SME-CH47 USA
SME-NGB USA
ASDAT2 USA
ASDAT3 USA
ASDAT4 USA
SME-GFN2 USN
CR1 USA
CR2 USMC
CR3 USN
SME-CCAD USA
IO-SEC USA

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
CONTAINS PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION
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Source Key

1 – EX 66. TF (b)(1)1.4a CONSOLIDATED TIMELINE

2 – EX 47. TF (b)(3), (b)(6) JOC LOG.5-7 AUG 11
3 – EX 67. (b)(3), (b)(6)
GUN TAPE
4 – EX 68. GUN TAPE
5 – EX 59. TF (b)(1)1.4a JOC LOG.8 AUG 11
6 – EX 69. WARNO (TF (b)(1)1.4a TM (b)(1)1.4a ) OBJ LEFTY GROVE (05AUG11)
7 – EX 70. TF (b)(1)1.4a DUTY
8 – EX 37. (b)(3), (b)(6) WORN STATEMENT (062200LAUG11)
9 – EX 38. (b)(3), (b)(6) SWORN STATEMENT (062200LAUG11)
10 – EX 57. HHC 10 CAB TOC LOG.122000ZAUG11
11 – EX 16. TM (b)(1)1.4a CONOP BRIEF.OBJ LEFTY GROVE (051800ZAUG11)
12 – EX 71. OBJ LEFTY GROVE-EXTORTION 17 ISR LINE-UP
13 – EX 72. OBJ LEFTY GROVE SENSOR ALLOCATION V2 0
14 – EX 62. TF 3(b)(1)1.4a CSG_POST INCIDENT THREAT VHF SUMMARY (7AUG11)
15 – EX 73. Pathfinders AAR
16 – EX 56. TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJOC LOG.9 AUG 11
17 – EX 58. Timeline - 22 AUG 2011 email from JBAD Flight Lead
18 – EX 52. TF (b)(1)1.4a LEFTY GROVE CONOP APPROVAL TIME
19 – EX 50. TF JOC LOG
20 – EX 74. CONOP Brief Time to (b)(1)1.4a CDR
21 – EX 75. PRED
22 – EX 76. MC-130H OPSUM Version 3.4
23 - EX 77. TF General Timeline(Macro)
(b)(1)1.4a
24 – EX 48. TF CDR, SEA, J3 Interview

NOTE: Separate agency documents refer to the CH-47 flight as

(b)(3), (b)(6) and EXTORTION (b)(3), (b)(6)
17. For the sake of clarity,
the CH47-D EXTORTION flight will be referred to as EXTORTION
/17 throughout this timeline.
(b)(3), (b)(6)

NOTE: Minor discrepancies in reporting times exist across all

exhibits; while acknowledging the differences, this timeline
seeks to represent the most accurate version of events
surrounding the 06 AUG 11 crash of EXTORTION 17.

5 AUG – Local Time (Zulu Time equals Local Time minus 4.5 hours)

1830 CH-47 aircrews arrive at company command post and

proceed to preflight (1)
1856 7 geo-locates Objective LEFTY GROVE (23)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

1930 Attack Weapons Team (AWT; AH-64) (b)(3), (b)(6) B

(b)(3), (b)(6) ) arrive at company command post (1)

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1930 TF (b)(1)1.4a Planner receives WARNO for an SP of
1800Z for OBJ LEFTY GROVE (8)
1944 WARNO: TF (b)(1)1.4a - TM(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c- Objective LEFTY GROVE: TM
(b)(3), (b)(6) CONDUCTS Helicopter Assault Force (HAF) RAID IOT
C/K Objective LEFTY GROVE (QARI TAHIR); GRID IVO 42S
VC 83431 62373; Sayyid Abad District, Wardak Province
(2/6)
1945 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ) on
station (O/S) Objective LEFTY GROVE (12)
2100 Combined AH/CH Air Mission Brief for Objective LEFTY
GROVE (8)
2100 Objective LEFTY GROVE CONOP briefed to TF (b)(1)1.4a
Commander (20)
2115 TM (b)(1)1.4ar (1st Platoon, Bravo Company, (b)(3), (b)(6) ,
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ; further noted as 1/B) briefs
Objective LEFTY GROVE Operations Order (OPORD) (11)
2130 Objective LEFTY GROVE Concept of Operations (CONOP)
submitted via SIPRNet from TF (b)(1)1.4a to TF (b)(1)1.4a, F (b)(1)1.4c , TM
(b)(1)1.4a , and Joint Special Operations Aviation

Detachment (JSOAD) (8)

2130 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ) O/S Objective LEFTY GROVE (12)
2200 TF (b)(1)1.4a receives approval for Objective LEFTY
GROVE initial insertion from CAB CDR. (8)
2218 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ) Off-station from Objective LEFTY GROVE
(12)
2230 P (b)(3), (b)(6) departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a for Objective LEFTY GROVE
(3)
2240 EX (b)(1)1.4a,
17 (b)(1)1.4c departs FOB (b)(1)1.4ak for Sayyid Abad with 46
personnel and one Military Working Dog (MWD) to
retrieve Battle Space Owner (BSO) liaison (3/19)
2240 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c O/S Objective LEFTY GROVE (3)

2245 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ) O/S OBJ LEFTY GROVE (13)

2253 EX 17 depart Sayyid Abad for (b)(1)1.4a

2254 EX 17 reports 6 minutes to infil (b)(1)1.4a (3)

2256 EX 17 reports 3 minutes to infil (b)(1)1.4a (3)
2258 EX 17 (b)(3), (b)(6)wheels down at (b)(1)1.4a (3)
2259 EX 17 infil complete (b)(1)1.4a (3)
2300 EX 17 depart (b)(1)1.4a , en-route FOB (b)(1)1.4a (3)
2308 EX 17 arrival FOB (b)(1)1.4a , assume casualty alert
posture (19)
2323 1/B reports arrival at CP1 (19)
2327 While ground force conducts movement toward Objective
area, (b)(3), (b)(6) positively identifies (PID) eight (8)
(b)(3),(b)(6)

insurgents with RPGs and AK-47s (3)

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2328 1/B reports confirmation of (b)(3), (b)(6) sighting of eight
(8) individuals with RPGs and weapons leaving the
target area on the south side of the east road (19)
2330 (b)(3), (b)(6) reports insurgents maneuvering tactically in the

tree line toward 1/B (3)

2332 (b)(3), (b)(6) (Joint Terminal Attack Controller; JTAC)
clears Attack Weapons Team (AWT) to engage the
insurgent position (2/3)
2338 (b)(3), (b)(6)
engages insurgents with 30 mm (3)
2339 (FMV) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (AC-130) report two
insurgents fleeing engagement area moving west (3)
2344 (b)(3), (b)(6) passes assessment of 5 enemy killed in action

from previous engagement (EKIA) (3)

2345 The TF (b)(1)1.4at commander at the recommendation of the
T (b)(3), (b)(6) considers using the
immediate reaction force (IRF) to interdict insurgents
fleeing Objective LEFTY GROVE to the northwest. (EX 1)
2346 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c requests(b)(3), (b)(6)conduct re-attack on insurgent
position (3)
2351 (b)(3), (b)(6) completes re-attack with 30 mm on the original
insurgent position (3)
2352 1/B at Objective Rally Point (ORP) (19)

6 AUG

0008 1/B reports primary target buildings isolated (19)

0012 1/B reports commencing callout on primary target
buildings. (19)
0012 1/B dispatches element to interdict two insurgents
fleeing engagement area (19)
0029 1/B element conducts battle damage assessment of AWT
engagement, reports one additional EKIA (19)
0030 TF (b)(1)1.4at J3 issues WARNO to IRF to interdict insurgents
that fled approximately two kilometers from Objective
LEFTY GROVE (11)
0030 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c UAV O/S Objective LEFTY GROVE (12)
0049 1/B reports isolation set on northern target
buildings. Tactical Questioning (TQ) and Sensitive
Sight Exploitation (SSE) are ongoing in primary target
buildings. (19)
0049 1/B interdiction element estimates total of six (6)
EKIA from AWT engagement. (19)
0100 TF (b)(1)1.4a Planner receives WARNO for possible IRF
insertion of 17 PAX (8)

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0135 TF (b)(1)1.4a commander approves IRF insertion to HLZ
(b)(1)1.4a , and increases force size from 17 to 32 (18)
0135 TF (b)(1)1.4a Planner updates TF (b)(1)1.4a Battle Captain
of TF (b)(1)1.4a intention to insert IRF (9)
0140 TF (b)(1)1.4a Planner notifies EX (b)(3)/17 by FM radio of
IRF mission (4)
0140 (b)(3) informs (b)(3) 3 that suspected insurgents who
fled the target area are now in a compound
approximately 2.8km to the northwest of Objective
Lefty Grove.
0140 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) Assistant S3 delivers hard copy of HLZ
imagery to EX 17 only (8)
0145 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) Planner contacted by 10th Combat Aviation
Brigade (CAB) Commander ( (b)(3) ) to discuss HLZ
(b)(3), (b)(6) nd verifies the Ground Tactical Plan (8)
0148 EX 17/(b)(3) assume REDCON level 1 (19)
0150 TF K (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR (KH6) and the 10th CAB CDR (F6)
discuss suitability of HLZ G(b)(3), (b)(6) ; HLZ (b)(3), (b)(6)s approved
by F6 (8)
0150 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Planner receives notification by TF
K (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR that HLZ (b)(3) IRF infil is approved
0200 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c mmander directs TF (b)(3), (b)(6) Planner to
infil IRF as soon as possible with a minimum force of
32 instead of 17 (8)
0200 (b)(3), (b)(6) k Tactical Operations Center (TOC) directs
EXTORTION 17 (b)(3) move to staging area and pick up 32
IRF personnel. (9)
0200 (b)(3), (b)(6) (U-28) off-station from Objective LEFTY GROVE

(12)
0200 (b)(3), (b)(6) (B-350) O/S Objective LEFTY ROVE (12)
0205 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TOC contacts EXTORTION 17/(b)(3) via FM radio
to determine if they are capable of infiltrating an
IRF of 32, plus one MWD. (8)
0205 EXTORTION 17/(b)(3) confirms via FM radio they are capable
of inserting 32 personnel via single ship (8)
0206 1/B reports primary target buildings clear and secure,
begins sensitive sight exploitation (SSE) of AWT
engagement. SSE yields: 6 x EKIA, 2 x AK-47, 1 x RPG,
6 x fragmentation grenades, 2 x ICOM radios, 6 x SCION
handsets(19)
0209 EXTORTION 17 (b)(3) reports to (b)(3), (b)(6) TOC via FM radio
that the IRF is composed of 33 IRF personnel, plus one
MWD and they are at REDCON level 1, awaiting AWT to
refuel (19)
0214 AWT depart FOB (b)(3), (b)(6) for HLZ (b)(3), (b)(6) (4)
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0222 EXTORTION 17 (b)(3) departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a for infil of IRF at
HLZ (b)(3), (b)(6)s 1/19)
0224 EXTORTION (b)(3) established in holding pattern north of
HLZ (b)(3), (b)(6) (2/4)
0225 EXTORTION 17 reports 6 minutes out from HLZ (b)(3), (b)(6)
(2/4)
0232 EXTORTION 17 reports ‘4 minutes out’ from HLZ (b)(3), (b)(6)
(4)
0233 (b)(3), (b)(6) establishes orbit in vicinity of (IVO) HLZ
(b)(3), (b)(6) (3)
0233 (b)(3), (b)(6) continues to monitor the suspected compound

where the insurgents fled (4)

0233 EXTORTION 17 reports 3 minutes out from HLZ (b)(3), (b)(6)s (4)
(b)(3), (b)(6) notifies EXTORTION 17 (b)(3) determines HLZ (b)(3), (b)(6)
to have no enemy activity (“ICE”) (4)
0236:47 EXTORTION 17 requests (b)(3), (b)(6) (AC-130) illuminate
(“sparkle”) HLZ G(b)(3), (b)(6) with Infrared (IR) designator
(4)
0236:58 (b)(3), (b)(6) (AC-130) notifies EXTORTION 17 that HLZ is
illuminated with IR designator (“burn is on”) (4)
0237:03 EXTORTION 17 reports IR designator on HLZ (b)(3) s in

sight (“Burn in Sight”) (4)

0238:36 EXTORTION 17 reports “One Minute, one minute” out from
HLZ (b)(3), (b)(6) (4)
0238:47 (b)(3), (b)(6) acknowledges EXTORTION 17’s one minute out call

and informs EXTORTION 17 the HLZ is still illuminated

with the Infrared (IR) designator: “Copy, 1 minute.
Burn is still on” (4)
0238:59 (b)(3), (b)(6) reconfirms to EXTORTION 17 that there is no
enemy activity noted on HLZ (b)(3), (b)(6) : “LZ is still Ice”
(4)
0239:15 P(b)(3), (b)(6) element positively identifies EXTORTION 17
inbound for HLZ (b)(3), (b)(6) (3)
0239:22 P(b)(3), (b)(6)0 passes HLZ conditions, EXTORTION 17 acknowledges
(4)
0239:48 P(b)(3), (b)(6) states “There’s an explosion, there’s another…
explosion.” Further states: “Extortion is down.” (3/4)
0240:17 (b)(3), (b)(6) makes “Fallen Angel” NET call to all elements in
the Objective area indicating EXTORTION 17 has been
shot down(4)
0240:18 (b)(3), (b)(6) suppresses suspected enemy positions IVO the
suspected point of origin (POO)(3)
0240:18 establishes security orbit over crash site (3)
(b)(3), (b)(6) I
0240:36 notifies (b)(3), (b)(6) TOC that EXTORTION 17 has
been shot down (4)
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0242:59 P 5 relays to
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (AC-130) suspected POO of
RPG attack (3)
0243 (b)(3), (b)(6) TOC initiates downed aircraft procedures
(7)
0243 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) element notified of downed
aircraft (15)
0245 PB reports secondary explosions at crash site (1)
0245 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) duty log reports crash site IVO (b)(3)

(b)(3) (2/7)
0245 10th CAB Duty Officer notifies Division of downed
aircraft (10)
0248 EXTORTION (b)(3) remains in a holding pattern 3 miles from
crash site (1/7)
0250 1/B reports they are leaving all detainees on
Objective LEFTY GROVE and moving to crash site ASAP
(19)
0252 Additional AWT at FOB (b)(1)1.4a assumes REDCON level 2 (1)
0254 EXTORTION (b)(3) arrives at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (1)
0254 10th CAB Fire Support Officer (FSO) reports (b)(3), (b)(6)
(B1-B) nine (9) minutes away from crash site (10)
0255 10th CAB intelligence section reports (b)(3), (b)(6)N (MQ-1) UAV
O/S over crash site (10)
0256 (b)(3), (b)(6) (AC-130) assumes role as On-Scene Commander
(4)
0304 10th CAB FSO reports (b)(3), (b)(6) O/S at the EXTORTION 17
crash site (10)
0305 (b)(3), (b)(6) assumes REDCON level 1 (7)
0315 (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12) O/S IVO crash site (12)
0315 (b)(3), (b)(6) (2 x F-16) O/S IVO crash site (13)
0315 (b)(3), (b)(6) (EC-130) O/S IVO crash site (13)
0317 (b)(3), (b)(6) (MH-47) departs FOB (b)(3), (b)(6) en-route to
FOB (b)(3), (b)(6) to pick up 3rd Platoon, (b)(3), (b)(6) Company,(b)(3), (b)(6) d

(b)(3), (b)(6) ; further annotated as

3/D) en-route to FOB (b)(1)1.4a (19)
0319:18 (b)(3), (b)(6) observes secondary explosions IVO crash site (3)
0319:47 (b)(1)1.4a identifies two possible survivors, passes
information to 10th CAB (21) **Refuted after viewing(b)(3), (b)(6)
gun tapes and crew statements; coroner finds injuries
invalidate the initial report**
0321 AWT conducting containment fire (7)
0327:43 (b)(3), (b)(6) element identifies possible FKIA IVO crash site
for first time (3) **Refuted after viewing(b)(3), (b)(6)gun
tapes and crew statements; coroner finds injuries
invalidate the initial report**

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0328 10th CAB fire support element reports (b)(3), (b)(6) (2 x A-
10) 20 minutes out from crash site (10)
0330 (b)(3), (b)(6) (EA-6B) off-station from crash site (13)
0330 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ) reports insurgents IVO
(b)(6), (b)(7)c claim responsibility for downing of a
alition aircraft (14)
0340 indicates insurgents claiming credit for firing two
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

rounds at the ‘target’ (CF aircraft) (14)

0345 (b)(3), (b)(6) (2 x A-10) O/S over Crash site (13)
0347 reports insurgents have identified that coalition
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

elements had entered a field, surveyed the aircraft,

and then headed back to an unspecified road (14)
0350 TF (b)(1)1.4a approves launch of the (b)(3), (b)(6) element to
crash site (10)
0359 (b)(3), (b)(6) r element (20 pax) depart FOB (b)(1)1.4ak en-route
crash site on GALLANT 40/44 (2 x UH-60) (7/10)
0400 (b)(3) (MQ-1) O/S over crash site (12)
0401 B reports 150m from crash site (1/7)
0405 reports possible insurgent referenced earlier
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

( (b)(6), (b)(7)c ) informed(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that three weapons were set

in the area; one round hit the aircraft fired from a
gun in the middle. Unidentified insurgents (b)(6), (b)(7)c

and (b)(6), (b)(7)cn had fired at the aircraft, but only (b)(6), (b)(7)c
had hit the aircraft (14)
0405 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) reports there is one friendly spotted
10-15 meters o tside of crash site (10) **Refuted
after viewing(b)(3), B (b)(6)gun tapes and crew statements;

coroner finds injuries invalidate the initial report**

0407 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) k reports one coalition service member
recovered from Crash site by (b)(3), (b)(6) (10) **Refuted
after viewing(b)(3), (b)(6)gun tapes and crew statements**
0409 indicates insurgents were preparing to further
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

engage coalition forces, asking that a watchman be

instructed to fire a few rounds presumably aimed at
the coalition forces in the area (14)
0414 (b)(3), (b)(6) initiates suppressive fires IVO Pathfinder HLZ
(10)
0415 (b)(3), (b)(6) with Pathfinder element lands in HLZ
approximately 600m southeast of crash site. (1/4/7)
0415 (b)(3), (b)(6) reports visual contact of Pathfinder element,

but has not established radio communications (7)

0415 (b)(3), (b)(6) element with 3/D arrives at FOB (b)(1)1.4a (19)
0416 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c reports a(b)(3), (b)(6)intercept
that insurgents plan to fire on Coalition Forces
around the crash site (10)
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0419 1/B reports crash site secured, reports six friendly
KIA (FKIA). Secondary explosions forces 1/B to back-
off crash site (1/19)
0424 (b)(3), (b)(6) arrive FOB (b)(3), (b)(6)k (7)
0431 Pathfinder element reports 400m from crash site (1)
0433 Relief AWT (PB 66/47) reports departure from FOB (b)(1)1.4a
(8/10)
0433 (b)(3), (b)(6) TOC reports the Pathfinder element is in
communication with 1/B and is being over-watched by(b)(3), (b)(6)
. (10)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

0434 remains REDCON level 1. (7)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
0440 TOC reports (b)(3), (b)(6) O/S over crash site
(10)
0441 10th CAB updates 10th Mountain Division via Tandberg.
(10)
0446 10th CAB Battle NCO reports (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4e is
complete. (10)
0455 AWT spotted six possible insurgents on top of a roof
of a qalat; attempted to gain positive identification
(PID) of weapons. (10)
0457 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) reports 1/B completed link up with Pathfinder
element. (2)
0459 Pathfinder requests water (CL1) resupply. (7)
0502 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) k reports 67 total personnel on EX 17
crash site. (10)
0505 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) k reports (b)(3), (b)(6) (TF (b)(3), (b)(6) ) has
arrived at the crash site with five (5) vehicles and
twenty (20) personnel and has linked up with 1/B. (10)
0506 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) reports a total of 87 personnel on crash
site. (10)
0515 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) k reports resupply speedballs are loaded
with water and ammunition; will deliver when able (10)
0520 (b)(3), (b)(6) depart FOB (b)(1)1.4a en-route to crash site to
take back over site security. (1)
0520 10th CAB intelligence section reports that (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-
12) is reporting a group of PAX 300m from the crash
site; security element firing warning shots. (10)
0525 1/B reports a perimeter of 150-200M is established
around Crash site; no requirements for additional
ground forces. (2)
0530 (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (B-350) O/S over crash
site. (12)
0534 Pathfinder element requests body bags and resupply (7)
0546 (b)(3), (b)(6) k TOC reports 10 individuals on foot, (b)(3), (b)(6)
monitoring. (7)
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
0553 Pathfinder element report on top of food/water and
body bags. Need 12 radio batteries. (7)
0610 K (b)(3), (b)(6) TOC reports C130 airdrop will be performed
between 0345z and 0430z. (7)
0620 (b)(3), (b)(6) (B-350) off-station of crash site. (12)
0623 1/B reports 12 FKIA identified. (2)
0641 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) reports ground force requesting 12 fire
extinguishers. (2)
0700 Pathfinder report 33 of 38 FKIA recovered. (7)
0714 (b)(3), (b)(6) off-station from crash site; battle handover
completed with (b)(3), (b)(6) .
0720 (b)(3), (b)(6) rrives at FOB (b)(1)1.4a . (7)
0730 (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12) off-station of crash site. (12)
0733 (b)(3), (b)(6) departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a to conduct resupply.
(7)
0758 (b)(3), (b)(6) arrives at FOB (b)(1)1.4a . (7)
0908 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) JOC reports C-130 air resupply complete. (2/7)
0930 (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12), (b)(3), (b)(6) (B-350) O/S crash site.

0930 (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (B-350) off-station of

crash site. (14)
1012 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) reports BSO element (TF (b)(3), (b)(6) ) conducting
ground m ment to crash site. (2)
1035 10th CAB intercept reports insurgents are planning
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

to attack crash site. (10)

1038 TF reports recovery by 1/B of all 38 FKIA. (19)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
1038 TF reports TF (b)(3), (b)(6) r continuing movement toward
crash site, multiple improvised explosives devices
(IED) have been cleared en-route to crash site. (19)
1122 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) reports BSO 500m from crash site. (2)
1122 TF reports second C-130 air resupply complete.
(2/10)
1156 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) reports TF (b)(3), (b)(6) has linked up with 1/B.

1330 (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12), (b)(3), (b)(6) (B-350) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (MQ-1)
O/S Crash site. (12)
1330 (b)(3), (b)(6) 4 (MC-12) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (B-350) off-station of
crash site. (12)
1347 Pathfinder reports all FKIA are loaded onto TF (b)(3), (b)(6)
vehicles for transport to Sayyid Abad. (10)
1515 (b)(3), (b)(6) R (MQ-9) off-station of crash site. (12)
1515 10th Mountain Division Chief of Current Operations
confirmed FKIA will be transferred by ground to Sayyid
Abad and MH47 aircraft will transfer them to FOB

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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
(b)(1)1.4a , then will travel via fixed wing aircraft to

Bagram Airfield. (10)

1627 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) r departs crash site with FKIA en route to
Sayyid Abad. (19)
1730 (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (B-350) off-station
Crash site. (12)
1730 (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (B-350) O/S crash
site. (12)
2114 1/B reports flash flood is washing away portions of
the aircraft wreckage. (19)
2130 (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (U-28) O/S crash site.
(12)
2130 F (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (B-350) off-station
crash site. (12)
2234 (b)(3), (b)(6) 3 (MH ir Mission Commander [AMC]) reports
departure FOB (b)(1)1.4a for Sayyid Abad for repatriation
of FKIA. (17/19)
2249 T (b)(3), (b)(6) 3 reports arrival at Sayyid Abad. (17/19)
2308 (b)(3), (b)(6) 3 reports departure Sayyid Abad with FKIA.
(17/19)
2321 (b)(3), (b)(6) reports arrival at FOB (b)(1)1.4ak. (17)
2350 MC-130 loads first lift of 19 human remains from FOB
(b)(1)1.4ak. (22)

7 AUG 2011

0106 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) reports 3/D departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a to conduct link-
up with 1/B. (19)
0107 (b)(3), (b)(6) reports three MH-47s are en-route to crash
site to conduct relief in place between 1/B and Team
3/D. (17)
0119 (b)(3), (b)(6) infil of 54 3/D personnel complete. (17/19)
0130 F (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (B-350) O/S of crash
site. (12)
0130 F (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (U-28) off-station
from crash site. (12)
0130 T (b)(3), (b)(6) reports arrival at FOB (b)(1)1.4a and REDCON
level 2. (17)
0200 (b)(3), (b)(6) (MQ-9) O/S crash site. (12)
0213 (b)(3), (b)(6) k TOC reports (b)(3) departs FOB (b)(3), (b)(6)
to conduct resupply of crash site. (10)
0224 TF (b)(3), (b)(6)
t reports crash site link-up of security and
relief forces complete. (19)
0234 (b)(3), (b)(6) k TOC reports (b)(3) resupply of crash
site complete. (10)
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0300 (b)(3), (b)(6) Q-1) O/S crash site. (12)
0301 (b)(3), (b)(6) TOC reports (b)(3), (b)(6) departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a
on resupply mission. (10)
0320 MC-130 delivers first lift of 19 human remains to BAF.
(22
0324 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) reports relief-in-place complete between 1/B
and 3/D; 1/B moving to exfil HLZ. (19)
0422 (b)(3) (AMC) departs FOB (b)(3), (b)(6) to pick up 1/B.
(17/19)
0433 (b)(3) reports exfil complete of 1/B. (17/19)
0435 C-130 loads second lift of 19 FKIA remains from FOB
(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(3), (b)(6). (22)
(b)(1)1.4c

0453 (b)(3) reports arrival at FOB (b)(1)1.4a with 1/B. (19)

0550 MC-130 delivers second lift of 19 human remains to
BAF. (22)
0719 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) reports two air resupply drops complete. (2)
0832 TF reports 3/D pushing out small element to link-
up with BSO. (2)
0929 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) reports BSO Commander (TF (b)(3), (b)(6) Commander)
link-up complete, conducted walk-through of crash
site. (2)
1611 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) reports EOD conducts several detonations,
reducing wreckage to effect transport. (19)
2034 10th CAB reports (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4e lifted. (10)

08 AUG 2011

1206 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) reports TF (b)(3), (b)(6) assumes responsibility for

crash site security
1239 Security element discovers IED outside of compound
near crash site. (19)
1438 Crash sites A, D, and E is 100% cleared. The welders
have moved to sites B and C. (19)
1832 (b)(3), (b)(6) en-route from FOB (b)(3), (b)(6) . (17)
1930 (b)(3), (b)(6) reports exfil of 20 Pathfinders and a
portion of 3/D from the vicinity of the crash site.
(17)
2010 (b)(3), (b)(6) reports exfil remainder of 3/D off of crash
site. (17)
2311 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) reports all FKIA departed BAF for Germany. (5)

9 AUG 2011

0655 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) reports all FKIA arrived in Germany. (16)

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Page 1 redacted for the following reason:
---------------------
(b)(5) Attorney Work Product Privilege

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The interview o CDR, TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c J3, TF J2, TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2,
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

1/B PLT LDR, TF

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 1/B PLT S 1/B RECC d 1/B JT ned
at 1607 Zulu, 17 August 2011, at FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c .

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD: Brigadier General J. Colt, US Army

LEGAL ADVISOR: LA

GROUND FORCE SME: SME-GFA

INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR: SME-INTEL

CAB CH-47 SME: SME-CH47

NGB REPRESENTATIVE: SME-NGB

MH-47 SME: SME-MH47

ASDAT TM MBR #1: ASDAT3

ASDAT TM MBR #2: ASDAT4

COURT REPORTER: CR2

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
J3: Sir, what we have lined up for you is the LEFTY GROVE
CONOP that was given on the day of the incident. Backed
up to that it goes a little bit to the special story
board. I'm just going to go through the events that
actually occurred on the ground. And then we have a few
bits of the EXSUM showing some of the photos, which we
have all of them on CD for you guys. So there's plenty
more than what we show here, but just kind of a run down.

I'm going to hit the wave tops, you know, please -- if

you want to dive into details now, by all means, we've
got most of the experts here. We have some that can come
in later and --

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

[Ex. 39]

BG Colt: Can you just start by giving a little bit of context

of when LEFTY GROVE really came to the fore. I
understand it was about the 19th of June when he actually
met the targeting deck for the first time.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
J2: Sir, we've been tracking LEFTY GROVE for a number
of weeks prior to (b)(3), (b)(6) Squadron actually ripping in.
So he had been on our deck, passed off to us by the

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squadron [(b)(3), (b)(6)] as one of those, kind of, hold over
targets that they weren't able to act on during their
four months out here.

So we picked him up a with a host of other targets

in the AO around TF(b)(1)1.4a, . So that's just kind of a
(b)(1)1.4c

handover piece, sir. He's been on or deck, not

necessarily in our target during our cross-hairs every
single day, but he's been one of those targets we've
been looking at since we hit the ground here.

BG Colt Okay.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF J2: So this is just our standard quad slide. It's just

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

a piece that kind of lays out the intel on who we think

this guy is, why he's bad, and why he meets the threshold
to commit good guys with the actions. I'll not bore you
with details here, but the highlights is that we think
LEFTY GROVE is a pretty senior level commander in Tangi
if not the senior guy that's kind of running Taliban
ops.

BG Colt: Can you talk to him taking on added interest after taking
out DUNLAP?

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TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ2: Yes, sir. There is a conversation that he was

subordinate to DUNLAP. So DUNLAP gets killed. And
then he, you know, he -- there was an assessment that
he had filled that leadership void.

BG Colt: Was DUNLAP killed on the 4th, or was it some time prior
to that?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ2: I would have to go back and check the exact date,
sir. I don't have that information.

BG Colt: All right.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
J3: For tonight, sir -- or for this night, the ultimate
trigger was met when we had IMINT over the PG [P-grid].
SI got us in the area on a known compound. And we had
IMINT of PAX on the compound. They left, went to a
mosque. The mosque [meeting] broke [up]. Multiple PAX
came back, and that's when we had trigger met - that
we felt comfortable with the SI in the area in the LOC
ust the PAX activity. And that's what launched(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) that night.

BG Colt: Okay. Can I ask a question on that point? (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) TF Commander], did you make the decision

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

who is going to be the lead or the main effort, and then

the supporting effort for the exploitation? What was
the conscious decision criteria to do that?

TF CDR: It was actually really deferred to Team (b)(3), (b)(6) . They

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

managed their troop and platoon. And as their

leadership rolled - distribute who does what. And they
had chosen actually early in the day before they even
knew what target it was, that (b)(3), (b)(6) has got the target
tonight.

BG Colt: Okay.

TF J3: To back up weeks [prior] to that,

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)

pretty much, operated every operation together. The(b)(1)1.4c

in this area is hard to neck down to a single compound.
So there were lots of NAI clearances. And so I think
there was maybe one other op where (b)(3), (b)(6)

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were separated. But for the most part it was always
together. We were talking about just the -- not
necessarily OPTEMPO, but just that feel would go out
almost every night - splitting them up. This was
actually the first night of the trial, and it was 1
Bravo's night, and so they took lead. And (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was
on IRF, and exactly the opposite. This was a day later.

BG Colt: Okay. Just contextually, can you tell me how long you
guys have been here.

1/B PLT LDR: We got here since the 5th of July, sir.

SME-GFA: So when (b)(3), (b)(6) goes on the ground, the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is C2
of them or straight back to you?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: We C2 all the ops. They standby as the primary QRF.

BG Colt: Okay.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: So this is the task organization for the evening.

(b)(3), (b)(6) taking lead. They had 47 PAX and one CAD [combat
assault dog] on the ground, used (b)(3), (b)(6) .
As you see IRF or more appropriately, the primary QRF

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was Tea (b)(3), (b)(6) . We also had the battle space
owner, (b)(3), (b)(6) F. CASEVAC was DUSTOFF. You
will see our (b)(3), (b)(6) platforms, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6).

BG Colt: Is the CST a mission-to-mission call whether you're

going to us it. Or does it always go in with an element?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: It's a mission-to-mission call, sir.

BG Colt: A mission-to-mission call. How about ?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
J3: Every operation. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c on every operation.

BG Colt: Always on the lead element?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: No.

BG Colt: No?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
J3: Just on the ground.

BG Colt: Okay. And always a BSO regardless of whether it's a

(b)(3), (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) element?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: Not MIN FORCE. But we try to get a BSO every time
so we don't have to do a full battlespace handover or --

BG Colt: Okay. Thank you.

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 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
J3: Next slide. Just a big picture. This is our money
slide --

BG Colt: Can you back up one. I'm sorry.

QRF, what is your understanding of the constraint or

restraint against utilizing that force and who controls
it?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
J Sir, the QRF is coordinated through the teams like
, and for example, I coordinated the QRF. We got
(b)(3), (b)(6)

her how many PAX they have, their response time, they
know where we are going. We've picked up -- at times,
picked up the same battle space LNO from that COP.

So we have realistic timelines and expectations for them.

But, I mean, our primary is always internal. That’s why
we have (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c for this one.

SME-GFA: I'm sorry. To employ them are you calling the battalion
commander, or how does that work?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: That's exactly right. We have not employed a BSO
QRF yet. But we will spin up to the battle captain. And

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then if we are going to actually launch the force, well,
I guess like we did once in Bronco’s AO, I call the
battalion commander.

BG Colt: Did you do anything on this particular mission after

the shoot down to cue them?

TF CDR: Didn't cue them. That was really with

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)

The discussions I had with (b)(3), (b)(6) about inserting

their Pathfinder element and making the decision to
whether or not infil them to the battlespace.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: We did contact them and made them aware of the
situation, and put them on a higher level, but --

BG Colt: Okay.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: -- you know, there in the gates ready to go if we

need it.

SME-INTEL: On the ISR, who controls - the 3 that controls the

ISR, tasked the ISR on what their responsibilities are?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: The ground force commander has control of all the
ISR, you know, pre-op - J2's doing development with the
ISR. And certainly, it's a J2/J3 function, you know,
with the commander's intent. But once on the ground,
the ground force commander can take control of all of
the ISR, or a portion of it, we can still control. It's
really up to the GFC.

BG Colt: On this particular mission, did you control all the ISR
elements and the gunship too?

1/B PLT LDR: Roger, sir. I have a JTAC attached to me whose

primary -- he lays out a deconfliction plan primary,
and briefs the CONOP, before we SP, which is where we
go from SP. And anything on the fly, we discuss between
ourselves and adjust it from the -- he's actually going
on Fires [inaudible].

BG Colt: We are going to talk to him at some point?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: Yes, sir.

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SME-NGB: Can I ask, what is your understanding of the DS role

of the lift asset that's provided to you as far as what
you expect from them, and what you can command of them?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: My understanding is they provide rotary-wing lift

to pre-approved HLZs, and they take our force in and
out to target. Is that what you're --

SME-NGB: Well, looking more in terms of, you know, there's a

three-hour, I think, hasty planning requirement that
is laid on those guys. But as far as getting a FOB risk
approving, all those things, it goes back to, I believe,
to their aviation commander.

But to what degree do you interact with that? Do you

just give them the missions and the departure time, and
then they work the rest?

1/B PLT SGT: No. The flight lead will come over and plan with
our routes planner too. And it's kind of a
back-and-forth between their S3 and our routes planner.
So they are going to talk saying, “Yes, we can approve
this HLZ, we can land here.” Then we base our routes
off of what they said they can or they can't plan.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
J3: Normally, our (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c . We
give it to them, and they approve or disapprove. It
initiates with us, the flight plans, for sure.

The three hours is their standard time for normal

mission planning. They can have that faster if it's
hasty.

This is just an overview slide showing this is what COP

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c taking the BSO, LNO and then into the target

BG Colt: Okay.

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF J3: This is showing the infil route. This is the original

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

one that (b)(3), (b)(6) went off, HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, for patrol in.
They had 2k, a 40-minute walk.

BG Colt: We will get more into it later, but uneventful?

1/B PLT LDR: Actually, as soon as we touch down, sir, we are

notified of five or six PAX that left the target compound
ID'd with weapons. And we were briefed they were moving
towards our location on the road. So we can get more
into that later if you want.

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 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: ORP over the target.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

This is for our planning and for this op.

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

This is -- you know, we get these (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c overviews.

So it shows all the stuff in Sayyid Abad that's been
happening over the last few years, really. Each one can
be broken down, give the time and date on it, what exactly
it was. But for every operation, we look at the air
threat to force on the ground.

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Next slide is more detailed. It's just breaking down

what happened and when.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Next slide is a close-up.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Next slide, basic GRGs we use.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Next slide, this is our fires and our sensors of how

we are going to use them on squirters or contacts.

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Next slide, CASEVAC. Next slide.

SME-GFA: I'm sorry. That's SOP? That's pretty much standard

throughout every op?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: Correct. Yeah.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Next slide is just an overview of, again, the different

BSO elements we have in the area that we used. Next
slide.

So at this point, these are the slides as they were

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briefed. And after this slide, we got into what
happened on the ground. And (b)(3), (b)(6) can go into more detail
if you have questions for them.

In the JOC before we SP, before he takes off, we are

going to a stand-up brief, get a detailed plan,
basically, of what we just saw to the commander. He had
already been, kind of, pre-heated before by the platoon
commander or the
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4ccommander. And we go through all
the different J codes, make sure everybody is tracking,
everybody is on board, and then briefs the whole nine
yards.

Commander can speak to it, but we were very comfortable

with the operation, looked at this area before, a pretty
good plan. We had a, you know, 2k offset. So we felt
(b)(3), (b)(6) getting in was fairly safe, and we felt good
about the target this night.

BG Colt: Can you talk briefly about the OPTEMPO of hits that have
been going here and the operations you have been
conducting?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: far as -- I would say the OPTEMPO with (b)(3), (b)(6)
2(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cgoing out the door together was every third night,
maybe -- second to third night. We would reset and go
again. Hit a target -- develop for a day or to hit a
target. Again, you know, the OPTEMPO in this area, in
my opinion, is ve different than the rest of
Afghanistan. The (b)(1)1.4ais hard to develop, especially in
these areas. They re very savvy. There's more of
insurgency than, you know, massing fighters anyplace.

So again, you know, it's getting those DPs and all the
times we're doing delivering or doing any eye clearances.
So I would say our jackpot ratio of getting our TIs are
lower in this area than other places in the country just
because the fidelity of the (b)(1)1.4a
. But the OPTEMPO we try
keep up just to keep that pressure on them.

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

[Ex. 2]

So after the -- and, (b)(3), (b)(6) , please jump in if you have

more details to add in. As (b)(3), (b)(6) was approaching the
compound soon after infil, we had ISR report squirters
maneuvering towards you. And we had AWT, which is our
only fire squad, went back and PID'd weapons from the
air. They did PID weapons. And, (b)(3), (b)(6) called a fire
mission.

Additional engagement resulted in five EKIA. There was

a follow-up attack at another one. So it was a six EKIA.
It was assessed from that original group of squirters
that two did get away, moved to the northwest, and linked
up with PAX from another compound. We don't know where
they originated from.

BG Colt: Did (b)(3), (b)(6) ever SSE those six PAX?

1/B PLT LDR: Originally, the ISR reported that they found that
six MAMS were linking up and moving down the road towards
us. We took a halt and pulled of the road. We were going
to push our Afghan partners to the front. I called off
the AWT strike.

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So from that mission strike, we had the six EKIA, and

two from that original strike pushed approximately one
kilometer to the west/northwest. ISR reported that
they were trying to [inaudible] to each other.

So we pushed through that original engagement,

identified the six EKIA, and pushed an additional
kilometer to the northwest as well, trying to interdict
those two squirters, which we were unable to do.

Additionally on infil, two squirters from the 280 series

[buildings on the objective] took off moving as well,
and were just going. Those are the ones that pushed at
least 1.8k to the northwest. And we were not able to
even attempt to do --

BG Colt: So after infil, you initially bypassed the objective,

went on, exploited that engagement. And did you ever
come back to that original objective and do a clear?

1/B PLT LDR: We split forces, sir. So the platoon sergeant with
one squad went to do the BDA and some interdiction. The
other two --

BG Colt: Clear.

SME-GFA: You said, you reported squirters off the target moving
towards you guys?

1/B PLT LDR: Roger, sir. Once we pulled off the side of the
road --

BG Colt: Do you have a pointer or anything?

1/B PLT LDR: I don't sir.

SME-GFA: Engagement is away from you guys?

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

1/B PLT LDR: Roger, sir. So we’re approximately right here,

pushing off the side, pushing APU up to the front. Once
we brought AWT over, they changed their mind, and then
started to egress. It took AWT a good amount of time
to actually acquire them in a zero CDE area, which will
allow them to move so far off to the east.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Part of it was as they were moving south to there

on the east side of that box, then they started moving
to the south of that. It was already identified that
they were armed. And I approved them to engage. But
the we said to wait for them to get away from these
buildings.

BG Colt: Okay. That helped.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CD , can you talk a little bit about, kind of, TF
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c during all this.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: So we had a (b)(3), (b)(6) leadership at this point when

this is going on -- when the fire missions are going
on. The (b)(3), (b)(6)

and some of the team leaders were inside the TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
JOC just sitting there, watching ISR, watching what's

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going on, tracking.

At this point, there was a known amount of squirters

that had gone to the northwest, and started talking
about options to interdict. As, you know, this
progressed over, I would say, 45 minutes to an hour.
The squirter group kept moving, and changed, you know,
numbers. But generally, it was a pack of roughly eight
moving around. They hid under a bridge. They moved
hiding in the fields again.

We had AC130 watching them, (b)(3), (b)(6) our AWT on the

FARP. The (b)(3), (b)(6) suggested
a squirter interdiction team. We were considering it.
We were playing with the numbers, how many people
originally, we were looking at about 17 in just to get
those squirters.

BG Colt: What was driving that number incidentally?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: That was out the number of available (b)(3), (b)(6)
shooters -- (b)(3), (b)(6) Squadron shooters at that time without
taking all of our enablers and --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: And exfil in one package.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: Right. With an exfil in one package.

BG Colt: I've heard that a couple times. So when you say "exfil
in one package," you are talking about (b)(3), (b)(6) and that
17-man element in one lift?

TF J3: Correct. That was the original mindset we had going

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

in. As we started looking at it, realizing we need to

put on our(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
, and then, you know, if they landed
and the squirter element went to a compound, now we’re
into a compound assault. So what the (b)(3), (b)(6) commander
and (b)(3), (b)(6) f s add on basically their
not quite their (b)(1)1.4a , but a (b)(1)1.4a .
So we had, we started taking more enablers, all the APU,
and ended up being --

BG Colt: Thirty-two.

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TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: Thirty-two on the ground, correct.

SME-GFA: Where is the EXTORTION flight at this time? Are they

sitting back here?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: Correct. So during the same time, EXTORTION is on

the deck here. Our ranking team leader is starting to
ask them, “Hey, you know, look at HLZs in this area.
We are thinking about going in.”

SME-GFA: Are they on the birds, rotors turning - what's their

status?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
J3: They were at Level 2. Their planners were in here.
And I think that at that point, they brought the flight
lead in as well. I will have to confirm whether the
flight lead came in or not, but I'm fairly certain he
did.

The end result was they did find an HLZ, which was about
three kilometers northwest of the target compound and
about 700-meters northwest of the actual squirter that
they were watching on ISR.

BG Colt: Who actually engaged in LZ nomination -- the nomination

of the LZs. My understanding is that for about a period
of approximately 30 minutes, they were going through
LZ adjudication and ultimately defaulted to a
pre-planned HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. Can you talk to that process
at all?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
J3: I'm not familiar with exactly the process that they
got to that.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: Fortunately, what we knew in the JOC, is the ranking
team leader is in there talking with the planners, and
we know that the LZ has to go up higher for approval,
so we had gotten to the point where we had a plan with
a couple different options and pending HLZ approval.
We didn't really have an option until we got that
approved.

BG Colt: Okay.

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TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: I was going to say, you know, we had been looking
at Tangi Valley for a couple days ahead of this,
preplanning some know a typical limiting
factor we had with (b)(3), (b)(6) was preplanning these HLZs.
The (b)(1)1.4a had already been nominating multiple HLZs
lea this event for Tangi Valley in general.

So this HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c just happened to be an HLZ that they

had already sed with (b)(3), (b)(6) , who was already
on board.

BG Colt: In the mind of the -- again, I'm not sure which echelon
of command I should be addressing the question to. But
my question is: Given the elapsed time between the
infil at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and now the discussion about the
subsequent infil in this particular terrain, in this
known environment, did we approach the risk of
additional infil differently than we did the first one?
Or how did we, would by a better question.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: So I know we based on our additional infil, HLZ

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, - our two times that we have been in there.

Despite the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , relatively uneventful because we

don't go there a lot. And then we deliberately went up
to the northwest. So there was a conscious decision to
not come down into the same LZ and just have a race team
zip up to do the interdiction.

BG Colt: I understand.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: So it's a combination of approach from where we

haven't been yet, where their force is not. And then
also proximity to where the squirters were. We were
like 700 meters to the west of where the squirters were.

BG Colt: Was the line of drift of the persons of interest in the

calculus of additional risk?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Our flight path to where they were or -- I think

we were looking to where they were either going to go
flee up into the hills. We had good ISR and fires
platforms to interdict that, or they were going to
hunker down. I'm not sure I answered your question on
the line of drift piece.

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BG Colt: I guess - if you think the threat is maneuvering in a

direction of relative safety, in your mind, do you think
they are moving to a more -- either a more defendable
position, or additional assets, that would elevate the
risk?

TF CDR: I think they were moving to -- they were gathering

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

people to do that. We expected that they were going to

flee away. So they were either going to come maneuver
on our force, but we didn't really expect that. We
wanted to maneuver on them to not let them get away.

BG Colt: Did (b)(3), (b)(6) have any small arms engagements prior to
this

1/B PLT SGT: We engaged the squirter pack, sir. There was one
WIA in the ditch [who presented an AK-47 to the
interdiction team]. But other than that, we had no
contact on the objective.

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-MH47: The battle captain for (b)(3), (b)(6) , in a discussion

with the (b)(3), (b)(6) team chief, they were discussing how the
IRF would be sent in. Was the (b)(3), (b)(6) team chief - did he
make the decision to put all 32 on one aircraft?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: You are talking about the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c chief or --

SME-MH47: Yes. I'm sorry. Those words were the (b)(3), (b)(6)

battle captain, that's what he referred to.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
J3: Okay. Yeah. Roger. Yes. The (b)(3), (b)(6) element, the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

chief
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c -- yeah. In the end, they had a discussio
between (b)(3), (b)(6) k on risk to force, whether to bring
two helos, a second helo having, you know, a higher
chance of being shot at because of the lag time, or
putting everybody on at once, getting them out.

They had that discussion. I wasn't privy to that

discussion. But it's a pretty standard way we do
operate, putting IRF in one ship.

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SME-MH47: So that was a ground force request that you will put
them on one --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: I can't answer that for sure.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: That's a challenge. We don't know how that

discussion transpired. So we are making speculation
based on --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3:I remember having one conversation with the

(b)(3), (b)(6) S3 planners when we were spinning up the IRF
that they were only approved for a one-ship infil. So
I think that was one of the driving factors.

And there were 33 on the helo, not 32. Just to clarify

that.

SME-INTEL: T k about the threat, too, with the -- on the comms,

the(b)(1)1.4a comms, were there any indication throughout the
assault that there was any type of VISOPS or any type
attempt to maneuver against the ground forces through
(b)(1)1.4a communications?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6) was hot most of the time. So almost every
time we are on an op, we get that when we turn the jammer
off. (b)(1)1.4a

using comm.

SME-INTEL: Was there any -- a different question with that too.

Was there any attempted jam prior to launching the IRF
in to the block the squirters.

1/B PLT LDR: We jammed on infil, sir, and then went jammer off
to try and collect as soon as we had started moving.

SME-GFA: (b)(3), (b)(6) was up at this time?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: (b)(3), (b)(6)

BG Colt: Did there come a time in this op where you relinquished

control with ISR assets back to the IRF commander?

1/B PLT LDR: Sir, we had cut one (b)(1)1.4a out. I'm not sure which
one, to keep eyes on the squirter patch. I know they

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were deconflicting over the fires, and who was going
to control the AWT on infil. And it was ultimately
decided that (b)(3), (b)(6) would control the AWT assets on
infil.

BG Colt: To your knowledge, did we do ever shift a sensor over

the HLZ prior to their arrival?

1/B PLT LDR: Not to my knowledge, sir.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
J3: My presumption is though that, as we deal with AC-130
it was looking -- I don't think we saw the HLZ, but they
always take a look at it. So that's an assumption, but
I think it's accurate.

And that's correct, the -- (b)(3), (b)(6) had control of the assets
as soon as (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was on ground. 21 was going to
take control of AWT, and the ISRs over the squirters
to deal with that immediate threat. They were in the

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

So, sir, as you know, this is where it all came together.

So the forces committed, you know, the PAX numbers, and
coming in, you know, exactly where -- you could probably

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talk to the guys who were on the ground more. But
300-meters or so from the HLZ is where they took an RPG
strike, spun around and crashed.

From this point on we, pretty much, go to Objective LEFTY

GROVE personnel recovery, and immediately moved (b)(3), (b)(6) ,
tasked them to go secure the crash site about three
kilometers away. They had to finish what they were
doing on target, reconsolidate, and give up there, about
45 minutes --

At the same time, we had CSAR come in from (b)(3), (b)(6)

landed at(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
. They had a portion of a (b)(3), (b)(6)

there with them. We prepped them to go on the ground

but didn’t insert them right away. We had the
Pathfinder unit from (b)(3), (b)(6) on standby. They
wanted to go right away. We wanted to wait until (b)(3), (b)(6)
got on the scene to secure the site and get an assessment.

Once they got there and we started getting SA about

ground atmospherics. We did launch a Pathfinder unit
before first light to get them in as extra support. They
have (b)(1)1.4a as well.

From that point on, no other forces from our immediate

control were committed. We were talking to TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
and TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and they started to commit a ground force
into the area to lock down the whole valley. And that
was a -- I have to look at my time sheet -- probably
a four to five hour process before they actually arrived
and got on scene.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Obviously, there's a lot going on. I was trying

to understand what the situation was. J3 is working a
CSAR plan. And my discussions primarily with
(b)(3), (b)(6) on the decision to infil the Pathfinder team.
They agreed to do it. You can see where their infil site
is. That's the LZ everybody uses. It's very close to
HLZ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. It's the same patch in the green zone. So
for obvious reasons, I was reluctant to commit another
helicopter force. We talked through it, and ended up
paying off well to help the (b)(3), (b)(6) element.

(b)(3), (b)(6) element -- the (b)(3), (b)(6) element moved over there,

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basically, slit -- basically, had the target secured.
They had detainees all ready to go. They were ready to
move to, more or less, exfil. And when we re-tasked to
release detainees, with the task to go to the crash site.

We didn't really pre-brief them. But we could tell from

ISR that it was a giant wreckage in flames. And didn't
get confirmation until they got on site. And then it
was clear from the ground force commander's initial
report that it was a hard impact, likely with no
survivors. But we had already committed a Pathfinder
team to get to the site, just in case there were survivors.
That was kind of the -- and then it really transitioned
into the recovery mode.

I would say once the Pathfinders were infiled and we

got -- the ground force commander said, “We have got
security,” that's when we transitioned into talking
with (b)(3), (b)(6) and established a ground line of
communications for a recover op.

BG Colt: Did the JOC offer additional assets and you either
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

accept or reject those?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: We were pushed more ISR and fires. We accepted a

few, and then it became -- we had -- you know, the stack
became almost too big, so we ended pushing some away.

TF J2: That's correct. They pushed a number of assets, sir,

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

from Central’s AO. Over the next few hours, we

constituted another entire manned line of (b)(3), (b)(6)
flights, and then internally to the TF allocation,
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

we just started flooding that battlespace with our own

stuff.

So there's a few other things that(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

tried lay out,
but I think we had a good idea of what was going on.
That was hours posted, just trying to get all that stuff
lined up.

BG Colt: When the (b)(3), (b)(6) element got down there, who was the
principle command and control on the ground at that
point?

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 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: It was (b)(3), (b)(6) . And the
agreement I had with (b)(3), (b)(6) was that so we set the
grid lines of what was our battlespace. And once he
established the ground line of communications down to
the site, (b)(3), (b)(6) was going to assume the ground force
commander

BG Colt: I’d like and try to get that, and then evaluate that
as best practice, or however they looked at, that for
our ground elements there.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: That was kind of our -- the next phone call that
A26 and I had was with (b)(3), (b)(6) . The battalion XO got
on deck to conduct that turnover. And they would own
the recovery operation, and our elements would support
them.

SME-GFA: What exactly is the composition of that element?

(b)(3), (b)(6) is the battalion XO --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: He's the battalion XO. So they led in a route

clearance patrol. They had IEDs all over the place.
There was seven IEDs in 600 meters in that section.

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So it took a long time. I want to say it ended up being
two platoons. Is that about right? I thought it ended
up being a little bit light of that.

1/B PLT LDR: It was two platoons, sir. And then the platoon from
Sayyid Abad dropped down, and they filled in behind the
convoy. So it ended up being three platoons.

SME-GFA: So once he got on the ground, (b)(3), (b)(6) ground force

commander so to speak. You are still on the ground at
the time?

1/B PLT LDR: Roger, sir. And what actually ended up happening
is they loaded up the FALLEN EAGLES, and then actually
had to, pretty much, turn around and return back to
Sayyid Abad. So he was only on the ground for -- it
seemed like two or three hours before he was pushed back.
And I just resumed the ground force commander role.

So, essentially, I would say I was actually the GFC

through that entire time until I turned back over
to the (b)(3), (b)(6) element.

BG Colt: Can you describe what the local atmospherics were when
you got there with respect to Afghans in the vicinity
of the objective for the downed aircraft?

1/B PLT LDR: Roger, sir. When we got there it was still just
before BMNT [Before Morning Nautical Twilight]. ISR was
reporting several groups of MAMs [military-age males]
kind of prodding the perimeter we established around
the cras ite. We were able to deter those by just
pushing (b)(3), (b)(6) towards the built-up areas. And then
deploying warning shots from some of our OPs.

And then as the day went on, they continued to probe

the perimeter by, like, pushing children up towards it,
or a man in the center of the group of children. But
relatively no interaction between the village to the
north and the crash site. Most of it came from this
small village right down here, sir.

BG Colt: Did TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c do anything post crash, as far as civil

affairs exploitation or anything in there?

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TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: I'm not sure, sir.

So there's two BSOs involved because coming from the

east is Task Force(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
, and they started pushing. But
it's just a lot longer route, and it took a long time
for them to get there --

BG Colt: They ultimately did?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: What strength did they come in?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: I'm not sure. They had a lot of positions all over
the place in an overwatch --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
J3: They mostly manned the OPs on both ridgelines. And
they had, like, six sniper teams out a couple k radius.

SME-GFA: TF Pathfinder rotary-wings in, links up with you at the

crash site, what exactly do they do?

1/B PLT LDR: Sir, the Pathfinder element consisted of (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a PAX. And essentially what they did was allow

us to fill in this perimeter. They, pretty much, took
from the wadi the entire north side of our perimeter
we filled in from the south.

SME-GFA: How long were they on the ground?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: The duration.

TF J3:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c They remained after (b)(3), (b)(6) came back.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Four days. We started pushing even though, you

know -- BSO lead, we were engaged. We had element on
the ground. We provided a lot of subject matter
expertise for the resupplies, things like that.

BG Colt: How did you push those to them?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Air drop.

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TF J3: Sir, to clarify your earlier questions, too, you know,
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

with the ground force commander. Obviously, (b)(3), (b)(6)

was the senior man on the ground, but we as TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

remained C2 of the entire operation. Battlespace
owners were coming through us and coordinate. So, you
know, (b)(3), (b)(6) and then later on, the three Delta commander,
I think, they were the C2 element, and not al
enior man on the ground. They had, you know, (b)(3), (b)(6)
signed off on the crash site. Obviously, it was handed
(b)(3), (b)(6)

over. We retained the coordination of all of that --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: So it was kind of that awkward, like -- and then,
though, the rose was pinned on (b)(3), (b)(6) technically,
but we just had the comms and infrastructure --

BG Colt: At what point?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Once Warrior got back on the ground? The convoy
then, when he left to take out the FALLEN EAGLES, had
basically turned around and came back and - first light
the next day or some time that night, right?

1/B PLT LDR: We only saw them once sir. It took them six hours
to get there the first time. They turned around six
hours before they had made it back we had exfil’d with --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Then he shows up the next --

BG Colt: How did they physically get there? (b)(3), (b)(6) ?

1/B PLT LDR: (b)(3), (b)(6) took in 160th package infil’d approximately
a k or 2k to the north --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ (b)(3), (b)(6) came back from J-Bad, RIP’d(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) . And they remained with the Pathfinders at t
crash site for the next over 48 hours.

BG Colt: Was that all coordinated at your headquarters?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: Yes, sir.

SME-MH47: I understand the (b)(3), (b)(6) took photos of the scene

before the flood.

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TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
J3: (b)(3), (b)(6) took a few photos, but they would not take
it of the actual crash site because we saw the FALLEN
EAGLES inside the helo. So there's some atmospheric
pictures. But the majority of the crash site pictures
come from (b)(3), (b)(6) over the next two or three days.

BG Colt: Incidentally, are any of those pre-flood?

1/B PLT SGT: Yes. There are, sir, pre-flood photos --

BG Colt: Okay. Good. Thank you.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: I just want to hit on the C2 piece again because

it won't be real clear. It was -- (b)(3), (b)(6) t had the lead,
but we were working, kind of, the de facto coordination
of all the pieces. And kind of coordination at the 3s.
And obviously, General Votel was very involved in
communicating between RC (b)(3), (b)(6).

BG Colt: We will do reengagement more in detail from the --

SME-GFA: Yeah. I would assume that (b)(3), (b)(6) is talking

to you. (b)(3), (b)(6) is talking to his headquarters, kind
of, toug ribe the C2 with everybody working in
conjunction.

TF J3: We were closely tied in with

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6) . They were over
in our JOC too --

TF CDR: I think there are probably a lot of people that will

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

see it from our perspective is we were running the show

the whole time.

SME-GFA: But we can characterize it as a BSO-led operation?

TF
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: Absent a photo, can you describe the debris field? What
did you see with respect to principal portions of the
airframe itself when you arrived there? Daylight would
be helpful if that's the explanation.

1/B PLT LDR: Roger sir. Once the fire mostly burned out and
daylight had come, you essentially had what was

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remaining of the [CH-]47 in the wadi. In the wadi, it's
got about eight-foot walls on each side. The bird
literally landed right inside of there, perpendicular
to the wadi.

And then from there, one of the rotors had spun off and
was approximately 200 meters to the northwest. And then
another remaining rotor blade was just to the north in
that open field up there. But essentially, everything
was contained right there within a 20 meter radius from
the crash site.

SME-MH47: But the rotor systems were -- you were saying

[inaudible] 100 meters?

1/B PLT SGT: No, sir. The front rotor mast was about 150 to 200
meters to the northwest in a ditch, and then --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: And then the rotor --

1/B PLT SGT: -- so the crash is actually about right here. So

you've got the front rotor mast right here, and you've
got the rear rotor mast up here.

BG Colt: You are talking about their whole pylon?

1/B PLT SGT: Everything. All three rotor blades, and what they
all bolt to. I don't know what you guys call it. And
then everything else was continued within a 20 meter
radius of the actual fuselage, turbines and pieces.

SME-CH47: Could you tell the front part of the helicopter was --

1/B PLT SGT: The front part of the helicopter, sir, was actually
buried in the north side of the bank. The only reason
we can tell was because the foot pedals were still
attached. Other than that, it was just a bunch of metal.

SME-MH47: So it came down perpendicular to the route of flight --

1/B PLT SGT: Yeah. It did. The tail was to the south, and the
nose was to the north, just perfect right in the
width -- the wadi was just a perfect width for the
helicopter.

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ASDAT3: Understanding that there was some folks that were

ejected from the aircraft, did you happen to plot those
by grid from the helo.

1/B PLT SGT: I have it.

SME-MH47: Could you just point at the map.

1/B PLT SGT: So you have --

1/B PLT LDR: I would say it's more like 12.

1/B PLT SGT: It's actually about right here where it actually
landed. And you've got your first EAGLE here at the 12
o’clock. And then you have two more along this terrace
wall. One right at the base of the terrace wall and the
wadi bottom. And then you had three more along the south
wall, where the first eight that we found.

BG Colt: Okay.

ASDAT3: Can I back up to ask one more atmospheric question to

this. (b)(3), (b)(6) , as you are moving to the north,
you've got FALLEN ANGEL when the aircraft is down, you
are moving your forces to the north. Assessing the
light level that you see from Joy Zarin to the north
there, was there an ability to think the -- the unaided
eye to be able to see the helicopter that may have been
out there. I don't know the aircraft to shooter based
on the location we have, point of origin.

1/B PLT LDR: Honest assessment, sir, it was still in the low part
of the illum cycled and based off where the moonrise
was. So we were still infil-ing, I would say at that
time, extremely on the side of darkness.

And then once we started moving, the moon came up. So

there was a good amount illum when we were moving to
the crash site. But the exact time, it was extremely
dark on target.

ASDAT4: So understanding that, was there any back-lighting from

the village?

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1/B PLT LDR: No, sir.

SME-GFA: What was the illum level?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: It was actually dark.

BG Colt: Okay.

TF CDR: By the time we pushed

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6) ’ guys up there,
it was actually daylight coming.

1/B PLT LDR: Just to clarify, there's been some confusion. You
see the Delta and Echo debris, none of that was there
prior to the flash flood arriving that night, sir.
Everything was extremely contained between Alpha, Bravo
and Charlie.

BG Colt: That's helpful.

TF CDR: So as
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6) said, they were on the ground,
then that flash flood came in. It's probably helpful
for you just to describe just a bizarre event.

1/B PLT LDR: Roger, sir. The BSO --

BG Colt: How long were you on the ground before that event took
place?

1/B PLT SGT: We infil’d 1830 Zulu. The flash flood was about
1600 Zulu on the 6th, sir. So almost 24 hours.

BG Colt: Okay.

1/B PLT LDR: So when the BSO left with the original FALLEN EAGLE
package and all the sensitive ops, we continued to
scavenge through the rubble to identify sensitive items
or any personal effects and then pile those in there.

And then right at 15 or 1600, right as the sun was

starting to going down, we got a light drizzle where
we were, but nothing really significant. And then
probably an hour after the rain had stopped - we had
our BP off to the western side. We thought a landslide

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or mudslide was coming, so we told them to get to the
high ground. It was a wave of water between three to
four feet tall came gushing down that wadi. Within 60
seconds it flooded the wadi which started to move all
that debris down there.

SME-MH47: How long did it last?

1/B PLT LDR: The water started to go down as we were there. When
we exfil’d at 0010, the following day, it was still two
to three feet of water running through that wadi.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: The first day that (b)(3), (b)(6) was on the ground,
everything was under water. We were talking about how
they are going to get the helo out, you know, and start
demolishing things. And by the end of that day, it was
a non-issue. They could walk down there, dig through
the mud.

SME-MH47: All the parts had to be cut, because you had to

man-handle all of it out?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: Correct.

TF CDR: It probably just hit them. I'm going to highlight

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

it. The exfil is behind that.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: Correct, sir. The CSAR team went in with saws and
demo [demolitions], quickly ran out of batteries and
demo. So the BSO air-dropped some more stuff in. BSO
was bringing more stuff in. Over the three-day period,
they cut and blasted through, pretty much, everything.

In the end, I think there was a -- they felt pulling

off there was nothing left behind. We saw some pictures
with a dug up piece of a weapon --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: Hey, (b)(3), (b)(6), if you go to that regular brief, just the
slides later than that in there that are hidden.

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(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

[EX. 96]

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: Okay. So this shows the CSAR team here cutting
through the rotor, different pieces here.

Go back up to Slide A [EX. 96], and work your way down.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

BG Colt: By the time this was going on, (b)(3), (b)(6) (ph) was
there correct?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: Yes, sir.

We didn't really appreciate how disruptive that flash

flood was. We heard about the flash flood and didn't
realize -- basically, everything was there in a pile.
And so, you know, everything there -- pistols to radio
parts were washed away. That became the majority of
what you will hear 3/D talk about. What they are doing
is digging that out of the mud. It was just bazaar.

BG Colt: Okay.

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(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

ASDAT2: Sir, (b)(3), (b)(6)

went in on that second convoy. So
it wound up being, I believe, about eight hours by the
time Pathfinder was there. He was on the second convoy.

1/B PLT LDR: When we say, Pathfinders, it was the -- 10th Mountain

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Pathfinders came in originally that night. And then(b)(3), (b)(6)
- (b)(3), (b)(6) came, the CSAR element as well. So probabl
eight hours from that second infil.

ASDAT4: When did the second convoy return back from --

1/B PLT LDR: I was off the ground --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: It was the early morning of the following day. It

was the morning of the 7th.

ASDAT2: That's when (b)(3), (b)(6) went in.

ASDAT4: Then everything had already been washed out by then?

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(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
J3: Correct. So all these pictures are from -- the ones
you see here are from (b)(3), (b)(6) . So it's post-flood
after (b)(3), (b)(6) was out. This is the Summit 15, RC South
Team conducting the cutting and blasting.

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

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(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(3),
(b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

As you can see, as the flood came through, it buried

everything. They started using rope systems to pull
stuff out. So it was washed far down the wadi.

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4a

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(b)(1)1.4a

That was a rocket booster found in the general area.

SME-MH47: Do you still have that --

ASDAT4: Was that exploited --

CR2: One at a time, gentlemen.

SME-GFA: Where is that exactly on the map?

1/B PLT SGT: That would be probably the field on the south side,
sir.

SME-GFA: Can you point it on --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: You guys didn't see --

1/B PLT SGT: I just remember walking through this vegetation.

This vegetation was very distinct to the south side.
Probably on that GRG, sir, where that "X" is at -- the
yellow X, somewhere in that vicinity.

ASDAT2: Is this plotted on any of your graphic charts?

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TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: Yes.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: I'm not sure where all of those parts went.

BG Colt: We saw them laying on the floor.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: The grid for that bottom “X” matches up with the
grid on the slide.

SME-GFN1: So does that match up closely to the point of origin

identified by the 64s?

1/B PLT SGT: Yes, it does, sir.

BG Colt: It's actually a little bit to the west of that.

SME-INTEL: You are saying this matches up to the point of origin.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
J3: The point of origin, yellow “X”, at the south there,
matches up with the grid that's on this picture slide.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: I would say you will have to kind of load

that -- there's so many points of origin that I'm not
sure which one we're talking about.

SECRET
Page 114
 SECRET

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: That's a possible one on the end.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: I know the AWT -- the AH-64 guys have a good sense
of, kind of, what they saw and where it was as well.
I know it's on the list for your discussions with them.

BG Colt: I think they shot somewhere in the vicinity of (b)(3), (b)(6) .

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: They did. It was kind of like -- well --

BG Colt: All right. If you want to stop now.

The interview closed at 1707 Zulu, 17 August 2011.

[END OF PAGE]

SECRET
Page 115
SECRET

SECRET
Page 116
 TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

LEFTY GROVE PR
SAYED ABAD DISTRICT, WARDAK PROVINCE

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

06 1600z AUG 11 Page 117

SECRET // REL FVEY

 BATTLEFIELD GEOMETRY

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

158 km
48 min HAF

KEY

LEFTY GROVE 139 km

42 min HAF Target

CF
FOB/COP/OP

26 km District
8 min HAF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Centers

Page 118
CP/ANP/ABP
N SECRET//REL FVEY
 TASK ORGANIZATION
TF (b)(3),(b)(6)
U

TF (b)(3),(b)(6)

CASEVAC/
AF MOBILITY QRF/IRF MEDEVAC ISR FIRES/EW CSAR

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3),(b)(6) AWT

(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) TBD (b)(3),(b)(6)
FD3/1
PAX: TBD FW
37
D
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6) TBD
Terp: 3 (b)(3),(b)(6)
FD3/1
TOTAL= 40
(b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6)

PJ: 3
CCT: 1
EOD: 1
PATHFINDER: 1
ASSLT:1
TOTAL= 7
TOTAL FROM ALL FLIGHTS = 47

TOTAL OTG:
AF: 47

TOTAL AF IN THE AIR:

AF: 47 Page 119
RW CREW: 7 + 7 + 6 = 20
SECRET // REL FVEY TOTAL: 67
 OBJ LEFTY GROVE RESPONSE DATE 06AUG11
MISSION: O/O TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c w/ CSAR and EOD conducts HAF to conduct a RIP with TM (b)(3),(b)(6) IVO (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(7)d NLT 06AUG11.

SIGNIFICANCE: LEFTY GROVE RESPONSE is a casualty response mission to recover a FALLEN ANGEL in Sayed Abad District, Wardak
Province.

TIMELINE LAST KNOWN LOC: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(7)d

WU / SP 1600Z
WD 1700Z
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
WU TBD
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
INFIL TBD
TOT TBD
NLT EXT TBD
TASK ORG
VEH/AC INFIL EXFIL
13 13
(b)(3),(b)(6) 14 14
13/7 13/7
TOTAL 40/47 40/47
K
INFIL
OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(7)d
EXFIL
CALL SIGNS LOC
GFC OBJ
RTO (b)(3),(b)(6) OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
JTAC OBJ
QRF TBD TBD
FIRES
ON OFF CO OF THE OPERATION: TRIGGER: SI/IM
ASSET (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
STATION STATION TM (3/D) W/ CSAR AND EOD CONDUCTS HAF TO OFFSET INFIL TO CONDUCT RIP WITH TM (b)(3),(b)(6) (1/B) AT
AWT TBD TBD RESPONSE SITE.
FW TBD TBD INSERT: HAF INSERT TO OFFSET HLZ
EW TBD TBD INFIL: GROUND INFIL TO TGT
ISR
AAO: L/U WITH GROUND ELEMENT, RIP, CONTINUE RECOVERY EFFORTS.
ON STN OFF STN
EXFIL: GROUND EXFIL TO HLZ
(b)(3),(b)(6)
1700 2100
2100 0100 EXTRACT: HAF RTB TO (b)(3),(b)(6) TO DROP OFF CSAR AND EOD. TM 3/D) HAF RTB TO JAF.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

AIREY INFIL 2100

SIGNAL BSO TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c QRF, C/S TBD LOCATION TBD

(b)(3), (b)(6)SAT SVOIP (b)(2) COMP TBD RESP TIME TBD

SQD SQD ALERT TO Target to Med

ASSET UNIT CALLSIGN / FREQ LOCATION WHEELS UP
CMD CMD (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Facility
(b)(3), (b)(6) Page 120
MH-47 (b)(3),(b)(6) HELO COMMON 10 min 5 min
ASLT ASLT (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

FIRES FD3 UH-60 (b)(3),(b)(6) / (b)(1)1.4a 15 min 5min

 CSAR CH-47
1) (b)(3),(b)(6) will depart from(b)(3),(b)(6)to FOB to p/u CSAR, EOD and
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3),(b)(6)
. Flight will depart and infil to HLZs(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6) , and return to for refuel and level II.
2) O/O (b)(3),(b)(6) will exfil from HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and
(b)(3),(b)(6) Once complete, aircraft will return to FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and
await follow on missions.

0+10 TOF -TGT

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

CASEVAC Response
Time: 0+30 (LVL 2)
CSAR at BAF: 0+55
TIMELINE

TASK ORG TM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c COMMO 1535z

ASSET PAX LOAD 1550z

(b)(3),(b)(6) ASLT) 13 / 20 DEP 1600z

ARR(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 1645z
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (ASLT/CASEVAC)
(b)(3),(b)(6) 14 / 20
DEP 1700z
INFIL 1710z
(b)(3),(b)(6) ASLT) 13 / 16
Page 121
BMNT 2334z
ENABLERS: RW CAS – (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4a
OBJ (b)(3),(b)(6)
RESPONSE INFIL/EXFIL ROUTE - 2.5K WALKING

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

HLZ’S (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3),(b)(6)

Page 122
 GROVE 2– SIGACTS
SIGACTS
OBJ LEFTY 90 DAYS – 90 Days

(b)(1)1.4a

Crash Site
2 Km

PAX activity after crash @(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(7)d

Potential RPG POO site

Possible POO site/ Enemy activity post crash

~1Km S/E of crash site 42S VC 80501 63706
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d

Page 123
Page 124
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
A
B (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d

C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N Page 125
 MANIFEST – (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

OBJ LEFTY GROVE RESPONSE VER. 1

(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)

Positio Weig Weig Positio Weig
# n ht # C/S Last Name SSN Position ht # C/S Last Name SSN n ht
TERP
1 GUN TL 270 1 200 1 TERP 178
2 AG 250 2 TERP 200 2 AG 260
3 SNIPER260 3 RTO 250 3 GUN TL 250
4 SNIPER260 4 PL 230 4 3 SL 295
5 MEDIC 240 5 JTAC 310 5 ATL 230
280 215
6 FO 6 MEDIC 6 BTL 250
7 (b)(3),(b)(6) PSG 250 7 2 SL 260 7 (b)(3),(b)(6)
AR 260
(b)(3),(b)(6)
8 1SL 250 8 BTL 240 8 AR 275
9 ATL 270 9 ATL 250 9 GRN 260

10 BTL 240 10 GRN 280 10 GRN 230

FO
11 AR 230 11 GRN 260 11 RTO 250
12 RFL 310 12 AR 270 12 MEDIC 220

13 GRN 230 13 AG 260 13 TSE 250

14 14 TPT 200 14
15 15 15
16 16 16
17 17 17
18 18 18
19 19 19
20 20 20
21 21 21
22 22 22
23 23 23
TOTAL WEIGHT PAX TOTAL WEIGHT PAX TOTAL WEIGHT PAX
3340 13 3425 14 3208 13
TOTAL ON TARGET 40

Page 126
 MANIFEST – INFIL (b)(3),(b)(6)

OBJ LEFTY GROVE RESPONSE INFIL VER. 1

(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)
Weigh
# Position t # C/S Last Name SSN Position Weight
1 GUN TL 270 1 TERP 200
2 AG 250 2 TERP 200
3 SNIPER 260 3 RTO 250
4 SNIPER 260 4 PL 230
5 MEDIC 240 5 JTAC 310
6 FO 280 6 MEDIC 215
7 PSG 250 7 2 SL 260
8 1SL 250 8 BTL 240
9 ATL 270 9 ATL 250
10 (b)(3),(b)(6)
BTL 240 10 GRN 280
(b)(3),(b)(6)
11 AR 230 11 GRN 260
12 RFL 310 12 AR 270
13 GRN 230 13 AG 260
14 3 SL 295 14 TPT 200
15 ATL 230 15 TERP 178
16 BTL 250 16 AG 260
17 AR 260 17 GUN TL 250
18 AR 275 18 FO RTO 250
19 GRN 260 19 MEDIC 220
20 GRN 230 20 TSE 250
21 21
22 22
23 23
24 24
25 25
26 26
27 27
28 28
TOTAL WEIGHT PAX WEIGHT PAX
5280 20 4833 20
TOTAL FOR 57/58 40

Page 127
MANIFEST – INFIL (b)(3),(b)(6)

OBJ LEFTY GROVE RESPONSE INFIL

(b)(3),(b)(6)

# C/S Last Name SSN Position Weight

1 CSAR 250
2 EOD 250
3 CSAR 250
4 (b)(3),(b)(6) CSAR 250
5 CSAR 250
6 CSAR 250
7 ASSLT 250
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
TOTAL WEIGHT PAX
1750 7
TOTAL ON 59 IS 7 + 40 FROM 57/58 = 47

Page 128
 JOC CHECK

Screen Check
Fires
JMAU
CSAR
J6
ISR
Weather
CJSOTF
Staff by Exception
J2
OCG Notification
Deconfliction
J3
CSM
CDR

Page 129
 UNCLASSIFIED

Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Investigation Team

The overall classification of this brief is:

SECRET// NOFORN//

15 AUG 2011
Page 130
CLASSIFIED BY (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 1
DECLASSIFY O UNCLASSIFIED
 SECRET//RELSECRET
USA, ISAF, NATO

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
Task Organization

CENTCOM

OPCON ISAF / USFOR-A ISAF / CAOC

COORD

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 131

2
SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO//DISPLAY ONLY TO AFG

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 132
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 133
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 134
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 135
 SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO//DISPLAY ONLY TO AFG

Operations and Intelligence Cycle (F3EA)

Continuous Targeting Cycle
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

New Target

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 136

8
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 137

0
 SECRET//REL
SECRET NATO//DISPLAY
// REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO // DISPLAYONLY
ONLYTO
TOAFG
AFG

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 138
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 139
 SECRET
TO USA, ISAF, NATO//DISPLAY ONLY TO AFG

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
Mission Statistics
s1
Kabul Attack Network
Multiple Kabul attacks disrupted

Al Qaida
No safe-havens in Afghanistan
Very limited presence

Haqqani Network
Disrupted sophisticated IED network
Understanding of network

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
Continual degradation

Taliban
Targeting of leadership
Kandahar assassination network

• 1% CIVCAS
• Daylight Ops (8% of total)
301 accounted for 23% of
CIVCAS
11%
• 64 total CIVCAS on 29
Shots Fired 31 Missions
Page 140

T
 SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO

Key Takeaways
• This Task Force has been operating in Afghanistan (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

• Tactic, Technique, and Procedure (TTP) is designed to capture or

enemy while avoiding Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) and
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

protecting the Afghans

• Our targeting process is resource intensive but precise

• Inter-agency integration is essential in our fight against violent extremism

• Every operation is coordinated perational

Coordination Group (OCG) and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

• Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c will not be decisive but are a

necessary r Insurgency campaign in
Afghanistan

• Pressure the enemy networks, remove and keep insurgents off the
battlefield (in cooperation with the DFIP) and incentivize insurgents desire
for reintegration and reconciliation

Page 141

16
 UNCLASSIFIED

Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Investigation Team

The overall classification of this brief is:

SECRET// NOFORN//

15 AUG 2011
Page 142
CLASSIFIED BY: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
17
DECLASSIFY ON UNCLASSIFIED
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 143
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 144
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 145
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 146
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 147
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

Page 148
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 149
Page 150
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d

Page 151
 (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d

Page 152
(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 153
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d

Page 154
(b)(3)
(b)(3)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 155
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 156
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 157
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Page 158

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 159
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 160
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 161
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 162
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 163
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(2), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 164
 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 165
Page 166
Page 167
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 168
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a

Page 169
 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 170
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 171
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 175
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
Page 177
 SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO
EXTORTION 17
UNIT, CREW, AND AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE BACKGROUND NARRATIVE

1. (U//NONE) B Company, 7th General Support Aviation Battalion (GSAB), 158th Aviation
Regiment (B/7-158) Background

a. (S//REL, USA, ISAF, NATO) Mission. This unit is a US Army Reserve (USAR) unit
based in New Century, KS mobilized to conduct full spectrum combat aviation operations to
include air assault and air movement operations in support of CJTF-101 and ISAF to facilitate
the defeat of insurgent forces in order to increase the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan’s (GIRoA) authority/influence, and regional security/stability. Capability
requirements included 16 x CH-47, 52 personnel and CH-47 Aviation Unit Maintenance Platoon
(AVUM), and 79 personnel. The CH-47 company must deploy with an adequate AVUM
package to maintain aircraft. Aircraft must have High Frequency (HF), Tactical Satellite
(TACSAT)/Satellite Communications (SATCOM), and Blue Force Tracker (BFT) capability. All
aircraft must have a complete Aircraft Survivability (ASE) suit (i.e., CMWS, ALQ-144, APR-39,
ATRCMS). Aircraft-specific equipment requirements state all aircraft should have 714C engines
or better and have hoist, Fast Rope Insertion-Extraction System (FRIES), and/or Special Purpose
Insertion-Extraction System (SPIES) capability. Aircrews should receive high altitude
environmental training at the High Altitude Aviation Training Site (HAATS) or equivalent prior
to arrival in theater.123

b. (U//NONE) Deployment History. This unit along with their parent battalion mobilized on
6 October 2005 for Theater Immersion training at Ft. Hood, TX to support Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF). On the second day of mobilization, the unit received a mission change to
conduct rescue and relief operations in Pakistan following the 7.6 magnitude earthquake that
struck on 8 October 2005 killing 86,000 people, injuring 69,000 and leaving an estimated four
million homeless. Arriving in theater nineteen days later, this unit was the first Army aviation
unit to deploy to Pakistan for Operation Lifeline following the earthquake, eventually returning
to their primary mission supporting combat operations in Afghanistan. During their
mobilization, B/7-158 conducted simultaneous 24/7 combat and humanitarian relief operations
from four locations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Company B directly supported two major
division offensives in Afghanistan (i.e., Operations Mountain Thrust in Tarin Kowt for six weeks
and Operations Mountain Fury in Salerno for four weeks). They flew 7,728 accident-free hours
while delivering more than 25 million pounds of cargo, rescuing more than 4,000 refugees,
evacuating 300 casualties, and conducting 65 combat operations.4567 As a result of this effort,
B/7-158 GSAB earned the Army Aviation Association of America’s USAR Aviation Unit of the

1
Force Tracking Number (FTN) 1110C010899 Data Report
2
Force Tracking Number (FTN) 1100C010899 Data Report
(b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(2) . (2011, August 22)

(b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(2)

7
USAR Unit of the Year Citation. Provided by the Army Aviation Association of America.

1
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 SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO
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UNIT, CREW, AND AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE BACKGROUND NARRATIVE

Year Award for 2006.89 More recently in 2010, B/7-158 deployed with their parent Battalion to
Haiti and conducted rescue and relief operations in support of Operation Unified Response with
Joint Task Force Haiti.10

c. (U//NONE) Mobilization. B/7-158 received Alert Order 1431-08 on 14 February 2008

and Mobilization Order 1709-10 on 26 July 2010.11 As specified, the unit mobilized on 17
March 2011 and reported to Ft. Hood, TX on 20 March 2011 for nearly two months of Theater
Immersion training in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). On 20 May 2011, the unit
was placed under the Operational Control (OPCON) of TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, 10th Combat Aviation
Brigade (CAB), Forward Operating Base (FOB) . By 26 May 2011, all aircrew members
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

completed OEF Rotary Wing (RW) Combat Crew Tactics (CCT) requirements IAW the
Afghanistan Aviation Procedures Guide (APG).1213

d. (S//REL, USA, ISAF, NATO) Mission OPTEMPO. From 26 May 2011 to 5 August
2011, the USAR Pilot-in-Command (PC) from B/7-158 conducted multiple General Support
(GS) missions totaling 91.9 NVG hours and participated in five Team (TM) (b)(3), (b)(6) Direct
Support (DS) missions totaling 9.8 NVG hours. The USAR CH-47 Flight Engineer (FE) also
conducted multiple GS missions totaling 83.3 NVG hours and multiple TM (b)(3), (b)(6) DS
missions totaling 36.3 NVG hours. In addition, the USAR Door Gunner (DG) participated in
multiple GS missions totaling 130.5 NVG hours, but had only participated in two TM (b)(3), (b)(6)
missions totaling 2.1 NVG hours prior to the crash.14

2. (U//NONE) B Company, 2nd GSAB, 135th Aviation Regiment (B/2-135) Background

a. (S//REL, USA, ISAF, NATO) Mission. This unit is an Army National Guard (ARNG)
CH-47D unit split-based with the Headquarters and one platoon (B/2-135 AVN [GSAB][-]) in
Grand Isle, NE and one platoon (Detachment 1, B/2-135) at Buckley AFB, Aurora, CO. The
unit was mobilized on 17 March 2011 to support TF efforts to defeat enemy networks in
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

support of the Commander International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) campaign plan
and Commander US Central Command (CDRUSCENTCOM) guidance. Capability
requirements included one Direct Support rotary wing aviation company consisting of no less
than ten CH-47 helicopters (to include headquarters and maintenance support) capable of

8
Army Aviation Association of America. National/Functional Awards. InfoFile-March, 11, page 3. USAR
Aviation Unit of the Year for 2006. Available: www.quad-a.org/images/pdf/Awards/awards2.i54.pdf
9
USAR Unit of the Year Citation. Provided by the Army Aviation Association of America.
10
Macleod, A. SSG. 99th RSC PAO Team. (2010, January) Task Force Longhorns Answer The Call. Around the
99th RSC [Online]. Available: http://99thrsc.blogspot.com/2010/01/task-force-longhorns-answers-call.html
11
(b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(2) ). (2011, August 23)
RE: Alert and Mob Order for B/7-138 (USAR) New Century, KS and B/2-138 (CO & NEARNG). Email to Stoops,
(b)(6), (b)(2), (b)(3)

(b)(6), (b)(2), (b)(3)

(b)(6), (b)(3)
(b)(6), (b)(2), (b)(3) 2011,
August 19) RE: Crew Experience Summary. Email and EXTORTION 17 Crew Background Tracking Sheet.xll file
(b)(6), (b)(2), (b)(3)
(b)(6), (b)(2), (b)(3) 2011,
August 19) RE: Crew Experience Summary. Email and EXTORTION 17 Crew Background Tracking Sheet.xll file
(b)(6), (b)(2), (b)(3)

2
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 SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO
EXTORTION 17
UNIT, CREW, AND AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE BACKGROUND NARRATIVE

operating in four geographically separate locations and lifting one Ranger company (4 x CH-47)
plus simultaneous infiltration and exfiltration of three geographically separated strike forces (6 x
CH-47) in one period of daylight. Request for Forces (RFF) 1078 (Mod 3) changed the
requirement from a specific duration to an enduring requirement.15

b. (U//NONE) Deployment History. This unit along with their parent battalion mobilized on
19 March 2006 for five months of Theater Immersion training at Ft. Hood, TX then deployed to
Iraq (Balad Air Base) in September 2006 through August 2007 as part of Task Force(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) relieving 7the Battalion, 101st Aviation Brigade on 24 September
2006.1617 The unit distinguished itself as one of the premier air assault units in the U.S. Army,
conducting 111 major, multi-night air assault operations – inserting over 15,500 troops into
enemy landing zones across the Iraq theater in the span of only one year.18 For this effort, 2nd
Battalion, 135 GSAB was awarded the Army Aviation Association of America’s top National
Guard Aviation Unit of the Year award for 2007.19

c. (U//NONE) Mobilization. B/2-135 mobilized on 26 May 2011 and reported to Ft. Hood,
TX on 1 June 2011 for two months of Theater Immersion training ISO TF mission. On
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

28 July 2011, B/2-135 was placed under the Operational Control (OPCON) of TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
10th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB), Forward Operating Base (FOB)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a,.(b)(1)1.4c
By 1 August
2011, all aircrew members completed OEF Rotary Wing (RW) Combat Crew Tactics (CCT)
requirements IAW the Afghanistan Aviation Procedures Guide (APG).2021

d. (S//REL, USA, ISAF, NATO) Mission OPTEMPO. From 1 August 2011 to 5 August
2011, the ARNG Pilot (PI) from B/2-135 conducted one GS mission lasting 5.0 NVG hours,
planned two TM (b)(3), (b)(6) DS missions, and executed two TM (b)(3), (b)(6) DS missions totaling 3.1
NVG hours. The ARNG CH-47 Crew Chief (CE) completed two GS missions consisting of 7.2
NVG hours, and executed one TM (b)(3), (b)(6) DS mission totaling 1.5 NVG hours. This was the
second TM (b)(3), (b)(6) mission for the PI and the first TM (b)(3), (b)(6) mission for the CE.22

15
Force Tracking Number (FTN) 1110C058869 Data Report
16
DA Form 7122 (Crewmember Training Record) of (b)(6), (b)(3)
17
Wikipedia. (2011, May 21) 2d Battalion, 135 th Aviation Regiment (United States) [Online]. Available:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2d_Battalion,_135th_Aviation_Regiment_(United_States)
18
Wikipedia. (2011, May 21) 2d Battalion, 135 th Aviation Regiment (United States) [Online]. Available:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2d_Battalion,_135th_Aviation_Regiment_(United_States)
19
Army Aviation Association of America. National/Functional Awards. InfoFile-March, 11, page 4. ARNG
Aviation Unit of the Year for 2006. Available: www.quad-a.org/images/pdf/Awards/awards2.i54.pdf
20
DA Form 7122 (Crewmember Training Record) of (b)(6), (b)(3)
21
(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (2011, August 23)
RE: Alert and Mob Order for B/7-138 (USAR) New Century, KS and B/2-138 (CO & NEARNG). Email to Stoops,
(b)(6), (b)(2), (b)(3)
1,
August 19) RE: Crew Experience Summary. Email and EXTORTION 17 Crew Background Tracking Sheet.xll file
(b)(6), (b)(2), (b)(3)

3
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 SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO
EXTORTION 17
UNIT, CREW, AND AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE BACKGROUND NARRATIVE

3. (U//NONE) Aircrew Training, Proficiency, and Experience

a. (U) A thorough review of the Individual Aircrew Training Folder (IFRF) and Individual
Flight Records Folder (IFRF) was conducted for each of the CH-47D and AH-64D aircrew
members involved in the Operation Lefty Grove mission that led to the shoot down of
EXTORTION 17. The review indicated all flight records were maintained IAW TC 3-04.11
(Commander’s Guide to Individual and Collective Aircrew Training) with only minor
administrative discrepancies observed.2324

b. (U//NONE) Each crewmember was properly qualified to perform the aircrew duties
which assigned and were in compliance with HQDA, theater specific, and unit qualification and
training requirements.25

c. (U//NONE) Of the five aircrew of EXTORTIN 17, the ARNG pilot and USAR flight
engineer had previous combat experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).2627

d. (S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO) (b)(6), (b)(3) s were the

pilots on board the downed CH-47D aircraft. Although not conclusive, the evidence suggests
(b)(6), (b)(3) that night.
During the Immediate Reaction Force infiltration, (b)(6), (b)(3) was heard making all radio calls
and actively engaged in leading and managing the flight, which, under standard operating
procedures, indicates that he was not flying the aircraft. Since his assignment to Task Force
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c on 23 May 2011, (b)(6), (b)(3) conducted five Team (b)(3), (b)(6) direct support missions
and accumulated 105.3 hours of flight time under night vision goggles. Although recently
appointed as a CH-47D Pilot-in-Command (PC), (b)(6), (b)(3) was an experienced pilot with
over 670 hours of total time and nearly 100 hours of combat time in the previous two months, all
of which were in support of TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c operations. In addition, (b)(6), (b)(3) was paired
with a highly experienced CH-47D Standardization Instructor Pilot (SP). (b)(6), (b)(3) was a full-
time ARNG Aircraft Qualification Standardization Instructor and High Altitude Mountain
Standardization Instructor for the High Altitude Aviation Training Site (HAATS), Eagle, CO.
(b)(6), (b)(3) was also a seasoned combat pilot assigned as the unit’s Senior Instructor Pilot in
2006/2007 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) where he accumulated 719 hours of
combat time. (b)(6), (b)(3) was among the Army National Guard’s most experienced aviators
with over 1,400 hours of total night vision goggle time, and over 4,600 hours of total flight time
in various aircraft systems, including the UH-1H/V, AH-1F/S, CH-47F, C-12D, and the C-26E.
He was also qualified as an Aviation Safety Officer. Since his assignment to Task Force
23
TC 3-04.11, Commander’s Aircrew Training Program for Individual, Crew, and Collective Training, dated 19
Nov 2009

(b)(6), (b)(3)

4
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 SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO
EXTORTION 17
UNIT, CREW, AND AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE BACKGROUND NARRATIVE

on or about 28 July 2011,

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(6), (b)(3) a Master Army Aviator, conducted two Team
direct support missions and accumulated 9.7 hours of flight time under night vision
(b)(3), (b)(6)

goggles. A thorough review of the Individual Aircrew Training Folder and Individual Flight
Records Folder was conducted for each of the CH-47D and AH-64D aircrew members involved
in the Operation Lefty Grove mission that led to the CH-47D shoot down. The review indicated
all flight records were maintained in accordance with aircrew training regulations with only
minor administrative discrepancies observed. Each crewmember was properly qualified to
perform the aircrew duties to which assigned and were in compliance with Headquarters,
Department of the Army, theater specific, and unit qualification and training requirements.

4. (U//NONE) Aircraft Maintenance History

a. (U//NONE) The EXTORTION 17 helicopter was a CH-47D model, tail number 84-
24175. It was originally manufactured as a CH-47C model, tail number 69-17113, and
converted from a “C” model to a “D” model on 17 June 1985.2829

b. (U//FOUO) While still configured as a CH-47C model, 69-17113 was involved in one
Class B accident in 197430 and one Class C accident in 1981.31 Following conversion to a CH-
47D model in 1985, 84-24175 was involved in one Class D accident in 198632, one Class D in
199033, and one Class D in 2000.34 On 13 January 2003, the aircraft was involved in a Class C
accident while assigned to the 7th Battalion, 101st Aviation Brigade in Afghanistan when its aft
main landing gear was damaged. During ground taxi on a road, the pavement gave-way
resulting in damage to the undercarriage.35 More recently, aircraft 84-24174 was involved in a
another Class D accident on 12 December 2009 while assigned to B Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd
Combat Aviation Brigade in Afghanistan. During ground taxiing the right rear strut assembly
failed. The aircraft was returned to service following repairs.36

c. (U//NONE) All Aviation Safety Action Messages (ASAMs) and Modification Work
Orders (MWOs) were up to date through 2011.37

d. (U//NONE) A 400-hour phase inspection of the aircraft was conducted in January 2011,
and a 200-hour phase inspection was completed on 5 June 2011 by the L-3 Global Security &

28 (b)(6), (b)(2), (b)(3)

(2011, August 22) RE: Tail Number for EXTORTION 17. Email to (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(2) ).
29
1984 USAF Serial Numbers. (2011, August 22) [Online]. Available:
(b)(2), (b)(6), (b)(3) usaf_serials/1984.html
30
Abbreviated Aviation Accident Report (AAAR), Case Number 1974-10-09-012
31
Abbreviated Aviation Accident Report (AAAR), Case Number 1981-02-01-006
32
Abbreviated Aviation Accident Report (AAAR), Case Number 1986-07-27-02
33
Abbreviated Aviation Accident Report (AAAR), Case Number 1990-11-18-006
34
Abbreviated Aviation Accident Report (AAAR), Case Number 2000-04-20-007
35
Abbreviated Aviation Accident Report (AAAR), Case Number 2003-01-13-001
36
Abbreviated Aviation Accident Report (AAAR), Case Number 2012-12-19-005
(b)(6), (b)(2), (b)(3)

(2011, August 22) RE: Tail Number for EXTORTION 17. Email to (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(2) .

5
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 SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO
EXTORTION 17
UNIT, CREW, AND AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE BACKGROUND NARRATIVE

Engineering Solutions (GS&ES) Depot Maintenance and Repair Facility at Forward Operating
Base (FOB)(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cThe aircraft was Fully Mission Capable (FMC) on the night of 5/6 August
2011.38

e. (U//NONE) A post-accident photograph shows the aircraft tail number “0-24175” as it

was painted on the fuselage.39 The first digit is not shown. The second number clearly shows
the number “0” instead of a “4” as indicated in the aircraft maintenance records and historical
files. This is believed to be a stenciling error as the aircraft panel was improperly painted. The
accident investigation team was not able to determine why this occurred, but information
provided by the unit indicates they found a few other aircraft that are Stay Behind Equipment
(SBE) with the same discrepancy. The aircraft historical records all indicated the correct year
prefix of “84” throughout its history.4041

5. (U//FOUO) Threat Countermeasure Systems/Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE). Installed

on EXTORTION 17 (CH-47D tail number 84-24175) was the AN/ALQ-212(V) Improved
Countermeasures Dispenser (ICMD) and APR-39A(V)1 Radar Detecting Set (RDS) systems.

a. (U//NONE) The AN/ALQ-212 is a modular system developed to defeat infrared-guided

missiles. It consists of the AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS), Improved
Countermeasures Dispenser (ICMD), and improved countermeasure munitions (i.e., flares). This
system provides automatic, passive detection of incoming IR missiles providing warning to the
helicopter’s crew and providing cues to the electronics module to automatically dispense decoy
munitions. This system is not effective against direct fire weapons such as small arms and
Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs).

b. (U//NONE) The AN/APR-39A(V)1 Radar Detecting Set (RDS) is a lightweight radar

receiver for general aircraft application. The system provides warning of radar directed threats
to allow appropriate evasive maneuvers and deployment of chaff using a separate AN/ALQ-212
ICMD. The system has the capability of detecting all pulse radar normally associated with
hostile surface-to-air missiles, airborne interceptors, and anti-aircraft weapons systems. The
system has ten individually housed components consisting of one control module, one cockpit
indicator, one comparator module, two receivers, two left spiral antennas, two right spiral
antennas, and one blade antenna mounted on the aircraft fuselage. This system is not effective
against direct fire weapons such as small arms and RPGs.

(b)(6), (b)(2), (b)(3)

(b)(6), (b)(3)

(b)(2) .
Accident Scene Photo of aircraft panel with Tail Number
(b)(6), (b)(2), (b)(3)

(b)(2)
Aircraft Historical Records

6
SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO Page 183
 (b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) MIL NG NGB ARNG (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)

Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2011 1:57 PM

To: INVEST TM NGB
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) NG NGB ARNG
Subject: RE: Alert and Mob Order for B/7-138 (USAR) New Century, KS and B/2-138 (CO&NEARNG)
(UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification:  UNCLASSIFIED 
Caveats: NONE 
 
(b)(3), (b)(6) , 
 
This is all I could find in MDIS on both units.  MDIS records go back to 2007.  If you think 
there is more I can get with the data base team but this will take time.   
 
B/2‐135 UIC is WVBDB0 
MOBDATE:  5/26/2011 
DEMOBDATE:  6/28/2012 
PAX count: 26  
 
B7/158's UIC is WNH5R5 
MOBDATE:  3/17/2011 
DEMOBDATE:  4/19/2012 
PAX Count: 79 
 
 
 
(b)(3), (b)(6)

Aviation Mobilization Actions Officer 

(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

 
 
‐‐‐‐‐Original Message‐‐‐‐‐ 
From:  (b)(2), (b)(6)

Sent 011 1:27 PM 
To:  (b)(3), (b)(6)  MIL NG NGB ARNG; ARNGAVCC 
Subject: RE: Alert and Mob Order for B/7‐138 (USAR) New Century, KS and 
B/2‐138 (CO&NEARNG) (UNCLASSIFIED) 
 
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED 

(b)(3), (b)(6) , 
 
B7/158's UIC is WNH5R5  
 
B/2‐135 UIC is WVBDB0 

(b)(3), (b)(6)
 
Investigation Team NGB Rep 
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(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

 
 
‐‐‐‐‐Original Message‐‐‐‐‐ 
From:  (b)(3), (b)(6) MIL NG NGB ARNG [mailto: (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2011 12:55 PM 
To: INVEST TM NGB; ARNGAVCC 
Subject: RE: Alert and Mob Order for B/7‐138 (USAR) New Century, KS and 
B/2‐138 (CO&NEARNG) (UNCLASSIFIED) 
 
Classification:  UNCLASSIFIED 
Caveats: NONE 
 
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
 
I need the UIC's for these units to look them up. 

(b)(3), (b)(6)  
 
‐‐‐‐‐O
From:  (b)(2), (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2011 7:43 AM 
To: ARNGAVCC;  (b)(3), (b)(6)  MIL NG NGB ARNG 
Subject: Alert and Mob Order for B/7‐138 (USAR) New Century, KS and 
B/2‐138 (CO&NEARNG) 
 
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET//REL TO USA, 
CAVEATS: NONE 
TERMS: NONE 
 
 

(b)(3), (b)(6)  
 
  
 
Can you reach into the system or back to B/7‐138 (USAR) New Century, KS or their parent BN in 
Ft. Hood, for a copy of their Alert Order 1431‐08 issued on 14 February 2008 and Mobilization 
Order 1709‐10 issued on 26 July 2010? 
 
  
 
I also need the Alert and Mob Orders for B/2‐138 (NEARNG) Grand Isle, NE.  
 
  
 
Thank you, 
 
  

(b)(3), (b)(6)

 
Investigation Team NGB Rep 
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 (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

  
 
 
 
DERRIVED FROM: MANUAL   
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

DECLASSIFY ON: 25 YEARS FROM DATE OF SOURCE DATE OF SOURCE: 1 MAY 2006 
 
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET//REL TO USA, 
CAVEATS: NONE 
TERMS: NONE 
 
Classification:  UNCLASSIFIED 
Caveats: NONE 
 
 
 
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED 
Classification:  UNCLASSIFIED  
Caveats: NONE 
 

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The interview of Task Force (b)(3), (b)(6) Commander, S-3, Tactical

Operations Officer, Intelligence Analyst, and S-2 NCOIC opened
at 2155 Zulu, 17 August 2011, at FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
.

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD: BG J. Colt, US Army

LEGAL ADVISOR: LA

GROUND FORCE ARMY ADVISOR: SME-GFA

MH-47 ADVISOR: SME-MH47

INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR: SME-INTEL

COURT REPORTER: CR2

Derived from: Task Force (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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LA: Stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear that the
statement you provide will be true and accurate to the best of your
knowledge and belief?

BG Colt: Can you first kinda describe the Task Force, it’s
composition and the CH-47 support. Let’s go down that track first
and then let’s talk about mission tasking.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Yes sir, the Task Force originally started off as
an assau battalion, with just UH-60s. When we found out that we
were coming here, we configured in March to a Task Force configuration
at home station consisting of Black Hawks and Apaches. Once we got
into theater we were joined by - we actually joined the Medevac which
had deployed early - 10th CAV Medevac unit which was here and at the
time the Oregon Washington guard---- Oregon Washington Chinook
crews. After we got here they were replaced; we also got an influx
of Hawaii crews and later on the Kansas crews that are with us at
this time. And just shortly about three weeks ago, we were joined
by Colorado and Nebraska crews as well as RFF individuals from Korea

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and Honduras.

BG Colt: [inaudible] 47 crews.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Right all 47 crews - yes sir.

BG Colt: Can you describe the mission tasking authority and and
mission tasking process for a Team (b)(3), (b)(6) mission?

CDR: Yes sir, -- Chinooks that are DS direct support to

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Team (b)(3), (b)(6) . We have two Chinooks and two apaches that are direct
support of Logar every night, obviously we work hand and hand with
them to make sure that the crews get their day off every 14 days and
work through that, but not to impede the mission. So essentially we
do 24 well - not 24/7, all night operation every day of the week when
called upon would from (b)(3), (b)(6) - if they had to be
here at the time.

BG Colt: And the crew selection for those particular AWTs and
47s, what is the process for selecting and integrating those crews?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Sir, what we do with that is we try to select the

best crews out of what we have here in order to do those missions.
In many ways the hardest part about the(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cset is the hasty
planning, which is why we have TF (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) here that
do that; that is their primary m (b)(3), (b)(6) is our TacOps;
officer that is his number one job, but he and TF K (b)(3), (b)(6) come
in at 1600 (local) and leave only after the (b)(3), (b)(6) set is done for
the evening. Between the two of them, they are the one’s responsible
for planning the Logar mission every single night.

BG Colt: Is that the construct that you inherited from the

previous task force or is that something in the Pre-deployment Site
Survey (PDSS) system that you felt was the best way to do this? Can
you describe that?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: When we first got here on the ADVON party they
had one Captain who was doing the(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , company LNO. We had a
different team make up, team set there. Once we got here myself
and TF (b)(3), (b)(6) started working hand and hand, cause I used to
do the same mission set for my previous deployments - that was kind
of my main role has always been on deployment not only being the
tactical operations guy flight lead or something of that nature,
working with ODA or working with other team members; that's what
I would do. So I got here, took on the mission and then in order
to keep myself flying and TF (b)(3), (b)(6) flying, we came up with

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[inaudible] and TF (b)(3), (b)(6) became primary and I became back up.
Once we got them trained up [inaudible] deliver our mission.

BG Colt: Are you UH-60 rated by trade?

TF TACOPS: Yes, sir.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TF CDR: Just to add to what (b)(3), (b)(6) said, he and I have

been tog er since OEF 7,--- and so---in those deployments which
was in Kandahar, last time Iraq and now back here, we have had
extensive experience working the Special Ops. community;
particularly down in Kandahar working with not only United States
special forces, but all the elements that were down there as well.
So we have developed what we think is a very successful way of working
these missions and the planning process and the execution and have
become comfortable with that type, which is a little bit different
perhaps than our predecessors, but we felt that it was necessary
to have two individuals there not just one for the very reasons we
just discussed, to back each other up.

BG Colt: Does the company itself or the platoon Chinooks

however you are organized, do they have a dedicated planner? What
is their participation in mission preparation?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Whenever they come in on duty they decide to come

ittle bit earlier. Once they come in, I send them down to Team
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c[inaudible] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ---team, we start working HLZs. It
is the crews themselves; the crews themselves make their flight
routes, they pick their HLZ’s, but once again it all depends on the
ground force commander’s intent and what his actions are. What we
have been doing is they will call me, they will chart this grid;
looks well after looking, pass them through TOPO and the teams are
pretty good at knowing what our constraints are. You know our
constraints we got from brigade right now is that 300-meters from
any type of Qalat structure, if it’s going to an offset or (Y) if
anything of that nature. So as long as it meets those constraints
and at the same time it’s within 05 degrees from the slope, it
normally gets approved-- there been no issues with that. So the
planners go down, the Chinook crews would pass me their flight
routes, their time in-routes, their go-around directions, how they
want to approach it, and again it’s based off of them speaking with
the ground force commanders. So when they develop flight routes sir
and their planning.

BG Colt: Is there anything unique about LZ planning or LZ decks

(pre-selected/approved) for the Tangi Valley?

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TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: The Tangi Valley is very limited to where you can
land to meet those constraints again with three hundred meters and
also of the terrain. What we try to do is typically we’ve done about
135 of these missions, we do brown outs and the dust landings and
also the terrain has been more dangerous than the enemy. So just
trying to find a place to land has been significant. However the
[inaudible] Tangi Valley is very tight. There is not a place to go
and especially in the green zone. So what I did prior to this
mission, we will discuss it later, is I actually started working with
the ground force commander also with the [inaudible] team to come
up with a HLZs that we could find, not for a specific mission but
because they were planning detainee operations for a few missions
and we went through everything we could find . And it's just its very
constrained inside of the green zone in the Tangi Valley.

BG Colt: Just for my own edification is the green zone a

vernacular here? What exactly does that mean?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: We use the green zone for anything that has
vegetati that’s around where - mostly the way it works - especially
for Afghanistan if you have a river there's life there’s grass,
there’s trees, there’s personnel. Most of the threat or enemy
personnel even local nationals just one’s who live around the water
source, we call its the green zone and also its green.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Just to clarify the process a little bit--- when the
crews go own there, they actually go down, but the crews are the
ones actually going to be landing the HLZ and PZ, so they help select
those. When they get those they send them to TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: here as
he indicated, once he gets those three and I look at those also to
vet them. As he mentions himself he knows what my criteria are too.
Which is the three hundred meters from any Qalat any threat area that
we deemed could be a threat of any type, we also expand that further
any kind of day time operations have to be either--- 800 to 1000 meters
away or have a significant terrain feature between the threat and
or by picking them up for whatever mission. So there are other
parameters involved in that to. Once he gets the LZ and the PZ and
the route it is also embedded into our S-2 section too for the very
reasons that are very apparent. There are a lot of places out here;
here the S-2 section looks at the SAFIRE that happened recently as
well as anything that's happened on the ground to try and facilitate
the best possible routes in and out and of course that doesn’t speak
to the normal piloting skills; not silhouetting yourself; flying
silhouetted on ridge lines and staying away from built up areas things
of that nature.

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BG Colt: And I appreciate very much the fact that you have given
us such a comprehensive record of the(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cmission since you have
been here. How would you characterize the 135 missions since you
have been here, as far as, day and night, in contact or out, number
of missions that have gone in the Tangi Valley etcetera?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: I can give you the exact number for Tangi Valley.
We have ne almost three or four that were all offset infil/offset
exfil for the Tangi Valley and there were some that had terrain
relief features---they were going more towards the Baraki Barak side
of the Tangi Valley versus the deeper side that we went in for the
IRF that one evening, but most of them had been just offsets
[inaudible] I want to say it was four, but I don't know the exact
number, no contact, no issues. We just go in, we got a few jackpots
and again sir the list is inside there and I don’t have them all,
but we were more to the south; we ran into some issues where for
the this operation some of the bridges; they looked at it and they
didn’t want to cross some bridges and be confined to crossing over,
due to some of the historical threat about two command wires on the
bridges and things of that nature; so that's the reason why they
didn’t want to come in from the north on this one or actually go
into the green zone itself.

BG Colt: Predominately night missions though?

TF TACOPS: Oh, yes sir.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TF CDR: They are all night missions. The only time we

operate ring the day is on an extract; if they go long on their
mission set, we do a day extraction and then we adjust the PZ’s as
necessary in order to facilitate the criteria that we established
already; but even on our deliberate ops for conventional forces,
we don't do day time operations down here, our Chinooks only fly
at night.

BG Colt: Do you want to talk through the deliberate sort of

intelligence -- how would you characterize the intelligence
collaborations between Task Force (b)(3), (b)(6) and Task Force(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: I’ll address the first point, since we have been
here we have had a very good working relationship with r, better
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

than most. A lot better than what I have experienced in the past
with different SOF elements. So we never had a real issue with them.
One reason for that is when a new team comes on board, we always

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do a meet and greet. We go there or they come here and from the
very beginning we let them know our constraints or intentions
[inaudible] [muffling background noise] are. Clearly we don't have
a lot of the technical capabilities that some of the other Chinooks
have whether it’s 160th or anybody else and because of---that and
couple other issues we point out to them 300, 800, 1000, the crews
that we have, things of that nature. So they know from the very
beginning that---if they ask us for a certain LZ that we may have
to adjust, sometimes it’s only 50 meters, sometimes, sure sometimes
it’s a 100, 200. And with that understanding from the very beginning,
it has facilitated our operation considerably. So the back and forth
feedback that we get from and they get from us from the very beginning
has made that much simpler. ----- [BG Colt: started speaking.]

BG Colt: Do you think just [inaudible] [voice muffled] as far

as risk management thought process, but do you think that most times
when you are given a coordinate that; I don’t understand not landing
onto the X or not landing on the Y, but do you think that---intent
of an area landing is clearly understood versus a precision or a
point landing?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: can you clarify sir, ---are you saying that do they
understand our constraints [inaudible]?

BG Colt: Do you think it is commonly understood by the crew

that though you were given a grid that it may be an area landing
that is?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Yes sir, I don't mean to jump on you here but, our
crews have to do that. When you have on an LZ, when you come in you
pick the best possible location, send it up to brigade---brigade
vets all of this as well. We should have said this at the beginning.
When we give HLZ cards, we get the TOPO we are looking for slope,
we are looking for any kind of laser imagery of what may be in that
area. Given that when you make your approach as a pilot, as you know,
that point may not be the most suitable for something that doesn’t
show up on imagery and they are well aware of that. So that's the
one part. On the PZ, on the extraction part of it, again Logar is
very professional, they know what we can and can't do. So what they
will setup, they will go to that grid and they will set up that PZ
so we can come in and extract them. The dust, the snow in the winter
clearly makes some things very difficult, but the pilots are very
important, the crews are very well aware that this is the grid, but
it’s that close proximity.

SME-INTEL: one of the questions with the HLZ [inaudible]

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development, it is not done here locally? How does that relationship

gets transmitted down to the terrain team [inaudible] Brigade? Can
you kind of talk through on how that works as far as when they take
their analysis, how you get it [inaudible] [muffling sound] feasible
suitable HLZ giving thee parameters, risk mitigation.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: I will start it and I will let (b)(3), (b)(6) take the
last par of it. As he mentioned earlier, we get the intended
n from Logar and from the (b)(3), (b)(6), whether it’s (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6) . This is where we want to go and this is our objective; this
where we want to get picked up from. Once we get that we make sure
we refine it to what we can and can't do. Most of the time it's
pretty close. We don't have to adjust too much and that comes from
working together for so long. Once we get that or (b)(3), (b)(6) gets
that,the crews, (b)(3), (b)(6) , the three (S3) or myself looks at and it
gets pushed up.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: [inaudible] [muffled und] to answer some more

of that stion, once the, working with(b)(3), (b)(6)and the team down there;
they will look at imagery; they will get our constraints, and he
can pick a thing and know what they were. By the time he sent them
to us passed maybe a month; they were already within ou [inaudible].
So I would just call direct to our TOPO team or TF(b)(3), (b)(6) , we’ll give
him a call, give him the grid; once they receive the g d, they would
look at it any point, in time our TOPO would also if our grids were
on top of a house or if it’s something; a dorked up grid for whatever
imagery they have they will be put other grids around there, keep
their original grid we gave them, but also show us other possible
suitable HLZs that meet the 70 meters for Chinook, 300 meters and
all of that and email them back to us. So that's kind of how that
works over at our TOPO team in terrain analysis and it's just a slide
that shows the zero to five is green, five to ten is yellow and ten
to or greater is going to be red.

BG Colt: Is that a similar process used by the other Task

Forces that all draw off the Brigade TOPO team?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)S3: Roger---just to make sure there's no confusion with

respect to the actual HLZ development, the TOPO team at brigade
simply put in the grids and looks at the actual slope and pulls the
imagery. All of the rest of it is actually done at the individual
task force level. So the criteria of the Qalats, the slope, obstacles
the threat the feasibility of approach departure that is all done
at the task forces and we just use the brigade TOPO [inaudible] for
the actual imagery with the ring and slopes and it’s a back and forth
really almost HLZ negotiations sometimes finding grids that work

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to meet all of those criteria. Other Task Forces use a similar,

but not the exact same process.

BG Colt: Has it ever led to a timeliness issue?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: As far as getting it approved sir?

BG Colt: Or getting the analysis that you were looking for in

order to make an informed judgment?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: In the very beginning when the process first

started where we had to push everything up to the brigade to gain
approvals, there were a couple delays, I think in its entirety, we
had maybe two missions, one I know for sure that was momentarily
delayed before they could actually execute the mission. It didn’t
impede the mission itself the mission still went, but as we did this
more and more, the TOPO guys up there at brigade became very
proficient at giving us the information quickly so we can then push
it back up to the brigade commander because it's got to go through
the S-3 and then the brigade commander as well for approval. That
process has gotten much, much quicker over time and I can't remember
the last time we had a really issue with anything impeding the
mission.

BG Colt: Any other?

SME-INTEL: Given the Intel shop we had down at battalion; if

there was anything you could do or changes you could make to help
assist with that process it seems cumbersome, is there anything you
would recommend to Intel, Intel architecture to change potentially?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Well if we could have our own TOPO team, that would
be great cause that would facilitate, we could draw our own imagery
quickly and then instead of going up back and up again that would
take that part out of the equation, but now again you are talking
money assets things like that. Those teams are at the brigade level
and not at the battalion level that would take one part of it out.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: I was working with the team down at the

[inaudib ] trying to get some of their high speed imagery and also
some of their graphics and also a program light art that we were
working with and working on. The only problem with that was it was
only I or TF(b)(3), (b)(6)working so we didn’t have a full team of people,
so if we were ying to do those ourselves we didn't have the manning
or assets; [inaudible] if they were working to get user imagery as
well. So if you had a dedicated cell to be working with special ops.

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Team or whatever is doing imagery then that is something that yes

it would speed the process up.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: that's a good point, it does not matter where the
TOPO tea s whether it’s with (b)(3), (b)(6) or with us here, we can certainly
cross level and then push it up again, but once again it’s going
to them and back to us, then up to the brigade. And even if we did
have that capability it would also, just as (b)(3), (b)(6) said, it will
require a dedicated team for that. And with the personnel issues
the way they are with all the deploying units, they have the
capability to manage that.

BG Colt: You referred to this back to brigade, is that a risk

mitigation method? What is the purpose of that and your thoughts
about that?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: It's considered a high risk mission. I'm only

authorized to authorize moderate risk missions; high risk missions
have to go up to the brigade commander for authorization for
execution.

BG Colt: What defines a high risk mission?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Hasty planning is one thing that would do that.

Also, --

BG Colt: Hasty is defined as less than three hours?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Three hours to four hours [inaudible] is considered

hasty pl ning, yes, sir. Three hours is for our (b)(3), (b)(6)0, mission set,
four hours for ISAF SOF.

BG Colt: Of the 135 missions that you have done in support of

Logar, how many would you say were deliberate planning not hasty?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Of these 135?

BG Colt: Yes.

TF CDR: These are all high risk sir. They are all considered
(b)(3), (b)(6)

hasty p nning [inaudible] for risk mitigation measure.

BG Colt: Everything single Logar mission is a high risk

mission?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Every single one is approved by the brigade

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commander.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)
: Sir I can speak a little on that to. [inaudible] [several
voices king low at the same time.]
TF(b)(3), (b)(6)was sworn in.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)
: For the deliberate planning process there would be some
hts would talk with (b)(3), (b)(6) ) would talk with
(b)(3), (b)(6) [inaudible] some of the [inaudible], we would work HLZs for the

following night, the problem is most of the time we would pick HLZ,
we have an idea whether [inaudible] would have a say in that, but
more than likely the next day when we showed up he had moved, so
most of our planning ended up being up for not. With that being said,
on occasion we could pick a vicinity and have HLZ’s already selected
for that area and it did speed up the process a lot more because
I already had TOPO from the previous night and we can then push
forward with the planning and execute the SP time a little earlier,
but for the most part, every time we would come in and do the check
in that same (inaudible) had moved and therefore we had to
re-evaluate where our HLZ’s were. So it ended up being [inaudible]
hasty planning process for an hour and a half plan and a hour and
a half for the brief and the crews [inaudible].

BG Colt: Keep in mind I'm not impugning the methodology or

the process here because I believe there has to be one. Of the 135
missions you planned so far, how many times has this risk mitigation
process overturned the original plan or influenced the outcome of
the original plan?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: The risk -- in other words getting approval from

Brigade w many times has that changed?

BG Colt: Exactly. And what categorically might be a reason

to change?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)
: I think it would be the risk for the Qalat near the HLZs
would b he biggest risks that the brigade takes a look at and I
can say we probably only had maybe one or two where they said take
a look at this area again see if you can find something better. They
didn’t necessary disapprove it but said if we can find something
else better based off the terrain maybe take a look at it. But maybe
one or two missions sir. Usually we vetted it pretty well before
we sent it up.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Usually on those one or two occasions and TF(b)(3), (b)(6)
is right would get a call from the boss and he will tell me h
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I'm looking at this I see that got a Qalat within 250 or 200 meters;
are you comfortable with that. And I would take a look at it and
I will tell him we have already done the analysis. I say sir, I its
one Qalat, the door gunners are aware of it they are going to be
concentrating on that it’s an LZ or if it’s a PZ, (b)(3), (b)(6)

will clear that building before we actually come in for the PZ.

BG Colt: I think that's a healthy dialogue to have.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: You asked about permission process if it delays

or whatever for the mission, I think since we have been here it has
only been two or three missions that has process this way actually
delayed the mission and pushed it. I know for myself I have
requested some additional time through the team members because the
request changed or I couldn't meet the intent and also put the plan
together in a timeline they wanted because of a change or SIGINT
mover hit. So that's the only time there have been delays with the
approval process as if something happens or another SI pops up or
he move and we lose flexibility but It's only been a few times that
has actually happened where we were delayed taking off due to
approval.

BG Colt: Okay. Have you ever sensed impatience from the ground
force with respect to the pace of being prepared to take off?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Sir, that's a loaded question. Like any team they
want to get out they want to go and SI hits the only problems we
have is our constraints so there has been frustration we have
expressed to them for things changed so much frustrating thing
[inaudible] us, but again it's a mutual frustration we both
understand, it’s nothing that either one of us can affect, they want
to go and get the targets as close as they can with the threat and
pick that target up. However with for us our constraints if it moves,
I have got to find new HLZ or TF(b)(3),(b)(6) has to find new HLZ’s and
[inaudible] looking for the 300 m ers and no Qalats and flatness
also [inaudible] routes, the threat, it causes us to build a whole
new brief which once again starts our time.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)
CDR: And that's the good part about having a good working
relationship, because we start from the very beginning with the meet
and greet and when we get to know them, I mean this aircraft going
down was not only hard hit because of our crews, we knew the guys
that where onboard because we worked with them. And they came over
here and talked to us, (b)(3), (b)(6) and TF(b)(3), (b)(6)they talked every single
day, they go down there and do the planning. So it's helps to build
that relationship because when there are frustrations on both sides

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everyone understands.

BG Colt: To what degree is using reserve component and their

rotational basis affected your ability to integrate crews and can
you describe that?

TF(b)(3),(b)(6)CDR: I will give you a perfect example, we have every

unit is different with the reserves or active duty. You will see
some units they are night and day from other units. The crew just
left Hawaii, which is fantastic, absolutely fantastic to the
man[inaudible] the Kansas guys that were here were just absolutely
fantastic crews.

BG Colt: And incidentally, how long did you have that? Did
you have that from RIPTOA or were they here before you got here?

TF(b)(3),(b)(6)CDR: When we first got here, it was Oregon / Washington.

They had few very good, very competent pilots, worked really well.
I'm a firm believer in the fact that the leader sets the tone for
the unit and the Captain that was down here had a different
disposition, a different outlook. They had several of their guys
that were very, very proficient, very good and those were the guys
that flew Logar. I had no issues with them at all and they were
great. When they left Kansas came onboard. They integrated fully
with our unit and that's one of the things that we do at (b)(3),(b)(6)

the whole time anyway. And you’ve a new group comes in and the first
thing they get is one of these to make them feel like they are part
of (b)(3),(b)(6) They’re not Chinooks; they’re not Apaches; they’re
not Black Hawks. We integrate them fully into the unit and this
Kansas crew has been phenomenal. They’ve got the right attitude.
They want to go out and do great things. They want to be part of
Task Force (b)(3),(b)(6) .

It's easier when they come into a Task Force. When we first
got here the Oregon / Washington guys had been here with ‘Brawler’
and so they’ve been brought up under ‘Brawler, under different SOPs,
different TTPs, and things of that nature. So, they then had to
adjust to obviously how the new Task Force does things and that
transition may have been a little bit more difficult. But, by and
large, I personally don't have an issue with any -- not a single
one of the Kansas crew. And, the new guys that have come in -- the
Colorado, Nebraska, Korea, our newer guys are the same way. Fully
integrated into the Task Force and I have had no issue with them.

SME-MH47: So, do they fly under your SOP or do they bring and

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SOP with them?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: They fly under our SOP.

SME-MH47: That’s their fighter management --

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Absolutely. And, it’s a 10th CAB SOP. They fall
under th and we tell them right from the very beginning, “Look,
this is not us picking on you, getting into your record and so forth
and so on. It’s making you part of the team. We are one team. We
do things one way and it's the 10th CAB way, and of course the (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) way.

BG Colt: Do we know -- Do they know, see, and train the 10th

CAB TACSOP or methodology during their mobilization processes?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)S3: They generally do not, but being with my previous

life her efore coming to the (b)(3),(b)(6) , we did forward out some
of those documents to them and to the MOB sites during their
training. For example, the Colorado/Nebraska guys, I was actually
in contact with them prior to them coming out here when they were
training forwarding them some of our business rules, the TACSOP
.suggestions for training to flying at night and different pieces
like that--

BG Colt: And can they VTC, or PDSS; anything between you and
them before they got here?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)S3: I can't speak to the PDSS, but we did do VTCs with
them.

SME-MH47: So, from my understanding Hawaii’s came through,

and then Kansas, and now we are working with Colorado and Nebraska.
So --
TF(b)(3), (b)(6)S3: Sir, it's an offset rotation. So, in essence
there's Guard / Reserve components in RC-(b)(3), (b)(6) at a time and they
are off cycle from each other. So, originally when 10th CAB TOA’d
and (b)(3), (b)(6) TOA’d there was the Oregon / Washington National
Guard, which was B, 1st of the 1-60th. Hawaii, B, 1st of the 1-71
came in at about the same time that we did and then we being 10th
CAB also brought our own organic crews and air frames. Five or six
months into rotation here there was a redistribution of air crews
and air frames across RC-(b)(3), (b)(6) in order to even out and leverage all
the capabilities based on all the different mission sets. So, the
Hawaii Guard was split between(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cand (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c with mainly the
Oregon / Washington focus out of Bagram with the traditional 10th

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CAB crews out of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and JAF. When the Oregon / Washington RIP’d
out, that’s when Kansas came in and then soon after Kansas came in
it was time for Hawaii to depart, at which time the Colorado /
Nebraska had just came in.

BG Colt: What challenges, if any, does that present with

regard to detachment leadership and detachment maintenance
management when you’re always homogenizing crews and maintainers?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: The maintainers are now falling under D Company,

so that a in it's one team, one fight, kind of thing. Because there
was that transition period when we got here, initially we had the
maintainers -- this is how “Brawler’ our predecessors did it --

BG Colt: Do you also pull on a thin slice from the AVUM or

AVIM-- No?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: There's none. No, sir. Essentially, Kansas the

guys, an correct me if I'm wrong, but they came here with crews
and that’s it. So, that's the maintenance piece has been a little
bit of a challenge, not insurmountable, and again there’s only so
many assets, so many personnel so brigade distributed those as best
as they could to make sure that we could fight the fight.

SME-MH47: So you have an SPs that are 47 drivers [inaudible]?

Do you all ever do unit collective training with these? Because
over the 135 missions there’s been other units dropping in, as far
as pilots, whether it was Kansas and now Colorado / Nebraska. Do
those guys just recently within the last month; is that correct?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)S3: Yes, sir. I should be happy to speak to some of

the trai ng pieces; I think we are starting to go down that road.
There's two distinct mission sets that are here for those CH-47s;
the general support and then also the direct support to(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
. So,
at least when I came on board it was primarily the Hawaii Guard that
was on Logar. It makes it much easier too, like TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR said,
choose your best crews, they formed that habitual relationship with
the supporting unit; not to say that the HLZ support or some of the
missions are enormously different than the GS, but certainly the
planning timeline and the repetitive nightly missions that they
have. We kept them sort of programmed for that and cycled through
front seaters were back in as necessary just to man that 14 day crew
duty before reset. When Kansas came in and they did their RIP, the
general process following the APG is to do all the academics. The
CCTs, which includes the environmental, the local area orientation,
an orientation on right seat qualification flight and then we would

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put them on the GS set. So, for a period of time we were running
two sets of GS from right out here, so basically watching two
separate teams. We called them the GS A and the GS B; so in essence
we were putting up six Chinooks every night for either delivering
hasty operations or delivery of supplies or [inaudible]

BG Colt: Still two of those dedicated to mission though,

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

right?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)S3: Yes, sir. So, the general progre ion was to get
all of t SPs out of the company. Our Task Force(b)(3), (b)(6)is dual rated
and the (b)(3), (b)(6) and fly a lot with the (b)(3), (b)(6) to assist with experience
and oversight as well as the company commanders to fly with those
crews and start to build the relationship and the training, the local
area and then to try to overcome the red-illum that's here in
Afghanistan as well. Once they had flown a number of GS missions
and we could separate out who the go-to individuals were, that the
Task Force Commander or that I was most comfortable with in a hasty
scenario, to either have the skill to fly the aircraft or have the
maturity to make the decisions that you have made then we selected
people to rotate into the (b)(3),(b)(6) set with the Hawaii crews.

It's certainly important to note that there’s only a two day

overlap between the Colorado / Nebraska arrival and the Hawaiian
departure. So we had to do a deliberate kind of left seat/right
seat ride with the Kansas crew members going down participating in
the planning. There was actually two nights did an Op so that
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

they actually did a planning exercise. Then riding jump seat, then
flying as a PI or as an additional back-ender, and then ultimately
[inaudible] moving to that mission set. We had to complete that over
the course of about two weeks by the time that Hawaii was due to
depart out and at the time of distance for them, we had just started
the process of rotating in one of the Colorado IPs [inaudible].

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Just to get to that one, too, when Kansas first
got here (b)(3), (b)(6) , (b)(3), (b)(6) , who is up in BAF right now --
he was one of the guys that we worked with down in Kandahar last
time. This is the same exact Kansas crew that was with this exact
Task Force down in Kandahar last time. So we knew -- Some of us,
like (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself they’re still around here. We knew some
of these individuals. (b)(3), (b)(6) had the experience required to
switch over to(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cfairly quickly and he was one of our stalwart
pilots down that was doing that in anticipation of having to get
one of the Kansas guys in there as we started doing afterwards, in
anticipation of the Hawaii crew leaving and that was the same thing
with (b)(3), (b)(6) . When he came in there, you look at who you've got

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who’s your most experienced guy, who’s got the most goggle hours,
who is the logical guy to put in the cockpit to then start getting
everybody else plussed up, because you can’t just have your two
crews. You have to cycle those guys through, so again, which is why
he was on that mission too.

SME-MH47: Do you have a standardized packet that they fall

in on as far inadvertent IMC procedures, the time -- the objective
diagrams, and the TDHs? Do you have that?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: A need-board packet?

SME-MH47: Yes, a need board packet that you have -- you're

basically -- it sounds like some -- you have peaks and valley as
far as experience when these guys come in, so you do some unit
training and crew coordination, training, things like that, TTPs
you’re teaching them. Do you push that to them or do you let them,
or do you let them use what they have and then you cover them?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Sir, I can speak on that one. When the crews
came in, ou know, of course they first came in with their mission
and products that they were used to. So, what I have done is most
of their products, I have incorporated or I’ve incorporated ours
into theirs. I'm kind of the keeper of the Master need-board packet
and inadvertent IMC. I talk with the crews we came up with prior
to the Oregon guys, and also with the Hawaii guys, and now with
Kansas, “Hey, this is what we’ve been using. What do you guys like?”
We’ve already seen things that look better, so it’s our standard
information, but it's all about the pilots and how they want to see
it and view it. We set up a standard need-board packet that comes
together with -- that they fill out at the company level. It’s got
their route card on there, but it is our overall mission standard
for need-board packet and there company card, their inadvertent IMC.
Same thing we use for our AMRs. There's a slight difference
whenever we do our large Air Assault missions. We’re using the
[inaudible], things of that nature. We have some different setups
since we have AWT, everyone kind of working off a larger packet.
But for the hasty operation, sir, it’s based off our standard, but
incorporates what's more pleasing to them to see in the cockpit when
they tell us more important information when they go on(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
mission.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: It’s the same thing we did when we first became
Task For Again, (b)(3), (b)(6) and I, we’ve worked with Task Forces
in all three deployments so we know there’s idiosyncrasies between

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units, but when the Apaches came over the first thing they told us
was, “Well, we don't need all that stuff. We need two things. We
need a GRG and a Concept of Fires (COF). That's all we really need.”
We made a point of saying for that one need-board packet, and if
you want those two pieces of paper on the top, then that’s fine.
But, we got their input, just like (b)(3), (b)(6) said, “What did you want
on that piece of paper,” and we adapted that and made that our SOP.

BG Colt: And you have one AH-64 company?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: And that is an organic company to 10th CAB?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: It is.

BG Colt: And they have integrated now with three different

47 units in the(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cmission?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: [nodded indicating an affirmative response.]

BG Colt: But also that same AH-64 company or have we ever

changed that?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: No, sir. The only thing we’ve changed -- Oh, go
ahead.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)S3: Yes, sir. I was just going to say the same thing
you wer sir. We have had other aviators rotate through OPCON to
the Task Force to that company --

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Two Apaches.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)S3: --both from organic 10th CAB and also will have C.,
st
1 of 2 pilots right now, that are here.

BG Colt: Okay. I understand. I take it anybody in the

company based on this rotational crew cycle and still managed by
that company commander is capable of performing the(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cmission;
correct?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)S3: They are capable, sir, but we still use the same
process selecting crews and forming a habitual relationship with
the attack company as well. So I maintain -- I have it here for
my reference, crew rosters with experience, missions since they’ve
been flying, all of their past training, leave dates, and everything

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on there. We update them every two weeks so I can assist in

selecting the crews.

BG Colt: Is it an accurate characterization then that these

two DS Apaches are formed most regularly by habitual crews. True?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)S3: [nodded indicating an affirmative response.]

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Generally speaking. Yes, sir. Again, we have to

have -- cause of the number of hours flown, there will be a stint
of maybe two weeks where the day crews fly 6 or 7 hours a day and
they need a break. Whereas the (b)(3),(b)(6) set may only fly 4 hours a
night depending on whether or not they get TIC’ed up on the ground
or something like that. Infils and exfil are mandatory; they’ve
got to have AWT coverage. That’s one thing we’ve put out from the
very beginning. But sometimes they don't want us over head. They
don’t want to give us -- especially if it’s an offset. If there
are going in six or seven clicks, something like that, they don’t’
want the Apache’s hanging around. So we do cycle crews through
there, but it's a deliberate thought process done, “Okay, this guy
he’s been a PI on the (b)(3),(b)(6) set before for a number of occas
He's now a PC, granted, a new PC, but he’s familiar with the(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
set, the mission, the requirement and also the planning process.
They are all briefed at the same time. When a(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cmission gets
briefed you get the Apaches over here, and you’ve got the Chinooks
over here. Everybody gets briefed at once.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)
: With the AWT guys as well, what w do is we’ll take
them do [inaudible] JTACs from Task Force (b)(3), (b)(6); that way we’re
all integrated with the specific JTAC [inaudible] or Striker
element. We do have pretty much -- everyone that's [inaudible]
through the(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cset, has linked up with the JTACs at some point
to talk TTPs

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: And done a face-to-face.

SME-MH47: So, the HLZ selection is a vetted process that goes

up all the way through the chain and back down. Who does the Route
selection? Do you leave it to the crews to do that?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)
TACOPS: Roger, the crews are looking at them. They will
build a ute. Usually, again, talk to the ground force commander,
we’ll get his intent depending upon if they want you to stay off
these terrain features or either noise, or whatever it may be. S2
then vets around. A lot of times, they’ll walk over to their CP,
look at their routes. They’ll have their SAFIRE tracker on it also,

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the threat tracker is on. They’ll look at that and vet their routes
through S2, but the companies are the ones that build their routes,
sir.

SME-MH47: And, you’re a 60 driver; correct?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Correct.

SME-MH47: And these are 47 pilots. So, sometimes there may

be a disconnect between what a 47 may need? Yes / no?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Negative, sir. We’ve talked to a lot of the

crews, a when it comes to flat out mission planning, there were
more times in the beginning when the Guard first got here on and
how we would do our mission planning and what we looked at, but that's
been fixed so they are -- right now they are tracking how the most
tactical routes that we can come up with, the [inaudible] mission
planning standards we can come up with. We gave them simple -- I
mean as detailed as, “I want to see blue routes as the first route.
Green route is going to be the second route.” You know, the ACPs
RPs, so they just went through a -- once again when they’re getting
trained and talking [inaudible] we’ve expressed what we want to see
and what I wanted to see and then they were just doing it, sir. There
hasn’t been a big disconnect.

SME-MH47: In individual crews, of the AMC they have been

spoken to by us. Say for instance the intel guys says, you know,
they’ve be brought along and they say, “Hey, when you are doing your
route selection be cognizant of these issues,” [inaudible].

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)
: We’ve not only vet through the S-2, but a lot of times
too, the was myself or (b)(3), (b)(6) talking to the S-3 of (b)(3), (b)(6)

6. Taking a look at the area we see a SAFIRE zone. We’ll come up

with an initial plan of where we would like to see the route and
then we’ll also talk to S-2, where they’d like to see th
pass that to the crews to say, ”Hey, we spoke with S-2 (b)(3), (b)(6)

6 wants you to come around from the east,” or whatever and then the
AMCs and the pilots do the actual routes and [inaudible] have to
go to S-2 and have S-2 take a look at the route prior to it being
completed.

BG Colt: Okay. Can you talk to AMC selection and what is the
process with regard to; I understand there are element AMCs and then
an overall mission AMC? Can you talk to that?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Yes, sir. We have a memorandum for record that

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has every AMC listed on there. Every AMC and PC is spoken directly
to by me. They first go through our SP and we essentially have two
of them. We have an AH and a UH. Our UH requirement is also a
[inaudible] pilot dual tracked. So they talk to them first, get
their spin on the whole AMC or PC briefing and once they are done
with that then they come talk to me. I give them what I consider
my left and right limits, my expectations of them what I think they
can do, can't do. I run them through several scenarios and I
basically tell them that I'm here to back you up and you have to
make the most informed decision you can. You can’t run through
every possibly scenario that happens out there. It’s impossible,
but the one thing that I express to them more so than anything else,
and this is across the board, particularly the Apaches is I tell
them that in order to make an informed decision you have to detach
yourself from the situation especially if it's a critical one. An
example that I always give them on the lift side -- on the MEDEVAC
side, you can have some lieutenant colonel down on the ground yelling
and screaming at you to come down there and CASEVAC this guy because
he's dying, but when you see tracers going across, you can’t come
in during because you’re just going to put four more casualties down.
And, on the Apache side, I tell them, “Look, when you’ve got a guy
screaming and yelling at you to shoot this building that we’re taking
fire from,” but you know there are civilians in there that you have
to say, “No, I can’t.” So, I stress to them all during this briefing
is you have to detach yourself from the situation even if it’s for
a few seconds and make a non-emotional decision.

BG Colt: Let me rephrase. You designate, I take it, for each

element the AH AMC --

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: For that CH element, with regard to(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

specifically support, the CH AMC and then there is an overall AMC.
How do you do we come to that determination?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: The AMC is usually the most experienced one on the
mission; sually. In the case of EXTORTION 17, (b)(3), (b)(6) ,
(b)(3), (b)(6) , he's our Task Force SP and he was the AMC designate for
that. Now, given the way we do deliver ops out here, the way
everyone does it, the Apaches are the ones that usually stay on
station so they retained the overall AMC responsibility. Once the
CHs leave, obviously (b)(3), (b)(6) he was off [inaudible]. But, he's
designated and we have a designated AMC for the Apaches as well.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: To answer in more detail your question, the

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reason why I have two listed on there, is because whenever the CH47s
are going to ground, of course, if the ground commander is onboard,
the CH-47 don’t leave the air mission commander. Once they break
station and its’ just the AWT on station, that's why we have it listed
on the Con-Op or the slide showing two different AMCs. At one point
in time, not both of them were there. That's how we have it listed
out, sir.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: In fact, the only time that we have had an overall
AMC for entire mission was when the conventional forces had very
large scale air assaults. In that case I was the AMC for the overall
mission. And when we broke station with the C2 bird and myself,
you know trail, whichever it was, the Apaches took over. It was
designated; it was briefed before-hand and then when I came back
on station then I assumed overall AMC responsibilities.

BG Colt: Okay. During a(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cmission, for instance a

support mission, what is this C2 node’s responsibility?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Our responsibility is for the flight in and out

infil / exfil and the overhead coverage, AWT. We track that, either
(b)(3), (b)(6) are generally in the TOC during the entire mission
so if questions arise, they are the planners, they have the most
insight to what was going on, how it was planned and how they operate.
So it's not up to just the Battle CPT to get briefed before-hand
and then try and figure it out. They are there to take care of any
issues that might come up. Obviously the AWT is generally on
station the entire time and that's to support the ground element,
obviously wherever they happen to be. We know the ground scheme
maneuvers; we know what their intent is; we know where they are going
to go; where they are going to come out, so that obviously helps
facility our support to them and that support comes primarily in
the way of the AWT.

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-MH47: Over the last 135 missions, sir, how many times was
an audible called that wasn’t briefed in the air mission AMB prior
to stepping; that they did an IRF or a QRF, depending on how you
would define it?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: There haven’t been that many. (b)(3), (b)(6) can you think
of any

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: I can only think of two that I had done. One
of course was EXTORTION 17 and one previously for actually inserting

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an IRF. Other than that, the usual audible calls have been in PZs,
moving, or things of that nature. Nothing of actually inserting
an IRF; so for me, I have only done two.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)
: We needed [inaudible the action. We have never done
an IRF for most of the missions. I briefed -- (b)(3), (b)(6) fills in
for me now twice a week; it was once a week. So, I have never
conducted an IRF with any of the teams prior to this.

SME-MH47: I'm just curious if Colorado or Nebraska, and we’ll

talk to them later, if their competency level was to the point where
they could audible and that and where the HLZ was brought out --
carried out to them the objective diagram right out to the aircraft
when their blades are turning. That’s a high level of --

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: It is. It is in some ways and it isn’t in others

and the r son I say that is because the most experienced Colorado
and Nebraska crew member obviously is (b)(3), (b)(6) . High time IP; a
lot of experience. Whether or not he in his 15 - 18 years of service
has gone through that in the past, I'm sure he has, but we can tell
you for a fact that we do audibles every single day on the GS set.
We get emergency AMRs constantly, so we’ve got a perfectly planned
mission and we’ll go from one place and suddenly in flight, we are
changing and we’re going someplace else. So, we get the intel data
dumped, basically, “Yeah, roger. No issues going from here to
here.” The battle CPT will call the crew and say, “roger, from BAF
going to McClain (sic) instead of going all the way to DehDadi(sic),”
et cetera, et cetera. So, that stuff is done all the time on the
GS side. Not done so much as we just discussed on the(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cside,
but it's almost a nature set to be able to do that sort of thing.
Having said that, not knowing (b)(3), (b)(6) exact experience with
audibles in his previous life, you know, before he came to us
obviously; the PC of the aircraft had done plenty of GS mission --
had gone through that and he had done(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cmissions since too. So,
he was there as the PC because he had experience and (b)(3), (b)(6) was
in there because he was new to the mission. You know, even though
he was an IP with thousands of hours et cetera, et cetera. I don’t
know if that answers your questions.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)
: Real quick, although we haven't done the IRF, we’ve
done mul ple PZ changes throughout the mission set; most of the
time if they are taking a little bit longer in the 10 series or if
they’re [inaudible] and we have to push through the day time exfil
we’ve done plenty of those where we have audible in the PZ and get
out the products to them and then they move to it, for
example[inaudible]. But, they have had to flex while they are out

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there ripping on two with the IRF the only thing that really changes
is the number of PAX. With that being said, we have also done
multiple recycled airs, where they do one and throw it, they come
back and execute another infil. So, it almost is the same process
to me as far as an audible change.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: We also have done two kinetic strikes involving

primarily the Apaches, but that involved going out -- we had started,
at least the very first one, we had started the planning process
for(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cset and in the midst of that some guy popped up that was
on the Joint Targeting List (JTL) and they asked the Apaches to come
out there and put a hell fire on them. Now, it didn't involve a
CH side in that case. The last that we just did was down here, Char.
That was a daytime mission and we actually infilled a Sensitive Site
Exploitation (SSE) element. Now, that was with Black Hawks, but
we have done that as far as the planning part of it. The crew part,
like I said, most of that experience will definitely come from the
GS because we had so many emergency AMRs.

BG Colt: Can you now step us through this Objective LEFTY

GROVE mission?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Yes, sir. You want me to start from the actual
deliber plan itself of just from the IRF portion?

BG Colt: From the planning piece.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: We have the timeline thing set up right there

sir, bec se I don’t want to -- I will generalize because I don't
have it exactly memorized. But, the one thing that started off --
We d started working on a previous mission where I went down --
TF(b)(3), (b)(6)
, was actually (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c . I was talking to(b)(3), (b)(6) and
a couple other guys, “Look at the Tangi Valley.” So, we’ve spent
pretty much two nights of sitting down there just looking at every
HLZ we can come up with in Tangi Valley. But, it was for a different
operation. We put imagery together. We talked and discussed the
intents [inaudible] and also, we were talking about making them a
map. We just pretty much found everything we could. So, that
helped out later on in mission planning because we already had
imagery. We already had stuff that came from TOPO due to that night
there was some SIPR problems getting things emailed back and forth.
That evening, once we received the warning order, same thing
happened whenever they give you a call. They kind of give us the
heads-up, they started sending us like [inaudible] they work in the
Tangi. That night they were looking at Tangi Valley. We sat

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planners down. Planners were passing grids for the initial team
going in, worked with those guys, came up and got everything put
together.

BG Colt: And their planners were out of the company?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Correct; yes, sir. So that the pilots go down.

They start doing the planning; looking at HLZs. They call us back
and forth once again, when we get the colonel’s intent and the
gade commander’s intent; they were always very very good with
(b)(3), (b)(6) and those guys, saying, “Hey, look 300-meters. [Inaudible.]
We didn't have to move anything or adjust anything. It was on the
eastern side, closer to kind of where [inaudible] was at; looked
at the imagery where they wanted to go; passed everything up and
start building the standard brief.

BG Colt: Is that joint planning with the AH’s also? The AWT?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Negative, sir. The AWT, we give a brief time --

their pl ning doesn’t really come in until they get to discuss how
they are walking in, where their check points are, with Concept of
Fires (COF), the action zone, that's usually where they are mainly
focused. But, they don’t get the debridged (sic) or get briefed
HLZs until we have come in here, sir. Sometimes some of the crews
do pop in to the plan shop and say, “hey what's going on,” and we
will point out to them -- we’ll show them what’s going on, but we
don't require them to be there as part of the HLZ selection because
90 percent of the time they are all offset and there hasn’t been
a reason really to bring guys in to have [inaudible] Usually the
S2 deals with this, but that’s well. But for that evening --

BG Colt: Incidentally, do you normally plan for an attached

or detached escort? Do the AHs normally lead out? Are they
attached to the flight or not; joint AMC or not?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Sir, it all depends on [inaudible] missions,

but it all depends upon the ground force commander’s intent. Our
typical mission,; they go out early they make sure they get eyes-on,
then make the “Cherry – Ice” call for us. If there’s a higher threat
area, sometimes I’ll try to have them follow in. I think it all
depends on the ground force commander’s intent and what he would
like to do. Like I said, we have done missions where one of the
aircraft is shot; it was with a [inaudible] rounds [inaudible]
follows them in. We’ve done where one is high/low -- and, again
it all depends upon just the threat and the ground force commander’s
intent. For this evening, again, the normal plan was for them to

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be offset Cherry/Ice. We had some AC-130s to inspect everybody

else’s hold station so we were doing burns and we discussed that
with the AWTs as well. We do the mission plan. We come in here
and brief as a crew. Everyone briefs; any questions they have for
me if there are any things they don't really understand or track,
then I will call back and that evening there was no questions, no
issues. It was a pretty straight forward mission where the HLZs
were going. The flight routes were initial push and then we execute
that mission, sir.

BG Colt: Is it common that the AMC has commo with the AC-130.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: With the Delta model Chinook, sir, the mission
would ha to have one Fox [inaudible]. We keep them up with the
AWT. AMC does talk directly to the AC-130. The ground force
commander in the back, he's on more COMs as well, so they were able
to push and move things when they need to move. Typically, we will
have -- the AWT will request [inaudible] for CH-47s and it’s for
the lead aircraft to go in. If it's zero illlum, and they don’t
want to fire a rocket, they’ll ask for a burn as well, because it's
of course, quieter, but of course, a little better and more accurate.
That evening, I don't recall if they asked for a burn or illumination
rounds. I do not recall that evening. I think --

BG Colt: Are you talking about Brewers first?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Correct, sir. It was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c with HLZ. We had
no issue fter the brief, the execution piece. We took off on time.
There was no issue with infil. The crews were sitting back there
in the parking pads and the infil had gone with no issue. The guys
where moving to the objective. Once we got a phone call a little
bit later said, “Hey, look we’re looking at some squirters and also
some guys massing in this nity,” and that’s when I got the
heads-up to get [inaudible] team a call and talk with them about
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

possibly getting an IRF. They need to approve it and put them in,
but it was like, “hey, can you go and start looking at some areas,”
and this is kind of our intent. Our intent is 4 kilometers to the
western side; trying to find an area everyone kind of masses us on
the aircraft. The only thing, the guy said the flight routes were
so polluted. He asked me to try to find something coming in from
like the northwest. So that way, again, we were coming in from the
northwest side and avoiding -- there was a spur that kind of stuck
out. Some of the guys were going and being asked to try to keep
the aircraft masked as much as possible for as long as possible on
the sound. We started working through the process --

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BG Colt: Can I stop you there for a second? Again, back to

the C2 component here, the responsibilities or situational
awareness-- How aware were you the AHs had already made an engagement
that evening?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)S3: We knew sir. We not only track it with the postings
the f ions on MIRC. I will be in the TOC with Mr. Ford and TF
will be on the phone back and forth over to(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cand to(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

battle tracking and then we also track ever

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c g on BFT
we will give reports from AWTs or the CHs as well.

So, not everything we have is absolute real time but most of the
time it's pretty close.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: We made a point, obviously, and I think it’s

probably ross the board with everyone, if an AH or CH element
becomes engaged, the response [inaudible] takes care of an
engagement and the report when able, and that’s what they do to.
In close proximity, more often than not, we will hear them because
we monitor the FM traffic.

BG Colt: Do you maintain any kind of MIRC with(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TOC? Any
kind of chat?

: In the window, the picture of the fusion itself usually

(b)(3), (b)(6)

the
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c NO down there will be keeping log in that window and that's

how we will track the situational awareness of the mission the entire
time. Also, if there's something that comes up question mark --
you know, question wise we will call it down there, but it’s in the
window itself is an actual LNO from(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cthat puts check points
when they are clearing the target or [inaudible] --

BG Colt: Do you maintain an LNO down there during mission?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) Not during mission, sir.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: That evening, when they got engaged, I was

already tracking that engagement and that's where some of the
discussions came in from Team talking to (b)(3),(b)(6)about putting them
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
4 kilometers from the original objective is what they wanted to do
so that way, one, we are outside of the engagement area, but at the
same time that's how these squirters and also the people -- the
individuals were moving towards, so he wanted to be on the other
side of them.

BG Colt: Okay. To any degree, does it influence your

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judgment with regard to risk assessment when you are considering

another LZ like that in the direction of the line of drift of the
squirter or threat?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Absolutely, sir. If we know -- it’s just what I

would c common sense. If we know you've got bad guys coming
towards you, it goes back to some of the stuff with our UHs. We’ve
done some vehicle interdiction training. Clearly, the biggest
threats you got; a vehicle barreling down on you; that’s not the
place to be is right in front of it, but given the distance from
that, that’s where you determine how much of a threat it is. So,
is there a threat when they are coming towards you? Absolutely.
You mitigate that by the distance, and what you have to cover.

BG Colt: Sure.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: And, sir, for me -- I'm the one that selected
the HLZ and looked at it. To me, the ground force commander’s intent
looking at the historical information for that area, with command
wires across the bridges, the intent for them not to cross over the
bridge and do an off-set to the south and also have more reaction
time to get towards the northern side of the valley to move over
towards the squirters and also the -- you know, we had to report
what we found; there’s individuals massing. It was the best th
in that area that we could find. I had already discussed it -- (b)(3),(b)(6)
and I were talking back and forth, because he was like, “hey, look
this one looks good; can we look at this one. Can we go here,” the
further west we went the worse it got from SAFire and when we came
to just a lot of structures or -- and then the closer we went, once
again, now we’re too close to the enemy as far as the threat that
we had already assessed was there. So, that's why we went with that
HLZ -- the best one that I could find there that had been the intent.

BG Colt: To what degree was your endurance in the valley on

the initial mission a consideration for the IRF infil? Did I phrase
that -- The fact that you had been down on the ground now for
essentially 3 hours and at 4 kilometer off-set in restrictive
terrain did that play any part in the thinking about risk assessment?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: The only thing I can speak of is our own -- I

just viewed this as a supporting element, so when they asked me to
go there I just started making the mission and planning it, because
again I was viewing it as I am an asset supporting element not a
-- don’t dictate their ground tactical plan. That’s what they asked
for and that’s what I started working on so, I didn’t assess their
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abilities to continue operations in that valley. No, sir.

SME-MH47: I don’t know if I missed it, but when they were at

REDCON 2 sitting out here on the gravel, did the crews know what
was going on, on the target as far as the shooting and the EKIAs
on [inaudible]?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: When they are red-con two, we keep them up to date
on what’ going on.
SME-MH47: Did you call them on the FM?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Roger. Just like tonight, we had to change the

PZ based one of the two elements that's out tonight. One of them
came in contact and they are exfilling. They actually called,
saying, “No, we don’t want to go to the other place because it's
going to take us further in. We need to go out.” So we keep them
up to date on what’s going on, pass them any new grids, and then
in this case HLZ cards, imagery, and everything else that they need.

SME-MH47: Is the string that tight -- or maybe I don't have

the geography view, that the PCs don't come in and you just leave
the right seaters in the aircraft ready for trigger pull. Do you
ever have to do that?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)
: I can speak on that a little bit. In regard to the
SA for th crews out there, they are also monitoring the Helo common
which is 50.650 [inaudible] and they are also monitoring Atlas as
well which is the fires from Task Force (b)(3), (b)(6) itself. So, the entire
time they are out there they are monitoring the situation on the
ground through the ground force commander. I’ve [audible] talked
to -- we normally don't bring them in to the TOC because they have
more SA, to be honest with you, from the aircraft with what’s going
on and they’re also used as the emergency CASEVAC if needed for these
guys. So, that's the reason we keep them out there[inaudible], sir.

BG Colt: Is it your situational awareness that the AHs were

flexed to look at HLZ (b)(1)1.4a before they returned to the FARP to
pick up the CHs? Do you believe that to be true?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: You’re asking -- I didn’t ask the AWTs to

directly o over to (b)(1)1.4a and look at it. I didn't do that
however --

BG Colt: No, is it your situational awareness for instance

that that JTAC asked them to do that?

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TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Roger, sir. What I'm tracking, sir, is that

when they started pushing to [inaudible] HLZs, the guys on the ground
were talking directly to the AWTs and then also to the CH-47s. So,
from my understanding that was the initial push when they were to
break station -- excuse me -- that they were just going to look in
that general vicinity and also the AC-130 was supposed to look over
it with ISR. I didn't ask them to do that or push anything over.
That mething that came over from -- and I don’t want to speak
for(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
, but I believe that came from them to look at it, sir.
I don't --

BG Colt: Again, [inaudible] the division of C2

responsibilities. I'm just curious what your situational
awareness was prior to them launching out for the actual second
infil. That was the question, okay? Because it has to do with
total duration in a relatively confined and restricted piece of
terrain; right? Okay, we have been there for 3 hours at this point
and the AHs have already cycled off the objective, back to gas, back
on to the objective; to my situational awareness I believe over in
the vicinity of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and back to the FARP a second time. Does
that sync with what you think happened?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: I believe that is what happened. I mean, obviously

the cre will be in here tomorrow night.

BG Colt: Right. Right. Absolutely.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: [inaudible] exact from them, but one of our

requirements -- one of my requirements is no lift aircraft or MEDEVAC
aircraft goes into any LZ for any reason without being cleared first
by the AWT. When there's any threat, I mean GS type stuff going
FOB to FOB --

BG Colt: Is that either or AC or --

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: No, sir.

BG Colt: It is an imperative AWT [inaudible] --

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Yes, sir. And that's something that we f

out during our meet-and-greet because it was a question that(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
asked with two different teams, saying “Hey, can we cover with AC
130,” and we’ve said no. An AWT will be there for infil and exfil
every time.

BG Colt: As a Task Force TTP, is there any kind of time

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sequencing to the LZ in order to achieve that task and purpose?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: It goes to what (b)(3), (b)(6) was saying earlier. A

lot of t t is dependent sometimes on the ground commander; what
he wants or doesn’t want on station. But, they always go out there
with enough adequate time to check, clear the LZ itself and take
up the high orbit with deconfliction. The deconfliction part is
always taken care of, usually in the brief we break it down into
sectors A, B, C, and D and deconflict it by altitude.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) [inaudible] answer there. They are briefed to take

off 5 minutes prior to the CHs in their timeline and that actually
goes into more than five minutes because we are BSO swap --

BG Colt: I’m sorry, you do the what?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) Battle space owner swap, sir, so the CHs have to go
to one of the local COPs to pick up the battle space owner, a
representative from them and then they go to the HLZ.

BG Colt: Is that unique to(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cmissions only?

TF KH: I can't speak on that, sir. I know we do it on every

mission that we have a battle space owner that goes out with
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Yeah, it's deliverance as well, sir. The battle

space ow r -- with the big deliverance we’ve done battle space owner
[inaudible].

BG Colt: So the CH landing [inaudible] individual. Is that

right?
A. It’s a concern, yes, sir.

SME-MH47: I didn't understand that; what you just said. So,

on the IRF they landed and picked up the battle space owner?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)
: They may not have on IRF, but on the original
[inaudib ] --

[Inaudible]

BG Colt: [inaudible] -- this is only initial infil.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)
: Correct; and so that gives them a little bit more time

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when they have to do that pick up to do the Cherry/Ice call at the

LZ.

BG Colt: It does. In this particular case, I think we can

acknowledge though that initial or a first landing in conjunction
with this mission set into the closer proximity to the(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cand
that second threat, right? Just a thought process.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)
: Yes, sir

SME-MH47: Was there an alternate for HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c chosen?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Yes, sir. I can go through the mission back

what we w t through. We had a total three HLZs, actually four HLZs
selected. We went through (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cs was primary, there were some
alternates. I don’t really recall what the name was; and there also
were two offsets.

BG Colt: Probably, to set exfil [inaudible].

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Correct. Well, the exfil is one of them. So,

it’s ins e the binder, there. I don't recall the names, but we
did have some set-up for offsets and also for the green zone, they
wanted to go with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c so that's what we went with the initial
infil.

BG Colt: That was briefed to AMB, too, alternates?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Correct.

SME-MH47: Was there an alternative for(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: When we did (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

, we sat down with the team
and disc sed and(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was the only one we could find that met
their intent. There was one further west in the valley. They did
not want to go to that one, and what I was told by(b)(3), (b)(6)that we couldn't
go there or land there; there was nowhere else they wanted to go
at that point in time. It didn’t meet their intent.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Now, having said that; all of our pilots,

especial Chinook pilots, know that if they deem an LZ untenable,
then they do not land. We have proven that, and we used that example
during our AMC briefings all the time, too. I personally do it.
Our senior most Hawaii Chinook pilot, IP, when he got here, I think
two weeks after he got here had two Chinooks landing. The first
one landed to an actual COP out here completely browned-out. (b)(3), (b)(6)
.

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came three approaches and could not land the aircraft, and this
(b)(3), (b)(6)

with one aircraft on the ground loading up personnel and he

called and said, “It's too dusty. We’re not doing this.” Called
off that delivery that night for that reason and I use that ex
with all our pilots especially because of -- not so much in(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
case, but in the other cases, if you are not comfortable wi
go around is free and if you don’t feel comfortable with it for
whatever reason then you call it. So there is never that
expectation of I have to get in there, you know, “I have to get in
there,” you know, they all know.

BG Colt: Sure. I think that’s terrific.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: I never briefed(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c in the initial brief,

and I ju want to make sure that I was going through the timeline
correctly; is that the original brief(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was not briefed, was
because it wasn't part of the plan at all.

BG Colt: I understand.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: The only time(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c got briefed or talked to

was via dio and actually having a runner run out imagery to the
cockpit for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
.

BG Colt: Was there ever a discussion about initiating -- you

can acknowledge perhaps that this was a sequel or separate mission
planning timeline. Did that discussion ever take place?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Sir, when I got the initial call on this, I never
viewed as being a separate mission. They’re there in support
of each other. Yes, it was going to be a different team out there,
but we had guys on the ground. We had received contact. We already
engaged the AWT. The initial report that I received was that there
were individuals moving and also individuals massing. To me, that
was, “we need to get guys out there to assist,” and that’s kind of
what was being pushed to me from the team as well from [inaudible].
That's what I was tracking, sir. It was in support of, not a total
separate clearing operation.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Having said that though, everything had to go up

to briga in order to get approved to do that. So, sir, what you
are getting at as far as a sequel, in many ways it was, because again,
we are not authorized to just arbitrarily say, “yeah, we’re going
to do this in support of this initial mission.”

BG Colt: I understand. I'm just trying to understand your

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thought process. If there was a perceived pressure here, I’m not

insinuating there was. I’m asking.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Sir, they asked me if they could do the mission;

if we co put the IRF in. Talked about the HLZ, the HLZ selection,
discussing where the threat was at that time. It was more towards
the eastern side where the original team was at. HLZ selection --
as long as I could get the HLZ approved, I didn't see there was any
issues; the crews were ready to go, they’re at red-con two. Myself
and the ground force with (b)(3), (b)(6) and the Recon team had already
discussed -- we had already looked at the same imagery. They talked
about their walk-in route, so it wasn't a -- for me, my thought
process was it wasn’t a difficult decision to make and to get it
approved. That was the only thing I had to get approved, was the
HLZ, sir.

BG Colt: Is shooting IR illum on infil a TTP that is an AMC

call that 47 AMC can request it?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Yes, sir, basically how works is if it’s so dark

that th are going to crash when they land, they must have IR
illumination, but it all depends on the illumination and also the
threat. There have been times that we have gone to ground in the
green zone where it’s not very dusty without IR illum due to the
fact that it's not dusty and that you could come in. It’s going
to be a little bit darker, it’s going to be a little slower than
zero-illum. I wouldn't say for this mission per say, but just other
missions you [inaudible] to go to the ground. If it's going to be
a very dusty and kind of a questionable terrain, then of course they
always elect for the IR illuminations. We prefer to burn (AC-130
illumination), but not every time do we have [inaudible] to do the
burn.

BG Colt: Sure. It was briefed as an option -- I’m asking a

question. Was it briefed as an option for the initial infil?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: When the crews, basically, the AWT sits across
from the - they go over their TTPs on what they’re going to do.
It comes from the guys flying with each other so much, that they
do a 6, 3, and 1 call, so that’s all they briefed was, “Hey, if you
want illumination, we’ll give you illumination, just give us the
normal 6 minute call, 3 minute call, 1 minute call.” So, the crews
that discussed that, now whether on their infil, I do not recall
if they shot illumination or not for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. I believe it was a
burn they had for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c.

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TF(b)(3), (b)(6)S3: They did not shoot.

BG Colt: Okay, I guess all I'm trying to contrast is, there

was deliberate joint brief for the first one and the second one was
as a sequel, a radio update and relied on a TTP or a previous brief
that if they wanted it in the second infil, they would have asked
for it?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Right, sir.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: I talked a part of this, too. Here at (b)(3), (b)(6) ,

Apaches n't go out without IR illums because it is an option for
all lift aircrafts whether it’s MEDEVAC, UH, or CH. I know some
of the other Task Forces don’t do that, but we always do. In fact,
it’s one of the lessons that we learned that we took away as a
[inaudible] when we supported another element expecting them to
operate the same way we did and finding out they did not have IR
rockets on the other aircraft, but here at night-ops we always have
and it’s always AMC’s prerogative or the PC’s prerogative to ask
for it or not based on the conditions on the ground.

BG Colt: In this case after 17 went down, what was your

situational awareness then with respect to on site AMC?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: It was [inaudible] AWT, sir. The AWT -- the second
Chinook because of the mission constraints, there was an informed
decision to put in just one Chinook. One, the ground commander
wanted to mass troops, but two, it also minimized our risk. Rather
than have one aircraft go down, than two, you produce a signature,
you produced targets, etc, etc. For that reason, one Chinook went
in. When that one Chinook went in, the other one set up the loiter
area and was set away from that point. AWT was the AMC on station
and when it went down they took control.

BG Colt: If we want to use point hotel, because I think I’ve

heard that used in the vernacular here, but whether that's the 3
minute mark, the 6 minute mark, was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , was his whole point
predesignated or was that anywhere on route after the 6 minute mark?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: When we briefed the crews, and again we had about
25 minu from the time we got the, hey we’re putting in the IRF
in to -- they were launching and everything and approved the HLZs.
We gave them the flight routes that they needed to take, to the
north[inaudible] --

BG Colt: I’m sorry, say the time.

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TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: We had about 25 minutes from the time everything

was appr ed, let's put them in, discussed and talked about it, so
we ran things up to the crews. When they departed their flight
routes, the ground force commander, once again wanted them to come
request it from the northwest for the reason of masking an aircraft,
trying to mask some of the sounds. Some are just kind of loud, but
it was -- that’s why the offset pushed them all to the ‘airborne
valley’. The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , just picked their order points on their
own, verses to the north with the understanding of having to stay
off the Tangi Valley getting themselves an offset, just so they can
escort and be around the general vicinity, but at the same time not
flying with the aircrafts and going two ships down there.

BG Colt: Actually, it was pretty close to -- that segment of

flight route was pretty close to where you picked up the BSO on first
lift, correct?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: For EXTORTION 17, yes, sir. They actually went
over it the ‘Airborne Valley’. They were at the intersection where
the Airborne Valley and Tangi Valley meet. They kind of flew that
flight route down that way. Once again trying to the push off
towards the west to like right in front --

BG Colt: For my SA is there a COP there that they landed to?

It makes for kind of a natural hold point if that’s where they wanted
to pick up the BSO that you're at least holding in the vicinity of
friendly force, if you must hold by yourself.

TF KH TACOPS: Are you talking about(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c17?

BG Colt: In this particular case this is , who is holding.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS:(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

never went over towards the Airborne Valley.
They maintained nort of the Tangi valley and east of the Airborne
Valley. They were 4 kilometers to the north of the Tangi Valley
with a terrain feature in between them.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: [inaudible]

BG Colt: I understand.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Extortion 17 continued on towards the Airborne

really near -- I mean, in the same vicinity of COB
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c came around towards the south around the green zone and
to cut across straight into limiting their time on the

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green zone is kind of how they were briefed to go into the HLZ. So
they didn't land or Chalk 2 never flew in, they just maintained to
the north.

BG Colt: Right. Okay, and when he RTB’ed, did he RTB reverse

course in the infil route?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: -- , when they departed, they departed more

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

towards e northwest d then moved off to Tangi Valley and the

reason why is because the AWT and things that were going on they
were requested to just kind of --

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: When they were on the lower side, as soon as we

got word hat we had a Fallen Angel, I wanted to get them out of
there. So we called them on the radio and said, “roger, single ship
authorized and get back here.” Close proximity, I didn’t have as
much of a concern, because I knew they were at altitude and I just
brought them out there, because one, there was no reason for them
to be there at the time. AWT was giving us the updates to get them
back here; one, if we needed to use them for other infil for the
Pathfinders or something like that, but mainly just get them out
of the area.

BG Colt: What en route altitude did they brief, incidentally?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: For which segment, sir.

BG Colt: Infil.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: For the original infil or the IRF?

BG Colt: IRF infil.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Sir, I do not know. They were on the radios

in the c kpit.

BG Colt: Okay, do you know what they briefed in the original

infil? I'm going to assume until we talk to(b)(3),(b)(6)that it was a similar
TTP?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Roger, sir. They maintain 1,000 feet in route

minimum L as they’re flying towards the COPs. What they’ve been
-- it all depends upon the threat or the environment they’re going
into it's got to be a -- if it’s mountainous training into a rapid
descent, they’re going to try to get a little bit lower to make it
easier to descend it down there, too, but normally, for me at RP

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inbound they start getting a little bit lower versus 1,000 feet for
their approaches, but their original TTP what was briefed was going
to be 1,000 feet en route, RP inbound, to start their approach.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: If you look at the bread crumb trails you can see
that whe hey go into Airborne Valley, again, to the mask the sound
and themselves, they come back around the south side. You see them
coming over the high ground and they start; and you can’t tell this
exactly from where the bread crumb trails are. But, the normal TTP
would have had them hugging the ridgeline to the south side, again,
to mask a little bit and then in the process of doing that, then
set up for an RP inbound and that last -- Yes, sir?

BG Colt: I understand.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: -- In coming right there, you know, coming around

there m ing themselves from here, hugging that high ground and
then at this point here right before they get to the Fallen Angel
site there is a large build up on the northern side, but if you look
at that on the extended view, you will that from there you can draw
a straight line from where the LZ was supposed to be. I believe
they were about 350 feet or so setting up for the approach to the
LZ. Again, red-illum and when we’re doing these kind of things
under red-illum conditions, really what you are doing is you are
following your number one needle, and you know that it’s a click
out in front of you and you starting [inaudible] to yourself.

BG Colt: Do we know if (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c burned the LZ -- we’ll find

out --

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)S3: I'm tracking that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was doing a burn on the
LZ and then after the Fallen Angel was called out by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ,

then (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c assumed the on scene commander duties in the stack
and shifted their focus away from the LZ over to the actual crash
site.
BG Colt: That's my SA as well. That (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c became the
de facto on site AMC.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)S3: Yes, sir. The discussion I had on both the radios,
I was in he TOC at the time Fallen Angel [inaudible]. All the
radios had been on, the phone was an immediate declaration of the
air battle net of the on scene commander. I asked the question over
FM to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c who relayed that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was the on-scene
commander and then we established the air battle net as the Helo
common and then several hours down the road, the air battle net was
transitioned to the actual fires net, I believe it was 78.05 and

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get on the phone with (b)(3), (b)(6) with(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cand with JSOAD we established
that the C2 would be held by TF (b)(3), (b)(6).

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Just to correct, sir, if I may earlier when you

were ask g about the AMC as to AWT on station I meant that for AWT,
obviously.

BG Colt: I'm okay. I was curious what your SA was on that,

because I heard that in previous discussions this evening. Is the
sparkle a common TTP here again, when we’re using the AC-130 or do
we ever use an AWT to do that, either with a system pointer or a
hand-held pointer?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: When you are using the AWTs, the only way they
can use eir lasers -- to use their weapon, the fun part with that
is, though -- it is shooting -- like if you wanted to put a grid
in it [inaudible] --

[Talking over each other.]

BG Colt: [inaudible] -- I understand, you get a lot of jitter,

too. Right.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)
TACOPS: [inaudible] It’s kind of a little more difficult
and it kind of takes that one aircraft out of the fight if they’re
going doing the laser [inaudible] or putting an HLZ [inaudible]--
the sparkle down. So, we prefer to go through either [inaudible]
the targeting pod or whatever else to use and mark an HLZ.
[inaudible]

[Over talking each other.]

BG Colt: [inaudible] or a TTP at the one minute call. They

are just going to burn the HLZ or sparkle it? [inaudible].

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Yes, sir, they cover that in the brief. The
AWT will request that for the assault element if they want it, say,
“Hey, do you know want to sparkle here the east asset here every
night?” I said, “Yes, we want to get that,” so the time we get on
station to check in, they will say, “Hey, look we want to sparkle
this HLZ and they’ll have a sparkle and set up for the lead aircraft.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: That's also at the 6, 3, and 1 call before the 6

minute call, the 3 minute call, usually, if we are using IR rockets
at the 1 minute call, that’s what that’s for. The 1 minute is what
initiates the aircraft to setup and it shoots the rockets at that
point. So, on inbound when they get the 3 minute call or 6 minute
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call they are already talking to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and they’re

establishing what they want and what they don’t want.

SME-MH47: I’ve got uick question. (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed us, I

don’t know if [inaudible] (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed us that the infil into (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
was south, completely south and in your AMB, it’s the blue infil
routes all the way up around the top of the horn here and into
[inaudible] and pick-up the battle space owner and then you drop
down and go up (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c perpendicular to the green zone. Good TTP,
I believe. And then, you basically pick-up and come back in and
sit and then the exfil was south. You’re going to come up and again
go perpendicular in the green zone, loop back around to the north,
back in a safe drop-off the battle space Joe and then, just beeline
straight k to the house. Good route selection. The disconnect
is what (b)(3), (b)(6) said that you all did, you know and then you went to
an audible with IRF, you basically just went around to the north
and came in and that's on the bread crumb -- the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c .
I’m just curious what was actually flown.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)S3: Either after we’re done here, or right now, if you’d
like, I’ got the bread crumb trails --

SME-MH47: I have got them too. I was just asking for the
infil. Did you all fly south for the infil in the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c or did
they go north?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Sir, the routes depicted on there is just how

they flew. We have the bread crumbs trails for the initial infil
prior to the IRF and it's pretty close to what the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
route that you have in front of you show.

SME-MH47: The (b)(3), (b)(6) brief?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Sir, I don't know what (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed. When they
did thei initial CONOP they’d usually come up how to [inaudible]
going to enter and exit out of the area, so I’m unfamiliar what
exactly (b)(3), (b)(6) briefs, sir.

[Inaudible]

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: And, that’s all it is, sir. This is the initial
assault rce route, the route here and the(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4croute is
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

actually -- this is the initial mission so not the IRF. That's

initially how we came in to go into (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c The(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4croute is
actually the IRF route, so that's ba

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SME-MH47: This is your AMB right here, the infil route.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

The planned route was up to the north, in the safe, pick up the battle
space guy and then south.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: So, all that’s missing it looks like to me is

that the nitial flight over to Sayyidabad is missing off of this
one, sir. That's how they came in and they can talk about it more
– is from Sayyidabad to the south straight in from this direction.
So, I believe that all this is missing is the actual coming in part.

[Inaudible] [Several people talking]

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: And again, we can get to those breadcrumb trails,

too.
SME-MH47: For the entire --

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: For the infil.

SME-GFA: Real quick, I know the mission started to morph a

little bit. First, they had squirters, movers, whatever they want
to call them. They were looking at interdicting those guys with
17 pax, I think it was. They eventually went static and turned into
an assault with 38 PAX onboard; 32 or 33 PAX with 11 on board. And,
that's what you guys were tracking all along, right? They are going
in to assault the target?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Yes, sir. Basically when I got the initial

report at 17, that’s what we started planning off of was having 17
individuals, they can exfil everyone with one lift instead of having
two lifts. I was understanding that we were going into, one, to
interdict the individuals that were masking also the eight
individuals that were squirting towards the north. I don't know
where that initial report came from. There was something that came
over, and I don't recall exactly who I was speaking with; the number
of 20 at some point in time about some guys on the northern side.
But also the 8-Squirters. I didn't get the information until after
the AWT had already engaged and again it was probably about 1:00
o'clock, Local, it is when we started discussing and talking about
the IRF.

IO: One o’clock local?

[inaudible] [several people talking]

BG Colt: This is just as a follow up question. Can you think

if it changing the urgency for that second take off if you knew your

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asset; that this was a static under observation deliberate assault

versus moving to a potentially moving target to interdict?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: Does it make us react quicker, sir? Is that the

question

BG Colt: Do you feel there was a greater sense of urgency to

get out there based on the fleeting nature -- your perception of
a fleeting target versus a static target?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: The one thing, sir, that we always talk about in
the meet and greet - when we meet with all the new teams, is one,
I tell them my background. I came from the Ranger Regiment way back
when, so my goal and the goal of the entire Task Force here, primary
goal is support the ground commander with whatever he wants to do.
Given your constraints and [inaudible]. So if the ground
commander, whether it’s(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
or anybody else wants something, we’re
going to do the best we can to make it happen. We will not go over
board and break our own rules in order to make that happen. So,
is there an urgency if there is a MEDEVAC or if there’s squirters
coming a certain way, that's a natural human nature, yes sir; but
not at the expense of making sure that your crews don’t have the
right information.

SME-GFA: I think that's kind of what I was trying to arrive

at was the comfort level and your guys’comfort level as this thing
kind of starts to morph and PAX numbers had increased and --

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: And, sir, the urge to just answer your question,
of cours for me, yes, they asked me, “What’s the soonest you can
get us out there? We’re going to get moving.” So, meeting
everyone’s intent -- that's as fast as I can go and that’s kind of
how we get it done is to the point of the fast track, not physically
do it, but as fast as we can get everything approved and all of the
grids and HLZs . With the crews, that was a conversation I had with
the crews on the radio; talked to them about the difference of 17
PAX versus 32, power numbers, what the ground force commander’s
intent was the landing directions, things of that nature, kind of
what the overall intent of their mission was.

BG Colt: Right, and this time, just for my own clarification

again, the radio conversation is between you and the AMC?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: Not the guy who is leading the route, but the guy

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-- and you were assuming, right, that he is having an inter-plane

conversation about it if anybody in the flight isn’t ready to leave
yet; right?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Yes, sir. Basically, both crews are

[inaudib up, EXTORTION (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 17. AMC was in 17, and we were
discussing bac and forth, “Hey, this is what’s going on.” Once I
got told that would be the one to be going to ground, instead
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

of talk to --

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR: --other way around -- AMC was on .

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS:(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

excuse me; and then when I got told that
17 was g g on the ground, then I just addressed 17 with the mission
information because there was only one CH-47 going on the ground.

BG Colt: You were talking to the lead cockpit only?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: after they had determined --

BG Colt: Yeah, I got it.

[inaudible] [Several people talking.]

BG Colt: Yes. Absolutely.

SME-GFA: Yes, sir. So, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is the one HLZ that is
planned and if you can't get it -- if that’s untenable, mission
abort?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Talking with their ground force commander,

[inaudib ] if you put us on the south of the river, does that meet
their intent that they clear through the building and then also
worrying about the command wire on BRIDGES. That wouldn’t meet his
intent. If you put them both on offset, there's a few places towards
the north that you can insert in and walk in. Once again, there
was (b)(3),(b)(6)e [inaudible], the town there, [inaudible] clear to that,
so it did not meet his intent as well. So, I was told this HLZ was
unsuitable for whatever reason, and we had to launch an alternate
plan and that’s why we started discussing once at brigade, and
talking with (b)(3),(b)(6) and also the boss. If everyone looked at it,
there should be no issues with it. We went ahead and started
planning on that and got it finally approved, so I had everything
[inaudible] other discussion points because I was under the
impression that if they did not get to the HLZ then they wouldn’t
be able to assault or do their mission.
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SME-GFA: So mission aborted?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)TACOPS: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: I think that's it for now. You guys did most of the
talking there and I really appreciate the transparency and
everything. We’re going to think about this and review the
transcript and if there's something else we will come back to you
again. It's about finding fact, not fault here. I appreciate your
time.

[The interview was completed.]

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 277
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a (b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
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 (b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) BDE DCO

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) ]
Sent: Monday, August 22, 2011 3:38 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c S3 OIC

Subject: RE: Tail Number for EXTORTION ET)

Classification: SECRET    
Caveats: No Caveat    
 
(b)(3), (b)(6)  you are right, none of this has anything to do with the shoot down.   
 
Summary follows: 
 
We assess that the aircraft panel was improperly painted...w ?  not sure, but we are finding 
a few others like that in our SBE aircraft.  It has been an   numbered aircraft throughout 
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

its historicals. 
 
Aircraft 84‐24175 was converted to D model on 17 Jun 1985.  Original tail number was 69‐
17113.  All ASAMs were up to date through 2011.  We conducted a phase on the aircraft in 
January (400hr).  We phased the aircraft last on 5 Jun (200hr) ‐‐‐ completed by L3 at 
.  The aircraft was FMC on the night it was flown (5/6 Aug).   
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

 
You should have all of the historicals, maint records, and other info on this aircraft.  If 
you do not, please let me know on NIPR, and I'll email direct to you. 
 
Fly to Glory! 
 
v/r 

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Deputy Brigade Commander 
 
10th Combat Aviation Brigade (10th CAB) 
Bagram Airfield 

(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

 
 
‐‐‐‐‐O
From:  (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

Sent: Sunday, August 21, 2011 9:08 PM 
To:  (b)(3), (b)(6) USA CJTF‐1 TF   BDE DCO 
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Cc:  (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) ;  (b)(3), (b)(6)  USA TF  (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

S3 O
Subject: RE: Tail Number for EXTORTION 17 (SECRET) 
 
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET 
CAVEATS: NONE 
TERMS: NONE 
1
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Acknowledged sir, that is what we are trying to identify.  Was the aircraft rebuilt following 
an accident, or was it converted from a C to a D and when.  Can I impose on your maintenance 
officer to provide a short paragraph summarizing the overall maintaince history and status on 
the night of 5/6 Aug?  Although not relevant to the shoot down, it is an element that me must 
address in the final report. 
 

(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

 
‐‐‐‐‐Original Message‐‐‐‐‐ 
From:  (b)(3), (b)(6)  USA CJTF‐1 TF   BDE DCO 
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

Sent: Sunday, August 21, 2011 4:28 PM 
To: 
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Cc:    (b)(3), (b)(6) USA TF  (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c  S3 OIC 
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Tail Number for EXTORTION 17 (SECRET) 
 
Classification: SECRET    
Caveats: No Caveat    
 
Gents,   
 
Not sure exactly what you are looking at in the maint records, but we have looked again at 
the historicals on Extortion 17.  The number of the aircraft starts with an  . 
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

 
That "0" may have been a mistake, or added when it was modded to a "D" 
model. 
 
Fly to Glory! 
 
v/r 
 

(b)(3), (b)(6)

 
 
10th Combat Aviation Brigade (10th CAB) 
Bagram Airfield 

(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

   
‐‐‐‐‐O
From:  (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

Sent: Sunday, August 21, 2011 4:48 AM 
To:  (b)(3), (b)(6)  USA TF  (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c  S3 OIC 
Cc:  (b)(3), (b)(6)  USA CJTF‐1 TF   BDE DCO 
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Subject: Tail Number for EXTORTION 17 
 
2
Page 280
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET//REL TO USA, 
CAVEATS: NONE 
TERMS: NONE 
 
 

(b)(3), (b)(6)  

  
 
Request verification of the tail number of the CH‐47D that was shot down.  The maintenance 
records provided are for tail number 84‐24175, but the attached photo indicates tail number 
?0‐24175.  There seems to be a discrepancy in the year.  We suspect it is a rebuild, but do 
not have the SME to do a thorough review of the maintenance records. 
 
  
 
Can you have your maintenance officer check into this for us, provide an explanation, and a 
paragraph summary of the aircraft history? 
 
  

(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

 
  
 
 
 
(b)(3), (b)(6)
DERRIVED FROM: 
DECLASSIFY ON: 25 YEARS FROM DATE OF SOURCE DATE OF SOURCE: 1 MAY 2006 
 
CLASSIFICATION W/O ATCH: SECRET 
CAVEATS W/O ATCH: NONE 
TERMS W/O ATCH: NONE 
 
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET//REL TO USA, 
CAVEATS: NONE 
TERMS: NONE 
  
Attachment Classification: SECRET    
Attachment Caveats: No Caveat    
Classification: SECRET    
Caveats: No Caveat 
 
Classification: SECRET    
Caveats: No Caveat 
 
3
Page 281
Classification: SECRET    
Caveats: No Caveat    
 
 
DERRIVED FROM:  (b)(3), (b)(6)

DECLASSIFY ON: 25 YEARS FROM DATE OF SOURCE DATE OF SOURCE: 1 MAY 2006 
 
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET 
CAVEATS: NONE 
TERMS: NONE 
 
Classification: SECRET    
Caveats: No Caveat    

4
Page 282
 Aircraft Maintenance History Summary

The EXTORTION 17 helicopter was a CH-47D model, tail number 84-24175. It was originally
manufactured as a CH-47C model, tail number 69-17113, and converted from a “C” model to a
“D” model on 17 June 1985.12

While still configured as a CH-47C model, 69-17113 was involved in one Class B accident in
19743 and one Class C accident in 1981.4 Following conversion to a CH-47D model in 1985,
84-24175 was involved in one Class D accident in 19865, one Class D in 19906, and one Class D
in 2000.7 On 13 January 2003, the aircraft was involved in a Class C accident while assigned to
the 7th Battalion, 101st Aviation Brigade in Afghanistan when its aft main landing gear was
damaged. During ground taxi on a road, the pavement gave-way resulting in damage to the
undercarriage.8 More recently, aircraft 84-24174 was involved in a another Class D accident on
12 December 2009 while assigned to B Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade in
Afghanistan. During ground taxiing the right rear strut assembly failed. The aircraft was
returned to service.9

All Aviation Safety Action Messages (ASAMs) and Modification Work Orders (MWOs) were
up to date through 2011.10

A 400-hour phase inspection of the aircraft was conducted in January 2011, and a 200-hour
phase inspection was completed on 5 June 2011 by the L-3 Global Security & Engineering
Solutions (GS&ES) Depot Maintenance and Repair Facility at Forward Operating Base (FOB)
11
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cThe aircraft was Fully Mission Capable (FMC) on the night of 5/6 August 2011.

The photograph below shows the aircraft tail number as it was painted on the fuselage. The first
digit is not shown. The second number clearly shows the number “0” instead of a “4” as
indicated in the aircraft maintenance records and historical files. This is believed to be a
stenciling error as the aircraft panel was improperly painted. The accident investigation team
was not able to determine why this occurred, but information provided by the unit indicates they
have found a few other aircraft that are Stay Behind Equipment (SBE) with the same

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)

Page 283
discrepancy. The aircraft historical records all indicated the correct year prefix of “84”
throughout its history.121314

Figure 1. Tail number panel of aircraft 84-24175 recovered from crash site.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)

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 SECRET

The interview of the 10 CAB J-2 and Assistant J-2 opened

at 1500 Zulu on 16 August 2011 at Bagram AB.

PERSONS PRESENT

INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR SME-INTEL

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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SECRET

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 SECRET

SME-INTEL: Good evening my name is [SME-INTEL] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) . I am a member of the team investigating the

circumstances surrounding the crash of the CH-47 helicopter and

Wardak Providence, Afghanistan on 6 August 2011. BG Jeffrey

Colt is the investigating officer in this case and was appointed

by General James N. Mattis, Commander of U.S. CENTCOM, MacDill

Air Force Base, Florida. The findings and recommendations as to

appropriate action will be included in the report to General

James N. Mattis in accordance with AR 15-6. Before we began the

interview will you please review and sign the following privacy

statement which has been completed. Next we will administer an

oath at this time. And right now the time is 1515Z August 16,

2011. If we can start at the beginning and review the package

that you presented in front of me and the other documents

presented here.

10 CAB ASST J2: What we have presented to you is an

overall threat assessment. The top document is the 10th CAB HLZ

[helicopter landing zone] Air Threat Criteria [Ex. 50] that 10th

CAB S2 created near the beginning of the deployment to assist in

our analysis and understanding of how ground threat relates to

air threat. This sets the standard for how the 10th CAB assesses

HLZ threat. So basically, what you have on the front page is

the condensed version. The next couple of pages are the in-depth

version as well as the justification to what the left and right

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limits for the assessment and assist our analyst in

understanding why it matters. This is an internal document

pushed from the Brigade to all the Task Force S2.

SME-INTEL: So the reporting criteria for HLZ [HELICOPTER

LANDING ZONE] threat is the 10th CAB standard?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes

SME-INTEL: Has this been vetted up through the chain?

10 CAB S2: Yes

10 CAB S2: 10th CAV S2 here, this has been vetted through

the Brigade S3, the Brigade XO and was presented to (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) is the final approval authority.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes Sir. For situational awareness the

process was implemented in November [2010] as we prepared for

the Spring and Summer [2011] offensive. We did review it again

and it was re-approved in May.

SME-INTEL: Okay, so the initial implementation of this was

in November 2010, and just recently 10th CAB approved and

reviewed in May 2011, approximately every 6 months.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB S2: Yes, sir.

SME-INTEL: Has this been vetted outside 10th CAB and

socialized with any other units?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

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10 CAB ASST S2: Myself, I’ve passed it up through two

divisions [CJTF-101 and CJTF-1,] to the RIIC [Regional

Information and Intelligence Center] - there is a Captain up

there, they are helping with air precedents for our coalition

force partners - this is also posted on CENTRIX [Coalition

SIPRNet] and SIPRNet portals so that everyone has an awareness

of what the standard is but, again also pushed up to the CJ2 [at

Regional Command-East] so they understand how we are assessing

threat in case questions come up.

SME-INTEL: Can you define the RIIC?

10 CAB ASST S2: I’m sorry, sir, the RIIC is the S2 cell -

the functional cell for the CJ2, where several sections are

located like your GEOINT [geospatial intelligence], your SIGINT

[Signals Intelligence] - your analysts are located – it is also

where your COIC civilians, CAOC civilians would be located, and

your overall – not necessarily the J2 or the CJ2 - assistant J2,

but, all the captains – also your cell would be located in

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

that section.

SME-INTEL: Okay, that is with CJTF-1?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, the initial one was through CJTF-101.

SME-INTEL: Now what I would like to do is go over the next

package, which is the air threat assessment?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir, the second document that we

provided for you is the Area Threat Assessment. We completed

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this in June [2011]; again this was in preparation for the

summer fighting season we have been asked by (b)(3), (b)(6) to come up

with a method and a manner with which to describe the threat for

a HLZ, but for a threat for an area, transitioning to and from

an area. So sometimes an HLZ will have a different threat

assessment in an overall area, meaning that the area itself has

a risk level, but certain HLZs based on coalition force presence

or lack of presence may have a higher threat, that’s just

situational. The method that we use is we look at historical

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c activity against

aircraft in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c from the first of April 2010 through the

30th of May 2011. What we notice is that essentially those

SAFIRE locations don’t change greatly. So those are your highest

risk areas historically, from one Spring to the next Spring so

that includes a Spring, a Summer, a Winter, and a Fall fighting

season so that gives us a look forward on what we can expect

this upcoming Summer. We then - if you go through the packet -

reviewed threat criteria. It’s the second page. The threat

criteria for an area are very slightly different than HLZ threat

criteria. And, that’s just because you are talking about an

area versus necessarily a specific location related to a ten-

digit grid. Very similar, but some slight differences. We

identified in June high threat areas those were in the Pech,

Korengal and Watapur area – as well as in the Alasay River

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Valley. What I highlighted, tabbed in the very back with a red

tab is an assessment for Sayyid Abad and Tangi. Again this was

an area that has had historical SAFIRE which it was identified

as potentially being a threat in the upcoming Summer. Based on

the information in the next couple of pages, you will see the

justification on why we assess Sayyid Abad and Tangi as a

moderate threat.

SME-INTEL: Okay, what I would like to do is to neck-in to

Tangi Valley, and just discuss what you saw as a threat at that

time - not at that time, but what your assessment was in the

Tangi Valley.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

10 CAB ASST S2: Okay, sir, do you want me to read the block

here?

SME-INTEL: Not necessarily read it, if it helps you that’s

fine, but if you can describe it to me in the aspects of what

you saw and what type of SAFIRE, what frequency of success there

was, what type weapons system you saw, so just a general

overview.

10 CAB ASST S2: Overall sir, Tangi was a historical hotspot

for SAFIRE activity. The normal TTP [tactics, techniques and

procedures] we saw in that area was IDF [indirect fire] and IED

[improvised explosive devices] against coalition force movement.

Your small arms fires, you are going to have your AK-47, we did

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have reports of heavy machine guns things like that in the

nature - not necessarily manifested but a lot of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

correlation. We knew that the Tangi was a support zone for the

insurgent area. The local population was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

; we didn’t have a lot of friendly local population in

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

the area - again which is why it was a rich support for the

insurgents. When coalition force presence, specifically US

coalition force presence decreased in the previous months, the

insurgents gained a lot of momentum. We had assessed in June

[2011] that the risk to aircraft was going to increase as the

insurgent population continued to gain local support over the

Summer months. So this was an area that we wanted to keep an eye

on as with all of the areas in this packet. If you turn to the

next page, this kind of goes down into the SAFIREs. Now these

SAFIREs - again this was done in the beginning of June [2011] so

we went through the end of May. These are the SAFIREs that we

saw from the fall, essentially just prior to 10th CAB taking

over here and all the way through the Spring, so these are the

SAFIREs that we saw. The type of weapons systems were primarily

small arms fires, or we did have a couple instances of RPGs

[Rocket Propelled Grenade] combined with small arms fire, and so

we did have a couple instances of RPG alone. We had one

instance with heavy machine gun: that was against a V-22 [CV-22

tilt-rotor aircraft]. So this is kind of a roll-up of what we

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saw from the Fall to the Spring, of SAFIRE activity overall.

Overall, sir, we had ten - eleven SAFIRE involving RPG’s.

SME-INTEL: Okay, what makes them significant going back to

the assessment?

10 CAB ASST S2: Sir, again this is [10 CAB ASST S2] (b)(3), (b)(6)

, the way 10th CAB assesses SAFIRE criteria starting from

(b)(3), (b)(6)

the top and working our way down, we have four levels. A

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

total loss, but if the aircraft cannot continue mission. Also

if any personnel within the aircraft have been hit because of

that enemy fire, so if a bullet hits and a shrapnel piece comes

off and hits a person, that is considered a “major” SAFIRE.

Also, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c SAFIRE, because it’s an

advanced TTP. So that’s a “major.” A (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c SAFIRE means

the aircraft was hit, but the aircraft can continue mission and

no personnel were injured. That is one of the most common types

of hits that we have with small arms fire. So (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

means that the aircraft was hit - another level of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

if it occurred from two or more points of origin. So if they

shot at from different location, and again that comes from the

S2 and it falls under the criteria of the first document of the

advance TTP’s and how well is the enemy able to collaborate the

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attack, if it’s a complex attack, things of that nature. So that

is why it would be (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c to us. A (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c means that

they were shot at but, that neither the aircraft nor any

personnel were hit also it happen from one point of origin. And

then a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is where the aircraft itself did not realize

at the time that it was being shot at and they were reported

from either a ground or a wingman “hey, you are getting shot

at.” Usually, in a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c the aircraft does not maneuver,

does not take evasive action. So those are the four criteria as

you see a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-INTEL: So for clarification under documentation here

for the - how far out does that look again? I don’t know if you

brought that up or not. You are looking at center mass grid and

how far out?

10 CAB S2: Kilometers

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-INTEL:(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB S2: Yes, sir.

SME-INTEL: So over the last year of the data available, 29

September 2010, was the major SAFIRE incident in the area - it

was a UH-60 – RPG, and the number of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was four.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

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10 CAB ASST S2: When this document was created in June,

yes. That is correct.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Do you have an update?

10 CAB ASST S2: I do, sir, it’s not in this document but

it’s in further as we go through this packet.

SME-INTEL: So we will get to it?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Alright, thank you.

10 CAB ASST S2: The reason we wanted to include this area

threat assessment from June is because this is the document that

Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c our Task Force, had available to them as

a moderate threat, and why brigade was pushing down that this is

a moderate threat. So this is the document that the S2 at Task

Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was functioning under or would have fallen

under.

10 CAB S2: Yes, this is [10 CAB S2] (b)(3), (b)(6) yes,

(b)(3), (b)(6) would see all these packets and again he approves them

and then we send them to the task forces to make sure that they

know what (b)(3), (b)(6) approved, and then they can disseminate it

and brief their pilots, their aircrews.

SME-INTEL: Okay, alright.

10 CAB ASST S2: Sir, one caveat for understanding purposed

at the brigade level we push down the approved minimum threat

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assessment. The Task Force - built into the original documents

our check and balances based on time line. So how often

something is reviewed. If something is a high threat and it is

only in effect by definition for days, then in that

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c -day
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

mark it is re-reviewed, and the Task Force themselves submit a

packet up to brigade for (b)(3), (b)(6) for re-approval for either an

elevation or a downgrade of a threat assessment. So the Task

Force has a lot of internal capability to adjust their threat

assessment - not necessarily dictated to them from brigade,

except in a very minimum standard. Its offers task forces the

ability to know the battlefield better than we do at the brigade

level.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: Also, as I turn the page, one more time,

as we refer back to the area threat assessment [Ex. 49], the

next slide is reporting. This is reporting of significant

threat to aircraft. What we saw over the spring was essentially

that they were moving ZPUs [12.7mm anti-aircraft artillery

system] into the area or heavy machine gun the threat to

aircraft was that insurgent (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

that we had against aircraft for the aviation threat.

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SME-INTEL: Okay and the second report there in Chak-E

Wardak is that the one - you referring to the one bring up the

threats specifically?

10 CAB ASST S2: Two reports, yes.

SME-INTEL: The second one on the report is what the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

there - what was stated in that report there? Do you know

specifically or can you provide that report to me?

10 CAB ASST S2: I can provide that report, sir. Let me

grab that, I don’t have that in this packet. The overall from

it was that insurgents were going to attempt to target aircraft

directly.

SME-INTEL: Did not say how or TTPs?

10 CAB ASST S2: No, just that they were going to, yes, sir.

SME-INTEL: If you can provide me with reports of what the

source level - was it an (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c source.

10 CAB ASST S2: Absolutely, sir, we will get that to you.

Both of those are IIR [intelligence information report] are

situational.

SME-INTEL: They never developed into TDs or anything?

10 CAB ASST S2: No, sir.

SME-INTEL: Okay, whatever the summary of the report is -

any attributes provided in the report I’ll submit that into our

records as well.

10 CAB ASST S2: Okay.

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10 CAB S2: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: On the next page, sir, this is the recent

reporting. This is all the reporting in the Tangi Valley in the

Sayyid Abad districts specifically – overall, not necessarily

just against aircraft. The reason we include this when we do an

air threat assessment, as you know sir – if a ground threat,

even if it’s not directed at aircraft, shows a certain level of

insurgent capability and desires to target coalition forces. A

lot of times, in fact the majority of everything we have seen

SAFIRE-wise in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c has been a target of opportunity. And if

you have a TIC [troops in contact] going on or you have

something else where the insurgents are actively shooting

coalition forces and we bring an aircraft in, even if we never

saw a threat to aircraft prior to that, the ability, and the

will, and desire, and the motivation of the insurgents to target

that aircraft when given the opportunity is obviously increased.

SME-INTEL: Can you orient me real quick on the job here,

where the aircraft is? The location?

10 CAB ASST S2: On this particular slide right here, this

was done through the Spring from May to June so the aircraft

itself - as far as the FALLEN ANGEL -- sorry sir, it’s not a

really good printout, I will have to get back to you on where

exactly the FALLEN ANGEL was.

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SME-INTEL: That’s okay, let follow up with that after this

so I can use this as a reference. It’s a good roll-up of the

SIGACTS [significant activities] that means they are all from

SIGACTs; correct?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, this is all from SIGACTs.

SME-INTEL: Great.

10 CAB ASST S2: If that - what type of attack it was what

we suspected the targets to have been, and the weapon system

used on it. Sir, this last side here, for Tangi Valley was the

overall threat assessment given from the BSO - also Task Force

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c itself their (b)(3), (b)(6) - commander there [TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

] – theirs, and our, internal recommendation to

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

CAB CDR] this was approved by (b)(3), (b)(6) as a moderate.

SME-INTEL: That is good to see, now do you know or does

that relationship exist when we do it by target? It’s probably

something more Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c S2 can answer, but if

everybody can hear [inaudible] - do you guys have any kind of

stamp of approval on per operations from the intel perspective?

“We agreement with their assessment for the CONOPS”?

10 CAB S2: When they are doing CONOPS [concept of

operations], the ground forces get with our Task Force - in this

instance (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c so when they look at the threat - I mean

the ground and also in the air. So the S2 down in battalion will

tell them, “this is the threat as far as the air is concerned,”

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so let’s say it’s moderate, but yes, the Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

and the ground force from - this is Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - so they

will get together and they go - and the S2 will get together and

go over the threat criteria and our S2 will say, “okay, for us

for the air threat is moderate,” so, yes there is a procedure to

where the Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cgets with the BSO to make sure that

they are all working together and concur on the threat.

SME-INTEL: And that is one of the things that we are

tasked to look at is: What is the process? How we can do the

threat assessment? How do we mitigate against the ground

operation and the target data? And how do we then mitigate those

risk when we are doing these operation or what process are in

place for this? So I appreciate this.

10 CAB ASST S2: Sir, if you would slide to the very last

slide. This is mitigation measures that were developed not by

the S2 but by the TACOPs [Tactical Operations] and the S3. We

included it into the S2 folder for the area threat assessment

for situational awareness to our task forces’ S2s as well as to

make sure that the S3 and the S2 and the TACOPS function

smoothly and have a unified understanding. If it’s a moderate

risk, if it’s a high risk, if it’s a moderate or high risk,

there are certain things that are overall expected of a task

force in preparation for operations and that the mitigation

letters in place.

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10 CAB S2: And that is done also at the battalion level

with the S2 and the S3 and the TACOPs.

SME-INTEL: So at the brigade and the battalion?

10 CAB S2: Yes

SME-INTEL: How often is this mitigation measure reviewed?

10 CAB ASST S2: Sir, I am not knowledgeable on that,

particularly because it is again a S3 and TACOPs product. We

just publish what we have been told is the standard. I don’t

want to speak out of my lane on that.

SME-INTEL: Okay. That is a cue to talk to our TACOPS guys

about that as well.

10 CAB ASST S2: Sir, the third document that we provided

for you in the packet is what (b)(3), (b)(6) just kind of

explained. This is the S2 portion of the actual CONOPS [Ex. 30]

from that night with the Extortion 17. I’m sure you will see it

in its entirety; we just included the S2 portion so that you can

see how it was developed. This CONOP - it takes the SIGACTs

prior to going into the operation so that the first two slides

are from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c in fact the first three slides are from

.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c The fourth slide is from Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c itself

and this is the air threat that is briefed to the pilots prior

to the mission. As you see this one was briefed “moderate to

high” for all of the LZs. The reason that it was a briefed

moderate to high is as you know - as we discussed, the overall

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threat for the area of Tangi Valley was a moderate, but based on

whom they were going after and the level of protection that the

person and early warning network that would be involved in any

separate operation, can elevate and so this one due to the

location, due to the proximity of Qalats and due to the target,

went from being just a moderate to high. And there is a

justification on there as well.

SME-INTEL: This is also the planned for the air threat on

their ingress and egress route?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes that is what you see here actually.

10 CAB S2: It’s from the beginning from when the crews are

going to load up the aircraft all the way to the infil

operations and then also from exfil operation. That is what you

see on this slide.

SME-INTEL: I have a couple of questions. That is backing

up with AO (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c SIGACTs that first sought after the coverage

that is the last 24hrs prior to going in SIGACTs.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

10 CAB S2: I don’t want to speculate how they do their

briefing, but I’m pretty sure they want to know the last 24hrs

before they commence the operation to see if there were any

changes on the threat.

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SME-INTEL: Near the target, but not necessary in the

vicinity that day – this is 1132D, 1528D, 0426D, we had a small

fire, RPG’s and a burst of PKM [7.62mm machine gun].

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: That day prior to the insertion.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB ASST S2: And then the second slide is the two weeks

and as you can see Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c identified a disruption

zone as well as obviously as we mention before Tangi Valley

being a support zone for the insurgents, and where they believe

the objectives to be located in vicinity to the disruption zone

and operations in the SIGACTs.

SME-INTEL: Okay, and then the assessment of the support

zone, was pretty the valley area where Objective LEFTY GROVE and

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d were located.

10 CAB ASST S2: Were located. Yes, sir.

10 CAB ASST S2: And then even deeper, again situationally

then there’s one for the last days of SIGACTS to get more
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

broad of this historical prior to going in. That leaves you

with the air threat, the accumulation air threat from all that

data from .
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c The next slide is the most recent major

SAFIRE in the valley that was on the 6th of June.

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SME-INTEL: So approximately one month prior to the

execution?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

SME-INTEL: Can you give me a roll up of what the SAFIRE was

type of weapon, was there damage or no damage to the aircraft?

10 CAB ASST S2: I’m going to review the story board quickly

sir. There was no damage to the aircraft this one was a major

SAFIRE based on the amount of points of origin from being shot

at. There have been in 30 days prior to this, four other SAFIRE

as well within 10 nautical miles of COP(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

. Specifically

this one.

10 CAB S2: Yes, for this one as you see the events time of

the major events its talks about 10 to 15 RPG rounds that were

fired at the aircraft.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, 10 to 15.

10 CAB S2: So that why it is considered a major SAFIRE

because it was more than three POO sites. Even though it didn’t

hit the aircraft, but that is why it’s considered major SAFIRE.

SME-INTEL: So 6 June, 10 to 15 RPG’s fired?

10 CAB S2: Correct.

SME-INTEL: What was the number of POO sites?

10 CAB ASST S2: Well there was also small arms fire.

10 CAB S2: It doesn’t specify on this story board how many

POO sites there were.

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SME-INTEL: Yea - it says it looks like five.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, and this particular instance they did

not think hasty air assault, they didn’t land they ended up

aborting the mission because of the heavy enemy activity in the

area that evening.

SME-INTEL: And this was objective-

10 CAB ASST S2: I believe also Objective LEFTY GROVE.

SME-INTEL: And they aborted this mission?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, they did sir.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

10 CAB ASST S2: Later on Task Force(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4caircraft did

complete the hasty air assault.

SME-INTEL: Say that one again.

10 CAB ASST S2: When this event occurred it was right

after midnight, it was about 0044D so that was local time and at

approximately one hour later Task Force(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cwas able to go in

and complete the air assault. So this - with Task Force

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c the mission was called off, but the mission overall

did occur without further incident with SAFIRE. So they had to

pull out and they had to go back in later.

SME-INTEL: So scoping that: same night?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: 10 to 15 rounds against conventional CH-47D,

next night MH-47G go in complete mission at approximately

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midnight local 0010 local. Okay, thank you that’s significant

right there.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: This explains the picture of this. Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: And then you have your last slide that

shows the LZs, where they were. What were the available LZs

that were used for that mission, I’m sorry for this upcoming

mission that they were working on. Again the entire CONOP is

briefed from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c to (b)(3), (b)(6) and the brigade S2 sits in -

(b)(3), (b)(6) sits in on that and either concur or not concur

based on any information that we may or may not have that they

don’t have. So that is one of the method we have prior to an

operation in order to insure that everyone has the same

knowledge base for assessing threat.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB S2: And also it also gets brief to the division by

the ground unit and our Task Force S3 sits on that brief. And

we also sit here me, the S3 and the brigade commander and we

listen to the brief that is being presented to CJTF [Combined

Joint Task Force].

SME-INTEL: Okay, if you could walk me through the next

piece here is - we want to talk about the process for a HLZ

development and how it works within the S2. Who has the

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proponency, and who has approval for that to make sure that

they’ve been properly selected?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir, the process overall is that the

ground force identifies an objective and says “we would like to

get within a certain range of this.” Based on terrain they then

pass those grids to our terrain team. The terrain team goes

through and looks at slope analysis, suitability. They work with

TACOPS at that point to determine - now these all non-standard

HLZs we have a different once they are standardized HLZ, the

process is almost automatic because those HLZ are like landing

on Bagram where it’s secure, they have other methods, they are

certain tarmacs that are available. So for non-standard HLZ

this is only the realm I’m speaking of. The TACOPs and the S3

will look at those for suitability prior to being submitted for

any threat assessment. Once it has been reviewed by the S3 at

the Task Force level and the TACOPS at the Task Force level, my

understanding is that it’s passed up to the TACOPs and the S3 at

the Brigade level. If there are questions about suitability

then they go back and review until they can identify the best

location to land that meets both the ground forces intent, but

also gives the best survivability to our aircraft. At that point

once an HLZ is suitable, it’s passed to the Task Force S2 to do

a threat assessment they create a threat assessment and that

assessment is put on a nonstandard HLZ card. That nonstandard

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HLZ card is passed back up to brigade and is briefed in the

overall CONOP to (b)(3), (b)(6) or the DCO [Deputy Commanding

Officer], or whoever is receiving the CONOP that evening.

SME-INTEL: Okay, so the S2 doesn’t see the HLZ for threat

assessment until after TACOPs approved it for immediate ground

commander intent and survivability?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Is there any way to go back and rebuttal, if

you will?

10 CAB S2: Yes, we can, because we go back and look at

those grids, we look at the grids of the HLZ then what we do we

go back to the brigade talk and we go back 60 days and go out 10

kilometers and look at any SIGACTs events. Whether it’s SAFIRE,

IEDs, small arms fires, it does not matter. So we look at the

HLZ. And that the way how we can rebuttal and show it TACOPs

and the S3.

10 CAB ASST S2: And, sir, that process - that procedure

occurs we get it generally the CONOPS prior to the briefing to

(b)(3),(b)(6) , but again the S2 is present for those briefings. So

any concerns that might be brought up, specifically some of the

things we look at the brigade level is, has the DSO requested

ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance]? Have they

identified any NAI [Named Area of Interest], TAI’s [Targeted

Area of Interest]? Do they have coverage of the high ground?

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So those things essentially are check and balances. The Task

Force has the initial say on the air threat. The brigade merely

provides a concurrence or non-concurrence and brings up any

additional concerns to (b)(3), (b)(6) Several times during in this

process (b)(3), (b)(6) , also the DCO, have said, “look it’s a suitable

HLZ, but I’m not comfortable with it due to it being so close to

a qalat,” or something of that nature and they have been sent to

go back and get me another HLZ.

SME-INTEL: Is there any HLZ standardization for example:

offset, versus Y, and versus X?

10 CAB ASST S2: That would be a TACOPS question sir, I

know that there is a comfort level for our commander -

obliviously we do everything we can to provide the least risk to

our aircraft. That really goes into ingress, egress, it goes

into HLZ selection those are going to be things that - I don’t

want to say that it’s out of the S2 realm because we do attend

the CONOPS briefings, but our primary assessment is going to

come on what they finally say this is where we want to go. The

other thing and the other point of that is ultimately the pilot,

when he gets there on the ground, they make those cherry-ice

calls at that point. And the pilot has the lead way to say, “I

can’t land here.” And so that is something that comes into

play, that pilot has the leeway to say on where he lands his

aircraft. They are given the risk, they are given suitability,

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but as with any operator the ultimate decision is going to come

down to the person who is flying.

10 CAB S2: That is what I stated - we go back and look at

the HLZ go out and go back

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c days. Then when we presented
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TACOPS and the S-3 and if (b)(3), (b)(6) wants to see it, now if they

want to land on the X or the Y (b)(3), (b)(6) will make the decision.

10 CAB ASST S2: Say if that what we have to do then you

know that’s what we have to do. We don’t have to do it. I’ve

never seen in my experience here (b)(3), (b)(6) approve landing at the

X when there is another option. When there was a high risk or a

moderate risk. When aircraft were at significant risk. I’ve

multiple times where I sat in a CONOPS brief and have him say

no. I get it, the next one [HLZ] is going to be a kilometer

away, but a kilometer away - they are going to have to hump it.

Because it’s just not, we are not going to land there.

SME-INTEL: Okay are they synched with the TACOPS as for as

the standard?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Do they understand the definition of the X, the

Y, and the offsets.

10 CAB ASST S2: Specifically our TACOPs and our terrain

team. We don’t have imagery - yes, so I want to make that clear.

The S2 has a terrain team - they do work under the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4gsystem

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which is an imagery system, but they are a terrain team, not a

GEOMET team for 10th CAB. I know different CABs might have

different make ups, but our CAB does not have imagery analysts.

SME-INTEL: I don’t know if that is part of the packet, but

it would be interesting to see what is the layout of the

organization for the brigade S2 shop?

10 CAB ASST S2: There is an MTOE [modified table of

organization and equipment], and then there is what we have.

SME-INTEL: If we could have the MTOE – this is what we

currently have in place. We can discuss it now - your intel

systems and your process. What works for you right now, what is

solid and what are something that may need help on or assist.

What is your assessment of -- Your intel architecture your

personnel manning and the training that you currently have in

the section?

10 CAB ASST S2: Sir, do you want to go ahead and start

with that?

SME-INTEL: If we need to revisit this then we can come

back.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes sir, I can give you intel specifically

and I will tell you that our S2 shop is significantly

undermanned at the brigade level. I believe - I’m not 100

percent - I believe there is a 16 person allotable S2 section

right now we have (b)(3), (b)(6) , our S2. I am the assistant S2.

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We have (b)(3), (b)(6) who is our S2 plans as well electronic

warfare. I am an SI1D which is (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c specifically schooled

trained, and (b)(3), (b)(6) is (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

, specifically schooled

trained. So we have those capabilities in the shop as officer

side. We also have one intel warrant, and we also had one MI

Lieutenant, a 35D. Unfortunately his father died and he had to

go home on emergency leave. He will not be returning to

theater; he has actually been gone since prior to EXTORTION 17.

So, on the officer side we have four personnel. On the enlisted

side, our NCOIC transitioned to warrant officer just prior to

the deployment. We did not get back filled. So our next highest

ranking noncommissioned officer, which is (b)(3), (b)(6)

stepped up to the plate, he has done a really good job at that.

We had from him, we should have more analysts available, but we

don’t. What we have is we have is (b)(3), (b)(6) , we had

(b)(3), (b)(6) who got injured during the deployment and had to

be redeployed home. We received (b)(3), (b)(6) during the

deployment who is right out of AIT, we have (b)(3), (b)(6) also in

the TOC, we did have another (b)(3), (b)(6) which we gave

to a task force because they were undermanned and ultimately

when you make the decision between who is going to be

undermanned, it’s going to be brigade rather than task force.

So what we have at brigade essentially is four officers, we have

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one senior NCO, and we have (b)(3), (b)(6) as well, so we have

one junior NCOIC and two enlisted soldiers.

SME-INTEL: Where does the terrain team reside? Is it in

the S2 section?

10 CAB S2: It’s inside the S2 shop.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, they are part of our shop we had

sergeant now (b)(3), (b)(6) and we have (b)(3), (b)(6)

and (b)(3), (b)(6) . They were running three people, 24hrs operation.

We just last week received another NCO on the terrain team. He

is really just kind of learning and he just got here, he’s not

going to be here full 90 days to make having a deployment count

ultimately, but he is going to help us in the things he can help

us with in preparation for redeployment. So we now have two

NCOs in the terrain team, but for the majority of this

deployment, and during this instance we only had three people

who have been doing 24 hours operations in the terrain.

10 CAB S2: And having said that, it’s been challenging but

we have been able to track the battlefield throughout the whole

deployment. So on that aspect there has been no issues as far

as far as tracking what has been going on a daily basis.

Whether it’s in the TOC [Tactical Operations Center] or back in

the office, we’re tracking the traffic, what the enemy is doing,

what we’re doing as far as operations, it has not affected it.

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Even though it has been challenging, but we have been able to do

the job.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yea.

SME-INTEL: So talking about personnel, what about the

intel systems that you use that you kind of alluded to – some of

them there. How do you produce the products and how do you

battle track?

10 CAB ASST S2: Well we have a couple of methods and it

really comes down to how we fall into the overall brigade battle

rhythm. Primarily, sir, as we spoke about, every week we assist

in writing what we call the CG script, which is an overall

threat assessment, significant acts that have occurred within

the week. That document is combined with S3 relevant information

(b)(3), (b)(6) then briefs that to the CG once a week. So that

is a document that goes out. Additionally every day we provide

a GRINTSUM, which is a graphical intelligence summary. And like

a battle space providing a daily INTSUM [intelligence summary],

the GRINTSUM - we get submitted any SAFIRE, any major event, any

significant reporting, and it’s rolled up every single day.

That’s a primary function of our analyst in the TOC and our

noncommissioned officer, (b)(3), (b)(6) . That document is

published and it’s also emailed out to certain people, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) gets it daily, (b)(3), (b)(6) gets it daily, anybody -

it’s on our portal, it’s open and available to anybody who is

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curious. Often our document is used by a CAOC and they will

call and ask questions about it. So that is our essential

publication to the rest of our CPs [command posts]. And that

also kind of summarizes all of the task forces’ daily operation

on what happened in their battle space in the last 24hrs.

Another document that we do on a regular basis is, we go through

like a set and we review - based on internally - a threat, if

there is a threat that is (b)(1)1.4a,

a (b)(1)1.4c
-day threat - if this event

happened and it’s going to elevate something for days, once

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

that days is up then that what is reassessed. So we keep

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

track of those types of situations. We are also - any time that

the S3 has a specific request, based on an identified target or

a RFI [Request for Information] from the division that we might

be able to answer, we create those products as well. And it is

very unified as a team in getting something done. Often times

(b)(3), (b)(6) , will all work together on

different perspectives for getting a product pushed forward and

it’s reviewed by everyone in the office before it goes forward

for accuracy, and also - to be honest everyone has different

backgrounds. Myself I’m pure MI; (b)(3), (b)(6) --

10 CAB S2: I was field artillery, also before I became MI.

10 CAB ASST S2: And (b)(3), (b)(6) worked with the infantry

before he transitioned. And so we use those different

perspective to - and (b)(3), (b)(6) who use to be a Marine, so we

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- everyone sometimes sees the situation differently, so whenever

we have a product, internally we review it before it get pushed

out. Obviously everything goes through (b)(3), (b)(6) before it

goes up to (b)(3), (b)(6) or the DCO. So for us at the captain

level, we give it to (b)(3), (b)(6) , and then (b)(3), (b)(6) presents

outside of our shop.

SME-INTEL: What about processes then - can you explain to

me the systems you use to gather this data that would be - and

alluded to before the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4gsoftware, you also alluded to the

MIRC chat--

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes

SME-INTEL: What are those databases where you go and pull

that data from?

10 CAB ASST S2: We have three primary databases. One of

them more recent ones is the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g . We have published a

standard operating - that was actually published in May - for

all the task forces to report SIGACTs. Internally we use the

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g system only on SIPR for reporting both pilot debrief as

well as any other significant acts that might involve air

threat. All(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4ghas the ability to pull imagery, so we have

we use that system - that is one of the systems we use. We have

the terrain team that uses the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4gSystem. In the TOC we

have the CPOF system being used. In our actual office we have

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the D6 system being used, and that is on (b)(3), (b)(6) desk

that our warrant, our intel warrant.

SME-INTEL: D6-A?

10 CAB S2: We also have one in the TOC. We also compared

the CPOF and we also look the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g because you have also the

BSO which also posts all of the SIGACTs on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g . So that is

another way we can get information to better present the problem

sets - the enemy threat with what he is looking at.

10 CAB ASST S2: The GRINTSUM [Ground Intelligence Summary]

for example one of the things that we do is we have a SIPRNet

GRINTSUM and then also every day we scrub that and we publish a

CENTRIX GRINTSUM. Obviously some reporting is removed when we

published the CENTRIX GRINTSUM, but overall that document is -

again that is our external document to the rest of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and

even Afghanistan for those who need it or want it. So that is

another method that we do, we do a SIPRNet to CENTRIX

publication as well.

10 CAB S2: And we also check, of course, our emails,

Microsoft Outlook because we are on the distribution lists

through (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and that is how we also gather information.

From the other S2s, G2s, throughout .

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

10 CAB ASST S2: And then there is of course this is -

again I don’t want to assume that you know anything, but by

default there’s the intel systems that are available on

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INTELLINK link. We use CIDNE to look up reporting. These are

standard military intelligence databases we are heavy users of

those as well. So when we have questions we obviously use the

standard available resources.

SME-INTEL: Quick question, referencing when you talked

about collaboration, distro lists, what is your relationship

with the Task Force, with team (b)(3),(b)(6) . With (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ,

mainly Task Force(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

. Do you have any established

relationships with the ARSOA [Army Special Operations Aviation],

JSOAD?

10 CAB ASST S2: Well there is definitely a relationship

there. Every day, for example, I’m on the distro list for the TF

, CAOC. So they provide intel, they provide a lot of

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

information. I would say that primarily though, for us at the

brigade level - now the Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is different

because they have this specific TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

mission, so they would

have Team(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cthere, they would have Team . So their

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

relationship is a little different than us at the brigade. We

are read on to that, I can walk down to Camp(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

, I can have

access to briefings, so we certainly have that - we are not

excluded from them, but I wouldn’t say that it’s necessarily –

we’re not necessarily invited to their briefings.

SME-INTEL: But there is a pathway to exchange information.

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10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, absolutely, sir. But, I would say,

again that our majority of our correlation through them or for

them is actually through Division. We go up to Division and we

get a lot of information. Again, information push - pull. We

go to Division and we get a lot of information on what

requirements, what - Since the majority of our air assets are

in fact, direct support - we do have some however that are

general support, and those general aircraft are located here at

Bagram and they are run by Division so, depending on the mission

set, part of our collaboration with TF comes not from TF

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

to us or from us to TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , but through the filter of

Division.

Does that make sense, sir?

SME-INTEL: Yes. So, to summarize that: You are to

receive--Whenever you have GS aviation assets sliced over to TF

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c --

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: --Division then filters that data or

information through you, here, but you still receive that

information.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: Absolutely.

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SME-INTEL: Has there ever been deconfliction of data

related to air threat? Have you been able to synchronize that

through TF or do you have to go through Division to do that

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

to get through TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

?

10 CAB ASST S2: We -- I’m sorry.

10 CAB S2: For the --Again, when it goes through the

task forces who’s conducting the operation, thus the S2s will go

up to Team (b)(3),(b)(6) , their S2, and deconflict if they have any

conflicts they have to work out as far as the air threat --

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB S2. --for that particular operation. And that’s

how they do it, not at the task force level--

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB S2: --because we try to keep it as low to the task

force level as we can.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yeah. What we are saying, sir, the task

forces themselves have a different working relationship because

they are co-located and they are conducting that mission. At

the brigade level, primarily we have oversight and checks and

balances. So, one of the things for our brigade that we try to

do is to empower our task forces and that’s to allow them -- I

mean, obviously there has to be a standard understanding of what

threat means, because, for example Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is located

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here at Bagram. If there’s a mission that, say, Task Force

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c views as being a certain risk or a certain level, but

it’s not pushed out to all of the brigade, then they might say,

“Hey, we’re not doing it,” but then Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is going

to get called to do it. And, that creates a disproportional type

environment so what we do - we have to have a minimum standard.

There has to be one for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c because we are in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

footprint. So, because of that, within those boundaries, we try

to empower the task forces, who know better their own specific

battlespace, the best that we can.

SME-INTEL: Does the other task forces, willing to DS or

not DS, do they put out the distro of what their threat

assessment is? Do they shoot it out to everybody to get -- not

necessarily get feedback, but for situational awareness?

10 CAB S2: Yes. Yes, that’s what we do.

10 CAB ASST S2: Another system --

SME-INTEL: So, if I’m Task Force(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cand Task Force(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

is doing a mission, and very specific to that there’s individual

groups, I see it regardless of it’s my operation or not?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: And, again, another mechanism that we

probably should include in this, to go back to our previous

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conversation, every other week there is an S2 synch on “breeze”

[secure chat session] and (b)(3), (b)(6) runs that.

10 CAB S2: You remember those?

SME-INTEL: Yes.

10 CAB ASST S2: And, so that is one again, the way it’s

nested is first there’s the J2 “breeze” that we -- there’s a

brigade at at Division, and then the next week would be our

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

internal S2 sync. The next week would be the J2 and then the

S2, so it alternates weeks.

SME-INTEL: Every other week?

10 CAB S2: Yes.

10 CAB ASST S2: Every other week.

10 CAB S2: And within the S2 syncs, they brief what has

happened the last two weeks as far as SAFIREs, IDFs, any

significant event. As part of their brief to us here at

brigade, they also have a slide that shows us the HLZs and then

make their assessments. Now, while they’re tracking and we’re

tracking, if there’s a difference, then we talk about it and if

they feel and they say they want to upgrade a certain HLZ or

downgrade it, then they’re supposed to submit a packet that

comes up to brigade and we look at it, the S3 looks at it, and

it is presented to (b)(3), (b)(6) and then (b)(3), (b)(6) makes their final

decision whether an HLZ is going to be upgraded or downgraded.

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SME-INTEL: Okay. Last night at the discussions with TF

they talked about the standard air planning threat

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

timeline the general norm. That was the brief by the JSOAD OIC.

They talked about hasty planning; three hours is what’s stated

in a FRAGO. Are you guys aware of the three hour time?

10 CAB ASST S2: Sir, often times there is – it’s a three

hour, but sometimes even less planning timeline. There have

been -- when it comes to TF specific operations there have

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

been some, I know, that have been 24 hours or less from the S2 /

S3 combination into execution. And so, three hours is

definitely a minimum that should be, but based on mission and

based on what’s going on especially trigger-based -- when you

have a trigger-based target and that trigger’s met the timeline

could be significantly shorter.

SME-INTEL: How does that timeline -- that short timeline

of three hours impact the intel picture; the intel processes

that we just went through? How is that --

10 CAB S2: Again, if a hasty comes down that is going to

take place, the three will come to us and we’ll go, again, to

the TOC and go to the CPOF and look, “Okay, we need the grid.

Where is this going to happen,” and that’s what we do. We do

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

kilometers up and we go days back.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

10 CAB ASST S2: And then --

10 CAB S2: We’ll make an assessment of the threat.

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SME-INTEL: Are you able to produce a -- How is that done?

How do you communicate that?

10 CAB ASST S2: We have a standardized threat assessment

template. And that standardized threat assessment template is

very similar in form to what you see in the area threat

assessment packets. What it’ll have is (b)(1)1.4a,

a (b)(1)1.4c
kilometer circle;

it’ll have SAFIRE activity separately; it’ll have reporting; and

separately it’ll have overall SIGACTS. That’ll be CPOF and

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g that are the primary databases used to mine that data.

We pull that up and based on the pre-established threat criteria

we are able to say, “Our left and right limits are this, and

this is the criteria that we would assess it to be.” Again, one

of the reasons that we did an area threat assessment, even in

the beginning towards looking forward towards the summer is

because it’s not that common to have an operation occur outside

the boundaries of where we’ve historically events happen.

Support zones remain support zones. Active zones tend to remain

active zones. There are small fluctuations, but in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

overall, when we are conducting operations, the bad guys tend to

just live in certain areas. Rat trails that are from Pakistan to

Afghanistan have been same places that have been used for 10

years, since our history of this war. And, while we do

operations that certainly affect their ability to use them, they

don’t adjust them in a manner that is significant to changing in

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overall location. And that is a simple fact about the nature of

this particular war we fight. SO, when a hasty comes down,

especially because we have been there 10 months already,

everyone has a general idea of what the threat is before we even

look at CPOF or (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g . Then we use CPOF and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g to

confirm or deny the tacit knowledge that is already existing

within our organization. Again, we have people with different

backgrounds from artillery, infantry, MI pure, different

services and while we may not all agree, we all have an idea of

what is existing and we use those systems to make sure that we

are not looking east when the azimuth points north. So, when it

comes -- I’m sorry, I know I’m kind of verbose on this, but the

bottom line is when it’s a hasty, we look at what we already

know and then we add to it the checks of what we don’t know.

SME-INTEL: Okay, and that’s done on the JOC [Joint

Operations Center] floor as well with, kind of, each system in

place to do the check. So, whether it be a hasty or deliberate

the process is the same.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: Just condensed.

SME-INTEL: Condensed. Okay.

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10 CAB ASST S2: And if you have two weeks to look at it,

we might get a little more in-depth with CIDNE and we might try

to find anything that is obscure – anything out there that is

just random that maybe we haven’t tied together.

SME-INTEL: Okay. Let’s run through the other portions

through here. I see you’ve got another -- a packet here, the

RPG Summary or RPG SAFIREs?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir. This is a Summer packet

specifically in the last month dealing with RPGs throughout

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

and it goes into detail for each and every event.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-INTEL: Can I ask, real quick, what spurred this to be

the --

10 CAB ASST S2: This happened after -- this was a request

from (b)(3),(b)(6) to look at after the EXTORTION 17 incident and

based on this event, we went back and historically looked --

again, one of the things we try to do at the brigade is to find

out whether or not the azimuth that we’re on and making threat

assessments is correct and that’s both looking forward and

looking backwards. And, so this was an after the fact product,

but what it does is it does confirm our assessments that we had

made prior to the EXTORTION 17 based on RPG threats in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-INTEL: Who is (b)(3), (b)(6) ?

10 CAB S2: This is from the incident from the happened at

the Alasay Valley with the Kiowa helicopters.

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SME-INTEL: That was --

10 CAB S2: That was back on April 23rd.

10 CAB ASST S2: That was our first FALLEN ANGEL.

10 CAB S2: --FALLEN ANGEL. I think CJTF --

SME-INTEL: That was --

10 CAB S2: 101st was still here.

SME-INTEL: Correct, that was --

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: That was your Task Force’s first FALLEN ANGEL?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

SME-INTEL: Kiowa?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Okay, so that’s the start point, was 23 April

to 11 August?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB S2: Correct.

10 CAB ASST S2: The bottom line is that since that first

FALLEN ANGEL, we have had 35 RPG SAFIREs which have resulted in

an additional two FALLEN ANGELS.

SME-INTEL: Can I scope that 35 RPG SAFIREs, is that still

looking at – You’re looking at Konar, Deghab --

10 CAB S2: Through the whole (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

10 CAB ASST S2: Across all (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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SME-INTEL: So this is all (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

10 CAB S2: All (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c; yes. (b)(3), (b)(6) wanted to look at

RPGs engagements from the 23rd April when (b)(3), (b)(6) happened all

the way until 11 August. We wanted to see if there was a

pattern -- if it was a change of pattern or TTPs from the

insurgents or not since this incident happened from the 23rd of

April.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB S2: And, it was just to give him a picture.

10 CAB ASST S2: And, so the next slide is an overview of

those RPGs and then all of the subsequent slides are the details

for those RPG events.

10 CAB S2: The different colors you see on that slide:

green meaning it’s green illumination; red, of course, red; and

the yellow is amber. The black square means the operation took

place during the day.

SME-INTEL: Go through this one again with me.

10 CAB S2: Yes. The red color means, red illumination.

SME-INTEL: So, greater than -- what’s red illumination?

10 CAB S2: It’s less than 10 percent.

10 CAB ASST S2: Illumination or its minimum is, you know,

under the mountains to a certain elevation.

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SME-INTEL: Angles? Okay. From an angle? So, less than

10 percent for red? Okay.

10 CAB S2: Then you have the yellow, which is amber

illumination.

SME-INTEL: And what is that defined as?

10 CAB ASST S2: Sir, I don’t have the left and right

limits for that, but I can get you that.

SME-INTEL: If you could follow up with that, please.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB S2: And, then you have the green which is green

illumination and the black box --

SME-INTEL: And green is, just kind of put it in the scope

of the current discussion. Green is high illum?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Okay. Does that mean daytime illumination?

10 CAB S2: No. Nightime.

SME-INTEL: This is all night?

10 CAB S2: Right. The only -- the black square you see,

that means that’s during the day time.

SME-INTEL: That’s day?

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

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10 CAB S2: And then all the following slides is just one

by one.

10 CAB ASST S2: And it just goes through one by one, all

35 events.

10 CAB S2: That’s all it is.

10 CAB ASST S2: The next slide that you should see in

there, is actually a copy of the story boards that we have

available from essentially the 6th of June. In the Tangi Valley

up through the FALLEN ANGEL, but not including the FALLEN ANGEL.

SME-INTEL: 06 June 11?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Up until 5 August.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: 6 August.

10 CAB ASST S2: So, these are the four SAFIREs that

occurred in the Tangi Valley since -- for 30 days prior to the

FALLEN ANGEL. The first storyboard you see, sir, is the one we

already reviewed where they were going after -- where they had

that -- the air assault that was called off and then later

fulfilled. The second Story Board -- Sir?

SME-INTEL: Can I back up real quick? And I don’t know if

you know the answer to this, but given this template here, was

there any indication or any efforts to use MH-47s versus the CH-

47s to do LEFTY GROVE?

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10 CAB S2: That would probably have to be on the S3 side

of the house.

10 CAB ASST S2: To be honest we do not have the MH47. So

if it’s tasked out to Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

, that’s not an available

option for us.

SME-INTEL: But there was no discussion that you were

aware of?

10 CAB ASST S2: I would not know that [inaudible]

10 CAB S2: I am not aware of that [inaudible]

SME-INTEL: The only reason I ask that is because when he

first heard about this operation, his though is, “Did we have

any discussion across the aviation task force to use this as a

template and say, maybe this isn’t the right package.”

10 CAB S2: Okay. That would probably S3 and Task Force,

I guess TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

for that operation. It would be in those

channels.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: The next slide was a witnessed SAFIRE.

Again, “witnessed” meaning that the aircraft themselves did not

know they were being shot at the time that they were being shot

at. Again, there was no damage to aircraft.

The third one is a rotary wing. The reason this is a CAOC

storyboard is because this did not happen to a Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

aircraft. When it says “rotary wing,” that is generally an

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indicator of another airframe. That’s where you might find the

MH event. This is the information that is passed to us, from

again CAOC. We don’t have that internal to our Task Force.

SME-INTEL: This one was small arms RPG?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes. Confirmed RPG and possible small

arms.

SME-INTEL: Just for your clarification, and I want to be

upfront with this. This was an MH-47.

10 CAB ASST S2: Okay.

10 CAB S2: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: We suspect, but again, since it’s not our

aircraft we can’t --

SME-INTEL: Well, I think it’s important to highlight

here, and this may not be in line with the investigation as

something that we need to look at, is sharing the data and

information of the most accurate data. That way commanders,

ops, have the greatest situational awareness going back to the

comment earlier that if we knew from the intel side that there

was an element done, you know, CH-47s go in, is there ever a

decision cycle - and we always struggle with this - is the use

of MH-47s. And, we’ve got to understand what is classified and

what is shared, and how can we build the best picture versus

hiding behind - or not necessarily hiding, but there is some

type of - I guess, what I’m trying to say is it needs to be

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transparent, and it can be transparent in making sure that that

occurs.

10 CAB S2: Right.

SME-INTEL: Not necessarily your area of emphasis, but

something that I think I need to carry the mail on.

10 CAB ASST S2: Okay.

10 CAB S2: I know it would be appreciated. We -- like I

said, we do get information from Division. This kind of story

board is sent to us, both from CAOC, but when we get to see the

actual TF , we are on their distro, so they do send us

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

information, but we don’t necessarily get all the same details

that we would have if it was an internal event.

The second part of this story board, this is attached to

the one you just saw, shows the three different points of

origin. Based on Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4ccriteria, we would have

assessed this as a major SAFIRE, because it’s three points of

origin. CAOC story boards do not use the same SAFIRE criteria;

they assess it as either close or distant, things of those

terms. So, for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, this story board would have been

assessed as a major.

SME-INTEL: So, they use close and what?

10 CAB ASST S2: They use “close.” They use “distant.”

They use “probable,” “possible,” and to be honest, sir, I’d have

to pull up their documents to pull up their documents to find

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out all the other variance. But CAOC has a different SAFIRE

delineation than what we use.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: The fourth story board is Task Force

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c would have assessed this as a “witnessed,” because the

aircraft at the time did not know they were being shot at. It

was reported to them from another location and no damage was

done. So, again, this is CAOC assesses it as a “close probable

small arms”. A Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c assessment would have been a

“witnessed”.

10 CAB S2: Right; and another way to assess it also when

we call it “witnessed,” CAOC would call it as a -- oh, the word

just left.

SME-INTEL: Did they call it a --

10 CAB S2: A “sighting.”

10 CAB ASST S2: A “sighting;” yes.

10 CAB S2: Usually we call it “witnessed SAFIREs” and

CAOC would call it as a “sighting”.

SME-INTEL: There’s not a lack of information or the

information doesn’t get out there. It’s a standardization

issue.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes. The reason -- just to kind lean

forward on this; the reason that we, as Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cassess

our SAFIREs different than CAOC does is, is because for rotary

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wing it makes more sense to our pilots in understanding the

threat and also to or commanders when use terms like “a

witnessed” “a minor” “a significance” and “a major”. It’s much

easier for them to understand the level of the SAFIRE and what

that means, rather than saying it was “close” or it was

“distant”. For them, how far away is important, but it may not

be the most important thing, and that’s why we have a

difference.

SME-INTEL: Thanks. That’s great data there. If you

could, dive into that portion.

10 CAB ASST S2: And then sir, the last document we have

is situational awareness. As a Task Force, when we accessed

weapon threats in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c the most common weapon is small arms

fire. The most dangerous weapon is RPGs on the HLZ. Now,

that’s what we’ve always briefed in our academics. However,

because there are MANPADSs and reports of MANPADSs in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

we periodically review the recording and the incidences related

to MANPADSs and MANPADSs trafficking because that is a

significant event for aviation risk in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c The overall for

MANPADSs is a “low threat” in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. We just don’t see them

used very often. They’re very expensive and they’re very hard

to transit from one location to the next. But, again, as an S2,

our job is to still assess what we see, especially if there’s

developing patterns. What you have here was our most recent

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MANPADSs assessment in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Specifically, the number one

that you see on this top page did not occur in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c it

actually occurred in RC-Southwest. However, it occurred right

outside of Ghazni very close to the border; on that mountain

right outside of Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c . It occurred right

about here [pointing at an exhibit]. This is (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c [pointing

at an exhibit].

SME-INTEL: What’s the name of that location?

10 CAB S2: You’ve got the Aikundi Province.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: The Aikundi Province?

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: This assessment, sir, was done in the

Spring essentially, in April and May time-frame. It did -- like

I said, it did include the one from March that occurred in RC-

Southwest because that’s -- insurgents don’t have the same

boundaries we have. So, if it’s close to us, we’re still

concerned about it. So, what we saw in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c are possible

MANPADS events. They were not confirmed, and they were not

probable, but again with our S2 assessment we note them as not

necessarily SIGACTS, so much as situational awareness. We

pushed this document out to Division – higher - as well as

pushed it to all the Task Forces - lower. This is a document

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that we wanted everyone to have a copy of for pure situational

awareness so if anyone saw something that maybe would relate to

any of this, they would be able to report it back up and we

could have a more free information flow. So-

SME-INTEL: Do you ever lay this over other intelligence

to -

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes. We do.

10 CAB S2: Yes. Right, we get any(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

traffic or any

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that come we receive throughout the battle

field we go back to the Task Force of the BSO, wherever the

report came from, and ask them to verify that report. What is

the source? What is the reliability of the source? Does the

source just want money? Because MANPADSs - they can call it for

anything. It could be RPGs, they can call as MANPADS.

SME-INTEL: Question with that. Can you discuss - or, are

you prepared to discuss about MANPADSs themselves and what they

mean to the threat -

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: --and then talk me through the suspected

employment of them in relationship to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c from your

knowledge.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir. Absolutely, we can discuss

that. MANPADSs risk as we previously stated is a low for

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Now, the reason for this is not because the weapon system

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itself is not dangerous. It is, in fact, the most dangerous

weapon system to aircraft. The reason we assess it as a low, is

because we just don’t see them in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Overall, when we see

MANPADSs in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c reporting wise, when we do get these

reports, we know that they generally come from three locations.

Just a little bit of history, when we first came into

Afghanistan as a coalition force movement, there was the

Northern Alliance that was up in Panjhir. Panjhir -- there was

Mashud who was known as the Lion of Panjhir. Now, Panjhir--the

Lion of Panjhir, Mashud himself, was not necessarily a fan of

the coalition force movement, but he was also anti-Taliban.

And, up in Panjhir area there was a lot of old Soviet cache

locations that we know contained MANPADS. MANPADS themselves

are laser guided, often wire weapons that can track on an

aviation heat signature, the more -- the primary MANPADSs that

we see in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c are what are known as first generation. These

are not the most advanced systems. They were commonly used from

the Soviet 1980’s era. They require a munition, they require a

battery, and they require a trigger and these are separate

parts. Now, often times when we see reporting on MANPADS in (b)(1)1.4a

and it’s missing parts, we know that it kind of came out of

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

the Panjhir location. When we see pictures taken and it’s

busted and it’s old, and it’s rusty we have a good delineation

that it probably came out of the Panjhir area and those old

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cache storage that we allowed them to keep up in that area. So,

sometimes up in the Konar area we see reports. We know that

people have them but we also know they’re not functional, and we

do get those reports. Second location that we’ll see MANPADSs

in RC-East come out of would be to come out of Kabul or from --

and a third location is coming out of RC-South transiting along

Highway 1. Generally, if we see a MANPADS reports or reports of

MANPADSs that are functional, that have all their pieces, or

that are relatively newer then we know that they’ve come out of

Kabul or either transit RC-South along Highway 1. The reason

being is that that’s where the money and the illegal illicit

sales tend to travel. Those are the avenues and lines of

communication that are of course used by all insurgents for a

lot of notorious activity. That also plays into CJTF’s

[Combined Joint Task Force] role of maintaining freedom of

movement along Highway 1. The insurgents don’t want that. They

want it to be their freedom of movement, not necessarily our

freedom of movement and so that, again, it poisons the overall

goals of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and the Division here. Now, when we see those

three cache locations and we see the types of MANPADSs coming

out of those locations, we try to track it. We very, very

rarely have ever seen any reports that are specific MANPADS

reports. A lot of times, the insurgents in this area call them

rockets or they don’t really know what they have. Because

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MANPADSs are very, very expensive, they are very difficult to

move throughout (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c based on terrain. The lines of

communication are so restrictive, that for an insurgent leader

to have a MANPADS, usually there’s a lot of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c reporting

that goes along with it, because, for lack of a better analogy,

a 40 year-old guy in America buys a Viper, his neighbors are

going to know about it. That’s kind of what a MANPADS is in

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c It is a status symbol. It is significant. It is

expensive, and it means that you are the leader of that valley.

Usually, it is something that somebody with a lot of time and a

lot of external alliances is able to obtain. It’s not something

that your regular insurgent guy down the road who works at the

bazaar during the day is going to be able to get. So, we get a

lot of reporting when there is something of relevance. There

are civilian organizations out of Kabul that we worked with to

try to remove MANPADS systems from the battlefield. They are

based out of Kabul and that’s because, again, if you see

something that’s functional, generally, that’s where you see it

come out of; and they have been successful in doing those kind

of things. Now, we have not seen an advanced, and by advanced,

I mean, past-generation one MANPADS in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c The last

confirmed MANPADS event was in RC-West, and I believe there’s

one in RC-South, but not in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c specifically. What we did

was get a probable MANPADS event. That happened in Ghazni this

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past April. That operation was actually conducted by TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

out of RC-Southwest. It was not an (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c or CJTF-101 event.

We received the information after the fact, and it is included

in this packet that you have in front of you, sir.

SME-INTEL: Okay. So, that was RC-West of the operation?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

10 CAB S2: For the Ghazni one?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Yes.

10 CAB S2: It was RC-South.

10 CAB ASST S2: South, I’m sorry. Yes. It was RC-South.

10 CAB S2: It was from RC-South.

SME-INTEL: That was Ghazni?

10 CAB S2: It occurred right over this lake, sir.

10 CAB ASST S2: They had just come in [inaudible].

Again, you have that in your packet.

SME-INTEL: Let’s go to those (Ex. 51], and review the

bidding for what occurred and how is it assessed in the MANPADS.

10 CAB ASST S2: Absolutely, sir. By the numbers, this is

number one, this is the one that occurred in March and this did

not occur in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c but again was of concern to us. Possible

MANPADSs. This is assessed by CAOC as being possible because of

the reporting from the spotter. Specific to a MANPADS you see a

different type of sparkle, smoke trails, cork screws are an

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indicator of MANPADS versus RPGs. So, when we make a

differentiation between the signatures and traits of a weapon --

enemy weapon system, MANPADSs have very unique features, which

is one of the reasons we believe the event for EXTORTION was not

a MANPADS. It just -- it doesn’t fit the MANPADS profile.

Now, on number 2, this is the one that was considered a probably

MANPADS event. It did occur in Ghazni. The main reason that

this was assessed as a MANPADS is that the munition changed

course, it did not explode. They did not actually -- the pilots

did not observe the air burst. On the next slide, you can kind

of see a 3D version of what had happened, where it was shot, how

it tracked on the aircraft. Again, something that tracks on

aircraft is generally a MANPADS and then also, I believe they

also saw the corkscrew smoke trail. I don’t think that’s in the

CAOC write-up, but from reviewing the pilot de-briefs I believe

they did see a smoke trail with this event.

SME-INTEL: Okay. DO you know of any -- was there any

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c indications at this time that a

MANPADS was fired?

10 CAB ASST S2: Unfortunately, sir, we didn’t get that

information. Again, it came from RC-South, so we didn’t get a

lot of -- their objective (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , we didn’t get the mission

set prior to, and we didn’t get the an email , (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
, or any

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other push of intel related to it, other than the MANPADS story

boards.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: The third event is of concern. This is

along Highway 1; and TACOPs can definitely go into a little bit

more about MANPADSs versus RPGs, but this was assessed by CAOC

as an unidentified rocket overall. We looked at it as a

“possible” as Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cbecause it sets off some of the

red flags for us internally as an S2 for things like 8 seconds

of flight level. When something burns for 8 seconds, that’s a

little bit different than say a rocket or an RPG. Again, the

smoke trail -- things like that. It says that this did not

appear to maneuver towards the aircraft which is why CAOC

ultimately assessed it as an unidentified rocket, but for

situational awareness it had a lot of traits that are very

similar to a MANPADS, and so we included this. This packet is a

bottom line up front to the task forces situational awareness,

again. So, we push this out and we say, “If you see something

that resembles any of these events, this is high priority. Let

us know.” We are tracking that they may be moving MANPADSs into

the area and we want to hear anything that sounds unique in

either reporting, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , or observation, and so, that’s

why these are included. The forth -- this is another pilot

de-brief from the number three, just more detail on it.

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And then the fourth one was Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c It did occur

near Sayyid Abad, which is relevant only in the fact that, not

necessarily Tangi, but Sayyid Abad is a known operation zone for

insurgents. This was significant to us in that the munition

maneuvered toward the aircraft and again, when we see something

that maneuvers towards an aircraft, that is a warning sign to us

as far as MANPADSs. And, again, they had the smoke trail that

the pilots observed as being a cork screw.

SME-INTEL: On this one here, what was the AGL [Above

Ground Level]?

10 CAB S2: AGL, I’d say it’s 1,800 to 2,000 AGL.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yeah, 2,000 feet AGL. 1,800 to 2,000

feet AGL. It’s on the second slide.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: This was also against Chinooks - against

our CH-47s. We have not seen any other reporting again of

MANPADSs, suspected MANPADSs used,(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

, or(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c traffic in

the Sayyid Abad area with MANPADSs. We included this for

situational awareness so that you could see what we’re tracking

as far as MANPADSs. The reason that we drew this line as we

did, is essentially, because we know the method of insurgent

TTPs to import weapon systems into (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c from RC-South along

Highway 1, when we look at the time-frame of these -

specifically event 2, 3, and 4 - they travel along a line of

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Highway 1 towards Kabul. Again, this was in the Spring into the

Summer, and so we are sensitive to the possibility that such a

weapon system might be being attempted to be brought into the

area for sale. And so, again, this was a document that we sent

out to the task forces to say, “Be aware. Let us know if you

see any suspicious that relates to these kinds of events”.

SME-INTEL: You had said also that there was a MANPADS

incident in RC-West.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, there was. I don’t have all of

those details right now.

SME-INTEL: Could you look that one up and forward that to

me as well so I could just take a look at what the report is.

10 CAB ASST S2: Absolutely. That was earlier this year.

10 CAB S2: Forward it to where?

SME-INTEL: I’ll give you my email after this.

10 CAB S2: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: That kind of concludes the threat

assessment packets that we have for overall (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

specifically to EXTORTION 17 and then the Tangi Valley.

SME-INTEL: Kind of a question that we talked about the

MANPADS and the next thing would be is, there’s some questions

out there as far as an open-source media that these were -- it

was assessed to be a weapon system that the U.S. had provided

the Taliban during the -- back in the Afghan - Soviet war, and

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that they are attributing to it that it is something that we

provided. The question would be, or if you would just describe

that, what is your assessment right now that you’ve heard

through intel channels of how the Taliban receives their

equipment or gear. I think alluded to it earlier with the

different caches locations within theater itself, but you’re not

aware of any other programs out there that funnel weapons into

the Taliban or even through other means outside of .

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

That the Taliban receive equipment or support.

10 CAB ASST S2: I’m not sure what classification level we

are talking --

SME-INTEL: We are discussing at the SECRET level right

now. Our point for release is SECRET//ACGU at that point at

least, or SECRET//REL ISAF so they can get a hold of the

reports, so as long let’s keep the discussions at that level for

right now.

10 CAB ASST S2: Okay, and the reason I ask is because

there are special access programs that do address the MANPADS

threat in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

and would be exempt from that classification.

I don’t feel comfortable talking about those particularly,

especially if it’s again - because those are NOFORN programs.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

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Meaning, that some US weapon MANPADS -- you’re talking about

STINGER [US MANPAD] - you’re talking about a little bit more

advanced, and if you look at the MANPADS data of the last 10

years, it has decreased significantly. Basically, the

insurgents used them and they didn’t have a lot more coming in

and they were not extremely effective. So, you’ll see -- I

don’t have the exact numbers, but there is a chart that shows

there was, you know, 20 MANPADS in 2005 across all of

Afghanistan. 2006 there was seven. 2008 there was two. 2009

there was one. 2010 there were none. And, I don’t have the

exact numbers, but that’s the trend, but basically what happened

is they had them, we came into theater, they attempted to use

them. They didn’t have a replacement for them, and then they

were out and, again, they weren’t very effective and that’s

another reason that we assess the MANPADS threat in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c to

be low, because the ones that were able to be used, were

primarily already used. And, because they don’t have a good

mechanism for bringing them into theater because of expense and

because of terrain difficulties, they just haven’t been replaced

and they know that -- this is the other thing: for MANPADSs to

be effective, a shooter has to be trained. There has to be a

certain distance for armament. A regular guy off the street,

who gets a MANPADS is not going to necessarily going to be able

to use it effectively. And, so that is why even the MANPADS

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that were shot had a very, very low effective rate. The

training is just not in existence in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c for the Taliban.

Even the Taliban training camps that we know exist, they’re not

training on MANPADS. They are training on things that they are

most likely capable of. Suicide vest, VBIED, they are training

on small arms weapons. We do know that they get foreign

fighters into the area that assist in training up from

Uzbekistan and across from Pakistan. We know this because of

the different language dialects, and also because when we’ve had

complex attacks on location occasionally with those foreign

fighters are with the bodies that are found. So, we do know

that foreign fighters with more experience have been brought

into .
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Whenever there’s a MANPADS shot -- most recently,

again, there’s been reports in RC-South that have said they’ve

brought Iranian personnel into the area, specifically with this

weapon system as the shooter for this weapon system. We don’t

see that in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c We track the reports. We’re aware of

reports primarily in the south and southwest, but we’ve not seen

those same reports in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c And so, again, as an S2, I would

not give a high credibility to the report of a US-sponsored

system in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that could be relevant to this attack because

it just doesn’t - it has not corroborative intelligence at all.

SME-INTEL: Okay. That’s a good summary of that. The

next area of discussion is we haven’t not necessarily an open

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source, but just trying to look at the whole aspect of this OPS,

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and also, too, is always talking about the night

vision devices or night vision goggles. Can I get your

assessment with where you think (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is with those aspects?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and also, too, is the

employment of NVGs [night vision goggles] line of threat.

10 CAB S2: Yes, we’ve seen a lot of(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

traffic on

VISOBS. They’re always doing that. They’re always trying to

see what are our TTPs as far as the aircraft is concerned. Are

we taking the same routes? Always flying in the same direction?

We do see that, so of course we pass all that information to the

task forces. NVGs: as far as NVGs, I know Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

had found quite a few of them, five I believe, or four of them,

in Kapisa area province, in Tagal Valley, so that’s where we’ve

mostly seen the NVGs. We’ve seen reports of NVGs up in the

Konar Province and also, not that many of them down in Paktika

and Paktya Province, mostly it’s up in the North of .

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

[The interview was paused for a brief moment due to an

interruption. The interview was continued.]

10 CAB S2: Yes, as far as NVGs, that’s what we’ve seen

the most is up in the Tagal Valley. We know they have foreign

fighters up in that area. I know that when (b)(3),(b)(6) is

conducting some of the operations and some of their enemy KIA

[Killed In Action] we’ve seen some Chechen rebels [Rebel Group

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in Georgia ---former Soviet republic]. So, we know there are

foreign fighters coming in, so we know they are highly skilled.

So, as far as NVGs, I mean those can be bought off the market,

as we all know. I mean, I can buy some. You can buy some.

But, like I said mostly it’s been up in Takah Valley. That’s

where we see the NVG threat.

SME-INTEL: Also, do you know what generation or what type

of NVGs we’re seeing? Are they military grade? Commercial

grade?

10 CAB ASST S2: Sir, to elaborate on that, we’ve seen a

broad spectrum. We have seen military grade night vision

goggles up in the Tagal River Valley. We have also seen the

lowest grade. I mean, down to the point of people had their

video cameras that you can buy commercially off the market that

have an NVG basic capability. All of these VISOPs and all

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

of that, although we don’t see large amounts of the night vision

goggles across .
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c What we do see is a robust early

warning network and when you’re talking about your(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

, and

you’re talking about repeater towers, and you’re talking about

visual observation with binoculars, and there (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , cell

phone use, all of these things portray into an early warning

network and that is really quite robust for .

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c We have

had time and time again, where we go to do a mission, and we

know based on , based on collections that we’ve conducted,

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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that the insurgents know when we leave the FOB and the general

direction that we’re going. So, that always increases risk for

certain operations. That is one of the reasons that Objective

LEFTY GROVE was a “moderate to high,” because an insurgent at a

certain level is going to have a more robust early warning

network than say, again, your common IED facilitator. The most

common that we have had any real use for at Task Force
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

has been with our

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

systems during an operation that was counter IED called

Operation
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c .

The mission was conducted under CJTF-101 construct].

Now, Operation (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was based on successful

operations of Iraq. It did not turn out to be as successful in

Afghanistan due to terrain constrictions and some other factors.

However, what it did is it paired an Apache attack helicopter

with a Blackhawk fitted with the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c system that enabled

us to detect traffic and helped us to try and target IED

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

emplacers along Highway 1 and other major MSRs in .

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c What

we were able to get from that is proof that, well, two things.

One, that when we’re flying overhead insurgents tend to not

emplace IEDs at that particular time, and two, they are aware of

certain levels of our TTPs. That we have targeted their

repeater towers in an attempt to try to degrade their early

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warning networks, but nonetheless remains a robust system

throughout all of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and I’m not sure how that can be

combated better. I’m not sure about that, but we do know that

it does exist, and it is efficient, and it has so far not been

degraded in capability since.

SME-INTEL: So, operations that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c . What was the

name of the operation itself?

IE1: The operation itself is called Operation (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c .

What we mostly got out of that was a deterrent effect for IEDs;

which affects what you’re going for to help decrease IED

activity and to support the MSR. That is an effect; that’s a

desirable effect. Nonetheless, it’s not sustainable based on

other aviation missions and that’s why (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c doesn’t

exist at this current time.

But, to go back to your question regarding , regarding

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

visual observations, and regarding night vision goggles, all of

those things come into play, again, with that early warning

network system. Part of that is political corruption. Part of

that is that it’s very inexpensive to employ. It is also very

easy to train somebody to participate in a network. It is very

easy to coerce somebody who may not necessarily want to fight to

be able to say, “Look, we won’t kill you and your wife and your

kids if you sit on this mountain top for five days and you just

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watch and let us know if anybody comes by or what travel method

are the vehicles going. What directions are the helicopters

going? What is the shape of the helicopter? Does it look like

the grasshopper? Does it look like the skinny one?” We see all

sorts of nomenclature used to describe helicopters but we picked

that up on an .
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-INTEL: So, the threat uses code names?

10 CAB ASST S2: Absolutely.

SME-INTEL: Do you know what those code names are?

10 CAB ASST S2: It varies between province and networks.

SME-INTEL: What are some of the common code names that we

hear?

10 CAB ASST S2: For expressing helicopters there’s “the

fat one”; they talk about the Chinooks. “The big one”:

Chinooks; “the skinny one” they’re often talking about Apaches.

“The grasshopper looking one” is generally talking about

Apaches. “The medical one” again, they see that cross for our

MEDEVACs. Those become a higher level of targets, because they

know they’re going to come in one way or the other. So, they’ll

talk about, “here comes the ambulance ones.” Those are common

nomenclatures that we’ll here.

10 CAB S2: And sometimes they’ll say, “The one that has a

ball on the top” which means the Kiowa.

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10 CAB ASST S2: The Kiowa they’ll also say “the little

one” for the Kiowa.

10 CAB S2: The insurgents are also are starting to go

more into the commercial aircrafts, because they know the

commercial aircrafts cannot defend themselves. So, we’ve seen

that.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes; “the white ones”.

10 CAB S2: So, that’s a code meaning the contract air.

So, they go after them.

SME-INTEL: Talking about that, and kind of changed the

subject away from the VISOPS and NVGs. It’s now looking at

TTPs with aviation. When you develop a threat, or when the

operations are done, are the considerations of how many times

they’ve used they air avenue of approach. How many times that

they’ve used the HLZs or how many times they’ve done operations

with the ground or air center [inaudible]--

10 CAB ASST S2: Absolutely.

10 CAB S2: Yes, it is. Every time, there’s a CONOP that

is briefed to (b)(3), (b)(6) , the DCO. Yes, they go

over that, they go over the HLZs. They look at the grids. They

look at the operations. “Wait a minute, we’ve used this HLZ too

many times and we’ve used this route too many times. We need to

change it.”

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SME-INTEL: In relationship to Objective LEFTY GROVE, do

you remember?

IE1: I know TACOPs has been specifically looking at that as

well for operations both previous within the 24 hours the two

weeks prior to, and also the month prior to. TACOPS would be

able to give you more fidelity on that specific issue because

they’ve pulled up the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c lines to show exactly what

levels -- how many times have we gone over this area; have we

burned the target. When we sit down and we do a CONOP, those

questions are always asked. That’s a primary concern for our

Task Force. (b)(3), (b)(6) and all of everybody that are in

the Task Force, down to the task force themselves level because

it’s a big concern for us if they know -- granted there are some

things we can’t avoid. When you are going up into Konar, you’re

terrain is very restricted. When you’re in the Tagal, your

terrain is restricted. When you’re in Kapisa, you’re terrain is

very restricted and there are only certain ways you can go, but

that doesn’t mean there’s only one way. And, so they do

everything in every capability to try and vary it as much as

possible for survivability of our crew aircraft mission.

SME-INTEL: So, risk mitigation is part of that and intel

plays a role in assisting TACOPs with risk assessments. Okay. I

can’t think of any other questions.

10 CAB S2: Okay.

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10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, absolutely.

[The interview was completed. The interviewees were briefed

regarding OPSEC and informed that they could be recalled to

clarify any answers].

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The interview of TF (ASPS, J2CHOPS, & DEPUTY J2 CHOPS) opened

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

at 2230 Zulu, 16 August 2011.

PERSONS PRESENT

INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR SME-INTEL

COURT REPORTER CR2

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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SME-INTEL: I'm (b)(3), (b)(6) . I'm the member of the team

assembled to investigate the circumstances related to
the crash of the CH47. My role is as the intelligence
SME. The [team is here to investigate the]
circumstances surrounding the crash of the CH47
Helicopter in Wardak Province, Afghanistan on 6
August 2001.

Brigadier General Jeffrey Colt is the investigating

officer in this case, and was appointed by General
Mattis, Commander U.S. CENTCOM, McDill Air Force Base,
Florida. His findings and recommendations as to
appropriate action will be included in the report to
General Mattis in accordance with AR 15-6.

Before we began the interview, the individuals to be

interviewed have signed a privacy act statement. The
bottom line is this is a fact finding investigation and
any information you provide [the investigation team]
plus your names will be included in this report.

Now, I need all of you to stand, and I'm going to

confirm an oath. Please raise your right hand.

The witnesses did as directed and was duly sworn.

SME-INTEL: Let's go around and introduce yourself, state your

duty position and [the scope of] your duties and
responsibilities within the Task Force.

ASPS: I'll start. My name is (b)(6) . I'm a civilian

assigned here within 3-10 J2, in the All Source
Production Section, ASPS. The role of the ASPS analyst
is to serve as a conduit between the strike forces and
the headquarters here [at Bagram, Afghanistan]. And
then additionally, to serve as the intelligence support
to the [TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
] headquarters itself.

My role in your average objective that comes in is just

contacting the strike force, acquiring information on
the target site, things like that, provide those to the
[TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c J2 Chops for inclusion in the target brief
to research background on the target himself, and
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provide that information in a brief to the [TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

command and staff in the CONOP [concept of operations]
brief.

J2 CHOPS: I'm (b)(3), (b)(6) , [TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

] J2 CHOPs, Chief
of Operations. I essentially run the operations
during the night for the J2 including CONOPs. And
specifically for roles what we do is, we
provide -- build about two to three slides doing a
really quick and aggregate level, macro level view of
threats to both surface-to-air [SAFIREs] and ground to
ground [threats] for the CONOP to try to give an
assessment to the commander.

We include all the different facets of intel support

from an analytical piece, the ASPS [all source
production section] piece that Devon just mentioned to
the in-brief support and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c support, and try to
provide a picture to the boss [TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCommander / J3
/ J2], and give the extents of where the mission is going,
what we access the threat will be and a bigger picture.
And then we present that during the CONOP brief. And
then once those are done, we actually monitor the
execution of the operations and working time sensitive
missions to understand the target.

DEP J2 CH My name is (b)(3), (b)(6) I'm the [TF

deputy J2 CHOPs [chief of operations] or DCHOPs.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

So I'm (b)(3), (b)(6) deputy. I'm also an intel

analyst and provide intel analysis for the CONOPs
[concept of operations] every evening as well as just
workload overflow for the chief operations.

SME-INTEL: Okay. What I want to start off with for the overview
for scope is first look at the targeted individual
Objective LEFTY GROVE. And also, too, if you can kind
of give us some background and data related to the
network that works within the Tangi Valley.

ASPS: The background to start with on LEFTY GROVE begins with

Mullah Din Mohammad [referenced as Objective DUNLAP by
TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
] who, until approximately two months ago,
[objective Dunlap was killed during TF execution
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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of objective (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d on 5 June 2011] was

the overall Taliban commander in Tangi Valley. The
network within the Tangi Valley is kind of a
sub-district structure that, largely, is
self-contained [geographically oriented network].
Whereas, most locations in Afghanistan there's a
district or larger structure, Tangi Valley primarily
for geographic reasons is largely itself contained.
So there's not as much interaction inside and outside
the valley.

So Mullah Din Mohammad, Objective DUNLAP, was the

Taliban commander until -- I don't have the exact date
in front of me. But I believe it was, you know, July 15
plus or minus [the actual date was 05 June 2011]. He
was killed on Objective (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d if I
remember correctly.

At that time, there came a little bit of a struggle among

other senior Taliban commanders in the Tangi Valley to
become that preeminent leader.

It is the Task Force's [TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c assessment that

Objective LEFTY GROVE is the most likely person to fill
that role. Reporting does show some disagreement.
Different sources do indicate different individuals,
Alahwee Mohammed is another name that comes up in a
couple reports. But our assessment is LEFTY GROVE is
the most likely person.

So he's not just another Taliban commander. There are,

you know, 15 or 20 Taliban commanders that, you know,
genuinely deserve the title "commander" versus
sub-commander, facilitator et cetera. Within that
geographical area [reference Tangi Valley network], he
is likely to be among those.

Under him, some of the more prominent objectives,

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d , is very well-known.
He's RC East's [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] number two
priority right now in terms of targeting just to give
an idea of his stature. He's involved in a very
prominent threat against Kabul and multi-end reporting
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within the last month. He's just an example of some

of the high profile commanders that we see as
subordinate to [Objective] LEFTY GROVE, just to once
again, you know, kind of frame his stature.

In terms of derog against [Objective] LEFTY GROVE

himself, with the exception of the organizational
attributes in terms of who he answers to, which we
believe that he answers directly to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d

– Taliban Shadow Governor for Sayed Abad District,

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d

Wardak Province, Afghanistan] , Objective (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ,

based on what we're [TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cseeing. But he was the
overall shadow governor for Sayyidabad District.

But other than the organizational aspects, he

[Objective LEFTY GROVE] looks very similar to any
other Taliban commander in terms of the actual attacks
that he's involved in, things like that in terms of,
his subordinates are conducting IED attacks, rocket
attacks, etc. And so I guess that's my overall take.

SME-INTEL: [Question regarding the Taliban’s use of the Tangi

Valley to facilitate] Attacks against Kabul, so the
Tangi Valley Taliban, how have they been involved or
what's the connection to attacks in Kabul?

ASPS: So as a general rule, I would say that Tangi Valley is

largely itself contained in terms of its threat. By
which, I mean, Tangi Valley is not seen as a staging
area for attacks on Kabul, generally speaking. It's
much more focused on US Forces, coalition forces when
they go into [or conduct operations in] Tangi Valley,
they are attacked. And so it's very inhospitable
terrain. The Taliban try to generally keep us
[coalition forces] out of that area.

There are a few notable exceptions to that, and

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d being the preeminent one. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d

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So the challenge there is, you know, we have to go into

this, you know, inhospitable terrain to get after him.
So -- and there's one or two other examples, you know.
Every couple months, you will see a report where some
kind of threat originates in Tangi, and has an effect
in Kabul. The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d threat that I have
been mentioning, by the way, has not yet come to
fruition. There was lot of reports of him staging
suicide bombers, staging, you know, VBIEDs etc. But
the attack has not yet occurred.

SME-INTEL: Has there ever been an attack associated -- on Kabul

or outside of Tangi Valley associated with the threat
network --

ASPS: There has. I would have to go back and do some reading

to come up with the specific examples. But I can
remember reading one threat that came out of Maiden
Shahr [village located in Wardak Province, Maiden Shahr
District] on to Kabul proper [the city of Kabul] that
was predominantly conducted by Tangi Valley insurgents.
But I would have to go back and find the name and time
of that.

SME-INTEL: Okay. But no preeminent --

ASPS: In my opinion, it's a very rare thing. I mean, from what

I've seen, most of the threat emulating from Tangi is
threat in the Tangi immediate vicinity.

SME-INTEL: But not associated with the attacks on the airport

a couple years ago? Not associated with the attacks
on the hotel?

ASPS: No. All of the main attacks in Kabul that we are all
familiar with, the preeminent Kabul threats are coming
from elsewhere.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

ASPS: And I think this (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d threat stream was
abnormal, although not unique. It's not a normal
thing.
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SME-INTEL: Can you scope it for me regarding the tough

[analytical] question: So why Tangi Valley?

ASPS: So in my opinion, the reason is a lack of willingness to

seed the battle space. Obviously, this is way above
my pay grade. But this is an area that connects Wardak
and Logar, the two provinces that are in the opinion
of RC East - strategic terrain. So Wardak and Logar
are preeminent staging areas for attacks, you know, at
the provincial level, specifically, like Maiden Shahr
and Logar and Sayyidabad and Wardak.

But the Tangi Valley is the connection between these

two areas, and the piece that allows the insurgents to
move freely. And so my guess is that it's recognizing
how bad of a safe haven it could easily become because
of the area surrounding it in terms of the threat and
things like that, it could very easily become a staging
area, training camps could form et cetera. We haven't
seen that yet, but coalition forces only moved out of
COP (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , what, two or four months ago. I
believe it was April 18 [2011] was the date -- April
9th [2011].

So it has only been a couple months that there hasn't

been a significant coalition presence in the middle of
the Tangi valley. So the fact that we haven't seen it
[indications the Taliban are using the Tangi Valley to
facilitate operations/attacks in Kabul] yet
doesn't -- I mean, it has all the markings of a
promising safe haven in the future.

So I think going into Tangi Valley on a regular

basis -- the Task Force going into Tangi Valley on a
regular basis is the only thing that could prevent that
from happening [pressuring the network within the Tangi
Valley]. Otherwise, we won't recognize that it has
happened until we are already seeing it.

J2 CHOPS: Some of it could be just trying to trip the network,

cut out different echelons of the network. If
Objective LEFTY GROVE took over for Objective DUNLAP,
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then he would actually be a(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c level target to say,

Hey, cut off the head of the snake, and let them run
around and figure out who the next guy is, and we keep
pounding the [Tangi Valley] network.

The reward is pretty high in the sense of, hey, we can

try to keep this network guessing. And [are then] less
effective than a stronger command and control network
with an experienced guy like Objective DUNLAP. And
then Objective LEFTY GROVE would take out some of these
bigger dudes [higher level Taliban commanders]. They
[Taliban senior leadership] then sit there and try to
move guys who aren't experienced up, or it's [the
network is not as effective] not as effective --

ASPS: And from the perspective of network targeting, you want

to hit when the iron is hot. The Task Force [TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ]
has had significant effect on the Tangi Valley network
and the surrounding area. So removing Objective
DUNLAP on Objective (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d , and then
removing Objective LENGEN on Objective (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d
, both of those within the last, two or three
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d

months the, I would say that's two of the top ten

insurgents in the Tangi Valley area have been removed.
[Objective DUNLAP being the first and] Objective LENGEN
being the second [Taliban senior commander killed in
the Tangi Valley].

SME-INTEL: Objective (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d that's when

Objective DUNLAP (Din Muhammad) was killed?

ASPS: Yeah, and that's --

SME-INTEL: What was the date of that; do you remember?

ASPS: I would have to check. It was roughly late June or July.

[the date of Objective DUNLAP death was 05 June 2011]

SME-INTEL: Was the operation executed the same day the CONOP
was briefed?

DEP J2 CHOPS: (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d was 6 June 2011?

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ASPS: Do you have the date for (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d ?

SME-INTEL: 5 August 2011.

ASPS: Okay. So on 5 August 2011, Objective LENGEN who was Sheen

Abdul Rahman was killed on that objective.

SME-INTEL: He was killed?

ASPS: On Objective (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d , Objective LENGEN was

EKIA.

SME-INTEL: What about Objective (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d – [need to

listen to recording for reference]

ASPS: No. Objective (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d --

SME-INTEL: -- was still out so there from the network --

ASPS: -- there is --

SME-INTEL: -- Objective LEFTY GROVE is still --

ASPS: So there is a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4creport that [collaborates] Objective

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d is dead.

SME-INTEL: So he [Objective (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d ] and Objective

LEFTY GROVE are stil

ASPS: Right. And then Objective LEFTY GROVE has been a

priority for Task Force in recent days. But weather
has really impeded [TF ability to action Objective
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d

LEFTY GROVE] on recent days. When he was targetable,

the weather did not present us with the opportunity.
But he is being closely watched as a priority [target
by TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
.

But so as I was saying, the turn in the network resulting

from Objective DUNLAP and Objective LENGEN deaths both
really presents an opportunity to continue to hit at
this [Tangi Valley] network. Because being as
self-contained [as the Taliban Tangi Valley network is]
as I mentioned earlier, you know, there's probably 10
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senior leaders total. And so removing two of them, you

know, if you had the opportunity to remove another, you
can do significant damage [to the enemy network] with
a minimal number of actual strikes.

SME-INTEL: Okay. Let's, kind of, off the network now, great
roll-up by the way. Thank you. It really, kind of,
clears up [the relative importance of the Tangi Valley
network] which helps me understand why TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cwas
targeting Din Muhammad [Objective LEFTY GROVE]. And
then I think it was 30 June 2011 or so when Objective
LEFTY GROVE was put on the target deck [TF Joint
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Targeting List – Afghanistan] [The actual date was 19

June 2011 which was confirmed by the TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ2].

So the next piece to get into is the reported SIGACT

(significance activities0 [within the Tangi Valley].
What have we seen [in the Tangi Valley] what is the
threat capability within the Tangi Valley with respect
to size and key targets? What weapons systems do they
[Taliban] employ in the region? What are their TTPs
(tactics, techniques and procedures)? And what are
their objectives?

J2 CHOPS: Well, one thing to caveat from this echelon --

a lot of those specific stuff [analytical analysis] [sic] is
conducted analyzed down lower [reference to Task Force J2 who
has regional responsibility for the network analysis].

SME-INTEL: Okay.

J2 CHOPS: We don't have the luxury, unfortunately, of getting

to that level of detail here. For us, what we are
trying to do is when the warning order is given, to say
we're going to go after this objective and this area.
We usually have about an hour to try to do some quick
macro level 10,000-foot level analysis of the objective
as best we can from what we have.

The guys who are at the lower echelon supporting the

teams going in, dive deeper into the threat of
[specifically] tactics, like, How are they shooting
these RPGs? Are they shooting them against where they
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think the aircraft to be [landing to insert the ground

assault force]? Are they using any sort of visual
aide -- I mean, night aide? You know, that kind of
stuff we don't see here. We don't necessarily go into
the TTP (tactics techniques and procedures) side [of
the threat] here [at the TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cHeadquarters].

What we do is we do aggregate pulls [of reporting] and

the Deputy CJ2 Chops was working the mission that night.
But we do big picture pulls from [reporting] databases,
and we pull what was the [reported] activities level
in this area at this time for [a specified] period of
time. [approx. 6-12 months based on the availability
of reporting]

So for like a typical CONOP brief, we will look at the

surface-to-air fire threat for any kind of rotary-wing
or fixed-wing aircraft in that area of interest. We
look back typically days to show the type of enemy
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

activities-- and it's really a pattern analysis kind

of deal as well as threat. We have seen in this valley,
we have seen significant activity or moderate [level
of threat---low, moderate or high] and so on, this is
where we saw it reported in this specific area.

Because at the end of the day, what we are doing is

trying to give to the commander a quick and dirty
assessment of what we think the overall threat is in

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

But again, he – (b)(3), (b)(6) [Reference to (b)(3), (b)(6)

,
(b)(3), (b)(6) Intelligence Analyst], he is up here at the higher

echelon. Most of the lower level stuff like a squadron

level guy who is sitting with his aircrew going, okay,
you are flying into this valley, this is where we've
seen them, this are their tactics, this how they do it,
and this is where you need to be careful. That level
is done down at the squadron level [by the squadron
level intelligence analyst]. Up here [at TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
Headquarters], we won't get that.
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Okay. So we do (b)(1)1.4a,
a (b)(1)1.4c
-day pull SAFIRE (Surface to Air
Fires), means the databases that track all the MISREPS
(Mission Reports) which is mission reports that the
aircraft gives out to brief their teams. And then we
do a quick and dirty look at the ground threat picture
and the ground situation.

We analyze what kind of SIGACTs (Significant

Activities) the have had on the ground, and we do one
year for that.(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
days for SAFIRE; one area for SIGACTs.
It's, again, it's more patterns, like, we look at a
SIGACTs report, and what we really look at is when is
the date of it to show, you know, time, spacial, we look
at what the activity was, whether it was small arms fire,
machine gun, or RPGs (Rocket Propelled Grenades).
And then we look at whether there were any casualties
reported, or any significance from that specific
incident.

And it was mounted patrol that took some small arms

fires sporadic, okay. So we note all the reports, and
then we present it to the commander and say -- sir, in
this area, it's a fairly active area [for the enemy that
operates in the region].

We provide give that kind of analysis. We don't really

dive deeper into it because we don't have the time
unfortunately. Our site picture is way far back. So
a lot of the times if there are questions on what are
the TTPs [tactics, techniques and procedures], and so
on, we can go and research that, or get the lower echelon
task force to give us that answer. We don't typically
have that up here unfortunately.

SME-INTEL: When you get that data, can you kind of talk through
what decisions are made with that data --

J2 CHOPS: Yeah.

SME-INTEL: -- or is it just informative?

J2 CHOPS: Essentially, when the warning order is given to us

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it's completely ops driven. So is the CONOP brief. The

warning order itself says “We want to go after this guy
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c .
They submit it, and then we go to work and just provide
three slides. Essentially, we are telling the boss a
quad, which is his lane in a sense of ‘this is what we
know about the guy, this is why we want to target him,
this is the network he is connected to.’ And again,
that's essentially it. It just sets on the network if
we can capture or kill this guy.

And then there's usually three slides after that. Two

to three slides depending on the fidelity. That
surface-to-air fire (SAFIRE) threat for however they
are getting in there -- and the package there will walk
you through it. It's in the CONOP as well. You will
see it when you guys get the CONOP. You will see what
we put in there.

So surface-to-air fire threat is where the location is,

and what we know for threats to the aircraft.

The problem is up to the point of EXTORTION, we didn't

have the routes ever delivered to us. We would have
to, pretty much, look at a direct line shot from the
base to the location. Look in the terrain, and say,
Okay, they are typically are going to fly up here and
do this.

Tangi Valley is a little bit different because it is

so restricted. There's one way in and one
way -- actually, there's two ways in, two ways out,
north or south.

SME-INTEL: But you don't necessarily do the threat along the

ground, you --

J2 CHOPS: We look at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

-day pull of what has been observed
in the last
(b)(1)1.4a, days along that route.
(b)(1)1.4c

SME-INTEL: Okay. So you --

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J2 CHOPS: We look at what the route is probable -- we are never

given the route. So we kind of anticipate what the
route is going to be. So in the case of this one, what
we would do is we would say, Okay, they are going to
launch Team(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
, and they're going to go up to the
objective, how would they get there? Well, they can
come through the valley up; that's basically what we
do.

SME-INTEL: Okay. But you don't receive the Falconview overlay

from the aviation or ground planners?

J2 CHOPS: Negative. We just started getting that the last two

weeks. One of the outcomes of this was, hey, we have
been asking for it, but we never received it. Now, we
are getting them.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

ASPS: Just to clarify a question on that because I don't know

myself. But, so, are the routes briefed by the
Aviation or Ground Assault Force LNO -- the anticipated
route, or is that also a guess-timate by the CJ2
Chops? --

J2 CHOPS: Up to this point, with the LNO -- there was a slide

that had a rudimentary route that says we will be flying
from here to here, and these are the times we are getting
there. So I'll clear them. There's no intel analysis
on that route down by the TF J2 CHOPS. That's done
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

at lower echelon.

So, again, it's that intel guy in the flying squadron

who will look at the entire picture, and present that
to their crews and their J2 and J3 at the task force
level to say this is the overall threat. For us, we are
just informing the boss out of what we think they are
doing and where they're going.

So it's [the analysis] very macro level. And

it's -- most of the time it's us putting the two points
together and figuring out how they're going to fly in
there. And since this time, we have worked with the
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J3 to get a new process where we are now going to try

and get the routes. But again, it's going to be a big
picture analysis. It's not going to be micro. So
that's the second slide.

The third slide is the disposition of the [enemy] ground

forces in a sense of -- not where blue [friendly] force
are, but [so can determine] where the enemy
[activities] on the ground that we have observed [or
were reported]. The only -- unfortunately, there's
nowhere to track enemy order of battle with the
insurgency. So I can't look at, you know, where we're
looking at battalion, company, whatever sized forces
[in order to template locations].

For these guys [enemy forces], what we look at -- all

we have is to look at what activities happened in the
past [reported significant activities], which would
show us, hey, there's a lot of direct fire in one of
the pocket lines that -- and we will dial into that,
and realize that there was no DA (Direct Action) team
or a BSO (Battlespace Owner) that was doing sweeps in
that village for two weeks straight. Oh, they are
going to get shot because people are going to shoot at
them -- targets of opportunity (TOO). So that kind of
stuff we do.

SME-INTEL: So when you do the assessment you are looking at

things there threats to the force at the macro level?

J2 CHOPS: Big picture.

SME-INTEL: You kind of understand, too, that the lack of

reporting doesn't indicate a lack of threat?

J2 CHOPS: Check. When we brief it, we usually say "observed."

So like for SAFIRE analysis, we say, ‘We've only
observed these SAFIRE in the last days.’ It doesn't
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

mean there's not people; there's not threats. The guy

with the rifle can be anywhere in this valley. The guy
with the RPG (rocket propelled grenade) can be anywhere
in this valley. But what we've observed in the last
30 days is the same analysis conducted with respect to
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the ground picture. [We assess] This is the activity

we've seen in this valley in the last year.

What we are showing is basically - it's small arms, RPG

(rocket propelled grenades) attacks against BSOs
(battlespace owners), activities in the area. That's
like a basic one [event]. Like, ‘Hey, we saw an RPG
attack against a mounted patrol on this date, at this
time.’

SME-INTEL: So understanding the presence of threat and what it

is?

J2 CHOPS: Yes. And how I explain it to people is we are trying

to depict big picture [macro level view] if we can see
any specific patterns [trends] or, provide
intelligence that in that specific compound, there was
two SAFIRE events in the last year in that village. I
think they might need to know that.

The commander might need to know that, so when he's

weighing the risk in his head versus rewards on what
the objective is, he can make the right decision. But
the real granularity is down lower echelon where they
have to sit there -- that two or three at the Task Force
has to say, based on what I'm seeing, I'm not
comfortable with the objective area or concept of
operation, but I'm comfortable with this objective or
concept of operation in an area.

In a case with this one, and LT (Deputy J2 Chops) will

walk you through his analysis here, but we don't have
any visibility regarding the employment of the Initial
Response Force (IRF) or Quick Response Force (QRF). In
a sense of, when we look at that CONOP and say,
essentially, this is where we are going to fly from,
this is where we are going to go. And we try to figure
out how they are going to do it, and they say by the
way a QRF will be stationed to support extra forces.
That's all we know.

So in this operation, you know, they came up the valley;

the IRF came down the valley. So we wouldn't have known
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that. So we don't -- and again, it's not our lane to

do the analysis of where QRF (quick reaction force) is
going because we just don't know. We don't have that
visibility here.

SME-INTEL: Lets transition into the objective. Can you just

give us a little bit of an overview of what was going
on, and what you saw on the ground itself in the
objective area regarding Objective LEFTY GROVE?

DEP J2 CHOPS: Okay. What I just handed you, sir, was the brief
that I built, the intel portion of the CONOP (concept
of operation) that I built for this one. And, again,
the first slide is just the -day roll up of the air
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

threat in the area. So we just go back days and see

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

what we have observed just directly. So again, as the

J2 CHOPs (J2 Current Operations) mentioned, it's almost
all inductive reasoning, and we expect more of the same.

It's not very predictive. Our best tool for predictive

analysis is from IIRs (Intelligence Information
Reports) from the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c reports.
And [inaudible] as reliable as IIR (Intelligence
Information Reports) are these reports have the least
credibility we tend to give them a lower level of value.
Like, we will look into them if it's something
significant like a MANPAD (Man Portable Air Defense
System) report or something like that, working with
JSOAC (Joint Special Operations Aviation Command).
But a lot of times, that information isn't very
credible.

So we will just show the commander the snapshot of what

we've seen, and the implication is that we expect more
of the same in the area of the objective. So, again,
the J2 CHOPS provides that level of pattern analysis.

The primary intelligence picture on the ground was

reported prior to the closure of Combat Outpost (COP)
[in April 2011]. So all this shows you is that there's
a lot of shooting going on over the last year. You
don't know the current situation because of how spread
out the span of time, over the last four months due to
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the lack of forces reporting in the area. The analysis

depicts a year worth of shooting [reported activity].
You don't know how many guns this is, how many gunmen
are in and around this area. We just know there's lots
of shooting going on.

So when we step back afterwards and took a look at it,

we saw mostly insurgent groups of two or three reported.
There are a couple estimates of higher numbers like five
to eight or ten to twelve, but mostly smaller groups
of insurgents operating in the area. So, again, this
analysis is pretty limited in regard to [space and time].
It just shows you that how the Tangi Valley has taken
lot of fire from ridgelines and stuff like that based
on the reporting.

SME-INTEL: What's your assessment of the threat capability?

What does the threat possess [in reference to the
Taliban operating in the Tangi Valley]?

DEP J2 CHOPS: The majority of the threat -- at least threat to

operations is that your question? --

SME-INTEL: Yes. Well, just in general -- just in general

picture of the threat activity from coalition forces
going into the objective area night. What would they
most likely have available based on your assessment?

DEP J2 CHOPS: We understood this was a high-risk area, sir.

(b)(3), (b)(6) [(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ASPS Analyst] made it clearly
earlier this was a Taliban stronghold. We had been
here before successfully in the recent past, but the
task force is very capable in being able to mitigate
the risks related to past engagements. --

ASPS: If I can jump in briefly on that. In line with this being

a high risk area, Tangi Valley is somewhere that we go
predominately at the low illumination cycle, and that
ended up playing a role in the operational decisions
that followed. But going in there intentionally at
lowest illumination so as to provide us the best
operational advantage.

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So just so you know, one example of the things that had

been done to kind of account for that threat relative
to a lot of other places that are operated in by the
task force [TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. --

SME-INTEL: So that is a process -- is to use illumination cycles

to assess operational risk to mitigate risk to force
in high threat areas during operational planning?

DEP J2 CHOPS: I visited Team(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

, like, 10 days before this
objective, and they specifically mentioned to me, ‘Next
low illum we're going into Tangi Valley.’ This is, you
know, part of their planning process to kind of rack
and stack the least hospitable terrain, and prioritize
that against the illumination cycle, that's the way to
mitigate the threat’s capabilities. --

SME-INTEL: It's part of the risk mitigation process?

ASPS: Right.

SME-INTEL: Okay. Anything else?

J2 CHOPS: That's about it, sir. Just to emphasize it, the

team’s [Task Force level] intelligence analysis is much
more thorough than when we [J2 Chops] provide through
our macro analysis. Their area of responsibility (AOR)
is just that one region. So they know that area much
better than we do. They have looked over it. They've
assessed the risk and accepted them. And they just
pass up the area to us, and we do a very -- like the
J2 CHOP said, a 10,000 foot picture of what we are
looking at, so the commander can get eyes on it so he
has visibility of the operational picture.

ASPS: As is appropriate at this level of the chain of command.

You wouldn't want an 0-6 making decisions, you know,
should the strike force move left or right. That, you
know -- that's, of course, made at lower echelons.

SME-INTEL: But bottom line though, it's a process that's in

place in order to provide oversight to make sure targets
are vetted up through the chain of command; and, the
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second one is analysis that the threat estimate is

correct. And there's a process to allow you to about
some of the risk mitigation that occurs –at the TF
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

level.

J2 CHOPS: When you have to guess on it. Like, the best way to
put it is the customer for us is the commander. We are
working to give him information, not the strike force
assessments, but the one the team (J2 Chops) provides
to the TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4ccommander.

SME-INTEL: What's your balance of (????---what was the

question?) --

J2 CHOPS: What we do is we pull up where they're going -- like

we pull up (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ), that the
[Task Force] has targeted. He calls down there for us
and says, ‘Hey, guys how did you get here today?’ And
then we try to build story, and
story to the boss [TF Cdr]. The
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

geo-locate it to a specific compound. We believe he

is there, and this is why. We, kind of, tell that story
to the commander. And then we provide a quick and dirty
[macro level] snapshot of, ‘Hey, this is what we think
the overall threat is.’

So we can give him [TF Cdr] knowledge to look at

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

the entire picture and say this is approved or not

approved.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

J2 CHOPS: Unfortunately, you have where there is a gap in

information, we don't know what the strike force is
thinking; that's why we call them direct everyday and
say, ‘Hey, is there anything we need to know?’ And they
tell us, and we share a little bit of information
between us.

ASPS: I think it's also worth noting, the decision making is

very decentralized, and it's the nature of operations.
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And, you know, once again, getting way out of my lane.

But, you know, the Colonel just has to trust that the
subordinate Task Forces have taken into account, you
know, all of these other factors.

And, you know, he is looking at the macro level, so he

gets, you know, two minutes on intel, and he gets, you
know, ten seconds on information operations (IO), [etc.
from the TF staff]. You know, and all these other
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

factors, and goes through and puts it together knowing

that the strike force and subordinate Task Force have
already looked at both of these things in greater
[detail] issue.

J2 CHOPS: That's the way it has to be. The goal is to make sure
that the commander has enough data to decide whether
a CH47 is going to be safe on infil, you know, the
subordinate Task Force is in their teams. They are
going to be doing that analysis. He's doing a much
broader picture of the mission as a whole, and how it
affects a broader range of issues [strategic level] not
just at tactical level.

ASPS: I guess, another piece or two which you may have already
covered elsewhere, and I'll leave it up to you whether
we go into detail on it. So the target in most cases
is already vetted before we get to the stage that we've
just discussed, and that's through the joint targeting
board process. So as you mentioned, this was an
established target that had previously been approved.

So through briefing the target quad slide, and standing

up there and saying, here's who the target is, here's
the derogatory information on them [the target], you
know, here's what we access to be the effective removing
them [the target]; that's having the target already
have been briefed to the 2 and many cases, the 3 at the
joint target inboard. And they've looked at it, and
they said, ‘This target is appropriate.’

And so a lot of those, kind of, checks that you would

expect to see don't occur during the briefing in the
CONOP (concept of operations) because they have already
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approved previously. And the reason is briefing

CONOPs is a high-op tempo situation in many cases. You
know, you have multiple CONOPs briefed back to back each
night.

And so whenever possible, you would like have

established well in advance that, you know, we have
already reviewed this target quad slide, and we believe
that Objective LEFTY GROVE is, you know, that the juice
is worth the squeeze. You know, that kind of
decision-making has already occurred.

J2 CHOPS: The current commander who was there, and then all the
previous commanders, they care about, like, three
different things: One, is it a valid target. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ) proves it's a valid target. So
when we brief the quad slide, it's essentially saying
this is approved and vetted target.

The second thing he wants to know is - what was the

trigger? In other words, why are we going after him
tonight? And it's our job --

ASPS: To determine, Why do we believe [or assess] he [the target

individual] was there?

J2 CHOPS:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

So those -- it's a valid target, what's the trigger for

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going in there on the objective. And then the third

is the big picture of, ‘Hey, is this is hot area, a
normal area, and what do I need to be concerned about?’.
And then real quickly, ‘Tell me what I need to be
concerned about most’ [within the objective area].

So those three things are what we try to do in four

slides or three slides depending on the threat. And,
again, it's a pulled back [macro level analysis], and
the rest is trusting your commanders. They are going
to put their lives of their men on the line for something
that is worth [based on their assessment of] the risk
versus the reward.

We did do that pull you asked. I did a pull of SIGACTS

(Significant Activities) for 360 days -- 365, 180, and
then the 90-day pulls. As you can tell [for the last
90 days], there's nothing [reported], and that's
because battle space owner withdrew, we think, around
8 April [2011].

That's for you. You said you wanted them. [J2 Chops
provide the Investigation Team Intel SME a copy of their
assessment plus a summary of the area over the last
30-60-90-180-365…included as exhibits]

SME-INTEL: Yes, please. And if you could send them to me by

email as well.

We can get that put into the folders. We will identify

it's from you, and that it was received and what it was.
And this will build a picture for us for the summary.

Thanks guys. I appreciate you taking the time to do

this and describe what's going on.

Plus, also, for the overview, too, it will help us build

the threat picture in those areas [the Tangi Valley
region] for the investigation.

[post interview discussion]

The investigation closed at 2307 Zulu, 16 August 2011.

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The interview of the TF (b)(3), (b)(6) opened at 1605 Zulu,

17 August 2011, at FOB (b)(3), (b)(6)

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD: BG J. Colt, US Army

INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR: SME-INTEL

COURT REPORTER: CR2

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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[TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2 was sworn in]

SME-INTEL: What we would like to start with is an

overview of the threat assessment and an overview of the threat
picture you saw that night itself [inaudible] Define why LEFTY
GROVE was important to the network in the Tangi Valley, what
was his level of importance and how did we come to target him
there?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Objective LEFTY GROVE (Qari Thahir) was one
of those targets that we talked about before. He was kind of
handed to us as part of the Tangi Valley network of guys
associated with the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c crowd, previously
associated with the Dunlap crowd, which as you pointed out sir
was killed on June 5th by (b)(3), (b)(6)squadron as they were going after
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

BG Colt: Precise date of the event?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Objective Dunlap?

BG Colt: Yes, on what date?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: He was killed on the fifth of June [2011].

BG Colt: June.

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yes sir.

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: A little bit before we got here, Objective

Dunlap E ame about as(b)(3), (b)(6)SQUADRON [Squadron Nickname] was
going after Objective (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c who was a senior mover
and shaker [within the Tangi Valley network] in that part of
Saiyedd Abbad. So Objective LEFTY GROVE fit in that overall
[Tangi Valley] network, he's part of that---part of the C2
[command and control] of the cells that operate in Sayyidabad
specifically in the Tangi Valley. His historic pattern of life
puts him right in the vicinity of where we went in on Objective
LEFTY GROVE the night of the fifth morning of sixth of August
[2011]. So the conversation in the Intelligence circle is after
[Objective] Dunlap’s gets killed who kinds of step into the
leadership void. There's no solid evidence that says, yeah,
Objective LEFTY GROVE was the guy, but kind of piecing together
all of the different reporting streams that we see in between
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c . You
can make a reasonable assessment that [Objective] LEFTY GROVE,

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if he didn't take over that role specifically by name, then now

you’re are the guy, you will have to take over for [Objective]
Dunlap, which we will very rarely see by name replacements. He
certainly moved up and took the reins coordinating what was
left of [Objective] Dunlap cell. Between him and another
objective (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c[inaudible] and another objective of
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that we have talked about. Those are kind of
the main movers and shakers in that part of our AO [area of
operation]. So that's kind of how we got on to him. Couple of
night prior, leaving on the fourth, we went after Objective
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ourselves not Tangy Valley it was little bit
to the south in the Baraki Barak district. We ended up
killing Objective Lengen [inaudible] who was also associated
with this target right here [reference to OBJ Lefty Grove]. We
were all kind of on the right trail on the fourth [ref. 04
August 2011] between [Objective] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and the
remnants of Objective Dunlap’s network etc. We were in the
right area, we were watching the right signature, so we thought
we had a pretty good bead if not on [Objective] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
S
(b)(1)1.4a, then [Objective] LEFTY GROVE or some of the other folks
(b)(1)1.4c
that were part of the network. So that kind of drove us to, hey
let’s take a good hard look between the fourth [4th of August]
and the fifth [5th of August], let’s take a good hard look at
[Objective] LEFTY GROVE and see if we can't start really having
some positive effects on that network. We had already killed
one guy and [Objective] DUNLAP was killed a couple of month
prior, and let’s start trying to take it to that network.

BG Colt: You said he was killed on the fourth [ref. 4th of

August 2011].

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yes, sir. Objective LENGEN was killed on the
fourth of August. So that was kind of what brought us to hey,
why [Objective] LEFTY GROVE, again it was part of the targeting
methodology trying to put pressure on that network [reference
Tangi Valley Taliban network] specifically.

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-INTEL: From a network stand point, [Objective] LEFTY

GROVE will he or do you think he can lead you to anything or
who's his superiors were, so to speak?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: His superiors are back at Pakistan as best

we understand sir.

SME-INTEL: Shadow governor types.

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TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Right, he's high enough in the food chain
[network] where his call activity [signals intelligence]
suggests that he is talking to the real movers and shakers that
are across the border [in Pakistan] and just kind of as a side,
after the attack on EXTORTION 17, there were a couple of
indications that LEFTY GROVE had been promoted and received
some type of increase in stature because of that attack. That
kind of further validates his level as moving up the chain.

BG Colt: How do you know this?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: From SIGINT [Signals Intelligence] sir. Just

guys talking about it after the event if it is OK to talk at
the TSCI level, we listen to guys’ conversations.

SME-INTEL: No, no TS/SCI (Top Secret/Sensitive

Compartmented Information), if we can discuss the network and
how it is bad at the Secret level
TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: I apologize.

SME-INTEL: If he's raised in status that's good.

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yeah, we have SIGINT [Signals Intelligence]

indication that he has raised his status as a result of
EXTORTION 17 attack.

We need to talk at the level of fidelity that the target

audience really wants to know.

SME-INTEL: The other piece with me is we want to

highlight who would be shadow Governor of Wardak and his
control or his interaction with this Tangy Valley group [and]
where (Objective (b)(1)1.4a is currently resides right now
what is your assessment of that.

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: The shadow Governor of Wardak is an

objective (b)(1)1.4a .

BG Colt: Say that again.

IO: Objective (b)(1)1.4a , a much cooler name than what

he deserves. Sir, he hangs out in Pakistan pretty regularly, he
has been in Chark district, Wardak sporadically over the past
couple weeks that we have been out here. His level of

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leadership; his level of C2 [Command and Control] expands

across the all of Wardak [Province] that's why he's the shadow
Governor there [in Wardak]. He has a direct role to ensure
that all the different Taliban cells under his purview are
carrying out the grand scheme of the Taliban Shuras.

SME-INTEL: How does he link back into Pakistan? Is he

linked back into what shura? Is he funneled back into the
Quetta Shura?.

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yes, sir. Quetta Shura.

SME-INTEL: [inaudible] what then is his association based

on geographic with Haqqani network networks?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6)
R J2: When we see [Objective] (b)(1)1.4a comes
back into Wardak [Province] we see him hang out in (b)(1)1.4a
[area] primarily which is where the Haqqani [Network] safe
haven is. So there is a lot of assessed association there. The
interesting piece is when [Objective] (b)(1)1.4a comes back
into country, we know, I’ve gotta get passed the
classification, we have good indications of via multiple
[intelligence] source when he comes back into the country we
know he's back and our ability to collect when he's back in
town [intelligence reporting] drops off the table if that makes
sense. He is very OPSEC [operational security] savvy, he
expands his OPSEC savviness to entire districts around him when
he moves in and out of the area, so that is kind of how we know
he is around.

SME-INTEL: So he [Objective (b)(1)1.4a does move

through Tangi valley.

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: I’m not tracking that specifically sir.

SME-INTEL: He controls what? --

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: He is the shadow government for Wardak. He

controls Taliban activities [inaudible] to include Tangy
Valley, which is also a couple of leaps of logic there, but
those guys [the Taliban] are set in motion for a reason, that's
why they are here.

IO (b)(3), (b)(6) : So there is an established relationship

between Taliban, Haqqani, shadow governments in the [area of
operation] Tangi area?

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TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Correct.

SME-INTEL: Anybody have any specific questions.

SME-GFA: The target specifically its historical bed down

location?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: It hard to say if it was actual BDL (bed

down location) that we went after that night, his SI pattern
of life strongly suggested that he [Objective LEFTY GROVE] was
in that village at some point.

SME-GFA: At some point that day?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Correct, the last---the last SI indication

that we had him [Objective LEFTY GROVE] at the ten series was
1420ish Zulu that day. And it has kind of goes to targeting
the Wardak [network] in Logar, the Taliban guys are smart
enough to know that at certain times they need to stop doing
what they are doing that we can see and hear and they start
altering their pattern of life to complicate our targeting
efforts. So that's kind of what we saw on the night of the
fifth [ref. 05 August 2011]. We had the key grid and the 1400
Zulu timeframe from Objective LEFTY GROVE at the ten series
buildings [reference CONOP Ground Reference Grid (GRG)].
Subsequent to that his SI (signals-communications)drops off
then we watch two movers from the ten series go north,
northeast to what we think is a mosque; kind of lock that place
down IMINT (Imagery Intelligence…ref to ISR Full Motion Video
feed) wise. From there typical starburst down the Mosque all
kinds of guys get out prayer time is over, what we did see
however was two PAX transit back down to the ten series
followed closely by three or four other guys that came down and
kind of hung out by the front gate and they also went into the
building. So at that point we were confident if it wasn't that
guy the picture is not going to get much better than that. So
that’s what kind of drew up the trigger conversation and the
start the planning process.

BG Colt: I'm sorry say again the time that occurred?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: The P-grid [ref. signals intelligence term;

‘possible grid’ based on signal telemetry] was sir, about the
1420z timeframe. So from the intelligence perspective, we kind
of wait with baited breath as we do most nights to make sure
nothing moves off that compound or things don’t come back in or
the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c doesn't travel all over the place

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so as we are trying to lock down that compound from an

intelligence perspective, we saw the movers that worries us,
see a starburst out of the Mosque that worries us even more.
The fact that we had PAX return to the ten series kind of re-
instills the fact that there's a reasonably good chance that
[Objective] LEFTY GROVE actually came back to that village.

BG Colt: I'm probably missing this, but this is 2000 Zulu

a period of darkness before correct?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: No, sir. This is 1400 Zulu that day [ref. 05
August 2011].

BG Colt: 1400Z that day.

SME-INTEL: Reference the mosque itself, [is it] contained

within this compound?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: The mosque if, I believe [it the 80 or the
90 series I believe it was the 80 series building. The compound
is just to the north.

BG Colt: Okay.

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Again, that's kind of what we see on the

target out here. Guys walk on, SI (Signals Intelligence) drops,
guys walk, motos [ref. motorcycles] or PAX (ref…personnel)
whatever, starburst out. It becomes a kind of shell game ISR
[ref. ISR platforms over the target area] wise trying to make
sure we are keeping tabs on the guys who we think are the TIs
[targeted individuals].

SME-GFA: Is this the first time the assault force had

gone after Objective LEFTY GROVE?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yes, sir. This was Objective LEFTY GROVE 1.

SME-INTEL: Any indications or correlation now with HUMINT

[human intelligence reports] as well as the SI [signals
intelligence] for the day, with FMV (full motion video) in the
event in the significant pieces that also related to the
targeted area on that day [inaudible].

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: We are not tracking HUMINT [human

intelligence]. HUMINT in Tangy Valley is difficult because the
Taliban have the valley pretty much locked down, so getting
placement and access [~critical component for human

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intelligence] becomes problematic.

IO: Anymore questions.

BG Colt: Any other significant operations conducted in

the battle space since you’ve been here by 4/10th Mountain
Division that were complimentary in nature or anything? Have
you tried to use the general purpose force (GPF) in order to
stimulate any of these things?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: The only thing I’m tracking; I want to make
sure, is in Charkh District a few weeks ago [inaudible] back a
few weeks. The big conversation was to try to do something
during the day, because these guys are smart enough to know
that if their SI (communications) drops off by 1500 / 1600Z
every day, that they are going to be pretty safe because they
understand that’s how we [coalition forces] target [enemy
networks]. So the conversation becomes as we’re tracking all
throughout the day on SI [signals intelligence] and watching
them with IMINT to try to take a swing [ref. ‘to conduct an
operation’] at them during the day. They report themselves
that they know that are safe, so we’re trying to disrupt that
[ability]. So, the general purpose force (GPF) conversation
came in with trying to rope in some of the ODA [ref.
Operational Detachment-Alpha; 12 member special forces team
assigned to Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force –
Afghanistan] guys maybe some of their commando teams to where
we go hit an objective at night (b)(1)1.4a , we leave,
everybody [in place] and all the bad guys go back to feeling
good and happy, but we’ve also infilled an ODA (Operational
Detachment-Alpha) or a group of commandos on over-watch
position to try to then pick up some kind of signature as the
(b)(1)1.4a up and these guys are back to their normal POL
(pattern of life) because they know the ‘bearded guys with
green eyes are gone for the night (ref. Taliban use to refer to
special operations forces). So, we’ve had those kinds of
conversations. I’ll have to check back with the Ops
[operations] guys to figure out where that conversation has
gone, but we had that conversation when we went into the Charkh
District a few weeks ago. The BSO (Battle Space Owner) was
doing a deliberate clearance of Charkh District; Operation
Dagger Fiery (ref. Operational name of the conventional
mission), again, it was a couple of weeks ago. So, the
complimentary pieces in place for us was to kind of put those
pieces in place to try to clear out some of the main bad guys
in advanced with the BSO (Battle Space Owner) coming in with
all of his choice of his people.

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BG Colt: And looking at that district on here, where

relative in Charkh is that?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yes, from Charkh District, it’s the Argon
Valley, which is approximately right through here. That is kind
of the black hole for the Haqqani and Taliban through the
entire province of Wardak. A lot of our [enemy] senior leaders
-- we think a lot of the senior level Haqqani guys are hanging
out within Wardak; the example I just gave with Dagger Fiery is
more a Haqqani specific conversation but we had tried to expand
that to places in Sayyidabad [District, Wardak Province] and
places in Logar [Province] as well. Maybe we could work more
of a conventional angle during the day, and we also have had an
SI (signals intelligence) imminent on targets in the Logar and
Wardak [Provinces] for that matter and have passed that target
gate off to the BSO (Battle Space Owner) and said objective so-
and-so is here right now and they’ll go out and they’ll roll
that guy up [in order to action the target]. It’s happened
twice since we’ve been here. So, again, they action daytime
[targets] which is part of a based on piece of what we’re
trying to do.

BG Colt: Anybody else?

SME-MH47: In the last 30 days, sir, of looking at Tangy

Valley, along with your SIGACTs (signals intelligence), how many
did you have [within the Tangi Valley area]?
TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yeah, so SIGACTs (significant activities) are
all over this place. I can pull up the slide, just give me a
second. (Reference CONOP Brief) So, it’s pretty representative
of SIGACTs (significant activities). Each of those red blocks
there’s either direct fire, indirect fire, or some type of IED
(improvised explosive device) was found in the clearance setup.
So, yeah, not safe places to go rolling in through if you don’t
know what you’re doing.

BG Colt: Who’s your reporting source against those SIGACTS

(significant activities)?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: This is an all source compilation, sir. This

graphic is produced by the NGA [ref. National Geospatial Agency)
folks up in TF (b)(3), (b)(6) , but the data
stored behind that is everything from BSO (Battle Space Owner)

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SITREPs (situation reports) related to stuff that we encounter

on objectives so it’s -- again, it’s a huge repository of our
significant events, our significant acts across the battle
space. This is just one of the standard planning products that
we pull up; and each one of these dots on here has meta
(ref…specific information related to the event to include date,
time, specific information, unit, etc.) data behind it that
says, “what happened, when was it, who was involved,” all that
kind of stuff. So, if we need to drill down to the level of
granularity where we can pick apart any single one of those, we
can. This is more for the commanders SA. [situational
awareness]. A lot of red is not good, so to make sure everybody
is tracking through that specific program.

SME-GFA: What time window does this product cover?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: I think, I have to go back and double check,

but it goes back at least to 2009. I have a replica data stored
on my servers here that goes back to at least 2009, so it’s for
the past couple of years’ worth of data [reported in
Afghanistan/Regional Command-East].

GFN2: So, what’s your understanding for why they pulled

out of [COP Tangi] and your assessment of the southeast?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: I’m not tracking that, sir. I don’t know.

IO: [inaudible]

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: That was back in, I think April [circa 2011]
time frame.

SME-GFA: So there is no constant friendly force present in

this valley?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: No, sir there is not. That is bad guy
terrain.

SME-GFA: How often does the battle space owner go through

there, or ANA (Afghan National Army) or anybody?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: I’m not tracking that, sir. I’m not sure.
We don’t go there -- our Task Force does not go in there very

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often. It’s been in a hand full of times that I can count since
we’ve been here.

SME-GFA Plus, do you have an idea what the last time Task
Force actioned an Objective [inaudible].

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: We went to Tangy Valley, there was an

objective, I believe it was this guy right here that our (b)(3), (b)(6)
squadron guys went to the first couple of weeks that we were
here, we headed back – but had not been back there since, so
this LEFTY GROVE was the second time we had been out there.

BG Colt: Was that also rotary wing assault?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: It was, sir. There was a sizable offset to

the south and then our guys just made a silent foot patrol from
the south as a few kilometers -- five plus kilometers, kind of
walk, if I remember correctly.

IO: What is your threat assessment for the rotary wing

infil? What did you give to your Task Force?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yeah, the rotary wing infil -- the numbers
are kind of misleading. There’s not a lot of Surface to Air
Fire (SAFIRE) incidents, just because we don’t fly there very
often. But the thing is a percentage of how often we fly rotary
wing into that valley, the threat is significantly higher,
perhaps higher than metrics alludes to. We had the conversation
about RPGs (rocket propelled grenades), where you know, this
[ref. terrain feature] little finger that jets down into the
valley is kind of known as RPG (rocket propelled grenade) hill.
There’s a lot of spotting activity [in the valley].(b)(3), (b)(6) went in
on Objective (b)(1)1.4a back in June [2011]. There was
a more complex, coordinated attacks with RPGs (rocket propelled
grenades), small arms fire, during the infil into that
objective, so that was kind of conversations was because we were
getting ready for [inaudible].

IO: Hence it is one of our TTPs (tactics, techniques and

procedures) that you guys talked about the use of (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a . Has the S-2 noticed, has enemy noticed that?
Can they take that as a precursor to an attack?

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TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: If they did, I’m not tracking that they’ve
been tipped off to that. Their comms do not reflect if they’re
tipped off TTP.

[Inaudible]

IO: Is this the same card that the aircrew has access to?
Is there an analyst same exact product as far as hand to hand --
at what point in the planning process are they working on this?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: So, this product is cranked out very soon. As
the mission, as soon as a WARNO (warning order) drops, initiate
guys [inaudible] for all the CONOPs (concept of operations)
across the theater. Whether this product specifically makes it
to the ARSOA (Army Special Operations Aviation – 160th Special
Operations Aviation Regiment) guys or the Night OP (operations)
guys here, I’m not tracking that, but as soon as the
conversation becomes about yeah, we’re going to look at this
objective. I think the S2 shop for (b)(2), (b)(6) and the S2 for
the ARSOA start cranking up their slide products. They have got
a multi-slide threat analysis that goes through the Surface to
Air Fire (SAFIRE) -- it’s more air specific. This is more
tailored to just an overall ground force [inaudible] encounter,
but the nearest specific threat line is coming from the subject
matter experts with the rotary wing [aviation] folks. So,
that’s kind of parallel on the threat planning processes from
the 2 [Intelligence] shops. Does that make sense?

IO: For Task Force (b)(3), (b)(6) [inaudible]I guess it was an

important part of that question was [inaudible] because I’ve got
the products that they’ve been like [inaudible] and stuff and
that’s why I was asking like how soon before [inaudible].

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yeah, (b)(3), (b)(6) . We’ve seen this before
[inaudible] before it and bring it in to this room to talk, to
get the playing pieces [inaudible] this light comes on. I’m not
tracking if this goes to a specific S2 in ARSOA and what not.
But, I know that they’re also going through their parallel
planning process.

IO: Do you have a descent relationship or what would you

assess your level of relationship with (b)(3), (b)(6) S-2 and
their lead planners [inaudible]. Have you ever met any of them?

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TM J2: The conversations that I had with the

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) come in the form of his slides would then come to me,
but just looking over, “Hey, where are they looking at from
rotary wing threat perspective?” If I have questions. At that
point, I would go back and follow up with a phone call.
[inaudible].

IO: Okay, so you don’t have a direct relationship then?

Objective LEFTY GROVE’s got a PSD (Personal Security Detachment)
I would imagine. Do you have an idea of what he has for PSD or
other than small arms?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: I’m not tracking any specific reporting that
he has a PSD (personal security detachment) or what that
conversation was like.

IO: Alright, how about NVG (Night Vision Goggles) use?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: I’m not tracking that level of fidelity.

IO: Do you have any cache roll-ups out of any mission

source any of the RPGs (rocket propelled grenades) were scanned
– related to any activity that they found in that valley?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yes, to the terms of the historic Surface to

Air Fire (SAFIRE); is that what you’re asking about?

IO: Just the last 180 days.

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Just the last 90 days, there were, I believe
four Surface-to-Air Fire (SAFIRE) events, to include this one.

IO: Any weapons found in caches as far as did they have

anything down [inaudible] RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenades)?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: No, we don’t go into that valley [inaudible]

nor do we usually find caches of that type to really say, “yeah,
[inaudible]” or “yeah, those are [inaudible] DsHK, etc.” That
conversation -- we don’t have that level of resources. We get
kind of a standard intelligence reporting related to [inaudible]
AKs (ref. small caliber weapon), RPGs (rocket propelled
grenades), PKMs (small caliber, automatic weapon), [inaudible].

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BG Colt: I think what he’s asking are there any unique RPG
variants that have been decidedly determined to be present here
in this AO?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: I don’t know that, sir.

IO: Yeah, that’s where I was going with that. What about
the eight EKIA (enemy killed in action) that we had? Was there
any SSE (sensitive site exploitation) done on them to identify
those that had RPGs (rocket propelled grenades), what
[inaudible] they had? Was that collected?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: If that’s collected, I’m not tracking what

that is, sir.

BG Colt: Do we know what happens to the weapons systems,

for instance, of these EKIAs (enemy killed in action) from this
particular event?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: From this particular event, I don’t know a

standard procedure. I believe it’s to blow those weapons in
place; however, I’m not sure if these got taken off the
objection and put somewhere else, I’m not tracking.

IO: Any other questions?

[Inaudible talking in the background]

BG Colt: Okay, thank you.

[The interview concluded]

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The interview of [JSOAD-J2] (b)(3), (b)(6) , JSOAD J2, was

opened on 16 August 2011, at 2152 hours Zulu.

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATING OFFICER: Brigadier General J. Colt, USA

INVESTIGATING OFFICER: SME-INTEL, USA

WITNESS: JSOAD-J2, USAF

COURT REPORTER: CR2, USMC

SECRET Classified By: Jeffrey Colt, IO

Page 397
Derived From: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassify On: 20360820

 SECRET

SME-INTEL: I'm [SME-INTEL] (b)(3), (b)(6) . I'm a member of a

team assembled to investigate the surrounding of the crash of CH47 in the

Wardak Province, Afghanistan, on 6 August 2011.

BG Jeffrey Colt here is the investigating officer in the case, and

was appointed by General James M. Mattis, Commander to U.S. CENTCOM. His

findings and recommendations as to the appropriate action will be included

in the report to General James Mattis in accordance AR 15-6.

Before we begin the interview, can you please review the privacy

statement. The bottom line is this is not a criminal investigation. But

the information that you provide including your name will be included in

the report. I just want to ensure that you understand those circumstances

itself.

The witness perused the document.

SME-INTEL: Okay. To give you a background on this, this is not a

criminal investigation. What we are tasked to do is gather the facts and

information, understand the processes behind how things work within the

task force itself, and also, to understanding the intelligence overall

of the objective area and give any assessments of how we [inaudible] to

the target to prosecute the objective to constitute what was the threat,

actions in the AO prior to looking back at approximately six months back.

Before we begin, I need you to stand and raise your right hand.

The witness did as directed and was duly sworn.

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SME-INTEL: For the record, state your name and rank and duty position.

JSOAD-J2: I'm [JSOAD-J2] (b)(3), (b)(6) . I'm with

Task Force(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

JSOAC J2. And I got here the first week of May 2011.

SME-INTEL: [ JSOAD-J2] , what about your experiences within

(b)(3), (b)(6)

JSOAD.

JSOAD-J2: I have been with JSOAD for the last five years. I got here

back in 2004.

SME-INTEL: How many rotations have you had in Afghanistan?

JSOAD-J2: Afghanistan, two. Iraq, three.

SME-INTEL: Okay. Let's start with the discussions right now. Let's

start with the target itself, and describing the air threat in and around

the target approximately the day of the execution, plus about two weeks

prior to give us a good window of up to 30 days [prior to the execution

of Objective LEFTY GROVE]. And then we will go backwards to give the

assessment of the Tangi Valley area.

JSOAD-J2: The Tangi Valley was initially assessed as a moderate to

high threat based on the location of the target in the valley you were

operating. We had reason to believe that the enemy within the valley

itself -- the bottom line, sir, is there wasn't a lot of good intel coming

out of the valley. In the last 90 days, there wasn't a lot of SIGACTs

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because, I would say, due to lack of BSO [battlespace owner] presence

within the valley.

That being said, we had not conducted a lot of operations in the area.

The operations that we did conduct in the area, we did note enemy activity.

And from what I recall from the other sapphire incidents within the valley,

most of those were targets of opportunity, pot shots from the BSO aircraft

transiting in the area, from what I read.

SME-INTEL: What do does targets for engagements, what did they

consistent of? Feel free to use your notes. Everybody else is using

slides too.

JSOAD-J2: Basically, what we have seen within the last 90 days is

three incidents within the valley itself. And then a fourth incident

approximately four miles to the west of the valley within the last 90 days.

Of those incidents, two of them were combined attacks, both RPGs and

small arms engagements. One of them was a hit with a small arms, that

was a full-back sapphire; that happened back on 20 July.

SME-INTEL: What type of aircraft is that?

JSOAD-J2: That was an MH47.

SME-INTEL: When you say it was a complex attack, can you define that

for me. What constitutes a complex attack?

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JSOAD-J2: What we define, sir, as a complex attack is engagements

from multiple points of origin usually using coordinated fire. Not just

multiple points of origin all engaging at the same time, but complex in

nature. Meaning, that they will engage with small arms or heavy machine

guns, and then try to distract in some way, and then engage with a more

lethal weapon.

SME-INTEL: These four incidents that you had overall, these were all

specifically what types of incidents? Ground or air? They were all air

related?

JSOAD-J2: Yes, sir. All those were all air related.

SME-INTEL: Okay. What was the mix of weapon systems used by the

threat?

JSOAD-J2: It was RPG [Rocket Propelled Grenade], and what was

believed to be 7.62mm.

SME-INTEL: So that was the last 30 days. What about going back

further?

JSOAD-J2: That was actually the last 90 days, sir. Last 30 days would

be the full-back sapphire on 20 July.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

JSOAD-J2: So a single incident while they were in transit in the last

30 days.

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SME-INTEL: Do you recall -- when was the time that the coalition

forces moved out?

JSOAD-J2: I want to say it was -- it would have been around April

timeframe, sir -- I believe.

SME-INTEL: Prior to April, what was your assessment of the threat

in the April timeframe, prior to the coalition forces moving out?

JSOAD-J2: Not a lot of air operations in there, sir. But, you know,

based off of what we saw through SIGACTs, again, we derived capability

out of ground SIGACTs. So anything from RPGs to heavy machine guns to

IDFs [Indirect Fire]. It was about a 70/30, almost a 60/40 split between

small arms engagements, direct fire incidents, and RPG direct fire

incidents on the ground.

SME-INTEL: So when you say "60/40, 70/30," the higher number

being small arms?

JSOAD-J2: Small arms, yes, sir.

SME-INTEL: Okay. Tracking ground SIGACTs, what about also too -- so

you are talking about caches as well? Any significant finds?

JSOAD-J2: I don't believe so, sir. Not that I recall.

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SME-INTEL: Okay. [JSOAD-J2] , what I need you to go through is

(b)(3), (b)(6)

the process for reporting SAFIRE [Surface-to-Air Fire], and how you

categorize them through the whole system up and distribute them back out.

Can you walk us through that process. You can get into definitions that

you use to describe the SAFIRE incidents.

JSOAD-J2: Yes, sir. The majority of the conventional sapphires we

received through the CAOC [Combined Air Operations Center] ISRD

[Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Division]. They are the

clearing house for the theater's sapphire distribution. So everybody,

basically, reports to the CAOC. And then the CAOC puts together story

boards, and distributes those out amongst the theater.

What we will do is we will take that information. We will input it

into a consolidated database that we house here that builds reports for

us, and just to maintain, basically, a consolidated database for all task

force aviation assets.

SME-INTEL: So CAOC maintains a database --

JSOAD-J2: They maintain their own database. It's called the MAT,

or the MISREP [Mission Report] Analysis Tool; that's how they keep all

of the MISREP from all of the units. And then they will build a story

board, and push that basically back out.

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We will take that information, put it all together every single day.

And then we'll distribute that out to all of our subordinate assets as

well.

SME-INTEL: Is that your database then?

JSOAD-J2: Yes, sir.

SME-INTEL: And when that database is pushed out, who does it go to?

JSOAD-J2: It goes to everybody -- all task force units and

(b)(1)1.4a units that we have supporting us.

SME-INTEL: Okay. How is it filtered down to the 10th CAB?

JSOAD-J2: We send it to their S-2. And from there, sir, I don't know.

SME-INTEL: So you send it out --

JSOAD-J2: Email.

SME-INTEL: -- to the rest of the task?

BG Colt: Is that a daily?

JSOAD-J2: Yes, sir.

SME-INTEL: On the SAFIARE reporting, one of the units within the task

force reports to SAFIRE. Who has responsibility for putting it together?

JSOAD-J2: That would be me. So the units themselves -- if a sapphire

then happens on a task force asset, the units will produce a MISREP, to

8
SECRET
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 SECRET

which I will take that. We actually request that the information be as

much as possible. And then I will sanitize it, and then push it out, so

there's no task force specific call signs or anything of that nature in

the MISREP. And then I will push that to the KAOC, and they will distribute

it out as well. And then I will input it into our database. And then

it will get sent out in our daily email.

SME-INTEL: So they just provide the MISREP. No story board comes

up from them?

JSOAD-J2: No. Sometimes they do story boards. It depends on how

significant the sapphires are.

SME-INTEL: What about perspective or de-confliction conflict between

the story boards themselves? Who resolves that?

JSOAD-J2: Generally, there's no real heart burn between story boards.

Once the conventional unit presents their story board, it's taken at face

value unless it's a - what I would consider a signature event, i.e., like

a rocket attack or an engagement something of that nature. And then we

will look into that a little bit deeper.

SME-INTEL: Okay. What about classification such as a significant

or close event? What are the definitions?

JSOAD-J2: Those are all standardized by the CAOC, and it's close,

it's distant and hit. Anything that's observed that's outside a half

9
SECRET
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 SECRET

nautical mile, depending on the weapons system, is considered a

"sighting." And that's tracked on a different database.

SME-INTEL: Okay. What about levels of responsibilities for

assessments of RC East -- or actually all of Afghanistan? How do you

process that? And what's the frequency?

JSOAD-J2: As far as overall assessment, we provide as much data, and

allow the lower echelon units to develop their assessments.

We'll put together, like, a 30-day roll-up, and just basically

provide those facts out. Locally, I will talk with the JSOAC(Joint

Special Operation Aviation Command) commander, and the other S2s

(Intelligence) in the area. And we will talk about certain areas, Hey,

what do you seeing that's high, you know, Are your guys tracking this.

So on and so forth.

So there's some cross talk between all of the 2s, and make sure we

are seeing the same thing, so our assessments are completely opposite once

they go up.

SME-INTEL: Are you in on the process when it comes down to prosecuting

an objective? Are you in on that process, too itself?

JSOAD-J2: No, sir. The only involvement that I have is I will usually

monitor objectives. And I'll monitor the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that comes out via

our collection assets. And then I will provide that out to anybody that's

monitoring our aviation intel room, and that's both ground and air guys

10
SECRET
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 SECRET

both monitor those. And then I will define how it's going to effect -- if

it is going to effect -- the target area or the route.

SME-INTEL: How is that distributed out to --

JSOAD-J2: That's all real time, sir, so it's via and phone calls.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-INTEL: Okay. Sir, do you have any specific questions?

SME-INTEL: Any traffic since you've been here about night vision

proliferation?

JSOAD-J2: Not proliferation, sir. We've picked up, I think, one or

two sets off of some of the coalition. I believe the Brits picked one

up here about a month ago.

Currently, we assess that, yes, insurgents do have it. They are not

widely distributed. And they are usually kept with some of your higher

level guys. It's more of a status symbol than actually sending it down

to the lower echelon shooters.

The ones that we do feel that are out there will be used more as a

spotting role than to aid in any type of weapons systems.

SME-INTEL: Any specific unusual variance, RPGs being fired around

here?

JSOAD-J2: None that are noted, sir.

11
SECRET
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 SECRET

SME-INTEL: [JSOAD-J2] , VISOPS, (Visibility Observation Post)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

kind of, describe VISOPS, aircraft reporting, just to get your thoughts

on them.

JSOAD-J2: Generally, it's depending on location. You take an area

such as RC Southwest, which has a lot of chatter; that seems to be

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

their main source of information.

We see pretty good networks in -- along the Helmand River Valley.

We see good VISOPS up in Konar. And based off the traffic that we've

received over the last couple of months, they don't talk in between the

Tangi Valley to the, you know, through Sayed Abad west to the Chark Valley.

So that encompasses everything from Baraki Barak, Logar Province, all the

way to Chark Valley --

BG Colt: Can you point that out on the map.

The witness did as directed.

JSOAD-J2: There's a river bed just basically comes -- just west of

FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cis Baraki Barak. And there's a river valley that comes all the

way across this boundary -- actually, across Highway 1, and up into the

eastern part of Wardak. The Eastern part of Wardak is where the Chark

Valley is.

There is active insurgent comms and VISOPS reporting in - once we

are operating in those areas. But nothing outside of that, you know,

unlike RC Southwest where they are talking all the time.

12
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 SECRET

But areas such as those, they are generally pretty good. They will

have two or three VISOPS out there along the ridge lines reporting that

they see aircraft, and that could go for a couple miles. So it just depends

on where we are flying is really the basis of the assessment, sir.

SME-INTEL: Okay. (b) (1)probably

One other question, (A) the last one:

Thoughts on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c We have had this discussion just kind of --

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-INTEL:

JSOAD-J2:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

BG Colt: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

13
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 SECRET

JSOAD-J2:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

I agree with that. Okay.

SME-INTEL: Sir, that's all I have.

BG Colt: I appreciate your time. Thanks. If we have a follow up,

we will come back.

The inquiry closed at 2214 Zulu, 16 August 2011.

14
SECRET
Page 410
Page 1 redacted for the following reason:
---------------------
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 411
 (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, c

(b)(1)1.4a, c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 412
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 413
 (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 414
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 415
 TM (b)(3),(b)(6)

OBJ LEFTY GROVE– 42S VC 83431 62373

QARI TAHIR

SAYYIDABAD DISTRICT, WARDAK PROVINCE

BSO: TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(7)d

05 1800z AUG 11 Page 416

SECRET//REL FVEY
 SECRET//REL
CAO: 29 JUL
ACGU11

OBJ LEFTY GROVE – QARI TAHIR Exp Trgr: SIGINT

Battlefield Geometry
LAST ACTIVE IVO: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(7)d

(b)(3),(b)(6)

OBJ LEFTY GROVE 24 km SLD

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c,(b)(7)d Sayed Abad District, Wardak Province

Populated Rural

Link Analysis

DIN MOHAMMAD
OBJ DUNLAP
QARI TAHIR
TB CDR
OBJ LEFTY GROVE
TB CDR

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(7)d

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c,(b)(7)d

• IO:
• Influence patterns of life IOT facilitate C/K opportunities;
• Disrupt C2 network;
• Reduce popular support to restrict FOM.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(7)d (b)(1)1.4a,
Page 417 (b)(7)d
• Post-Op Mitigation: Yes

SECRET//REL TO USA FVEY

(b)(3),(b)(6)
OBJ LEFTY GROVE – QARI TAHIR N
Sayyidabad District, Wardak Province
22 KM SLD

20 JUL 11
HIT – RPG/SMARMS
MH-47; 600 AGL

(b)(3),(b)(6)

OBJ LEFTY GROVE

8 JUL 11
Close SMARMS
C-130; 700AGL

(b)(3),(b)(6)

18 JUL 11 (b)(3),(b)(6)
Close SMARMS
RW; 150AGL

Page 418
 OBJ LEFTY GROVE TFD/SIGACTS Overview N SECRET
//REL TO USA, AUS,
Sayyidabad District, Wardak Province, AF CAN, GBR, NZL
CL BY:
(b)(3), (b)(6)
CL REASON: 1.4 (c)
GEO: 340006.58N 0684914.08E MGRS: 42SVC8343162373 DECL ON: 25X1, EO 12951
1:25,000
Image Base
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(7)d

38 x DF/IDF
to 10 APR
RPG attk at TANGI:
3 FEB 11
7 DEC 10
(b)(3),(b)(6) 15 NOV 10
15 OCT 10
9 APR 2011: SAF at TANGI;
0xCAS
20 NOV 10: 1 x RPG at TANGI;
0xCAS

19 NOV 10: 3 x INS OBJ LEFTY GROVE

5AUG11
RPG/SAF at TANGI,
broke contact

7 x RPG/SAF attk at
TANGI to 28 MAR 11

Page 419
SECRET
//REL USA ACGU//MR
 OBJ LEFTY GROVE TFD/SIGACTS Overview N SECRET
//REL TO USA, AUS,
Sayyidabad District, Wardak Province, AF CAN, GBR ZL
CL BY:
(b)(3), (b)(6)
CL REASON: 1.4 (c)
GEO: 340006.58N 0684914.08E MGRS: 42SVC8343162373 DECL ON: 25X1, EO 12951
1:8,500
Image Base

10 DEC 10
Recoilless rifle at
TANGI – No dmg

Mosque
Cemetery

OBJ LEFTY GROVE

5AUG11

3 SEP 10
SAF at MP
2 FEB 11 0xCAS
2 x RPG at TANGI
No dmg

7 DEC 10: RPG/SAF at MP –

minor vehic dmg
10 JAN 11: SAF at MP – No dmg

Page 420
SECRET
//REL USA ACGU//MR
 OBJ LEFTY GROVE Overview N SECRET
//REL TO USA, AUS,
Sayyidabad District, Wardak Province, AF CAN, GBR
CL BY:(b)(3), (b)(6)
CL REASON: 1.4 (c)
GEO: 340006.58N 0684914.08E MGRS: 42SVC8343162373 DECL ON: 25X1, EO 12951

DOI: 1AUG11 /
0842Z

1425z

Possible
School

Target Area
50m

(b)(1)1.4a
HCH
PGRID
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(7)d
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
Mosque
Cemetery
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(7)d
Page 421
SECRET
//REL USA FVEY//MR
 TASK ORGANIZATION
TF DR
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF CDR
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

AF LIFT IRF QRF CASEVAC ISR FIRES CSAR

TM TM (b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) T (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 8 (b)(3),(b)(6)
1700Z – 2100Z
(b)(3),(b)(6) INFIL - EXFIL
CH-47s x 2
US x 25
(11 - 5 Crew) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)
(12 - 5 Crew) 1300-1700Z
otal 10 x Crew

(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 1500-1730Z

1815Z-2330Z

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 422
 OBJ LEFTY GROVE TRIGGER SI DATE 5 AUG 2011
MISSION:On order, TM (b)(1)1.4a OBJ LEFTY GROVE(Qari Tahar) IVO Sayed Abad District, Wardak Province, AFG IOT disrupt TB
activity in Wardak.
Significance:Qari Tahir (LEFTY GROVE) is a TB CDR and was the deputy to Din Mohammad (DUNLAP-EKIA) active within the Tangi Valley, Sayed Abad District, Wardak
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(7)d, (b)(6)

TIMELINE
WU / SP 1800Z
INFIL 1830Z
TOT 1910Z
NLT EXT 2330Z
TASK ORG
VEH/AC INFIL EXFIL
EX11 23 23
EX12 24 24
TOTAL 47 47
KEY GRID COORD
OBJ LEFTY GROVE
INFIL (b)(3),(b)(6)

OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(7)d

EXFIL
(b)(3),(b)(6)
CALL SIGNS LOC
GFC OBJ
24 km
RTO OBJ
(b)(3),(b)(6)
JTAC 35km
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(7)d
QRF (b)(3),(b)(6)
10 km
FIRES
ON OFF 2 km
ASSET
STATION STATION Air Route
INFIL EXFIL
(b)(3),(b)(6)
1815 2330 Ground Route
ISR CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION: (b)(1)1.4a
ON ST OFFST
INSERT: 1 x BSO FROM FOB (b)(3),(b)(6) TO TGT.
2230 EXFIL
(b)(3),(b)(6) 1700 2100
INFIL: HAF INSERT TO Y HLZ. GROUND INFIL TO TGT
2030 2400 AAO: ISOLATE TGT, TACTICAL CALLOUT, BREACH, ASLT TGT, TQ/SSE, EXPLOIT, BSHO
EW EXFIL: GROUND EXFIL TO HLZ
ASSET ON ST OFFST EXTRACT: HAF RTB
(b)(3),(b)(6) 1815 2330
BSO TF (b)(3),(b)(6) QRF, C/S BLACKHAWK BASE/ (b)(1)1.4a LOCATION (b)(3),(b)(6)

SIGNAL SVOIP (b)(3),(b)(6) COMP 25 US PAX RESP TIME (b)(1)1.4a

HELO COMMON ALERT TO Target to Med

ASSET UNIT CALLSIGN / FREQ LOCATION WHEELS UP Facility
ASLT REDASLT
(b)(1)1.4a
UH-60 10 min Page 423 7 min
CMD REDCMD (b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a
FIRES FD2 UH-60 10 min 7 min
 OBJ LEFTY GROVE INFIL

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)

Route Overview: Walking Time | Distance Covered | Elevation Change

OFFSIT 40 min 2K 6845FT -Page
6594
424 ft
 OBJ LEFTY GROVE ORP

INFIL

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

OBJ

Route Overview: Walking Time | Distance Covered | Elevation Change

100M Page 425
 OBJ LEFTY GROVE EXFIL

INFIL

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

OBJ

(b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(3),(b)(6)

Route Overview: Walking Time | Distance Covered | Elevation Change

EXFIL PZ 25 MIN 650 m 6845FT Page 426- 0 ft
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
A (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

B (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c,(b)(7)d

C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N Page 427
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
AA (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

BB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c,(b)(7)d

CC
DD
EE
FF
GG
HH
II
JJ
KK
LL
MM
NN Page 428
 BSHO / QRF
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 42S VC 83431 62373

BSHO INFO:
(b)(3),(b)(6)
BSO: TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
UNIT: 2-4 INF
CALLSIGN: (b)(3),(b)(6)

FREQ: (b)(1)1.4a
OBJ LEFTY GROVE
TAC/SAT: (b)(1)1.4a

SVOIP: (b)(2)

(b)(1)1.4a
COMP: 1 x US
LOCATION: (b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(7)d
RESPONSE: on TGT
CRITERIA: WILL EXECUTE
TRIGGER:(b)(3),(b)(6)
CALL
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c,(b)(7)d

QRF INFO:
BSO: TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3),(b)(6) UNIT: 2-4 INF
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CALLSIGN: (b)(3),(b)(6)

FREQ: (b)(1)1.4a

TAC/SAT: (b)(1)1.4a

SVOIP: (b)(1)1.4a

COMP: 25x US
LOCATION: (b)(1)1.4a

RESPONSE: 10 min (air)

PageEXECUTE
CRITERIA: WILL 429

TRIGGER:(b)(3),(b)(6)
CALL
 CHALK LOAD INFIL
(HAF) LEFTY GROVE
(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)

HAF HAF
# WEIGHT # WEIGHT
1 240
1 265
2 240
2 260
3 255
3 250
4 325
4 270
5 222
5 278
6 226
6 250
7 245
7 250
8 250
8 230
9 230
9 240
10 230
10 210
11 250
11 262
12 265
12 (b)(3),(b)(6) 262 (b)(3),(b)(6)
13 282
13 265
14 314
14 295 15 235
15 250 16 200
16 255 17 200
17 270 18 200
18 280 19 200
19 245 20 200
20 270 21 200
21 160 22 200
22 170 23 200
23 260 24 259
TOTAL WEIGHT 5747 TOTAL WEIGHT 5668

TOTAL ASSAULT
(b)(3),(b)(6) x1
x 35 + 1 CAD
(b)(3),(b)(6)

APU x 7
CST x 1
TERPS x 2
BSO x 1
(b)(1)1.4a
Page 430
 JOC CHECK

Screen Check
IO
Fires
JMAU
CSAR
J6
ISR
Weather
CJSOTF
Staff by Exception
J2
OCG Notification
Deconfliction
J3
CSM
CDR

Page 431
 SECRET//REL ACGU Current as of: 09 AUG 11

SPARE A/C
NO CREW TF (b)(3),(b)(6)
Shifted Disposition (Darby Shift)
Steady State through Surge Force Departure (early Sep 11)
CENTCOM (38x160th Aircraft)
(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)
IZ (10
UNIT 4 Air (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(3),(b)(6)

PLT PLT PLT PLT PLT PLT PLT 1A PLT 2A PLT A3 TRP 2B PLT TRP PLT TRP PLT ETF TRP PLT
1b PLT 3b PLT

(b)(3),(b)(6) TRP PLT(-)

LIFT LIFT (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6)
TM MeS
1
4xMH60L ACB
2xCH47F 2xCH47D
2xCH47F 2xCH47F 2xCH47D 2xCH47
(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)
2+1xAH6M (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)

2xMH60L 5xCV-22
1xMH60K 3xMH47G (b)(3),(b)(6) 3xMH47G 3xMH47G TM KDZ
(b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)
54/55/56
AFG (28 Aircraft)
UNIT 8
159th CAB
(b)(3),(b)(6) 5xMH60K/L
TF (b)(3),(b)(6) 10th CAB
23 (b)(3),(b)(6)

Aircraft TF (b)(3),(b)(6)
2+1xMH6M
(b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(3),(b)(6) 71/72
(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)

1
ACB
5xMH47G
(b)(3),(b)(6) 2xAH64D 2xAH64D 2+1xAH6M 2xAH64D 2xAH64D 2xAH64D 2xAH64D 2xAH64D 2+1xMH60L 2xAH64D
(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a
1 ACB: TF
159 CAB (b)(3),(b)(6)
10 CAB: Page 432

SECRET//REL ACGU
 SECRET CAO: 09 AUG 11

TF (b)(3),(b)(6)
Aviation Disposition
(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) TF(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a
2x CH-47
(b)(3),(b)(6) 4x U-28
5x MH-60K (ETF) (b)(3),(b)(6) 2 (+1)x MH-6 (b)(3),(b)(6) ) 2x AH-64 (b)(3),(b)(6)

2 (+1)x MH-60 DAP (ETF) ( (b)(3),(b)(6) 8x JAVAMAN (b)(3),(b)(6)

2x
1X JAVAMAN (b)(3),(b)(6)
1x MFW (b)(3),(b)(6)
1x U-28 (b)(3),(b)(6) 3xDHC-8 (b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6)
2x AC-130H ( (b)(3),(b)(6)
2x MC-130H
(b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) 1x MC-130P

1x MQ-1 5x AoD (F-15/F-16)

(b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6)
2x EC-130 (b)(3),(b)(6)
1x EA-6B ( (b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) [SHK] 14 x MC-12 lines (b)(3),(b)(6)
2x U28 (b)(3),(b)(6)
1x C-130 (b)(3),(b)(6)
1x P-3 (b)(3),(b)(6)
TF (b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6)
2x CH-47
(b)(3),(b)(6)
2x AH-64 )

(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)

1x HIMARS
3x MH-47 (b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) 6x MQ-1
TF (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)

1x SCAN EAGLE (b)(3),(b)(6)

TF (b)(3),(b)(6)
4x AH-64 (b)(3),(b)(6)

TF (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) TF (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) TF (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)

3x MH-47 (b)(3),(b)(6) TF (b)(3),(b)(6)

3x MH-47 2x HIMARs
(b)(3),(b)(6)
2 (+1)x AH-6 (b)(3),(b)(6) 4x CH-47 (b)(3),(b)(6)
2x MARSS (KA-30 TF (b)(3),(b)(6) TF (b)(3),(b)(6) TF (b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6) (-)
(b)(3),(b)(6) 4x AH-64 (b)(3),(b)(6) 2x CH47F 2x CH-47 (b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6)
2x MARSS (DCH-7) 2x AH-64 ( 2x AH-64(b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6)
2x AoD (A-10) (b)(3), (b)(6))
(b)(3),(b)(6)
2x HIMARs 7x MQ-1 (b)(3),(b)(6) Notes:
(b)(3),(b)(6) ,
5x CV-22 (b)(3),(b)(6) RED TEXT = Shift toPage 433day surge – 6 Sep)
HOA (60
3x MQ-9 (b)(3),(b)(6) -4x MI17s from CSTC-A with 2 weeks notice
2x AC-130U (b)(3),(b)(6)
7 x MC-12 lines (b)(3),(b)(6)
CRET (b)(3),(b)(6)
Pages 1 through 4 redacted for the following reasons:
----------------------------
(b)(5) Foreign Document

Page 434
Pages 1 through 5 redacted for the following reasons:
----------------------------
(b)(5) Foreign Document

Page 435
Pages 1 through 5 redacted for the following reasons:
----------------------------
(b)(5) Foreign Document

Page 436
 SECRET

The interview of 1/B PLT LDR and 1/B PLT SGT opened at 1840
Zulu, 17 August 2011, at FOB .
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD: BG J. Colt, US Army

LEGAL ADVISOR: LA

GROUND FORCE SME: SME-GFA

INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR: SME-INTEL

CAB CH-47 SME: SME-CH47

NGB REPRESENTATIVE: SME-NGB

MH-47 SME: SME-MH47

ASDAT TM MBR #1: ASDAT3

ASDAT TM MBR #2: ASDAT4

COURT REPORTER: CR2

Derived from: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

SECRET
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 SECRET

BG Colt: Incidentally is the graphic that is up right now,

that was all preplanned is that true?

TF
(b)(1)1.4a, CDR:
(b)(1)1.4c Yes, sir.

BG Colt: Okay, if we can get (b)(3),(b)(6) to talk us

through, what we are really talking about now is post-crash
actions and I guess when do you take it from your call of FALLEN
ANGEL actions and then moving from there?

1/B PLT LDR: Sir, initially there is some confusion wasn’t

really a clear picture of whether or not EXTORTION had taken RPG
fire or whether they had dropped off the PAXs and then got shot
down or what exactly that was. Certainly in my mind did not jump
to worst case scenario - what was the actual reality of the
crash site. So I got on SAT [satellite radio] with the JOC
[Joint Operations Center] and tried to clarify whether or not
they needed us to push to secure the crash site to assist in any
way, or whether or not we were good to just continue on our
target as it was. So once it --

BG Colt: When you say the TOC [Tactical Operations Center]

or the JOC for clarification is that Team (b)(3),(b)(6) or is that the -

1/B PLT LDR: (b)(3),(b)(6)

, sir.

1/B PLT LDR: So once it was clarified that EXTORTION had

actually been shot down carrying 2 (b)(3),(b)(6) - extremely rapid pull-
off target - essentially had already established our detainees
in the 10 series [buildings on the objective] that we had – we
were done with the ten series essentially, sixty series – so we
had everybody pulled out and not really knowing - just told
everybody stay where you are don’t move until the sun comes up.
Got a grid for the crash site and then - this doesn’t really
show it, but there is a huge spur straight line distance from
where we were to the crash site which was about 4 kilometers. So
we assessed the fastest way to go was right down route (b)(3),(b)(6)a,
which is this MSR. We got back in our original order of
movement and pushed out on down the MSR with our 47 PAXs
organically, and like (b)(3),(b)(6) had said happened, one asset kind
of talked us – “hey does this road keep going,” “what if we need

SECRET
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 SECRET

to cut off this,” and there was talk of having AWT lase where to
cut off MSR (b)(3),(b)(6) into the wadi. Once we got within 400 meters
of the crash site, we pushed up another squad --

BG Colt: Was it pretty obvious to you then based on fire?

IO: Once we got passed that berm, sir, we were still about
a click [kilometer], click and a half out. You can just see the
flame and the illumination really on the NODS of where exactly
we were headed. So again once we got about 400 meters out, we
pushed two squads out on the line and cleared through the crash
site like you would in any live fire objective keeping the third
squad in the reserve as the flanking element of whoever it was.
So once we have identified the crash site, cleared through, we
quickly set up a 360 perimeter with the two squads that cleared
through and that third squad went up immediately to try to
recover any sort of bodies or find any wounded in action, sir.

BG Colt: And how long were you on that crash site before
you identified the first FALLEN ANGEL, the first KIAs.

1/B PLT SGT: About 90 seconds.

BG Colt: 90 seconds, really?

1/B PLT SGT: Yea, because we had two squads; we had one on
the north, one on the south, that were just creating a football
shape around the crash and the third squad was in reserve of
flying service, went straight up the gut right towards the fire.

BG Colt: Illumination level at that point was?

1/B PLT LDR: We were right at BMNT, sir. We still had NODs
down - I had NODs down for about 15 to 20 minutes on the crash
site.

1/B PLT SGT: We were NODs up due to the fires.

BG Colt: And you said there were still active fires and
active explosions or discharges going off at that time?

1/B PLT SGT: I would say probably for the next hour, we
had secondaries going off.

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 SECRET

BG Colt: Did I understand you had two guys injured from

that?

1/B PLT SGT: Yes sir, we had two guys take some shrapnel
from some secondaries, sir.

ASDAT3: I would imagine some of the cook off going off not
just small arms, but hand grenades?

1/B PLT SGT: Yea, hand grenades were one of the big ones
and then, yes there were some small arms that were cooking off.

ASDAT3: Do we have anything bigger: PG, [R]PG7s, something

that sounded like PG, possible rocket motor cooking off?

1/B PLT SGT: There was no - they had breaching charges and
thermobaric hand grenades and hand grenades and then small arms.
They didn’t have anything like a Gustav rounds or mortar rounds
or anything inside the aircraft.

ASDAT3: Any demo?

1/B PLT SGT: There were demolitions for breaching.

BG Colt: Any thoughts about the communications and / or

link up with Pathfinder element?

1/B PLT LDR: Pathfinder element was great. So we had the

call that they had infil’d. We heard their infil assets
obviously, acquired then them and as they were coming on we were
there when they came up. Did a good link up with Pathfinders
and then quickly incorporated them into our perimeter.

IE: There was discussion in the media sir, about talking

to an indig - an eyewitness, was that you all—

1/B PLT SGT: We had no contact with the local populace

throughout the entire –

SME-CH47: So that was an erroneous report –

1/B PLT SGT: Yes.

1/B PLT LDR: At least an our end. Again, that does not
really depict it really well, sir, but the BSO drove that whole
convoy and essentially secured this entire village. There had to

SECRET
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 SECRET

have been some sort of interaction between both the ANSF that
they brought with them and then - the size of the package they
had. Where we were was completely secure each stand-up.

SME-CH47: You just kept everyone away from the perimeter.

BG Colt: And then when it was you and the Pathfinder

element, there was inner cordon, and then the BSO did the outer
cordon?

1/B PLT LDR: No sir, the first BSO package that showed up
was that RCP element with the three platoons, which essentially
came down. We loaded it up all 38 [FALLEN] EAGLES into their
trucks and then they turned around and escorted the EAGLES and
the personal effects back to the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c . So there was
never any relief in place until 3/D arrived that evening.

SME-GFA: What time did you actually -- I guess start

getting on the wreckage?

1/B PLT LDR: We went “crash site secured” about 2345Z and
we were at 38 EAGLES accounted for just after 0600Z.

BG Colt: [inaudible].

1/B PLT LDR: The fire burned down [inaudible] --

SME-GFA: And you guys were pulling security for a while

then come the Pathfinders, they’re helping with security,
waiting for the blaze to burn down?

1/B PLT LDR: Well, it was a continuous effort --

1/B PLT SGT: It was a continuous -- we never stopped

working the crash from the time we got EAGLES on it until we got
38 accounted for. We never stopped working.

BG Colt: Acknowledging the obvious difficulty, can you

talk me through the identification of the 38?

1/B PLT SGT: Right, sir. We kind of kept running tally

through and - just based on the farther we got into it - and it
was time for rest, it was 38 skulls and C-spines. That’s what
we were counting and then my medic was helping me kind of trying
to piece the extra stuff back together and make sense of it.

SECRET
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 SECRET

1/B PLT LDR: That photo we showed up here earlier of the

crash site, there’s still probably I would say five or six
EAGLES in that photo, so just to give you guys a perspective of
--

1/B PLT SGT: No, there’s more than that. There was like
16 still in that picture.

1/B PLT LDR: That’s the type of shape -- the condition that
we were pulling out. We had 22 EAGLES accounted for when we
took that photo, sir. So, let’s separate -- there’s 22 EAGLES
separated from the crash.

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-GFA: What is the Pathfinder element made up of --

[inaudible]

1/B PLT LDR: 20 –

SME-GFA: Infantrymen?

1/B PLT LDR: Roger, sir. So, most of them were Pathfinder
and a CSAR element with tools and all of that.

1/B PLT SGT: They brought a quickie saw and that was about
it.

SME-GFA: Led by a lieutenant?

1/B PLT LDR: Captain, sir.

BG Colt: Okay, and what was the decision criteria or the

trigger point to move you off and do the relief in place with
3/D?

1/B PLT LDR: That came from higher headquarters, sir.

BG Colt: Okay, and did you -- you got picked up by SOF

47’s or what was your mode to get back here?

1/B PLT SGT: Two MH-47s, sir.

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-MH47: Where did they land?

SECRET
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 SECRET

1/B PLT SGT: They landed 2.5K to the north of this

village, so up here. They were [inaudible] about 1,000 meters
from any structure is the one place they would come in and pick
us up. It’s the same place they inserted the 3/D element.

BG Colt: Was this during the time by the BSO or anybody?

1/B PLT LDR: It was not, sir.

BG Colt: It was not? And, was that a first dark exfil?

1/B PLT SGT: It was BMNT exfil, sir, for us. They
inserted just after an EENT, I think.

CR2: I’m sorry; can you speak up just a little bit please?

1/B PLT SGT: The 3/D element inserted just after EENT,
walked down to us, and then by the time we made it back up it
was BMNT.

SME-GFA: When did the (b)(3),(b)(6) element show up?

1/B PLT SGT: Probably about 0800Z.

SME-GFA: You said three platoons led by a lieutenant

colonel, correct?

1/B PLT LDR: A major

SME-GFA: A battalion XO type? They recovered the bodies

that were there?

1/B PLT SGT: We were completely done with the recovery

process. We were -- We just received the CDS drop with the body
bags, and they assisted us putting the remains in the bags and
then we all carried the 38 out to the truck.

SME-GFA: They exfil’d?

1/B PLT SGT: Then they exfil’d the remains.

SME-GFA: That entire package left at approximately what

time?

1/B PLT SGT: Probably two-and-a-half-hours after they

showed up, so probably 1015, 1030Z.

SECRET
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 SECRET

SME-GFA: And still you guys [inaudible] --

1/B PLT SGT: It was still us and the Pathfinder elements.

SME-GFA: -- and the Pathfinders on the ground?

1/B PLT SGT: Yes, sir.

SME-GFA: So, (b)(3),(b)(6) comes in around EENT?

1/B PLT LDR: Probably around 2300-ish I would say.

1/B PLT SGT: By the time they got to us, yes -- 22 / 2300.

BG Colt: You did the relief in place and then you walked
out and they came back in for another exfil so that --

1/B PLT LDR: Correct, sir.

BG Colt: Okay, and they physically left the site when?

3/D - do you know?

1/B PLT SGT: Four days after the crash, sir. So, the 9th,
I guess.

BG COlt: Which is two days after you physically left;

correct?

1/B PLT SGT: Three days after we left, sir.

BG Colt: Three days. Okay, anybody else?

E-GFA: Is there anything of significance once the

(b)(3),(b)(6) element showed up or -- We talked earlier about who was
in charge of the scene and all that. As I understand it,
(b)(3),(b)(6) was in charge. Do you guys know of any friction
points [inaudible] anything like that?

1/B PLT LDR: No friction points at all, sir. I would say

the Pathfinder element, element and I worked very well. There
(b)(3),(b)(6)
was never any power struggle between us. I was told over SAT
that (b)(3),(b)(6) would be in charge, and so I didn’t [inaudible]
with him and the way it planned out he had [inaudible] so I just
assumed GFC responsibilities.

SECRET
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 SECRET

BG Colt : Anybody else? Okay, thank you very much. I

appreciate it. And, incidentally, when do you two depart
theater?

1/B PLT SGT: December, sir.

1/B PLT LDR: Same time, sir. December 15-ish.

BG Colt: You are departing theater this time? Do you

understand what I’m asking? When do you rotate your --

1/B PLT LDR: December 15, sir.

BG Colt: December? So, you just got here basically?

1/B PLT LDR: About a month on the ground, sir.

BG Colt: Okay, I appreciate that. Thank you.

SECRET
Page 445
(b)(1)1.4a, 1.4c

Page 446
(b)(1)1.4a, 1.4c

Page 447
(b)(1)1.4a, 1.4c

Page 448
(b)(1)1.4a, 1.4c

Page 449
Page 450
(b)(1)1.4a, 1.4c

Page 451
(b)(1)1.4a, 1.4c

Page 452
(b)(1)1.4a, 1.4c

Page 453
OBJ LEFTY GROVE
ISO TM (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 454

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
 OBJ LEFTY GROVE
TASK ORG: 2 x CH, 1 x AWT
.
MISSION:TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cAir Assaults TM(b)(3), (b)(6)on OBJ LEFTY GROVE NLT 1800Z on 04AUG11
IOT capture/kill: Qari Tahir (LEFTY GROVE) is a TB CDR and was the deputy to Din
Mohammad (DUNLAP-EKIA) active within the Tangi Valley, Sayed Abad District,
Wardak Province. Qari Tahir is the replacement for Din Mohammad and assessed
to be the overall TB Commander of the Tangi Valley. Qari Tahir is associated with
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION

OBJ LEFTY GROVE
PH I: (INSERTION): TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c inserts TM(b)(3), (b)(6)to an offset LZ 633M from OBJ LEFTY
GROVE. AWT provides illumination and security of the LZ. Once infil is complete CH47 will return
to
(b)(1)1.4a, and remain REDCON-2 until called forward for exfil.
(b)(1)1.4c
PH II (ACTIONS ON): TM(b)(3), (b)(6)conducts dismounted movement from LZ to OBJ. Once OBJ is
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c assaulted, SSE will be conducted. Upon completion TM(b)(3), (b)(6)moves to PZ posture.
PH III (EXTRACTION): CHs extract TM(b)(3), (b)(6)from the PZ back to FOB and are EOM.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

CHERRY/ICE CRITERIA
Cherry considered any persons/ equipment in position to affect landing aircraft
Actions taken enroute to RP- Any persons on LZ require the moving of LZ to clear area
Actions taken RP to LZ – Mutually supported self defense measures taken when HA/HI identified

THREAT:
ROUTE – LZ – PZ – WX – MISSION-
LZ is assessed as a MOD. Route, PZ, WX are assessed as LOW. Overall mission MOD from ERAW

ISR: See COF

CONCEPT OF FIRES:
-AWT on station to provide overhead security for insert and actions on the OBJ.
-FW CAS: See COF
SUSTAINMENT:
MEDEVAC: Nearest MEDEVAC and (b)(1)1.4a,FST .
(b)(1)1.4c
FARP: Primary FARP at
(b)(1)1.4a, .
(b)(1)1.4c
DART and PR coverage from .
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
FLT TIME: 6+00 Moon Illumination:
MISSION TIMELINE
1800z SP DUTY DAY: 14+00 GREEN: 1330Z-1530Z
1830z INSERT BMNT: 2332Z RED: 1530Z – 2330Z
2020z TOT SR: 0032Z
NLT 2315z EXFIL SS: 1427Z
EENT: 1528
MR: 2356Z
Page 455
(b)(3), (b)(6)
MS: 1317Z

SECRET//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL, POL

 TIME EVENTS

1630Z / 2100L ACMB

O/O HOT LOAD PAX / COMM CHECK WITH JTAC

1755Z / 2225L AWT DEPARTS (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

1800Z / 2230L CH DEPART (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c FOR INSERT LZ

1825Z / 2250L CHERRY / ICE

1830Z / 2255L CH ARRIVE INSERT LZ

EVENT AIRCRAFT ARRIVE -REDCON 2 FOR EXFIL

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

EVENT CH EXTRACT TM (b)(3), (b)(6) FROM PZ

Page 456
EVENT AIRCRAFT ARRIVE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c EOM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 457
 SHK: 05/2200L – 05/2300L
OBJ LEFTY GROVE 02008KT 8000 DU/HZ FEW200 T25
A2986 PA: +6670

OBJ: 05/2230L – 05/2330L

02007KT 8000 DU/HZ FEW200 T25
A2986

OBJ : 06/0300L - 06/0400L

02007KT 5000 DU/HZ SCT150 T21
A2993

SHK : 06/0330L - 06/0430L

02005KT 5000 DU/HZ SCT150 T21
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c A2993 PA: +6605

WX HAZARDS: 05/2200L– 06/0430L

ICING: NONE
TURB: LGT OVR MTNS
TSTORMS:NONE
PRECIP: OVR MTNS E
VIS: 5000 DU/HZ

SOLAR/LUNAR DATA:
BMNT: 06/0409L
SR: 06/0509L
SS: 05/1851L
:
(b)(3), (b)(6)
EENT: 05/1952L
CIG/VIS: >1000ft/3mi MR: 05/1005L
WND: <35kt MS: 05/2132L
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
TS: NONE % ILLUM: 32/43%
(b)(3), (b)(6)

CIG/VIS: >700ft/2mi FCST: BH

WND: >35/<45kt
CTS
Ceiling Mist/Fog Precip (b)(3), (b)(6)

CIG/VIS: <700ft/2mi
WND: >45kt
Dust/Haze Turbulence Thunderstorms TS: TS ENRTE

Page 458
1800L 1830L 1900L 1930L 2000L 2030L 2100L 2130L 2200L 2230L 2300L 2330L 0000L 0030L 0100L 0130L 0200L 0230L 0300L 0330L 0400L 0430L 0500L 0530L 0600L
37 34 31 27 22 17 12 7 2 -4 -10 -16 -22 -28 -34 -40 -46 -52 -57 -63 -67 -71 -74 -73 -71
40 40 40 41 41 41 41 42 42 42 42 42 43 43 43 43 44 44 44 44 45 45 45
FCSTR:
45
CPS 46
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 459
 LEGEND LAST 24 HOURS
IED
N
SAF
RPG
RPG/SAF
HMG
IDF
IDF POO (b)(3), (b)(6)
GRENADE
SAFIRE
IED FOUND
VBIED
0840D- MAULER 22 REPORTS
RECEIVING SAF AND 2X RPGs
FIRED

1132D- BARAKI 16 REPORTS THEY

TOOK 2x BURSTS OF PKM
1528D- BARAKI 16 AT EBK CP
OBJ LEFTY REPORTS TAKING 2 X RPGs AND
(b)(3), (b)(6)
GROVE SAF
0426D- EBK CP REPORTED
TAKING SMALL AMMOUNT OF
SAF.

0750D- DELTA 26 TOOK SAF. CM

TO JSS ROADHOUSE
1310D- CZECHS AND ANA IN SALAR
REPORTED RECEIVING SAF AND 1245D- CHARKH 47 REPORTS
RPG TAKING A GRENADE ON THE
2xGBUs DROPPED. NO BDA. WESTERN SIDE OF THE BAZAAR.
0745D- CZECHS AND ANA IN SALAR 4xUS WIA
AND AKAKHEL RECEIVING SAF AND 1657L-CHARKH 31 AT OP BOLEN
RPG REPORT THEY ARE TAKING SAF
1xGBU DROP / 1xSTRUCTURE Page 460
DESTROYED
(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)
LEGEND
IED
SAF N
RPG
RPG/SAF
HMG
IDF
IDF POO OBJ LEFTY
GRENADE GROVE
SAFIRE
IED FOUND
OFFSE
VBIED
T

DISRUPTION

Page 461

(SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)

21 JUL 11 @ 0220L:
RPG DIRECTED AT MH-47 N
DURING A DELIBERATE
OPERATION

04 JUN 11 @ 2110L:
UH-60L WAS ENGAGED WITH
OBJ LEFTY
SAF. ROUNDS BURNED OUT GROVE
WITHIN 1 ROTOR DISK OF THE
A/C.

OFFSE
T

(b)(3), (b)(6)
06 JUN 11 @ 0040L:
CH-47D WAS ENGAGED FROM
5-6 POO’S AND HAD
APPROXIMATELY 14 RPGS
FIRED AT THEM ALONG WITH
SAF. AIRCRAFT MAEUVERED
AND ABORTED INFIL OF 05 JUN 11 @0450L:
DELIBERATE OP. PITCHBLACK 07/47 OBSERVED POSS RPG OR LARGE
SAFIRE TRACER ROUND DIRECTED AT BB 14/17. PITCHBLACK
COMPLEX ATK REPORTS ROUNDS WERE FIRED AT THE 7 O'clock
IDF POSITION OF BB CHALK 2 FROM APPROX 2-3Km AWAY.
IED F/C 23 JUN 11 @ 0300L:
IED STRIKE BB IDENTIFIED 2X FLASHES OF LIGHT VICINITY VC
DIRECT FIRE 81972 51726 AND ONE RPG AIRBURST Page
BETWEEN
462
THE
CACHE TWO AIRCRAFT. AIRCRAFT CONTINUED MISSION.
OTHER (SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)
 N

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

• Air Threat: Moderate to High for all LZs

•Most recent OPN in Tangi (29JUN) resulted in 2x CMPLX SAFIREs with 20-24 RPGs
and sustained SAF directed at A/C
• 1x SAFIRE in Tangi last 30 days; RW A/C engaged with 2x RPGs while en route to
OBJ, 200 ft AGL, 90 KIA, NO HIT Page 463

• EW network and effective DA cells continue to be postured to engage A/C

 06 JUN 11
42S VC 82332 62559
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CH-47/ (b)(3), (b)(6) IVO TANGI VALLEY/ WARDAK PROVINCE SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO
N Friendly Mission/Operation Task
and Purpose:
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c conducts hasty
N air assault NLT 1930Z on 06
JUNE11.

TIMELINE OF MAJOR EVENTS:

0022D: BB W/U FOB en
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
route LZ for INFIL.
0025D: PB W/U FOB en
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

DTG: route OBJ for INFIL security.

060040DJUNE11 0036D: PB A/C arrive on station at
LZ.
LOCATION (MGRS): 0044D: BB A/C receive ten to
42S VC 82332 62559 OLD COP fifteen RPG rounds and SAF during
TANGI OBJ LEFTY final approach for INFIL. LZ was
INCIDENT:
GROVE unable to be made ICE at that time.
NONE
Mission abort criteria was meet due
MISSION TYPE: to CHERRY LZ. BB RTB to FOB
AASLT for BDA and LZ
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a reassessment.
TYPE OF A/C INVOLVED: 0058D: BB A/C arrive at FOB
2 x AH-64D to conduct a BDA.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
2 x CH-47D 0130D: BB A/C confirm that there is
no damage to crew and A/C. TF
UNIT & C/S:
(b)(3), (b)(6) A/C completed the hasty air
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
assault.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c S2
RESULTS / BDA: Assessment:
NONE In the last 30 days there have been
4x SAFIREs directed to CF A/C
within 10NM of the former COP
TANGI. Multiple HUMINT sources
have indicated that INS operating in
the Tangi Valley planned to engage
“Low-Flying” CF helicopters with
SMARMS and rockets (RPG). Based
upon pilot debriefs its assessed that
FLIGHT INFORMATION Total Legend an AIR AMBUSH was established by
Total Munitions Casualties
ALTITUDE: 300’ AGL INS due to the multiple POO
Expended SAF/RPG POOs:
HEADING: 070 Enemy: NONE locations and timing of the attack.
KIAS: N/A Rockets: NONE Friendly: NONE
30MM: NONE INFIL ROUTE: CF retrograded from COP TANGI in
Detainees: 0 x MAR 2011 and established OP’s on
SAFIRE INFORMATION: 7.62MM: NONE
FELT THREATENED: YES Detainees
5.56MM: NONE EVASIVE MANUEVERS: each side of Pagethe Tangi
464 Valley
ADJUSTED FLIGHT PLAN: YES
HELLFIRE: NONE denying the enemy FoM. INS now
OTHER: NONE use the Tangi Valley as a support
 (SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)

OBJ LEFTY N
GROVE

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 465
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 466
 OBJ LEFTY GROVE

H K LEA
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6), (b)(3) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6), (b)(3) GRO
ON
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
FAST RO Page 467
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
A (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N Page 468
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
AA (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

BB
CC
DD
EE
FF
GG
HH
II
JJ
KK
LL
MM
NN Page 469
Page 470
Page 471
AIR MO PLAN
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 472
 AIR MOVEMENT TABLE INFIL

INSERT POD 05/06 AUG 11

BSO X 1 @ SAY
LIFT SERIAL CHALK PZ T/O TIME HLZ TIME

1 1-1 1800Z/2230L 23x PAX (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 1830Z/2300L

BSO X 1

1 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
24X PAX
1 1-2 1800Z/2230L (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 1830Z/2300L

Page 473
BATTLEFIELD GEOMETRY

2.3KM

Page 474
 INFIL / EXFIL Routes
OBJ LEFTY
GROVE
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)
INFIL ROUTE Page 475

EXFIL ROUTE
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
Page 476
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 477

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
 OBJ OVERVIEW
OBJ LEFTY GROVE

633M
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
1200M

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 478
 AIR MOVEMENT TABLE (EXFIL)

EXTRACT POD 05/06 AUG11

LIFT SERIAL CHALK PZ T/O TIME HLZ TIME

1 1-1 EVENT 23x PAX EVENT

BSO X 1
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
1 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

24x PAX
1 1-2 EVENT EVENT

Page 479
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 480
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4a

Page 481
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(6), (b)(2)
 OBJ LEFTY GROVE (VER 1.0)
OPERATION WILL FALL UNDER OEF ROE
42S VC 83431 62373/ Elev: 6571’ MSL
CALLSIGNS TIMELINE BLOCK CALLSIGN TOS NOTE
1800Z HAF W/U FL 270 1815-2330 OUTSIDE ROZ E – 15
1830Z Y INSERT FL 240-260 CHECK IN E- 8
1910Z TOT FL 230 W/N ROZ
2330Z EXTRACT NLT FL 220 1700-2100 W/N ROZ
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
ROVER DOWNLINK FREQ/LASER CODE FL 210 2030-2400 OTSD 4NM
(b)(1)1.4a

FL 200 2230-0500 OTSD 4NM

FL170-190 E10
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
FL140 - 160 1815-2330 E-10

FREQS SURF-3K AGL

HLZ s
****ALL PLAYERS CHECK-IN W/ G87 ON AIRCORD/EASTSAT PRIOR TO CHECK-IN ON
FD2. CHECK-OFF W/ JTAC ON FD2 AND G87 ON AIRCORD/ EASTSAT PRIOR TO
RTB****

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c mIRC Room: (JIANT server) E: 42S VC 83431 62373

#TM_(b)(3), (b)(6)_OBJ_LEFTYGROVE A Elev: 6571’ MSL
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

ROZ: “EIGHTPENCE”
(SFC – 12K’ msl, 3NM / 12K’- FL270, 8 NM)

CTR GRID 42S VC 83431 62373

CGRS 89CP2,3; 90CP8,9

D
B

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

89 CP Page 482

CRET (b)(3), (b)(6)

C
OBJ LEFTY GROVE (VC 83431 62373) Requesting Containment Fires with 40mm and below. All munitions will remain outside 0.1 percent PI of structures and personnel. Zero CDE
will be followed. There are no structures located within requested areas. Additional approval will be requested as needed utilizing GS or ISR.

AREA 1 AREA 2

AREA 4 AREA 3

RFA
Page 483

CONTAINMENT FIRE AREA

 AWT CONCEPT / DECONFLICTION
A B
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

D C
Task and Purpose
T1: RECON LZ FOR SECURITY AND SUITABILITY
P1: TO ENSURE SAFE INFIL OF TM (b)(3), (b)(6)
T2: PROVIDE RECON AND SECURITY OF OBJ
P2: TO GIVE TM(b)(3), (b)(6)MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY/ SECURITY WHILE ASSAULTING THE OBJECTIVE

Clearance of Fires: Through G21/ GFC

Page 484
QUESTIONS
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 485
35
 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(2)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 486
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(2), (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 487
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3),(b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3),(b)(6)

Page 488
(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(3),(b)(6)

Page 489
 (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(6), (b)(3) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 490
 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 491
Exhibit 39

(No Used)

Page 492
 SECRET

The interview of the AC-130 Aircrew occurred on 18 August

2011, at Bagram AFB.

PERSONS PRESENT

DEPUTY INVESTIGATING OFFICER IO-DEP

JSOAC SME SME-JSOAC

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

SECRET

Page 493
 SECRET

This is SME-JSOAC, part of the Lefty Grove Extortion 17

assessment team. We are here to interview (b)(3), (b)(6) the AC-130

crew overhead the site at the time of the incident.

Members who were sworn in: electronic warfare officer;,

fire control officer; Co-pilot; aerial gunner and left scanner

that night; Television Sensor operator; Aircraft commander;

Navigator.

SME-JSOAC: Okay, just for context—do you fly as hard crews when

you are here, has this been a hard crew the entire time? And how

long have you been in country this rotation?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: We’ve been in since the beginning of the

month really; I guess our first flight was the 31st of July ---.

SME-JSOAC: Okay, about a week before the mishap. How many

rotations have you guys had overall?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: This is the fifth for one and twelfth for

some people.

SME-JSOAC: So, across the crew a pretty fair amount of

experience in the AOR in Afghanistan and supporting Task Force.

Ok I’ll let you guys start and just kind of give us your context

of the mission that night; your tasking as you understood it.

When you arrived on scene and kind of what you all saw. As you

walk through the whole thing you guys can decide who talks when,

SECRET

Page 494
 SECRET

when you have something to add, but you have to give us the

whole contextual flow then, we’ll re-attack with any detailed

questions we have.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: I was the aircraft commander that night and

we were tasked to support a direct action mission from Team

(b)(3), (b)(6) for Objective Lefty Grove. As we understood it was a

direct action mission and it was an infil to an offset, so we

were to take off from Bagram here and were going to refuel with

Toxin on the air refueling track - which is to the east of

Bagram. After our refueling we were tasked to go over and pick

up the ground team; [inaudible] they were basically already

infilled and we were going to pick them up on their hike to the

objective. That was the tasking that we had understood, and so

we had start driving to the objective area and got an initial

update from (b)(3), (b)(6) , who was on station at the time and proceeded

to an echo orbit ---and we start making Comms with the JTAC on

the ground, (b)(3), (b)(6) at the time as well (b)(3), (b)(6) on station as

the Warden for the night and getting our update from that point.

SME-JSOAC: At that point the team had already been infilled and

they were making their movement to the objective?

IE: Yes sir.

SME-JSOAC: Okay.

SECRET

Page 495
 SECRET

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: At that point we checked in with (b)(3), (b)(6)

got his position, got eyes on his movement, and we also started

getting communication from (b)(3), (b)(6) who is AWT on-station at

the time who were kind of flying around the objective area, he

had PIDed several individuals that were around, I think it was

southern part of the main objective building North of—what was

series two-one?

NAVIGATOR: Going back a little bit, our on-station time that

night was 1845Z when we actually arrived on station. We checked

in with (b)(3), (b)(6) and then at 1856Z was the time that we had

for (b)(3), (b)(6) [inaudible] 8 pax North of building 110 and PID

of weapons-- basically they describe them as huddling up along

the wall North of 110 and then shortly thereafter they moved off

to the West approximately 100 to 120 meters to the next series

of compounds south of the road, and that’s when (b)(3), (b)(6)

actually cleared (b)(3), (b)(6) one to engage the 8 pax that they

identified. After hearing that (b)(3), (b)(6) was going to engage

those guys we immediately asked the (b)(3), (b)(6) if we could go

overhead. That way we could be watching from a point where we

would be ready to shoot if there were any additional squirters

that moved off the engagement site from (b)(3), (b)(6)

SECRET

Page 496
 SECRET

SME-JSOAC: So where were you guys physically? Over what piece

of terrain were you over then? So here is HLZ (b)(3), (b)(6) here’s

their engagement, here’s Lefty Grove.

NAVIGATOR: Yes sir, we were an(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

orbit at the time so we

were holding six miles off set from the ---.

SME-JSOACIO: Ok, so define(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4gwhat does that mean?

NAVIGATOR: Yes sir, basically from the target.

SME-JSOAC: Lefty Grove.

NAVIGATOR: From Lefty Grove, we were holding a six mile radius

and flying a counter clockwise wheel around the actual

objective.

SME-JSOAC: Ok, so this is your center of mass?

SECRET

Page 497
 SECRET

NAVIGATOR: Yes sir, and then when we asked ---overhead (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) gave us that clearance and we moved from a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

SME-JSOAC: So just to be able to provide fire support if

needed. Is this your standard TTP? (TTP Tactics, Technique and

Procedures).

NAVIGATOR: Yes Sir.

SME-JSOAC: Okay.

NAVIGATOR: Then at that point (b)(3), (b)(6) One engaged the eight

pax north of the building, 120 meters west of the actual of the

Lefty Grove target set, and we picked up two squirters that did

not get hit (or less injured than the rest of their other folks)

that the AWT engaged and we basically started following those

guys off to the northwest.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Really quick an important point I think at

this juncture is), we had requested to engage those two

individuals and we were denied----

IO: By the JTAC?

IE: By the JTAC, by (b)(3), (b)(6) I think you coordinated with

his (b)(3), (b)(6) ground force commander they had gotten denied.

The original engagement the AWT’s was looking at conducting on

those pax was a hell fire engagement; they elected to go to the

SECRET

Page 498
 SECRET

30 millimeter due to CDE constraints. We pushed 40 millimeter

engagements is a 0 CDE (CDE Collateral Damage Estimate) weapon

and we were denied that-- we were just requested to maintain

track on those two squirters that were moving west.

SME-JSOAC: Let me back up a little bit, all the products that

we are looking at here, all your graphics, all that stuff is

pushed to you where, in the air, or before you take off?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: In this scenario sir, we had the products

before we departed.

SME-JSOAC: What is your standard or is there--

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: The standard we have seen; it varies from

rotation to rotation, I’ve seen different things on different

trips, but from the Task Force this trip I have seen we get the

products approximately (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c prior to take off.

SME-JSOAC: Unless it’s a troops-in-contact responding kind of

thing, do you feel like you have pretty good situational

awareness when you get over the objective?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Absolutely

SME-JSOAC: And you said the (b)(3), (b)(6) provides your battle hand off

when you arrive?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Yes sir.

SME-JSOAC: What is the standard kind of talk through they give

you?

SECRET

Page 499
 SECRET

IE: They give us a stack update, they give us a general low-

down on the ground situation, the friendly positions, what phase

of the direction action mission they’re in, and then any enemy

threat type of information, so if they’ve got any pax or movers

they are maintaining track on, they will pass us locations of

those and any other pertinent details on the objective, grid

products that have changed or anything on the time line.

SME-JSOAC: And the (b)(3), (b)(6) stayed in the stack then correct? He

wasn’t departing. So he is controlling the stack and you are the

second fire support asset in addition to AWT? (Air Weapons Team)

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: In addition to the AWT.

SME-JSOAC: Okay.

NAVIGATOR: Just to clarify before we step to the aircraft we had

the concept of fires and we had the micro and macro GRG’s for

the operation as well as sensor de-confliction plan slide and

also the TF CASEVAC and the HLZ standard slide.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-JSOAC: [inaudible] so you guys are counted as a fire asset,

not an ISR asset-- Who is the sensor allocation for you guys?

Is it JTAC telling you what to look at or do you decide within

your own crew?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: It depends if there is a TAC-A (TAC-A

Tactical Air Controller—Airborne) in this case a (b)(3), (b)(6) , depends

on (b)(3), (b)(6) delegation to (b)(3), (b)(6) . If he is given the sensor

SECRET

Page 500
 SECRET

tasking to (b)(3), (b)(6) then (b)(3), (b)(6) can manage where the sensors are

looking. In this case it was (b)(3), (b)(6) that was telling us

where he wanted our sensors to be looking at and what kind of

posture-- defensive, offensive, neutral that type of

relationship.

SME-JSOAC: So we’ve got the two squirters coming off to the

North east, we already have the AWT engagement, kind of walk

through what happened after that.

NAVIGATOR: Basically like we said we were passing periodic

updates to (b)(3), (b)(6) the first one we passed was when the

squirters were 200 meters away and really it was about every 200

to 300 meters we were passing along updates. (b)(3), (b)(6) I guess

you talk to (b)(3), (b)(6) they said they didn’t want us to

engage; what he passed to us was that they wanted to follow

those guys and figure out where they stopped. And then find out

exactly where they were and then basically use that as a follow-

on after they were done clearing and securing the actual Lefty

Grove site.

SME-JSOAC: Okay.

NAVIGATOR: So basically we kept following them until they were

about two clicks away and then they finally stopped under a

piece of terrain, a small tree grove.

IO-DEP: Can you point that out on the map here?

SECRET

Page 501
 SECRET

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: So this is the initial engagement; you

follow this road up with the time stamps and continue to move up

and you can see there is plus numbers on here, they continue to

pick up additional personnel along their route. So we passed all

this to (b)(3), (b)(6) and they come up here and we kept following

north up into this general vicinity and at that point you can

talk about how they support.

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Before they gained access to that

piece of terrain up there, we maintained chain of custody the

SECRET

Page 502
 SECRET

entire time while tracking them. They were stopping, they were

moving tactically in the tree line, stopping at compounds,

picking up individuals and by the time they got to this piece of

terrain they had already had eight individuals total at that

time, so they had picked up six pax along the way.

IO-DEP: Okay.

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: And they were all moving

tactically, running, at that time.

SME-JSOAC: Your primary task at that point was to track these

guys and AWT still had over watch over the ground forces.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: AWT was still in the main objective area,

this is like what (the navigator) said, they were a couple of

clicks away from objective Lefty Grove. So AWT, (b)(3), (b)(6) , a couple

of ISR assets were still overhead the main area. And that’s,

primarily— there was two additional squirters that (b)(3), (b)(6) was

tracking in the objective area that they were initially ones the

ground team was going to go interdict. And they had “eyes on”

those set of squirters and we had “eyes on” this set of

squirters at 280. So they had two guys and we had these guys

right here. This is where kind of the hand off took place and

(the navigator) will describe that sequence.

NAVIGATOR: We had tracked continuous the squirters all the way

up the point where they stopped which is right here underneath

SECRET

Page 503
 SECRET

this, right underneath this, it’s hard to tell all this based on

this imagery, but there was actually pretty good drop off here.

It was a pretty good cliff. And there was a small tree here

that ran east to west. And they basically hid out under those

trees. From there---- we have (b)(3), (b)(6) was tasked, I

believe through the ground force commander, to go find the two

squirters that (b)(3), (b)(6) was tracking. So at this time we basically

swapped who was tracking what. So I believe the time was around

2010Z that night. So we gave (b)(3), (b)(6) the 280 squirters and then we

moved to pick up the 1A1 and 1A2 squirters, which were closer to

the Lefty Grove site.

SECRET

Page 504
 SECRET

SME-JSOAC: Just for the record here, can you guys define movers

versus squirters, that terminology and what it means to the

force?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-JSOAC: Not yet declared hostile or is he declared hostile?

SECRET

Page 505
 SECRET

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Not declared hostile he hasn’t shown any

hostile intent or hostile act, but we label him a squirter

because he is an individual who has left the target compound.

SME-JSOAC: Thanks.

NAVIGATOR: And in this case the squirter that we had tracked

came from the original site thatwere declared hostile by the

ground force command when AWT initially engaged them.

SME-JSOAC: Ok.

NAVIGATOR: We did the swap over [inaudible].

IO-DEP: So the two that you’re now tracking, that you got the

hand-off from (b)(3), (b)(6) , ares the two --- that’s not the two guys

that were left from the original eight where six were KIA.

NAVIGATOR: That’s the 280 series

IO-DEP: That’s the two – that (b)(3), (b)(6) has now picked up.

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Yes sir, the two that left the

engagement site that the AWT engaged, those are the two that met

up with individuals along their route [inaudible]. [Several

voice speaking at the same time] yeah it got to a total of eight

and they stopped in that tree line and that’s where (b)(3), (b)(6) picked

them up.

IO-DEP: Okay.

NAVIGATOR: We moved down to look at the 1A1/1A2 that was much

closer to the objective area, it was down in the green zone and

SECRET

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there was some really dense foliage. And we ended up losing

track on those guys. The (b)(3), (b)(6) element, they pushed

through what the last known location that we had them, it

appeared that both of those guys had been injured from the

initial AWT strikes, but they pushed through trying to find

those squirters. They weren’t able to, but they did find a

small hold-up site so basically they had SSE on that. They

found-- some bed rolls a couple of motorcycles and I believe

some cell phones that were there at that little hold up site,

but they were not able to find the actual squirters due to the

foliage in the area. After that was complete, we basically

moved our sensors back over to check on the 280 squirters and

then we saw three of the 280 squirters break off and head to the

west and then up to the north. We then labeled those guys 280

Bravo. So from the hold up site,[voice in back ground] from

their hold up site these 280 Bravo squirters moved to the west

and up to the north to a series of compounds about a hundred

meters or so north of their original hold up site.

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They initially came over here to the compound where we have the

triangle, it looked like they linked up with some folks who were

basically trying to get access to this building. After that was

done they went inside, they were in there for a very short

period of time, probably two or three minutes, and then it

looked like they got escorted over here to another building off

to the west. So we saw them go into that building, and then one

person walked back from this building, to the building where you

actually have the triangle here. And about that time is when we

actually heard that they were looking to send in the IRF or QRF

to land and interdict these pax that we had been tracking the

whole time.

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SME-JSOAC: Was there ever any--- when the discussion began on

inserting the IRF was there any feel that the initial ground

force was in danger and needed extra support, how would you

characterize the decision to insert the IRF.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: From our perspective the ground team was

not in any danger, and this will come out later in our

discussion, but this insertion was infilling to the follow on

HLZ as (b)(3), (b)(6) was conducting the call out on the 60 series

building separated by two and half clicks. So this was a follow

on tasking, not a QRF to help support their situation, it was

just a follow on tasking. That is from our perspective, which

is what we believe was the case.

SME-JSOAC: Okay.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: And what we were tracking on the aircraft

is that we believe that the ground force commander wanted to

figure out where those guys went, and once they were done on the

objective of Lefty Grove, they would move to figure out exactly

what those guys have been doing. But by that time they have

moved so far away, I think on the aircraft we were trying to

play “hey what is he thinking on the ground?” We were like, it’s

too far away for them to actually logically go and ground and do

a GAF (GAF Ground Aassault Force) to interdict these guys that

have gone so far away.

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SME-JSOAC: Okay.

[Inaudible] [several speakers]

NAVIGATOR: That was when they, (b)(3), (b)(6) , pax were moving

to interdict one alpha one and one alpha two, they did call

troops in contact. Basically what happened was the (b)(3), (b)(6)

element was moving towards the known location of the squirters,

one alpha one and one alpha two. One alpha one and one alpha two

pax stopped, turned around and I believe they shot at (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) element as they were moving towards them.

SME-JSOAC: Was this when you guys were over the top or was

(b)(3), (b)(6) directly over the top then?

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: At this point DRACO was over the

top [inaudible]

SME-JSOAC: You all swapped back? – [several voices speaking at

same time].

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Yeah it was prior to the swap, and

then once they started getting troops in contact that’s when

they decided to switch.

SME-JSOAC: Okay, because you are a fire support asset.

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Absolutely. Voice in back ground

speaking “if that was on the main objective or that”

SME-JSOAC: Right I understand.

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NAVIGATOR: So we watched the squirters go into the building at

this time (b)(3), (b)(6) had moved out to escort Extortion into the

HLZ (b)(3), (b)(6) -- after we got all information passed to us about

where the HLZ actually was going to be and their route of

flight.

SME-JSOAC: Who passed you that information?

CCopilot The (b)(3), (b)(6) flight had gone to FARP so they were off

station and we were the only fires asset overhead, and we had

helo common up so we could talk to those guys while they’re

FARPing and we had coordinated a plan that when (b)(3), (b)(6)

flight had come back-- we would use our laser to designate this

280 Bravo series so they could get their eyes on. What we were

thinking in the aircraft at the time, correct me if I’m wrong,

but we were thinking those were the biggest threat to the infil,

these 280 Bravo guys. We wanted to have (b)(3), (b)(6) eyes on

these guys before anything happened.

SME-JSOAC: Did (b)(3), (b)(6) go to FARP? Was this part of the

normal routine or was it because you have decided the infil the

IRF and they wanted to be topped off?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: I can’t say whether or not this is to lead

into the QRF, but typically that is what we see, they FARP at

some point in the middle of the mission and would come back for

the exfil.

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SME-JSOAC: Okay.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: So at that point it look they were

posturing for this follow on or to exfil, and it happened to be

a follow on they were posturing for

IO-DEP: One question, so right now, you had earlier stated that

this is the main threat to the IRF infil—you haven’t identified

any other persons of interest or anyone that displayed hostile

intent other than what was going on in this series of building?

SME-JSOAC: And this series of buildings is about two clicks

away from, we are talking about 6, 3, 7 (gridline 637) or so if

I’m reading this correct.

[Inaudible - several conversations taking place]

NAVIGATOR: Down in here.

SME-JSOAC: About a click and a half from--

NAVIGATOR: From the actual crash site, it looked like the LZ

was about 600 meters from the actual location of the 280 bravo

pax and the crash site was about 500 to 600 meters away.

SME-JSOAC: So 600 meters southeast of the HLZ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c were the

squirters you were tracking.

NAVIGATOR: Yes sir.

SME-JSOAC: Okay.

[Inaudible - voice speaking in the back ground]

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AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: So like what (the copilot) was saying, we

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

series of compounds. They called capture on our LST spot and

then they were looking around in the area and this was all

happening about two to three minutes prior to the infil. I

forget what the original infil plan was going to be. It ended

up being approximately 2010, I think it was closer to 2000 when-

- I’m sorry it was 1950, I think originally, and there was a

little confusion when we were picking up on helo common on where

the HLZ was going to be. We had copied HLZ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cand the

coordinates for that so we started looking at that area and

typically we scan out to five hundred meters around the HLZ

area, which we were doing. The initial run in heading for the

Helos was going to be from the west to east, so we were tracking

that.

SME-JSOAC: West to east, okay.

[Inaudible - several voices speaking at the same time]

SME JSOAC: Who passed you the HLZ coordinates? Where did you

get that from?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: It was from Extortion on Helo common.

SME-JSOAC: Okay.

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AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: [inaudible] was Extortion up on fires

(fire control direction radio net) so a lot of this was going

down on Helo common and co pilot was monitoring that, and it

seemed from our perspective a little confusion on exactly where

the HLZ was going to be, they had mentioned an offset, is this

going to be HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

? Then they confirmed HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cthose

were the coords we were tracking that so they were on the same

page, but this was very close to the infil time. So things kind

of slid a little bit to the right. We had coordinated with the

Helos that we were going to the burn down at H minus one so we

had one of our sensors on the HLZ and the other sensor on

squirter 280 bravo which we perceived as the greatest threat.

That was the reason the team was infilling so we wanted to

maintain eyes on the position, while AWT was providing a

defensive scan around the Helos.

DEP-IO: So you guys had the HLZ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

, you had the squirter

location for 280 Bravo, and AWT had the responsibility for at

least visually escorting the IRF, Extortion 17 into the HLZ.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Yes sir.

NAVIGATOR: The actual brief that we got on helo common that we

were passed (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c as the HLZ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

coordinates and then there was a little bit of confusion—the

other thing that we got in our conversation [inaudible] was

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there going to be thirty eagles, 280 land heading on the LZ

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6) was the JTAC on board they were going to be using

FD-3 (FD- Fire Direction net) primary was the initial plan, and

the initial infil time was going to be 2150.

SME-JSOAC: Did you get a communication check with the JTAC in

the back of the airplane or has that?

NAVIGATOR: Yes, I talked to the JTAC two three minutes prior to

the aircraft going down and the reason –

SME-JSAOC: On the fires net?

NAVIGATOR: We were talking on FD-2 at the time; (b)(3), (b)(6)

did not have good comms With (b)(3), (b)(6) on FD-3 and his big

concern was if you couldn’t talk to him on FD-3 that they would

get on the ground and they would have any fire support.

SME-JSOAC: Who is (b)(3), (b)(6) ?

NAVIGATOR: (b)(3), (b)(6) was the JTAC on board the Extortion

helo.

SME-JSOAC: Ok

NAVIAGTOR: So, I was talking with (b)(3), (b)(6) , FD-3 was not

working so basically his intent was to maintain one single fires

net, we were going to do everything on FD-2. So he relayed to

me to tell (b)(3), (b)(6) we are going to work on FD-2 so make sure

----and they were---- (b)(3), (b)(6) was up on FD-2. So, I

reiterated that to them so FD-3 was completely out of the

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picture both (b)(3), (b)(6) were going to operate

on a single fires frequency on FD-2.

IO-DEP: Did (b)(3), (b)(6) establish comms on FD-2 with

(b)(3), (b)(6) prior----?

NAVIGATOR: I don’t know that he was ever able to contact

(b)(3), (b)(6) I know that (b)(3), (b)(6) had coms with (b)(3), (b)(6) ,

I don’t know if the AWT had comes with him or not.

IO-DEP: OK thank you.

IE: Extortion had comms with (b)(3), (b)(6) from helicopter to

helicopter on helo common.

[inaudible - several voices talking in the back ground]

NAVIGATOR: Like we said we had one sensor on the 280 Bravo, we

had the television on the LZ and then we end up putting the burn

on when we heard the one minute call and then that’s when I

believe the pilot and the left scanner saw the RPG launch.

AICRAFT COMMANDER: To back up, we got a three minute out call

from Extortion and so we were getting ready, it was zero illum

that night, so I’m on NVG’s searching for the Helos, I can see

the AWT because they are sitting there with their strobes just

moving around the objective area.

SME-JSOAC: How high AGL (above ground level) are you?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: I think we are roughly 7 to 8 AGL [7000 to

8000] that night. I was looking for the 47, I couldn’t see

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their location, but I could see the AWT moving around. They

called three minutes out, so we are trying to figure out, we’ve

got the HLZ, we are getting ready to put the burn on and we are

just sitting there waiting. A normal one minute, we are waiting

two minutes for that one minute out call to put the burn on and

just waiting, and we don’t know exactly what is going on, but we

talk about making comms with the 47 but if they are trying to

work something out, so if it keeps going we don’t want to bother

them in this critical phase of flight, so we’re going to just

let them continue to move around. And they’re changing their

run-in heading it sounded like, they are coming from the

Northwest now and so there was that delay and then we heard the

one minute out call, put the burn on. Shortly after the burn

came on we saw- I saw three RPG shots, kind of just ripple--

one, two, three--coming from the south to the north, I was in

the southern part of the orbit and I saw, what I saw was either

the first or second one make an initial hit, and just a massive

explosion, and it just seemed to be stationary and it just

dropped.

SME-JSOAC: From your perspective, did it explode in the air and

then drop, or?

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AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: It was so close to the ground; there wasn’t

much movement from what I could tell, but it seemed to just stay

stationary.

SMNE-JSOAC: Did you ever visually pick up Extortion 17 before

the RPGs were launched?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: No.

IO-DEP: No one on the crew did? No one picked them up?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: No they were completely lights out and zero

illum.

IO-DEP: OK.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: It was pretty much impossible to see them

from our distance.

IO-DEP: You didn’t see the aircraft spinning; do you think

that is a function of your perspective overhead; you might have

missed that; is it possible that you might have missed that?

SME-JSAOC: From your left your seat you’re south of the

objective, kind of looking across looking this way ----.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Yes, see here is the crash I saw, was

approximately on this part of the orbit looking up like this.

For instance tonight the illum is really good and I can see the

Helos and I can see their shadow, so if there was any kind of

movement rotating, I would be able to see that. But on that

night there was no illum at all. So I was only able to see

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lights; I couldn’t even make out this road, or any of these

buildings, or these little crevass or this little stream down

there, it was completely dark.

SME-JSOAC: Any cultural lighting in this area at all?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: No, not-hardly at all, I don’t remember

hardly any cultural lighting even in the objective area; I think

it was all pretty much black.

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: When he called that he saw RPGs

come up, I turned off the burn, slid over to him, and that’s

when I saw the third RPG. And, the third RPG had already

started coming out of the tube when the Helo was already on the

deck -- it was already on the ground -- impacted with the

ground. And, at that point, I mean, the first or second one had

to have hit it, and it was a massive fireball. I mean, it just

lit up.

IO-DEP: In the air? From what --

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: It had to have, yeah because --

LEFT SCANNER: -- I was sitting left scanner, I have a single

monocle that I look out of-- NVGs so I had like one eye that’s

just looking normal, and one eye looking through the NVG. From

my perspective the second RPG did hit directly. It made direct

contact with the helicopter.

IO-DEP: The first RPG?

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LEFT SCANNER: The second RPG.

IO-DEP: The second RPG; I’m sorry.

LEFT SCANNER: I think the first RPG went underneath the

helicopter, from my perspective. The second one did make a

direct hit with the helicopter and there was a fairly large

explosion in the air, but it was split seconds between the time

the helicopter was hit. There was that explosion, and then it

hit the ground and then there was an explosion.

SME-JSOAC: How many RPGs -- well, assessed RPG launches did you

personally see?

LEFT SCANNER: Three.

SME-JSOAC: You saw three?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Yes, I saw three. Yes, sir.

SME-JSOAC: Okay, at this point, (TELEVSION SENSOR OPERATOR,

you’re focused on your TV on the HLZ; correct?

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Yes, sir.

SME-JSOAC: And working the burn?

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Yes, sir.

SME-JSOAC: And then what did you do after when you heard this

chatter?

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: As soon as the pilot called the

RPGs, I turned off the burn, I slide over to dead nuts; that’s

what we call in the aircraft, which is 0 in azimuth, -20 in

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elevation which puts me directly about where his (the aircraft

commander) HUD (Heads up display) is.

SME-JSOAC: You’re guiding him?

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Absolutely, yes. So, when I slid

over there, I saw the fireball on the ground. The third RPG

came out and shortly after, probably 10 or 20 seconds after AWT

put down suppressive fire right next to the same location where

that RPG came out of.

IO DEP: So, you think they were fairly close to where the

point of origin from the RPG attack when the AWT put down

suppressive fire?

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Yes, sir. We watched the AWT video

a few days later and we found out that it was the second ship

that was -- it came in and saw the explosions, the pilot saw it,

talked the sensor on to it and then they put down suppressive

fire.

SME-JSOAC: From your perspective as the crew, do you know

where the AWT was when the RPGs were shot physically on the --

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: I think one was to the north, but I

couldn’t say where the other one was based on [inaudible] --

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Yeah, the aspect that we saw the

video, the AWT, yeah, one was over here on this side of the

orbit so it had to be off the East.

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IO-DEP: The east --

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: The east; yeah --

SME-JSOAC: But, you didn’t see him though? This all

[inaudible] --

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Negative. I’m guessing the other

AWT was behind the other aircraft because he was calling the HLZ

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ) and he also said that

this area was clear around it, so --

IO-DEP: Okay, let me ask you a question. Prior to this

mission, how many RPG launches have you witnessed on other

objectives?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: I’d say on four different objectives. I’ve

seen four different RPG launches.

IO-DEP: Okay, so you’ve seen several RPG launches on other

objectives before this?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: And, I can classify this as a bright comet-

like, with glowing sparks leading to a trail.

IO-DEP: Okay, so you’re fairly confident this was an RPG type

weapon system --

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Yes, sir.

IO-DEP: -- not a man-pad or anything like that. Is that what

you saw?

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AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: I’ve seen man-pads launched before and it’s

very different than this. This is more ground-to-ground, you

can tell they’re not aiming up.

IO-DEP: Right.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: It’s aspect, in that you can just see that

bright glow with the sparks, kind of trailing after it.

IO-DEP: Okay, so from your perspective there was no doubt in

your mind --

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: That’s why I called it out, “I just got RPG

fire to the north.”

SME-JSOAC: Based on what your experience --

LEFT SCANNER: I’ve seen multiple RPGs on multiple deployments

launched at ground forces, as well as helicopters.

IO-DEP: And you concur that it was an RPG?

LEFT SCANNNER: Yes, sir.

IO-DEP: Okay.

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: And to make this known as well, the

next mission that we did after this, there was a Helo that was

infilling and got launched at with an RPG, the very next mission

that we had, and it was confirmed by AWT that it was an RPG and

it was the exact same sight -- or exact same --

IO-DEP: Signature?

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TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: --signature as what we saw on this

flight, so --

IO-DEP: Okay, so --

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: -- there was no doubt in our minds

that night it was RPGs.

SME-JSOAC: Okay. So, now walk us through the steps what

happened with your crew from the time the Extortion impacted the

ground.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Initially, our main focus was to try

establish comms with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and to provide security around the

crash site. So, we immediately --- both sensors came back and

started doing a defensive scan around the crash site. This is

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

the compound, on the backside of a wall. So, that was an area

of focus. We pointed that out to the AWT who was in the area

and we continued to scan around the crash site and attempting to

make COMs. At the same time, the electronic warfare officer was

making COMs -- back COMs back home station letting them know

that we had a Helo down and that we weren’t sure if there were

survivors until but we were wanting to spin up Dust-Off,

initially because we weren’t sure if there was anyone that

survived --

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SME-JSOAC: When you said home station, are you talking about

through (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c or who are you --

Electronic Warfare Officer: Immediately, sir, I talked in the

MIRC room for the operation itself and getting on SATCOM talking

back to the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Detachment) making sure that I got a hold of our mission

commander here or anybody down in the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

. Started spinning

up CSAR and getting Dust-Off out there, passed him the grids and

we have our MIRC chat for all this; I’ve got it up here right

now also. Immediately passing grids, saying that we need CSAR,

QRF took RPG, and immediately asked other assets in the air to

shift their eyes to the crash site; scan for hostiles and

communicating with(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

to coordinate a HLZ for exfil of any

type of downed personnel if there are any survivors.

SME-JSOAC: Okay.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: This may be a point worth mentioning. We

were under the impression that (b)(3), (b)(6) . These are

the call signs that we heard on Helo common.

ELECTRONCI WARFARE OFFICER: We never heard 17 until we started

seeing emails days later.

IO-DEP: Yeah, I understand.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: But, yeah, immediately after the Helo went

down the -- we’re just trying to analyze where this RPG we

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believe came from. On the northeast side of this building there

was a turret, almost like a man-made defensive fighting position

on top of a building that was elevated about 20 to 30 feet. It

definitely had about a three or four foot wall in front, rounded

off, had good line of sight, good 360 coverage for that entire

valley basically, and just below that -- actually on the ground

level, I think all of those buildings were probably about two or

three stories tall. On the ground level there was a lot of

movement going on --

SME-JSOAC: So, you changed your sensors then from -- you’d

taken them off the squirters? You’ve got one on the infil sight

and one on the POO (point of origin)?

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Yes, sir. It was the TV operator.

As I slaved over there and saw the third RPG, so the AWT hit a

suppressive fire. I immediately called for the IR Sensor

operator to slave to me and once he slaved to me, he put a

sensor directly where I was looking into -- right on this

compound and we have labeled as the POO and immediately we

picked up personnel on top of the roof handing off objects. We

can’t identify what the objects were, but they were handing off

objects to the lower levels and they were getting down on those

levels and then there was increased activity, up to like 6 to 8

personnel, and they were running around the compounds. I have

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no idea what kind of equipment that they were carrying. We were

trying to get AWT’s eyes on to PID (positively identify) or try

to figure out what their intent was, but the entire time the

infrared sensor operator was tracking that.

SME-JSOAC: Okay.

Fire Control Officer: Our infrared guy, he’s not here tonight

with us. He’s on another flight, but basically for my sensor

allocation, I try and let these guys know what we need to look

at. This is basically part of my job as a weaponeering, sensor

allocation portion. So, to go back a little bit when we were

basically checking out the HLZ for AWT and for Extortion, I had

IR give me a good sweep of the entire area because we didn’t

have anybody over there, like the aircraft commander was saying

and the navigator; I mean everybody was over the objective area

and they were getting ready to do a callout, or actions on over

there. So, basically we tried to do what we could in the short

amount of time that we had because, you know, we knew the QRF

was spinning up. The aircraft commander was the one that

actually designated us to go overhead because we hadn’t been

tasked with this mission. So, as soon as we had original eyes-

on, knew the whereabouts of 280B, basically the television

sensor operator and the IR Sensor operator. Basically, they did

their best to try to figure out what was going on in the general

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vicinity of the area because we advertise our aircraft right now

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

snesore operator could probably speak more to it. I’m still new

to the air craft, but anyway, our capabilities for scanning --

SME-JSOAC: That’s the same ball as a (b)(3), (b)(6) , I think, isn’t it?

FIRE CONTROL OPERATOR: Yeah.

SME-JSOAC: Okay, so it’s pretty good capability?

FIRE CONTROL OFFICER: Yeah.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Really good during the daylight. We could

probably get into, but that’s probably a different discussion.

FIRE CONTROL OFFICER: Yeah, and we obviously can’t PID with

it, so anyway, the TV was basically focused on HLZ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cwhen

the teams were coming in. Normally, we have IR kind of scanning

out and giving us a good heads-up on what’s going on around the

area. Also, the pilot is a visual scanner so he can let us know

and talk us on to any kind of tracer fire or RPG or anything

like that. So, it was kind of not normal operations for us to

lock both of our sensors down at two different locations because

it’s kind of asking for us to be kind of vulnerable, I guess.

We put our teams in a vulnerable spot, so with that, I mean,

that was kind of hard for us to swallow because we couldn’t have

eyes-on and that’s why our pilot had to talk everybody on and

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our visual sensors had to let everybody know what was going on

because we were basically south of what was going on from

everything else. Our eyes were somewhere else, so that’s why

our hands were tied as far as that goes.

IO-DEP: Okay. Thank you.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: The plan that we had was for AWT to escort

the Helos in and they pointed out that a point where we were

tracking a 380B so we had clearly coordinated with them, “this

is what we are looking at” and “this is where we think the

threat is” and they’ve got primary task, this group of Helos.

That was the contract going in. It was a little non-standard,

but, in our opinion, was talking about in the crew, it seemed

just rushed and we were trying to figure out why exactly it was

being so rushed for those eight individuals.

IO-EP: Okay.

NAVIGATOR: I think on station, at this time, we had (b)(3), (b)(6)

and then (b)(3), (b)(6) and then ourselves, and I think at this point

Draco was gone because this was after 2100.

SME-JSOAC: (b)(3), (b)(6) correct? (b)(3), (b)(6) is a --

NAVIGATOR:
(b)(6)

SME-JSOAC: the contractor.

NAVIGATOR: Yup.

SME-JSOAC: Okay. Is (b)(3), (b)(6) controlling the stack?

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NAVIGATOR: They were Warden I believe.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: I think they were. No, they definitely were

because they were controlling once the Helo went down. We

declared on scene commander at that point.

SME-JSOAC: Okay, did you make that declaration yours because of

your situational awareness or did (b)(3), (b)(6) give you that? Okay,

so you were the guys with the best information at the time so

you just said --

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: From the ground point, there was very

clearly coordinated from the air point. (b)(3), (b)(6) was still

trying -- they were, I guess unfamiliar with on-scene commander

and what responsibilities we were trying to establish at that

point. But, we had HAWG (A-10) check in to the stack who was

(b)(3), (b)(6) qualified so they called back and we had anticipated our

contract is when (b)(3), (b)(6) shows up they’ve got on-scene commander.

But we’ll establish on-scene commander, initially we’ve got the

best SA, and you know the most people on the aircraft, and

that’s why we have the best SA so that’s why we established that

once HAWG got on scene.

SME-JSOAC: And just for the record, the (b)(3), (b)(6) crew is a

contract crew it’s not military crew.

DEP-IO: One question, just so I’m clear in my mind, and for

the record, the first two RPG shots were in very close

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proximity, verse in time and the third was a little bit delayed.

I heard the air craft was on the ground [inaudible]

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: If it was, it was, it wasn’t by anything

substantial --

IO-DEP: In seconds, if you could -- What would you say? Two

seconds? Three seconds?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Yeah. One fire, two fire, three fire. You

know, that’s about how quickly it went.

IO-DEP: Okay. Thank you.

LEFT SCANNER: The third RPG traveled further, because it looked

like it fired over the helicopter because it had already gone

down. But, it traveled further, so the TV, it’s definitely

easier for him to pick up that third one because it was --

SME-JSOAC: Same point of origin, but since it missed, it went

farther.

LEFT SCANNER: Right.

IO-DEP: In your estimation, and I don’t want to put words in

your mouth, so correct me.

LEFT SCANNER: Yes, sir.

IO-DEP: That the aircraft was on the ground when the third RPG

passed over

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: [inaudible] – that’s confirmed.

Yeah, it was definitely on the ground.

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IO-DEP: When the third RPG --

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Confirmed. Yes, sir.

IO-DEP: So, we’re talking a couple of seconds? Is that true?

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Yeah, it is.

IO-DEP: We’re trying to capture from the time it impact to how

long it was on the ground is what I’m getting at.

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: As soon as that RPG impacted it, it

went immediately down, because when I slaved over to it, to find

that RPG -- or when I saw it, it was already on the ground.

That spot -- That explosion spot never moved at any point so it

was already in the ravine and it was already on the ground.

SME-JSOAC: Do your sensors bloom out like NVGs do or -- What

could you see?

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: To an extent. The television has a

lot more resistance to the blooming effect. We even have

filters on our camera that we can go into to decrease that whole

blooming effect. But, when I slaved over to it, I didn’t go

into the separate filter, but it wasn’t bloomed out at that

point. You could see the explosion very clearly and you could

see the point of origin where the RPG came through. So, at that

point, there’s no doubt in my mind exactly where it came from

and the Helo is on the deck.

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IO-DEP: Another question; and this is just for the record, but

there are no recordings of this?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: No, sir. We have a BDA (Battle Damage

Assessment) drive, however it’s unreliable and it didn’t work.

The indications that you saw they had to get actually

[inaudible] --

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4e, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4e, (b)(1)1.4g . When the BDA recorder is not working, the

record button and the stop button are grayed out, so basically

you do not have the option to click them and this night that we

were on the aircraft we tried resetting the BDA hard drive.

It’s basically a solid state, I believe it’s a 32 gigabyte solid

state hard drive. Really all we can do is pull it out and reset

it to try to make it work. We tried that and I still had the

same indications. We also have a back-up hard press button on

the FCO (Fire Control Officer) station. We tried pushing that

and we got nothing. So, there was no way to trouble shoot any

further to get our BDA drive to work.

IO-DEP: Okay. Got it. Thank you.

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SME-JSOAC: Alright, Aircraft commander, when you declared

yourself on-scene commander, who were you talking to then and

was there contact back with TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

or Team (b)(3), (b)(6) ?

Electronic Warfare Officer: I announced it in the MIRC window

room so and every other person involved with that room,

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

which is command and control of every player at the objective,

but shortly after the Helo went down, that I announced it in

that (b)(3), (b)(6) head-on scene command.

SME-JSOAC: They acknowledged that in MIRC? Did they --

ELECTRONIC WARFARE OFFICER: (b)(3), (b)(6) copied.

SME-JSOAC: Alright, and then what?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Basically at that point, we’re working with

(b)(3), (b)(6) and still trying to establish comms unsuccessfully.

That was the extent really of the on-scene commander checklist--

establish COMs with the ground team to try and get their

situation passed and pass it on to C2 and it’s really -- there

wasn’t any of that we could establish so our next priority was

to sanitize the area around them, prevent anybody approaching

the crash site and if anyone had, we would have provided

suppressive fires to make sure that area remained clear.

IO-DEP: Okay, another question again, just for the record, but

you’re fairly confident that the POO was in this built up area

here, and not anywhere here in this tree line, or –

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Being that dark, I saw the lights coming

from some region in here and that’s when I talked the TV

operator on to it so he could see better than my perspective

[inaudible] .

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Yes, sir. As soon as I went over

there to that third RPG volley, it’s the exact area. It was in

this compound right here and the suppressive fire came from AWT;

this is the aspect that I was looking at it. And, as we came

around, you could clearly see the crash site and that’s when I

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saw the third RPG volley and then this is where AWT kind of

strafed right there and puts suppressive fire down.

SME-JSOAC: What’s your confidence level the POO was from this

compound?

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: It’s 90 percent. Just because of

the illum, I can’t say 100 percent because I can’t pick out

exactly what compound, but as soon as the infrared operator

slaved to me, that’s the exact same spot, and our slaving that

night was within 10 meters.

IO-DEP: One more question on that. So -- I’m trying to word

this so I’m not putting words in your mouth, but--

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Yes, sir.

IO-DEP: You were able to observe the launch signature of these

three RPG shots. Would that lead you to believe there was no

over-head cover? You had a direct shot at where they launched

from? What I’m getting at is that the signature wasn’t under

trees by your estimation or something like that masked it?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Yes, sir, and I can speak to this, I can

speak to the signature of what I saw, -- what I saw was a bright

light coming from the point of origin, I believe, I could see

that complete trail, of sparks leading from the RPG. So, there

wasn’t -- if you’re asking if it was under cover, I would say

no, because I could see --

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IO-DEP: There was no --

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: --a complete track of an RPG from its point

of origin to impacting.

IO-DEP: Okay, great. That clears it up.

FIRE CONTROL OFFICER: Just to let you know, sir, also what

the navigator was saying, the architecture of that structure on

basically had castle-like, circular -- I don’t even know --

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Columns, it looked like --

(b)(3), (b)(6) : --yeah, column formation. So, they’re vantage

point was by far better than just merely standing in a tree

line.

SME-JSOAC: And that piece was elevated above the rest of the

compound?

FIRE CONTROL OFFICER: Oh, absolutely. It was definitely --

SME-JSOAC: Like a look-out tower, kind of?

FIRE CONTROL OFFICER: Yeah, it was definitely third or fourth

story.

IO-DEP: So, they shot from a third or fourth story?

FIRE CONTROL OFFICER: if you were putting it into story

level. I mean, it was a lot of higher than the second floor

that we had viewed everyone having [inaudible] --

NAVIGATOR: The elevation of the terrain here also increases

pretty significantly.

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IO-DEP: Oh, does it?

NAVIGATOR: I think the difference between --

SME-JSOAC: This is high ground here? That’s a drop off?

FIRE CONTROL OFFICER: Yes.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

NAVIGATOR: Yes, sir. So, the ground level at the bottom of

the wadi here, going up to this building is probably about, I

would say 15 to 20 feet difference. So, not only do you have

the difference in elevation from the bottom of the valley there

to the bottom of the compound, but you also have the elevation

difference with the turret, where we believe they actually shot

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these RPGs from. So, you know probably in reality you’re

looking at about 50 feet difference from the top of this turret

to the bottom of the wadi. So, depending upon the altitude of

the Helo, you know, I don’t know what the angle of the shot

would have been, but it could have been very well level to, you

know, plus 10 to 20 degrees; somewhere in that range.

IO-DEP: Based on the accuracy of the RPG shots, would you

assess -- or could render your opinion on whether they had night

vision goggles or anything like that.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER : I would say yes, and that’s only because

they were fairly far away and the shot was maybe what, 6 - 700

meters?

[background conversations]

NAVIGATOR: Well, actually from where we assessed the POO to the

crash site was about 150 meters.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: I thought it was a little farther than

that, but from my perspective, seeing that I couldn’t see the

Helos, and I was on NVGs, I would say that they weren’t just

shooting at noise, from the accuracy that they had, but that’s

just my estimation.

IO-DEP: Right, I understand. Okay.

ASDAT2: You said that Qalat didn’t have a lot of lights?

There’s no --

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AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: No, sir.

IO-DEP: So, no cultural lighting that would have indicated they

were back light coming in there at all?

[no verbal response]

ASDAT2: And when the shot was taken you were already burning?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: They called one minute out, so we but the

burning out?

NAVIGATOR: Our burn is probably roughly the equivalent to the

size of a football field and we’re down here to the south on HLZ

(b)(3), (b)(6) . I don’t believe there’s any way that our burn could

have highlighted the aircraft.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: And we were coming from the south so it

wasn’t going --

ELECTRONIC WARFARE OFFICER: Just to try and paint the picture

here, the football field that the navigator was talking about

right here--our vantage point being about over here, so that

stream of light is coming down this way to Helo crash site, so

they would --

ASDAT2: Opposite side of the water.

SME-JSOAC: What’s your communication with the helicopter

normally on that? Do they say, “got burn” or do you have any --

do they acknowledge that or is there a --

AIRCAFT COMMANDER: Typically, no.

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SME-JSOAC: Okay.

FIRE CONTROL OFFICER: They’ll just tell us to --

NAVIGATOR: To turn off when you get there?

FIRE CONTROL OFFICER: Yes.

IO-DEP: You received -- just for the record -- no

acknowledgement from Extortion 17 of the burn?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: No, sir.

SME-JSOAC: Alright, how long did you all stay on the target

after mishap.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

SME-JSOAC: So, about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c after that. Alright, anything

else significant during that time that you saw?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Enemy activity; No, sir. We just saw the

activity behind the wall and continued to maintain eyes-on, but

no other activity.

SME-JSOAC: No signs of life from the mishap point?

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Negative, sir. The only thing that

the infrared operator was picking up when he went to the crash

site was an individual who got ejected from the Helo and he was

to the southwest. He was still in the tree line right there,

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but he had got ejected probably about 10 meters and his body was

fully intact.

IO-DEP: Did you see the body get progressively cooler over that

period?

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Yes, sir.

FIRE CONTROL OFFICER: I saw it as cool.

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: There’s actually a video of that.

Somebody recorded our feed that was coming out and there’s about

a 10, 20 second clip of that track right there. I’m not sure

who recorded that, but it’s on the(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

.

SME-JSOAC: Okay, you all have it? Okay.

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Yes, sir.

NAVIGATOR: The other thing also that came up, (b)(3), (b)(6) came

in on -- I forget the call sign of the Helo -- When they came

in, I don’t believe they had COMs with anybody. So, we were

trying to reach them on line of site on FD2 --

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: --CSAR-A we had--

NAVIGATOR: Yeah, we had CSAR-A. Basically when the (b)(3), (b)(6)

came in on the Helo, they came in from a different --

SME-JSOAC: Did you know they were coming inbound? Did you

expect them?

NAVIAGTOR: We knew they were coming inbound, but nobody had

COMs with them.

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ELECTRONIC WARFARE OFFICER: [inaudible][several speakers]—

That’s the (b)(3), (b)(6) Flight—a two ship of UH-60s, backed up by

another two ship of UH-60s, but the other two of which never

showed up.

SME-JSOAC: And you got that from MIRC, or how did you guys know

that?

ELECTRONIC WARFARE OFFICER: That was all over MIRC, and we have

all those logs if you want those.

IO-DEP: Did you submit those? Did they take copies of the

MIRC?

ELECTRONCI WARFARE OFFICER: They did.

SME-JSOAC: They’re in our files.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: As well as these story boards that we’re

talking about.

NAVIGATOR: But, yes; once they landed -- they landed basically

in the vicinity of HLZ (b)(3), (b)(6) and then the Pathfinders moved

their way up. This was already by the time (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6)

were already pretty much onto the crash site, already by the

time the Pathfinders came in; but, that being said, nobody had

contact with them and they basically -- the Pathfinders moved up

into the crash site which was already being secured by the

Rangers without talking to them. So, that was one concern that

we had and they basically infilled--I want to say it was about

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10 - 15 minutes before we actually left, so they were on the

ground. They were moving towards the crash site and then we

left.

SME-JSOAC: Okay, so give me the whole tactical situation on the

ground when you guys cleared off.

NAVIGATOR: Okay, so when we cleared off, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6)

had already made their foot patrol all the way up to the crash

site, so they moved the two kilometers all the way up until

Extortion went down. It took them about 45 minutes once they

realized that their mission had shifted from Lefty Grove to this

Fallen Angel. So, they basically came up along the road that’s

on the east side of the wadi here, and they came up to this

point almost due east of the crash site, and then came down

through the wadi over to the crash site.

SME-JSOAC: Okay, so both ground elements had linked up and they

were at the --

NAVIGATOR: This was (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) so all the friendly

forces that were on Lefty Grove had moved up here. By the time

that they were within 100 meters of the crash site I believe is

when (b)(3), (b)(6) came in to drop off the Pathfinders and then

shortly thereafter we left, so when we departed station there

were -- the Rangers had already gotten to the crash site and

started securing that. The (b)(3), (b)(6) were on the ground at

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that point. We had Hawg 73 with (b)(3), (b)(6) and had passed on scene

commander to (b)(3), (b)(6) we had (b)(3), (b)(6) was still on station.

(b)(3), (b)(6) was on station. -- Chapman, ISR – (b)(3), (b)(6)

came to rip us out. So they were also on station.

IO-DEP: Is there anything you’d like to add anything we should

have asked? Any points of clarification?

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: No, sir. The only thing that I

would like to add was during this entire time after the flight

went down, and we’re doing our defensive scan, we scanned all

the way to the south, we scanned to the north, we scanned

everything and the only activity that we ever had was from the

POO site. There were people running around, handing objects

back and forth. Running back and forth between little buildings

like sheds and compounds and things like that and, like I said,

we saw those objects they were handing down from the roof --

SME-JSOAC: How long did that activity sustain itself post

impact?

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: We saw it all the way until the

point that we left.

SME-JSOAC: Okay, so there was activity in that compound

[inaudible] --

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Yes, sir, and that was the only

activity that we saw in this set of compounds and the one to the

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north. We searched everywhere just making sure that no one was

going to try to make their way towards the crash site, and be

prepared to do anything about that situation whatever arose.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: One thing I’d like to point out too, is

normally we -- well, not normally-- we’d like to roll with the

Direct Support officer, a Hobbit we call it, he has capability

to monitor push to talk and things of that nature. We were not

able to have a DSO for that sortie on this particular night,

however, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c did arrive on station. They were

saying they had a lot activity in a certain range. I’m not sure

if they were using push-to-talks in this entire region to

coordinate their activity, but it’s something that I think needs

to be at least addressed or looked into.

SME-JSOAC: No, that’s good. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Yes, sir.

SME-JSOAC: They came on scene sometime during your coverage.

NAVIGATOR: After the Helo went down and prior to our departure

of station.

SME-JSOAC: Did they have a DSO on board or just part of their

suite?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: No, sir; part of their suite. They had a

whole booth in the back that --

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TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: I believe all their traffic was on

MIRC as well?

ELECTRONIC WARFARE OFFICER: Yeah, their information, as they

passed showed up in the MIRC room so on the logs that you have.

So, the first message we received from them was the one, if you

look in the logs, talks about planning an attack on the downed

Helo.

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: And there’s another message saying

that two individuals are starting to brag over the net and they

actually said their names over there too.

[The interview was concluded.]

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Interview of the 1/B (PL, PSG, JTAC, RECCE) and TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
at FOB
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD: BG Jeffrey N. Colt, US

Army

MH-47 ADVISOR SME-MH-47

GROUND FORCE ARMY ADVISOR: SME-GFA

INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR: SME-INTEL

ASDAT ADVISOR: ASDAT4

LEGAL ADVISOR: LA

COURT REPORTER: CR2

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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BG Colt: What I would like you to do is begin with mission

planning, what did you think you were going to do and then tell
me? If you have injects into mission planning we will address
those questions appropriate to that and then we will turn to
how did the plan actually get executed. All right?

RECCE TL: (b)(3), (b)(6) , Sniper Team leader, my job is HLZ’s

and routes to the objective. When we get a mission I get a
grid and start planning from there. We got a mission for LEFTY
GROVE. I had probably four--- first I make a phone call, I
have the pilots come down and then start planning with them -
two pilots come down. I had two main HLZs that we were looking
at, my infil was 2 K to the east in the green zone and then my
exfil was about 700 or 800 meters southeast - that was my exfil
plan. When we landed I get out, I get my bearing - we walked
on the, we skirted the main road all the way to the ORP and
right before the ORP we got a call six men with weapons - we
heard AWT and that’s when JTAC and them started doing their
thing, once we hit ORP, we hit the objective. Where do you want
me to go from there, sir?

BG Colt: What were the planning criteria for HLZ

selection?

RECCE TL: First thing I look for is - are we coming in on

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a Y?, are we doing an offset? Terrain analysis and the best

from that location was because of terrain analysis I figured a
2K because….. an offset because the terrain was horrible we had
time limits, we had coming in on the Y we never like to do
unless it's the last resort. So 2k to the east is what I went
with.

SME-GFN2: What would you call it? Was it a Y or offset?

RECCE TL: Negative, a Y is 300 meters; it was an offset.

Typical offset we like to do 3 to 5 kilometers somewhere around
there, but a 2K was an offset - that was the best location we
could find.

SME-GFN2: Let me finish real quick, so based on you know

this terrain pretty good, what's the audible distance to the
helicopter to the enemy would you estimate? What is the audible
distance the enemy can hear the helicopter?

RECCE TL: It depends if I have terrain in between us or

not between us. Can, when I was 2k from the objective, could
they hear us? Most likely they could have, but we had the
standoff---instead of coming in on the Y we did get 2k so we
had a standoff so they can’t do anything. RPG range I'm
quoting 700 meters that is why I like to push everything back
off of that.

SME-GFN2: OK.

SME-MH47: To start off, you have a flight crew -- you

said two flight crew?
RECCE TL: Yes.

SME-MH47: And then you -- Was there S-2 imagery with you
or when you do---ok that is it, so you are looking at imagery--
-

The IE shook his head, indicating a negative response.

SME-MH47: Does anybody supply you with imagery?

RECCE TL: I have the pilots there they obviously, pilots

are good at looking at imagery. So when we choose HLZs I'm
looking at how far I'm going to go with this, there is multiple
things that go into it. I pick one - the pilots say yeah I can

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do that I'm willing to do that we and then we send it up to

their leadership and their leadership I think sends up to the
brigade or a battalion size who approves it. They have imagery
that - they have layovers saying that a bird can land in there,
a bird can't land in there, and higher ups from their chain of
command approves it and we get the word to go.

BG Colt: From the time that your element started

preparing for this mission to the time you sat down with the
pilots - would you say that was pretty much a normal timing
planning time line?

RECCE TL: Yes.

BG Colt: Yes. And you actually got the mission and

started sitting down with them---how long prior to infil? Same
day as the mission correct?

RECCE TL: I don't know the exact timeline, but on a

normal day I come into the TOC we get our brief at 1300 in this
area and then I go over there and I make my first phone call
soon after that and say hey we got a mission we are looking at
this can you send pilots down. That's a normal day. I don't
know the exact the exact time line --

BG Colt: Had you planned with these planners before?

RECCE TL: Yes, it's been the same pilots since we got
here that has always came down and talked to us.

SME-GFA: Approximately how many missions have you done

with these pilots?

RECCE TL: Ten missions.

ASDAT: Do you know who the name of the lead planner is

where the pilot you see on a regular basis?

RECCE TL: The pilot sometimes change it’s always a

Warrant Officer 3 and a Warrant Officer 4, but I always call a
guy name(b)(3), (b)(6) – we’re on a first name basis, up there he's
their main planner. He's the one that does the grids and then
sends it up to higher.

ASDAT: Are the pilots that come down to do the planning

with you, are they the pilots who typically fly the mission?

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RECCE TL: Yes, they are the pilots that were flying.

SME-MH47: Was one of the pilots named (b)(3), (b)(6)

Background: That's (b)(3), (b)(6)

SME-INTEL: When you are playing with the imagery is it

CIB that you are playing with?

RECCE TL: I mostly usually use Google Earth because it

gives from my experience the best elevation of mountains,
hills, everything…. roads---the military version of Google
Earth is---

BG Colt: Can you get him to bring the image up that had
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cand so forth, it’s probably on that same one?

SME-MH47: You had an exfil HLZ, do you remember the name

of that or who that was?

RECCE TL: If we could bring the route up on the CONOP I

can show you.

[talking in background – discussing where CONOP is located

on computer]

BG Colt: Did you plan for alternates of both primary and

exfil LZ or was it a single point? I understand(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
, I
understand .
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Did you plan for any others?

RECCE TL: We have. (b)(3), (b)(6)

, the recce team leader for(b)(3), (b)(6)
,
he has planned, because I would go work -- I would go in their
hooch all the time. He had like six I want to say approved and
more that weren't approved….HLZs for this area. So when we
planned this, this was obviously what we came in on, that was
our plan to exfil. And if anything, let's say we are taking
contact from there, we are like hey we got to exfil, I can send
it up to my leadership we can call on the ground and hey that
type of stuff. But, no it wasn't in the CONOP because this was
exactly what we were planning for.

BG Colt: In your ten previous missions with these guys

talking about exfils, did you ever exfil from an on call LZ
where you did spinning chemlights or IR strobes or something in
order, because you were not where you planned to be?
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RECCE TL: We did a combined mission with (b)(3), (b)(6) where

they did do that, we went to their planned one because we were
off in two objectives and they said they weren't going to make
the time so they did do that with these pilots, yes.

TF
(b)(1)1.4a, SEA:
To the best of my knowledge sir, that’s been
(b)(1)1.4c
the only one that I can remember from here from the HLZ.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
Not a preferred method for the 47s here. That’s why (b)(3), (b)(6)
just pre-planned as many as he could in all the AOs.

Unknown Invest Tm : And that alternate was passed up by

AWT that night correct?

RECCE TL: It came from one of the assets in the sky saying
it was do-able.

BG Colt: Of the ten approximate ten infils you have done

with this set of crews have you had a hot infil yet?

RECCE TL: No.

SME-GFA: Were any of those ten missions in this general

AO?

RECCE TL: No, those were from Chark [district] [answering

another question in background?]. This was the first Tangi
mission; this was the first Tangi mission.

SME-GFA: OK. Are these infil and exfil HLZs two ship
HLZs?

RECCE TL: This was our infil(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cthat I told you that
was 2k to the east and then that was our planned exfil.

[multiple voices in background asking about two ship HLZs]

RECCE TL: Yeah, two ships came in on(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

BG Colt: And was the intent to do a simultaneous exfil

from two ships out of also?
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

RECCE TL: Yes, that’s what we have been doing.

BG Colt: Any other questions for the planner at this

point?

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Negative response by all members.

BG Colt: Okay. Do you want to talk through sensor

planning and sensor execution?

JTAC: If we pull up a COF I can show you exactly what we

did.

JTAC: All right, with a COF, usually what happens is when

we infil to a HLZ or objective particularly this night, we will
have AWT that follows us with the 47’s and we will usually have
an asset on station that already has lock on the target
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
building. This night it was (b)(3), (b)(6) and they had both the
sensors on the target building. We usually leave them there so
that way in case we have a squirter they can cue us. Primary
squirter control, so when we chase them and lase them for the
AWT’s as well as be lock on the target building. We also
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
have when AWT checks on we usually put them because we are in
2k we usually put them little closer around E-5 that way they
can scan the target area and see if there’s any hostiles in the
area. On this night we actually had three farmers that we
located on the HLZ, however, AWT determined they were a normal
pattern of life and they really just were more scared for their
lives than anything.

Once we landed the AWT was scanning the area and they were
able to find eight personnel all PID weapons and two MAMs that
were co-located with them, that said they were originally from
around the target building. They originally stated the MAMs
were 100 meters to the west, but that turned out they were 500
meters and they said they were moving in a military type
formation. Once that we heard that there were PID weapons
moving in military formation, we work it through (b)(3), (b)(6) ,
we brought them in closer overhead to optimal orbit and they
were able to actually identify and PID full of weapons and
chest racks on all eight PAX. We checked with the BSO to make
sure it was not any ANA in the local area if there any
checkpoints nearby and based off that they were moving to a
position of advantage possibly setting up an ambush and there
were PID weapons so we engaged with 30MM due to CDE level---.

BG Colt: Who was the weapons clearance authority then?

JTAC: Weapons clearance authority always comes from the

ground commander (b)(3), (b)(6) . Any direct fire weapons under
our ROE which is 40MM and 25MM for AC-130, or 30MM from Apaches

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is approved with the on scene ground commander.

BG Colt: Okay. What is (b)(3), (b)(6) looking at now?

JTAC: (b)(3), (b)(6) was not on station at this time, they

ended up checking on, I believe directly after the first
engagement. Once (b)(3), (b)(6) checked on we actually did have two
squirters that came from around the 280 series they were the
original two PAX that were with the 8 pax. When AWT originally
saw the eight PAX it actually looked like they were in an open
ranks formation the two PAX that squirted looking each one up
and down and walked off after they sent them on patrol.
(b)(3), (b)(6) immediately followed those two squirters to the
northwest as they were running off and was willing to engage
them with containment fires, but we held off on containment
fires and have them just keep going and track them. One of the
(b)(3), (b)(6) sensors was on the original engagement site of the six
PAX, correction the eight PAX. Once we engaged the eight PAX,
we had six EKIA and two WIA and the two WIA from the engagement
ran off to the west into a tree line. One of ’s sensors
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
had eyes on the two PAX, but AWT was having a hard time getting
eyes on and (b)(3), (b)(6) ’s sensor was also there, but we also had
one of (b)(3), (b)(6) sensors still on the 10-series compound because
that was our original objective. After the engagement we
wanted to go to conduct BDA on the six PAX and try and find the
other two wounded in action. So we maintained one (b)(3), (b)(6)
sensor on the PAX that squirted from 280 - at this time I
labeled them squirters 280 Alpha and Bravo. (b)(3), (b)(6)R throughout
the entire mission reported that they were bounding to the
northwest and knocking on doors of several compounds trying to
gain access possibly for safe haven. Eventually, (b)(3), (b)(6)
reported that they were around 2.8K to the northwest and at
this time I found it was best that we put one of (b)(3), (b)(6)
sensors on them and pull (b)(3), (b)(6) sensors back over so they
could help the BDA team with security for the two wounded in
action that were still possibly out there. So now we had both
(b)(3), (b)(6) sensors over in the original engagement area looking
for the two wounded in action and helping provide security for
the BDA team moving to the six engaged PAX. Once the BDA team
came to the six engaged PAX it turned out one was actually
wounded in action and rolled over and reached for an AK-47 -
the BDA team engaged that single PAX resulting in the sixth
EKIA. Once the BDA team engaged that sixth PAX the two wounded
in action squirted to the west further into a tree line and
(b)(3), (b)(6) and AWT had eyes on and followed him into the tree
line, but once they were in that tree line they lost lock on

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them they were not able to find them anymore. They burned and
lased the area and squirted, correction, sparkled the area for
the BDA team and the BDA team conducted clearances through the
area but wasn't able to find anything. They found a couple of
bed down locations and a motorcycle. We brought everyone back
to the 10-series compound once the BDA was complete on the
engagement site and at that time I heard over - it was relayed
to me through (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, that there was going to be a QRF team that
(b)(1)1.4c
was going after the PAX - squirters 280 Alpha and Bravo. At
this time also (b)(3), (b)(6) reported to me that the PAX 280 Alpha and
Bravo had met up with several other MAMs that were around seven
MAMs total. They had gone into a building and pretty much
stopped in that building. (b)(3), (b)(6) told me that they were going to
have the QRF (b)(1)1.4a, 2 come in and land and interdict the
(b)(1)1.4c
squirters in the target building, assault the target building.
(b)(3), (b)(6) , however, informed me that they were going to
need suppressive fire on the HLZ due to the high threat in the
area, we had already engaged the six PAX before and it was
really not a very clear area so they were really pushing for
pre-assault fires on there. I originally said since we were on
the scene ground commander was (b)(3), (b)(6) that we controlled
the pre-assault fires from our location with accurate timing
and accurate targeting data basically for the HLZ - controlled
through AWT. At this time I also pushed one of (b)(3), (b)(6)
sensors over to the HLZ site as well to start doing clearance.
So (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) s sensors were over onto the
HLZ, one of (b)(3), (b)(6) sensors was on us and (b)(3), (b)(6) sensors was
on the 60 series because at this time the eagles had already
cleared and secured the 10 series. Once AWT had cleared the HLZ
and (b)(3), (b)(6) --

BG Colt: When you say the HLZ, are you talking about
or are you talking about
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ?
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

JTAC: I’m talking the HLZ for the(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cQRF site.

BG Colt: All right.

JTAC: So talking to (b)(3), (b)(6) ] they talked to

Golf Uniform 2 who was the JTAC in the air on EXTORTION 17 and
they said they wanted to control the pre-assault fires for the
HLZ. I passed --- both (b)(3), (b)(6) over to control to GU2
through EXTORTION through their comms and at that point that
(b)(3), (b)(6) said they were one minute out and after the one
minute out call, they said EXTORTION was down.

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BG Colt: Did you get any feedback throughout this mission

from Pred?

JTAC: (b)(3), (b)(6) , the biggest problem with them is we are

having a lot of really big comms issues with them either they
cannot hear us or we cannot hear them. They press the
microphone and they are either half way talking or the talking
escalates. So what I do I usually pass them to (b)(3), (b)(6) and any
comms that goes through them is going to go through their MIRC
and I believe they were doing a perimeter scan up to 500 meter
of the 60 series building for us---.

BG Colt: Who's directing that?

JTAC: I'm in control of the sensors through (b)(3), (b)(6) .

BG Colt: How about any of the -- you also had a (b)(3), (b)(6)
asset on station right?

JTAC: Yes I did sir.

BG Colt: When did they come on?

JTAC: (b)(3), (b)(6) came on to RIP (b)(3), (b)(6) so basically replaced

(b)(3), (b)(6),
so (b)(3), (b)(6) went home and (b)(3), (b)(6) checked on, so that way
we were only able to have a single sensor on the 60 series.

BG Colt: Did you get any kind of voice -- do they pass

any voice intercept or anything like that to you?

JTAC: We would have, however because the QRF team was

coming in we also had (b)(3), (b)(6) on station, so based on (b)(3), (b)(6)
SOP they always go PTT buzzer on 10-minutes prior to infil, and
throughout infil. So they were buzzer on throughout this time
so (b)(3), (b)(6)W wasn’t able to collect.

SME-INTEL: Quick question on (b)(3), (b)(6) , two sensors that

are on (b)(3), (b)(6) is that it?

JTAC: (b)(3), (b)(6) is a single sensor sir.

SME-INTEL: Single FMV?

JTAC: It's a full motion video [inaudible], it's a single

sensor, sir.

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ASDAT4: Did you have communications with (b)(3), (b)(6) ?

JTAC: I had very limited communication with them as well

because they are a jamming aircraft. Usually when they come
buzzer off or music off I can usually have communication with
them, but if not, then I usually relay through (b)(3), (b)(6) because
they are able to contact via MIRC.

ASDAT4: After the incident at the crash site did they try
to communicate with you?
JTAC: The crash site themselves or Good Deal themselves?
ASDAT4: Good Deal.

JTAC: Good Deal I had them maintain buzzer on usually

they’ll try and directly contact me via communication, they
will either go through (b)(3), (b)(6) or (b)(3),
(b)(1)1.4a, - and (b)(3), (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(6)(b)(1)1.4c
would relay a “Striker, (b)(3), (b)(6) is wondering do they need to
go back and buzzer on or go buzzer off”.

BG Colt: So what did we do in this case?

JTAC: In this case you keep, I kept buzzer on for them for
the entire mission. Even though we had a (b)(3), (b)(6) asset because
we haven’t been in this area in a while, I think it’s best to
have PTT(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c.

SME-GFA: You have guys had Good Deal on LEFTY GROVE infil
buzzer on---

JTAC: Good Deal is able to cover the whole area, usually

they will hold around echo 15 which is basically they are
giving a 15 nautical mile wheel inside the area, so they are
able to jam pretty much that entire area, so they’ll be able
to---

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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JTAC: We had infil and then ---

PLT LDR: Which they did collect for a little bit---

JTAC: We did but because the QRF was coming in, they went
buzzer back on.

SME-GFA: QRF comes in several hours later as I understand

– so just for context - Good Deal buzzer on during your infi,
then buzzer goes off, they start collecting –

JTAC: Yes.

SME-GFA: At some point (b)(3), (b)(6) replaces (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6)
collects, correct?

JTAC: can collect but I believe we were buzzer on

(b)(3), (b)(6)
by the time checked on station.

JTAC: Then (b)(3), (b)(6) checked on very close to the time that
the RIP’d (b)(3), (b)(6) very close to the time the QRF package was
coming in.

SME-GFA: Is (b)(3), (b)(6) - are they translating back down here

and the TOC is pushing to you guys?

JTAC: As far as translating the communications?

SME-GFA: Yes.

JTAC: (b)(3), (b)(6) does not have - like have a translator on

board.

SME-GFA: Right, did they pipe it down to somebody down

here?
PSG: We went----the BDA team for the 6 EKIA, they had two
PTT on them and we had ICOM scanner with the terp. They weren't
damaged during the 30MM strike, so I made the recommendation to
16 we go buzzer off, I gave the frequency to the terp to plug
into his scanner so we could hear what was going in the area
and what was moving around.

BG Colt: Did you get anything?

PSG: I don't know sir, because that was probably 10 to 15

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minutes before they were going to go buzzer back on for 21’s

infil.

SME-GFA: I’m just curious on their (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - are you

getting anything significant on enemy posture or preparing for
another helo infil?

JTAC: Sir I didn't hear anything regarding any sort of

communication. There was no DF finding from (b)(3), (b)(6) themselves
and there was no chatter at that point [inaudible].

SME-GFA: Just to back up a little bit during part of your

execution of (b)(3), (b)(6) sensor on the building - primary sensor
for the squirters, correct? (b)(3), (b)(6) was looking at what?

JTAC: (b)(3), (b)(6) was doing 500-meters scans around the

target sir.
SME-GFA: They’re 500 meters around---you have (b)(3), (b)(6) ---

AC-130, they come on station after you guys are on target,

or during your infil?

JTAC: During our infil.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-GFA: (b)(3), (b)(6) is doing what?

JTAC: (b)(3), (b)(6) is, usually I have them initial scan.

AWT is pretty proactive when they are out on target so they’re
really looking for something to try and engage in the security
of the PAX, so I put them in initial posture, free scan around
the area for the trails found around the target, around the --
around the target and the Eagles.

SME-GFA: (b)(3), (b)(6) replaces (b)(3), (b)(6), so (b)(3), (b)(6) goes away.

(b)(3), (b)(6) is primary on?

JTAC: On the 60 series.

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SME-GFA: The 60 series.

JTAC: The next objective after the 10 series was the 60

series and so because we were through clearing the 10 series we
pushed the sensor to the 60 series.

BG Colt: How long prior to the IRF infil did you push the
Apaches away from you to go look at HLZ ?
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

JTAC: It was --

BG Colt: -- Now were you still controlling that asset

then or did at some point it passed to the IRF element lead?

JTAC: What happened, is as soon as they said that they

were going to have a QRF infil I sent (b)(3), (b)(6) to go check
out the HLZ.

SME-MH47: Well, at some point (b)(3), (b)(6) had to get a bag

of gas, right?

PSG: That was during the EKIA BDA, sir.

SME-MH47: Okay, so --

JTAC: While we were cleaning the BDA site, (b)(3), (b)(6) went
to FARP, (b)(3), (b)(6) was maintaining eyes-on.

BG Colt: Okay, when you came back on station, how long

after he was back on station, did you push him over to ?
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

JTAC: It was after we finished going through the BDA site

and they helped us try and find the squirters that were in the
tree line and once we were back at the 10 series is when we got
the call that QRF was going to be coming to the HLZ site. As
soon as we got the call that QRF was coming in HLZ, to go over
to them then I pushed them [inaudible] --

BG Colt: How long would you say when you say they were
getting ready to come in there, were they airborne at that
point?

JTAC: No, they were just about to go airborne. They were

preparing to - I was trying to get a timeline through
(b)(3), (b)(6) , but I wasn't really getting the timeline and then
all of a sudden at one point they were --

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BG Colt: So (b)(3), (b)(6) went out, looked at the HLZ, and

at some point did they not go back and FARP a second time?

JTAC: No, they didn’t go FARP until after the Fallen

Angel incident.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) SEA: They went and refueled which held up the
wheels up here of the (b)(3), (b)(6) --

JTAC: I want to say, sir, that they went from 2115 to

2130 they went to FARP--

JTAC: -- They were gone for a while.

PSG:-- Right, because it was about 45 minutes [inaudible]

before we got back to you to push to the 60 series, so probably
2115 you cut (b)(3), (b)(6) to go check out .
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-GFA: Okay, you have the initial group of squirters

leave the target, eight PAX, correct?

JTAC: The eight PAX were found, pretty much but we can’t
confirm if they were the squirters from the target building but
two of the PAX that were with the eight PAX that we originally
engaged --

SME-GFA: AWT engaged and kills six -- or AWT killed five

and you guys killed one?

PSG: Yes.

SME-GFA: So there's two more, we think they are wounded

so---

JTAC: They are separate from the 280 A and B. The two
wounded in action that were with the engagement of the eight
PAX were separate. They were in the tree line.

SME-GFA: They are the tree line folks. So, 280A is a

separate set?

JTAC: 280 A and B are the two PAX that were originally
with the eight PAX, so there’s ten PAX total and those are the
ones that squirted once they heard the AWT fire.

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SME-GFA: Okay so the two wounded PAX are the original

engagement [inaudible] more than 280?

JTAC: No. The two -- alright, the two -- there was ten

PAX total, sir --

IO: [inaudible].

PLT LDR: Let me try real quick for you. So, at some
point either two PAX from the 60 series went into the 10 and
got those from the 10 - interaction between ten and 60, came
out. That's where you got your eight PAX that were engaged
right here on this road, sir. Additionally, we had two PAX
from the 280 series that squirted and just moved northwest; so,
no interaction with this initial set.

SME-GFA: So, from the 10 and 60, eight PAX, six are dead
two are -- we think are wounded in the tree line --

PLT LDR: Correct; way off to the left.

SME-GFA: -- two more PAX from 280 are moving northwest.

PLT LDR: I want to say--- do these two squirt

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
before we even had this interaction with 10 and 60?

JTAC: No, it was -- as soon as the AWT engaged, (b)(3), (b)(6)

reported we had two squirters from the 280 series.

SME-GFA: So, rough timeline of squirting is during your

infil?

PLT LDR: Yes, sir.

JTAC: That was -- we had not gone to the target building

-- well, when we engaged with the AWT.

PLT LDR: And that was the thought process, not to chase
the original two squirters from the 280 series, because we
already had the 10 series to go and BDA and two more, so we
just said let’s just bite off what we can chew right now and if
two guys without weapons get away from us tonight --

SME-GFA: So, you got a sensor on the two squirters moving

northwest and a sensor on the other two in the tree line?
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PLT LDR: Yes.

BG Colt: How long was the foot march from(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cup to

the 10 series?

PLT LDR: Just over 2K, sir.

BG Colt: Time?

PLT LDR: About forty minutes, sir.

BG Colt: And you had information though that those

original squirters out of the 10 series building, they moved
off that while you were enroute to the 10 series from the HLZ,
correct?

PLT LDR: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: Okay.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)SEA: The two squirters from the 280, it was about
the time of the AWT engagement.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) SEA: And they took off. They were hauling ass,
just like I mean, showing the pattern of what the Taliban does
over here.

JTAC: (b)(3), (b)(6) said they were bounding -- military

bounding.

TF
(b)(1)1.4a, SEA: They were moving and you can hear it kind of
(b)(1)1.4c
play out, you know, as fast as they were going in the terrain
that they were not going to be able to catch those guys.
That's what kind of drove everything to -- to (b)(3), (b)(6) and
especially when they hooked up with the other group.

BG Colt: And as I understood it again, the AWT after they

made their engagement, the squirters from 280 -- you directed
the sensor and the AWT after those two squirters - negative
contact?

JTAC: No, not AWT. Just (b)(3), (b)(6) sensors because we have
the 6 PAX we were engaging AWT had both sensors on those two
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PAX-- or six PAX.

BG Colt: Okay. At no time did the AWT go looking for

those 280 PAX?

JTAC: No.

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-GFA: And the assessed wounded in the tree line – you

never found those guys?

JTAC: Never found those guys. Those guys ended up

fleeing the area.

SME-GFA: Did 280 link up with some more --

JTAC: 280 linked up with PAX [inaudible] –

SME-GFA: Were they pounding on the buildings to get in?

JTAC: The 280 A and B are the same PAX that went to the -
- The two PAX that went to the north - that’s 280 A and B.
SME-GFA: Yeah?

JTAC: Those were the PAX. They linked up with six other
PAX, actually.
SME-GFA: Where at?

JTAC: (b)(3), (b)(6) reported it was like 2K away.

SME-GFA: In a building? In an open area?

JTAC: In an open area. They were just kind of tracking

them out there. Actually, it was --

SME-GFA: That group of folks is the one pounding on

buildings trying to gain access and all that?

JTAC: Just the 280 A and B were pounding on doors and

then eventually we dealt with PAX.

BG Colt: Are those the elements that the IRF was

literally going to contain -- those [building] 280 PAX?

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TF
(b)(1)1.4a, SEA: Yes. And then after they had linked up with
(b)(1)1.4c
the other six guys. And, if I remember correctly, it was -- he
was -- what I was hearing was they had moved to -- they linked
up with the other six PAX, there were eight total and had moved
to a historical fighting position I think it was the way it
came to me.

JTAC: The building that they described that they ended up

going to was three rows of buildings oriented east to west with
a guard tower on the eastern side -- the northeastern side.

SME-GFA: Which sensor again, which sensor is watching?

JTAC: (b)(3), (b)(6) -- One of (b)(3), (b)(6) sensors.

SME-INTEL: Was there ever an assessment made on the

ground of who those two individuals where or what their intent
was?

JTAC: Negative, sir. I mean, they were squirters from

the 280. I mean, they squirted and ran off so we followed
them.

SME-INTEL: Was there any -- did they demonstrate any

hostile intent?

JTAC: Not directly towards the assault force but they

were military bounding and ran away from and actively engaged
in fire.

TF
(b)(1)1.4a, SEA: I would say no, sir, but I’ll say again they
(b)(1)1.4c
were exhibiting the patterns that, you know, we historically
see as what the bad guys do over here. The way they were
moving and how they were acting. You know, it’s not anything -
- it is not how the civilians act. They were definitely
showing the signs.

BG Colt: Do you know or believe that that was the

judgment of the IRF commander; that was his trigger point that
when it got to a mass of eight? Was that the reason why he
determined that he was going to infil?

TF
(b)(1)1.4a, SEA: I do not know for fact. I was in Jbad at
(b)(1)1.4c
the time, but I would say 95 percent, that would be my guess
from what I was hearing and my conversation with 01. Yes, sir,
I believe that was.

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PLT LDR: Had I been able to interdict those two with y

elements, sir, I certainly would have. From when I heard, (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) is coming in, I said, “good on them,” [inaudible].
Certainly, I’m under the impression that good guys don’t run
away.

SME-GFA: Just for -- you guys are cleared and secured the
10 series?

IE: Yes, sir.

SME-GFA: You got into TQ, or -- the tactical questioning?

IE: The issues, sir, is -- I forget what the slant was,

but it was like eight -- eight men in here and then running low
on time so we had done an initial BIT / TQ in here just to
identify who’s who, who are these guys running, and we were
looking to take down the 60 series as well as soon as we got
the BDA element back because of the interaction between the 10
and 60 and the MAMs that we engaged coming from those, so we’re
look to just do a quick who's who and then probably pull
military aged MAMs of the target compound and sort it back
here, sir.

SME-GFA: Nothing from tactical questioning saying LEFTY

GROVE was one of the squirters, correct?
PLT LDR: Correct, sir.

BG Colt: Was the exfil from on time or on call?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

PLT LDR: No, it was no later than 2330, sir, and we were
looking to push out right at 2330 just based off of -- We had
the 60 series clear, conducting back clear when we have
actually got the call about the EXTORTION flight, sir.

BG Colt: Okay. And the other element that was about to

infil at 2209; correct?

PLT LDR: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: And at 2209 your actions then were what? What

were you doing at infil -- the second infil?

PLT LDR: We had just pushed in our(b)(3), (b)(6)counterparts into

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the 60 series we were clearing -- we had done a callout so we

had all the MAMs and feathers and chargers outside the b ding
push them through just to conduct a quick clear with (b)(1)1.4a,
an and
(b)(1)1.4c
our assault force in the 60 series, sir.

SME-GFA: Okay. Is your entire element consolidated as

one---?

[UNIDENTIFIED]: [inaudible, two people speaking

simultaneously] Roger, to the 10 and 60.

PSG: Right, half the element was in the 10 series, the

other half was conducting callout and clearing to the 60
series.

[inaudible]

PSG: We were done with BDA my element of I think ten PAX

was back and I was leading the callout on the 60 series.

E-MH47: I’ve got a question. Earlier we were briefed

by (b)(3), (b)(6)that the six enemy KIA were all shot by (b)(3), (b)(6) , but
you said it was your BDA killed one. Is that right?

PSG: We had -- there was one WIA left in the pile of six-

SME-MH47: Oh, and you finished?

PSG: Yeah, we finished him off as we were moving through.

SME-MH47: Okay, fair enough.

PSG: Still on the -- because it was on the way to pick up

the two out in the field there.

LA: Just so we’re clear, you finished him off because --

PSG: He was reaching for a weapon.

LA: Thank you.

SME-GFA: You didn’t request the IRF to go and interdict.

It was -- you were informed that was going to happen, correct?

PLT LDR: Yes, sir.

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SME-GFA: [inaudible] “hey, we are now shifting fires from

-- fires and ISR from you guys to support the IRF,” was that
transmitted to you guys?

JTAC: Yeah, once the call was made that EXTORTION was
going to infil the IRF to interdict the squirters 280 A and B.

CRT RPT: Sir, can you speak up just a bit, please?

JTAC: Once the call was made that EXTORTION was going to
drop off the IRF to interdict squirters 280 A and B. I sent
(b)(3), (b)(6) over to start looking around the HLZ and one of
(b)(3), (b)(6) sensors---

SME-GFA: Still under your control?

JTAC: Still under my control.

SME-GFN1: So, (b)(3), (b)(6) was still reporting back to you

when it was scanning ?
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

JTAC: Yes, because the JTAC was not on the ground and
sensor on the EXTORTION birds only have one radio that they’re
able to monitor. We usually just have a person on the ground
control or go through (b)(3), (b)(6) through the EXTORTION flight.

SME-NGB: Didn’t you say you believe that's 2115 is when

(b)(3), (b)(6) went up to to do that?
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

JTAC: They went as soon as I got the call. I don’t know.

I’m not sure.

SME-NGB: You don’t know the time?

SME-MH47: But (b)(3), (b)(6) was on site for about ten

minutes roughly, at before the aircraft came in with the
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
lift air elements?

JTAC: They were looking over there for a little while,

sir -- for quite some time. I believe it was –

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)SEA: I don’t remember, but they had to go refuel

like you said, and that pushed back the departure here of 2
. I don’t know ---
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

BG Colt: They looked at the HLZ and then came to get gas

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and then went back?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)SEA: From my best understanding; yes, sir, and I

don’t know the timeline that they were -- you know, if they
came in ahead and looked over the HLZ before the EXTORTION came
in or if they just were aft the whole time. But, I know we did
have sensors on the HLZ area and I don’t remember any reporting
of any movement of the HLZ area [inaudible].

JTAC: You know (b)(3), (b)(6) was looking at the HLZ. I'm
not sure of how long they were looking at the HLZ for before
EXTORTION got there. I know it was at least over 6 minutes
because at one point while they were looking at the HLZ,
(b)(3), (b)(6) had informed me that EXTORTION was at 6 minute hold
waiting to infil at the HLZ and basically waiting for me to
transfer control of (b)(3), (b)(6) over to GU2 before they would
infil for suppressive fire.

SME-GFA: At what point was that supposed to take place?

JTAC: At what point -- the transfer over?

SME-GFA: Yes.

JTAC: It wasn't really a designated time that we had to

transfer, it was pretty much, they said, “Hey, GU2’s on the
ground,”-- [inaudible]

SME-GFA: On the ground or in mid-flight?

JTAC: Oh, no while they were still flying they

transmitted to (b)(3), (b)(6) ver EXTORTION’s radio that they
wanted control of (b)(3), (b)(6) for the pre-assault fires and once
they requested it, I sent up the [inaudible] --

SME-GFA: (b)(3), (b)(6) or with sensors over - (b)(3), (b)(6) at

least looks at the HLZ.

JTAC: (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) sensors are all looking at
the HLZ.
SME-GFA: So, in support of the IRF, you've got (b)(3), (b)(6)
and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c .

JTAC: Yes.

SME-GFA: (b)(3), (b)(6) is --

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JTAC: I believe (b)(3), (b)(6) is still looking at our 60

series.
IO: [inaudible]

TF
(b)(1)1.4a, SEA:
My best -- there may be six to ten minutes
(b)(1)1.4c
before infil, I think I remember the discussion going on about
switching control [inaudible] --

JTAC: It was more than six, but I can’t confirm it was

more than that, I believe six to ten would be accurate
[inaudible].

SME-GFA: Good comms with (b)(3), (b)(6) ? (b)(3), (b)(6) still at

this point?
JTAC: (b)(3), (b)(6) still at this point.

SME-GFA: Good comms with (b)(3), (b)(6) ?

JTAC: Absolutely.

BG Colt: Okay, and after the aircraft went down, at that

point, your actions with regard to the AWT were what?

JTAC: I kept the AWT in the area. AWT, as soon as the

aircraft went down, engaged in where they thought the fire came
from. It was a field on the side of a terrain feature. I kept
the AWT through both the SLASHERs sensors over there and pretty
much dedicated every sensor I could to that area except for
(b)(3), (b)(6) . I kept (b)(3), (b)(6) on us and kept all those sensors on
the Fallen Angel in case there was anyone coming up to it, and
look for survivors.

SME-GFN2: Did you say earlier you heard a one minute

call?

JTAC: I heard a one minute call. I did.

SME-GFN2: From EXTORTION?

JTAC: Not from EXTORTION itself, but through PITCHBLACK.

ASDAT4: Did you have a second (b)(3), (b)(6) on station at all

that night?

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JTAC: Later on that after the Fallen Angel, there was a

second (b)(3), (b)(6) that came in to RIP the original (b)(3), (b)(6)
almost, I think it was during daylight hours I had two (b)(3), (b)(6)
on station.

ASDAT4: So, with (b)(3), (b)(6) , the only (b)(3), (b)(6) on stat on
up to that point, did (b)(3), (b)(6) move over for the infil to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
and provide anything to those guys over there?

JTAC: Yes, (b)(3), (b)(6) did look over at the HLZ before
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
the bird landed.

BG Colt: And at that point was he talking to(b)(3), (b)(6)

?

JTAC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

? I don't know if he was in direct comms with
him, but I pretty much put them over for allocation for them
for pre-assault fires ISO (b)(3), (b)(6) .

SME-GFA: The(b)(1)1.4a,
(b)(3),(b)(1)1.4c
(b)(6) got -- still has the sensor on the
follow-on target location – and sensor looking at HLZ. The
primary task for (b)(3), (b)(6) is clear HLZ and then anything
following that or just focused on HLZ?

JTAC: Just focused on HLZ and any threat at the HLZ for
(b)(3), (b)(6) . And (b)(3), (b)(6) , I think had eyes-on the 280 PAX and
the HLZ.

ASDAT3: From where you guys were on the objective, did

you see the IR spot light that (b)(3), (b)(6) provided to HLZ
?
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

JTAC: I can see where it’s coming from the aircraft, but
there was an extremely large terrain feature between us and the
HLZ site.

BG Colt: Do you think (b)(3), (b)(6) glinted the LZ?

JTAC: I think they sparkled the HLZ.

SME-MH47: Do you know at what time? What time call?

JTAC: I’m not sure, sir.

SME-MH47: I’m sorry. For how long did they sparkle the
HLZ?

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JTAC: For how long they were sparkling the HLZ? I’m not
sure. Usually the standard SOP is at the one minute out call,
they’ll sparkle on the HLZ.

SME-GFA: That's been the norm ever since you guys have
been here working with the --?
JTAC: That's the norm ever since I have worked

[inaudible].

BG Colt: But the AC was sparkling?

JTAC: That the aircraft was sparkling?

BG Colt: Yes. Not, that the AC - not the AWT - was doing
it.

JTAC: Yeah, AWT has a -- kind of a problem with their

sparkle capabilities because of the IR pointers on their gun
and with them banking and turning their gyros actually make the
IR pointer jitter quite a bit and so usually it's better to
have a AC-130 or a fast moving aircraft to sparkle the HLZ.

BG Colt: After the aircraft went down and all the(b)(3), (b)(6)
element took off on a foot march how did you utilize the
sensors available to you then? They were pretty much all
staring at the Fallen Angel at that point.

JTAC: Because we were going to head towards the Fallen

Angel site and I was determined -- I kept both the (b)(3), (b)(6)
sensors and he actually became the air mission commander for
[(b)(3), (b)(6)?] mission at that point and kept one of the AWT sensors
over there so (b)(3), (b)(6) was there, (b)(3), (b)(6) was on
Eagles with (b)(3), (b)(6) as well clearing the route and finding the
best route possible for us to get to the Fallen Angel.

SME-MH47: How did they show that route to you? Did they
just---?

JTAC: They did a verbal description and I don't think

they sparkled at all for us. I think they might have sparkled
one [inaudible--someone speaking in the background]. They
didn't sparkle at all for us. But basically a verbal
description, “Follow this road, come around the bank, and
you’re going to enter a Wadi at this point.” At this point I
also pushed (b)(3), (b)(6) over to the Fallen Angel.
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SME-GFA: Is (b)(3), (b)(6) still on station at this point, or

is he---?

JTAC: I think so. I think he was still on station.

ASDAT3: Did (b)(3), (b)(6) report anything of significance in

the area of these suppressive fires from (b)(3), (b)(6) ?

JTAC: No. There was nothing significant in the area at

all.

ASDAT3: What would the terminology ‘registered in the

area’ would that pertain to? Why would(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
say something
‘registered in the area’? What would that pertain to?

JTAC: Something registered in the area?

ASDAT3: Right.

JTAC: You said (b)(3), (b)(6) said that?

ASDAT3: Correct. I believe he said it to you.

JTAC: He said it to me? I don't remember (b)(3), (b)(6) saying

ng registered in the area. Registered is usually a
term. It's used by most ISR aircraft. They were
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
talking about that; I believe they didn’t check on the HOBBIT
that night, either. So, I don’t think they said anything about
registering comms. If that's what they were talking about.

BG Colt: And to your knowledge again, they were jamming

the whole time. During the IRF infil as well?

JTAC: Standard SOP is for them to jam 10 minutes prior.

BG Colt: And was that by SOP or by direction?

JTAC: I believe it was by SOP and double checking

directions [inaudible].

BG Colt: Okay.

BG Colt: Anybody else.

Negative response by all members of the investigative team.

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BG Colt: Okay. Thank you.

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The interview of the (b)(3), (b)(6) crew opened at 1603 Zulu, 18 August
2011, at FOB Task
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c.

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD: BG J. Colt, US Army

LEGAL ADVISOR: LA

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: TF CDR, USAF

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

GROUND FORCE ARMY ADVISOR SME-GFA

MH-47 ADVISOR SME-MH47

CAB 47 ADVISOR: SME-CH47

NGB REPRESENTATIVE: SME-NGB

ASDAT ADVISOR ASDAT

COURT REPORTER: CR2

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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All witnesses relevant to the investigation were sworn.

BG Colt: Okay. Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) , if we could start with you,

please.
(b)(3), (b)(6)
FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir. (b)(3), (b)(6) I go by (b)(3), (b)(6)

I'm the Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c standardization instructor pilot.

I was also the CH47 AMC on the night of the incident.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: (b)(3), (b)(6) , Bravo Company, 7/158th. I

was PC of the aircraft on August 6th.

Ramp: (b)(3), (b)(6) , Bravo Company, 7/158th. At the time,

CEO on the ramp position.

Left Door: (b)(3), (b)(6) Bravo Company, 7/158th, and I

was on the left door gun on (b)(3), (b)(6) .

Right Door: (b)(3), (b)(6) Bravo Company, 2/135th

Nebraska, flight engineer in the right door position.

BG Colt: Okay. Can you tell us how many Team (b)(3), (b)(6) missions

you have done up to this point approximately.

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir. That was my first one that night.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: A handful, sir. I would have to go back to get --

BG Colt: How long have you been on a mission doing this

particular --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: About four to six weeks.

BG Colt: Four to six weeks?

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(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: Okay. Doing about two missions ever three days or

so?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: For a while, it was every third day.

Ramp: Roughly, the same amount, sir.

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) I think I've been doing it for about two weeks.

And I've done about four to eight missions, something like that.

Right Door: It was my second (b)(3), (b)(6) mission.

BG Colt: Okay. Can you talk us through the planning process

either you've utilized or seen in conjunction with (b)(3), (b)(6)

missions.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Typically, sir, we send one of our (b)(3), (b)(6) pilots

down to the planning cell, and they assist the (b)(3), (b)(6) planners

with finding LZs. Then we send it back, what we think is a

suitable LZ, we send it back to the battalion, and they work what

they do [sic], and then send it up to the brigade to get

topographic imagery and send it back. And we get approved

through (b)(3), (b)(6)

BG Colt: How closely is what you’re doing here replicate

what you did in your mobilization preparation?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Not at all, sir.

BG Colt: How is it different?

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(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We never picked LZs before. Actually,

that's -- I would say, that's an advantage having this on this

mission planning. We get to find the LZ. We pick the LZ that

we think is most suitable for us, instead of someone else picking

it for us. But we actually like that part a lot better.

BG Colt: Any other thoughts about the way mission

preparation goes relative to how you prepare to come here and

join the task force?

Ramp: No, sir.

BG Colt: Okay. So the day that you got this particular

mission, okay, can you talk us through that timeline.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: It was approximately 1830. Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I, we

got a call from the (b)(3), (b)(6) planners. They said they are ready

for us to come down. He and I we went down. They said it was

his first mission, so I show him what we do on the planning side.

Went down and started working with planners, picked some LZs,

discussed options going into the area and where we might exfil

from. And I got the grids, and sent them up; they got approved.

We came back and got ready for our brief.

BG Colt: Had you been in this geographical area before?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I have not.

BG Colt: Obviously not. Have you been in this area before?

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FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir. This is actually my third rotation

to Afghanistan. I've flown, extensively on RC East, all three

rotations.

BG Colt: Okay. But not in some time?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Excuse me, sir?

BG Colt: When was the last time?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) The last time prior to this rotation, sir?

BG Colt: Yes.

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) OEF-07 -- '06/'07.

BG Colt: Okay. Anybody else fly in this area before?

Left Door: I flew in RC South and a little bit of RC East

back in --

BG Colt: How about in the Wardak Province before into this

Tangi Valley Area.

Ramp: The night we -- the night prior it was just south

through Tangi, so right at the opening of the valley.

BG Colt: Okay. Anybody else for mission planning

specifically?

SME-MH47: Did y'all routinely do walk-throughs with the

ground force? Did they ever come out and do statics in the

aircraft?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We did several static loads, especially with

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their MATH (ph) package, they brought their equipment over,

showed our guys how to load it, unload it. They discussed on

multiple occasions, how to load the aircraft passenger-wise, and

make sure they leave the correct seats open for our guys in the

back.

SME-MH47: When they load a dog, is it in the kennel?

Ramp: No.

SME-MH47: Was it muzzled?

Ramp: No.

SME-MH47: Did y'all get bit much?

Ramp: It was actually pretty cool.

BG Colt: Can you describe for me the seats out, seats plus

policy and how that applies to your missions.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We have only done it one time, sir. And it was

on request from .
(b)(3), (b)(6)

BG Colt: What was ACL that night, do you know?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I don't know.

BG Colt: Okay.

(b)(3), (b)(6) : During the planning, did you discuss any

alternate HLZs, or(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cHLZs? Do you routinely discuss that?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We did. We had several LZs that night. And at

the beginning, they were real concerned about crossing the river.

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It was the information they got on the valley was the slope to

the river was real steep -- like nine foot embankments. They

didn't want to have to cross those.

And they had intelligence that the bridges were wired. So they

didn't want to cross any bridges either. That's why they went

on the north side of the river for the landing.

BG Colt: Incidentally, when we are talking about mission

planning, let's make sure that we are talking about mission

planning inclusive, not just the last portion of the mission,

all right? We're taking it from the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cinfil on, okay.

SME-CH47: Let me ask a few questions: Crew selection and

qualifications from the get, you were the pilot in command. And,

Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) , you were the air mission commander --

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) That's correct.

SME-CH47: Now, was there a reason why you weren't the pilot

in command?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) It was just my first (b)(3), (b)(6) mission. That's the

only reason as far as I know. He was the pilot in command; I

was selected as AMC.

SME-CH47: Now, on this mission planning process, at 1830 you

get a call, and you go -- somebody goes down to the planning cell,

and I assume that's where the TACOPS officer, Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) is doing

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the planning; is that right?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: No. He plans in this building, sir --

SME-CH47: Oh, he plans over here? Okay.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: -- and we call him over the phone and pass the

grids.

SME-CH47: So you get the details of the mission from the

supported unit, and you pass it to him. And he assists in

planning routes and HLZs and things of that nature?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: He usually -- he works on the mission briefing

package, and gives the LZ and PZ approvals.

SME-CH47: Now, who is the person that's selecting routes and

flight routing and that sort of thing?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: That night, it was (b)(3), (b)(6) (ph) --

SME-CH47: (b)(3), (b)(6) -- flight lead then? Okay.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Yeah. He was our --

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Just to clarify for the planning purposes, the

crews go down there, they get the grids, they talk to , you
(b)(3), (b)(6)

know, the supported element, whoever it happens to be that night,

pass the grids. Mr. then produces the two packets, the
(b)(3), (b)(6)

briefing for the AMB, and the packet that we have to send up to

brigade --

SME-CH47: Understood.

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TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c -- so that's what he does.

SME-CH47: So the CONOP package is the AMB brief?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Essentially. Right. And when he gets that for

planning purposes that's when the 3 and I look at LZs, PZs and

we shoot it up.

BG Colt: Right. And there were, to my knowledge and

recollection again, no alternate PZs -- or LZs, designated for

this mission.

Do you recall any being briefed? I mean, there's certainly no

packet products or knee board cards that reflect alternates from

the AMB, true?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We had alternate (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Was it (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) , that's correct.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-CH47: So once you came back up, now do you go on ,

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

and you do it in falcon view when you put the package together?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: That's being done simultaneously with the flight

lead, (b)(3), (b)(6) that night. He was on the AMPS planning the

route as we passed him, and got the approval for the LZs and PZs.

SME-CH47: Okay. So he gets it all -- the routing plan -- do

you have a map that you carry as part of a knee board packet that

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goes to the aircraft? Is there a map that goes with it?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We do, sir.

SME-CH47: And do you still have the one for that night that

y'all had?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I don't know.

SME-CH47: Don't have them. Or how about the knee board

packet? Can you reproduce it electronically.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I can probably get pretty close, sir.

SME-CH47: What I mean by that is do you save those in a

folder?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Yes, sir.

SME-CH47: So you could reprint all of that. It would be

nice if we could get all of that to help understand how the

planning went. With regard to performance planning -- and I saw

the numbers in the CONOP of 39,700, I think, for 24 pax on your

aircraft. And I agree with that. It looks exactly right.

Now, I don't want to jump ahead, but with regard to the later

flight, the add-on, if you will, the IRF portion, there were nine

more pax aboard that aircraft to bring it up to 33 pax, plus the

crew.

So that brings it up to around 42 and some change. Does that

sound right to y'all? And was the performance planning card

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regenerated for that, or was that just, sort of, off the top of

your head, or how did that go down?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I don't know if there was one printed, sir. But

I do know on our (b)(1)1.4a -- most of them anyway -- have the (b)(1)1.4a

program onboard. So you can do it digitally. And we also have

our tab data booklets that we have had.

SME-CH47: All right. Do you know whether or not (b)(3), (b)(6)

did that, or was that discussed over the radio at all?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I can't confirm that, sir. I don't know if he

planned that or not, sir.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c The one thing that we can't -- I mean, no one can

tell you whether or not he did that it night. But all lift

aircraft use (b)(1)1.4a every time they go in and out of any PZ,

LZ or anything like that. It's one of our SOPs, brigade-wide.

But we really enforce it at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c .

SME-CH47: I have a question about the routes. What we see

in the CONOP route is different from what we see on the bread

crumb analysis that came back to us. Was there a switch or a

change in the routing -- for going to for instance, the

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

primary route to that you flew?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I don't recall any changes.

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) I don't either.

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SME-CH47: Well, when we get done, sir, if we can show them

what we’ve got, and get an understanding of what that was.

The route selection, now did -- y'all discuss that in a crew brief

after you did the AMB? You did a crew brief with (b)(3), (b)(6)

team. Now, were all the crew members present for all of

that -- everybody?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) They were.

SME-CH47: And the route that you selected from RP to LZ

, what criteria did you use to make that selection?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c In

other words, when lead came in, I think the landing direction

was 020. As opposed to flying down the valley. You, kind of,

came in perpendicular to the valley and -- was that threat related,

tactics related approach to the LZ?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: It was, I would say, the combination of both, sir.

The winds were predominately out of the north that night.

Without knowing the true condition of the LZ, we tried to make

our approaches so we have (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Additionally, we preach to our guys all the time

not to (b)(1)1.4a . We try to avoid it as

much as possible.

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SME-CH47: Did you get an actual hard time from the LZ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

to be at [sic]? Was that 1830 Zulu as a hard time, or was that

an event-driven kind of thing? How did that come about?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: During our planning process -- during -- while

lead does the route, they will pass up the times it takes for

pick-up here at to where we pick up our BSO, the battle

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

space owner, and then to the LZ. And that gets incorporated into

the brief.

BG Colt: Would you characterize the planning time that night

to be the norm, or more compressed than normal?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: It was pretty average, sir.

SME-CH47: Now, when you get the LZ points and the route

points, and you send them back to the unit, and maybe the flight

lead is working on the (b)(1)1.4a computer and then putting it together,

at what point is the S-2 information passed to them?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Once the route is completed, we will call the S-2

and they come and vet the route.

SME-CH47: Okay. And is that -- or are there any threats

marked on the map at all when you print the map out, so that you

are aware of where things are -- of potential hostile acts?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Most of the time, sir. I can't say all the time.

SME-CH47: Was it that night?

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(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I believe so.

SME-CH47: You had the threat on the map?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Yes, sir.

SME-CH47: So when you reprint the map from the folder you

that you save it in, it should have that on there maybe, or is

that something that is penned in?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: No. We don't save the entire map. We save the

route. So any changes to our threats or attack range or ROZ’s,

when we reprint the map, all those changes will be on there. So

we don't save the maps, sir.

SME-CH47: Now, when you got your threat brief, what was your

opinion -- or what was your gut feeling about the mission that

night as far as threat? No different than any other night? No

big deal? No concern -- or little concern?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Not really sir. There was a little concern there

where a couple SAFIRES previous to that, and on previous (b)(3), (b)(6)

mission even.

BG Colt: If anybody else feels differently, feel free to

speak up. Again, this is not intended to insinuate anything

other than to determine the facts of what actually was planned

versus what got executed; that's what we're interested in, okay?

The witnesses nodded indicating an affirmative response.

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(b)(3), (b)(6) FLT AMC: I didn't personally have any issue with the

threat. We had a couple of -- when the S-2 slide came up, we

had a couple historic POO sites for SAFIRE, probably more to,

I guess, the north/northwest of where we were going into(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

.

And it didn't really cause me any concerns as the AMC.

SME-CH47: Both aircraft use (b)(1)1.4a?

EXT FLT AMC:

(b)(3), (b)(6) Correct.

SME-CH47: How about HUD? Do you use HUD on goggles --

(b)(3), (b)(6) FLT AMC: Every time.

BG Colt: As you flew down the route in this particular case,

the Apaches at some point, they had already been out in front

of you on the first infil, right? Did they burn the first LZ

for you as well, the (b)(3), (b)(6) element, or the AC? Anybody sparkle

or burn their LZ?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: They did? And you picked that up at what range?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We could see that from a mile and a half at least.

BG Colt: A mile and a half? And as you approached(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

the very first time, did you also officially detect people

running out of the LZ, or get that back from the AHs?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I don't think so.

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) I don't recall. I don’t recall anyone running

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off the LZ, or being informed of it.

BG Colt: Okay. At any rate, the first landing went in there,

wasn't terribly dusty. I understand. Can you describe the

landing actions on, and the return back to the FOB.

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) I recall there being some grass. Sometimes we

call it "getting grassed out," as opposed to browned out. It

was more of a recently cultivated field, sir. And we had a little

bit of grass that blew up, kind of, washed out the goggles a little

bit with reflected light. And that was about it, really. It

was a pretty easy landing compared with some of the stuff we do.

BG Colt: Any issues with the ramp? The ramp goes down, pax

unload --

Ramp: No. The ramp usually goes down -- as soon as the

aircraft is at a complete stop, is when our crew members lowers

the ramp.

BG Colt: In this particular case, ramp down, pax offload --

Ramp: Yes, sir. As soon as the last man is off the ramp,

the ramp goes back up. And then we call "ready in the back,"

and we’ll take off.

BG Colt: Okay. Do you make an up call before you guys

depart?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Yes, sir.

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BG Colt: And then lead departs, and you depart as a flight,

not one ready?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-MH47: So if -- you're saying it's wherever you are ready,

you depart? So CHALK 2, if his ramp is up first, he's clear to

depart?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We have done that on several occasions, sir.

SME-MH47: And then, where do you rejoin the flight? Is that

a SOP? Or is it just something common?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: It's what we brief.

SME-MH47: What do you brief?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We will go to the start point after the drop off,

and meet up there. If lead takes off first, they would turn their

(b)(1)1.4a But CHALK 2 always has

(b)(1)1.4a So just for situational awareness, so we can (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

SME-MH47: Is he holding at that waypoint or is he slow?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: (b)(1)1.4a

but it's however we brief it for that night.

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SME-MH47: Whose SOP do y'all fall under? Do you bring one

with you, or do you fall underneath?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We fall underneath 10th CAB.

SME-MH47: Did they have a rejoin procedure in that SOP?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I would have to look, sir. I just know that we

brief every night as our mission. That's what we -- the similar

brief that we fell on when we started this mission set, we've

kind of continued what our predecessors had done.

SME-CH47: Going back to the planning, was there any briefed

plan or any conversation about the IRF portion at all? Was that

ever a contingency that was discussed whatsoever? And had it

ever been prior in any of your experiences with this particular

mission?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) This particular night we did not. The reaction

force was not addressed at all. And that was my first mission.

I don't know about previous.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I hadn't done one before.

SME-MH47: Before the (b)(3), (b)(6) mission, how many -- I understand

to integrate into -- to get to the (b)(3), (b)(6) mission set, you fly

GS missions; is that correct?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Yes.

SME-MH47: Is that the SOP that generally y'all had followed?

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(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Absolutely. At approximately 120ish hours on GS

before I came to Logar.

SME-MH47: And each mission for GS is, what, a five-hours

mission?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I would say that’s a little above average.

SME-MH47: So do you feel you're confident that you were

comfortable when you went on the (b)(3), (b)(6) mission?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I was, sir.

SME-CH47: What was your planned route speed -- en route

speed to infil?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We plan our (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

BG Colt: Can you talk me through after you did the initial

infil at(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

, and then -- I haven't seen any kind of

routing -- planned routing anyway -- back to the FOB. I take

it you just came back direct, or were you following way points,

or did you reverse the infil course or --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I know we had a start point. And I believe that

from the start point, it was direct back to .

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

BG Colt: Okay.

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) As I recall, it was the high ground to the north

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of Tangi Valley up over that way, stay clear of the (b)(1)1.4a zone.

BG Colt: And then direct back here. You came back in, did

not get gas, and went to REDCON 2, correct?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) For the ones I've been doing, we get gas. Yes,

sir, we refill again.

SME-CH47: During your statement that you made earlier, said

you had burned down (b)(1)1.4a whenever y'all took off. So

that's why I'm --

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Right. We came back, got fuel, went back to

parking. We stood on the . And then as I recall, we went

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

back out to (b)(1)1.4a , and we were at 100 percent flight for

quite a while. And that's why I estimated we burned down about

(b)(1)1.4a pounds prior to take off.

SME-CH47: Fair enough.

BG Colt: Okay. Can you talk us through some of, sort of,

the radio traffic as you began to generate the IRF mission? What

is your recollection of how that got prepared?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Well, sir, Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6)was the primary planner for

(b)(3), (b)(6) that particular night. The first thing I recall him saying

was they had some squirters that had squirted out of the main

objective. And that they were going to try to put in the reaction

force to contain those squirters.

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So that's kind of how it all started off. And then we just heard

some back and forth -- talked about products. I know Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6)

created some products, and gave them to CHALK 1. They came

across the radio asking -- they just wanted one aircraft to go

in. I was AMC that decided just for no particular reason just

that CHALK 1 was CHALK 1, so they would take them. So we agreed

to that, and then --

BG Colt: Did you also have the products, or were they only

delivered to CHALK 1?

(b)(3), (b)(6)FLT AMC: I received my product, sir.

BG Colt: You were absolutely following lead blind at that

point?

(b)(3), (b)(6)FLT AMC: I wouldn't say blind, sir. We were going to

follow them out, and they were just going to hold at the RP

basically. So we didn't have a particular route, so we were just

going to stay clear of any known threats when we proceeded up

there. So that was the intent.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: (b)(3), (b)(6) and I did a map recon on our (b)(1)1.4a and

discussed our route of flight, and where we were going to hold

and what the plan was prior to take off.

BG Colt: So it was more intent? There was not a time where

you were aware that they came out with preplanned ACPs that you’re

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going to put in the (b)(1)1.4a

, and fly around to the northeast and make

this infil?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: No, sir. There was no route planned or anything

like that. But we did discuss how we were going to go in -- he

and I, over the radio --

BG Colt: Okay. It's very, very important that -- did you

feel that this was rushed to a point where you needed to slow

it down?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Not really, sir. We had plenty of time. We

had -- how long? 45 minutes or so sitting in (b)(3), (b)(6) waiting

on --

BG Colt: Shut down?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: No. Ready to fly. We were waiting on the pax

to show up.

BG Colt: Okay. At no time did you ever shut down in (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Not in (b)(3), (b)(6) sir.

BG Colt: Okay. But before that -- I'm trying to get this

straight in my head. You went to(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

. You came back here.

You did get gas. You shut down, but you were on the ?
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

The witness nodded indicating an affirmative response.

BG Colt: And that's when the radio traffic between Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6)

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and yourself started. And then at some point when it was

determined that was going to be a one-ship infil, again, in your

statement you said you decided that.

Is that literally what happened? Who decided that we were going

to use a single ship and why?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6)actually came across, sir, and said

they wanted one ship only. So that was directed, as far as I

know, from the TOC. And we just decided to have them take the

passengers because they were CHALK 1.

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-MH47: Did the crew members-- did you ever -- were you

briefed on the plan? Did you understand everything that was

going on in the discussion as far as the IRF?

Right Door: Yes, sir. We all, pretty much, stay up on COMMs.

The radios, from what I remember, you couldn't always hear both

sides for some reason. But we heard most of it, what they were

asking for. Originally it was 17 people, and they wanted one

aircraft because they didn't want to spook anymore, and have them

run even further or whatever.

They wanted us to go to the other side. Which is why they went

where they were going. I think that's why it was one aircraft

originally because it was a 17-person team, not a bigger team.

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And when it went bigger, we just left it the same. They could

still do it.

Like I said, they wanted one aircraft to minimize the noise and

stuff going in there since they tried to capture the squirters

or whatever.

All of us, we were there. We heard most of the same traffic that

they heard.

SME-MH47: I understand that the HLZ diagrams were brought

out to the aircrew while y'all were waiting for the 64s to refuel

before they went out. Did y'all get a copy of the HLZ diagram?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) We did not.

SME-MH47: So it only went to the lead aircraft?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Correct.

SME-MH47: What's y'all's regular -- I mean, if that lead

aircraft PLs en route, what do y'all do? What's y'all’s SOP?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) I specifically briefed that night if CHALK 1

goes down then CHALK 2 follows them, makes sure they are safe.

If CHALK 2 goes down, CHALK 1 follows two down, makes sure they

are safe. Basically set up a security perimeter over the

aircraft. And the senior-most person becomes the on-scene

commander.

We have an on-scene commander's checklist that we keep in our

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cockpit at all times. And we start running that through the TOC.

SME-MH47: If the aircraft -- say for instance, PL'd or the

battle space owner when you land into that air field there -- say,

for instance, lead landed in there, would you have cross-loaded,

and taken the ground force and continue the mission, or would

you have aborted it?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Are you saying when we're (b)(3), (b)(6) , if one

of the aircraft had broken right there --

SME-MH47: No. Say, for instance, you departed, and you

were flying that circular route to the north coming into the

valley, you had no pax on-board. You didn't have the IRF. You

are basically an escort for the lead.

For instance, they had a CHIP light on an engine, and they wanted

to land, would you have landed -- as the AMC, would you have

cross-loaded and taken the IRF and continue the mission?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) I would not have. I would have called back and

aborted the mission.

SME-MH47: Why?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Basically because we -- the requirement in our

task force is to have two aircraft. So if we're down to one,

we're not going to send a launch out and fly into that area. We

are going to make sure we have an escort. So I would not make

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that decision.

SME-MH47: But the plan was for you to hold at the mouth of

the -- and which you did. You held at the mouth, and lost sight

of your other aircraft. What was your purpose at that time?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Just to wait for them to come out, so we could

escort them back.

SME-MH47: So they would have reversed and flown back through

the green zone again to get to you and rejoin?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) I can't say that. I don't know what route they

would have taken. I would assume that they would have come back

to the north of the high ground and link up with us.

SME-MH47: And reverse route?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) I don't think they would reverse route. They

would come out due north, and then link up with us that way.

SME-MH47: So it wasn't discussed how the rejoin procedure

would have occurred, how you would have rejoined that flight.

As the Air Mission Commander, you were holding at the mouth up

near where the battle space owner -- their FOB is, right? And

then you entered into the --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: That's not correct, sir. We were holding to the

northeast along the ridgeline. So it was northeast of the

reaction force.

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SME-MH47: Okay. We would like to sit down and look on a map

and see that. I was just curious as to how you all would effected

a rejoin without having lead fly back up through the green zone.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: They were supposed to cross that ridgeline back

to the north. And we were going to rejoin and fly back at that

point.

BG Colt: What we understand is at the best of your

recollection based on the bread crumb as well, kind of, confirms

that the green route appears to be the infil route. Where do

you drop off and hold? And you are holding in left-hand turns

or --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Yes.

BG Colt: You want to draw it on there.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Right over this ridgeline.

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) So the question about reversing the route, they

would not have done that. They should have come directly out

and proceed up and joined up with us. They would not reverse

route in my opinion.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: There's a small ridgeline right through here.

And they were supposed to come back up. They were supposed to

land 090 at the LZ, and then come back up to the north where we

would rejoin them.

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SME-MH47: Okay. That's(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

. Here's the opening right

here, the breadcrumb, they came in here, and entered the green

zone and flew down.

BG Colt: They are holding here.

SME-MH47: Right. So they continued on around.

BG Colt: And you lost sight of them right here?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I don't recall this route of flight to be honest

with you, sir. That's not how I remember it.

BG Colt: Okay. You want to grab the breadcrumb.

SME-MH47: It's right here, sir.

BG Colt: This is literally, the last entries of him coming

around inbound. And the other one we have reflects this is what

he did, right, coming around the horn?

Here, that's the one we have been looking at.

So based on what you described to me so far, you took off, and

you flew the route. And you dropped off in the vicinity of this

location right here.

He continues around, and you would have -- at this point, you

are (b)(1)1.4a feet AGL.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We were at (b)(1)1.4a holding.

BG Colt: MSL?

The witness nodded indicating an affirmative response.

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BG Colt: Okay. And he continues, and you lost sight of him,

I take it after he crossed the ridgeline?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I must have been mistaken that night, sir.

Because what we had discussed is there's a smaller ridgeline

right through here that comes down through this valley, cross,

make a quick turn to 090. And then come back out and meet with

us here. I know that's what we had discussed.

BG Colt: Okay. And roughly though, flying out

there -- roughly -- again, I'm not doing all the MSL/AGL

conversions. But roughly, you took off from here, joined, you

know, coming off of -- would you call it a holding area again?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) , sir.

BG Colt: (b)(1)1.4a knots ground speed, (b)(1)1.4a feet AGL. How many

rotor disks were you flying apart? Lose? Close? Extended?

What was briefed?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Combat cruise. So it's (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a But no closer than (b)(1)1.4a

BG Colt: Okay. And at that point, you get up to that point,

you drop off and right holding, and he continues or you enter

holding. I got it.

And your actions at that point are -- what are you hearing on

the radio at this point as AMC?

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FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) As AMC, sir, I heard them do the six-minute.

I heard the three-minute call in the LZ brief. I do not recall

the one-minute brief -- or the one-minute call from CHALK 1.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I do.

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) He says he remembers it. I don't remember

hearing that call. I don't know if I was on the radio or

something at the time.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: The reason we picked the place that we did to hold,

sir, was that was our three-minute mark. So we were three

minutes from the LZ at that point, from what (b)(3), (b)(6) and I

had discussed during our map recon.

SME-MH47: Right. That's along the MSR run back the plots.

BG Colt: But that's not where they held, right?

SME-MH47: No, sir.

BG Colt: Okay. About the six-minute mark is where you

dropped off then?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We called "three minutes" when we started to hold.

BG Colt: Okay. At any rate, you are in holding. You hear

that the aircraft has gone down, and your then your actions are?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Actually, sir, the radios were eerily silent.

I was just kind of monitoring, I believe, the right gun. We're

in left orbits. We have the right gunner calling that the Apache

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was engaging targets on the ground. And at that point, again,

the radios were quiet as I recall.

And then we waited for a while. We just continued our orbits

just waiting. We had sight of the Apaches. They were about four

miles away. And at that point I elected to move -- I was on the

controls -- to move down a little bit closer to the high ground

to the north of the Tangi Valley to see if we could see anything,

and also if they needed us to come in and assist.

And at that point, all I heard was "crash site" something

about -- the Apaches were talking about something in relation

to the crash site. So at that point, we were all, like, shocked

because we realized they were down.

And we orbited there probably another four or five orbits. And

then I called the TOC and said, "What do you want us to do."

At that point, they had said -- "they" being the Apaches said -- I

believe (b)(3), (b)(6) was designated as the on-scene commander --

BG Colt: Correct.

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) -- and so we stayed waiting to see if they wanted

us to go in to assist, to try to extract any wounded or anything

like that. At that point, I believe (b)(3), (b)(6) told us

to return back to FOB go REDCON 3.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

BG Colt: Okay. You came back in, shut down and came inside?

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FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir, that's correct.

BG Colt: Okay.

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Just jump in if I am missing anything.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We got approved for a single ship return.

SME-CH47: I would like to ask you about the 38 pax on your

single aircraft. Under CONOP, you have a box that checks seats

out, seats plus. And, of course, it wasn't checked because this

was an add-on. It wasn't part of the original mission. Are you

familiar with the approval process for seats out and seats plus?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) My understanding is that the (b)(3), (b)(6)

teams have a prepositioned waiver for seats outs and seats plus.

But it has to be individually approved by the admiral that's in

charge. So that will all get channeled through our chain of

command. I don't --

SME-CH47: So your assumption was that all of that got

approved?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: They weren't seats plus, sir.

SME-CH47: They didn't all have a seat, did they?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Yes, sir.

SME-CH47: You have 38 seats in the aircraft?

BG Colt: No. They have seating for 32. The gunners and the

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ramp guy, obviously, are not occupying a seat, and not required

to based on monkey harness restraint.

In this particular case, when they loaded pax, it's my

understanding that the 33rd pack was the dog handler. And that

was not clear to them until they loaded.

Ramp: That is correct, sir.

SME-CH47: Did you have somebody in the jump seat? Troop

commander’s seat, or do you know whether they had some --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I have no idea, sir.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c They have done that in the past in the jump seat.

They have had somebody there to maximize personnel.

ASDAT: How about anybody on the ramp, not seat-belted? Did

you have anybody on the ramp.

Right Door: For the (b)(3), (b)(6) set, we have not been running the

ramp gun. They are usually close. So by the time we get out

there -- it's like being in a seat when you land, so we are not

hanging out on the ramp.

So I'm pretty sure he would have been up closer to a seat, or

on the edge of the -- a seat in the aircraft. There wouldn't

have been a ramp because there's nothing there. There wasn't

a gun mounted back there. So he had no reason to be back there.

He would have been in the cabin.

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ASDAT: Is it uncommon to have anybody from Team (b)(3), (b)(6) on the

ramp during infil?

Right Door: There's nobody ever back there.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c That's one of the things we discussed during the

meet and greet is, again, our constraints and limitations. And

that's one of them.

SME-NGB: As the AMC, were you aware they were in a seats-plus

status, or were you assuming that they were just full --

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) I was not tracking the seats-plus status at all.

BG Colt: At any time during the mission as AMC, did you get

any radio traffic from either the AH's, or any of the (b)(1)1.4a

platforms talking about conditions of LZs, or any other

intelligence being passed?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) The only thing I remember, sir, is the actual

LZ brief that the AH64s provide in standard format. I don't

remember any other (b)(1)1.4a or (b)(3), (b)(6) or any of those guys giving

us any other kind of threat updates.

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-GFA: What point do you guys lower the ramp? Once you

touch down?

Right Door: Once the aircraft has stopped. With the dusty

landing, sometimes it [inaudible]. So once it stops, then the

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ramp goes down.

SME-MH47: Does the PC call that, or do you do it on your own?

Ramp: We announce it as soon as the aircraft comes to a

complete stop.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Once they call "aircraft stable".

SME-CH47: Can you tell me what -- typically, the position

of the gunners are on RP inbound. Are they standing up, manning

the guns in the doors?

Ramp: Yes.

Right Door: Left and right gunners have to be standing

because the dust is normally a bigger threat. So we're trying

to get the aircraft in a safe place with the dust landing. So

you can't do it from sitting down. So we are calling the altitude

and the dust clouds and everything so we are usually standing

up in the windows to make sure we don't tear [inaudible] to try

to get it landed safely.

SME-CH47: Any discussion prior to taking off about the

landing direction in HLZ as opposed to the 020 when you

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

did earlier into(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c-- based off the winds out of the north.

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) The only thing that I recall was, again, Mr.

, when he gave us the warning order, we are going to be taking

(b)(3), (b)(6)

the(b)(1)1.4awas that they wanted this -- wanted flight lead or whoever

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is taking the passengers, to land to the southeast, approach from

the northwest. And that was because the squirters were coming

out to the west from the primary objective.

BG Colt: I'm sorry. Say that one more time.

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) The only thing I remember Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) saying is

that the supported unit had requested that we land to the

southeast, approaching from the northwest, so that we wouldn't

overfly the objective, obviously.

And then that would probably be better off to contain the

squirters. So we put them in a left quartering or cross-wind

condition.

BG Colt: You were not aware any time that the squirters were

stationery, occupying or located at a common building?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) I wasn't aware of that, sir.

Ramp: No, sir.

SME-MH47: When you all got in-country and started this

mission set, did y'all ever or do any unit collective training?

Did you ever do brownout landings in the local area that weren't

on mission set?

Ramp: Part of our -- in order for us to fly missions, we have

do our CCTs prior to being able to fly mission; that includes

brownouts and pinnacle landings for both the front-seaters and

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back-seaters.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c That is a lesson we learned the hard way when we

first got here. Our predecessors had us doing brownouts right

out here off the HLZ, which it didn't even -- it didn't brown

anything out. So we had to go out, and every crew that comes

in here goes through serious brownout conditions to make sure

daytime, nighttime, zero illum in order to get to that, that

training.

SME-MH47: Do you all feel comfortable with your level of

training?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) As comfortable as you can call any brownout

total zero illum, yes, sir.

BG Colt: Just briefly for me, did all four of you mob

together same site, same time?

Ramp: It was just the three of us.

BG Colt: What was your FAC and RL level when you activated

to go to mobilization station and start prepping for this

particular mission?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I was RL1 day/night/NVG --

BG Colt: PC?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Negative, sir.

BG Colt: When did you make PC?

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(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I made PC here about 50 hours in-country.

Ramp: Okay. I was RL1 day/night/NVG CE, roughly -- a little

over 400 hours total. And about 300 of that was goggles.

Left Door: I started out as an RL3 door gunner, but I had

previous experience. So I had to do some flights with an FI

before I got signed off. But I was an RL1 by the time I got here.

Right Door: I'm with (b)(3), (b)(6) a couple months

after these guys. I'm the (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a So I was RL1, doing NVG.

SME-MH47: Did the other crew do the same mob? Were they on

the same timeline as y'all?

Right Door: (b)(3), (b)(6) mob'd with

myself and 2/135th --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: And we had (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) and

(b)(3), (b)(6) with our mob.

SME-MH47: Okay. Can I associate a date to what month and

year that was.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: March of this year.

SME-MH47: I'm sorry?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: March.

SME-MH47: March of '11. And where was that conducted?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Fort Hood, Texas.

SME-MH47: Where y'all went and collectively did your

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training?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: Were those aircraft configured the same way these

are?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: But you didn't bring any of them?

Ramp: Yeah, we did. 218 and 219. Our aircraft we

brought --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: But we weren't flying them that night though.

SME-MH47: Let me flush out the macro timelines of what y'all

did. So March 11, you did the MOAB in Fort Hood. How long did

that take?

Ramp: Our last training day was prior to Memorial Day

weekend. So I would say roughly --

BG Colt: Maybe June the 1st of this year?

SME-MH47: So 1 June, you were complete?

Ramp: I'm sorry. I misspoke. We had a four-day -- it was

roughly May 1st is when our training was complete.

SME-MH47: You were complete training?

Ramp: Right.

SME-MH47: And then y'all went back to the house for leave

and things like that --

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Ramp: We just had a four-day pass. And during that four-day

pass, our ADVON was already en route here.

SME-MH47: Okay. So when did y'all basically start flying

into country?

Left Door: I got here the 10th of May, and made it to FOB

probably like the 12th or 13th of May.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-MH47: And the event crew also came in May?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Except for the 2.

Right Door: The (b)(3), (b)(6) , over their timeline.

The timeline we are on here now is (b)(3), (b)(6) , and I can go over the

(b)(3), (b)(6) 7/135th timeline if you want, sir.

SME-MH47: So y'all basically -- both (b)(3), (b)(6) and

(b)(3), (b)(6) got into country in May or June timeframe?

Right Door: Sir, we didn't get here until towards the end

of July.

BG Colt: Go ahead and layout your timeline there.

Right Door: The (b)(3), (b)(6) , we moved

from our states like 29 May, went to (b)(3), (b)(6) . The last flights

to (b)(3), (b)(6) were 30 June, and we did our pass and our loading,

and a week delayed for airplanes, and then slowly trickled done

here. I think I made it to on 26 July or something like

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

that.

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SME-MH47: And you finished your training, and became a

mission crew some time in --

Right Door: It was like 4 or 5 August.

SME-MH47: 4 or 5 August, you actually went operational?

Right Door: Yes, sir. Being the(b)(1)1.4ato my CCT, and help do

the rest of our guys in the back, and then went to missions.

SME-MH47: Okay. And we have that timeline, sir, 4, 5 on the

event crew; that matches up.

BG Colt: Anybody else got any questions?

SME-NGB: Most of my questions, I, kind of, wanted to focus

a little bit on the pre-mob process, and training aspects of it.

So I didn't want to inject that while we were still focused on

the --

BG Colt: Okay. I have got one more then: From your crew

station and your experience having preformed the (b)(3), (b)(6) mission,

do you think that you were adequately planned and briefed going

into the second phase, or the sequel of this mission?

PC: I think I was adequately briefed, sir.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I felt comfortable with it, sir. We had all the

information we needed.

Ramp: Yeah. I felt comfortable as well. The two chalks

talked amongst each other on what the plan was going to be. And

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I was comfortable with what we had decided as a flight.

Left Door: I felt comfortable. I, kind of, knew what our

plan was. We were just escort and everything. But I felt

comfortable with what we were doing.

Right Door: Sir, I felt comfortable with the plan. There

was a lot of talk about direction and LZ, and it sounded like

it was -- just like the one I done the night before; fly in, drop

them off, and get out.

(b)(3), (b)(6) : When you guys broke and you went into holding

pattern, did CHALK 1 change his lighting?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Other than all lights off?

BG Colt: All lights off?

PC: No. He was up (b)(1)1.4a , sir.

BG Colt: Okay. And do you brief an IR position two --

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir.

BG Colt: -- strobe something?

PC: NVG plus two, DIM plus two.

(b)(3), (b)(6) : So now when you guys broke, and when he was going

to come back and you were going to rejoin, was there any

discussion when he had come up with his IR anti-collision lights?

Were they just going to use yours?

PC: More than likely, they would have turned on their -- once

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we separate, they turn on their IR upper anti-collision.

BG Colt: Did you see it on?

PC: I did not, sir.

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-CH47: Could I -- I would like to discuss certain

documents we talked earlier about knee board packets. But we

would like to get the 365 series from aircraft 175 and the CCT

class -- not the classes themselves, but the rosters, and the

makeup of the class, not -- I don't want power points. But if

you just tell me what's taught. And reading file…your new

information folder -- or quarterly folder, let me get one of your

reading file folders that has all the memorandums and all that

stuff. I'm not interested in regulations and things, but the

memorandums and stuff.

PC: We have that all on digits. Would you just like for me

to print off --

SME-CH47: Or burn it on a disk. That would suit me just

fine.

PC: Okay. No problem.

SME-CH47: And your IATF, we would like to take a look at

that -- or if you can make a copy of it, either way.

SME-NGB: You are Bravo 7/158?

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Right Door: No, sir. I'm 2/135.

SME-NGB: Can you explain the relationship between Bravo

7/158 and Bravo 2/135?

Right Door: Yes, sir. When we showed up, we knew when we

left Hood we were going to three different places. The Commander

and First Sergeant of 2/135 went to Kandahar, and then a

lieutenant and, I think, 40 of us, half maintenance, half crew

came here and the other lieutenant and 20 of them went to Salerno.

When we came here, (b)(3), (b)(6) was going to remain the commander

of our group, and we were just, kind of, meld and create one team

with the (b)(3), (b)(6) Reserve Guard -- or the guys that works pretty

well.

SME-NGB: So --

BG Colt: You are basically two platoons, if you will. At

one time, you had eight aircraft, now you have seven; is that

it?

SME-NGB: (b)(3), (b)(6) , you're a guardsman?

Right Door: Yes, sir.

SME-NGB: (b)(3), (b)(6) ?

Right Door: I'm (b)(3), (b)(6) , sir.

SME-NGB: There's a detachment, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) , correct?

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Right Door: They're at (b)(3), (b)(6) Air Force Base. And it's,

essentially, half and half. They have six aircraft. And they

got in six from (b)(3), (b)(6) or --

SME-NGB: Where at in (b)(3), (b)(6) are they stationed?

Right Door: (b)(3), (b)(6) .

SME-NGB: And then, where is Bravo 7/158? Is that New

Century?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: The New Century, sir.

SME-NGB: What's at (b)(3), (b)(6) (ph)?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: (b)(3), (b)(6) is the little -- larger town it's right

next to.

SME-NGB: Okay. So, essentially, New Century is the --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Yes, sir.

SME-NGB: Okay. Can you explain for both organizations,

where are you in the ARFORGEN cycle planned for this rotation?

Can you speak to that? Do you know about that? And then can

you tell me when you got you alert notification prior to

mobilization notification?

Right Door: I can't for us, sir. We knew well in advance,

I think we traded with Florida or something somehow to come to

Afghanistan instead of Iraq in a different timeframe. I

remember something about that.

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But we knew probably a year out, I would think, and started the

preparation. We did AT with Colorado -- actually, we knew at

least a year out because we did AT with Colorado to do some flight

training. And then the next year, we did AT for the green

training.

BG Colt: Did you bring in airframes?

Right Door: No, sir. All of our airframes were turned into

the States.

BG Colt: Okay. And when you broke camp there in the mob,

getting ready to deploy, you knew right then that the company

was going to be split --

Right Door: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: -- or did you find that out once you got here.

Right Door: No. We had everything, kind of, planned out

to -- and we've been talking to Washington/Oregon and some other

people and the RCs. So I'm not sure what the -- we, kind of,

had a list of who's going where to try to make it as easy as

possible getting structures and everything we needed in each

location. So we had it split out prior to.

SME-NGB: When you say you came together and started training

throughout the course of the past year, you are just talking about

the two guard elements, right?

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Right Door: Yes, sir.

SME-NGB: Two platoons?

SME-NGB: As far as Bravo 7/158, how far in advance did you

all know that you were going to be here?

Ramp: Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I, we had a pretty good idea. He and

I were in Iraq at the time when we were told that this unit was

set to deploy. So that would be, what, May --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: It was May 10.

SME-NGB: Okay. So may of last year. So you were --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Iraq.

SME-NGB: -- Iraq at that time?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: That's correct, sir.

SME-NGB: Okay. When did you get back to the States

following OIF?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: The second week of September.

SME-NGB: So from September through March, can you talk me

through what you did coming off of OIF, and then in preparation

for this deployment.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I was on leave until 1 November -- terminal leave

from active duty. And then starting in November, I came back

to the unit and started flying again.

I have been doing training since through that whole time.

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SME-NGB: And I know we've got, kind of two organizations

here, how did you individually feel from a unit standpoint? Were

you resourced and prepared for this known mission -- or at least

this rotation cycle? Did you have the resources? And were you

able to get the training you needed to in order to fly and prepare

or RL progress, get all the personnel PC statuses that you needed

to, things like that?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I would say for the most part. We had a few

late-comers that struggled getting with progression.

SME-NGB: As a result of folks in flight school?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: That's correct, sir.

BG Colt: Can you address, how is the Honduras and

Korea -- are those individual augmentees?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Yes, sir. We've got one from Honduras, and two

or three from Korea. One pilot and one crew chief.

BG Colt: You have to grade them in the same --

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Absolutely. They fall under (b)(3), (b)(6) He is

the detachment commander.

SME-NGB: So as far as the two organizations, they didn't

come together until you got here to Task force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c --

Right Door: Yes, sir.

SME-NGB: -- and started integrating? Okay. You, pretty

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much, have your timeline at Fort Hood. Did you know specifically

that you were going to be doing this mission, supporting these

kind of missions here? Or were you planning a different type

of mission during the course of the last year as you were

preparing for deployment?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We prepared for all types of missions. We did

a couple of planning in air assault-type missions at Fort Hood.

Generally, I know the people in our unit from their last rotation

here in Afghanistan that they were expecting a lot more general

support types of mission I believe.

We did train to do air assaults.

SME-NGB: Were you -- did you have in mind that you would be

direct support to special operations type support?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Not until we got here, sir.

SME-MH47: Were you surprised?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: No.

SME-MH47: It didn't surprise you in the least?

SME-NGB: When you were first assigned to this particular

mission, did you feel at that point that the training you had

done leading up to this had prepared you for supporting these

types of missions? Did you understand the level of mission

planning, short notice type stuff? I mean, what was the mission

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planning cycles that you were used to training in? For example,

when you were in Iraq, and then as you went to the training cycle,

and had the mob station and prior to that?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: In Iraq, the planning process was a lot different

than it was here. The AMRs would come directly to the company,

and we would plan any AMR or air assault that way. Here, the

AMRs are planned here at the task force.

SME-NGB: And as you integrated, I know there was a fairly

deliberate integration process once you got here at the task

force level. Do you feel like you went through the

crawl/walk/run process to get yourself to the point where you

could go perform as an AMC flight lead, and essentially be signed

off on team (b)(3), (b)(6) type missions?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Absolutely. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I flew several air

assaults on the GS sets before we came to .

(b)(3), (b)(6)

SME-NGB: As far as the crew mixing here, did you see any

significant issues as far as -- tell me how the, essentially,

the guard guys and reserve guys started mixing together, that

integration process. Can you talk to that a little bit?

Right Door: Starting day one, we meet and greet started

rolling through the FIs first [inaudible] and then from Hawaii,

did CCTs. I was MH crew. There was always a mixed bird, and

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we just worked with them.

I know for the enlisted crew, we went out to their aircraft, and

talked about their system, (b)(3), (b)(6) and the GS, how to set them up,

what they expect. We just talked about it, briefed it and it

worked --

SME-NGB: Just a purely basic crew coordination standpoint,

any significant differences, you know regarding basic

coordination principles, aircraft systems?

Right Door: There were a couple just minor things from what

we see in (b)(3), (b)(6) . And what they did -- I brought it

up -- (b)(3), (b)(6) and I talked about it. We made sure we

knew what was going to see as a group here. And it was fairly

easy. Nothing major --

SME-NGB: So you feel the standardization process was

successful, and you've work those things out eventually?

Right Door: Yes, sir. It was very easy. No big changes.

SME-NGB: And what about from the SOP standpoint? Obviously,

we've got several different organizations even within the same

organization of different States. So we have a plethora of SOPs

from, essentially, you know, what your doing in OIF, to what

you're doing back in the States, garrison versus tactical SOPs.

And then here, integrating into two task forces, how did you

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overcome -- I guess, essentially, how did you -- what was the

integration process? And how did you get smart on the new SOPs

for operating here with Team (b)(3), (b)(6) and Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Our stands had the 10th CAB SOP all through our

training at (b)(3), (b)(6) .

SME-NGB: Okay. So you were able to look at the SOP far

enough ahead of time at both stations, and started working

towards that?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Our stands had it, and passed it down to the rest

of the pilots and crew on how to do things.

BG Colt: Is that the same for (b)(3), (b)(6) ?

Right Door: I don't remember a 10th CAB SOP while we were

planning at (b)(3), (b)(6) . But, you know, (b)(3), (b)(6) worked

together. We were fairly close, so we were all on the same SOP.

We shared it back and forth.

(b)(3), (b)(6) was actually -- produced all the same between

the two States.

SME-NGB: So any significant differences from the

time -- from what you saw when you started training [sic] at the

mob station to when you got here, any significant differences

that you had to get spun up on, or was it just a matter of,

essentially, going out and starting to do the mission to solidify,

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you know, the process?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I don't remember any big changes at all, sir,

coming in. We integrated and started going.

SME-MH47: I've got a question for the crew members. I

understand there are three crew members in the back of the

aircraft, correct?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Yes, sir.

SME-MH47: All right. So you have two up front, left and

right. And you on a 60D? What type of weapons are you using?

Right Door: 240s.

SME-MH47: You have 240s up there. And then on the ramp, I

understand it was a stinger; is that correct?

Ramp: We do not fly with the stinger mount.

SME-MH47: You do not fly with the stingers.

Ramp: It gets in the way of the (b)(3), (b)(6) Teams getting on and

off.

SME-MH47: So that third crew member, he's -- what's

his -- he's on a ramp, or is he on the -- he's on the ramp at

the maintenance panel?

Ramp: Right. The last one-man troop seat, that's his

designated seat.

SME-MH47: Okay. So he's right there. And do you fly with

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that bubble window in, or do you remove it?

Ramp: The bubble windows are installed.

SME-MH47: All right. So during the landing, he's basically

blind back there? Is he assisting the aircraft to land, or is

he just --

Ramp: Typically, the guy in the back will assist either side

if he feels that he needs to.

SME-MH47: So you will stick your head in the bubble and then

try to look out?

Ramp: Roger.

SME-MH47: Do you have fidelity with the ground? Are you

calling that with the pilots?

Ramp: No. The guy at the right gun is calling the aircraft

down.

SME-MH47: The right forward gun is calling the aircraft

down?

Right Door: Yes, sir.

SME-MH47: And doing surveillance with the gun system?

Right Door: Yes, sir, as best you can. You can see way more

from the door than you can a bubble window. It's a lot easier

to call the aircraft height and everything. So it's always been

done from the right door.

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SME-MH47: Do you give dust or observation calls to the

pilot? How does that work?

Right Door: We usually brief the left gunner will call the

cloud forward. And the right gun will call the altitude to the

aircraft, so it's less time tied, and you can pick up and hear

everything.

Left Door: Normally, sometimes the guy in the

back -- because normally, as we're coming in for a short final,

I'll have my head sticking out front, so I can get a snapshot

of the LZ. And then I'll be scanning. I would normally hear

them say "dust cloud forming at the ramp". At that time I already

know that it's coming.

So then as I'm starting to scan, I can see it mid-cabin, and I

will call "dust cloud in the cabin," and it's all simultaneously

while he's calling it down. Then I'll call "dust cloud, cabin

door, dust cloud coming under the nose," just to give them the

three seconds they are about ready to lose sight of the ground

so they know.

SME-MH47: Okay. And generally, on your approaches, where

do you want to be when he calls "mid cabin"? Where in your mind

is the pilot -- where do you want to plant the aircraft in a heavy

dust environment?

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(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: On the ground as quickly as possible.

SME-MH47: So you are trying to beat the dust to the ground?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: In an ideal situation, I want to land before the

dust cloud envelops the cockpit, but that doesn't always happen.

BG Colt: That's right.

SME-MH47: What's your touchdown speed?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: It depends on the type of landing we're going to

do, sir, and the terrain.

SME-MH47: So it can vary from five knots to ten knots with

the ground roll --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: From zero. And if it's a wide-open LZ, I would

land at a 20.

SME-MH47: Twenty knots ground speed?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: That's correct, sir.

SME-MH47: Say for instance in a -- when it's a confined area

of landing, can you talk to me how that would go. As you are

coming in, let's say for instance, a green zone, you were told

you are doing 70 knots ground speed basically. So you're running

around 70 knots ground speed. At what point, at a one-minute

call, what altitude and air speed would you normally be?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: It varies on the type of terrain we're flying

over.

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SME-MH47: It's a green zone. It's terraced. So you're

going to have to come down basically.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: The lower the better. But you want to have a nice

approach angle into a terraced area. You want a short ground

run. You want a steeper approach.

SME-MH47: Okay. So where are you in altitude?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: 100 to 200 feet --

BG Colt: Can I tell you here, too, the line of questioning

here, really, is going to directly help us build a model of

simulation of the profile that they are flying. And that's

really why we're very interested in this.

By SOP, when you are flying out at CHALK 2, going into these types

of places is helping us back off the intel, the LZ and do basically

a decent angle and air speed control so that we can get to that

point, all right? That's kind of the context that we're asking

this.

So try to visualize going through the approach, so then we can

try to get the parameters close, all right?

Right Door: With (b)(3), (b)(6) all the training that we did,

because we were both from FOB so the Double Eagle and

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

everything -- he's a HAATS instructor. So we used a lot of

techniques from HAATS. I'm sure Mr. Carter would have been right

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at the forward edge of the shutter steeper than a normal approach,

and would have been trying for a zero ground run. Just -- after

your touch, just as the cloud goes in front of the aircraft, then

you just lower the nose, is what we did a lot in Double Eagle

training for this environment.

SME-MH47: So -- but RP inbound you are generally how high

off the trees would you generally fly? 200 feet? 300 feet?

Looking for the HLZ. So when you're a pilot, you are looking

at your (b)(1)1.4a looking to zero out your right to your point that

you want -- point in space. When you are searching, what

altitude and air speed are you generally doing that terminal

area?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: One, in the inbound -- RP inbound, you want to

be 200 foot or below for me.

BG Colt: Is that pretty consistent for the way Mr. Carter

flew?

Right Door: I would think so. I don't -- altitude's at a

one-minute is one --

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Now, do you guys know who was on the controls?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c He was definitely on the controls?

BG Colt: How do you know that?

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(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I was talking with (b)(3), (b)(6) is

on the radios. So if you are on the radios, you are not on the

controls.

SME-NGB: (b)(3), (b)(6) , how long have you been an AMC?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) I have been at 10th CAB for 10 years in October.

So I've been an AMC the entire time.

SME-NGB: And that's based upon your unit AMC training

program?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Well, I think if you think back to the last

commander's guide prior to the 4.11, I don't think it had a very

specific way of training AMCs. We now have a very specific way

of doing it. So I've, kind of, grown up and been the guy that

teaches all that stuff.

Myself or TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c commander has to give the academics.

Then he gives the final left and right limits AMC brief. So I

kind of grew in into just by default. I haven't been at (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) so long.

SME-NGB: Was there any -- is there any difference in the

certification requirement for being an AMC with 10th CAB versus

once you integrate with Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c or task force here. Are

there any additional training requirements or certifications for

AMC?

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FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) We run all of our personnel through about

30-slide, slide show. That's the academics myself or the LTC

have to give, and that's by SOP. And then, of course, if I give

the academics, then he still has to take them aside, and give

them his command philosophy and left and right limits as far as

what he expects from his AMCs.

SME-NGB: And is there a proficiency requirement, you know,

oral or flight demonstrated proficiency for that additional --

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) There is not.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c That's determined before the person is even

proposed as an AMC.

SME-NGB: Depending on their level of experience --

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Exactly -- experience, maturity --

SME-NGB: -- previous AMC and all that --

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) I would say that we do, kind of, a

refresher-type deal. We are pretty good at doing academics here.

So any time the Colonel gives an AMC brief, we try to do it during

our pilots' brief, so they all get to hear the law of repetition.

If he changes something in his way of thinking that wants to be

updated, then it's all put out at that time.

SME-NGB: Okay. And then, kind of, a little bit more about

SOP stuff. What's the rejoin procedure in the SOP? For example,

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in this case, here you all separated at the RP, obviously, there's

going to have to be an in-flight rejoin procedure executed. So

what would have been the procedure for that?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) For a CH47, I'm not sure. I would have to go

back and review it. Being this is my first (b)(3), (b)(6) mission, and

the fact that it was -- we did separate for the (b)(1)1.4atype deal,

I would have to review that, and make sure that I was aware of

it because --

SME-CH47: Was it briefed -- for the (b)(1)1.4a portion, did you

brief that part to each other?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) I don't recall that we think. I don't think

we did.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We've talked about it.

SME-NGB: You've already spoke to the issue about external

lighting. What about internal lighting? What's the SOP say

versus how you execute that?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I'm not sure that there is an SOP --

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) I don't think it’s addressed. I'm not sure

what the question is though.

SME-NGB: Well, what I'm getting at is about HUD use. Do you

fly with the HUD.

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Absolutely. It is completely mandatory.

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TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c The only one that authorize somebody not flying

with a HUD is myself. And the only time I have ever authorized

it if it is from FOB to FOB, and then it's just one. The PC has

to have a HUD.

SME-NGB: Okay. Very good, sir, I understand. And so with

use of a HUD, what would your normal cockpit lighting

configuration be on an infil like this?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) The eyebrow lights would be on --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: And it's personal preference to the pilots up

front, sir.

SME-NGB: Okay. On this particular mission, what was your

cockpit lighting or use of eyebrow lights or anything like that?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Halfway -- mid -- mid-range on the dials.

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Yeah.

SME-NGB: I know you might have to speculate a little bit,

and I apologize for that, but do you know what CHALK 1's cockpit

lighting configuration lighting was?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I have no idea, sir.

(b)(3), (b)(6) AMC: No idea.

SME-MH47: Do you have a CAS requirement? Do you require AWT

or AC-130 overhead?

The witness nodded indicating an affirmative response.

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TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Yeah. My requirement -- and this is during the

meet and greet, no exfil or infil will happen without AWT. And

a couple teams have asked, because of other requirements that

happened in the past, whether an AC-130 could cover them and we

don't. An AWT has to be there for infil and exfil.

SME-MH47: And then (b)(1)1.4a?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4ais primarily on the teams. It is not one of

our requirements. If it is available, and it's not a TS asset,

we have it up in the TOC, so that we can monitor it as well. But

more often than not, it's TS and TOC is not cleared for that.

So we can't get a hold of that.

SME-MH47: What's weather restriction? Do y'all have like

any kind of (b)(1)1.4a -- we don't -- I didn't see your SOP.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Roger. It's a (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

requirements.

SME-NGB: I just have one more question about lighting. Use

of supplemental lighting devices, is that addressed in your SOP?

Finger lights, lip lights, things like that -- flashlights --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I don't recall.

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) We have a supplemental lighting section in our

SOP. We do.

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SME-NGB: And what type of supplement lighting devices, do

you all normally fly with?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I just use a finger light, sir.

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) I have a vest mounted NVG compatible light

that's both white, and NVG compatible light that I fly with.

BG Colt: Any idea what (b)(3), (b)(6) flew with or (b)(3), (b)(6)

Left Door: I think (b)(3), (b)(6) had a finger light --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: A yellow --

SME-NGB: -- a lip light?

(b)(3), (b)(6)FLT AMC: I don't think (b)(3), (b)(6) had a lip light. I

believe he had a finger light.

SME-CH47: Okay. I've got three quick ones: (b)(3), (b)(6) , what

MDS is he qualified?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) UH-60.

SME-CH47: Okay. Is he a pilot in command?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) He is.

SME-CH47: Your D-Model aircraft, are they configured with

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: They are, yes.

SME-CH47: And they have (b)(1)1.4a , and how about the cabin

configuration -- typical? How do you configure the cabin as far

as all the equipment that you have back there that you carry with

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you?

Right Door: The cabin is -- mostly, the seats down.

(b)(1)1.4a

BG Colt: Have any one of your door gunners shot since you

have been here?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Yes, sir.

SME-MH47: Did y'all test fire on the way out?

Left Door: Not all the time. Not on this mission we didn't.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c The problem we have here is during (b)(1)1.4a , you

can't see the targets. We have a range that we put together when

we got here, just right off the FOB. During (b)(1)1.4a and

during (b)(1)1.4a , all the guys go

out and shoot.

My standing guidance is: If you've got a short mission, being

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five hours or less, you go shoot (b)(1)1.4a out there. And

what I tell them all the time, "You only get better at shooting,

by shooting." So that's what we do.

Now, with them -- the (b)(3), (b)(6) set flying at night, in a good part

of that time being (b)(1)1.4a , you can't clear the range out there.

And they have a bunch of qalats that popped up in the meantime.

So it makes that more difficult to --

BG Colt: Is there any restriction in test firing in remote

terrain.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c We had a restriction that just came into play

since we've been having contact the BSO, Battle Space Owner, had

an order to conduct test fires. So a little bit more restrictive,

but not entirely.

SME-CH47: And then the last question I have, sir, is

probably for you more than these guys. On a given night, how

many Chinooks from the task force launch?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Well, we have (b)(1)1.4a Chinooks every night. We have

the(b)(1)1.4a that are(b)(1)1.4a

, and (b)(1)1.4athat are (b)(1)1.4a So they will launch,

generally, about (b)(1)1.4a based on acquiring

targets. And the(b)(1)1.4aset launches just about every single night.

Very rarely do they not lunch. We have had a couple occasions.

BG Colt: One carrying out two missions, correct?

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TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c It's two separate missions.

BG Colt: (b)(1)1.4a Chinooks doing GS --

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c No. I'm sorry. (b)(1)1.4a Chinooks doing GS; (b)(1)1.4a

Chinooks doing (b)(3), (b)(6). We did, until fairly recently, have (b)(1)1.4a

Chinooks. And then it was (b)(1)1.4a .

(b)(3), (b)(6)

SME-CH47: Are the GS missions predominately ring route type

of stuff and resupply?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c We have never done ring route here. We did it

in OEF-VII when we were here, and they had a couple when we first

got here. They have gotten rid of them. Because they are GS,

we find ourselves flying in support of -- well we have done every

single task force out here.

When we had the second GS set down here, that was used

predominately for deliberates. And when (b)(3), (b)(6) got here, we

were doing probably a deliberate every other night, whether it

was (b)(3), (b)(6) or any of the these other task forces. And then the

other was doing GS. But sometimes we were actually doing two

deliberates with those GS assets.

SME-CH47: Do you launch anything in the daytime, or

predominately everything flies at night?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c No. I told all the conventional forces and our

brothers that we don't fly during the day.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c We have made

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exceptions. The only exception to that would have been in

support of (b)(3), (b)(6) because their missions have gone long.

It starts getting light around 4:30ish, right around there,

depending on the time of year. But now lately. And sometimes

the mission will go long. They understand that. And what they

will do is they will go off to an offset.

My basic requirement is (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a But again, in the case of , it's usually exfil.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

And that's only happened a couple of times.

SME-MH47: What is your ASE? Which aircraft is that?

CMWS --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: APR39 and CMWS.

Court Reporter: What is that word you said again, sir? I'm

sorry.

SME-MH47: (b)(1)1.4a .

BG Colt: Which stands for? (b)(1)1.4a .

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

SME-MH47: And then what's your radio spread? You've got

one FM --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: One(b)(1)1.4a one (b)(1)1.4a and a (b)(1)1.4a .

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) We also have high freq, but we don't have the

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base station set up here because of the antenna requirements.

SME-CH47: Is your (b)(1)1.4asecure? Do you have (b)(1)1.4a for that?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: No.

SME-MH47: Uniform security level?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We have the frequency --

SME-CH47: (b)(1)1.4a is the only secured --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: -- we have frequency hop capability on Uniform.

SME-MH47: Well the (b)(1)1.4a is secure, right?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Yes, sir.

SME-MH47: That's all I have, sir.

ASDAT: I'm going to go back and revisit a little bit of

training. I want to start with (b)(3), (b)(6) .

(b)(3), (b)(6) , when you were at the mob cite or here in the

unit have part of your left side door gunner and responsibilities

and duties, what is the primary reference that you utilized in

the training program for threat identification?

Left Door: I mean, we go through the classes of threats and

stuff. I mean, most of mine has been past experience. A lot

of it is just, know, fall on the S-2 slides and going through

standards that are talking about other people that have been

flying. Which kind of fall in those tactics.

ASDAT: Okay. So let's jump up one more level then.

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(b)(3), (b)(6) , do you have a program that you are using for

training for your door gunners?

Right Door: Yes, sir. We -- like (b)(1)1.4a or more like (b)(1)1.4a

threat stuff?

ASDAT: There you go. That's what I'm kind of getting to.

So you (b)(1)1.4a (ph). Now, what about any other thing that might

be a little newer than that? We haven't shot (b)(1)1.4a for a long

time. Okay. How about (b)(1)1.4a

, is anybody aware of what that acronym or that program is?

(b)(1)1.4a

Negative response by all members.

ASDAT: Okay. (b)(3), (b)(6) , are you aware of that program at

all?

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) I am not.

ASDAT: Through Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) we will get some more training for

that. And, sir, that will help you out during the pilots briefs.

That will give you some meat to the threats that folks see.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c That would be great. The things that we

predominately hit around here are the things that we expect to

see here (b)(1)1.4a (ph), you know (b)(1)1.4a, you know, the types of things

that you are going to see more often than not around here.

ASDAT: Absolutely, sir. And it's going to be the weapons

signature, not a (b)(1)1.4a sitting on a tripod or sitting [inaudible]

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technical. It's going to be that weapons system that we have

to face in the air while it's flight. And that's the things that

we want to show you.

64 Crews, we sent a series of videos to them. They were each

aware of the (b)(1)1.4a program. They understood it as (b)(1)1.4a . And

a lot of people do understand that program uses a different

acronym for it.

We have stripped the names out of the videos and we were able

to provide them in a series of videos in which they picked out

what they thought the piece of ordinance was that interacted with

Extortion 17.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Yeah, great.

BG Colt: Good. Anybody else?

SME-CH47: One last question, sir. For any of you to speak

up, has there been any issues or challenges regarding integration

of crews with the guard active force together as far as crew

coordination, negative habit transfers, any of those kinds of

issues? Terminology differences?

Negative response by all members.

Right Door: What I noticed in the back is very minor. And

we worked it out the this flight when I flew the first CCT, you

know, debrief. And basically got everybody on the same page.

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It was very minor terminology basically. Nothing major at all.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Hey,(b)(3), (b)(6), why don't you address the issue that

we had with (b)(3), (b)(6) and these guys, just

so they can hear it from your perspective. I addressed it a

little yesterday.

FLT AMC:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Well, when we got here last October, we took

over as Task Force Headquarters. We integrated the

(b)(3), (b)(6) National guard folks into our program. I

believe Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is very open and receptive to

bringing people in, make them part of the team or the family,

if you will.

(b)(3), (b)(6) didn't necessarily want to do that. I'm not

going to shoot arrows at previous task forces, but they were -- as

long as basically the Chinook company was over and they went and

flew, that's all the task force seemed to care about. They

didn't try to integrate them.

I'm a career UH-60 guy with about 4200 hours. I have a little

less than 300 in the Chinook now. I went over there when these

guys came in -- let me back up for a second. I went over and

offered, you know -- I said I would like to progress with you

guys, not only am I the task force commander's eyes and ears on

standardization, but I thought it would be nice to be able to

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help them out with the resets. We fly the living crap -- the

only way I know how to put it -- out of our Chinook folks.

So I went over to offer my services. They didn't really want

to integrate to well with that. Finally, through a series of

events, I finally got progressed with those guys. And then when

these guys came, being the (b)(3), (b)(6) National

Guard, much more team players wanted to integrate with the task

force well, wanted me to go fly with them and help them out, so

I did. And so that's kind of the differences between the two

units.

Bit as far as integration, these guys have been fantastic. They

came in, they're team players. We work well together.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Having said that since you weren't here yesterday,

from my perspective, I really believe that's part of the

leadership that was involved then. Because they had some

phenomenal pilots and crew chiefs in that unit as well that did

the (b)(3), (b)(6) missions and did them very well.

But there was a distinct difference between that group and

everybody else that's followed with them.

SME-CH47: How much support are you getting from brigade

level standards? Specifically, (b)(3), (b)(6) , he's a 47 guy --

(b)(3), (b)(6)FLT AMC: Yes, sir. He did a lot of my progression.

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SME-CH47: Is he coming down a lot and helping out and --

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c He's been down here five or six times, something

like that, and has assisted greatly with not only progressions,

in fact, he progressed(b)(3), (b)(6)here, and gave him his PC ride because

it was just taking too long with (b)(3), (b)(6) .

And I prompted him. I said, "(b)(3), (b)(6) I need you to come down here,

there's two guys that we have here on staff. (b)(3), (b)(6) (ph)

has half his time 360 hours of goggle time, and was in the same

boat." They didn't want to progress him.

So (b)(3), (b)(6) came down, got them both up. And has helped

us with other issues too when we had a couple issues with one

of their IPs, and then he would come down several times just to

fly with (b)(3), (b)(6) and everybody else. Integrates very well.

SME-CH47: You didn't have a Hawaii guard with your task

force here, did you?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c We did.

SME-CH47: How were they in comparison?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Phenomenal. And, you know, you can talk to the

(b)(3), (b)(6) guys too because (b)(3), (b)(6) really didn't need

them that much. But absolutely fantastic group.

SME-CH47: That's all I've, sir.

BG Colt: Anybody else?

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Negative response by all members.

BG Colt: Thank you for your time. I really appreciate it.

The investigation closed at 1742, 18 August 2011.

[END OF PAGE]

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Archived Log 2.1.4

SECRET

Log Name: TF JOC LOG 05

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Period From: 8/5/2011 Period To: 8/6/2011
AUG 2011 2:52:00 AM 2:52:00 AM
Font Size /
SIGACT? Zulu Time Entry Initials

07Aug2011
224 LOG ARCHIVED
0224Z
07Aug2011 TF - TM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: TM(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
223
0023Z RTB
07Aug2011 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : FINAL
222
0006Z ROLL-UP, JP/TD, 3 X DETAINEES, 12/11/19/8
07Aug2011 TF - TM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: TM(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
221
0005Z EXFIL COMPLETE
06Aug2011 TF - TM(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
- OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: TM(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cPZ
220
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

2358Z POSTURE
06Aug2011
219 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : RTB
2356Z
TF - TM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: ENGINES ARE
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

8 FT DOWN EMBANKMENT, WILL BIP; 2 ROTORS CUT OFF,

06Aug2011
218 CUTTING INTO MANAGEABLE PIECES TO MOVE UP TO
2343Z ROAD STILL WORKING ON 2 OTHER ROTORS THAT ARE IN
THE FIELD
06Aug2011 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : EXFIL
217
COMPLETE
(b)(6), (b)(3)
2342Z
06Aug2011 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - OBJ : AF PZ
216
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

2339Z POSTURE
06Aug2011 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : AF
215
2323Z MOVING TO PZ PO 3 X DETAINEES
06Aug2011 TF - TM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: AF ASSESSING
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
214
2311Z MORE HE NEEDED TO PROPERLY DESTROY SITE

06Aug2011 TF - TM - OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: RELIEF IN

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

213 PLACE COMPLETE; TM(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cBEGINNING MOVEMENT TO

2254Z EXFIL
06Aug2011 TF - TM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: AF
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
212
2247Z CONDUCTING HANDOVER
06Aug2011 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c :
211
2238Z JP/TD; TQ SSE ONGOING
06Aug2011 TF - TM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: L/U
210
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 655

(b)(2)
Archived Log 2.1.4

Page 656

(b)(2)
 SECRET

interview of TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR, TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3, TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3 TF

SEA opened at 2045 Zulu, 19 August 2011, at FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c .

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD: BG Jeffrey N. Colt, US Army

GROUND FORCE ARMY ADVISOR SME-GFA

GROUND FORCE NAVY 1 SME SME-GFRN1

GROUND FORCE NAVY 2 SME SME-GFRN2

COURT REPORTER: CR2

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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SME-GFA: If you could, gentlemen, just state your names for

the record to get it on the machine here.

TF CDR: I'm the (b)(3), (b)(6) TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: (b)(3), (b)(6) TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3

TF SEA: (b)(3), (b)(6) TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cSEA.

TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: (b)(3), (b)(6) Team(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3.

SME-GFA: My intent was to, kind of, drill in on the

actual -- when you started considering employing the IRF, just

talking about these as far as the planning process, course of

action development, which you can my talk a little bit about too.

And then, you know, my intent was to talk a little bit about the

recovery efforts and all that just to make sure we go over all

that ground.

So we have talked extensively yesterday with the red platoon

about their LEFTY GROVE operations. So I'm not sure at exact

what point you saw the squirters leave. I think it was during

their infil; that seems to be the, kind of, logical point to

pick-up the IRF planning process. So whoever could kick-off

with that at that point, we can go ahead and jump in with

questions.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Yeah. I will tell that story. So we tracked

the different groups of squirters. But there was one that

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congregated in that area. We figured out that was two clicks

away from the objective area. And we were just starting to clear

the objective and assess that 1 Bravo could not make it to go

interdict those guys. And so we talked about who was it,

potentially jackpot. Likely, at a minimum, the fighters

associated with that network. We what thought what they might

do. And one thing that they might do is they might move up on

that finger. You can't see it on that graphic real well. But

where they were clumped was a finger of, kind of, an open terrain

that goes out, but there's a lot SIGACTs on that hill. So

potentially, they would move up and set up that position over

the valley.

And we felt pretty confident if they did that -- if they were

armed, we could engage them. If they weren't we would have to

maneuver on them, or they would just stay in that clump of trees.

Either way, we assessed one way to get them was to insert a force

to maneuver on those -- we started out with two. Now, anywhere

between 8 and 13 were assessed to be MAMS in that grove.

SME-GFA: So they were still moving at this point?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: They are static at this point.

SME-GFA: But not inside the compound?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Not inside the compound.

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BG Colt: Did you see all that via ? Did any of the FMVs
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

reflect a group that was that large? Where did the number begin

to build from 2 to 8 to 13, and I have heard as big as 20?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: We got it mostly from the reports that come

into the MIRC chat. We are not able to just -- the(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
feeds

aren't good enough. We don't get all the feeds to actually see

individuals.

But it was -- as I remember the report, two originated and were

picking up others as they were moving along the northwest.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: Closer than when it came on the AC 130 about

numbers. I never heard over 13. 8 to 13 was kind of, like, the

flex number.

SME-GFA: That's the figure you are talking about right

there?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yeah. Exactly. They were at that base of

that.

SME-GFA: This is, I mean, approximately what time did they

go, I guess, static at that finger?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: I don't remember what time we inserted. So

I would say about an hour before they inserted.

SME-GFA: So 2100 Zulu, the squirters --

BG Colt: They went in at 2209.

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SME-GFA: -- entered the compound.

BG Colt: The aircraft that went down, went down at 2209.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: So around 2100 is when --

SME-GFA: Yeah. I mean, the special story board it says

2100 Zulu is when they stopped, entered the compound in the

vicinity of grid…

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: There were multiple groups of squirters.

There was a naming convention with them. It was 280 --

BG Colt: 280 Alpha --

SME-GFA: 280 Alpha and Bravo. I think there was a 1

Charlie, seven squirters or something like that.

So IRF is watching this the whole time. They are starting to

spin up --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: So with every discussion we would say, like,

Okay, so who do we think it is. I've seen the target enemy that

got away. We really just kind of talked the idea of inserting

the element to maneuver on them -- the enemy that got away.

BG Colt: No at all at the time?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: In correlation -- in fact, it’s dry at

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

around 1430 to 1500 Zulu because the towers had shut down. We

didn't expect any, but we didn't get any.

SME-GFA: What are you -- just historical collect, kind

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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of, what you guys see up here?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: We haven't done much collect at all.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c In

fact --

SME-GFA: Do you guys get (b)(3), (b)(6) much?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Rarely.

SME-GFA: That was just a flex line you guys requested that

day?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c We did. We asked for a lot, and we got a lot.

So it was by exception to get (b)(3), (b)(6) .

SME-GFA: Okay.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c So, really, the planning started with a small

interdiction team. And then as we looked at the best tactical

exfils, they were really working on the planning, Okay, we

understand where we have got to go, and come up with a good

tactical plan to interdict the squirters. And then what makes

the most sense for the tactical exfil.

And that started with a 17-man element was the first chalk load.

And then it turned into, Hey, the best bet is for us to be our

independent maneuver element. We will move through wherever

they go. If they go inside compounds, you know, we can do a

call-out. So we had the full complement of , and then a plan

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

to exfil later in the next day to remain over a day -- to be

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prepared to remain over a day. That was the expectation of their

exfil.

SME-GFA: Okay. So the original option was an en route

interdiction, so-to-speak, 17 pax roughly, and as they

[inaudible] they go static, and that's when you go into the

assault?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c No. They were static, and it was just whether

we were going to do a 17-man element. The way I remember it,

they were crunching the numbers that if they go small, they may

be able to exfil completely with the 1 Bravo element. They go

interdict the squirters, link up to 1 Bravo, move to exfil. And

the 2 chalk loads exfil.

SME-GFA: I guess the 17 pax option was prior to squirters

going static at a compound.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c All the planning was after they went static,

not in the compound -- static in that treeline in a finger, but

south of it. It was like at the base. It was a pretty big,

wooded area. You could see a -- it was like a tower.

SME-GFA: I think that's what (b)(3), (b)(6) was looking at.

(b)(3), (b)(6) nodded indicating an affirmative response.

SME-GFA: Okay. The COA to send -- to basically re-mission

1 Bravo from where they are at, and go get the guys was never,

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…not a good option, correct, based on distance?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c We assessed as they are not tactical feasible,

they are moving too fast. And so I kept them as their priority

was their objective.

SME-GFA: Okay. Historically just from the enemy COA

standpoint, is your experience up here is, you are getting

jackpots on the squirters? Does that make sense?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Yes. We haven't had a lot of jackpots in this

area because we're doing a lot of NAI clearance. Only in one

area have I found where the squirters have been, like, farmers

and stuff. And it's definitely not in this area. It's way up

in northern Laghman.

We felt confident that those were -- if not the jackpot, it was

clearly those associates that we had flushed out of the 10 series

on infil.

TF J3:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c We did get jackpot on a squirter last night in

Nangarhar.

SME-GFA: All right. Continue on.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: So once we had that tactical plan, there was

some planning going on with the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c element. So we are

C2'ing the operations. And the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c were

engaged in the discussion. And they delegated out planning.

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And, really, the next piece I remember was waiting for [sic] was

HLZ approval for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , which historically has been our

biggest limitation, to flex to an NAI.

SME-GFA: Are we at the point where they are static at the

compound and wanted a compound assault?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yes. We were -- I'm tracking that there was

18 to 13 in that wooded area. I know the story board had -- but

just, you know, what I was tracking, in that wooded area there

was 8 to 13.

I knew some squirters had gone into compounds. But we were

tracking 8 to 13 in that wooded area.

SME-GFA: Maybe. I'm a little confused. The IRF mission

was to go and assault the compound or the wooded area?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: The wooded area, 8 to 13, just to maneuver on

those guys that were there.

TF SEA:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c It was more to go interdict the squirters, and

be prepared to go to a compound --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: We would pursue them there to do a call-out.

That's why we had the whole , and we had an interpreter.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-GFA: Okay. For some reason I was tracking you are in

the compound at this point, and that's where the assault is going

to take place.

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TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c So then the decision came. So LZ was approved.

We looked at our timeline, is when we really got to the

discussion of, Hey, does it make sense; do we have enough time

do this while the sun is still down. And we assessed, yes. And

we planned to be prepared to do a daylight exfil.

They worked the Fires coordination with their Uniform. And we

did one last huddle, and talked everybody -- the 3, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Think some team leaders were in there

by then, and to get approval for the insert.

SME-GFA: Were air planners in there during that planning?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: No. I don't know where they -- were the

planners in here in the planning area?

TM(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: I think they were still back at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c .

We initially first started setting up, the planner I was working

with that night was (b)(6), (b)(3) and just gave him the heads up

that we were discussing, [inaudible] IRF, QRF. I think that's

where he initiated the process of just getting it approved,

figuring out, you know, what HLZs are around there that we will

work with.

But, really, I was just a part of that initial process being the

recce element. I got on the horn with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and started

working the issues.

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TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c I mean, and that's how we worked a mission last

night. In fact, we changed the exfil HLZ, and it was the same

way. We want to push the exfil HLZ out west because we have got

an engagement on infil, and we worked it, kind of, the same way,

call-out, they keep action on it, the grid for HLZ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cwe are

good.

SME-GFA: Normal deliberate op planning process, the pilots

come over here or wherever, and just -- does (b)(3), (b)(6) come over, or

he stays back at the aircraft?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: He usually stays back in the planning area,

and two pilots would come over. It's usually, you know, two or

three of the same guys that are very accustomed coming over here

and working the HLZs. We have sniper elements for the rangers --

TF J3:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c It's accurate to say that they found -- the HLZ

they found was preplanned from before. So --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: The one --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: -- probably didn’t go through the full cycle.

They looked in the area found it solid. I mean, I was surprised

it actually happened because the troop was in there planning,

you know, under the contingency that they found an HLZ, which

was, generally speaking, slim. That's, gonna kind of, of happen.

When they popped up, it was actually really surprising because

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they had looked there before.

SME-GFA: I guess other infil courses of action, they look

in and do an offset, just walk in [inaudible] --

TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ2: Actually. I wasn't in the middle of the

conversation as far as how they were doing the HLZ planning.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Now, when you look in that area there isn't

much that is close by.

TF J3:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Their exfil which is on the other HLZ, I think,

to get them in there, it was four kilometers over the ridgeline,

which they were going to use to get out during the daylight.

Because once you go over that ridgeline you are pretty low-risk.

That would be the only one to get into besides this one.

SME-GFA: 4k is the closest.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: Correct. 4k over the ridge.

Court reporter: Gentlemen, I'm sorry. I just need you

guys to speak up a little bit more please. I'm trying to capture

this. Thank you.

SME-GFA: At this point, 1 Bravo had been on the ground, I'm

tracking, three-plus hours, you know, the bird is overhead and

all that. How did that kind of affect the risk assessment

process here.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c So they [1/B] came in from the south. We were

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guarded about coming in from the same direction where we had

infilled, patrolled and had made contact. So it was a deliberate

decision to look to the opposite side of where the squirters were.

We were coming in from the west. So we saw that as the enemy

focused more towards our call -- by now, we were -- you know,

the target had developed. They knew we were had an engagement,

and we assessed the enemy actually would likely be looking

towards -- if they are going to make an engagement, looking

towards our 1 Bravo element. So that this newer element will

be coming from the opposite direction -- the opposite side of

where they are currently engaged.

SME-GFA: How far was (b)(1)1.4a from --

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was 700 meters to the west of where the

squirters were. And the objective was two kilometers to the east

of where the squirter location was.

SME-GFA: What is the actual(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCONOP approving process

for a follow-on target? Do you know what they fall under?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Yes. So as far as commitment, the QRF got -- I

see that as, my decision to commit the QRF on a pre-planned op,

knowing that this wasn't exactly a QRF situation, meaning, like,

they were not in a fight that -- they weren't coming to the aide

of the ground element who were, you know, maneuver on --

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You know, I made a phone call to the(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Commander. I told him

what we were thinking about. I said we will do some planning.

And then I called him back when we decided to go in.

SME-GFA: Any concerns coming back from him?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: I don't remember the discussion exactly.

What I talked through was -- my intent was to maneuver on these

guys and then get away, or we've got the opportunity to maneuver

on these guys, I assessed they were bad guys. And I didn't lay

out the risk that I knew, you know, in the valley to the(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Commander.

SME-GFA: When is the last time you did an op in this valley?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Kind of, in that green zone, was just the day

before. But in the valley, it was about two weeks before when

we did a long offset, a dry hole, very near where, actually, the

squirters were. We had -- and I'll have to -- I can get the

date --

SME-GFA: That was the one that was, kind of, south of the

green zone there? It's outside of the --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: The day before was south of the green zone.

Two weeks before was just north of the green zone, about where

the squirters were. And we infilled from the north on a long

offset, got there, dry hole on the south person, very uneventful

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[sic].

BG Colt: How did you exfil from that one?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: It was an offset infil and exfil.

SME-GFA: So what was the exfil plan for this follow-on?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: There's an LZ -- I don't know exactly where

it is. It's outside of the green zone to the southeast. They

were going to foot patrol out.

So their exfil -- for this squirter team, they were planning on

doing a daylight exfil out around here.

The LEFTY GROVE exfil was in the green zone.

BG Colt: Is there some reason, for instance, you guys

wouldn't consider going back to(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cthe exfil?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Remind me of which one that was.

BG Colt: That's where 1 Bravo was going to go out --

SME-GFA: It's roughly down in here, 600 meters, I believe

from LEFTY GROVE.

BG Colt: Did you ever consider -- and again, just securing

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
until after-actions on with the squirter element, and then

doing one exfil? I mean, we could have picked it up in one lift

at that point.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Well, if they had finished early, we might have

considered that. We expected this just to go longer because they

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brought the whole force. And so their plan was exfil them, exfil

1 Bravo out of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and then they would just keep patrolling

out and not stay static. That was their initial thought.

Did I get that about right?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: Yeah. The assumption was 1 Bravo would stay

on their timeline, exfil there at night. But them going in at

2200 was going to be daylight exfil for sure. So they didn't

want to go anywhere in the green zone, daylight.

SME-GFA: You are talking probably a daylight move from

squirter location, down to the southern HLZ by the follow-on

force.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yeah.

SME-GFA: You said the other operation you did, you infilled

from the north -- 4k to the north, correct?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: We did. Those LZs were, you know, expired.

And I think it might have been -- I don't remember if it was the

MATH or not, but it might have been 15 clicks out.

SME-GFA: So there wasn't --

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c This was current. This LZ was current for --

SME-GFA: So it was --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: -- what we just planned.

SME-GFA: How long does it take to get an HLZ approved by --

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TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: At least three hours, but sometimes days.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: HLZ approval process is our limitation

challenge.

SME-GFA: And that's the 1st CAB guys -- 10th CAB?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Um-hmm. We were able to pull down, like, wide

hour imagery, like real high-def. imagery and go through

and -- my understanding is they were using like a 15-meter

imagery up there to approve or disapprove the LZs.

But we understood that that's the process. So we would submit

a bunch and prioritize which ones to seek for approval because

they wouldn't approve, like, our whole list of antenna LZs around

target.

SME-GFA: Okay. Do you think it's because they don't have

good imagery or --

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Well, I mean, because it's a, you know -- it's

a stove pipe. Every night, the Colonel has got to approve

something; they've got to plan and brief.

So the more options we look for in HLZs, the slower the process.

And then we -- you know, so we have to straighten the balance

of being able to spend time on the ground, not infilling too late

and having an HLZ.

SME-GFA: Okay. For the infil, did you guys consider, I

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guess, containment or even pre-assault fires? There was some

talk yesterday about somebody talking about pre-assault fires

to support that infil. Did you guys think about that?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: We didn't talk about that at all. We had a

lot overhead. We didn't talk about any pre-assault fires.

SME-GFA: Just -- I'm backing up a little bit. From the TF

perspective, how do you break it down, Team

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , Team(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

mission sets?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: We don't at TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
. I delegate it to Team

, Team(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c .

TM(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ2: Typically it would just be the Lieutenant

Commander would make the call -- either earlier in the day where

a lot of our targets tended to be. I can mention that of

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

fidelity, tended to drop off around 1430 or 1500 Zulu, and then

proceed to an (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that,

you know, stop my multiple compounds and return to the, you know,

3, 4, 5 and NAI clearances and what not.

So (b)(3), (b)(6) mentioned the other day, a lot of our ops are

actually 2(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cand 1 Bravo going out together as a large force

to be able to support, you know, clearing multiple NAIs.

This particular one, I think, it was just a call earlier in the

day where (b)(3), (b)(6) would say, Hey, if this target pans

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out, 1 Bravo, you guys have it. And that was our, you know, team

leader meeting when we came in earlier on in the day 1300 Zulu.

We didn't even have a final target yet.

SME-GFA: So not based on LEFTY GROVE as a red target. It

was --

TM(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ2: There weren't assigned targets to either team.

It was just more of a -- I don't know -- just a call on (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) part.

SME-GFA: Once the helo is down, if you would just, kind of,

walk me through the recovery effort portion.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: The JOC went into the, you know, CSAR

contingency, everyone is in the JOC. But everyone down on the

floor -- our initial assessment was to figure out what aircraft

went down, and then to find out if it was the aircraft with the

passengers on it, and if it went down before or after infil.

So that took us about -- it probably wasn't all that long. It

was probably about 10 minutes.

BG Colt: Could you monitor the AHs from here on the Fires

net?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: I'm not -- our Fires guy might have been

monitoring them. I'm not sure.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c He was the first -- our Fires guy is the first

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one that told us that, you know, you've got an Angel down. When

we saw it, I just remember saying -- we seen the big burn, it

looks like a helo is down. And then he called it. They made

the radio call -- or it was on -- I think it was with that Fires

network or if it's the TAC SAT, one of those two.

BG Colt: What was your SA on what your sensors were looking

at, at like H minus 3? What was the AC looking at?

TF J3:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c A treeline of squirters, in that general area.

BG Colt: Okay. And what was (b)(3), (b)(6) looking at?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: I don't recall.

BG Colt: What was (b)(3), (b)(6) looking at?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: One of on them was still on 1 Bravo's target.

I don't remember which one was which. So we had the 1 Bravo

coverage; we had the squirter coverage. I think another one was

panning around, which included looking at the HLZ, but it focused

on it for the landing necessarily.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cSEA: I remember the -- I don't remember which

platform it was it, but it was scanning the HLZ area because I

was, kind of, keying in on that where I could find location. And

I was seeing no movement. And it was on that area when the

helo -- I think a little bit to the east of that, is when the

helo went down. But I did not see the helo get hit.

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BG Colt: What do you think the AWT's primary tasking

purpose was at H hour?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: Escorting the helos.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yeah. Escort the helos for a safe infil.

BG Colt: Okay. When we left the AHs -- I'm just going to

give you the feedback. The AH guys they really thought that

their primary task was continuing to monitor these guys in the

vicinity of 280 Alpha and Bravo. That's where their focus was.

And as far as the amount of attention that they paid to HLZ (b)(1)1.4a

and the infill route, it was a secondary task to them. So all

I'm trying to do is paint a picture for you. But I think that

there were at least three sensors in the AWT who were focused

on this same event, meaning, the threat, the squirter group and

nothing else. That's my SA.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: I don't know -- I wouldn't be sure why they

would do that because we didn't yet have our blue JTAC on the

ground. But the CCT wasn't there yet to direct to do that. But

it might have just been their gut instinct -- that was the biggest

threat to go there, but I don't think they were directed to do

that.

SME-GFA: Correct me if I'm wrong, sir. But that's what he

indicated was exactly that, that he sensed his biggest threat

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from the 13 dudes in the wood-line, and that's what I remember

hearing.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cSEA: I don't know what their priorities were. I

remember that the helos were delayed -- 47s delayed taking off.

I remember specifically being told this because they were waiting

on AWT to refuel.

And the reason was it was SOP for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c for AWT to cover

the infil, you know, when the troops were going in. So in my

mind, I went, Okay, we have AWT to cover the infil. And that

is what I thought they were thinking.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: Yeah. They can't even take off, off the FOB

here without an escort at night. We have asked for a waiver

before, but it was -- you know, this wasn't one we really

considered a waiver for.

SME-GFA: Yeah. I mean, the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c commander said it's

their policy that AWT cover infils and exfils.

TF SEA:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c But I did not talk to them directly. But that

was what I was told, and that (b)(3), (b)(6) was overhead covering the

infil also.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: I guess the one UAV I do remember -- I don't

remember which one it was -- it was looking at that tower in that

area where the squirters were.

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We were trying to figure out, like, Hey, call the OCG [Afghan

Advisors to(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

JOC], like, what could that tower be. I don't

think we got a --

TF J3:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c We did get an answer, yeah. It was for hanging

whatever crop or orchard or whatever it was, they dry the food

out there.

SME-GFA: All right.

BG Colt: I think the AC had to have at least one sensor on

the HLZ because they had -- you know, they confirmed he was

burning it.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cSEA: Sir, I specifically remember going and I'm

pointing with this green, XO was there. I go, "That's the HLZ,"

he said, yes. And they were scanning the area. And I was like,

it looks pretty quiet. We got the three-minute call, and then

they were just -- six minutes later, I was going, What's up with

the infil, did they go in already.

SME-GFA: I know we were told the AC 130 cleared the HLZ at

some point. But I don't know if they kept a sensor on it or not.

I think it's in the sensor plan.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: I'm not sure if they can burn without the

sensors on what they are burning. We can ask that from (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) when we get back.

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SME-GFA: At what point does -- do you remission 1 Bravo to

start moving?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c It was soon after we knew that there was a crash,

and once we got COMMs with them. They were finishing up SSE.

So they had their split element. One element doing SSE. And

I think about five kilometers west. And they you had -- they

were cleaning up the target. They had already gone follow -- two

follow-on targets.

I left and looked in the JOC log for the exact time, but it

was -- when they came up on COMMS, once we realized it was a crash,

they said, Hey, your mission is to go secure the crash site. And

they asked, you know, What do we do with the detainees. We said

release, it’s the end of that mission -- task is the crash site

[sic].

BG Colt: Did the(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cTOC have any capacity to C2 their

own op at that point?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: I had not given them any -- I haven't delegated

any of that C2 in there. So I have not manned them to C2 any

operations.

BG Colt: Okay.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: They are target development op center.

BG Colt: Okay.

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SME-GFA: So Team(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cis out of your C2; and Team is

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

out of your C2 and they are both out --

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c We C2, you know, vehicle movements for the HAT

teams. C2 is here at TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-GFA: The -- did you -- for the TF Pathfinders response

and all that, did they call over to you to inform you of that

or vice versa?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Well, I mean, this is at, you know, like -- you

know, the phones are obviously just ringing off the hook. And

we are trying to figure it out. I've talked with (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) I'm uncomfortable putting another aircraft in there.

My initial assessment is that it just burned in, and there are

no survivors.

I didn't want to assume risk to go save somebody because I don't

think anyone was there to save. So that was the discussion and

thought process that we had. And (b)(3), (b)(6) called. And, you

know, we talked about the pros and cons. And I knew that we were

running against the sun coming up. So if we were going to insert

them, now is the time to insert them.

And considering that they were Blackhawks, that there was a

ground element moving there, we came to the agreement, and I

approved and inserted the Pathfinder Team knowing they were going

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to lash up with our element and 1 Bravo still being the ground

commander.

SME-GFA: I was a little confused earlier. Who's decision

is that commit those guys? I mean, who's --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: I took it as my decision. That's my battle

space. Those aren't my forces. I hadn't requested them. He

was offering them, and then I said, yes.

BG Colt: Release of the Pathfinder element was a CJTF 10

commander authority. He could tell them to go release him to

the employment of C2 node. In that particular case, I get the

impression that (b)(3), (b)(6) thought that he was providing you

an asset, and it was a mutual agreement. But, ultimately, yours

to make whether they were going to infil them or not.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c That's how I understood it. We didn't say it

in those words, but that's how I understood it. And I'm

confident. If I said, No, I don't want to put them down, that

he would have supported. It would have been --

SME-GFA: This is you talking to --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: This is me talking to (b)(3), (b)(6)

BG Colt: And at no time did(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

weigh in on that?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Well, I was really talking to (b)(3), (b)(6)

and talking (b)(3), (b)(6) (ph). I sought his counsel and,

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kind of, talked to my decision-making and make sure I wasn't

missing anything, any blind spots.

BG Colt: What we do need to do is ensure -- to see if there

was any CJTF 10/ discussion, I think.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: (b)(3), (b)(6) called directly here, and I

think you were on the phone with somebody else. But he said that

it was our decision, or he's laying it in our hands -- (b)(3), (b)(6) hands.

So he just backed that decision up.

SME-GFA: Okay. So the Pathfinders go in. 1 Bravo has

already secured the crash site --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: Yeah. They hadn't secured the crash site, but

they were close. And so they had gotten to a point where they

weren't even near the HLZ. So they kept on, and made sure that

they weren't going to land on 1 Bravo, which we confirmed later

1 Bravo was --

BG Colt: Which is an interesting question. Do you know

that (b)(3), (b)(6) authorized them to fire containment fires on

infil?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: No, sir.

BG Colt: And they did.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Sir, I didn't know that.

BG Colt: Okay.

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TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: So we had two options with the force on the

ground: We were going to tell them to stand fast, or we were

going to --

SME-GFA: I'm sorry to break in. I mean, that's why I asked

that question about clearing the fires and all that stuff. But

normally it wouldn't come back -- I mean, correct me if I'm wrong,

but --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: When say that. You know, I don't remember

having that discussion.

BG Colt: What I believe, they required in order to shoot

anything on the ground at that point was: They had to have talked

to --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: (b)(3), (b)(6) .

BG Colt: -- (b)(3), (b)(6) , and have the JTAC clear them to just

ensure that there was no way they could frag one of their own

guys shooting it. And they claimed he did.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: We do de-conflict -- I was, all the time,

de-conflicting where 1 Bravo getting ready for their HLZ. So

I mean, while I did not hear that they did that, but the distance

was -- I mean, there was a little over 500 meters -- 600 meters

away.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yeah. I guess if (b)(3), (b)(6) --

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TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: If (b)(3), (b)(6) knew, then we were good.

SME-GFA: Yeah. I understand (b)(3), (b)(6) was the guy on the

ground clearing those fires. That's what I understood from --

TF
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: They were doing a lot of fires.

SME-GFA: All right. I guess --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yeah --

SME-GFA: -- it just kind of brings up questions

[inaudible] --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: -- and [inaudible] with (b)(3), (b)(6) there. AWT

talks to (b)(3), (b)(6) and says they're going to do pre-assault fires.

He clears them hot; that's good business practice to me.

SME-GFA: Yeah.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Okay. So then, yeah, next is -- so they move

to secure the site. I think we got an initial report where they

called six friendly KIA. Soon after, the (b)(3), (b)(6) element links

up with them. And we were just getting, like, little reports

on -- the crash site is secure.

There was a very intense fire. They were talking about they

can't get close to get a sense of what's going on down there

because the fire is so intense. We had an updated number of,

I think, up to eight or nine that they found from the KIA.

And then it's, really -- we go through some hours. They are

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securing the site, or just expanding, getting in better secure

positions and letting the fire die down. And in that time, we

are working with (b)(3), (b)(6) to establish a ground line of

communications for a recovery op.

We knew early on -- this was just a discussion with (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) that an air exfil wasn't going to be our primary plan.

And so they started to piece together a ground element. And we

knew it was going to take a while because they had to do the,

you know, ground clearance control.

That was, you know, from sun-up -- you know, 0100 Zulu until about

1000 Zulu when it was mostly just getting a periodic update, a

sense of how secure the area was, and updates on that route

clearance patrol. And that's when (b)(3), (b)(6) and I were

working out the details of, you know, from 80 to 85 grid lines;

that's my battle space.

He's moving from the east to the west. And then, you know, we

were talking every 20 or 30 minutes just as the plan started

coming together of who was coming in, what they were bringing.

SME-GFA: What's your discussions with(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cat this point

whenever they were doing some resupply missions and stuff like

that?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Yeah. Early on, it was, you know, how are we

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going to work these logistics. And we got guidance early that

the mission was going to be to recover every scrap out of there.

They were working a lot on, I think, you know, their 3 and 2

challenge, keeping Fires and assets overhead.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Really, my

discussions were primarily that ground line of communications,

when the turnover will be to, you know, their lead effort. And

then working out the plans of, you know, what we were going to

continue to support.

You know, we just had the resources to do those air drops. So

we spent a lot energy on that air resupply, like the batteries

we needed, and we started looking at, you know, what we were going

to do that period of darkness.

SME-GFA: So my understanding was when, like, I think, it

was (b)(3), (b)(6) shows up, the recovery effort is technically turned

over to him?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yeah. And, you know, the main focus was to

recover all the Eagles. And then, so, you know, we probably went

through, you know, 30 plans on how that was going to transpire.

TF J3:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c And, sir, I would say the recovery wasn’t really

turned over to him until they returned the second time. When

1 Bravo was on the ground, they showed up and took the Eagles

off and left.

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1 Bravo stayed. We pulled them out with (b)(3), (b)(6) , and Pathfinders

had remained. And then the next day when (b)(3), (b)(6) showed up

again to stay, really, that's when it, sort of, became, like,

Okay, this is a BSO operation, and (b)(3), (b)(6) , I would say, really

handed the site over to them.

SME-GFA: When (b)(3), (b)(6) showed up, exfilled the remains,

what did they leave on the ground? Security up on the high ground

or --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: They had the OPs up. But, like, on the crash

site, the whole convoy went back.

SME-GFA: But they left some guys on ground?

TF J3:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c No. They had Pathfinders at 1 Bravo. And then

they OPs setting up by the time, and starting to be set up along

the ridgelines, but --

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c It was, kind of, whoever was inside the MRAP --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: Yeah -- back --

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c -- stayed. Like, whoever was in the passenger

compartment, I should say. And they had to stay because those

were now where all the Eagles were. It wasn't to too many. So

that was part of our discussion. It was like, Hey, can they stay

there -- Can the platoon stay out there, we just need the

security.

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BG Colt: Who was the source provider for (b)(3), (b)(6) ? Who

owned those guys? You did?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Yeah. So we had the discussion, and the 3 was

working it -- (b)(3),(b)(6) was working it mostly. But do we extend 1

Bravo, or do we develop a plan to insert another force, and how

are we going to do that --

BG Colt: Ultimately, you are using an ARSOA airplane that

you owned from(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

, brought (b)(3), (b)(6) in. They foot march into

a relief in-place. 1 Bravo foot-marches out to a PZ, and then

is back hauled to here?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yes, sir, exactly.

Going back to the day. So 1 Bravo is on the deck. It's three

hours into daylight. And the discussions we're having a lot is

could there be any survivors.

So(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cactually came up with this analysis of where they think

it was shot down, and then the flight path into the crash site.

And so you go back into this area, where could

have -- someone -- on impact, someone was thrown from the

aircraft, then we could search the ground area. So we actually

gave the coordinates and everything to 1 Bravo for a task to do

a sweep.

BG Colt: He does his own reconnaissance and finds nothing

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new, correct?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: He did do that. And this was before (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) had gotten there. So they were, kind of, still in the security

mode. But then they came back, and said they had accountability

of 38 Eagles.

And then, you know, we went back later, and was just, kind of,

like, said how did you get that. I mean, it was, kind of, like,

these uncomfortable conversations on the radio. But I will say

a big thing on my mind was that I was worried we would never find

everybody. Like, I wouldn't be able to go to the notification

process at home, and confirm that all 38 had been killed.

But he was confident. And the discussion came back, it was 38

torsos. It really, kind of, you know -- in later discussions

it was, kind of, at least C-spines.

A piece that I missed was ARSOA package with CSAR and the

(b)(3), (b)(6) -- the (b)(3), (b)(6) came out of Sharana. So around the same

time we were debating about putting in the CSAR element -- excuse

me -- the Pathfinder element, we also have an additional ground

force with our CSAR element. And we considered infilling them

in green zone.

By then, the sun started coming up, then we started to look at

an offset and, ultimately, elected not to put more forces on the

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ground. We didn't know how long we were going to be there, and

didn't know -- just the more forces we committed in there, the

more forces, we were going to have to get out there, there more

cycles of helos to get them out.

BG Colt: How did those guys ultimately get there -- the

green EOD guys and the CSAR guys?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: So, I guess, you know, around 0400 Zulu or

so -- probably earlier than that. We actually sent the package

back to Sharana. You know, it was 15-minute flight. They would

go back and reset, and be ready to --

BG Colt: Which package?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c This is ARSOA, (b)(3), (b)(6) and the CSAR package

that's based out of Sharana --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCSAR stayed, but --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Right. The CSAR stayed. They are --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: EOD was --

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c -- Summit CSAR element stayed just in Sharana.

They all pushed up to here after the crash.

SME-GFA: So the (b)(3), (b)(6) and Sharana actually got in the

aircraft, and were burning the infil?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yeah. They were in the TOC doing planning

with the 3.

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SME-GFA: Oh, they came here?

(b)(3), (b)(6) nodded indicating an affirmative response.

SME-GFA: This is what time? 0400-ish?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: No. This was, you know --

TM(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ2: They were here probably about midnight Zulu,

maybe a little bit after.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: Yeah. Within a few hours of --

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c So they were in the mix as we were considering

infilling the Pathfinder element.

SME-GFA: So this is -- I mean, 1 Bravo had just arrived at

the crash site?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: Yeah.

BG Colt: Who owns those guys?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: It's Task Force Central,(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

.

BG Colt: Okay. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

pushed them to you? Did you ask for

them, or they just showed up there?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: We asked for the CSAR package, and they came

along as a security force for them. And then what we did to

insert the CSAR right away, they end up going back -- we knew

we could call them back. It's a 15-minute flight. And then,

obviously, we ended up putting them in with (b)(3), (b)(6) , the CSAR

package. And they picked up the (b)(3), (b)(6) also in Sharana.

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BG Colt: And when did they do that? The night of the 6th?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: The next night, yes, sir.

SME-GFA: So the (b)(3), (b)(6) went in with (b)(3), (b)(6) ?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yeah. It was a pretty complicated air

movement around. J3 was jockeying because we knew we needed

expertise to help break up the helicopter for recovery. So

that's where we got the (b)(3), (b)(6) coming out of Sharana to meet

up here. But we had weather challenges, so they got diverted

and then delayed. Ultimately, he made -- the EOD guy made it

here to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cby a C130. That was the secondary plan. We

struggled with weather getting 47s from(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cTO here as well.

And, ultimately, the ARSOA package that was based out at(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

flew here to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

, went to COP (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c to recover all the

Eagles, bring them back here to(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

. And then load up the(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) platoon, which they had brought here earlier. The (b)(3), (b)(6)

got off, went and picked up the remains. They came back, then

(b)(3), (b)(6) got on, plus the EOD guy that had been flown in fixed-wing,

from Sharana, plus the CSAR team, which was here from the night

before, all got on. And did an offset infill to the crash site,

and then -- just like you said.

BG Colt: Night of the 6th, they foot march in. They

relieve 1 Bravo. 1 Bravo walks out, and they pick em up and bring

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him back?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yes, sir.

SME-GFA: (b)(3), (b)(6) stays on the ground until mission

complete?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: They got extended twice. So it was supposed

to be 24-hour mission, and it turned into 72 hours.

SME-GFA: At the end of the day, the guy is saying, hey, we

are done here, was (b)(3), (b)(6)

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yes, it was.

BG Colt: How did all of those pax get out ultimately?

TF J3:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c To get (b)(3), (b)(6) CSAR, EOD and all 20 Pathfinders,

ARSOA,(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
came back down, did two turns that same HLZ and loaded

everybody up, and then returned to(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cwith (b)(3), (b)(6) .

SME-GFA: Again, backing up. The entire assault force on

one helo, does that raise any red flags?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Actually, we didn't know about it. It makes

sense to us. When we hear afterwards that they could only cycle

in one helicopter to HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c at the time. It's a common

practice for us, and I suspect others to reduce exposure to the

helicopters by only one going into that same LZ --

SME-GFA: Yeah. I'm not making any -- just, kind of, the

reasons behind it --

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TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yes, sir. After the crash, they were trying

to figure out who was on the helo. And we actually sent a, you

know, bus out to the EXTORTION that came back and then here at

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cjust to confirm them.

SME-GFA: What actual product -- did any product go to(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

prior to those guys wheels-up?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: (b)(3), (b)(6) had the chalk load, and then he had held

it. I didn't ask for it. And then when it went it down, I got

it right away. But the one thing that wasn't clear about which

EXTORTION they were actually on was that -- I knew they were all

on one helo, but it wasn't clear if it was (b)(3), (b)(6) . Obviously,

we didn't see to get which one they got on. So there's a little

bit of confusion there.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yeah. The radio calls always say EXTORTION

(b)(3), (b)(6) that support us. It's 17 I think because --

BG Colt: It is(b)(3), (b)(6)

. 17 went down. was the wingman.
(b)(3), (b)(6) And

that's a function of the ACO, and the way their tail numbers align

with the squawks that they have to do. So it's dedicated

to -- but based on the airframes, they were physically flying,

that's what gave them their --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: I see.

SME-GFA: Anything else, sir?

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BG Colt: It sounds to me like (b)(3), (b)(6) pretty much, was

the deciding factor on a single-ship infil. If this

headquarters never knew it -- I shouldn't say that. The

discussion was between (b)(3), (b)(6) and probably the troop

commander.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: We have learned to operate, you know, in the

limitations of the approval process, special operations, our

tasks in the process for a lot of the LZ stuff becomes challenging.

I would say it took us a solid three weeks to figure out, you

know, how to plan, how to prioritize, you know, how early to set

our DPs. So a lot of those discussions were happening between

the troop commander and the lead planner.

And knowing that the lead planner, and we understand, didn't make

a lot of decisions. He packaged it up, set up for 0-5s and 0-6s

in Bagram to approve or disapprove. Once they get that, then

the clock starts on how much time they need to brief their pilots.

SME-GFA: What's your comfort level of flying with these

guys? Is there any friction points, or issues that come to mind

besides just the normal three-hour timeline, and trying to get

out the door quickly and they can't do it still?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c I would say, you know, we train in everything

always with ARSOA. So comfort level is low because they don't

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fly like ARSOA -- They don't plan like ARSOA. They don't land

like ARSOA. They will either, you know, kind of, do a runway

landing. Or if it's a different crew that trains different areas,

they will do the pinnacle landing. So we are starting to

understand different crews landed differently and needed

different set ups for exfils and pick-ups.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cSEA: It was a popular topic of discussion.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c It's tough. I mean, and I gave them guidance

to make it work. And they were making it work. But it limited

our effectiveness. It made our options and our tactical

flexibility [sic].

Our agility was clearly limited by our air platform infil -- where

we could go. How quickly we could get there. So when I talk

about it, I briefed the boss and he knew it that, Hey, we're

missing the enemy sometimes because we just can't get there. We

can't adapt fast enough.

We will see what we think is the target, then a vehicle follow

and move, and we just can't get an LZ approved there. And then

instead of -- and it usually became my decision whether to infil

real late and then, you know, we are going to accelerate our

escalation of force. And then we start taking risk there.

And often, I wouldn't go in preplanned to have a compressed

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time-line where we have to compress our escalation of force and,

you know, risk something happening or the thing could blow back.

SME-GFA: Did you see the same crews for your missions for

the most part?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Actually, I would say there's solidly, at

least four different crews that I know of --

TM(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ2: We don't have the same full crews for some

others that were here. Maybe a week prior to this mission, the

Hawaii crew, I think, ripped out. And I believe it was the

Colorado crew came in. So there was at least one new crew. But

other than that --

SME-GFA: As far as the pilot showing up for your planning,

meetings, same guys?

TM(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ2: Typically the guys that came over here for

planning were the same --

SME-GFA: They were the guys flying for you on that mission,

correct, for the most part?

TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ2: I don't know for this particular night, the

pilots that came over that night. I don't know the answer to

that.

SME-GFA: Who's is it -- as far as ARSOA asset allocation,

is it that says Thunder Package was at Jalalabad or was that

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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you?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: No, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-GFA: What's that based on? Terrain?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: I'm not sure --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: Maintenance package that were --

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c -- yeah. I mean, it's the trail of tears when

you ask -- because there's some things that we want as far as,

okay, if you are going give us direct support and ARSOA, where

it gets positioned is just like the J3 said it. They've got to

accommodate what the CAB can provide. And a lot of it has to

do with the models and their compatible logistics packages,

maintenance packages and stuff like that.

SME-GFA: That's a brown maintenance package at(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: It is. They move that --

SME-GFA: They don't tack it to the --

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c -- the route can move them back and forth. But

I mean, I would recommend asking JSOAD. They are intimately

familiar. We are going through it right now.

SME-GFA: I'm just curious because they moved the thunder

package from north down to Sharana as we rolled in last year.

I still don't really understand the reasons behind that.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yeah. We got our input. We explained the

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costs of, you know, and that's what we're going through right

now.

SME-GFA: Is there a different target set down at(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cas

far as SI dropping in and sending them, you know --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: It is a different target set -- I mean,

different terrain. Both places, you know, we're going -- at

least for Team(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

and Team(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
, you are going to have more

opportunities to get after the enemy with ARSOA than you have

with direct support.

You know, we wanted just a background. Big Apple had a

G-model in(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cwhen -- before when they had ARSOA in direct

support here. But they just couldn't support keeping Big Apple

and(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cand keeping ARSOA here just because of the logistics

footprint of it.

I don't understand the shuffle, but people are well-aware of the

decision. They talk about it. it was very deliberate -- I think

they nash over what the --

SME-GFA: Yeah. I mean, I understand. There's only so

many people around you.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c But the bottom line is their comfort level is

low. If we don't train with conventional helos, we learn to plan

with conventional helos here. They brief us in on the process.

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It's very different than any SOF process that we've been in.

Because it's not a SOF process. It's conventional planning to

a SOF mission. I think we figured it out pretty well for our

timelines.

SME-GFA: Are they flexible at all on the end part or to help

move improve the processes, or is it --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: I would say kind of help us to change the

process. You know, a planner to planner, you know, a great

American just like everyone in this room is willing to ask for

a lot of things. But, you know, clearly the brief I got over

at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was, you know, an apology upfront for the process

we have to go through -- Now, here's what we've got to do, and

here's let’s backward plan on how to get you out the door in time

with the constraints of the planning process.

I don't know enough about the conventional air to question the

process too much. I always, you know, kind of stole the phrase,

but it was good pushing the envelope on the planning timeline

or whatnot. You know, any time they came up with a redline, I

wasn't willing to cross the redline because I just didn't know

what it was. There's probably a reason there was a redline.

SME-GFA: Yeah. I'm sure there is. It sounds like our

experience up north. I mean, they are -- like you said great

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Americans and whatnot, but we couldn't get out the door that fast.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Any other comments on that?

SME-GFA: It sounds very similar to my experience. We

got -- pretty much, had the same crews every night, which was

good. You know, they would show up at Tm (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c at 1300 Zulu,

and they would stay there out there all night long. So it was

a good relationship. And we were co-located with the CAB

commander. So he was 200 meters from my JOC. So I could walk

over and talk to him very easily. So it was good. Totally

different.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: I understand the Delta Model is the least

capable model compared to, like, the Golf Model.

BG Colt: As far as power and performance more capable for

picking things up, more restricted as far as radios, no rover

feed, that's the real difference. It has more capacity to lift.

It's lighter, same engine, but --

SME-GFA: That's it, sir.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cSEA: I would say the normal concerns about flying

with them was there. I think we've had on every op over here.

But there was really no undue stress or concern outside of what

we normally do in this operation.

0-1[TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR] and I discussed it. He called me up, you know,

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and told me what was going on. And I talked about it, and we

both agreed that, you know, it was not unfeasible. It was

nothing, I would -- you know, crazy or way out of the ordinary.

And, you know, we were comfortable with it.

I, you know -- like I said, I tried to watch the HLZ area as much

as I thought I was, and wasn't seeing anything. As always, I'm

concerned about the, you know, the infils and extracts with these

guys and watching them, and have gone on some of them. But I

wasn't -- there was no feeling at any time that, Hey, we are

stepping way out the box here.

SME-GFA: Have you employed IRF often, or it's --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
CDR: No we haven't. I can't think -- we talked a

couple times about it, like, briefly we talked about it. We had

movers up high. It was just too late ---

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c target but --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yep. The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c target --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: -- just BLUE IRF again --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: -- SIMRON (ph). We talked about their --

BG Colt: Would you say that you approached the IRF infil

more from a deliberate standpoint than they did knowing that the

operators that were going to go execute it and the C2 node were

all located here, and in their particular case, from air

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perspective, you had continuity of the planner. But all the

other participants were out operating.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yes.

BG Colt: It became -- I don't want say in-extremis, but it

became a compressed event for them based on them being in

continuous execution. Is that the way you characterize it?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yes, sir. It was -- they were back here so

they were static. But were fragged with a new HLZ, you have to

talk about it face-to-face --

BG Colt: And never left the aircraft?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c They did not come back here, right? I never

saw them.

TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ2: Pilots were never here --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: Yeah. I think they were out there at level

2.

BG Colt: And the assault(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

, were they already at the

aircraft, and just the leadership joined them when they were

ready to ultimately leave?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCDR: No. Everybody was here.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: It really wasn't by definition an IRF where,

you know, bam, they are airborne right away --

BG Colt: No. I'm with it.

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TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cJ3: -- yeah. And we haven't had that ability,

really, with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c as we do with ARSOA, you can find a Black

HLZ, put an IRF in wherever the squirters go. But it's always

more deliberate with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c .

So they [the(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

] weren't even jocked up in the back. They

were just standing by to see what happen. They got the kit on

as things developed.

SME-GFA: Anything else?

BG Colt: I haven't got anything else right now.

SME-GFA: I appreciate it.

The investigation closed at 2153 Zulu, 19 August 2011.

[END OF PAGE]

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The interview of the 10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) ) opened at 1508

Zulu, 16 August 2011 at FOB (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD: BG J. Colt, US Army

DEPUTY INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD: IO-DEP

LEGAL ADVISOR: LA

GROUND FORCE ARMY ADVISOR: SME-GFA

INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR: SME-INTEL

CAB CH-47 ADVISOR: SME-CH47

NGB REPRESENTATIVE: SME-NGB

MH-47 ADVISOR: SME-CH47

ASDAT ADVISOR SME-ASDAT

COURT REPORTER: CR

Derived from: Task Force (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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All witnesses relevant to the investigation were duly sworn.

BG Colt: Our responsibility here is to find facts, not fault,

all right? That's what we're out to do. Last night, our

discussions with(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c
and were very insightful into process.
(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

So what we would like to begin with, and I recognize that we didn't

afford you the opportunity for a command brief type thing. But

what we would like to do is get you to discuss for us, please,

and explain process and, kind of, optempo in a contextual setting

before we, sort of, narrow down to this particular mission.

Because we, certainly in our previous conversation also,

understand that op tempo here, and the greater contextual -- what

the demands are on this task force well exceed that just of this

particular mission. But it does have an influence on the

resources available, allocation or apportionment, all right.

So that's kind of what we would like to get you to talk to us

about.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. Sir, I'll go ahead and start off

with that, and then I will ask some of the staff on the end over

there.

These microphones are not active. I just put down. If you guys

want to put them down so it looks like you've got a flower in

the middle of table or something like that, that's blocking your

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view, you can just set them on the other side.

Sir, the S-2 is actually upstairs. I have both my S-2 and

assistant, those two are upstairs. So if you want to speak here

for a bit first, I can bring them down, and have them come down

here and join us, or we can just leave them upstairs. It's your

call.

We understood that that was going to be a separate interview.

That's why we left them upstairs.

BG Colt: That's what we will do.

Court reporter: Gentlemen, if possible, because there's a

lot of people in there, just one time before you speak on the

record, can you just say your name. That way, I'll have an

accurate account of who is actually speaking.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): My name is (b)(3),(b)(6) . I'm the Aviation

(b)(3), (b)(6) . Sir, as we talk about the overall context

and the big picture for the fight here, the aviation brigade in

RC East is a traditional regular combat engaged brigade with a

full MTOE of the United States. In addition to that, we have

a battalion task force that is tasked organized with us from RC

North.

The brigade and all of those aviation assets are tasked organized

at each one of the COPs and FOBs. We have five main FOBs that

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we operate out of. So four of those are my task force

headquarters. One of them is a task force that, right now, is

from 1st Air CAV Brigade from (b)(6) (sic) brigade.

Prior to that it was with Gambler that came out of, (b)(6)

brigade (sic). In addition to those assets, we have almost

another battalion's worth of National Guard or reserve component

assets that are mobilized and here in support of the mission.

One of them is a CAC Command and Control UH-60 company. We have

a company and a half, a total of(b)(3), (b)(6)CH-47 Deltas that come from

two different locations. And then we also have a MEDEVAC

team -- a three - ship MEDEVAC team that's on the ground.

When you add all of that up, it's turned into nearly three

companies of additional flying assets that are part of the

brigade, almost another battalion’s worth. So total it's a

regular aviation brigade. No augmentation with regard to

planning or capacity at the brigade level. But with two

additional battalions - worth of assets. One [inaudible] to

battalion headquarters, two battalions worth of assets that are

tasked organized with us.

The op-tempo across the brigade supports seven coalition

brigades here on the ground at RC East. That is five US and two

coalition with the French and with the Polish. The French and

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the Polish have aviation detachments that support the French.

The French has a French aviation detachment that supports the

Polish. The Polish have a Polish aviation detachment that

supports them.

Neither one of those detachments are self-sufficient, so they

rely on Task Force (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c to provide support, particularly when

it comes to lift support of CH-47s as well. When we look at the

other forces that we support, obviously, Task Force(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c and

their operations, which take place every night across the

brigade.

We support CJ SOTF here. So all of the -- quite a few of the

ODA missions are with the Afghan commandos. We provide lift

support for those and southeast. And that's, pretty much, most

of the forces that we normally provide support for.

And, of course, Afghans. And the Afghan National Security Force

itself that we also provide for as well. Anything from gun

escort for their MIs to actually doing a resupply for ANSF Forces.

So the mission load here is very, very significant for the size

of the force that we have.

BG Colt: Uh-hmm.

10th CAB :
(b)(3), (b)(6) The op -tempo is extremely high across the

fleet. It is quite mind boggling that we have as big a brigade

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as we do and we still run out of assets. But with all of the

conventional force assets that we support, in particular, the

five U. S. brigades and their op -tempo and the partnership work

that they do with the Afghans, that simply is a question of demand

that is not met with the conventional force assets that we have

with regard to our CHs.

BG Colt: How would you characterize the trend of op -tempo

right now, trending up, down, remaining relatively the same,

perceptively increasing of weight?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): I would say it was actually higher last year.

And I would say that one of the changes that we've seen with CJTF-1

when CJTF switched with CJTF-11, out is that we actually did see

a -- I would say in the grand scheme of things, a slightly reduced

op-tempo in comparison to what we had seen with CJTF-11. It had

to do different op -plans, different techniques that had to do

with different BCTs in the battle space.

When we arrived, we had three air assault brigades that were on

the ground. We had (b)(3), (b)(6) (ph).

(b)(3), (b)(6) , he just ripped out. They were the last ones to rip

out.

The op -tempo for different types of brigades ties itself very

directly to what the -- or the type of brigade that are out there,

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they are attached to the fight, how they are partnering with the

Afghans, all of that plays into the optempo of that particular

brigade as well as, of course, is the oplans and the campaign

plan by CJTF. So we actually have seen from a conventional force

perspective what I consider to be a slight decrease in comparison

to what we saw with CJTF-11.

However, capacity continues to grow with the Afghans. We

continue to increase our focus on partnership with the Afghans.

And so, in a general sense, there are more assets available out

there.

We set CJ SOTF for the summer piece. The ISAF soft piece is one

that has hardly -- when we were here with CJTF-11, they did not

receive hardly any support. It was very rare that we flew a

mission for them because we simply did not have the assets.

So there are always at least one asset that's out there that is

almost getting very minimal lift support that they would prefer.

So when anything else goes down, their missions will

automatically come up on the table because now we have assets

available.

And then, of course, you toss in the rip process which takes place

which relies heavily on the CH-47 support. Every time a brigade

rips out, we now shift. And we have a lot of movement, as you

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look at the outlying COPs and FOBs, with CH47s to move those

troops in and out of the main FOB, in and out of Salerno --

BG Colt: Currahee the most recent --

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6): Currahee and Black hawk being the most recent.

And we are still actually flying, even thought that rip is

complete, Black hawk is in control of the fight. We are still

flying Blackhawk rip as we move equipment, in particular, around

and they continue to get their mission set.

Around the corner right now, the Polish will be ripping out, and

(b)(3), (b)(6) will be ripping out. Those will be taking place almost

the same time as the aviation brigade TOA as we look in the

September/October timeframe. So the optempo is certainly -- I

mean, it's just reality. It is a very, very fast optempo as you

look across the board.

Big picture context, I think it is fairly safe to say that as

you look in -- everyone knows it, everyone talks about it, and

everybody acknowledges that it is definitely in knowledge with

the leadership that aviation is one of the leading factors that

we have in this fight, and all of Afghanistan. This is not an

RC East solo question. This also applies to RC South. In my

opinion, as well with RC North. I think that would be fairly

clearly illustrated by those commanders as well.

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BG Colt: Do you have a written op-order from ISAF or anybody

above you that codifies what the priorities of user

are-- priority support?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): I believe there was at one point in time, a

prioritization that was written. I don't know that it currently

exists. I agree. (b)(3),(b)(6) do you recall if we have that?

10TH CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: I don't think so, sir. I haven't seen anything.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): (b)(3),(b)(6) came on board as the 3, sir, only about

a month. So some of the institutional knowledge as a 3 we have,

he's definitely going to be working for it. Do you guys recall

if we have that?

Negative response by all members.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): I don't. I want to say that we received some

guidance at the CJTF level where it came to mission

prioritization. But one thing to understand is that on the CH-47

side, CH-47s are GS across all of RC East. Some of my assets

are DS, my attack assets, my UH assets, my scout assets are DS

to specific battle space owners. CH-47s are not.

BG Colt: Has it always been that way?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): It's been that way since arrived, sir.

BG Colt: Was it that way with your predecessor?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): I believe so. But I'm not 100 percent sure.

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I think with 3d CAB it was when it came to CHs. And there

was-- that has constantly been a debate. Now, it was a debate

last year.

I think 3d CAB -- and I think (b)(3),(b)(6) was the one who, kind

of, consolidated into the GS role. In fact, I'm almost certain

that it was 3d CAB that that transition took place. I think prior

to that, most things were DS'd out to the battle space owner.

But it became a question with the efficiency of the use of the

CH47 as we built more combat power into this theater. Because,

of course, we brought in Currahee which was the 7th Brigade. And

as that combat power came up, they realized they did not have

the ability to focus those assets where they wanted to.

BG Colt: Just a follow-up point of clarification. When you

say, during in a GS role, they are still decentralized and

positioned with these outlying battalion task forces, and they

run an AMR process against the demands of those aircraft that

are located there, or are they apportioned at the brigade level,

and directed to them.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): They are apportioned at the division level,

and then further tasked to us to provide support.

BG Colt: And what mission cycle is that?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): It varies, sir. Generally, it is a 24-hour

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mission.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): There is a daily synchronization that is

taking places at the CJTF level that the 3 can talk about a little

more. But as missions change on a day-to-day basis, that

determination of who is going to get CH-47 tomorrow for this

operation or that operation that is the decided at the division

level. And that takes place every single day, sir.

One thing that does not include are the(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cassets. What we

have DS to(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cis set aside and is DS to(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

; that is the

only-- the DS CH-47s, they have to have packages that we have.

Those half packaged just for(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

are DS to those missions. That

is a mission set that is protected, and that is what are expected

to be there [sic].

All other CH47s what I'm referring to, sir, when I say "GS". So

if Bronco wants to do an assault, they don't they don't

have-- they have to go to the division and say, I would like a

pair of CHs. And they are probably the CHs that are sitting right

there at that same FOB that he is. And his DS battalion

headquarters is the aviation battalion task force headquarters,

will be the aviation C2 cell for that. And for the most part,

it will be his CHs that are flying. He may receive two CHs from

Task Force (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c that come, and fall under that aviation

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task force in order to support Bronco in that assault.

BG Colt: That's clear.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir. That kind of dynamic happens

everyday in the allocation of those assets happen everyday at

the CJTF level with the exception, again, of the(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

assets which

are protected for that mission.

BG Colt: Can you describe the task organization, and the

assets provided to(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cthen?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. We have a half package that is at

Sharana, down at Blackhawks AO. So there is a pair of CHs that

will be dedicated against them. We do not set aside specific

crews for that if that's where you are going with the question

on the task organization.

We set aside the mission set. So there will be a pair of CHs

that the will be ready to fly at(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

, and task force attack

understands that they will have the aviation C2 piece for that

half mission for(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

on any given night. There's one at(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c
,

and there's one at (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c as a current mission set is now.

That has changed depending on where the requirement has been

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

over the course of the year that we have been here. There was

a period of time when we had a half package that was up at

Jalalabad. And a lot of that depended on where we had the task

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force assets -- Task Force(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cassets placed on the battle field.

So we find ourselves working with(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cto determine where the

best place is to put it.

So bottom line is: A (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c . Currently as we

sit right now, and a (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c . In addition to that, we fly the AWT support for though

three half packages, plus we also provide AWT support for (b)(3), (b)(6)

when they go in, and they fly the half missions. That takes place

out at -- one of those is out of (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

; one of them is out at

Jeff. And I think that's it, just those two right there.

BG Colt: Do each of the outlying battalion task forces

maintain a QRF?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. They each maintain a QRF in direct

support to the battle space owner that they work for.

BG Colt: Okay. And is the composition the same in each?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): For the QRF itself? Normally, it would be in

an attack team that is for each one. Here, you would, pretty

much, argue here at Bagram, it's really two -- it's kind of the

(b)(3), (b)(6) teams day and night.

Out at every other task force, they AH-64s that are DS to the

battle space owner. And one of their tasks is to be the aerial

QRF, and AH-64. So that's at the DS level for the battle space

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owner.

At the division level, we maintain a day and a night Apache QRF

team here on Bagram. Plus, we maintain a day and a night UH-60

QRF team out at(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

, which are co-located with the Pathfinders.

And that is for CJTF wide. UH-60s, along with Pathfinders at

to respond across the entire CJTF AO for any kind of

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

responses we need for [inaudible] and lift support, we pull the

Pathfinders in to the --

BG Colt: Is the brigade commander and the S-3 that trigger,

decision makers for launch all the Pathfinder QRF missions?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): It's actually CJTF, sir.

BG Colt: Okay.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Pathfinders are a CJTF asset.

BG Colt: Okay.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): As well as the Apache day team and night team

here, and UH day team and UH night team is down at (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c Those

assets are the decision-maker at CJTF.

BG Colt: Okay.

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: We will start planning as soon as it looks like

some concern come down, sir. The aviation task forces all track

it. As soon as it looks like the QRF is going to be employed,

they will start the planning. But the release authority is up

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at CJTF working with Chops, saying, Hey, the planning is done;

we're ready to go; we're waiting for the release word. And then

they will give the release word, and we are usually off the ground

pretty quickly.

BG Colt: Okay. Are all the(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cmission planning

cycles -- they are all generated from lower to higher?

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6): When you say lower or higher, sir, do you mean

for the company --

BG Colt: Right. From a battalion task force, they notify

you that they have a mission that they are going to plan to prepare

for.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Correct.

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: Sir, I was out at Jalalabad, and we had a half

out there for a while. The way it usually works is we will send

our planners over to team JBAD. And the team JBAD guys out, will

bring us their releasable CONOPs, they say, this is where we want

to go; this is where the HLZs that we want to use are.

At that point, it's a give and take. We know what our standard

is in the brigade. And so we will come up with a compromise

between where they want to be, and where we need our HLZs to be.

At that point, once we have the framework of a plan, we will

generate the CONOP with the intelligence that we generally

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receive from the higher side that Team JBAD has. They will send

it to the aviation battalion, where the aviation battalion's S-3

will review it. If the battalion commander is physically there,

he will review it. If not, I will always my -- you know, get

a hold of my boss on (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c and give him a quick brief on it if

it was available.

Then we will send it up here to the battle captain. The battle

captain downloads it, prints it off. He makes a whole lot of

notes that he sees based off past guidance that we've received

from (b)(3),(b)(6) ; hands it off to myself as the 3. I'll review

the entire CONOP to see if there are any other additional notes

that we need to make before we take it upstairs for either (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(3),(b)(6) to review. And they are the final approval

authority for it, sir. So it's been through a lot of eyes at

that point generally.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, to answer your question regarding the

lower level, yes. It usually goes from the battalion task force.

A notification is made, and then we are given the AMCM product

once they have finalized that with the ground element.

BG Colt: Okay. Is there anything codified in writing about

planning timelines and planning risk authority or mission

authority when operating with(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

?

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10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): First, from our level, sir, we have put out

guidance -- I've put out guidance about the planning timeline

when it comes to working with(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c specific. As well as with

our general leaders. Three hours is the minimum amount of time

that we set aside; that is the absolute minimum. And that is

guidelines that have come out because we had -- it was kind of

loose out there before.

Other types of unit differ from longer time lines. But what we

have established with(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

is that habitual working relationship

at the battalion level with that team that comes on the ground

at (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c . They have that

direct contact, and partly due to the nature of the fact that

we have that habitual relationship. We work through that

discussion process. We have set a three-hour minimum timeline

for us to be able to plan the mission that's for(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

specifically.

That is something I put out. We put that out in writing --

BG Colt: Do we have that on the share drive?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6)

: We put that out in a FRAGO. And we put that

out also to the units that we're working with. We also had

guidelines that went out to the conventional units and to the

ISAF because all of their planning timelines are different. The

only one that is that compressed is with(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cbecause of the

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nature of that particular mission and that particular fight.

And I'm sure we've got that product somewhere. Am I missing

something on that? I'm not sure if it came out on the CJTF side

or any other side. I don't that there has.

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I don't remember -- I will have to go back

and research the IJC order that quantifies our relationship and

our requirements. But I don't believe that it is in that

document.

I do believe that we have put out a FRAGO from 10th CAB to our

subordinate units that quantify the time limit for the(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

planning cycle, and it is three hours.

BG Colt: Was that your guidance, or is that something that

(b)(3), (b)(6) or somebody before you all utilized?

10th CAB :
(b)(3), (b)(6) The guys that were here before us had

compressed it, and got it down to that type of a timeline. And

from the time we arrived, we took over that mission cycle in terms

of the way it was working. You were not part of that initially

because it was up at JBAD. You good didn't get the handover.

Am I missing anything on that? As I recall, I'm not sure exactly

when 3d CAB started or got to that level. But they were certainly

at the level of the three-hour notification and mission execution

time cycle by the time we got on board. We learned, and we took

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some of their planning ideas, systems and then, of course, we

continued to adapt through the course of this year to arrive at

where we are now. But that was certainly the starting point for

us.

BG Colt: How about other assistance that the brigade staff

or the battalion and lower collaborate on and in the development

of the three-hour timeline? Can you talk about that at all? And

sharing of intel products, for instance.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. There is sharing of information.

And it is generally at the task force and at the company level.

I don't know specifically if our S-2 here at the brigade level

shares information readily with Task Force(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

. But I don't

think that happens. It is more located at the lower level.

Having said that, there is information sharing, but it is not

codified in a FRAGO or in an SOP anywhere that that is supposed

to occur.

BG Colt: Okay.

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: Sir, at the task for level, there's a lot of

that information sharing. My S-2 would basically live over

there at the Team JBAD compound. So in terms of direct

coordination there when they are building the products, there

was a lot of that going on. The only information we would really

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get from up here at higher headquarters would be our topo team

would do a lot of work for HLZ selection and that type of stuff.

The actual intel on enemy threat was RS2 working directly with

the Team JBAD side.

BG Colt: Okay.

IO-DEP: So for the crews dedicated to(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

, did you get any

guidance from ISAF or, Hey, this is what these guys have to do,

and this is the capability? I know you've got a 2, 2 and 2 right,

for each half? Two AHs, two UHs and two CHs.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Two and two. There's a CH and AH.

IO-DEP: And so there wasn't any FRAGO or anything saying,

Hey, you need to train them up to this standard, you need to do

these things or --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Not to my knowledge, negative. We have a

requirement to provide support, and it was defined as two CHs

and two AHs. And that was, to my knowledge, unless I'm missing

something, that was the extent of the guidance and the order.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, there are a few products out there that

I will look for that include specific units such as the B 1/171

Hawaiian National Guard which is directed to provide support for

a specific purpose, which was direct support to(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

.

And I can't tell you what specifically was in that type of order.

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But I will look to see if there's mention of that. I don't

remember that it was in there delineating that.

IO-DEP: Okay. Thanks. I appreciate that.

Next question is -- so to make sure I understand. The

aircraft -- or the CH is DS to(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

. The crews are not. So the

crews, I mean, do you have a pool of crews and whoever is available

supports that mission -- I mean, I'm not trying to say there is

no crew selection process. I understand there is. But if you

could talk me through that.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): The -- and, (b)(3),(b)(6) you can add in, also, from

your side as to what you saw down at the task force. The task

force commanders select which individuals out of their

populations are going to fly the(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

missions; that is the first

step in the criteria that I would lay out. And that is something

that is done based off of, clearly, crew experience, the

experience they brought into this fight, what they see for how

these guys are flying now in terms of their aptitude and their

abilities. Understanding that it is a constantly charging

dynamic because we constantly have changes that are off-cycle

in the RIPTOA process.

As you look across RC East, I have got two and a half companies

of CH-47s. I have got my company, which are Foxes. And then

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I've got a company of Delta models from one location, and then

another half a company of Delta models for a third location. All

three of them are on different timelines.

BG Colt: And that half company is separated between you and

(b)(3), (b)(6) (sic) BCT?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): That's correct, sir. Right now, it's

Colorado and Nebraska. They just switched out with Hawaii.

Hawaii arrived when we arrived. It ripped in back in about

October or November of last year.

BG Colt: And when they did that, did they rip knowing that

six airframes each were in each task force?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): When they arrived, it was not clear when that

unit was activated that they were going to come here and be

separated like that. They were activated against the RFF

[Request for Forces] to provide additional support for(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

,

which is what (b)(3), (b)(6) had mentioned. That was the genesis of the

ark the -- not the motivation -- but the reason behind that RFF

that brought in that second CH company.

BG Colt: (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cop -tempo was the requirement to generate the

additional RFF?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): That's correct, sir. And that's what the

requirement was against. So we have three different timelines

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for the three different CH units. When we initially

arrived -- of course, you understand everything we are at now

is a result of evolution all the time.

When we initially arrived, I had CH-47 Foxes on three locations.

Keep in mind, we have 5 FOBs. I had CH-47 Foxes on three

locations. And I had Delta models on three locations. The

third location for the Foxes was right here at Bagram. We

reduced that footprint, and we put the Foxes on two locations

because we found that logistically, we simply were not able to

support who we needed to support by having them splitting to

three --

BG Colt: Bottom lines?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Bottom line and, to a certain extent, eight

memoirs, sir, became a question of ready to launch, ready

to -- what you needed to have on the ramp. You know, if you want

to have four on the ramp, you can be definitely sure you're going

to have two everyday on a mission. If you need three to make

two everywhere you are, you're going to find yourself failing

on missions --

BG Colt: Were those QRFs, or where those SBES?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): All those were ours, sir. The unit we

replaced -- we were the first ones to have this issues when it

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came with Foxes -- I shouldn't say the first ones. (b)(6)

had the same issue. Because (b)(6) was here with Foxes that he

brought and Delta models.

He ripped out with (b)(6) and 3d CAB. They were pure. (b)(6)

had not done the Fox model fill. (b)(6) had the luxury of having

a pure fleet of Delta models, which adds a tremendous amount of

flexibility to what you have in this fight.

We go back now to Foxes and Deltas and, oh, by the way, we pick

up the additional six CH-47s. And so it made sense for us to

split into -- essentially you had five half companies of CH-47s,

a total of two and a half companies. You have five locations.

The wave ended up falling out. Logistically, it made sense to

put the Foxes on two locations, and the Delta models on three.

Essentially, about a half of company --

BG Colt: I absolutely understand.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): -- [inaudible] if that makes sense.

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, there were other considerations that were

tactical and accidental that we looked at, and the rationale for

putting those --

BG Colt: Can you talk to some of those, please.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, the other considerations were clearly the

terrain, the enemy threat and the requirements. So we looked

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at those different aspects for consideration as well when

considering where to put the Fox model aircraft.

I think the thing that really put us over the edge was the

sustainment of those aircraft, and the logistical [inaudible]

of continuing the sustainment of those aircraft at two locations,

was much easier than putting them at three locations.

BG Colt: When got an extra company and a half of their D

models, what logistics do you get to sustain D model pure fleets?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Pretty much -- I mean, we've got the -- well,

they come in different packages, sir. That's not an easy

question to answer. By the order, I don't think the order

specified anything outside of those assets. In other words --

BG Colt: You didn't get any AVUM augmentees?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): I will have to verify that, sir. But I don't

think that they came with --

BG Colt: Let me rephrase: Did you get any AVUM or AVIM

augmentees for that additional --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Did we get them is a different question, sir.

What was tasked, if I recall by the order, and we have to verify

this with the order, there was no additional maintenance.

However, these units will come with and they will activate with

different levels of maintenance support that they see the need

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themselves.

For example, we have a company from Washington/Oregon that was

the full company we had when we got here. They ripped out with

Kansas. When Kansas came onboard, Kansas brought a significant

amount of support with them. It was a far more robust package

than Washington/Oregon had before them. So it was the same RFF,

one company for one company. But one came in with much more --

BG Colt: Have you been, in any manner, constrained by force

gap?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir, absolutely. We are locked

into -- we are. But the RFFs for these additions may not be.

We, as 10th CAB, that's what we have walked in with a force gap.

Certainly our RFFs are not necessarily under the same force cap

if they were here, for example, with half a company against the

mission, they didn't have the same requirement.

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): The authorizations for those RFFs are

delineated in the original RFF for those companies. But there's

flexibility, and the National Guard units tend to take advantage

of some of that flexibility. And they come in with different

packages like the Colonel mentioned, you know, additional 15Us

for the Chinooks and things like that.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, when we got -- versus the last crew, they

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came in, and we did a lot of [inaudible] things like that. Now,

the Washington/Oregon guys, they had fuel handlers. They had

some door gunners, things like that. So it's very different to

support, other than the actual crews, very different than the

support that comes with them on the outside. Of course, I

appreciate that we get all those guys in the reserve national

guard asset. But --

BG Colt: Have any National Guard units that came to you come

with a greater than 1.5 crew ratio? Meaning, they sent more crew

than they did --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): I don't think so, sir. I will have to verify

that. But I don't believe so. We will check on that, and give

you the actual answer. But we will give you the actual -- we

have the actual crew charts and what they brought, sir.

IO-DEP: (b)(3), (b)(6) , can I continue on that thread with how -- you

said the battalion task force commander selects a certain pool

of crews who are E. glasses off or you're approved to fly(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

--

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6): Going back to where I initially digressed, and

went down a different path for a minute. I was talking about

the different timelines. Because you have a constantly

changing -- first of all, two of our locations are prime locations

that we've had since we arrived for flying the(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cmissions,

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that's (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c .

From the day we arrived, we've had a half package at each one

of those locations. That has been enduring. That has not

changed at all. Both of those locations are pure Delta models.

We have no Foxes there. It goes back to what (b)(3), (b)(6) had raised

earlier when he talked about why we decided where to place the

Fox models where we did. A large part of that had to deal with

terrain and the threat.

The KONAR, we clearly identified as needed to have Fox models.

So right there, boom, that's one slice of the Fox model piece

that you have.

IO-DEP: And why did you --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): We felt that because of both, the terrain

challenges and the enemy challenges that we saw out there in KONAR.

Based off of what our predecessors had seen here before us, we

did not see putting the reserve component units up into the KONAR

in the optempo which a pinnacle approaches that we have to deal

with on a regular basis up there in KONAR. It's not from a risk

mitigation perspective.

BG Colt: As a crew training perspective, not an airframe --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. Absolutely. Because Delta models

have flown in KONAR obviously and the -- it's not like the KONARs

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only have Fox models. We are very understanding of the fact that,

Sure Delta models could fly up there.

But we felt that from the question of both aircraft capability

and the enhance risk mitigation opportunities and capability you

have with the Fox model, it made sense to put the fox model up

into the KONAR. I still feel extremely comfortable with that

decision. I will not change that at all today. We find that

is and continues to be one of our most challenging environments

in which to fly.

So we've had Delta models at (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c where

we fly the(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cevery night. The long answer to your question,

, when you talk about the crew selection, the task force
(b)(3), (b)(6)

commanders there clearly had to access the crews that they had,

decide which were the ones that they wanted to fly the (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

mission. And they focus on flying those crews.

They tend to keep a pretty consistent base of crews. It's the

two crews that are dedicated that, Hey, you two guys are the only

ones that are flying(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

mission, no, they are deeper than that.

And, obviously, we set ourselves up for failure if we have to

rely on just two crews. Because, nothing else, they are going

to take leave. Never mind the guy who is going to walk outside

and eat some bad food, and he's going to have food poisoning for

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a day. He's going to be out on his ass. We obviously have a

depth beyond that.

And each one of those locations, I would say, they probably

maintain about four or five crews that they can interchange in

to fly the(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cmissions --

IO-DEP: So it not the full --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): It's definitely not the full gambit. They

don't just throw anyone at that mission at all. And it was a

very deliberate thought process on who they are putting against

those(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4ccrews. That is very much the case.

With that said, there is constantly a requirement to train and

to improve, and get ready for the next set because the National

Guard units are here for about an eight-month effective mission

set. You will switch out guys on each one of those locations.

To mitigate that risk, we have split an offset on each one of

the locations.

While I say I have got a half a company at each location, is not

a pure half company. In other words, Hawaii had half a company

here. I did not take one FOB and say, Hawaii, that's your FOB,

you have half a company. I split Hawaii crews amongst two FOBs.

And I split a company from, what used to be Washington/Oregon

is now Kansas, on to the same two FOBs.

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Why? So that I offset the rips of those units. If I had all

of Hawaii on one FOB, and they handle the(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cmission up until

X day, they leave the next day a new --

BG Colt: Right. And you get all brand new people.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): -- there's an entirely new set of brand new

folks. And so you have no continuity of support. You have no

experience base. And what you find yourself dealing with, I

think, is that operational tactical risk that goes up

significantly. Because now, you have an entirely new, fresh set

of crews. And even if they have some experienced individual

aviators there, that transition, I think the risk goes way up.

So the way we have mitigated that is to offset. So on FOB (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c ,

they may have a number of crews from Kansas, and a number of crews

from Colorado/Nebraska. Kansas was there first. They were

trained up. And now, Colorado/Nebraska came in and we continue

to move forward. We will take the strength out of both of those.

But as we start getting to the end of Kansas, when they get ready

to leave, the expectation will be is that Colorado/Nebraska crews

that are there, they will own the(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

mission by the time Kansas

leaves. A new unit comes in, and they are not necessarily right

on with(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c
. But they might have one or two individuals or three

individuals that are particularly strong aviators that can put

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in very quickly. But for the most part, that new unit that comes

in, as you go through that rip process, go through that transition

process, the unit that's been there is the one they have it.

That is the way we have mitigated that risk when it comes

executing the(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c
mission on those two FOBs in particular. And

that has been the case we've dealt with now. Both of those units

have ripped since we have been on the ground.

SME-JSOAC: What about your dedicated planner with(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

? Do

you have an embedded planner that stays with them.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): The units -- I'll let -- (b)(6) can talk about

that a little bit more.

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: When I was at JBAD, sir, what we would have is

we would have two planners that were the primary planners that

would be over there. We had an aviator, and then we had an S-2

planner. And once we picked up that mission set, that was their

purpose in life, was to be that planner. Short of them going

on leave, they are always going to be that planner, that way they

had that relationship established, and they knew the personnel,

and they knew how to plan within there.

They would do all the planning, whether or not they went on the

mission. The aviator over there was also one of the Team(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

crews, and he might plan the mission out, hand off the plan to

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the S-2 to continue it while he goes out and flies the mission.

So often it was the who's now the company commander out there,

one of the more experienced aviators. And he would go out, and

he would AMC the mission that he just completed the plan on.

SME-JSOAC: So that face is constant?

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: Yes, sir.

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6): And I think you will find that's the case with

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c as well with Task Force (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c ,

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c . They will maintain

their set planners. They build that relationship, and that is

their primary job.

IO-DEP: What's your process for when you get these

detachments? How do you bring them in on your TACSOP, you know,

and make sure that they are in compliance with the crew

[inaudible] and all of those?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) We have a -- and I will, again, ask (b)(3), (b)(6) to

go ahead and plug if you have anything to add here. Most of his

crews were not -- he's hardly had any task crews out in six years,

so he doesn't necessarily have the first-hand experience with

this.

The short answer is the battalion task force level. We have had

this discussion. We have a consolidated brigade TACSOP that all

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the battalions operate off of. And when the units come in, the

expectation is that they train them, and they get them up to speed

on that TACSOP. Definitely the crew endurance policy and the

crew -- things like the crew rescue, crew endurance policy,

something that is maintained and monitored at the battalion level.

But in the execution down at the team level or at the company

level, expectations that they are read in with that TACSOP.

But I can't answer your question on how each battalion task force

is doing it.

IO-DEP: But it's the battalion commander's responsibility

to make sure that he trains up his elements.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Absolutely. Is it possible we could get a

digital copy of your TACSOP.

10th CAB :
(b)(3), (b)(6) I think it was actually on the disk.

IO-DEP: It might have been.

BG Colt: Does that address AMC designation too?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: Does it address the AMC program? If that's what

you're asking, no, sir, it doesn't. It does address the

responsibilities.

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6) : Each of the battalion task forces is

responsible for training their own AMCs, you know, in accordance

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with the TACSOP. But it's done at the local level, rather than

the consolidated brigade level TACSOP or AMC program.

BG Colt: How about element versus mission AMC?

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6) : Not sure what you mean, sir.

BG Colt: If you put out an AWT in an assault element, is there

an overall AMC for the mission?

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir, there is. What we will do is you

will have serial commander; for example, tonight I was supposed

to fly with AWT. I was the CH-47 serial commander, but the

overall mission AMC, was a captain who was one of the AWT PICs;

and that's, pretty much, how we do that.

BG Colt: Okay.

10th CAB :
(b)(3), (b)(6) That's also delineated, sir, on our risk

assessment portions, and also almost always covered during the

CONOP.

IO-DEP: (b)(3), (b)(6) , now, I just want to make sure the mission for

LEFTY GROVE, was that approved at the battalion level?

10th CAB :
(b)(3), (b)(6) By me.

IO-DEP: Did you have any concerns over that mission? Was

it consistent with any other missions in that AOR? Was there

anything that we haven't asked you that spiked on that mission

in your mind?

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10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): It was consistent with other missions in that

AOR. There was -- any time we went into the Tangi, the Tangi

was definitely an area of concern. There was no doubt about that.

We have a number of areas that are high threat areas across our

AOR that we watch, and that we have a greater amount of concern

over.

Tangi is certainly one of them. CHALK district up into the KONAR,

certainly the Pash River Valley and going up further north from

there. LSA and particular off of the Tegab (ph) Valley, each

one of these are areas, which we will automatically have a great

deal of concern about because of the demonstrated SAFIRE threat

that exists in each one of those locations.

That said, was this one-- anything in particular left outside

of that general higher threat concern entering? No. There

was -- I didn't have anything that I could think of in the intel

that specifically raised it to a higher than normal level for

the Tangi. In other words, in comparison to any other operation

we've done in the Tangi, it was on par with anything else that

we've done here.

IO-DEP: Okay.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Nothing specific that popped out that said,

hey, this was a different level of the Tangi than usual, if that

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makes sense.

IO-DEP: Yeah. I just want to know if there was anything out

of the ordinary, anything that made, you know, your hairs on your

back of your neck stand up, or to pay special attention to this

or just -- I mean if it was consistent with the standard missions

that you were seeing from(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): I have asked both the 3 and the DBC to make

any comments as well because all of us had a chance to look at

that operation that night. But at the end of it all, the approval

authority was at my level.

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I would say when I looked at the operation,

I did recognize it was Tangi. I did recognize the target that

we were going after as a high level target. And that was the

only thing that really stood out to me at that point in time was

that he was a high level insurgent area. And, you know, aside

from that, I didn't see anything else that was significant about

it.

IO-DEP: When you received the CONOP from the battalion task

force up here for review and approval, did they include any

demographics on the crew like this was -- you know, time, crew

mix, experience levels or anything like that? Is that held at

the battalion?

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10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): We have the -- the ERAW comes up with every

CONOP -- the risk assessment worksheet -- electronically

because we have it all -- it's all computer-based now with what

we're doing.

The ERAW comes up. It identifies, certainly our level -- it

identifies the AMC -- PC, AMC, our total hour level -- total

goggle hours or NVG hours on the aircraft. We have an annotation

if it is a crew that is under 25 hours in the AOR, which is shown

on that CONOP or on the ERAW itself. And so it does not show

how much time the crew has flown with together. That is not

listed or defined on the ERAW.

IO-DEP: You said that this one reached your level for

approval. Was that because of a certain thing on the risk

assessment? Was it because(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c--

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): All of the hasty(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cops come up --

IO-DEP: Okay. All the(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cops --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): -- it's either myself or the (b)(3), (b)(6) that will

approve it up here at the brigade level. But everything single

op comes up to my level.
(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

BG Colt: Yeah. Just for clarification, you made that

distinction as far as hasty. Are there more deliberate ones that

you have them unfold more methodically than this particular one

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did?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): With regard to --

BG Colt: .
(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Sometimes we get a little bit more lead time

on it. But that's not too often, sir.

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: I think I had twenty-four hours notice once the

whole time we had the mission down here. That was about it, sir.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, if I may, every single night we go through

the same, what I call "our hasty drill," and to put things in

context for you, it generally starts about 1800 Zulu. And it

goes probably three to five hours after that. And that's the

time period when we received these from the unit, from the task

force, and we review them. And we either approve, disapprove

or make changes as needed and modify the mission.

But every night it's a drill, if you will, for the chain of command

here and the staff to go through it. So we usually receive

anywhere between, you know, one and, I would say, we have gone

as high as maybe 12 in a night, something like that --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Not just for(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) No. Across the board. So generally, I will

for(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c
, it probably around four to six, somewhere around there.

BG Colt: Right. For reference, I understand you support

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six of their task force elements. That particular night of this

mission, they had 11 missions going on in . So contextually,

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

there's a rack and a stack within the overall complexity or the

overall value that their doing and I recognize that, all right?

Do you recall when the mission came up here originally, right?

Did they plan for IRF sequel, if you will?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): I don't think so, sir.

BG Colt: Objective LEFTY was originally planned for an infil,

a deliberate target talk out and an exfil. That's what it was

planned for; is that correct?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): That's correct, sir.

BG Colt: Okay. And then at some point in this particular

mission, can you just describe how Objective LEFTY then, you know,

unfolded. After the initial infil, there was another discussion.

How did that one go?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): I think that it was myself and the 3. You can

go ahead and talk from your perspective. ]

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: Sir, I was informed by my CHOPS that there were

multiple people starting to gather around Objective LEFTY, and

they needed to put the immediate reaction force in. They were

going to put the reaction force in on a four and a half k offset.

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The force was already on the helicopters, and they just needed

authorization to be able to do the infil.

So we quickly went over, pulled the topo up -- the topographical

map up to make sure that the landing conditions would be suitable.

I came up here quickly and briefed the boss because they were

already airborne at this point. I believe, sir, I think you

called the commander to discuss it with him as well.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): That's correct.

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: That was the immediacy of it. The report we

got was people were gathering, troops were in contact on the

ground. The flight was already airborne at this point, and just

needed authorization to go in at a four and a half Kilometer

offset.

Other than that piece right there, that's about the best intel

that we got. But based on the severity of the situation, that's

when we brought up to the boss, and I think he called directly

to try to get more information.

BG Colt: Would you characterization the sequel sort of

nature of objective lefty and then the subsequent infil as

something that has happened routinely or recurringly?

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: No, sir.

BG Colt: No?

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10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir. That has not been the routine.

IO-DEP: So employment of the IRF [inaudible] is not a

normal --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) We have -- I can --

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: I can think of possibly --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): It has not happened, sir. I would have to go

back and check. But I cannot think of many times.

BG Colt: There are plenty of circumstances -- wouldn't

you -- help me (b)(3), (b)(6) in the question how I can say this.

Have there been a number of missions where you have approved an

IRF infil or prior as part of the original mission brief?

Because if a commander maintains an IRF capability, it's fairly

logical to assume, right, that it's an -- it is a sequel that

could occur -- a contingency -- a likely contingency to plan for.

And then if that's the case, do you give parameters to which the

IRF can be employed by the battalion task force commander without

them having to come back to you?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, from my perspective as we have been in

supporting(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c
, I cannot recall us being asked to employ an IRF.

If we have, it's been very, very rare. I've got to go back and

look. It's certainly been the exception from a planning

perspective --

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BG Colt: (b)(3),(b)(6) can take that one and look at that. How many

times, for instance, have you flexed on a second turn, or done

something that was causal or not reactive, I guess, than initial

conditions on the target.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): We will get you that answer, sir. Again, as

I'm thinking right now, I can't really think of any off the top

of my head. That doesn't mean --

BG Colt: I mean, in other cases you may have done based on

the limited number of assets, a two-turn infil, right? A

deliberate two-turn infil --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir.

BG Colt: -- to put in both tiers of elements that were going

in?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. And in particular -- and this was

before (b)(3), (b)(6) came up as the 3, I would say that there was at least

one or two operations. It may have been right around the time

we transitioned with (b)(3),(b)(6)

. There was one or two

operations in Kosovo where we had multiple targets in the same

location where we did multiple turns. And that was a deliberate

operation with multiple turns in.

Usually it is one turn in 60 pax or less infil, execute the mission

and then exfil. Very rarely, to answer your question on the

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planning piece, sir, very, very rarely have we had a plan in-place

that we have been asked to lay out for an IRF. That is not

something that is a normal. I can tell you that for the whole

year, that is not something that we have normally planned on.

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: I can think of -- the RFFs, sir, I can't think

of any. I know there's been times that we've -- that -- usually

the brown air guys or possibly ourselves, if we're doing it, will

put in the battle space owner's troops afterwards to do the

consequence management piece. And they may go in when there are

still actions still not on the objective, but associated with

the objective going on. But their primary purpose would be the

consequence management after an operation. I can't think of any

RFF in the middle of an operation that we've infilled.

SME-JSOAC: (b)(3),(b)(6) for the employment of the IRF, what's the

process then for LZ selections? Is that retained at the task

force level or does(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cpush you proposed HLZs --

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: I couldn't answer that, sir, in this case. I

know that with everything we did when I was worked with Team(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c
,

sir, they would make a request to our planner. Our planner would

look at it knowing (b)(3),(b)(6) guidance, and say, well, this is

the adjustment I think we need to have. And then they would send

it to me.

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In this case, four and a half kilometer offset was a big mitigator

that, okay, we don't really understand what's happening up there,

but we know there's a lot of activity. This is a four and a half

kilometer offset. The aircraft is already airborne. We did the

check, and saw there were no qalats within 300 meters -- or not

very many qalats was in 300 meters. And they were out past 250

meters, and then brought up to (b)(3),(b)(6) for approval.

So we did do a deliberate thought process with it. But the

immediacy of it, we didn't delve as much as we needed to into

the threat at that location.

SME-MH47: Sir, was there a misunderstanding at this level

about what the intent of IRF was? Was there a thought process

here that the ground force was in distress or --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Not for me -- not at the decision level with

me because I got on the phone and talked to (b)(3),(b)(6) who was

the battalion task force commander there.

My staff brought up they HLZs, and they gave me the general

context of it. I got on the phone and called the battalion task

force commander. I asked them, what do you understand about

what's happening there on the battle field. And the impression

that he gave me was that they had contact at the objective; that

there were squirters moving off to the west and north; and, that

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we wanted to place in, essentially, a blocking force about four

kilometers away at this HLZ.

IO-DEP: For the squirter control?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): For the squirters. And that was my clear

picture as we talked about it. And we talked about what the -- we

talked about the HLZ, the HLZ selection, the squirter and the

contact that was there at the objective. I looked at it from

the big picture on that regard, and then I went on ahead gave

them the approval for use of those HLZs for the insertion.

SME-GFA: Just for clarification, the four and a half

kilometer offset. Is that four and a half k from objective LEFTY

GROVE, right, sir?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Four or four and a half k from the objective.

Not from the infil points. The infil locations were actually

even further away because they were to the south and east. Exfil

was about 600 meters south and east. And infil was about a 1,000

meters if I recall -- 1,200 meters east/south east from the

objective.

IO-DEP: (b)(3), (b)(6) , the ground force commander made the decision,

I think, in consultation with the air mission commander about

putting all of the sof operators on one aircraft.

Can you provide us with your -- one, is that a normal TTP; and,

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what are your thoughts about that? Were you informed of that

or --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) I don't recall being informed that they were

going to go on one aircraft before they went. Had they raised

that to me, I probably would have told them, if that's what the

ground force operator wants, I was okay with it. I would not

have fought that. I wasn't informed of that. At least I don't

recall.

Do you recall if that came up?

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: No, sir. And the numbers we had were different

initially. What had approved for was --

BG Colt: Seventeen.

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: -- seventeen personnel. And they didn't say

if that was [inaudible] or not --

IO-DEP: And that was during the infil to be clear of the

initial assault force on the objective --

BG Colt: Forty-seven was always the first infil. And the

second one was going to be 17. And then it went to 32. And then,

ultimately, it was 38 including crew. So it was going to be 32

on the ground.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. That is -- now, that you have

sparked my memory, 17 is what I recall. And then I recall at

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some point either before or during the infil, someone told me

that they felt 17 wasn't enough, so they were going to bump it

up to 30. And I think that was the last number I was tracking.

But in either case, the power management considerations

are -- one of the key things I look for, obviously, is the power

management consideration as well as the tactical risk and the

accidental risk. From my perspective as the aviator side of this

piece, clearly, one aircraft to me is better than two. That's

half the numbers of landings; that's half the number of targets

in the sky; that's half the number possible brown-outs and

possible hard landings and breaking landing gear.

So from an aviation perspective, I'm comfortable with going in

with one. And as long as the power management is not the issue,

which is the one I would come back if I see an issue there, that's

where I would start to push back, and talk to the commander about,

hey, whether we have the power in the aircraft to take all of

them in one load. I had no concerns about that for this

particular location and going into the Tangi at this time of the

night with a CH47.

We were comfortable with the power margins on it. So while I

was tracking 17 when I initially approved it, had they come up

to me and said, Well, I want to do 30, I would -- I'm pretty --

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IO-DEP: As long as it was supported by the power available

in aircraft, you didn't have an issue.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Absolutely.

BG Colt: Can you describe for me "seats plus"? Isn't that

a policy here.

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. The policy at the brigade level is

that we keep it at 30, and everyone is in a seat and they have

got a seat belt on. Unless there is specific permission that

is required outside of that. That the policy that I have.

BG Colt: Okay.

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: And what they did brief for the seats plus, sir,

when they briefed it, it was going to be seats plus. Everybody

in a seat was going to be buckled in. And those not in a seat

were going to be D'clipped to the bottom of the aircraft. So

if there was anything, they would be secure at their location.

IO-DEP: Okay. Another question: On this particular op,

my understanding is it went into a flight -- it was a flight of

two. At about the three-minute out point, CHALK 2 went into

holding, and lead proceeded in, single ship.

Is that a normal TTP, I mean, to keep one airplane airborne while

the other one goes in?

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: If you're on -- each task force does it a little

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bit differently, sir. I know that my experience out in Jalalabad,

that's what we would do frequently. But that's also based on

the terrain that we have out there. Because it doesn't allow,

in most cases, for two aircraft to land simultaneously. So

that's just how we operate. I would have to defer to those guys

back there about their local TTPs with that.

BG Colt: Another one would be: What was the tactical task

given to CHALK 2? Because you didn't carry pax.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir. The primary purpose for CHALK 2 in

this case would have been escort and escort CHALK 1 because AWT

was already out there. So now, we've got AWF, we have an aircraft

flying single ship from (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cto the target. At a minimum,

obviously, we don't put them out there single ship for

cross-country or moving across the terrain. So at a minimum,

they would have been out there to escort.

BG Colt: Would you say it was a normal TTP given the four

kilometer offset to have the AWT on-site 10-minutes prior?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, are you asking is the 10 minutes prior

a normal TTP as far as clearing an HLZ is concerned and securing

it?

BG Colt: Particularly, given the fact that you had another

deliberate operation already going four kilometers south in the

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same valley.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. I would say being there at some

point in time whether it's 10 minutes or 5 minutes prior is fairly

typical TTP. Ten minutes is our general rule. Five minutes to

clear; and five minutes fudge factor in there to remain on station,

and continue to observe.

Given the fact that the other part of this was ongoing, in close

proximity -- depending on how you look at it, some distance away,

I would say, yes, it was still fairly common.

BG Colt: Has it been a normal TTP to ask for sparkle one

minute prior?

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir. Either a sparkle or a burn. I get

a burn on the LZ from (b)(3),(b)(6) at least another -- I had flown

right by that on a different that night in the valley. And I

saw a burn going on the LZ. I'm not sure which part of the

operation it was. I think it was the initial infil. And you

could clearly see on the night, the C130 is flying around, and

that whole LZ is lit up.

So that is absolutely normal. If we don't have a burn or sparkle,

if we don't have any of those types of assets, we will put IR

rockets out from our Apaches or scouts over the LZ, so we can

actually see the land, and have a better view of the actual LZ

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when we're going in.

BG Colt: And it sounded like in one of the statements that

that was what was planned.

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6) : They were using it. I saw it as I was -- like

I said, I was on another mission --

BG Colt: No. I'm talking about the IR illum.

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6) : I'm not aware of that.

BG Colt: Okay. Anybody else?

SME-MH47: I'm just curious, sir, the rejoin plan. If

aircraft -- I mean, how do they do that? I mean, the lead

aircraft would have had to retrace his inbound and gone back out

and rejoined his play mate. Do they de-conflict by altitude?

Do they turn on their pink lights? How do they rejoin?

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6) : I think that would be on the mission

depending on how they came out on the briefing for that. We have

a specific -- we have a rejoin plan in the SOP. But for that

particular mission, I don't know how they briefed that.

BG Colt: It sounds like the egress plan was to the southeast

directly back right to (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c So we will have to ask them

tomorrow.

SME-CH47: Sir, I have a quick question. When you were

briefed the IRF portion, did you get briefed the routing that

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the aircraft was going to take? It was already up in the air,

but did you get, actually, briefed that or any intel that went

along with that piece?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): I did not. I don't think I got that level of

detail on that brief. I'm pretty comfortable with the planning

capacity at the battalion task force level when it comes to the

en route portion. The battalion task forces are usually, and

I expect in this case, it was nothing different. They are

usually smart about the en route portions of the routes going

in and out. When we get the full CONOP, I always have the routes

that are in there. Very, very rarely have I ever had any issues

with the routes that my task forces have laid out to get in and

out of a target or objective area.

But on this particular case, I did not receive that as part of

that briefing.

SME-NGB: Sir, back to Colorado and Nebraska. When they

came and completed the RIPTOA in addition to the robust

maintenance package that they had, were they fully equipped and

prepared otherwise as far as equipment, NVG sets, things like

that.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): When I spoke about the robust maintenance

package, I was speaking specifically about Kansas. As far as

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Colorado and Nebraska, I don't recall that Colorado/Nebraska had

any particularly strong maintenance package or robust package

that came along with it. I would have to check with my expert.

(b)(3), (b)(6) , do you recall?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): They did not, sir. They came with minimal

again, maybe one or two fuel handlers, and a couple of extra door

gunners, but that was it. It's the Kansas guys that came in with

a detachment, a D Company minus probably 25 -- I can get the

numbers but about 25 soldiers, again, SHOPS guys, avionics

guys --

BG Colt: Did they SPE the airplanes from Kansas to these

other guys? The aircraft stayed?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

BG Colt: Just crews and maintainers swamped.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): It mostly stayed, sir. We have had aircraft

losses. We have had different aircraft that were transitioned

here. Most of the aircraft stayed when crews swapped. But I

want to say -- I can't remember the details between

Colorado/Nebraska.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Did we traditionally wholesale, swap

airplanes out and things like that? To be honest with you, sir,

no, we did not.

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BG Colt: Well, for a RIPTOA of the D models specifically.

I didn't know whether they brought additional airframes when they

TOA'd or they just --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): They didn't bring in any airplanes.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Bravo 2135, sir, did not bring any airframes.

It was, I think originally 52 personnel, and then it changed.

And was, I believe, a total of 61 personnel that came in.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) That was a half company with Hawaii.

BG Colt: Any discerns with the difference of maintenance and

readiness between the two units?

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6) No, sir. The reason I can't say that there is

a discernable difference because we do, I guess, what we call

mix those units together. They’re blended units.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Whenever it comes down to like aircraft

maintenance and things like that, knowledge of the aircraft, they

are actually very good at it. That's kind of, you know, the bread

and butter of what they do back home. They are pretty good when

it comes to that. I can't speak much for the other stuff. But

I can again, about the --

BG Colt: The thought process though of not leaving an empty

nest at least to a RIPTOA where you wind up with completely new

guys. It also guarantees cutting down the ownership and

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maintenance processes so that you don't have a discernable dip

after TOA, or somebody doesn't go out the door leaving somebody

with, you know, a depleted bank and a situation. And now the

guy is trying to start up building his reputation from a hole.

So I think that's all thoughtful.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, we have wrestled with that question.

Speaking personally, I'm a big person when it comes to teamwork

and building a team. And it is not lost on me at all, as I have

this discussion with the incoming unit, with the task force

commanders. The whole concept of breaking an organization and

split them up, and you lose that synergy that comes along with

it.

That is the downside, you know, we recognize that. I personally

recognize that very clearly. But I also recognize that

continuity and that the op-tempo and the demands of this flight

require a certain level of knowledge that if you turn around,

and you take all the players off of this FOB and put a whole bunch

of new ones there, you are taking an operational risk for missions

there for one to two months. That could be extremely --

BG Colt: You know a commentary, because of the dissimilarity

between F and the active component D, really, the only guys that

can bear this burden of that, having a mixed team are reserve

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component guys rights now. We wouldn't do that to ourselves.

We wouldn't take home a genius unit, break it apart, and apply

it to another F model unit probably, right?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I'm not sure if I would agree with that.

Because we've done, pretty much, what we've done with the AH64s

here as well. We have -- I have a pair on three FOBs. Each FOB

has a pair or AWT that was dedicated against the IRF package.

And they are offset from the rest of the AWTs. I will give you

an example -- actually it's at four FOBs.

At (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c
, my task force (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c is there, and he's got an

Apache company, Bravo from 4th Company was with for the whole

fight. When we arrived, there were four Apache aviators and two

aircraft that belonged to RC North that had originally landed

there because they were part of the RFF to provide support for

.
(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c So those crews were there.

The rest of the battalion task force ripped out; ripped in with

my guys. And I had two Apache crews that were there who provided

a tremendous amount of transitional risk mitigation for the rest

of new Apache crews that were on the ground.

Because what could I do with those guys at that point? What you

could do is you can take that experienced PZ, fly him with that

junior PI over here, and go out and execute a mission. And take

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that junior PI and put him with the experienced PC with my guy

coming. In you going to automatically have that infusion of area

knowledge that comes into the mix.

Tremendous risk mitigators, and something that the guys found

very, very powerful. And that happened at Jalalabad, at ,

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

and at(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c
. That is something the offset of the aviation units

coming through here, I think, gives us the ability to do that.

And the only way you get around that is you accept if you want

the same op-tempo or you either accept an increased risk. Or

you conversely decrease the op-tempo. Which becomes, obviously,

a question that has to be deal between us as the supporting unit,

a risk unit with the customer on the ground, which is all CJTF,

all the BCTs,(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cand everyone else.

And that's the other answer is, Hey, we just did an aviation rip,

let's take a decrease in our op-tempo for three weeks or a month,

while we get everybody really spun up on the --

BG Colt: Right.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): -- [inaudible] and get back up. That's the

trade off --

BG Colt: Sure. I can see that.

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6): -- absolutely what we struggle with. So going

back to when you pointed about the Fox [inaudible] essentially,

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we do that right now with Longbow Package. I have got six crews

that are all over this battle space that are not with their own

organization.

We feel in on that. We decided to keep that. We're going to

do with 82d CAB. When (b)(3), (b)(6) (ph) comes in he's going

to have that two, two and two on the AH64s. And he may reorganize

and consolidate that company again, and structure things so it's

a little bit different. But I feel very strongly that that is

a powerful --

BG Colt: [inaudible] techniques that we do that with, even

in the right/seat, left/seat as far as that?

10th CAB :
(b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir. It's almost like an extended

left/seat, right seat. But it does come with a cost of TACSOP,

knowing the crews, commander has these two crews on the ground

that he's got to get to know, and understand what their strengths

and weaknesses are, so he can make the proper decision for risk

mitigation.

There is no perfect answer. There's an upside and downside in

taking that choice. And that's where I have sat in terms of

setting that approach here RC East. We thought about pulling

those attributes back together. We thought about taking that

half a company of Hawaii and put them on one spot, so he's got

SECRET
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this Hawaii half company.

But in this operational environment, I think of that as -- my

personal judgment of that is taking an increased risk in terms

of the operation.

BG Colt: Okay. That's valid.

SME-JSOAC: What are your two 47 Fox locations would have

been down there?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c . The two are extreme.

In , they fly a half mission down in

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c for(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c
.

SME-NGB: Sir, just one last question: The reserve

component guys, are they coming in fully RL1 qualified, day/night

NVG? Are there any training issues when they get here, or -- and,

I guess, equipment shortages. Are that are equipment shortages

that are significant?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6)

: Let me ask ESP to go ahead and talk about the

training readiness.

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6) : This is kind of a prickly subject for us.

But for the most part, they bring crews in who are day/night NVG

RL1 on paper. However, if you look at the numbers they have as

far as experience level, goggles, the killer for us -- I don't

want to use that term lightly. But the worse part here is the

fact they have very limited NVG experience.

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You might have a guy who's a 4,000 hour SP, with 200 hours of

goggles. We have a 10,000 hour pilot with 100 hours of goggles.

That's not doing us any favors here in theater when it comes

to -- if you fly goggles, you can do anything. If you can do

day, you can't necessarily do goggles.

So to answer your question, yes. On paper, they are, for most

part, where they belong, where they need to be on RL1 NVG. But

in the reality, when it comes to mission execution in this theater,

a lot of their aviators are not at that level to be able to do

that.

As far as equipment goes, I haven't seen as shortages. They come

with the same equipment as everybody else. We did have one small

issue. The unit from Kansas did not deploy with their HUDs,

their Heads-up Devices for their goggles. They had to get sent

back and forward because we require all of our aviators to use

those regardless of airframe, whether a 58D, obviously, the

Apaches do it. But or 60s and 64s, it's a requirement to fly

with HUD on all missions. And if you don't have it, then the

battalion task force has to approve that mission.

SME-NGB: You know it was that because they don't train with

it --

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6) : They don't train with it. We've had

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experiences with -- whether it was from Hawaii, or whether it

was Washington/Oregon or whether it was from Kansas, and I can't

speak to the Nebraska/Colorado piece because I was off on one

of my trips to another unit when they came through here, whether

they were qualified.

Not hardly any of them have used it. Most of them have never

used it. But what we found out is when we forced them to use

it, they don't want to fly without it. It becomes kind of a force

multiplier. They like the situational awareness that it brings.

So it's not being trained at the home stations.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Now, with that said on the aggregate of

training, we also recognize that within that organization, while

they all come up and they all say, We are day/night RL1 NVG, the

reality is that not all are there; however, there are always some.

There are quite a few of them that have in been here on deployments

before. I want to say, when we were here with Washington and

Oregon, that unit had been in this theater with this brigade back

in 2006 with the Falcon Brigade. And they still had a number

of aviators that had combat experience from that.

So every unit that comes in here has a certain capacity of

individuals who have deployed and have pretty decent experience.

They might need to shake the rust off a little bit, but they have

SECRET
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 SECRET

been out here and been in the fight before.

But on paper, it says "100 percent," and it's not. So what we

find ourselves going back to your question on crew selection,

that's where the task force commander has to dig in, understand

the individual capacities, and then put them on the proper

mission.

As (b)(3), (b)(6) has mentioned, we have an aviator that has 10,000 total

hours, but he was a daytime -- we keep him on daytime only

missions. He's a great American. I'm confident that he is.

I'm confident he's got great skills. But he's got 100 hours of

goggle time. He will not be flying goggle missions any time

soon.

So we have to get into that level of knowledge on the individuals

that come. And there are some individuals who come with a

tremendous amount of skill. But it's not on paper what you think

it is on paper, or what he thinks it is on paper when we receive

it [sic]. And that's gotta be something that clearly

recognized.

IO-DEP: The skill set or experience level of the pilot and

co-pilot. Do you know that handy?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

IO-DEP: I just want for your opinion, if you think that's

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 SECRET

consistent -- basically, the PC is very low experience; however,

it looks like there's potentially some risk mitigation by a very,

very experienced co-pilot on this particular mission.

I want to determine if this is getting at the core of what you

are discussing --

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: Yes.

IO-DEP: -- about on paper versus -- or in qualifications or

currency versus proficiency.

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: This particular aircraft, the pilot in command

was a , three years out of flight school, 672 hours of total

(b)(3), (b)(6)

time, 99 hours of combat time, 588 CH-47 Delta time. 156 hours

of goggle time, and only 46 hours of TC time. He was, essentially,

a brand new PZ appointment within the last 30 days or so. He

was our reserve guy, Bravo 7158, and he was paired up with a (b)(3), (b)(6)

Bravo 2/135, who was a CH47 Delta Fox SPIE; total time 4,600 hours,

719 combat time, 30 hours in danger. All his combat in the danger

time were in CH47, and he had deployed OIF in 2006.

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6) : He had his goggle experience on there?

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: It's 700 hours.

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6) : Okay. He's a high time -- I would say that

(b)(3), (b)(6) was a high-time goggle PC for what we are getting in

the guard. Most of our guard PICs with 3 to 4,000 hours have

SECRET
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 SECRET

2 to 300 hours of goggles, maybe ten percent of the time. He's

a little bit different on the high-side.

I have flown with (b)(3), (b)(6) on a few missions before when I

was down at Task Force (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c . The way I understand it, he

was relatively new to the Team (b)(3), (b)(6) or(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cmission, because

when they ripped in, the Hawaii guys, Bravo 1/171, still had that

mission, and they were mostly doing it. Now, he was the

replacement for that as they ripped out.

I found (b)(3), (b)(6) to be a very competent aviator for his hour

level. I had no questions with what he did. But from what I

saw, these hours, they speak typically of that grade experience

level. And through the (b)(3), (b)(6) side, it's actually lower.

We have got guys with, you know -- show up with 50 or 60 hours

of goggle time in theater, and then try not to put them on goggle

missions unless FOB to FOB type of, you know, support type stuff

until they build some time. Does that answer your question, sir?

IO-DEP: Yeah. Very much so. Thank you. That was very

helpful.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): It was not necessarily common at all to have

a PC at that hour level come back to a little more fidelity on

it. But as you mentioned, one of the keepers [inaudible] was

who he was flying with --

SECRET
Page 771
 SECRET

BG Colt: Sure.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): -- it was (b)(3), (b)(6) , clearly, a very

experienced aviator. And while he was new to the theater and

to the mission, the intent was that he was rapidly going to become

one of the PCs that was going to be flying with Team (b)(3), (b)(6) .

So, again, Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) had flown a number of Team (b)(3),(b)(6) missions

already, understood the planning cycle [inaudible]. And that's

why they had the two of them together -- paired together both

of them are mitigating the cockpit experience perspective, as

well as having to hand this mission off fairly quickly to -- and

getting (b)(3), (b)(6) into the mix as a high-time SP that would be

flying in the mission set.

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6) : Correction, sir, (b)(3),(b)(6) has the ERAW for

the actual mission up there. It shows (b)(3), (b)(6) had just over

4,300 and 1,400 hours of goggles, which is pretty typical with

what you see for an active duty (b)(3), (b)(6) at this point in time. ]

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: I knew the S-3 down there, (b)(6), (b)(3),(b)(6) He

just couldn't speak enough about (b)(3), (b)(6) before this happened.

Every time he talked about (b)(3), (b)(6) , he was impressed with

him. He spoke really high of (b)(3), (b)(6) and his abilities down

there.

Unknown Speaker: Sir, I personally flew in the jump seat

SECRET
Page 772
 SECRET

with (b)(3), (b)(6) as one of the crew members onboard the aircraft

on a mission probably three to four weeks prior to this. I was

very impressed by his maturity and his skill in the cockpit.

IO-DEP: Thanks for your help.

BG Colt: Anybody else.

SME-GFA: Sir, the three hour planning cycle begins with the

target on the ground -- the grid on the ground. Is that where

that begins?

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6): I'm sure if I can define that clearly. That's

at three hours from notice, but I'm not sure we specified that.

10th CAB(b)(3), (b)(6)

: We recognize it, and we would get the release

for a CONOP from (b)(3), (b)(6) . At that point is when we say, Okay, now

you have told us what the mission is, now the time.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): If I may, a couple questions that you asked

me before, I will give you this order, and I can get it to in

digits as well. This is the IJC order dated 30 November 2010.

Which basically specifies some of the command and control

relationships with regards to(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cand our conventional forces.

It also lays out the three-hour planning time constraint for us.

It also covers the other question you asked about, the crews.

It does not specify the 1.5 crew ratio. It just says,

"associated crews" in the order.

SECRET
Page 773
 SECRET

So it does lay those things out very clearly as a direct support

relationship, as a three-hour planning time constraint. And

that the number of aircraft and associated crews at specific

locations. You are welcome to that. It's kind of marked up a

little bit.

IO-DEP: Thanks. I haven't read it yet, but I was told about

it.

BG Colt: Anybody else?

Negative response by all members.

BG Colt: I appreciate your time tremendously.

[END OF PAGE]

SECRET
Page 774
 Log Refresh in 39 sec.
SECRET
|
Log Name: 05- Period From: 8/5/2011 1:26:00 Period
06AUG2011 AM To:
Font Size /
SIGACT? Zulu Time Entry Initials

OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0105Z: KD36R:

09Aug2011 RQST AIRDROP HAVE 30 PACKS OF
235
0105Z WATER,15 PACKS OF MRE'S. ALSO DO
NOT NEED MORE 5590 BATTERIES
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0035Z: KD36R:
09Aug2011
234 RCVD CURRENT CRYPTO, WILL ROLL
0036Z
ATT
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0018Z: KD36R:
THE AIRDROP AT 0630Z CAN USE THE
09Aug2011 SAME LZ AS THE PREVIOUS DROP.
233
0020Z REQUEST ALSO SEND SUGAR FREE
RIPITS, COFFEE SHOTS AND
COPENHAGEN LONGCUT
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2317Z: KD36R:
RQST MRE'S, WATER, 15 MBITR
08Aug2011
232 BATTERIES AND 4 152 BATTERIES,
(b)(3), (b)(6)

2317Z
FOR THE NEXT AIRDROP AT APPROX
1000Z
TF (b)(3), (b)(6) OBJ

08Aug2011
231
2259Z
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)
08Aug2011
230
2208Z

Page 775
 (b)(3), (b)(6)

08Aug2011
229 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)
2155Z

(b)(3), (b)(6)
08Aug2011
228
2153Z
(b)(3), (b)(6)

08Aug2011
227
2141Z

OBJ (b)(1)1.4a
: 2031Z: KD36:
WILL LOOK TO REMAIN IN PLACE AND
EXFIL TOMORROW NIGHT WITH THE (b)(3), (b)(6)
POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY OF
WALKING OUT WITH THE BSO IF THEY
PUSH BACK TO SAYAD ABAD
08Aug2011 TOMORROW. ELEMENT HAS MINIMAL
226
2041Z ASSETS, SUPPORT AND NOT WELL
RESTED. NOT RECOMMENDING TO
PUSH OUT ON LONG MOVEMENTS
ATT. WILL REMAIN IN PLACE AND
PUSH OUT AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY TOMORROW NIGHT OR
WITH BSO.
(b)(3), (b)(6)

08Aug2011
225 (b)(3), (b)(6)(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
2037Z

Page 776
 OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2017Z: KD36:
08Aug2011
224 WILL COME UP ON THE NET WITH REC
2018Z
ON EXFIL
(b)(3), (b)(6)

08Aug2011
223
2005Z

(b)(3), (b)(6)

08Aug2011
222
1959Z

(b)(3), (b)(6)

08Aug2011
221
1956Z

08Aug2011
(b)(3), (b)(6)

220
1954Z
(b)(3), (b)(6)

08Aug2011 (b)(3), (b)(6)

219
1953Z (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

08Aug2011 (b)(3), (b)(6)

218
1953Z
08Aug2011 (b)(3), (b)(6)
217
1953Z
(b)(3), (b)(6)
08Aug2011
216
1951Z
(b)(3), (b)(6)

08Aug2011
215
1950Z

(b)(3), (b)(6)
08Aug2011
214
1928Z
213 08Aug2011 (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 777
 1918Z
(b)(3), (b)(6)
08Aug2011
212
1917Z (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

08Aug2011 (b)(3), (b)(6)

211
1917Z
08Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1631Z: KD36:
210
1831Z RQST UPDATE ON WX

08Aug2011
(b)(3), (b)(6)

209 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

1806Z (b)(3), (b)(6)

OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1525Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :

08Aug2011 REC TO SIT TIGHT AND WAIT FOR WX
208
1525Z TO CLEAR AT 2000Z OR DP FOR OBJ
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: OBJ LEFTY

GROVE PR: 1453Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) : ETA ON
08Aug2011
207 BREAKING ON WX FROM JBAD AND A
1454Z
POSSIBLE DIFFERENT LIFT PACKAGE (b)(3), (b)(6)

FROM SHARANA
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1440Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
08Aug2011 UNDERSTAND THE 3 COAS AND WILL
206
1441Z COME BACK ON THE NET IN NEXT 5
MIKES FOR RECOMMENDATION
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1400Z: (b)(3), (b)(6)
SUMMIT 15 TOOK MULTIPLE
PICTURES, VAST MAJORITY OF ITEMS
08Aug2011 WENT WITH BSO AND WE HAVE MISC
205
1405Z ITEMS SUCH AS SURPRESSORS
RADIOS AND OTHER SENSITIVE
ITEMS. WILL PASS THEM OFF AT
EXFIL
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1330Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
BSO ELEMENT IN SECURITY
08Aug2011
204 POSITION. USING ALL THERMITE
1332Z
GRENADES FROM BSO AND (b)(3), (b)(6)
ELEMENT AND (b)(3), (b)(6) ON

Page 778
 BRAVO AND CHARLIE. WILL TAKE
PHOTOS WHEN ABLE
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1300Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
SITE BRAVO CONTINUES TO BURN, AT
CULMINATION POINT. SHOULD BE
ABLE TO MOVE MOST ALL PIECES OUT
AFTER A FEW CUTS TOMORROW.
FINAL BIP ON CHARLIE COMPLETE,
GOOD EFFECTS, SEVERAL LARGE
08Aug2011
203 PORTIONS LEFT THAT STILL REQUIRE
1305Z
TORCH FOR CUTTING TOMORROW,
EST A FEW HRS WORK. CONFIRMED
WITH AWT, DOES NOT LOOK LIKE WX
WILL BE AN ISSUE FOR EXFIL.
INTEND TO PUSH OUT @1500Z AND
MAKE MOVEMENT TO EXFIL HLZ TO
BE PREPARED FOR 1545 EXFIL
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
08Aug2011
202 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)
1241Z (b)(3), (b)(6)

OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1239Z: KD36R:

08Aug2011
201 FROM (b)(3), (b)(6) , THEY NO LONGER
1239Z
NEED CDS RESUPPLY
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1211Z: KD36R:
COMPLETED ASSESSMENT ALL
WRECKAGE SITES. ALPHA, DELTA AND
ECHO 100% COMPLETE. BRAVO 85%,
CURRENTLY BURNING REMNANTS AND
BELIEVE WE CAN BURN IT TO THE
08Aug2011
200 GROUND AND PICK UP ANY
1217Z
REMAINDERS. CHARLIE 40-50%,
THERE ARE STILL SEVERAL LARGE
PIECES. WELDERS ARE BINGO ON O2
AND ARE DONE FOR THE DAY. CAN
TRY MORE DEMO SHOTS BUT DO NOT
BELIEVE THEY WILL BE EFFECTIVE.

Page 779
 SECURITY WILL BE HANDED OVER TO
BSO AT 1330Z AT WHICH POINT (b)(1)1.4a
ELEMENT WILL PULL OFF SECURITY
POSITIONS. ATT ALL LOCATIONS
HAVE BEEN STERILIZED. AF WILL BE
PREPPED FOR EXFIL AT NIGHTFALL.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1005Z: (b)(1)1.4a
WRECKAGE SITES ALPHA, DELTA, AND
ECHO ARE 100%. BRAVO AND
CHARLIE STILL BEING WORKED BY
WELDER W/ TORCH. ATT NO OTHER
08Aug2011 PIECES TO BE MOVED. BSO TIED IN
199
1008Z FOR SECURITY, THEY ARE GOING
DOWN FOR A FEW HOURS. AT 1330Z
BSO WILL ASSUME SECURITY AND
(b)(3), (b)(6) ELEMENT WILL PULL OFF LINES.

WILL COME BACK UP IN 1HR WITH

SITREP
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0909Z: KD36:
CURSORY SSE COMPLETE. NSTR BOTH
COMPOUNDS. 2 FEATHERS AND MALE
CHARGER FROM SEPERATE
COMPOUNDS STATE THAT MAMS DO
NOT LIVE HERE. NEITHER ARE
(b)(3), (b)(6)

08Aug2011
198 CLAIMING IED INITIATOR FOUND
0912Z
NEAR COMPOUND. WILL GIVE
INFORMATION TO BSO FOR
EXPLOITATION. INTEND TO RE-
CONSOLIDATE WITH BSO AT
SECURITY POSITIONS, AND BSO TAKE
THE LEAD IN SECURITY POSITIONS.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0906Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
TQ/SSE COMPLETE BLDG 999, NSTR.
PUSHED TO ADJACENT COMPOUND
08Aug2011
197 THAT WAS EMPTY. (b)(3), (b)(6) ENTERED
0907Z
TO CLEAR AND (b)(3), (b)(6) BACK
CLEARED. CLEAR AND SECURE.
CONDUCTING SSE ATT. CALLING

Page 780
 BLDG 998.
08Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0853Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
196
0853Z COMPOUND 999, CLEAR AND SECURE
08Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0844Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
195
0844Z FALCONS ENTERING TO CLEAR.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0841Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
08Aug2011
194 CONTAINMENT SET ON COMPOUND.
0841Z
INITIATING CALLOUT.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0840Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
08Aug2011 MOVING TO CONDUCT SSE ON
193
0841Z COMPOUND, CALLING IT BLDG 999.
ETA 2 MIKES TO COMPOUND.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0833Z: K(b)(3), (b)(6) :
SECURITY RIP COMPLETE WITH (b)(3), (b)(6)
08Aug2011
192 . CONSOLIDATING AF NOW, WILL
(b)(3), (b)(6)

0835Z
MOVE OUT SHORTLY. JOLT WILL BE
TRACKING AF MOVEMENT
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: (b)(3), (b)(6) : GRID (b)(3), (b)(6)
OF COMPOUND INTENDING TO SSE:
42S VC 80137 64646. WILL PUSH AN
ASSET OVERHEAD AND HAVE THEM
CHECK IT OUT. INTEND TO MOVE 28
08Aug2011
191 PAX (INCLUDING (b)(1)1.4a,
7 (b)(1)1.4c) TO SSE
0813Z
COMPOUND. ONCE (b)(3), (b)(6)

BACKFILLS ALL SECURITY POSITIONS,

WILL GATHER (b)(1)1.4a SITE,
THEN ONLY APPROX 50-75M TO
COMPOUND.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0805Z: (b)(3), (b)(6)
SEVERAL MINS AGO, SECURIT
ELEMENT FOUND PIPE BOMB IN A BAG
EXTERIOR TO A COMPOUND NEAR
08Aug2011 THEIR LOCATION. CALLED EOD TO
190
0809Z INVESTIGATE AND THEY DETERMINED
THAT IT WAS AN IED INITIATOR.
THROUGH TQ WITH CHARGER AT
COMPOUND, ASKED WHERE IS
FATHER IS AT, ALSO SPOKE WITH

Page 781
 ELDER FEATHER WHO CLAIMED THAT
HER HUSBAND CAME IN 3 DAYS AGO
FOR A MEAL THEN LEFT WITH 10
OTHER MAMS. THAT TIMELINE LINES
UP WITH WHEN THE HELICOPTER
WAS SHOT DOWN. BELIEVE THAT
WITH IED INITIATOR OUTSIDE
COMPOUND IT WOULD BE WORTH
SENDING ELEMENT TO CONDUCT SSE
ON COMPOUND LED BY .
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

COMPOUND APPROX 50-75M OFF

WADI. (b)(3), (b)(6) IN CONCURRENCE
AND LOOKING TO PUSH THERE TO
CONDUCT LED SSE ONCE
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SECURITY RIP IS COMPLETE

OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0748Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
(b)(3), (b)(6) ELEMENT ON GROUND (35
PAX) CONDUCTING RIP WITH (b)(3), (b)(6)
ELEMENT FOR SECURITY. WILL
INSERT THEM INTO PROPER
LOCATIONS TO ENSURE SECURITY
AROUND CRASH SITE. MOVEMENT OF
CRASH SITE MATERIALS ONGOING:
SITE ALPHA 90% COMPLETE, BRAVO
75% COMPLETE, CHARLIE 45% STILL
08Aug2011 SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURES THERE,
189
0752Z DELTA 50% STILL SEVERAL LARGE
PORTIONS INTACT, ECHO 100%
COMPLETE. ATT BSO HAS SEVERAL
WELDERS ONSITE BREAKING DOWN (b)(3), (b)(6)

STRUCTURES FOR MOVEMENT. BSO

WORKING SOLUTION TO GET MORE
SUPPLIES FOR WELDERS.
UNDERSTAND BSO/ (b)(3), (b)(6)

RESUPPLY MOVING TO THE RIGHT.

WILL ADVISE WHEN COMPLETE WITH
RIP FOR SECURITY POSITIONS.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0627Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
188 08Aug2011 (b)(3), (b)(6) SUPPLY REQUEST; 30

Page 782
 0627Z CASES MRE'S, 2 PALLETS OF WATER.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0557Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
CONTINUING WITH DESTRUCTION OF
WRECKAGE AT ALL SITES INTO
SMALLER PIECES FOR MOVEMENT TO
BSO TRUCKS. SITE ALPHA IS APPROX
90% COMPLETE. CURRENTLY
CONDUCTING DEMO ON SITE BRAVO,
THE LARGE STRUCTURES ARE BEING
WORKED ON BY WELDER W/ TORCH.
STILL WORKING ON CHARLIE WHERE
THERE ARE STILL LARGE PIECES AND
IT IS A CHALLENGE TO BREAK INTO
SMALLER PIECES. SITE DELTA
CONTAINED MORE WRECKAGE THAN
ANTICIPATED, DISCOVERED LARGE
PORTION OF AIRCRAFT FLOOR
SUBMERGED 1-2' DEEP IN MUD
UNDER WATER. CONTINUING TO DIG
08Aug2011
187 IN THAT LOCATION AS WELL AS
0614Z
(b)(3), (b)(6)

CONFIGURING MULTIPLE PULLEY

SYSTEMS WITH CSAR, ALSO
CONDUCTING MULTIPLE DEMO
STRIKES. BELIEVE A MORE
MANAGEABLE SOLUTION IS BEING
ACHIEVE THERE BUT EXPECT SLOW
GOING. WAS ABLE TO RETRIEVE
SHOVELS FROM BSO ROUTE
CLEARANCE PACKAGE THAT ARE
ASSISTING IN CLEARING THAT
LOCATION. SITE ECHO, ALL PIECES
FROM ECHO HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO
SMALLER MANAGEABLE PIECES AND
ARE CURRENTLY STAGED ON THE
BRIDGE AWAITING TRANSPORT.
(b)(3), (b)(6)
WILL LIKELY REQUEST
CDS DROP, WORKING ON GETTING
NUMBERS FROM THEM.

Page 783
 08Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0521Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
186
0521Z BIP COMPLETE SITE D.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0505Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
08Aug2011 ELEM TORCHING B AND C SITES.
185
0505Z CONDUCTING BIP ON D SITE IN
APPOX 10 MIKES.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0410Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
08Aug2011
184 BIP COMPLETE SITE A. TRYING
0410Z
MOVE SITE D OUT OF THE WADI
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0311Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
BIP COMPLETE LOCATION C. ALSO
08Aug2011
183 TORCHING LOCATION B.
0312Z
CONSOLIDATION OF RESUPPLY
COMPLETE.
08Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0206Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
182
0206Z AIR RESUPPLY COMPLETE
08Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0204Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
181
0204Z EYES ON AIRDROP (b)(3), (b)(6)

OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0145Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :

08Aug2011
180 AIR RESUPPLY WILL BE COMMING IN
0145Z
SHORTLY
07Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2239Z: ALL
179
2239Z ASSETS PUSHED TO TF (b)(3), (b)(6) SAT
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2231Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
REQUESTED SUPPLIES FOR AIR
RESUPPLY: 15x CASES MRE, 15x
07Aug2011 CASES WATER, 15x MBTR BATTERIES
178
2231Z (CHARGED), 4x 152 BATTERIES
(CHARGED, CRITICAL FOR MAINTAIN
AIR COMMS), 2x BOXES CLIF SHOTS
OR OTHER CAFFEINE PRODUCT
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2147Z:
UPDATE ON MISSION STATUS:
07Aug2011 FORCES ON GROUND WILL BE
177
2147Z EXTENDED 24 HOURS. RESUPPLY
WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE MORNING.
(b)(3), (b)(6)
WILL VISIT SITE IN THE

Page 784
 MORNING.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1846Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
SITES ALPHA AND DELTA HAVE BEEN
CUT DOWN TO SCRAP METAL.
NOTHING RECONIZABLE. APPROX 5
OR 6 TRUCK LOADS. DELTA MIGHT
NEED ADDL DEMO. CONDUCTED
SEARCH OF WADI FOR ADDL
MATERIALS FROM SITE ECHO WHICH
07Aug2011
176 WAS WASHED OUT BY FLOOD
1857Z
WATERS. GOOD SECURITY ON SITE.
NO SIG MOVMENT. HAD REPORTS ON
ICOM OF SEVERAL MAMS MOVING TO
HIGH TERRIAN WITH MACHINE GUNS.
NOTHING SEEN ATT. BSO ETA 2130
TOT. CONDUCT HANDOVER AND
MOVE TO EXFIL HLZ. COMING UP ON
NET EVERY 30 MIKES FOR UPDATE.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1605Z: KD36:
RQST UPDATE ON BSO AND SP TIME.
RQST THE OTHER ELEMENTS TAKE
07Aug2011
175 CHARGE OF CRASH SITE SO WE CAN
1608Z
EXFIL BEFORE BMNT. WILL BE UP ON
(b)(3), (b)(6)
THE NET EVERY 30 MIKES FOR
UPDATE
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1324Z: KD36R:
07Aug2011
174 TRACKING MOVEMENT ACROSS WADI
1324Z
NEAR SITE ALPHA.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1308Z: KD36:
GETTING A LOT OF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

FROM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : SEVERAL UIM

07Aug2011
173 REPORTING TO EACH OTHER TO GRAB
1313Z
MACHINE GUNS AND GATHER ON
HIGH GROUND TO ATTACK AF AT
HELICOPTERS
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1305Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
07Aug2011
172 CONFIRM 53 PAX FOR EXFIL.
1312Z
UNDERSTAND (b)(3), (b)(6) ARE NOT

Page 785
 EXFILLING WITH (b)(3), (b)(6) ELEMENT.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1301Z: (b)(3), (b)(6)
GOOD EFFECTS ON SECOND
CONTROLLED EXPLOSIVE
DETSTRUCTION. STILL HAVE SOME
VERY LARGE PORTIONS FROM DELTA.
HAVE CULMINATED ALL EXPLOSIVE
FROM BOTH EOD ELEMENTS.
WRECKAGE AT ALPHA IS PROBABLY
THE MOST MANAGEABLE BUT STILL
HAS LARGE PORTIONS THAT WILL BE
07Aug2011 DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT EVEN WITH
171
1312Z SEVERAL PERSONNEL. POSITIONS
BRAVO AND CHARLIE STILL HAVE
VERY LARGE PORTIONS RELATIVELY
UNTOUCHED. ATT HAVE CULMINATED
WITH ALL ATTEMPTS TO DESTROY
AND REDUCE WRECKAGE FOR
MOVEMENT. STANDING BY FOR
SECURITY ATT. STILL HAVE 1 PLT
FROM BSO OUT HERE, PRIMARILY TO
THE NORTH. LOOKING FOR GUIDANCE
ON EXFIL PLAN.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1254Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6)
REASONING FOR CANCEL OF (b)(3), (b)(6)
07Aug2011
170 INFIL, (b)(3), (b)(6) PICKED UP(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
1256Z (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
"GET ALL THE MACHINE
GUNS READY"
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1250Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
07Aug2011
169 CONTROLLED EXPLOSIVE
1254Z
DESTRUCTION OF DEBRIS COMPLETE.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1249Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
07Aug2011
168 1 MIN TO CONTROLLED EXPLOSIVE
1254Z
DESTRUCTION OF DEBRIS SITE DELTA
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1240Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
07Aug2011 INFIL OF (b)(3), (b)(6) HAS BEEN
167
1242Z CANCELLED. TF (b)(3), (b)(6) HAVING
AIRCRAFT ISSUES.

Page 786
 07Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1238Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
166
1239Z 5 MIN TO (b)(3), (b)(6) INFIL
07Aug2011
165 1210Z: VMR: HAT23 RTB
1211Z
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1204Z: KD36R:
BSO PUSHING SMALL ELEMENT TO
07Aug2011
164 CONDUCT LINK UP AND PROVIDE
1204Z
SECURITY FOR (b)(3), (b)(6) INFIL SITE.
ETA APPROX 20 MIKES
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1152Z: KD36:
PRETTY GOOD EFFECTS USING 60+
BLOCKS OF C4 AT SITE ALPHA. STILL
HAVE SOME LARGE PIECES BUT WILL
OBLY BE SLIGHTLY MORE
07Aug2011 MANAGEABLE. LOOKING TO PUSH
163
1156Z DOWN WADI FOR REMAINING DEBRIS
AT POSITION DELTA. WILL ATTEMPT
TO LINK UP WITH PATROL ELEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

TO THE NORTH TO SEE IF THEY ARE

ABLE TO MOVE AND SECURE (b)(3), (b)(6)
HLZ.
(b)(3), (b)(6)

OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1146Z: (b)(3), (b)(6)

08Jul2011
162 CONTROLLED EXPLOSIVE
1148Z
DESTRUCTION OF DEBRIS COMPLETE
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1145Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
07Aug2011 2 MIN TO CONTROLLED EXPLOSIVE
161
1146Z DESTRUCTION OF DEBRIS AT CRASH
SITE ALPHA
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1123Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
ABOUT TO CONDUCT SEVERAL
DETONATIONS WITH EOD. WILL
COMPILE AS MUCH DEBRIS AS
07Aug2011 POSSIBLE AND WILL START WITH
160
1131Z SITE ALPHA. UNDERSTAND (b)(3), (b)(6)

LOOKING TO INFIL, REQ INFIL

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

. AF HAS LOCATION SECURED.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

WILL MARK WITH SMOKE, MONITOR

Page 787
 74.5 VIA (b)(3), (b)(6) WHO WILL TALK
IN BIRD. WITH (b)(6), (b)(3) AND BSO
OFF SITE, AF IS STRETCHED TOO
THIN TO SECURE PREVIOUSLY
SUGGESTED INFIL LOCATION
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1049Z: ETA
07Aug2011
159 1HR TO INFIL OF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)
1050Z (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1026Z: (b)(3), (b)(6)

UPDATE TO NUMBER OF PAX FOR
07Aug2011
158 EXFIL. MORTUARY AFFAIRS AND
1027Z
CRASH INVESTIGATION TEAM LEFT
WITH BSO, TOTAL PAX NOW 74
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1016Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
TRACKING FROM (b)(3), (b)(6) :
LOOKING TO EXFIL IN NEXT 15-20
MIKES. WILL GAF OUT WITH ALL VICS
AND PAX AND 4 TRUCKS OF DEBRIS,
07Aug2011
157 WILL DOWNLOAD THEN RESET AND
1018Z (b)(3), (b)(6)

HEAD BACK OUT. UNDERSTAND IT

WILL MOST LIKELY BE SEVERAL HR
MOVEMENT EACH WAY. WILL
CONTINUE TO SECURE AREA WITH
PATHFINDER ELEMENT.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0825Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
CONDUCTED LINK UP W/ (b)(3), (b)(6) ,
PASSED ALL INFO FROM (b)(3), (b)(6) &
REGARDING GBU STRIKES ON
(b)(3), (b)(6)

ALPHA AND BRAVO, (b)(3), (b)(6) IS

COMFORTABLE WITH THAT AND WILL
07Aug2011 CONFIRM FINAL CLEARANCE.
156
0831Z CONSOLIDATED RECOMMENDATION
FROM CRASH SITE IS 2X FA FROM
AWT ON SITE CHARLIE TO MITIGATE
ANY DAMAGE TO NEARBY QALATS.
(b)(3), (b)(6) IS WORKING SOLUTION
TO GET MORE TRUCKS ON LOCATION
TO HAUL DEBRIS.

Page 788
 OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0811Z: KD36:
(b)(3), (b)(6) FLYING BY FOLLOWED BY
(b)(3), (b)(6) FOR KINETIC AND TALKED
THEM ONTO CRASH SITE LOCATION
AND DEBRIEFED THEM. (b)(3), (b)(6) IS
COMFORTABLE WITH ALPHA AND
BRAVO ENGAGEMENT SITES, BUT HAS
SOME CONCERN WITH POSSIBLE
DAMAGE TO QALAT IVO ENGAGEMENT
SITE CHARLIE APPROX 75M AWAY.
STANDING BY AND WORKING WITH
(b)(3), (b)(6) FOR CLEARANCE ON
ALPHA AND BRAVO, WORKING OTHER
SOLUTIONS FOR CHARLIE. IN THE
MEANTIME WILL CONTINUE CUTTING
AND HAND CARRYING OUT ALL
PIECES THEY POSSESS, BE ADVISED
07Aug2011
155 THERE ARE CURRENTLY ONLY 4 (b)(3), (b)(6)

0819Z
TRUCKS ON LOCATION WHICH WILL
NOT BE ENOUGH TO TRANSPORT ALL
WRECKAGE. PENDING FINAL
CLEARANCE, INITIATE GBU STRIKE
ON ALPHA AND BRAVO. BE ADVISED:
INTEND TO EXFIL 78 PAX TOTAL. 47
PAX FROM (b)(3), (b)(6) ELEMENT
(INCLUDING ) TO RETURN TO
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6) ; 20 PATHFINDER PAX TO

RETURN TO (b)(3), (b)(6) ; 6 PAX TO

(b)(3), (b)(6) (2 (b)(3), (b)(6) , 4 (b)(3), (b)(6) ); 2 PAX
FROM MORTUARY AFFAIRS AND 2
FROM CRISIS INVESTIGATION. DOES
NOT LOOK LIKE THEY WILL BE ABLE
TO EXFIL ALL 78 PAX ON ARSOA
PACKAGE, REQUEST WORKOUT EXFIL
LOGISTICS.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0505Z: (b)(3), (b)(6)
07Aug2011 PASSES HE HAS CONDUCTED A WALK (b)(3), (b)(6)
154
0516Z THRU WITH (b)(3), (b)(6)
AND CRASH
INVESTIGATION TEAM OF ALL FIVE

Page 789
 LOCATIONS. REQUEST TO CONDUCT
KINETIC STRIKE ON LOCATIONS A, B,
& C. (b)(3), (b)(6)
CONCURS WITH
ASSESSMENT TO CONDUCT KINETIC
STRIKE ON THESE LOCATIONS.
STANDING BY FOR CDE AND HIGHER
HQ APPROVAL.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0421Z: FROM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6) BSO REPORTED SEEING
07Aug2011
153 MUZZLE FLASHES JUST NORTH OF (b)(3), (b)(6)
0427Z
THEIR POSITION, GRID VC 78200
66800.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0135Z: KD36:
ID'D 2 ADDITIONAL LOCATIONS WITH
WRECKAGE FURTHER SOUTH DOWN
WADI AS FAR AS THE BRIDGE. WILL
REFER TO THEM AS DELTA AND ECHO.
07Aug2011 GETTING GRIDS AND PHOTOS AND
152
0135Z WILL PUSH VIA HPW. AF IS DOWN IN
THE RIVER TRYING TO PULL
EVERYTHING THEY CAN. HAVE FOUND
A RADIO, WEAPONS AND OTHER
COMPONENTS AND WILL CONTINUE
GOING THROUGH BY HAND.
07Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0111Z:
151
0111Z (b)(3), (b)(6) : ARRIVAL JBAD.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0033Z:
07Aug2011
150 (b)(3), (b)(6) : WU (b)(3), (b)(6) ENROUTE
0035Z
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
ETA 0120Z
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0028Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
07Aug2011 HPW PICS SENT. ELEMENTS
149
0028Z SCANNING AREA FOR ADDITIONAL
WRECKAGE.
07Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0023Z:
148
0023Z (b)(3), (b)(6) : WD (b)(3), (b)(6)
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0010Z:
07Aug2011
147 : BSO DROP OFF
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)
0010Z
COMPLETE. 48 (b)(3), (b)(6) CAD ETA

Page 790
 (b)(3), (b)(6) 0021Z
07Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0003Z:
146
0006Z (b)(3), (b)(6) : EXFIL COMPLETE
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 0002Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
WILL CONDUCT COMM CHECKS EVERY
30 MINUTES. FINAL ASSESSMENT
COMPLETE. WRECKAGE SITES
DESIGNATED A, B, C. SITE (A) IS
LOCATED AT THE CP, HAS MAIN
FUSELAGE TO INCLUDE NOSE AND 2
07Aug2011 ENGINES IN RIVER BED 8 FT DOWN.
145
0005Z SITE (B) HAS FRONT ROTARY
HOUSING UNIT. SITE (C) HAS REAR
ROTARY HOUSING UNIT. SUMMIT15
AND MYSELF HAVE CONDUCTED
DETAILED ANALYSIS WITH PHOTOS.
WILL PUSH PHOTOS VIA HPW.
(b)(3), (b)(6) BINGO ON ALL CUTTING
TOOL BATTERIES
06Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2352Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
144
2352Z (b)(3), (b)(6) CAD IN PZ POST
06Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2352Z:
143
2352Z (b)(3), (b)(6) : WU FOR 0001Z EXFIL
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2347Z:
06Aug2011
142 (b)(3), (b)(6)
: MOVING TO LEVEL 1
2347Z
FOR 0001Z EXFIL
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2325Z:
(b)(3), (b)(6) : 2 ENGINES ARE 8 FT
DOWN EMBANKMENT AND UNABLE TO
06Aug2011 GET OUT, WILL BIP. 2 ROTORS CUT
141
2326Z OFF ATT, CUTTING INTO MANAGEABLE
PIECES TO MOVE UP TO ROAD. STILL
WORKING ON 2 OTHER ROTORS THAT
ARE IN THE FIELD.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2310Z: KD36:
06Aug2011 HANDOVER COMPLETE, BROUGHT
140
2310Z SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF HE, EOD
REQUESTING BSO BRING AS MUCH

Page 791
 HE AS POSSIBLE BASED ON AMOUNT
OF WRECKAGE LEFT
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2255Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
LINK UP COMPLETE, CSAR CUTTING
ROTOR BLADES, 16 ELEMENT
06Aug2011 RECONSOLIDATED AND PUSHING TO
139
2255Z EXFIL ETA 2330Z. RELIEF ELEMENT
ASSUMED SECURITY AND HAS
POSITIVE LINK UP WITH PATHFINDER
OTG.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2253Z: RIP
06Aug2011
138 COMPLETE, PUSHING TO EXFIL, ETA
2253Z
2330Z.
06Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2245Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
137
2245Z LINK UP COMPLETE ATT
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2230Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
06Aug2011 LINKED UP WITH 1B ATT, ALSO HAVE
136
2230Z LEAD ELEMENT PULLING SECURITY
ATT
06Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2223Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
135
2224Z CP3
06Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2222Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6)

134
2222Z LINK UP WITH KD36 COMPLET
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2154Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
06Aug2011
133 AF CONDUCTING LINK UP IVO CP7
2214Z
ATT
06Aug2011
132 2156Z: OM62R: ARRIVAL BAF
2156Z
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2154Z:
06Aug2011 (b)(3), (b)(6) : CURRENTLY AWAITING
131
2154Z LINK UP FROM OTHER RED ELEMENT.
ASSESSED TO BE OVER 1K OUT.
06Aug2011
130 2134Z: OM62R: CP2
2134Z
06Aug2011
129 2127Z: OM62R: CP4
2127Z
128 06Aug2011 2121Z: OM62R: DEPARTING (b)(1)1.4a

Page 792
 2121Z BASE FOR BAF ATT
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2100Z:
06Aug2011
127 (b)(3), (b)(6) : ARRIVAL (b)(3), (b)(6) FOR
2100Z
REFUEL AND LVL2
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2049Z:
06Aug2011
126 (b)(3), (b)(6) : INFIL COMPLETE,(b)(3), (b)(6)
2049Z (b)(3), (b)(6)

OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 2035Z:

06Aug2011
125 (b)(3), (b)(6)
: W/U (b)(3), (b)(6)
2036Z
ETA INFIL 2045Z
OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: 1931Z:
06Aug2011
124 : REFUEL COMPLETE:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)
1931Z
GOING TO LVL2
06Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1851Z:
123
1851Z (b)(3), (b)(6)
: FLIGHT ARRIVAL (b)(3), (b)(6)
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1838Z:
06Aug2011
122 : W/U SAYED ABAD W/
1838Z
(b)(3), (b)(6)

FALLEN ANGELS. ETA (b)(3), (b)(6) 1852Z

06Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1819Z:
121
1819Z (b)(3), (b)(6) : ARRIVAL SAYED ABAD (b)(3), (b)(6)

OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1804Z:

06Aug2011
120 (b)(3), (b)(6)
W/U (b)(3), (b)(6) EN
1804Z
ROUTE SAYED ABAD. ETA 1820Z
06Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1752Z:
119
1752Z (b)(3), (b)(6)
: W/D (b)(3), (b)(6)

OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1741Z: LB16R:

06Aug2011
118 GRID FOR BSO FOR OP (b)(3), (b)(6)
1742Z
42S VC 7744 6713
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1739Z:
06Aug2011
117 (b)(3), (b)(6) : W/U GARDEZ. ETA
1739Z (b)(3), (b)(6) 1750Z
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1727Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
06Aug2011 CURRENTLY THERE ARE FRIENDLIES
116
1728Z IN BETWEEN AF NEAR(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cAND OP
(b)(3), (b)(6)

06Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1715Z:

115
1718Z (b)(3), (b)(6)
: DUE TO WEATHER,

Page 793
 EARLIEST ATTEMPT TO REACH SHK
1800Z, ETA ARRIVAL 1820Z.
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE COURSE OF
ACTION, DIRECT THUNDER FLIGHT TO
SHARANA AND HAVE C130 FLIGHT
TRANSFER EOD PERSONNEL TO SHK
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1640Z: (b)(3), (b)(6):
FLASH FLOOD. CURRENTLY UNDER 1-
2 FEET OF MOVING WATER ATT. WILL
REQUIRE USE OF BRIDGE DIRECTLY
06Aug2011
114 TO EAST TO LINK UP WITH INFIL
1644Z
ELEMENT, REQUEST HAVE EOD W/
INFIL CHECK BRIDGE PRIOR TO
USAGE, BSO STATES BRIDGE IS
TYPICAL IED SPOT.
06Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1642Z:
113
1643Z (b)(3), (b)(6) : W/D (b)(3), (b)(6)

OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1639Z:

(b)(3), (b)(6) . BASED
06Aug2011 MPT
112
1642Z FLIGHT TO (b)(3), (b)(6) AT 1730Z. EARLIEST
LINKUP TIME WITH (b)(3), (b)(6)

1750Z.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1615Z: (b)(3), (b)(6)

: CURRENTLY UNABLE TO
06Aug2011
(b)(3), (b)(6)

111 PASS THROUGH MOUNTAIN RANGE

1617Z
DUE TO WX. EN ROUTE (b)(3), (b)(6) , WILL
HOLD 45 MIN AND RE-ATTEMPT
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1609Z:
06Aug2011
110 (b)(3), (b)(6) : DUE TO WEATHER,
1610Z
UPDATED ETA (b)(3), (b)(6) 1620Z
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1600Z:
06Aug2011
109 (b)(3), (b)(6) : W/U (b)(3), (b)(6)
1605Z
ETA (b)(3), (b)(6) 1645Z
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1554Z:
06Aug2011
108 (b)(3), (b)(6) : W/U (b)(3), (b)(6) 2
1554Z
EAGLES. ETA (b)(3), (b)(6) 1615Z
107 06Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1549Z: (b)(3), (b)(6): BSO

Page 794
 1550Z RCP PUSHING TOWARD CRASH SITE
RTB DUE TO STORM. WILL TRY AGAIN
AT 0400L
WARNO- LEFTY GROVE RESPONSE. TM
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(3/D) W/ CSAR AND EOD WILL
CONDUCT A HAF TO AN OFFSET INFIL
06Aug2011 TO RELIEVE TM (b)(3), (b)(6) (1/B) AT
106
1407Z RESPONSE SITE. TARGETED AREA OF
INTEREST 42S VC 80161 64686,
SAYED ABAD DISTRICT, WARDAK
PROVINCE.
06Aug2011 OBJ LEFT GROVE: 1312Z: LB16R:
105
1312Z GOOD CDS DROP
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1157Z: LB16:
PREDS AND PATHFINDER PAX
SECURING ORIGINAL CRASH SITE.
RCP SP APPROX 15 MIKES AGO AND
ESTIMATES 12HR RETURN TRIP TO
RETURN TO CRASH SITE. TRACKING
1300Z AERIAL RESUPPLY. COPY PLAN
FOR TONIGHT: INTENT IS TO RELIEVE
06Aug2011
104 IN PLACE WITH ANOTHER PLATOON, (b)(3), (b)(6)
1210Z
WILL BE AN OFFSET INFIL OF (b)(3), (b)(6)
ELEMENT WITH EOD AND CSAR. WILL
PATROL TO CRASH SITE FOR ON-SITE
TURNOVER. ONCE TURNOVER
COMPLETE, PATROL TO EXFIL AND
RTB. TIMELINE TDB, EXFIL LOCATION
EXPECTED TO BE APPROX 2K TO THE
EAST.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1045Z LB16: RCP
IS PREPPING TO SP WITH FALLEN
06Aug2011
103 (b)(3), (b)(6) STAY IN
1046Z
PLACE MAINT SECURITY ENROUTE TO
HWY1 TO PICK UP ENGINEERS
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 0955Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) G01
06Aug2011
102 WILL CONTACT (b)(3), (b)(6) AB
1000Z
BRINGING IN ENG TEAM FOR

Page 795
 ASSESSMENT AND DESTRUCT PLANS,
ELEMENT WILL EXFIL WITH
PATHFINDERS
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 0841Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
(b)(3), (b)(6) PLANS TO EXFIL DBD,
MONITOR WITH BDE SUPPORT,
06Aug2011
101 POSSIBLE REPORT BACK TO CRASH
0842Z
SITE FOR ANY POSSIBLE LEFT
REMAINS AT CRASH SITE, WILL PASS
ANY UPDATES WHEN AVAILABLE
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 0800Z: (b)(3), (b)(6):
CURRENTLY CONSOLIDATING DEBRIS
AND TRASH IN ONE LOCATION,
LOOKING FOR GUIDANCE.
PATHFINDER ELEMENT CAN MITIGATE
06Aug2011 ALL ASPECTS OF CRASH. THERMITE
100
0806Z PLAN WILL COMPLETELY REDUCE
CRASH SITE. SUSPECT ONLY ROTOR
BLADE COULD BE STRAP LOADED OUT (b)(3), (b)(6)
OF SITE. ADDITIONALLY, GRID FOR
SURVEYED HLZ FROM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 0748Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :

CURRENTLY ALL VIX ARE MAXED OUT.
ONCE EAGLES ARE INSIDE ALL PAX
WILL BE DISMOUNTED FOR RCP AND
BSO ELEMENTS. DISCUSSED SEVERAL
OTHER PLANS, UNABLE TO GET ANY
SORT OF WHEELED VIX INTO THE
06Aug2011 WADI. TOP ROTOR ASSEMBLY IS
99
0749Z APPROX 100M FROM CRASH SITE IN
SMALL DITCH ON A FOOT PATH
WHERE WE WILL BE UNABLE TO GET
ANY MOTORIZED VIX, AND IT IS TOO
HEAVY FOR PAX TO MOVE. BSO HAS
ID'D AN HLZ THEY HAVE USED
PREVIOUSLY THAT IS 400M DUE
NORTH ON THE OTHER SIDE OF

Page 796
 ROUTE (b)(1)1.4a AND HAS OFFERED
TO SECURE IT WITH ALL VIX UNTIL AF
EXFILS.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 0726Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) : BSO
LINK UP COMPLETE. RED PAX
MAINTAINING SECURITY WHILE BSO
ASSISTS IN MOVING EAGLES AND
WEAPONS INTO VIX PARKED ON
(b)(1)1.4a . PLAN IS TO DROP
ORDNANCE ON REMAINDER OF
AIRCRAFT DUE TO FACT IT IS MOSTLY
RUBBLE. ONLY REMAINING PIECES
ARE TURBINE ENGINES (APPROX 3K
POUNDS) AND STILL TOO HOT TO
06Aug2011
98 MOVE. PENDING APPROVAL TO
0726Z
REDUCE REMAINDER OF CRASH SITE,
AF WILL FOLLOW THE RCP'S WEST ON
(b)(1)1.4a AND PICK SUITABLE HLZ
BETWEEN 1K TO 7K, WHICH IS HW1.
REQUEST ASSIST IN LOCATING
POSSIBLE HLZ OFF ROUTE (b)(1)1.4a .
THE RCP IS WILLING TO PROVIDE
SECURITY TO SECURE HLZ.
CURRENTLY TRACKING ALL EAGLES (b)(3), (b)(6)
WILL GO BACK WITH RCP TO SAYAD
ABAD.
06Aug2011
97 VMR: 0702Z: OM20: RTB
0702Z
06Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 0651Z: SECOND
96
0651Z AIR DROP COMPLETE
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 0622Z: SECOND
06Aug2011
95 AIR DROP IN APPROX 7 MIN. WILL BE
0622Z
2 DROPS FROM SAME ASSET.
06Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 0607Z: ETA 2ND
94
0609Z AIR RESUPPLY 0700Z
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 0607Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
06Aug2011
93 CURRENTLY UP ON ALL 38 EAGLES,
0608Z
ATT BSO 1100M OUT AND HAS HIT

Page 797
 7TH IED SO MOVEMENT IS SLOW
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 0545Z: BSO
06Aug2011
92 CONVOY LOCATION
0606Z
42SVC7940165686
06Aug2011
91 VMR: 0504Z: OM20: SP
0504Z
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 0446Z: (b)(3), (b)(6):
ASSESS NO SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
06Aug2011
90 NEEDED AT CRASH SITE, 2 TURBINES
0447Z
AND ROTOR SHOULD BE ABLE TO BE
PILED AND DISPOSED OF.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 0427Z: (b)(3), (b)(6):
FROM ROUTE (b)(1)1.4a RIGHT
BEFORE MAJOR POPULATION, IT
LOOKS VERY POSSIBLE TO GET A
DECENT SIZED TRUCK INTO CRASH
SITE, EXCEPT THE GROUND IS LOOSE
SAND WHICH MAY BE DIFFICULT FOR
HEAVIER MRAP VIC BUT CERTAINLY
PASSABLE BY A SUSV. CURRENTLY (b)(3), (b)(6)

HAVE 22 FRIENDLY KIA SEPARATED

06Aug2011 FROM RUBBLE. WRECKAGE IS STILL
89
0440Z SMOLDERING WITH SMALL FIRES,
BUT IS ESSENTIALLY BURNT TO THE
GROUND. WILL CONSERVE MBITR
BATTERIES AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE
ATT. (b)(3), (b)(6) WILL BE ON
GROUND, IF NOT IN INITIAL CONVOY,
COMING SOON. WILL PASS SITE TO
(b)(3), (b)(6) ONCE ON SITE. WILL
DEVELOP GROUND EXFIL PLAN TO
NEAREST COP ( (b)(1)1.4a
) AND
THEN AIR EXFIL TO SHK.
06Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 0438Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
88
0440Z FIRST AIR RESUPPLY RECEI
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 0328Z: (b)(3), (b)(6)
06Aug2011
87 UPDATED ETA FOR AIRDRO 0Z
0329Z
WITH FOLLOW ON 1.5 HOURS LATER.

Page 798
 CONFIRMED NO SURVIVORS FROM
DOWNED HELO.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 0312Z: PASSED
TO AF: FIRST AIR RESUPPLY DROP TO
BE CONDUCTED BETWEEN 0345Z AND
0430Z IVO 42SWC8023664596. FIRST
06Aug2011
86 DROP WILL CONTAIN FOOD, WATER
0315Z
AND BATTERIES. SECOND DROP WILL
BE 1.5 TO 2 HOURS FOLLOWING
CONSISTING OF RECOVERY
EQUIPMENT.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 0211Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
06Aug2011
85 REQUEST A DOZEN FIRE
0211Z
EXTINGUISHERS.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 0153Z: (b)(3), (b)(6):
06Aug2011 CURRENTLY 12 FRIENDLY KIA ID'D,
84
0153Z CONTINUING TO WORK CRASH SITE
AND MAINTAIN SECURITY ATT.
06Aug2011
83 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
0111Z
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c :
06Aug2011
82 BSO SWAP COMPLETE. EN ROUTE (b)(3), (b)(6)

0100Z
JBAD ETA 0110Z
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 0055Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
06Aug2011 PERIMETER 150-200M AROUND
81
0056Z CRASH SITE, NO REQUIREMENT FOR
ADDITIONAL GROUND FORCES ATT.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

06Aug2011
80
0055Z (b)(3), (b)(6)

06Aug2011 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

79 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)
0047Z
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)
06Aug2011
78
0041Z
77 06Aug2011 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 799
 0036Z POSTURE. 30 SEC TO IMPACT POS C.
5 EKIA. AF CONFIRMED 3 EKIA
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 0006Z: (b)(3), (b)(6):
06Aug2011 CRASH SITE STILL SECURED.
76
0006Z PATHFINDERS ARE APPROX 400
MIKES OUT
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
06Aug2011
75
0004Z
06Aug2011
74
0003Z

06Aug2011
73
0000Z
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

05Aug2011
72
2357Z
05Aug2011 (b)(3), (b)(6)

71
2356Z
05Aug2011
70
2350Z
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 2349Z: (b)(3), (b)(6):
05Aug2011 CRASH SITE SECURED. AF BACKOFF
69
2349Z DUE TO ONGOING EXPLOSIONS. ID'D
6 FRIENDLY KIA
05Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 2345Z:
68
2349Z (b)(3), (b)(6) : W/D (b)(3), (b)(6)

05Aug2011
67 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
2348Z

Page 800
 BRAVO AS WELL AS MULTIPLE OTHER
FIGHTING POSITIONS WITH GBU'S
05Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: (b)(3), (b)(6) : ETA
66
2323Z (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

05Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 2302Z:

65
2303Z EXTORTION(b)(3), (b)(6) , W/D (b)(3), (b)(6)

05Aug2011
64 (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(3), (b)(6)
2255Z
(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 2247Z:

05Aug2011 (b)(3), (b)(6) 1: W/U EN ROUTE
63
2247Z (b)(1)1.4a
TO PICK UP QRF THEN EN
ROUTE (b)(3), (b)(6)

05Aug2011
(b)(3), (b)(6)
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 2244Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
62
2244Z ETA CRASH SITE, 45 MIKES
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 2234Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
05Aug2011
61 CONDUCTING BIP 10 SERIES,
2234Z
MOVING TO CRASH SITE.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : 2230Z: (b)(3), (b)(6)
CONTINUING MOVEMENT NORTH TO
SOUTH DOWN WADI. TERRAIN IS
ROUGH. ETA 0000Z EXFIL AT HLZ
05Aug2011 (b)(3), (b)(6) . SPOKE WITH ELEMENTS AT
60
2231Z FIGHTING POSITIONS, BELIEVE
HELLFIRES WILL HAVE NO IMPACT ON
FIGHTING POSITIONS AND
RECOMMEND GBU'S TO DESTROY
FIGHTING POSITIONS.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 2227Z:
05Aug2011
59 EXTORTION : LVL1 (b)(3), (b)(6) FOR
(b)(3), (b)(6)
2227Z
REFUEL

Page 801
 05Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 2221Z: GRID OF
58
2221Z DOWN CRAFT 42S VC 80173 64660
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: OBJ LEFTY GROVE:
05Aug2011 2220Z: LB16: LEAVING ALL
57
2220Z DETAINEES ON TGT, MOVING AF TO
CRASH SITE.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 2217Z: QRF TOOK
05Aug2011
56 RPG AND IS DOWN. GRID 42SVC
2217Z
80173 64660
(b)(3), (b)(6) : 2210Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) : AF
COMPLETE SSE AT CAMPSITE. SSE:
1X SCION WITH 8X INDIAS, 1 TB IED
MANUAL WITH EXTRA DOCS, 1 GPS,
SEVERAL BDU UNIFORMS, AF WILL
DESTROY BDUS, ALL OTHER SSE WILL
05Aug2011
55 BE GOING WITH AF. ELEMENT
2215Z
MOVING TO CONDUCT SSE AT
ORIGINAL AWT ENGAGEMENT.
INTEND TO WORK UP 9 LINES FOR (b)(3), (b)(6)
FIGHTING POSITIONS ALPHA AND
BRAVO. RECOMMEND TO DESTROY
BUNKERS WITH GBU'S.
05Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 2215Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) 60
54
2215Z SERIES CLEAR AND SECURE ATT
05Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 2208Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
53
2208Z FALCONS ENTERING 60 SERIES
05Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 2203Z:
52
2203Z EXTORTION : 3 MIN TO INFIL
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : 2155Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) : AF

CONTINUING SSE AT CAMPSITE.
CLEARED MULTIPLE BUNKER
05Aug2011 FIGHTING POSITIONS, NO SIG SSE.
51
2158Z VICINITY OF TENT SSE: 1X SCION, 1X
TALIBAN IED MANUAL, 1X GPS AND 1
BAG OF POSSIBLE HME, G06
ASSESSING AT THIS TIME.
50 05Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 2156Z:

Page 802
 2156Z EXTORTION : 6 MIN TO INFIL
(b)(3), (b)(6)

05Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 2155Z:

49
2155Z EXTORTION : W/U (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

05Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 2151Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :

48
2151Z SETTING CONTAINMENT 60 SERIES
(b)(3), (b)(6) : 2142Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) : AF
CURRENTLY CONDUCTING SSE AT
05Aug2011
47 CAMPSITE: TENT, CAMPFIRE,
2144Z
SEVERAL BUNKER FIGHTING
POSITIONS, NO PERSONNEL ATT
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
: 2139Z:
05Aug2011
46 EXTORTION : 32 EAGLES, 1 CAD.
(b)(3), (b)(6)
2139Z
LVL1, AWAITING AWT
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
: 2136Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) : 10
SERIES CLEAR AND SECUR NT
10/6/25/6, 3 ECHO, 2 INDIAS. BLDG
05Aug2011 69 CLEAR AND SECURE, SLANT 1/0/0.
45
2136Z FROM AWT STRIKE, 6 EKIA, 2 AK, 1
RPG, 6 FRAGS, 2 ICOM, 6 SCIONS. TQ (b)(3), (b)(6)
ONGOING 10 SERIES. CONTAINMENT
SET 60 SERIES, CALLOUT ONGOING.
05Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 2118Z:
44
2118Z EXTORTION (b)(3), (b)(6) LVL1

05Aug2011
43
2118Z

05Aug2011
42
2109Z (b)(3), (b)(6)

05Aug2011
41
2105Z

05Aug2011
40
2059Z

Page 803
 05Aug2011
39
2057Z

05Aug2011
38
2045Z

(b)(3), (b)(6)

05Aug2011
37
2036Z

(b)(3), (b)(6)

OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 2032Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :

05Aug2011 SQUIRTER INTERDICTION ELEM
36
2032Z CANNOT PID SQUIRTERS. MOVING TO
BDA ATT
(b)(3), (b)(6) : 2018Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) : FROM
JOKER, HAVE ID 2 MAMS IN FIGHTING
POSITION BRAVO TO THE NORTH.
05Aug2011 MAMS ARE HUNKERED DOWN ATT.
35
2020Z ATTEMPTING TO GET EYES ON WITH
SNIPERS ON RIDGELINE AND JOKER
IS ATTEMPTING TO GET ATTACK
ANGLE ATT.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 2019Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
HAVE ISOLATION SET ON 10 NORTH.
05Aug2011 TQ/SSE ONGOING ON 10 SOUTH.
34
2019Z SQUIRTER INTERDICTION ELEM
PUSHING THROUGH LAST KNOWN
LOCATION. INTEND TO PUSH TO BDA

Page 804
 AT AWT ENGAGEMENT AREA.
CURRENT BDA SLANT EST 5 EKIA AND
1 EKIA 300 METERS WEST OF 10
SERIES WITH 1 AK.
(b)(3), (b)(6) : 1958Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) : CHANGE
IN PLAN: NE ELEMENT WILL PATROL
TGT COMPOUND NEAR CAMPSITE
WHILE (b)(3), (b)(6) ELEMENT MAINTAINS
OVERWATCH. AF CONFIRMED
FIGHTING POSITIONS BRAVO 50M
NORTH OF CAMPSITE. INTEND TO
ENGAGE WITH 30MM BASED ON
FIGHTERS MOVING FROM THAT
05Aug2011
33 LOCATION. HAVE ALSO IDENTIFIED
2004Z
FIGHTING POSITIONS ALPHA
LOCATED ON THE RIDGELINE BEEN
MARKED, LOOKING TO DESTROY AS
AF MOVES TO EXFIL. FIGHTING
POSITIONS HAVE 360 DEGREE COVER
AND SIGNIFICANT CAMO AND ARE
VACANT ATT. WILL CONDUCT SSE ON
ENGAGED LOCATIONS AFTER
CLEARANCE (b)(3), (b)(6)

OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1958Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) : 1

05Aug2011 EKIA 300 M WEST OF 10 SERIES.
32
1959Z ENGAGED BY PACKAGE. MOVING TO
BDA
(b)(3), (b)(6) : 1948Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) : JOKER
REPORTING 4X EKIA. ALL SENSORS
LOOKING AT TGT COMPOUND AND
SCANNING NORTH TO SOUTH
LOOKING FOR ADDITIONAL
05Aug2011
31 FIGHTERS. JOKER REPORTING
1951Z
SEVERAL LIKELY FIGHTING
POSITIONS IVO ORIGINAL TGT
COMPOUND. (b)(3), (b)(6) ELEMENT OFF TO
NE IN HIGH TERRAIN HAS ALSO
FOUND SEVERAL VACANT FIGHTING

Page 805
 POSITIONS. (b)(3), (b)(6) ELEMENT WILL
REMAIN ON HIGH TERRAIN WITH
SNIPERS AND MACHINE GUNS
PROVIDING OVER WATCH WHILE
(b)(3), (b)(6) ELEMENT MOVES IN TO CLEAR

FROM NORTH TO SOUTH. WILL BEGIN

MOVEMENT MOMENTARILY, TERRAIN
IS RUGGED.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1942Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
COMMENCING CALLOUT 10 SERIES.
05Aug2011
30 MOVING INTERDICTION ELEM TO
1943Z
INTERDICT TWO SQUIRTERS FROM
ENGAGEMENT AREA.
(b)(3), (b)(6) : 1937Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
CONDUCTED SEVERAL RUNS WITH
AWT W/ 30MM AND HELLFIRES.
ASSESSMENT VIA JOKER 4X EKIA.
05Aug2011 USING ALL ASSETS TO SCAN FROM
29
1940Z NORTH OF TGT SOUTH TO SOUTHERN
ELEMENT TO DETERMINE LOCATION
OF ADDITIONAL FIGHTERS. WILL
DEVELOP PLAN AND COME BACK UP
WITH COURSE OF ACTION 10 MIKES
05Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1938Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6)
28
1939Z ISOLATION SET ON 10 SERIES
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1928Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) : 4,
05Aug2011
27 POSSIBLE 5 EKIA WITH SECONDARY
1929Z
EXPLOSIONS
05Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1922Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) :
26
1922Z ORP

05Aug2011
25
1922Z
05Aug2011 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
24
1913Z
05Aug2011
23
1908Z

Page 806
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1858Z: (b)(3), (b)(6): PID

05Aug2011 8 PAX LEAVING TGT AREA. NOW ON S
22
1904Z SIDE OF EAST ROAD. ID'D WEAPONS
AND RPGS.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : 1858Z: KD36R: INFIL
05Aug2011
21 COMPLETE OF SQUIRTER
1859Z
INTERDICTION TEAM
05Aug2011 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : 1856Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) : INFIL
20
1856Z COMPLETE
05Aug2011
19 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
1854Z
05Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1853Z: (b)(3), (b)(6)
18
1852Z CP1
05Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1848Z:
17
1848Z EXTORTION : LVL2 (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

05Aug2011
16 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
1844Z (b)(3), (b)(6)

05Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1838Z:

15
1838Z EXTORTION(b)(3), (b)(6)
: W/D (b)(3), (b)(6) . LVL1
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1830Z:
05Aug2011
14 EXTORTION(b)(3), (b)(6)
: INFIL COMPLETE.
1832Z
ENROUTE (b)(3), (b)(6)
05Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1830Z: LB16R:
13
1831Z INFIL COMPLETE

05Aug2011
12 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
1829Z

05Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1827Z:

11
1827Z EXTORTION : 3 MIN TO INFIL
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1826Z:

10 05Aug2011
EXTORTION : 6 MIN TO INFIL
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 807
 1826Z
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1825Z:
05Aug2011 EXTORTION : W/U SAYAD ABAD.
9
1825Z BSO SWAP COMPLETE. ENROUTE
INFIL.
OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1806Z:
05Aug2011
8 EXTORTION : W/U (b)(3), (b)(6) . 46
1806Z
, (b)(3), (b)(6)

EAGLES, 1 CAD
05Aug2011 OBJ LEFTY GROVE: 1802Z:
7
1803Z EXTORTION(b)(3), (b)(6)
: SP

05Aug2011
6
1641Z

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

05Aug2011
(b)(3), (b)(6)

5 (b)(1)1.4a
1527Z

WARNO- (b)(3), (b)(6) WARNO

OBJ LEFTY GROVE: CONDUCT HAF
05Aug2011 RAID TO Y-INFIL IOT C/K OBJ LEFTY
4
1525Z GROVE IVO 42S VC 83431 62373.
SAYAD ABAD DISTRICT, WARDAK
PROVINCE
05Aug2011
3 VMR: 0317Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) : RTB
0317Z
05Aug2011
2 VMR: 0100Z: : SP
0131Z
(b)(3), (b)(6)

05Aug2011
1 NEW RADIO DAY
0131Z
18

Page 808
Page 1 redacted for the following reason:
---------------------
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 809
 From: AF (b)(1)1.4a,
TF J3
(b)(1)1.4c

Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2011 10:37 AM

To: INVES ADV
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Cc: AF TM OPS; AF (b)(1)1.4a,

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TF J3 CHOPS; INVEST(b)(1)1.4a,
(b)(1)1.4c TM (b)(1)1.4c
; AF TM J2; AF TM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c J2A1
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Subject: RE: Timeline RFIs

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TERMS: NONE

Rgr,
1530z is the correct WARNO time.

V/R,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Loc: Camp Dahlke, FOB

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(2), (b)(6)

SIPR: (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

From: INVEST TM ADV

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2011 12:39 PM

To: AF (b)(1)1.4a,
TF J3
(b)(1)1.4c
Cc: AF TM OPS; AF (b)(1)1.4a,
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TF J3 CHOPS; INVEST(b)(1)1.4a,
(b)(1)1.4c TM (b)(1)1.4c
; AF TM J2; AF TM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c J2A1
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Subject: RE: Timeline RFIs

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TERMS: NONE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Discrepancy below. I am assuming 1/B WARNO is supposed to read 1530Z, as this is the approximate
time in the JOC LOG.

Thanks

From: AF (b)(1)1.4a,
TF J3
(b)(1)1.4c

Sent: Friday, August 19, 2011 5:59 PM

To: INVEST TM ADV
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Cc: AF TM OPS; AF (b)(1)1.4a,

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TF J3 CHOPS; INVEST(b)(1)1.4a,
(b)(1)1.4c TM (b)(1)1.4c
; AF TM J2; AF TM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c J2A1
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Subject: RE: Timeline RFIs

Page 810
 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
TERMS: NONE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

1/B WARNO came out at approx 1730z.

1/B gave their OPORD at 1645z.
Comm Checks 1730z
Movement to A/C 1745z

(b)(3), (b)(6) and sat in the OPORD.(b)(3), (b)(6)is back at the beach now,(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) works
days for TM (jiant address: AF TM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c J2A1)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

V/R,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TF J3
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Loc: Camp Dahlke, FOB

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(2), (b)(6)
S
SIPR: (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

From: INVEST TM ADV

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Sent: Friday, August 19, 2011 5:14 PM

To: AF (b)(1)1.4a,
TF J3
(b)(1)1.4c

Cc: AF TM OPS; AF (b)(1)1.4a,

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TF J3 CHOPS; INVEST(b)(1)1.4a,
(b)(1)1.4c TM (b)(1)1.4c
Subject: Timeline RFIs

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
CAVEATS: NONE
TERMS: NONE

Sorry to bug you guys, just need some info on the following.

Approx time Backbrief/OPORD given by PLT and who outside the PLT sat in, if anyone.

Approx time for comm checks/ and movement to A/C.

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DERRIVED FROM: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

DECLASSIFY ON: 25 YEARS FROM DATE OF SOURCE
DATE OF SOURCE: 1 MAY 2006

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
CAVEATS: NONE
TERMS: NONE

DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

DECLASSIFY ON: 25 YEARS FROM DATE OF SOURCE

DATE OF SOURCE: 1 MAY 2006

CLASSIFICATION W/O ATCH: SECRET

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
TERMS W/O ATCH: NONE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
TERMS: NONE

DERRIVED FROM: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

DECLASSIFY ON: 25 YEARS FROM DATE OF SOURCE

DATE OF SOURCE: 1 MAY 2006

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
TERMS: NONE

DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

DECLASSIFY ON: 25 YEARS FROM DATE OF SOURCE

DATE OF SOURCE: 1 MAY 2006

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
TERMS: NONE

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The interview of the PI ACK 65/70 cre at 1408 Zulu,

18 August 2011, at FOB (b)(3), (b)(6) , Task Force (b)(3), (b)(6) .

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD: Brigadier General J. Colt, US

Army

LEGAL ADVISOR: LA

GROUND FORCE ARMY ADVISOR: GFA

GROUND FORCE NAVY ADVISOR: GFN1

SME-INTEL: SME-INTEL

CAB 47 ADVISOR: SME-CH47

NGB ADVISOR: SME-NGB

MH 47 ADVISOR: SME-MH47

GROUND FORCE NAVY ADVISOR: GFN2

ADSAT ADVISORS ASDAT3; ASDAT4

COURT REPORTER: CR

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: TF(b)(3), (b)(6)CDR

PB70BS: PB70BS

PB70FS: PB70FS

PB65BS: PB65BS

PB65FS: PB65FS

Derived from: Task Force 5-35 Manual 380-5

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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All witnesses relevant to the investigation were duly sworn.

BG COLT: What I would like for you to do is, one at a

time, introduce yourself. Tell me what crew station, and

which PITCH BLACK airframe you were associated with that

night. And then tell me a little bit about your experience.

And then we are going to start talking about process issues

as far as mission planning.

PB70FS: I'm (b)(3), (b)(6) . I was on the gun team.

We called ourselves " (b)(3), (b)(6) " that night, front CBG station,

front seat, with the NVGs. Is that all the questions?

BG COLT: How long have you been serving in this

capacity?

PB70FS: I've been here for about seven months. But I've

been a pilot since '08.

BG COLT: Are you a PC also?

PB70FS: Yes, sir.

BG COLT: Both seats?

PB70FS: Yes, sir.

PB70BS: I was the back seat for (b)(3), (b)(6) , (b)(3), (b)(6) .

We were flying under call sign " (b)(3), (b)(6) ". I'm (b)(6)

(b)(6) . I'm a PC also, and have been flying since 2001.

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I've been a pilot for ten years.

BG COLT: Okay. For either one of you in Gun 2, any

previous OEF tours?

PB70FS: Just Iraq, sir.

PB70BS: Two OIFs, sir.

PB65BS: Sir, (b)(3), (b)(6) . I was backseat of

the Aircraft, PITCH BLACK 65, Gun 1 of 1 BLACK ONE that

night. I'm dual-seat qualified PI. Graduated from flight

school last September. I have been here about two months.

PB65FS: (b)(6) , front seat lead. I've been to Iraq

and now here two years, PCHC and I was in PB 65 with (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) .

BG COLT: Okay. Can you talk to us about pre-mission

planning. How many Team (b)(3), (b)(6) missions have you supported?

PB65FS: I've been on Team (b)(3), (b)(6) for four to six months.

So I supported probably two missions every three days with

them dedicated to Team (b)(3), (b)(6) .

BG COLT: Okay.

PB65BS: I've been on about four or five (b)(3), (b)(6) missions

that night. Now, I've been on about 10 or 12 to this day.

PB70BS: I have been on (b)(3), (b)(6) as long as (b)(6) has.

And so we've -- I mean, rough estimate, maybe 60-plus (b)(3), (b)(6)

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missions specifically.

BG COLT: When you two fly as a team, does he normally

fly as the lead aircraft and you as trail?

PB70BS: We switch back and forth, sir. We're both AMC

qualified. So we take turns at roles. The crews that we

have on (b)(3), (b)(6) are pretty interchangeable. So we constantly

keep -- so you stay -- you, kind of, keep your skills up in

every position. And we switch seats, and we switch duties a

lot, so that we all stay proficient in all the duties.

PB70FS: Sir, I did it about the same time, probably four

to five months since this tour. It's usually been about two

missions every three nights or so.

BG COLT: Okay. What determines who is AMC in a team?

PB70BS: It's on the flight schedule, sir. They usually

rotate. (b)(6) and myself are the two AMCs that have

been on Logar for a while and we rotate. One night he will

do it, and the next night I will do it. It switches back

and forth like that.

BG COLT: Is there an additional duty responsibility

aside from those that will be an AMC in flight that causes

the mission authority to alternate the AMC?

PB70BS: No, sir. Other than us purely wanting to keep

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each of our proficiencies added, there's nothing else

derived in it.

BG COLT: Okay. Can you briefly describe for me what you

feel those unique responsibilities of being an AMC that have

to be kept current are.

PB70BS: The main thing is just the preplanning phase of

it. The AMC is usually the one that comes over and meets

with the (b)(3), (b)(6) planner, either (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) .

And we receive the initial WARNO and, kind of, help develop

the AWT aspect of it.

BG COLT: Okay. It is a planning function as well as a,

I guess you would say, a command responsibility function for

the team?

PB70BS: Yes, sir.

BG COLT: Okay. Can you talk us through the planning

processes that you normally use in support of a (b)(3), (b)(6)

mission?

PB70BS: Yes, sir. We normally -- when we come -- our

normal show-time in 2000 every night. We come in, and the

AMC will immediately call over to the plans shop here, and

either talk to (b)(3), (b)(6) or (b)(6) , and find out if

there's a WARNO, if they're, you know, actually tracking a

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target at that point.

They will then get in contact with the Chinooks, and they

will start planning the PZs and LZs and stuff. And we will

find out where the target area is going to be at, so we can

start ramping up, basically, our scheme of maneuver for the

operation.

We are usually in direct contact pretty -- immediately

within 30 minutes or so of the WARNO also with the JTAC down

at that Logar compound. They will usually call us, or we'll

call them and find out exactly how they want to utilize us.

From that point --

BG COLT: Are those mostly telephonic engagements, or do

you normally get together for a face-to-face engagement?

PB70BS: It's usually telephonic, sir. We have been down

there on different occasions. Some of the nights that we

don't have missions, we will go down there and actually talk

to them. They have come to the us also because they have

been wanting to view our gun tapes. If we have anything

that we pick up in reconnaissance, they will come down. But

it's normally telephonic. I would say probably 80 percent

of the time. That's how we find out what they are wanting

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us to do specifically for that mission because they vary, as

far as our hold-off, about every mission, depending on noise

abatement and factors they are looking at.

BG COLT: Would you say the process over time has been

greatly abbreviated, based on this individual planning

relationship? The fact that your stable crews and you work

regularly with them?

PB70BS: I don't know if I would say "abbreviated," sir.

It's before we took over the (b)(3), (b)(6) mission, it was a crew

out of 4th CAB that was doing that before they ripped out.

It's, pretty much, been the same way. I mean, they -- for a

short suspense like that when they get fidelity, it's about

as thorough as it can be for such a short amount of time.

We are also trying to give those guys -- you know, because

they are getting their scheme of maneuver together. So we

try not to get in their way. So we talk directly to their

JTAC, and do plans here for them. I wouldn't think it's

abbreviated. It's pretty thorough given the amount of time

that we have.

BG COLT: Would at least the two PCs -- how would

characterize your familiarity with the battle space that

(b)(3), (b)(6) operates in?

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PB65FS: This has been our battle space for 10 months

now. Most of the time, when (b)(3), (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) or all those rip

in, I would go down there and talk to them. I will tell

them what our capabilities are, where we can refuel, where

we can give them the most help with some of their plans,

especially when we are supporting RSOA and everything. When

RSOA would have a route in, I could tell them, Hey, you

know, four months ago, this happened there, I would stay

away, there's an early warning network there. Everything

like that. So familiar with this AO and helping (b)(3), (b)(6) with

that, I would say we were very familiar this AO. And this

is where they operate, is our primary AO.

PB70BS: I would agree. The thing about most of our

crews, we spent times on QRF shifts also supporting Patriot

out here. And we're all pretty familiar with. I mean, all

of us could navigate the area easily without the use of any

kind of map or anything. We are that familiar with the

landmarks.

As far as the Tangi, specifically, I mean, we have spent

numerous missions and hours in that valley alone.

BG COLT: Okay. When you meet with the JTAC, are you

also familiar with the AC130 plans, capacity, its tasking

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purposes for each mission?

PB65FS: With the AC130, we are familiar. We have never

done a capabilities brief with AC130s, sometimes with DRACO,

which is one of their ISR platforms. But with AC130s just

by us working with them, we know that their capabilities are

for the intelligence portion of it. We know what their

munitions do. We know how far we need to push off, what

their burn capable of.

So if they do have to engage, we know what we've got to do

to allow them to engage to clear out of their air space.

BG COLT: For planning purposes, do you share account and

fires net with them?

PB65FS: Yes. Everything -- the JTAC, usually, their

pointman and usually their FO is all on a common fires. And

(b)(1)1.4a
we also stay up a common -- frequency which is

dictated by the COMM. All that stuff is out there.

We talk to all ISR, everything in here including the point

man, the FO and the JTAC on FIRES 3. And if at any time, we

are working with (b)(3), (b)(6) or the MHs, (b)(1)1.4a is where

we share aircraft to aircraft COMMs.

And then if (b)(3), (b)(6) needs to say something to us that's not

related to what's going on the ground, he will talk to us on

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(b)(1)1.4a .

BG COLT: Are both of those secure nets?

PB65FS: Yes.

BG COLT: Have you ever had issues with fills on the

plane?

PB65FS: No. They use the same fills that we use just

for the 1523 Echos. So I mean, it's a standard fill. It's

very easy. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c their (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that they us is a different

field than our (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. So occasionally we have had problems

with that. But with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c we're just checking into their

JOC, and most of the time we can relay through (b)(3), (b)(6) or

DRACO, or directly to their JTAC to get COMMs on the net.

BG COLT: Okay. And do you do a joint planning cell, or

just a joint AMB with the 47s?

PB65FS: Their 47s will send a planner initially down

there because they will actually talk to them about routes

and everything. Due to the time that we stay here, when

they do an initial brief, that's really the first time and

last time we will talk to the Chinooks until we go out and

route the aircraft.

At that point, when we are spinning up aircraft, we will get

an update from them. We will get an update from Tyrant

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along with -- excuse me -- the JTAC along with an ISR that

has something over head to see if there's any changes to the

battle space as it's happening.

BG COLT: Both you and your national guard Chinook

counterparts operate off the same TACSOP do you?

PB70BS: Yes, sir. It's the same TACSOP amongst the

brigade.

BG COLT: Do you have any questions?

SME-MH47: I was just curious. What's your station time

for your aircraft?

PB70BS: We usually fly [inaudible] for deliberate

missions. And then we can push about three hours out of it.

SME-MH47: It's a 15-minute flight on station, basically,

from here.

PB70FS: Are you talking about to Tangi?

SME-MH47: Yes.

PB70FS: Yeah. That's 10 to 15 minutes.

SME-MH47: On the additional actions on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c infil, I

understand you arrived 20 minutes earlier than the lift

elements; is that correct?

PB70BS: We normally do. We were already on station

supporting the initial insert of the (b)(3), (b)(6) Team. They were

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already on the ground. They were further up the valley --

SME-MH47: I'm talking very initial --

PB65FS: It wasn't 20 minutes. We took off almost

simultaneously. We led the Chinooks out, and the Chinooks

took them to Baraki, I believe, to pick up -- either Baraki

or Sayyid Abad, I can't remember which one to pick up their

BSO. At that point, we were no closer than 10k initially to

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c until they started giving us their 6, 3 and 1-minute

calls. And that's when we went in.

We were so far out, we didn't have fidelity on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c LZ

because we didn't want to burn the LZ. We were taking

everything from DRACO that they had for reporting until the

6, 3, 1-minute calls --

BG COLT: Okay. You were sharing a common net for intel

early warning with DRACO at that point?

PB65FS: Just the Fires net. Every platform has Fires

net. And DRACO will usually be the sensor that we use to

sparkle the LZ, or they can just put a sensor --

BG COLT: I'm sorry. Say that again.

PB65FS: The sparkle put --

BG COLT: No. Who does that?

PB65FS: DRACO.

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BG COLT: Okay.

PB65FS: Usually they have two sensors. They will keep

one on the target, and then sparkle one of the LZs because

it's a whole lot easier for the Chinooks to land when they

are sparkling, rather than us because we are usually pushing

directly in with them.

BG COLT: Okay. If I can go back and, kind of, process

it, do you normally fly in an attached or detached escort?

It sounds like it's detached.

PB65FS: We usually take off -- we always take off before

them, or right with them. And it's usually detached due to

the fact they have a route where they pick up the BSO. And

we would usually push off more direct to get eyes on as much

as we can in the area where the LZ is.

BG COLT: Okay. In this particular case, without

pre-assault fires though, you still had TAIs or something

that the ground force wanted you to report on it, or they

just wanted you to provide area security?

PB65FS: We have to take the 47s in on all the LZs. So

that's a big reason why we are with (b)(3), (b)(6) every time.

We are not cleared for pre-assault fires or anything like

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that.

So our big deal is if it is a red illum night, which prior

to this mission we had discussed not shooting illum due to

the threat in Tangi, we didn't want an aircraft that was a

high mover. We wanted an aircraft to be able to cover the

Chinooks when they went in. So we did not provide illum

that night. We didn't push over the LZ until we started

receiving the 6, 3 and 1-minute calls.

At that point, we had two people that were running. We

assessed the situation that they were just running because

scared farmers. They weren't --

BG COLT: Okay. Before we get into the mission though,

let's talk more, and then we will go to the actual

execution, what was planned and what was actually done, all

right?

What is a normal TTP as far as in route up to {inaudible}.

PB65FS: Usually, 1,000 feet 110 knots, and we would just

hold the direction that the terrain allows away from the LZ

until we are relaying everything for (b)(3), (b)(6) .

BG COLT: Okay. Do you normally -- in the objective area

-- do you normally fly a high/low profile, or do you fly as

a team at the same altitude?

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PB65FS: We are usually 500 feet stacked depending if

they are on our six, or if they are 180 degrees off, just

depending on what we are looking at, at the time. Gun 2

will be 500 feet above us and behind us.

PB70BS: We also fly if they are requesting illum. We

have used them in the past. Gun 2 will go ahead and set up

at a higher altitude to be ready at the 1-minute call to

shoot the illum. It keeps from having to rock the aircraft

back so much in order to get the illum out. So we'll go

ahead, and Gun 1 will push in closer to get eyes on the LZ,

and Gun 2 will have more of a broad picture. But we set up

the illum targets.

BG COLT: I'm just asking a question: When you know that

you have an AC130 up, you have clear your fires with him and

announce that prior to shooting the round?

PB70BS: Yes, sir. We give them [inaudible], and we tell

them we are going to be are firing illums at the 1-minute

call by (b)(3), (b)(6) .

BG COLT: Okay. In this particular case, my

understanding that it's a standard, standing TTP that it can

be an on-call shot, right? It doesn't have to be a

specifically planned route into the mission. You carry the

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illum, and if he requests it, at the 6-3, you would shoot it

at the 1?

PB65FS: Roger. Yes, sir. As long as they tell us about

the 6-minute call, we can set up for it. With Gun 2 having

to climb up and has to set at about 5k away so he can shoot

it at [inaudible], they can't just call out one minute, and

say I want illum now because we won't be in position to

provide it. But at the 6-minute call is where we made all

the arrangements.

BG COLT: Okay. Any other questions about process or

pre-mission planning, anybody?

ASDAT4: Going into (b)(1)1.4a , what was the

interpretation between your crews and 17? How were they

expecting the LZ to be marked?

PB70FS: (b)(1)1.4a is the one [inaudible] going to the

crash. It marked by burn.

ASDAT4: I understand what it was marked by. What did

they believe how it was going to be marked?

PB65FS: Every brief we do, now that we've -- with

(b)(3), (b)(6) being able to burn, we have always told them that we

had preferred they take burn rather than illum. So we have

talked to them every time.

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If (b)(3), (b)(6) is able to push into Echo 3 on the initial, it's

usually hard because they are stationed out (b)(3), (b)(6) to (b)(3), (b)(6)

-- or 8 to 10k.
(b)(3), (b)(6) If (b)(3), (b)(6) is overhead, and (b)(3), (b)(6) is

burn capable, we've always talk to the Chinooks about

letting them have burn rather than us shooting illum because

it takes one of us out.

So if it was possible, we had already made COMMS with them

because we took off earlier than them. It was already

relayed that it was going to be marked by burn with (b)(3), (b)(6) .

SME-MH47: A burn or sparkle?

PB65FS: Burn.

SME-MH47: They don't burn -- they don't use sparkle?

They burn everything.

PB65FS: Well, no. They can sparkle. But for an LZ --

for them landing to an LZ with red illume, a burn is better

for them because it allows them to see a whole lot more.

BG COLT: And how big is the box when they are doing

that?

PB70BS: A football field.

PB65FS: I would say 500 meters or so. It's pretty big.

BG COLT: What the issue is, is how big have they been

projecting it.

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ASDAT3: How early that they call to the burn is one

minute, or 40 seconds asking for it any earlier than that?

PB65FS: No. We get the 6, 3, 1. That one-minute call

is when we say -- because their -- the 47s are (b)(1)1.4a models.

They only have FM. So they are up (b)(1)1.4a , so we can

talk to them. And we're relaying on Fires. Gun 2 talks to

(b)(1)1.4a to the (b)(3), (b)(6) element. Gun 1 talks to Fires.

And we relay on the one-minute call, burn or sparkle on.

SME-CH47: I would like to ask a couple questions: Prior

to launching your aircraft, did you get an S2 brief as part

of the mission planning?

PB65FS: Roger. We did during the brief.

BG COLT: AMB?

PB65FS: Yes, sir.

SME-CH47: And what did you think of the S-2 brief? Were

you comfortable with it? Did you feel like there's been a

lot of SAFIRES in the area recently that it might be a

concern there?

PB65FS: I mean, with Tangi, we knew it was a bad area.

We were prepared for that. The S-2 -- we knew the last time

the RSOA element went in there. The last time BARBARIAN,

which is what they were called then, went in there. We knew

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what to expect in Tangi.

It was no surprise. The S2 just gave us a recent update on

the SAFIRES. And basically, no coalition forces had went in

there since we pulled out. So we knew -- it was a good S-2

brief. And we knew exactly what the threat was at Tangi.

SME-CH47: The route selected to go into (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , the

first route that was planned, and the direction it was

planned -- this is probably not a good question for you, but

I want to get your thoughts about.

Was that plan based on a threat to come in from, basically,

the west to land 02 to your knowledge since your covering

it?

PB65FS: That was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c coming from the west. The way

it was, yeah. I would say that was a good landing direction

due to the fact Tangi was farther to the west. They landed

to the east of Tangi, more along Baraki Barak scales. With

Baraki, there's more targets of opportunities for their

engagements. They are not the attacks that we see at Tangi.

So the direction they went in, into the green zone where

they are not going to brown out, I would say, yes, that was

a good route.

SME-CH47: Now, the LZs, both (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and I believe

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was a moderate risk or (b)(1)1.4a LZ; is that correct to

your knowledge?

PB65FS: It was due to being unsecured, which it always

is on every initial infil. I believe it's red due to not

being secured.

SME-CH47: Okay. So you didn't believe it was red?

PB65FS: I don't know for sure. But, yeah, I think it

was red just due to not being secured by any ground force.

SME-CH47: Show time for the mission that day, what time

did you show up for work?

PB65FS: 2000.

SME-CH47: And on your ERAW, was your specific ERAW

signed and approved?

PB65FS: Yes.

SME-CH47: Okay. I didn't see it in the packet that we

got. So if we could get a copy of that, that would be good.

BG COLT: Do you have your flight routes? I don't

believe we've ever seen one.

PB65FS: We don't plan a fly route using [inaudible].

When we go to the aircraft, when they get us to the LZ, we

will type in the grid, give us a direct so we know how much

standoff we are using. And we will usually quad, unless

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there's a [inaudible], we will fly directly to where we need

to go, just a straight line.

BG COLT: But you know very specifically what the 47

route is, so that we don't create a track in the ground,

right? Consciously, if we know where the objective, we

maneuver to it, we don't fly to it?

PB65FS: Roger. We are familiar with -- when they post

up the 47s, we are familiar enough with their route that --

because they only have one FM, we will make ROSS calls for

them and everything like that. So I mean, we are familiar

with it. We don't directly fly over their route that

they're --

BG COLT: Is this specified or implied task that you

route clearance for them as well if you are in lead of them?

PB70BS: Just only based on the air threat, sir. If we

are briefed that they are going over an area that has more

than a low air threat, we will check the area out in advance

level.

But normally, it's low because of the way they plan their

routes specifically. I think they purposely choose the low

areas.

SME-MH47: Okay. What altitude did you fly en route?

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PB70BS: En route, Gun 1 is 1,000 feet AGL. And Gun 2,

based on if we shoot a loop or not [sic] either we stack

500 feet above that or well on up at around 12,000 MSL if we

are anticipating an illum shot.

SME-MH47: And then in a target area where do you drop --

where do you go to?

PB70BS: It's JTAC dependent. We start off with standoff

what they request. It's usually about 7k out that JTAC

wants us off the target for noise. As they get closer, they

bring us in closer and stage us down. They pull all the

assets in at that point. Usually, when they are over the

objective, we'll be anywhere from 1 to 3k at 1,000 feet AGL

over the target.

SME-MH47: Pretty much the whole night. So when you are

in the target area, you're about 1,000 feet AGL?

PB70BS: Right. We have the best fidelity with our

sensors, and we are in positions to fire in a 1 to 3k orbit.

We can roll in pretty quickly.

SME-CH47: Let me go back to that ERAW again. On the

ERAW it lists the amount of illumination and whether to

bring yellow or light. And it's green because you have the

MTABs I believe.

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PB65FS: Roger. The illumination really isn't a factor

for us --

SME-CH47: All right. Now, you also have a front-seater.

Which seat is flying with the night vision goggles? Because

I think the goggle box was checked that night. Is the rear

seat goggled, front seat is on the MTAB; is that the way it

was?

PB65FS: The way -- back-seater will usually be up-system

because that gives them the best SA. And that's the way we

were set up that day. Both back-seaters were up clear. The

front seater -- both front seaters was up goggles because we

can see sparkles, burns, everything like that. And we are

using the TDAK that sets in front of us for targeting and

everything like that.

SME-CH47: Understood. And does the -- your fighter --

do you have a fighter management spreadsheet that populates

the ERAW automatically? Is that the way it works?

PB65FS: If you going to have less than 10 hours for fire

management, you have to select something different, less

than 10 hours of rest. But it was selected that we had

greater than 10 hours because I think the night prior we

didn't fly, or we were done by 5:00 a.m.

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SME-CH47: Is that an automated spreadsheet that you log

your flight-time and your duty day time on? And does it

populate the ERAW automatically, or --

PB70BS: No, sir. It doesn't populate the ERAW

automatically. Our safety officer -- our company safety

officer, we have a separate spreadsheet. And he checks it

daily. And it tracks our duty hours and our flight time for

a cumulative 30 day roll-up. He keeps track of that. If

you start getting close to one of the limits, you know, he

brings it up so they can get a day off or whatever action

they're going to take.

SME-CH47: Now, when you fill out the ERAW before the

flight, and the names are put in the PC and that stuff, and

then there's flight times right behind it, now, those are

manually entered flight times?

PB65FS: Those are by the SP. He updates the ERAW excel

sheets. It's not updated daily, but it's updated probably

once or twice a week. And we will get a new version that we

have to start using for the ERAW to update those hours.

SME-MH47: Did y'all hear on the radio or anything from

the ground force that they were going to do an IRF? When

did you all first hear the IRF?

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PB65FS: It was before we broke for refuel. They were --

Striker had said something about they were trying to pull up

QRF to get the 280 series squirters that had moved to the

west.

At that point when we broke station for refuel, we made

COMMs with (b)(3), (b)(6) . They already had it loaded up. They

already had the route, and they were ready to go. And we

held them off, so we can launch again before them so we

could be overhead.

So I would say it was probably 30 minutes to 40 minutes

before they took off that we heard that they were starting

to spool up QRF or IRF assets.

SME-MH47: So you were working over the target area with

the ground force?

BG COLT: The 10 Series targets.

PB65FS: Right.

SME-MH47: Then you're still on station, and you heard

that (b)(3), (b)(6) was looking to perform an IRF, and you had to

get back in FARP and get back out in front of the lift

element on the way to (b)(1)1.4a . Did you know any fidelity of

the HLZ they were going to use? Did you know about (b)(1)1.4a ,

and then how long?

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PB65FS: No. We had not pushed over that far west.

There's a spur in Tangi that separates the east and the

west. We had not gone over that spur to the west where the

squirters had gone. We had only been over the 10 Series and

over our engagement area.

BG COLT: What would you say the lateral dispersion

between the area that you've been working two hours, and

that (b)(1)1.4a was?

PB70FS: 2k or so?

PB65FS: No. It was probably three miles maybe -- three

miles from where we were doing orbits to where (b)(1)1.4a

were.

TF KH CDR: Just to clarify your question there earlier.

Were you asking did they have a new LZ when they launched?

Was that your question?

BG COLT: No. Before they returned --

TF KH CDR: Before they returned --

BG COLT: -- the JTAC implied that they were

knowledgeable of where (b)(1)1.4a was. And I think he

communicated to us last night that his situational

understanding was that he thought that you had already gone,

and surveyed or conducted preliminary reconnaissance of

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(b)(1)1.4a prior to returning to the FARP.

PB65FS: No. We had not, and it was just due to the fact

we knew the IRF was spooling up, and we were low on fuel.

So we wanted to hurry up and have maximum station time for

their infil because we have seen infils slide to the right,

and if we would have been out of gas, they wouldn't have

been able to do anything. So we immediately return to the

FARP.

SME-MH47: Did you also re-arm?

PB65FS: No. Because we had only engage, what, 60 rounds

of .30 millimeter. So we still had 240 rounds in Gun 1.

And Gun 2 had 300 rounds. So we had enough to fulfill our

mission.

SME-MH47: FARP time is what? Ten minutes? How quickly

can you turn?

PB65FS: It was a 10-minute flight back, probably 10 to

15 minutes. So it's probably --

PB65BS: 35 or 40 minutes total turnaround time.

BG COLT: When you took off the second time, you only

FARP'ed once after the initial mission, right, came back,

got gas, and then launched out for IRF infil, correct?

(b)(6) nodded indicating an affirmative response.

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BG COLT: What route did you had take that time to go out

to (b)(1)1.4a ?

PB65FS: Directly north of Baraki, we stayed out of the

green zone, and flew directly north over the mountain range

directly to (b)(1)1.4a . Because at that point, we were hearing

from (b)(3), (b)(6) that the 280 squirters had separated. And

that's what we were perceiving as the biggest threat.

BG COLT: Okay. I would ask you guys if you could mark

that on a map for us after we are done, all right, and then

we'll move on. And then from a conscious perspective, you

knew the 47s launched, and you knew their intent was to go

west, northwest, fly it up, spark it around, call 6, 3, 1

inbound. And that point you had already made a definitive

LZ reconnaissance. Just tell us about, in your eyes, what

you felt you saw. We, obviously, have the gun tape, so we

captured that. But in your own thoughts now, what do you

think about the posture of (b)(1)1.4a in the surrounding area?

What did you observe?

PB65FS: From Gun 1 -- I will let Gun 2 speak. But Gun

1, my biggest threat was the squirters. So I never put eyes

on (b)(1)1.4a . I was more worried about finding the squirters

that would pose a threat to our guys when they were landing

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or when they were infilling the aircraft.

Gun 2 had made COMMs, and had eyes on the LZ. But I was

still trying to get eyes on the threat. I mean, that was up

until they started giving 6, 3, and 1-minute calls.

BG COLT: Do you ever have any situational awareness

through either any of the ISR platforms or a C2 node that

the two squirters had linked up with other military-aged

males, and occupied or gone to ground in another building?

PB65FS: Yes, from (b)(3), (b)(6) was probably our

biggest help that night. He give us one grid, which was

underneath some trees where he thought potentially two to

three squirters could still be at.

And then 280 Bravo which were just belonged to that group

split up. 280 Bravo had moved further to the west, just

south of the road into a big housing structure. And he had

saw two MAMS come out, look around and go back in. And at

that point that is where I was trying to get eyes on the

people that were further to the west in the buildings.

BG COLT: When we are done with this, I would like for

you to point that out to me on a GRG or something, all

right?

Okay. Gun 2, what did you see?

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PB70FS: At that point when they started calling their 6,

3, 1, I was looking at the LZ, just trying to make sure that

the burn was in the right spot --

BG COLT: At what range?

PB70FS: Probably about a K or two.

PB70BS: 2 K.

PB70FS: But I was looking around --

BG COLT: All with systems, or with goggles?

PB70FS: Both goggles and system. I was using goggles to

look down at this for the burn and make sure it was in the

right field, right spot. And I was using the T active

system to look at the LZ, sir.

The biggest threat that I saw was probably like the tree

lines because there was a lot of trees around there. So I

was making sure that no one was hunkered down. I was trying

to scan around, and trying to give (b)(3), (b)(6) a good LZ

brief, just find out there's no obstacles or hazards inside

the --

BG COLT: Okay. Was there any -- even though we didn't

hear anything on the gun tapes, or any kind of proactive

response out of (b)(3), (b)(6) did you pass in addition

to a CHERRY or ICE call, any kind of verbal description of

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the LZ?

PB70FS: I didn't give a description. I gave the winds,

and I told them -- I think I told them it was like a mile

brown or something. I gave them a brief description. It

could have been more detailed than what I gave them.

PB65FS: (b)(3), (b)(6) replied with "Roger". And then

that's when they said -- I believe they said, "Roger, three

minutes."

BG COLT: And do you remember a commentary about the

sparkle? I believe that there was commentary about "I don't

know why he's asking for it so soon."

SME-MH47: That's correct.

BG COLT: Or words to that effect. Was there ever a

one-minute call -- I mean from listening to the gun tape, it

sounded like was an incredulous comment that, He just asked

for the burn at three, why did he do that? I mean normally,

he calls at one." We're not even clear if there was even a

one-minute call, or if that was the moment that he was

struck.

PB65FS: I haven't seen the tape since it happened --

BG COLT: I would like to review that with you if I

could.

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PB65FS: I want to say that it was either (b)(3), (b)(6) --

there's a disconnect because they go H minus 2 a lot of

times, which we don't even put the sparkle or the burn down

on one-minute call.

So it could have been directed at them. I believe (b)(3), (b)(6)

called the one-minute, and that's when they got hit.

BG COLT: Here's a question: Did you ask for the burn,

or did (b)(3), (b)(6) burn on his own?

PB65FS: We asked.

BG COLT: Okay. You asked. Did you ask for sparkle, or

did he ever sparkle in this mission?

PB65FS: I mean, yeah. He sparkled throughout the whole

mission. At the whole time as we were working west of the

squirters, he was burning -- sparkling squirters as they

were moving because it gives us SA --

BG COLT: I'm talking about the HLZ specifically.

PB70FS: I couldn't tell you if the sparkle hit it. The

burn was so bright. The burn was definitely down there. As

you were saying that, I do recall a little bit. I'm not 100

percent. I would have to watch my video again.

Usually, they always call for burn a minute out and/or

sparkle, whatever they were given that night. I think they

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called it out "three-minutes," that's probably what set the

confusion off. We never get a call that early for sparkle

or for them looking for it -- or burn in this case.

BG COLT: Okay. You were fully aware that this was going

to be a one-ship landing. Were you aware of where 16 was

going to drop off and hold?

PB65FS: We weren't exactly aware. We knew they were

holding outside the valley --

PB70FS: It was like northwest or something.

PB65FS: -- because we were inside the valley, and we

knew that they were outside the valley. Honestly, they were

outside our area. And we were so worried about the

squirters and lead that it wasn't that important for us to

know exactly where they were holding.

BG COLT: Right. What was 17's light configuration when

he came inbound?

PB70FS: He was dark. He was really hard to see.

(b)(3), (b)(6) , is the ones that used to fly. I think they would

have the pink light on in the Chinooks or something like

that. And they would have their IR strobes on bright. So

they were always easy to pick up.

Well, (b)(3), (b)(6) doesn't fly around like that. They were

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actually – they were real hard for us to find.

NGB SME: You probably would have saw them on the FLIR

because, you know, it's irrelevant under FLIR. He can see

no matter what. Goggles, sometimes especially under black

illum to pick these guys out under goggles [sic] especially

if they are flying with no IR lighting on at all. Those

were blackout you believe? No external lights?

PB70FS: I don't know if you have like a control on there

--

SME-CH47: You can dim them.

PB70FS: -- I'm thinking it was dimmed. I'm just taking

a wild guess. I'm not 100 percent sure.

PB65FS: They were by no means bright. I don't know --

do you all have slime (ph) lights?

SME-CH47: That's normally in non-NVG mode.

PB65FS: They had some type of lighting. But it was not

bright. I mean they weren't glowing -- like, usually, their

strobe. If we are looking under goggles, and it's a big

glow, there was nothing glowing on 17 when I made I made eye

contact with them under goggles.

BG COLT: Okay. Can you just lead us through actions on

here inside the one-minute call.

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PB65FS: Coming in, eyes on squirters --

BG COLT: Tell us where you were relative to distance to

the target and 17 at that point.

PB65FS: We were directly over the squirters, which were

to the east of (b)(1)1.4a . We were probably 2k from (b)(1)1.4a

.

Due to the terrain, we were probably about 2000 feet AGL,

just due to the terrain and the spur, the way it came down.

(b)(3), (b)(6) was entering from the west. So we were

probably, initially, 6k from (b)(3), (b)(6) .

As we were going towards the west, right after the

three-minute call, I got eyes on (b)(3), (b)(6) . I told my

back-seater, Hey, I've got (b)(3), (b)(6) , go ahead and pick him

up. At that point, Gun 1 starts a slow left turn to pick

them up and follow them in the LZ.

At the one-minute call, that's when they got hit. And

that's when we immediately came in and searched for

survivors.

BG COLT: Okay. Can you describe what you physically saw

in the 47 itself, as far as, did you see structural

decomposition occur, or did you see the light and the next

thing --

PB65FS: We saw that -- under goggles, because I didn't

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have my system on because I was naked -- or I was under

goggles, there was some houses to the south that I saw the

initial flash from. It looked like the aft part of the

Chinook is where I saw the second flash with the sparks.

I distinctly remember seeing the sparks after I watched the

video because it just stood out to me. I don't know which

way the Chinook immediately turned. It immediately turned.

And within --

BG COLT: You could see it rotating?

PB65FS: Roger. Under five seconds, it was on the ground

in flames.

It was on -- it had already hit RP inbound, I believe. So I

mean, their altitude was between 100 to 150 feet, and they

were slowing to get into the LZ.

BG COLT: Okay. Perspectives of other crew members --

tell me what you saw.

PB65BS: From the back seat of Gun 1, I was out searching

for them under system because they were coming in low next

to the mountain, I was having a little trouble breaking them

out at the three-minute call. I picked them up shortly

after my front-seater got them. He gave me kind of a

distance direction. I got eyes on. We started a slow lift

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turning down to come around and pick up their six --

BG COLT: Who's on flight controls at that point?

PB65BS: I was, sir. We started a slow left turn inbound

right about the one minute call. I saw a very distinctive

red flash, something that almost looked like fireworks.

Then I saw the second hit what appeared to be the rear right

of the aircraft, and the aircraft immediately started to

spin and descend.

BG COLT: Okay.

PB70BS: At about the six-minute call, we started moving

to the west, sir, towards the mouth of the Tangi where it

intersects the Airborne Valley. We were a little bit higher

on the ridgeline because we were Gun 2. So we were on the

southern ridgeline heading west.

I could see the (b)(3), (b)(6) coming down the valley through

FLIR. He was up-googles in the front seat. And right when

we got broadside them, we were going to turn and come --

BG COLT: Whose on the flight controls?

PB70BS: I was, sir, the back-seater. As I saw passed,

they were pretty much right beside us to the left. That's

when I caught the flash of everything. It was all unaided

because it was off my left eye, a distinct red flash. It

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was very short, less than a second. So it had to be a close

range. But, you know, I saw it. It looked like it spun.

It did a 180 after it hit and then --

BG COLT: Can you recollect which degree you saw it spin?

PB70BS: I can say at least 180 degrees because it --

BG COLT: Which direction?

PB70BS: It looked like to the right, sir. It was hard

to tell, but it looked like it spun to the right. The

aircraft spun right.

ASDAT4: Was it clockwise or counter-clockwise?

PB70BS: Clockwise. This was all from an unaided

perspective. By the time I looked down at my system, I got

the PNVS. It was already on the ground at that point, so we

continued left.

I didn't descend at all because I knew Gun 1 was lower than

I was. So I kept -- stayed at the same altitude, turned

left and came around. That's when we started all the calls

to try to get some support in there.

SME-INTEL: How many points of origin did you observe?

PB70BS: I observed one, sir, distinct to the red one.

There was a little bit of confusion, but the group of qalats

that it appeared to come from was as a result of that

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general area. Everyone was thinking it was a little bit of

a different place, but there's pretty significant qalats are

on the bridge right there.

PB65BS: Right on the southern edge of the green zone,

there's two in particular off-set a little bit from a larger

group. There was the general consensus as to where it came

from.

BG COLT: Is it a general TTP of yours to engage a POO --

or suppress, I should say, a POO without PIDing the target?

PB65FS: Sir, I wouldn't say it's a TTP. I saw when they

went down. And if there was any survivors, I wanted

suppression fire to be placed where I thought the POO was.

I didn't fire at the qalats because that was where the POO

was right in the qalats that I shot directly to the right

of. I didn't PID anybody. So I put it down to save a spot

that I thought where they were survivors. If there was

another attack coming, it wouldn't have came.

BG COLT: Okay. To be clear, again, you felt that the

POO came from those structures?

PB65FS: Absolutely, sir. Between the two guys on

goggles in the front seats, and the two guys up system, the

two guys with the goggles -- there's two triangle buildings

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directly to the south of the (b)(3), (b)(6) crash site.

That's where it seemed like it came, from us, from our

perspective. The guys that were unaided said it was a

little further to the east, the next group of qalats --

BG COLT: We'll have you point to those when we are

done --

PB65FS: Directly to the south is where they --

SME-MH47: Okay. How many rounds did you fire?

PB65FS: 100, sir. I'm not 100 percent sure.

SME-MH47: We got you down for 70. That's what the story

board --

PB65FS: Yeah. It was probably 70. Yeah, that's -- it

was 70 to 100 rounds.

BG COLT: Okay.

SME-MH47: And what they shot at, sir, is different than

what a line of people are saying as far as the POO what its

being assessed as.

BG COLT: I understand. And what I take Gun 1's PC to

have said was, he selected an area that he felt was

clear/safe, and put out a suppression burst, I guess, as a

method to deter someone maneuvering to the downed aircraft.

PB65FS: Roger. Due to ROE and tactical directives, I

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couldn't fire at the building where I thought the POO was,

so I aimed directly to the west of the building --

SME-MH47: Okay. I understand now. That's my bad.

Ground Force SME: Can you describe -- going back to when

you saw the strike. Did the aircraft rotate rapidly or was

it a slow rotation.

PB65BS: It rotated very quickly, sir. As soon as we saw

the second flash, the aircraft started to spin and descend.

Immediately, I thought it got hit in the rotor system.

SME-CH47: Let me ask this: How much time would you

estimate from the red flash from the qalat, to the flash of

the aircraft? How many seconds? One second? Three

seconds?

PB70BS: Less than a second.

SME-CH47: Less than a second. And the distance between

the two of you, you think, if you were guestimating?

PB65FS: It was probably 100 meters. 200 meters max.

SME-CH47: 100 to 200 meters is what you think?

PB70BS: It was very close range shot, it appeared to be.

ASDAT4: Clarify for Gun 1, you said your two kilometers

to the east. So does that mean that (b)(3), (b)(6) was coming

almost in, directly towards you so you were looking at the

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front of the aircraft?

PB65FS: When they were making their 6, 3 and 1, at that

point, we started going outbound from looking for the

squirters. We were headed due west on the ridgeline to pick

up their six.

So we were probably a little further behind them than Gun 2

was the actual impact hit, and we were starting our left

turn to pick up their six as they were coming in.

ASDAT4: So you were looking at the side of the aircraft

when they took the hit basically?

PB65FS: Yes, correct.

ASDAT4: So now, looking from that direction, did they

take the hit on the side of the aircraft you were looking at

or on the opposite side of the aircraft that we were looking

at?

PB65FS: But it was -- to me, under goggles, it was far

enough in the rear of the aircraft where I saw the sparks

behind the aircraft as they were moving.

ASDAT4: So knowing that the rear blade system turns

clockwise, do you believe it would be in the 3:00 o'clock

axis with those blades moving through?

PB65FS: Roger. I would say that it got hit on the 3:00

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o'clock of the rear of the aircraft.

ASDAT4: Thank you.

BG COLT: After the aircraft went down, you shot, you

reported. What was your situational awareness about who the

AMC was then? The on-site AMC, who was it?

PB65FS: For the on-scene commander?

BG COLT: Yes.

PB65FS: For the on-scene commander, (b)(3), (b)(6) called it

up. So we -- to me (b)(3), (b)(6) has better SA of all aircraft.

So I was going to let (b)(3), (b)(6) do it.

Gun 1 was lower, so I didn't have COMMs with battalion. And

my primary purpose was getting the ground guys over there,

and to make sure no one went to the crash site. That was my

whole purpose after the crash.

BG COLT: How long and where did you orbit after --

PB65FS: We orbited at 1,000 feet until we were bingo and

had to refuel. We stayed directly at 1,000 feet 2k over

that crash site until we were bingo and had to --

BG COLT: And then did you refuel and return --

PB65FS: Yes.

BG COLT: To the same site?

PB65FS: Yes, sir.

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BG COLT: And you stayed there how long that time?

PB65FS: At that point, we had used our duty day, and we

were on our nine-hour battalion extension.

BG COLT: Were you aware that 1 Bravo was maneuvering

then -- from the vicinity of your original enemy engagement

west of the Building 10 complex toward the objective?

PB65FS: Yes. There was a little confusion when it first

went down. (b)(3), (b)(6) was wanting to know where the -- when we

sat the birds down he was trying to get COMMs. And we tried

to relay to him the bird has been hit.

He then asked where's Lift 2 going to put the QRF. And at

that point, I told him there was no Lift 2, everybody was on

Lift 1 and it all went down --

BG COLT: Who said that?

PB65FS: I relayed that to (b)(3), (b)(6) that there was no Lift

2. Lift 1 was it. At that point, I believe he was on

command. I don't know because it was a little bit of

silence, and he immediately started working his guys up, and

they were going to secure the crash site.

At that point, I continued to look in the green zone, Gun 2,

because they were in the high bird, and they had SA. They

got eyes on them, and walked them into the crash site.

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So I believe that before we broke station for our second

FARP turn, (b)(3), (b)(6) had secured the crash site. It was a

matter of 45 minutes to 50 minutes from the time it went

down to the time they were on the crash site.

SME-MH47: Was the AWT, did you handoff with them? Did

you ever at one have four 64s over the site?

PB65FS: We did handoff to them, and it was for a FARP

turn only. It was 30 minutes and we were back on station.

But, yes, we did hand off to them so we could go FARP.

PB70BS: There may be been a comment on the tape (b)(3), (b)(6)

the QRF out of Sharana, came through the area. We

commented -- I remember distinctly commenting on what's that

other 64. They transited around us because they were coming

up for the Fallen Angel.

And we didn't have COMMs with them right away. We got a

hold of them on air-to-air, and told them to talk to X-ray,

and see how they were going to sequence them in. But I do

remember commenting on that because it caught us off guard.

There was another 64 came by us, and we didn't know who they

were for a second there.

BG COLT: At any time after the crash sequence, did you

observe local Afghans coming out of any of those buildings

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towards the objective?

PB65FS: Nobody came towards the objective. There was

nobody in the green zone. To the southeast, (b)(3), (b)(6)

initially called some pax out, labeled them "1 Charlie," but

they stayed internal to the the courtyard area.

But I believe there was around 5 pax to the southeast

probably 200 or 300 meters from the crash site. There was

nobody that came out, nobody that came to the green zone.

Nobody had crawled out on the roofs to take a look.

BG COLT: What would you judge the distance between the

280 series buildings and where you thought the point of

origin came from?

PB65FS: A mile and a half to two miles due west --

southwest. The 280 series were to the east. The POO was to

the southwest a mile and a half to two miles.

BG COLT: Anybody else?

ASDAT4: Did you see any subsequent shots whether it was

immediately or afterward?

PB65BS: No. We never saw any back-seat lead. I had a

good naked eye look at the area, obviously, because the

aircraft was burning brightly. But there were a lot of

secondary explosions from the aircraft caught on the tape.

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We never saw any movement or any fires of any kinds towards

the aircraft or the crash site.

PB65FS: When we were saying earlier, "the second flash,"

that was the impact. There was only one flash -- or one

shot. But the second flash is the impact that we're talking

about.

ASDAT3: I want to go back to do some of the geometry.

So from Gun 1's perspective, we understand that you are

looking at the aircraft, the detonation occurs on the right

side of the aircraft, the opposite side of which you were

looking at. Detonation occurs somewhere around 3:00 o'clock

on outboard deck.

Let's go to the launch site point of origin. Where in

relation to the nose of the helicopter from 17? Where is

that shot taken from?

I heard earlier 100 to 150 --

TF KH CDR: Did you want them to draw it?

BG COLT: Yes, absolutely.

(PB65FS moves to whiteboard uses dry erase pens to sketch the

terrain and events.)

PB65FS: You've got the south down range, the north are

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on range and (b)(1)1.4a right there. Gun 1 and Gun 2 are up

here respectively. You've got the two triangle buildings

that are right here, Gun 1 and Gun 2. (b)(3), (b)(6) is

somewhere about right here.

It seemed like it came -- the initial came from the front of

the aircraft. And as the aircraft moved, it impacted about

right there on the aft portion of the aircraft, is what it

looked like.

And then the other buildings the naked -- people that were

unaided was right next to the triangle buildings, and that's

where they seem to think the POO originated from there. And

the guys on the goggles saw it from the two triangle modes.

ASDAT3: Okay. So point of origin to detonation on the

aircraft probably 150 meters. Can you draw where your

suppression fires went?

PB65FS: Right there.

ASDAT3: During the suppression fires, (b)(3), (b)(6) makes a

comment to (b)(3), (b)(6) something registered in the areas of the

suppression fires. Do you have any idea what that means?

PB65FS: I don't know if they have a system that picks up

flashes, kind of, like our PTIDS does. But, yeah, he made

that point. And I remember distinctly -- and I have asked

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(b)(3), (b)(6) if they have some system. I'm not familiar, but he

said something registered at the place where I was putting

the suppression fire.

PB70BS: We are not sure if it was a CMOS or some sort of

declaration like that with -- dealing with UV. I do know

that there -- our aircraft, their aircraft and the C130 also

declared shortly after this. We attributed it to the

secondaries of the Chinook as what was setting it off, but

we are not sure.

ASDAT3: No false declarations or no declarations prior

to the event, correct?

PB65FS: No.

(SME-MH47 moves the white board and begins sketching.)

SME-MH47: Could you take a marker and just kind of

pretend like that red marker is the Chinook coming down the

green zone.

Just go ahead and lay the marker up like this. So it's

coming down towards the HLZ, and then it gets hit. Keep

going, right about there. And now, it starts to turn. Can

you show me how it turned?

PB65FS: I was under goggles. I know it turned. I don't

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know if it turned clockwise or counter-clockwise --

PB70BS: It looked like it turned clockwise.

SME-MH47: So I would like to know how many times did it

turn?

PB65BS: It made about 180 degrees.

PB65FS: If it's coming down, it took the hit 180 degrees

and then crashed.

PB65BS: Yeah. That's how I saw it. I had -- I kind of,

was -- my perspective was a little off. But when I first

saw the flash, it drew my attention out to my naked eye to

try and see where it was.

I saw the second flash, and I then I concentrated back on my

system, and that's when I saw the aircraft was already

spinning. It took the hit and then immediately start

spinning and coming down. And it look like it hit, just

almost back in first, and as it hit, it slid.

SME-MH47: Okay.

PB65BS: It hit and descended very rapidly. Just

instantaneous, it started to spin as it came down.

PB65FS: The only continued flight that it had basically

was the inertia of it was already going forward because it

immediately started descending on impact.

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SME-MH47: About what air speed do you think they were

hitting?

PB65FS: I would say 80 knots or less.

SME-MH47: In the past working with other lift elements,

have they ever -- as they get in close to their HLZ, do you

ever notice them throw on their peak light to confirm HLZ?

PB70FS: (b)(3), (b)(6) did it a lot.

PB65FS: It's been done. But most of the time it's been

done when there's only sparkle out; burned very rarely due

to the fact it lights up so good. And illum, I would say

very rarely because illum will light up a K or a K+ area.

So usually just when we put down sparkle from (b)(3), (b)(6) or

something, is the only time I've really seen it. But it

could be the only time because it's not light outside.

SME-MH47: And these guys -- (b)(3), (b)(6) generally didn't

do it -- or they didn't do it that night?

PB65FS: Roger. I don't remember seeing it that night.

I never -- under goggles, there was no light that was on

their aircraft.

BG COLT: I realize it's a very subjective question. But

in your estimation, he looked like he was in a good attitude

in order to make the LZ -- attitude and air speed.

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PB65FS: Yes. He was not -- he wasn't flaring it to

decelerate or anything. He was at a level attitude

continuing his approach to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c .

ASDAT4: For the two front-seaters up front with their

goggles, standing off to the east of those guys, you said

you had a very hard time picking them out.

Looking up the valley to the west and behind them, was there

any significant lighting from Juy Zarrin, and are there

any --

PB65FS: Juy Zarrin --

ASDAT4: -- other stuff to backlight them either to the

naked eye or to -- you know, with some goggles?

PB65FS: Where the point of impact was, Juy Zarrin was

directly to the north. And, yes, that could have

silhouetted them. We were literally under goggles. It was

red alone. We were having a hard time seeing them due to

the fact it was dark and they were dark. I mean, there was

no --

ASDAT4: Right. I understand that. But what I'm asking

is: Was there enough light from that village or anywhere

else behind them to silhouette even to your goggles?

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PB65FS: No. To your goggles a little bit. With Juy

Zarrin, as they started coming in, they started lighting up.

Because father to the west, there's just very small qalat

structures or small villages. There's not anything as big

as Juy Zarrin.

As they got closer -- I don't know if it was because we were

getting closer to them, or I had finally just seen them,

but, yes, they started breaking out easier, and being lit up

more.

ASDAT3: Did the light level change at Juy Zarrin?

PB65FS: Not that I remember, sir. It didn't flash.

They didn't turn the lights on -- turn them back on.

Nothing --

ASDAT3: How about post to that?

PB65FS: No. All lights remained on.

ASDAT3: From the suspected point of origin there that's

elevated ground, you guys came down to the south. Were you

able to, kind of, look at that azimuth from the point of

origin to where the aircraft laid to Juy Zarrin to, kind of,

estimate if there was a backlighting situation there?

PB65BS: Later in the day, when we were still pulling

security in the area, once daylight had broke, we talked

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about that. That might had been a possibility. Based on

where it was, there might have been enough light to

silhouette the helicopter to give whoever the shooter was, a

better idea of the area to aim at.

But at least unaided, it never appeared that there was a

significant light source of any kind that would silhouette a

perfect shape of an aircraft. At best, you might get one or

two outlines of the body, just based on what I have seen

unaided.

TF KH CDR: If you look at the breadcrumb trails, it'll

tell you the exact altitude that they were at, at that last

point, and you can look -- if you take that on a topo map,

you can figure out the elevation and all that stuff.

BG COLT: Yeah. We are going to fly it in SIM. And

incidentally when we fly this at SIM, we are going to want

you to try to say, Yeah, that looked like it, all right?

ASDAT3: At the point of origin, were there any lights at

the point of origin? You know, ambient lighting in around

-- they have one light? Two lights? Three lights?

PB70FS: It was in the river bed. I don't remember

seeing any lights.

PB65FS: Are you talking about the point of origin?

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PB70BS: All those qalat structures were lit up. I mean,

they all had the normal amount of qalat lighting that's easy

to see out here.

ASDAT3: Okay. And that's what I'm looking for right

there.

PB65FS: The two triangle qalats, I don't think they had

lights on. But the qalats structure that the unaided

back-seaters saw directly to the east, those were lit up

qalats, the same as a normal qalat would be lit up, no

spotlights or anything like that, but just normally lit up.

PB65BS: The two triangles ones are kind of tucked in

right to the southern edge of the green zone. So if there

were any lights on that, based on where we were, we had

trouble seeing them or they might have been covered.

ASDAT3: Okay. This is an opinion question: You are

trained on the fully, dark, adapted unaided eye, you are at

the point of origin and your aircraft was 100 to 150 meters

away from you, do you think you would be able to see that

aircraft prior to the fire?

PB65FS: I would say when it comes into Juy Zarrin,

you're going to silhouette. Yes, it will silhouette.

PB70BS: I would agree.

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SME-MH47: Approximately 40 minutes after the crash,

there was containment fires in the vicinity of the crash

site, the eight that y'all conducted. Where was that in

relation to the crash?

PB65FS: That was on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c . I did that, and that was

because they were bringing the (b)(3), (b)(6) in. Is that what

you're referring to?

SME-MH47: Yes.

PB65FS: They were bringing the (b)(3), (b)(6) in. And if

there was anybody out there that was going to pose a

threat -- we didn't see anybody. But I put containment

fires or suppression fires directly on (b)(1)1.4a as the

Black hawks were coming in from the southeast. And it was

just to keep anybody's that would potentially been a threat

or popped up to keep their head down.

SME-MH47: And then later on there was four vehicles that

were observed moving towards the crash site, and you also

fired on those?

PB65FS: No. I never fired on any vehicles.

Ground Force SME: (b)(3), (b)(6) did not go in. It would

be (b)(1)1.4a correct?

PB65FS: No. It was basically (b)(1)1.4a . I mean, it

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might have been a little bit off. But they came from a

different direction.

PB65BS: Definitely the same area that they were going

to.

TF KH CDR: When we set aside with the (b)(3), (b)(6)

, I

talked to (b)(3), (b)(6) myself. He was initially reluctant

to put more guys on the ground because the rangers were

already en route. But when he realized how many more we

could put on the ground, with the potential for Tangi

erupting, you know, he and I discussed it. And we decided

to put the (b)(3), (b)(6) down on the ground.

We came up with a different TTP. I talked to the pilots

directly, had the right pilots to do it. They were going to

come in low, fast from the south to the north, and then the

Apaches were going to be right behind them to cover left and

right. And that's why they put down the suppressive fire

too, just to keep their heads down.

Because we've notice that anytime anybody gets ticked up out

here, all you have to do is put a few rounds, even in close

proximity and they stop firing. So that's why we adopted

that and put the Pathfinders on the ground.

Ground Force SME: From a task perspective, when you left

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your first FARP, what did you understand your task to be?

PB65FS: When we left our first FARP, the task was to get

eyes on the 280 squirters, those were the threats, and to

allow (b)(3), (b)(6) to put the QRF in, so they could move to the

east to detain the squirters.

Ground Force SME: You knew they were coming in, in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , correct?

PB65FS: Roger. We had the grid. We had already typed

it up, and we were going to get handovers from (b)(3), (b)(6) and

(b)(3), (b)(6) for the squirters, and we were prepared to -- we were

going to go up a different fires net because Uniform 2 was

going to control us --

Ground Force SME: At what point?

PB65FS: At the point that he touched the ground. We had

made COMMs with him on (b)(3), (b)(6) before they had taken

off. We made COMMs with (b)(3), (b)(6) that we would --

because they were ready to take off, and we told them to

wait, let us refuel, and we will push out ahead.

At that point, we pushed out. We went out Juliette. They

went out Kilo, which would have gave them a more northwest

for their route. We went direct, got handovers from

(b)(3), (b)(6) with sparkle.

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Gun 2 got eyes on the LZ, and then I got eyes on them as

they got hit. But what we were tracking was Uniform 2 was

going to control us -- once they hit the ground, we were

going to switch up to FD3. Uniform 2 was going to control

us. And I don't know how the stack was going to move to

help (b)(3), (b)(6)

BG COLT: So you'd say that (b)(3), (b)(6) sparkled the LZ 10

minutes prior to arrival?

PB65FS: No. We were sparkling squirters. We never

sparkled the LZ until it was --

BG COLT: I thought you said they sparkled on your way

back out.

PB65FS: They were sparkling the squirters because we

were under goggles, and under the system to get eyes on

these squirters because we couldn't find where they were

hiding.

BG COLT: So they were stationery at that point?

PB65FS: Yes. They had split and (b)(3), (b)(6) Alpha was still

under the trees. (b)(3), (b)(6) Bravo had moved into the buildings.

Ground Force SME: That's what I was going to ask.

I know we talked about it before. How early were you guys

-- how long prior to (b)(3), (b)(6) TOT were you guys over that

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area?

PB65FS: I would say 10 minutes total. We pushed over

that spur. And within nine to ten minutes was when they

were making their one-minute call and they were down.

Ground Force SME: Any issue from your guys perspective

on your in supporting an IRF infil controlled by (b)(3), (b)(6) ,

and then switching over to UNIFORM when he gets on the

ground?

PB65FS: No. No issue with us due to the fact that

(b)(3), (b)(6) is the JTAC. We still had COMMs with (b)(3), (b)(6) .

I mean, at that point until they hit the ground, we really

have nothing to do with the JTAC because there's nothing,

really, they can control.

PB70FS: We --

BG COLT: Actually, (b)(3), (b)(6) , right?

PB65FS: Roger.

BG COLT: (b)(3), (b)(6) was still on the ground --

PB65FS: (b)(3), (b)(6) --

BG COLT: -- you were still working for him --

PB65FS: -- and then when (b)(3), (b)(6) --

BG COLT: Got boots on the ground --

PB65FS: -- we were going to switch up FD2, and he was

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going to take control.

Ground Force SME: Thank you.

SME GFN1: At any time when you came and checked in and

got the handover from (b)(3), (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) on the squirters, did

they talk about the condition of the LZ or the area

surrounding it at all?

PB65FS: Honestly, sir, I don't think anybody had really

looked at the LZ. I mean, at any time if we would have

found these squirters, or they would have found weapons, we

were -- the way I was understanding it, we were going to be

clear to engage due to the fact that they had weapons, but

we had to PID them first.

So we hadn't started looking at the LZ yet, just due to

there was so much more of a threat to the east with the

squirters. I would say that on the three-minute call is

when Gun 2 started -- you see a system on the tape -- start

looking at the LZ, giving an LZ brief op. I would say that

was the first time that we really had eyes on the LZ.

BG COLT: Can you describe for me both AMCs, your

decision criteria on a (b)(1)1.4a call, what constitutes

each in your mind and a methodology for LZ reconnaissance or

security?

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PB65FS: For mine -- for (b)(1)1.4a , when they went into

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , there was two guys on it. They didn't have

weapons. They weren't a threat. They were running for

their life because they scared shitless.

So to me, that's not a (b)(1)1.4a , just due to the fact

that they are not -- excuse me -- that is a (b)(1)1.4a

because they are not posing a threat. They were trying to

the get off the LZ.

The only thing is somebody with a weapon or somebody that's

hiding, moving tactically in a position to effect the

aircraft would --

BG COLT: Would constitute a?

PB65FS: An (b)(1)1.4a -- (b)(1)1.4a I'm sorry.

SME-MH47: What's y'all TTPs if you do call a (b)(1)1.4a ?

What is the heat lifted? They go into holding until you --

PB65FS: We put them in holding. And at that point, it

falls in on their ground force commander along with the JTAC

who will relay through (b)(1)1.4a .

If they want to escalate force, we will go through that way

to escalate force. If not, we have held our lift asset off

in a three-minute hold, and picked an LZ that was away from

the QT tents or any threat that we could have saw.

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BG COLT: In this particular case, or in previous (b)(3), (b)(6)

mission, had they always or never or sometimes designated

alternate LZs? We saw no evidence of any planning for

alternates.

PB70BS: They usually brief alternatives, sir. They have

alternatives for that. I have been on two missions with

(b)(3), (b)(6) where we have observed people on the initial LZ on the

primary. We called it back to them and the GFC aborted one

mission completely because they didn't want to give away, I

guess, the element of surprise. And the other, they

diverted to an alternate.

I don't specifically remember this mission in particular

briefing the alternatives. But I'm pretty sure we did

because they usually have alternative LZs that they use.

Like he was saying, we observed the two people initially on

the LZ. They didn't appear to be acting in a threating

manner. In all, they were obviously -- it looked like they

were farming, and they were just caught, and they realized

that there were two helicopters coming in. And they were

running. I mean, they literally were about to kill

themselves trying to get out of the area.

We have seen LZs before where people are moving a little bit

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more suspiciously and it's always been aborted. We have

never escalated.

But the alternatives, they are usually always briefed. I

don't remember specifically for this mission that they

probably were. I just I don't remember that night.

TF KH CDR: When you were asking about the alternative

LZ, you were referring to the last one with the insertion of

the ARF, correct? Not the initial ones; is that right?

BG COLT: Both. I never saw an AMB or any of the

pre-mission products, anything that designated anything

other than (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c And no intent communicated

that one of those was going to be an alternate.

PB65FS: For (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , that was the only grid we had

received. And I mean it was just passed over the radio that

this is where the QRF was going to go, here's the grid.

SME-MH47: Did both Chinooks land together into (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

or were they separated by a treeline?

PB65FS: It was just a big -- basically, a big open

field, and they both landed simultaneously or close to

simultaneously. I remember that because they both -- all

the pax had eyes on the movers that we saw running off the

LZ.

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BG COLT: Online or in trail?

PB65FS: Online. I believe they touched down on maybe

echelon right or echelon left.

BG COLT: Okay.

SME-CH47: What were the conditions of the LZ when they

landed? Was it dusty? Dry?

PB65FS: It was a green zone. So it wasn't that horribly

dusty --

PB70BS: There was some dust kicked up, but it wasn't

that bad.

SME-GFN2: Was this the first time you conducted primary

mission planning with (b)(3), (b)(6) and JTAC as opposed to

UNIFORM?

PB70BS: I can't remember if that was the first mission

we did specifically with the (b)(3), (b)(6) Team from when they had

ripped out before. I know we did do it with (b)(3), (b)(6) quite

often. But I don't recall specifically.

SME-GFN2: Was (b)(3), (b)(6) there for mission primarily? I

know you -- obviously, you might have talked on the phone.

Is there any input from (b)(3), (b)(6) ?

PB65FS: I don't think on that day. I believe there was

a day prior because Tangi had come up a couple days that

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they were going to go in there, and look for these guys. I

remember specifically one or two days before, I talked to

(b)(3), (b)(6) on what he was expecting from us, what we could

help him with, and just a brief

outline of what was going on in this area.

SME-GFN2: One more question: So during all this

planning, was there any discussions of deliberating using

that IRF?

PB65FS: No. Not that I remember. It was never

discussed until those squirters had moved off to the west,

was the first time we had heard that it was on the table.

I mean, it has been briefed that QRF, as always the team

that doesn't go, but there was nothing specifically for this

mission that it was going to happen this way.

SME-CH47: Have you ever supported any previous mission

which they launched?

PB65FS: Not QRF. But, now, they carried 10 pax of IRF

with RSOA to have squirter interdiction with the third

aircraft. But never with (b)(3), (b)(6) .

TF KH CDR: We've discussed it at the command level, or

during the meet and greets. We discussed the capability of

having ARFs. Our main discussion was getting the UH60s out

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there to help support them if those assets were available,

and putting either (b)(3), (b)(6) , ARF, or even (b)(3), (b)(6) .

BG COLT: And just for the record, describe the ARF.

PB65FS: Aerial Reaction Force.

BG COLT: Thank you.

TF KH CDR: But beyond the discussion point, we discussed

it. I discussed with (b)(3), (b)(6) myself about using that

and building that capacity. But it had not been

implemented. Actually, it had only been implemented at one

time as an SSC for a (b)(3), (b)(6) strike that we did during the

daytime.

SME-GFN2: There's a little confusion on the terminology

because we keep going back from IRF to QRF --

BG COLT: Exactly.

SME-GFN2: -- this is me, and I'm not saying we don't all

speak the same language. But an IRF is a preplanned base

contingency. Meaning, if the enemy does this, and we do

this --

PB65FS: IR --

SME-GFN2: [inaudible] for immediate reaction. A QRF is

a reaction to an emergency event.

PB65FS: Yeah. The IRF is always planned into the

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mission; that was eight to ten guys dedicated on a bird for

the IRF, like you're saying, it's planned. If enemies

squirt to the east, we're putting down here to do that.

The ARF is just an Aerial Reaction Force; and, QRF is the

same ground based, or in the air, it turns into an ARF

rather than a QRF.

SME-GFN2: Thank you.

Ground Force SME: Was there any discussion about

shooting containing fires to support (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c infil?

PB65FS: No. The way Tangi is broken up, there's been no

Americans in that valley. So any time there's no Americas,

you have got no reporting on threats. Honestly, that

western valley, I didn't perceive it as that bad of a threat

as than actual Tangi Valley. I knew it was bad because we

didn't go in there. But nothing ever happened there because

we never went in there.

Ground Force SME: Yeah. The way containment fires, you

know, shoot at [inaudible] --

PB65FS: Yeah.

Ground Force SME: I mean, you guys know the deal. I

just wanted -- because we heard it yesterday. I'm not sure

from exactly who was talking about it, pre-assault fires to

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support is that infil which --

PB65FS: That was not discussed. That is something

that's happened since then that we're trying to work in the

TTPs in hostile areas. But for that, that was not -- we did

not see the need due to the fact everything had happened to

the east, to draw attention to the west where we have never

landed before, ever.

BG COLT: In the vicinity of where the aircraft went down

you had never conducted a landing there --

PB65FS: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , from what I know of this AO, I cannot

name an operation that has went on, an air assault or

anything that went on in that area.

TF KH CDR: And to get back to your question about

pre-assault fires, the ROE and tactical directorate are

pretty specific about what we can and can't do.

Ground Force SME: From my experience, pre-assault fires

are next to impossible. Containment fires, I mean, you guys

do it all the time. I'm just wondering if there was any

talk about that because, I mean, sometimes just to draw

attention. I just wanted to clarify. Thank you.

ASDAT4: On your initial insertion into (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c you said

you had a few farmers out there. Obviously, you guys were

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looking at those and made the (b)(1)1.4a . How far out was the

assault element from landing when those guys noticed they

were inbound?

PB65FS: When we received the three-minute calls, I think

when we got eyes on, Gun 2 was the one that initially got

eyes on. I had more of a wide scan. So it was at the

three-minute call. Once I got eyes on, which was about the

one minute call -- so they were still a K or more away on

their approach.

Me being front seat lead, I made the assessment that they

weren't a threat; that we could continue with the landing.

So they were probably about a K, and K and a half away.

BG COLT: Do you expect they were reacting to them, or to

your presence?

PB65FS: At that time, we were behind the Chinooks. So

they were reacting to the Chinooks. And, I mean, they were

just scared.

ASDAT4: You think they heard them about a K or a K and a

half away?

PB65FS: Yes. At least that's when they knew that they

were coming to their area. I mean they might have heard

them before. But about a K or K and a half a little over a

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minute is when they could tell that they were approaching

them.

TF KH CDR: There's only so much you can do in that

valley with sound. You know, by looking at the breadcrumb

trials, they tried to stay on the high ground, skirt the

southern edge before they were RP inbound just to mask some

of that sound. But it's a valley, and sound is going to

travel. So you can only do so much.

SME-CH47: So I guess the question, for me, is you

escorted the Chinooks into (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c from behind -- from

further than a click and a half and you joined up to escort

them in?

PB65BS: We actually -- they started turning RP inbound.

We made a right turn in behind them. Because of when we

picked them up, we never really got down low to their

altitude. That's kind of the TTP we picked up now, is to

come down at their at their altitude.

So we were high and behind them. I would say less than a

kilometer though. It was probably about 5 to 800 meters.

In an area where we needed to implement a weapons system,

front-seater had an area where he was cleared then to shoot

anything that would have been a threat.

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SME-CH47: Is that the TTP -- the standard TTP you use?

PB65FS: Roger. Lead will usually follow them in every

LZ they went to.

SME-CH47: So when they went to the second one, you

really weren't in that position --

PB65FS: We weren't in position due to the fact of the

threat. The threat was to the east, and we were trying to

get eyes on a threat that was going to pose -- was going to

be the greatest risk to them.

At the point that we picked them up, we attempted to

maneuver behind them, but we weren't able to.

SME-CH47: Understood.

TF KH CDR: And that's usually because they are RP

inbound is when they come up behind them.

BG COLT: For clarification, you said "that's where the

threat was." You are still referring to the (b)(3), (b)(6) Alpha and

Bravo. But in your assessment from (b)(3), (b)(6) Alpha and Bravo,

those forces at the time could not have applied effective

fires against the aircraft on its approach to the LZ?

PB65FS: Not the approach. But when they would have been

at their LZ, they would have been within -- from (b)(3), (b)(6) Bravo,

I believe it was close to 600 meters, maybe closer from LZ

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c to (b)(3), (b)(6) Bravo. (b)(3), (b)(6) was probably 800 to a K away.

But those guys -- the reason why we saw them as such a

threat is because they had squirted from a place where had

just engaged six individuals that were heavily armed moving

in a very military manner.

So we assessed that these guys were trained military. They

weren't just five guys that picked up a weapon for a weekend

of fun. These guys were legitimately, to me, the real

thing, and that's where we saw the threat.

Not from the west, which was basically the green zone. But

when they hit the ground, we thought that's when they were

going to receive fire.

LA: With regards to the two farmers, the infil time was

what to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Do you remember?

PB70BS: 1830 Zulu.

LA: And I know you've flown a lot of missions. Is it

pretty common to see folks out doing those activities?

PB70BS: Yes, sir.

PB65FS: Even so far in the night that you’d think it's

not common, they will be out there working on their

irrigation. So, I mean, at all times of the night they

work.

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LA: (b)(6) , you mentioned that somebody does an

air route assessment, and then if it's a high threat, then

you guys will do a route clearance; is that correct?

PB70BS: We will check a point, sir, that fall within

anything other than a low. But we rarely ever have a

(b)(3), (b)(6) even when we were working with RSOA.

They purposely won't plan their route out to go well out of

these areas.

If there's ever a point that it has to intersect an area

that has other than a low air threat, we will scan it ahead

of them just to briefly check it out. But we've -- they are

really good about that.

LA: Who does the assessment?

PB70BS: As far as air threat?

LA: Yeah. Who would look at the route and make the

assessment?

PB70BS: The S-2 usually. They put their input in for

the entire AO. They know the areas that are other than a

low air threat because of the reconnaissance discussed that

we have found out here -- RPGs. So the S-2 always will show

the areas that are a moderate or above air threat.

LA: And that gets briefed to you when?

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PB70BS: During the AMB, sir.

LA: Did that happen on this for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

PB70BS: Yes, sir. Every time, the S-2 is really good

about briefing us.

LA: Did you get any kind of assessment for the inbound

to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

PB70BS: That whole valley -- but specifically, like he's

talking about, the eastern portion of it, there was an op

there two or so months prior to that where, not only

(b)(3), (b)(6) , but RSOA got a significant amount of RPGs --

BG COLT: That's actually southeast of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c correct?

PB65FS: No. It was in Tangi Valley, which was northwest

of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c There's a big spur that separates the Tangi

Valley from this valley that's off to the west where (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

was. So all this stuff happened in the east in the Tangi

Valley by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

And for the S-2 portion for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c no, we didn't receive it

because we were on the mission. We received all our updates

based on what we knew about Tangi and from (b)(3), (b)(6) that

they were ready to go. There was one aircraft going in.

Trail was not going in.

PB70BS: Historically, the eastern side of spur, that's

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where the COP used to be at before they turned it over and

did away with it. But that's historically always been the

bad area.

The west side from about Juy Zarrin ran up to where it

intersects the Airborne Valley. They moved a bunch of OPs

out there, and they can cover in the west side pretty

decently with their observation posts out there. So that's

--

BG COLT: Who is "they".

PB70BS: Who is that works out there?

PB65FS: Creek element, which is --

PB70BS: All of Patriot Brigades, sir.

PB65FS: They're ground, coming out of Sayyidabad,

Warriors 6s or Warrior Battalion.

LA: So they had OPs out that night?

PB65FS: They have, basically, OPs to the west. It's a

joint ANA; it's a TCP. There's -- overlooking that valley

to the west, you have a TCP and two OPs, OP Savannah, and

just an OP that's just overwatching the valley. But no one

goes into that valley.

LA: So -- and I'm not trying to trap you. I just want

to make sure I understood you-alls SA. You're assessed

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 SECRET

based on what you have been told by your 2, and within all

of SAFIRE, your assessment of the inbound route from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was --

PB70BS: We felt it was all right. I mean honestly, sir.

I mean, we -- obviously, if we had perceived that kind of

threat, we would have been over there and that -- you know,

we didn't concentrate on that area. We knew they were

coming in for an IRF or QRF type operation.

We still had (b)(3), (b)(6) , you know, there was still a lot of

activity going on in their sector. So we were trying to,

you know, sort of balance both balls at the same time.

That's why we didn't get on to the LZ until about three

minutes prior. But even at that, after we observed (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

it appeared to be all right.

It was the whole valley to the west of there, that choke

point and stuff where we, honestly, didn't feel like, you

know, the threat was that high in that specific area. We

thought it was all to the east of there. And that's pretty

much it, sir.

SME-MH47: In your experience working with (b)(3), (b)(6) and

(b)(3), (b)(6) , did those aircraft operate significantly

different RSOA aircraft?

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PB70BS: Not significantly. RSOA, I know they never used

illum, ever. The like to go in, you know, significantly

blacked-out. (b)(3), (b)(6) , they would run, you know, with a

lot dimmer lighting than -- but never blacked-out

completely. We could always see them a little bit.

As far as their planning and stuff, it did seem fairly

similar to what our RSOA went over in the plan.

NGB SME: When you say you could see them a little bit

though, you are referring to IR, not available light?

PB70BS: Yes, sir.

PB65FS: Another thing that was different between RSOA

and (b)(3), (b)(6) was due to the limitations of the aircraft,

RSOA would get updates from(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cor the ISR directly.

Where we have to relay everything to (b)(3), (b)(6) due to they

only have one Fox Mike.

We don't want to -- it's more difficult for them to come up

Fires, and if we have to pass an LZ brief and there's

actually something going on, so we always push them the (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a only. And we are the only ones that are talking to

them. We are the ones relaying information to them.

To me, that's the biggest difference. And the biggest

crutch is RSOA inbound would call up (b)(3), (b)(6) for a brief, and

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then we are just really there as a check the block for RSOA.

I mean, we are still providing security, but we don't

provide illum or the security like we would for (b)(3), (b)(6)

just how they want us to stand off most of the time [sic].

With (b)(3), (b)(6) , we are more hands on, and we are relaying

everything to (b)(3), (b)(6) .

SME-MH47: Wouldn't it make your job easier, and probably

make your own situational awareness better if you didn't

have to be so much hands-on, and the lift element was, kind

of, on its own and he did his thing?

PB65FS: It would make it easier, yes. But with

(b)(3), (b)(6) , if we push them up Fires, if we ever had an

engagement, they would be completely, to me -- and this is

my thinking -- they would be completely lost. And we would

be clogging up the radios talking to them because that would

be our only way to talk to them, when we should be focusing

on a threat or engagement.

Any time on (b)(1)1.4a , we can tell them to pick up a

six-minute hold and push them away, and deal with what we

have to deal with. If they were on Fires and Fires only, we

wouldn't be able to do that.

TF KH CDR: Yeah. We had that issue once, earlier on,

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trying to get everybody up on Fires, and it's just too much.

You can't do it that way. What it does do for them though,

it gives everybody situational awareness of where everyone

is at doing it the way we do. Of course, in the Fox models,

they have taken care of that. They've got two Fox mods now.

But the way we do it here, it really gives everybody

situational awareness, including with the deliberate ops --

BG COLT: Helo comes on UHF?

(b)(1)1.4a

BG COLT: Anybody else?

SME-CH47: Oh, I've got one question. Go back to the

ERAW just briefly. A question because I don't know the

answer: sometimes I will see an asterisk in the beginning

and end of a guy's name on the ERAW. What does that

asterisk mean?

PB65FS: That's our SP. He puts those in. I don't know

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if he puts those in because they are temporary people, and

they are not part of us or what. I really have no clue.

SME-CH47: You don't know what the answer --

TF KH CDR: What was the question?

SME-CH47: On the ERAW, the pilots' names. Some pilots

may have an asterisk in the beginning and the end of their

name on there. I'm just curious as to what the asterisk --

TF KH CDR: That's time in country.

BG COLT: One last question, and I promise. And that is:

My understanding is that all of the (b)(3), (b)(6) missions are

high-risk by definition as a result of planning time

allotted. Three hours or less, high risk. How does that

apply to you as well? Are your missions high-risk as a

routine because the planning time?

PB65FS: On our -- going off our ERAW, our risks are

moderate due to deliberate. And it's specific, but it's

only two to four hours is what we select.

But it becomes a moderate due to deliberate operation, and

we are less than four hours, is the way it briefs on the

ERAW. But it not a high-risk for us.

BG COLT: Okay. That's it for me.

TF KH CDR: The other thing that makes it high-risk, sir,

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just for explanation is illum. That does not apply to them,

but red illum makes it high-risk.

BG COLT: Okay. Anybody else?

Negative response by all members.

BG COLT: Thank you very much for your time. I have a

couple products I'm going to ask you guys to produce for me.

The interview closed at 1552 Zulu, 18 August 2011.

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Page 895
 AH-64 FMV FEEDS (GUN 5 – TAPE 5)

21:44:33 FS: On the go.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
21:44:35 BS: Alright
21:44:35 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Any station, this is (b)(3), (b)(6) radio on FB2.

21:44:39 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: (b)(3), (b)(6) this is (b)(3), (b)(6) I got you loud and clear.

21:44:44 (b)(3), (b)(6) : , (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) , so far you are the only person I’ve
been able to get in touch with. Break.

21:44:50 (b)(3), (b)(6) : We are just looking for a target update from our infill
HLZ understanding (b)(3), (b)(6) is tracking 2 squirters about
200 meters south and (b)(3), (b)(6) is tracking the rest of the
group. is that correct?
21:45:01 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Roger, let me get comms with them and I will clarify
for you.

21:45:06 (b)(3), (b)(6) : …

(b)(3), (b)(6)
21:45:08 FS: this is (b)(3), (b)(6) .
(b)(3), (b)(6)

21:45:18 FS: (b)(3), (b)(6) this is (b)(3), (b)(6) on fires.

21:45:23 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) here got you Lima Charlie on the FB2.

21:45:27 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Roger. I did the same. (b)(3), (b)(6)requesting an update, we
got these 2 PAX (b)(3), (b)(6) labeled that were 600 meters to the
southeast and he is tracking 8 other PAX. Do you have
any intel on those guys?

21:45:44 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) . Yeah, we just put our sensor back in the

Page 896
 vicinity of the (b)(3), (b)(6) PAX. Break.

21:45:53 (b)(3), (b)(6) : It looks like there is still some left in the grid past
by (b)(3), (b)(6) and we had three just depart to the west on
the road out of their last know position. How copy?

21:46:05 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Roger, so 3 PAX out of the 8 pack element went to the
west on the road you still have eyes on the two PAX
that are at (b)(3), (b)(6) and you have the grid for the other
PAX?
21:46:22 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) . Yeah we got the grid for the original 8
that came over to the last known passed position from
(b)(3), (b)(6) . Break.

21:46:24 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: You have all lights.

21:46:34 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Now watching the three that moved off to the west and
we are getting in and out in the trees it’s pretty
thick foliage over here, but yeah, we are tracking the
guys that move off to the west. If we can get (b)(3), (b)(6)

another sensor to maintain the original point of origin

from the (b)(3), (b)(6) guys.

21:46:54 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Roger I copy all. And how close are they to the east -
-[INAUDIBLE]

21:46:57 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c [INAUDIBLE] 70

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

21:47:04 [INAUDIBLE]

21:47:04 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 70 currently [INAUDIBLE]

21:47:05 (b)(3), (b)(6) FIRES (b)(3), (b)(6) Fires

Page 897
21:47:07 [INAUDIBLE] 34815 approach

21:47:08 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: (b)(3), (b)(6) go ahead

21:47:10 [INAUDIBLE]

21:47:10 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) your’re broken. Could you pass
that update again?

21:47:14 FS: Roger, right now (b)(3), (b)(6) PAX are still in the location
where they are at. Break.
(b)(3), (b)(6)

21:47:22 FS: We got three PAX walking to the west on the road into
some foliage. They are trying to get eyes on them PAX
and they have the grid that (b)(3), (b)(6) sent up its still
where the other PAX are.

21:47:35 (b)(3), (b)(6) , copy all. I just want to work out a coherent
plan for where we infil. Break.
(b)(3), (b)(6)

21:47:42 So from our infil HLZ I’ll be [INAUDIBLE] Can you give
me a general direction and distance for the first group
of squirters?

[INAUDIBLE] 618 [INAUDIBLE] 60 series

21:48:01 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: 600 meter to the southeast as it stands now. Once we
get on station we will -- as soon as you get boots on
the ground, I will call out all squirters.

21:48:13 (b)(3), (b)(6) : , do you? And I just want to confirm that will
(b)(3), (b)(6)

be on FD3 and guns are good to go immediately overhead.

21:48:20 (b)(3), (b)(6) : So you will up FD3. We haven’t got any word about

Page 898
 that. What is it freq.

21:48:28 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) standby one. Should be on the COF.

21:48:33 FS: Roger we have a FD3 on the COF.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

21:48:37 BS: Yeah.

21:48:39 (b)(3), (b)(6) Copy so(b)(3), (b)(6)and (b)(3), (b)(6) will be on FD3 working
squirte (b)(3), (b)(6) will be on FD2 working their
targets.

21:48:49 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: (b)(3), (b)(6) copies all.

21:48:53 [INAUDIBLE] Yeah, it’s back there.

21:48:55 BS: Yeah, we are back there. Are we switching FD3 or --

instead of half and half?

21:49:00 BS: I think we’re about to work it. It sounds like

[INAUDIBLE] is going to be on FD-3.
(b)(3), (b)(6)

21:49:06 BS: I heard that part.

21:49:07 FS: [LAUGHTER]

21:49:09 BS: He like just stepped on everybody.

21:49:13 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) copies.

21:49:15 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Alright, right now that’s the way it is. Their
(b)(3), (b)(6) is going to be up on FD2,(b)(3), (b)(6)is going to be
on FD3, we are going to work it through (b)(3), (b)(6) so we

Page 899
 can immediately freq change to FD3 as soon as they gets
boots and take all fires from them.

21:49:30 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Alright, so we’re going FD2 until we get boots on the
ground and then we’re going FD3.

21:49:37 [INAUDIBLE] -- your location.

21:49:39 [INAUDIBLE] (b)(3), (b)(6) [INAUDIBLE]

21:49:53 [INAUDIBLE] [LAUGHTER]

21:49:55 [INAUDIBLE] he will call me when they get off the deck.
21:49:57 BS: Alright, FD3 is already up on there.
(b)(3), (b)(6)

21:49:59 FS: Ok.

21:50:00 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Confirm they are going to an offset HLZ and they will
take AWT when they land.

21:50:05 [INAUDIBLE] 23 from 61 that is affirm. They are going

to an offset HLZ and they will take [INAUDIBLE].

21:50:14 (b)(3), (b)(6) Roger, copy.

21:50:16 BS: Alright 30 minute fuel transfer there AUX tanks pumps
on [INAUDIBLE].
(b)(3), (b)(6)

21:50:18 FS: (b)(3), (b)(6)

21:50:22 (b)(3), (b)(6) : This is your AWT overhead. We are 3 minutes out. We
are tracking (b)(3), (b)(6) it’s going to be on FD3. Once they
get boots down, request either push to FD3 to talk to
them to complete break.

Page 900
21:50:36 BS: He just cleared us at
(b)(3), (b)(6)
21:50:37 FS: We’re still going to LZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c correct?

21:50:41 (b)(3), (b)(6) : what I’m getting over (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cis that
(b)(3), (b)(6)

they are going to go to an offset HLZ now. Break. And

go to walk in and then take control of you guys as they
walk in.

21:50:52 Yeah.

21:50:53 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Roger. I copy all. We are directly push overhead and
we will clear (b)(3), (b)(6) time now to take off.

21:51:06 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Roger. Confirm you are going to clear (b)(3), (b)(6) in;
make sure you guys don’t go overhead the PAX (b)(3), (b)(6)
though.

21:51:15 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Roger, we will not go overhead PAX (b)(3), (b)(6) yet we will get
eyes on from (b)(3), (b)(6) handover.

21:51:22 (b)(3), (b)(6) : copies and break do you guys have a good time
(b)(3), (b)(6)

line for the (b)(3), (b)(6) flight.

21:51:29 FS: Once they go out wheels-up it’s about a seven minute
time of flight.

21:51:34 (b)(3), (b)(6)

FS: Hey, get them on Helo-com and tell them to launch.

21:51:37 BS: , (b)(3), (b)(6) .

(b)(3), (b)(6)
21:51:41 PC: , go.
21:51:43 BS: Roger you are clear to launch and I guess about 7

Page 901
 minutes [INAUDIBLE] ETA is right now right.

21:51:52 (b)(3), (b)(6)

PC That’s affirm - about 8 minutes.
21:51:55 BS Alright about 8 minutes (b)(3), (b)(6) copies and you’re
cleared.

21:51:58 (b)(3), (b)(6) [INAUDIBLE]

21:51:59 FS Hey, 45 wheels-up going to LZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

.
21:51:59 PC: 11’s got 32 eagles
21:52:05 FS: They are going to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
21:52:05 FS: (b)(3), (b)(6) this (b)(3), (b)(6) go ahead.
(b)(3), (b)(6)

21:52:09 FS: Yea they are going to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

21:52:12 FS: Roger this is (b)(3), (b)(6) did you call?

21:52:15 FS: Don’t know if you caught that or not, but we had three
of the (b)(3), (b)(6) PAX break off heading west northwest, still
about 800 meters from the pre-planned LZ break. Label
those guys (b)(3), (b)(6) Alpha is still at the position
where we left them [INAUDIBLE] (b)(3), (b)(6) ; maintain eyes on
throughout the duration of the tion.

21:52:39 (b)(3), (b)(6) : copy, can you guys find out what HLZ they are
(b)(3), (b)(6)

landing at because right now I am tracking that they’re

at an offset. Originally I heard that they were going
to I told you 500 meters away.

21:52:50 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: (b)(3), (b)(6) confirms that you are going to HLZ
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 902
21:52:56 EX17 PC: Affirmative, HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
21:52:59 BS:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Alright confirm (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cthere is a little confusion
going on right, we are just trying to clear it with the
ground guys.

21:53:06 (b)(3), (b)(6) : And (b)(3), (b)(6) waiting for you to call back
21:53:07 (b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Understand the miscommunication I’ll wait for the call
back.

21:53:10 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Roger (b)(3), (b)(6) copy

21:53:14 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Roger send it when able. [Talking to (b)(3), (b)(6)

21:53:19 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(1)1.4a how copy over.

21:53:31 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) striker copies that is HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that is the
originally HLZ they are planning to land that was 600
meters away.

21:53:40 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Good copy [INAUDIBLE] PAX by 87

21:53:43 PC: are we holding at the 6 minute mark

(b)(3), (b)(6)

21:53:50 (b)(3), (b)(6)

FS: I copy they are still going to HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c requesting
that we push over high cap get a hand over from
(b)(3), (b)(6) .

21:54:01 (b)(3), (b)(6) : copies, requests you coordinate with

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

and go overhead at 6 minutes out and give me updates.

21:54:11 BS: They are going to six minute hold time now.
21:54:14 FS: Are they in it right now?
(b)(3), (b)(6)
21:54:16 BS: Affirm
21:54:18 FS: (b)(3), (b)(6) is in the 6 minute at this time.
21:54:23 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) copies, what are they in a 6 minute hold for?

21:54:27 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: [LAUGHING] [INAUDIBLE] (b)(3), (b)(6) I believe they are in a

Page 903
 hold because of a little bit of confusion about the LZ.

21:54:29 FS: [INAUDIBLE] we might push in a little bit further than

that.

21:54:37 PC: (b)(3), (b)(6) are you recommending holding?

21:54:40 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: (b)(3), (b)(6) this is (b)(3), (b)(6) if you can request a spot out on
(b)(3), (b)(6)
movers [INAUDIBLE]

21:54:45 BS: [INAUDIBLE] you’re cleared in at this time.

21:54:47 PC: [INAUDIBLE] roger cleared in at this time.
[INAUDIBLE] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
21:54:47 [INAUDIBLE] copy, stand by for 1688
21:54:52 BS: Alright (b)(3), (b)(6) is coming.
21:54:56 FS: Roger, you got all call with (b)(3), (b)(6) .
21:54:58 BS: Roger, are they putting the burn on it?
(b)(3), (b)(6)

21:55:04 FS: We will work that.

21:55:06 BS: It looks like we got one too many things going on right
now. We got (b)(3), (b)(6) coming in worried about it too.
21:55:12 : One Eagle on the roof top 63 commence call out
(b)(3), (b)(6)
21:55:27 : (b)(3), (b)(6) standby one.
21:55:31 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Standing by.
21:55:39 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) call tap 616 [INAUDIBLE].
21:55:45 PC: (b)(3), (b)(6) 6 minutes, 6 minutes.
(b)(3), (b)(6)

21:55:48 BS: Copy 6 minutes

21:56:04 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6)

21:56:08 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: , this is

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) I’m searching for 1688 and I’m
capturing.

Page 904
21:56:12 (b)(3), (b)(6) : We had the (b)(3), (b)(6) PAX move to the east of this compound,
we never saw them come out to the east side, we are
starting to see some movement inside those compound
wall, you can see there is one guy coming from the
north side moving west bound believe they went in there
because we have not seen them come out the side, break.
And the other group is down to the south and you guys
want to maintain track on one of your ships maintain
track on them so we can sparkle or, correction – we can
lase the other one.

21:56:47 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Roger, we got eyes-on the (b)(3), (b)(6) PAX, request that you
put your sparkle out on the (b)(3), (b)(6)

21:56:57 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) Roger standby one and just to confirm you
want sparkle on the (b)(3), (b)(6) Alpha.

21:57:05 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Negative, you can put that laser out. [INAUDIBLE]
21:57:09 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Standby we will put the laser out on (b)(3), (b)(6) Alpha.
21:57:14 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: What was the laser code I missed it.
21:57:15 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Break, break, break. (b)(3), (b)(6)

21:57:18 FS: Did I miss it also?

21:57:20 FS: This is (b)(3), (b)(6).
21:57:24 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) , I need you guys to relay to
(b)(3), (b)(6) and try to get a hold to (b)(3), (b)(6) to
see who is going to have priority of fires for these
PAX (b)(3), (b)(6) series before they land?

21:57:35 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: , [INAUDIBLE]

(b)(3), (b)(6)

21:57:37 [INAUDIBLE] they were trying to get guys [INAUDIBLE] --

21:57:38 EX17 PC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

21:57:41 BS:
(b)(3), (b)(6) Roger, we need to get a hold of (b)(3), (b)(6) . He’s in the

Page 905
 back of your aircraft, we need to know who is going to
have fire [INAUDIBLE] on the (b)(3), (b)(6) series.

21:57:50 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) .

21:57:53 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: (b)(3), (b)(6) this is (b)(3), (b)(6) capture your spot searching for
the PAX.

21:57:57 (b)(3), (b)(6) Roger, (b)(3), (b)(6) we will have priority of fires.

21:57:59 (b)(3), (b)(6)

BS: Copy (b)(3), (b)(6) will have priority of fires.
21:58:03 FS: And (b)(3), (b)(6) , from (b)(3), (b)(6) will have
priority of fires

21:58:08 (b)(3), (b)(6) : copies.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

21:58:15 [INAUDIBLE] 361 [INAUDIBLE]

21:58:21 BS: You know what, I’m going to look at LZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c man; that
(b)(3), (b)(6)
is about all I can do right now.

21:58:28 FS: this is (b)(3), (b)(6) , will you be able to burn HLZ?
(b)(3), (b)(6)

21:58:34 (b)(3), (b)(6) : , roger we can do that. What’s the wheels

(b)(3), (b)(6)

down time?

21:58:40 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: this is (b)(3), (b)(6) it looks about 4 mikes right now,
(b)(3), (b)(6)

we will keep you up dated with 3 mikes and a 1 mike

call.

21:58:47 (b)(3), (b)(6) : , copy.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

21:58:49 FS: What did you say?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

21:58:52 BS: I was telling (b)(3), (b)(6) it looks like about 4 minutes
right now probably closer to three now.

Page 906
21:58:56 FS: Roger, hey you got eyes-on (b)(3), (b)(6)?
(b)(3), (b)(6)
21:59:02 BS: No, I was talking to (b)(3), (b)(6) with the laser code and
I asked you for laser code and I never got -- so I
never got a hold of none of these.

21:59:11 FS: Alright I’m going to send you a target.

21:59:13 BS: Alrighty, then. That the first target (b)(3), (b)(6) ever
(b)(3), (b)(6) sent me, it’s like a present.

21:59:19 FS: [LAUGHING]

21:59:22 BS: You sending me a target; is that like a present for
Christmas or something?

21:59:32 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) on Helo Common, just let us know
when you want the burn on.

21:59:46 (b)(3), (b)(6) : .

(b)(3), (b)(6)

21:59:49 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: (b)(3), (b)(6) this is (b)(3), (b)(6) , go.
21:59:52 (b)(3), (b)(6) : [INAUDIBLE] (b)(3), (b)(6) going to up on the FD2 as
well?

21:59:57 BS: (b)(3), (b)(6) this is (b)(3), (b)(6) .

22:00:01 FS: [INAUDIBLE] (b)(3), (b)(6) going to up on the FD2 as
(b)(3), (b)(6) well?

22:00:04 BS: . Confirm with

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) if
he’s going to be up FD2 or FD3 [INAUDIBLE].

22:00:10 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) copy [INAUDIBLE].

22:00:15 EX17 PC: Say again.

Page 907
22:00:17 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) , are you going to be monitoring FD2 and FD3?

22:00:21 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: (b)(3), (b)(6) Confirm with (b)(3), (b)(6) is
he’s going to be up on FT2 or FT3 for radios.

22:00:29 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) will be [INAUDIBLE].

22:00:31 EX17 PC: Stand by.

22:00:34 : (b)(3), (b)(6) copies all and requests 30 second out

(b)(3), (b)(6)
call.

22:00:38 : (b)(3), (b)(6)

22:00:44 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: this is (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

22:00:46 (b)(3), (b)(6) : I just want to make sure you guys were in contact with
the three individuals that moved to west and then into
the building about 50 meters or so to the west of where
we left them with you.

22:00:58 2 on FD2 [INAUDIBLE].

22:01:03 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Negative. I did not see any PAX -- any (b)(3), (b)(6) PAX move
to the west and move into another building. We’ve got
the buildings inside that they initially went into.

22:01:17 Q my spots out. [INAUDIBLE]

22:01:21 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Correction, we [INAUDIBLE] can put down sparkle if

you’d like.

22:01:27 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: If he put a spot out everything he says he sees
something it’d be [EXPLETIVE] money [laughing].

22:01:30 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Roger. Can you go ahead and put sparkle out on them.

Page 908
22:01:37 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Of course I can’t see [EXPLETIVE].
22:01:40 (b)(3), (b)(6) : 23 02 sparkle one the 32AB [INAUDIBLE]

22:01:46 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: say again.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

22:01:48 They’re on the [INAUDIBLE]

22:01:49 EX17 PC: (b)(3), (b)(6) we’ll be on FD3.

22:01:52 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Copy FD3 and what’s your time right now?

22:01:57 EX17 PC: I apologize for that; a little premature, but we had to
go a little bit farther north, so we’re probably --
we’re 4 minutes inbound now.

22:02:03 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Copy 4 minutes LZ will be burned. Just call 1 minute
and we’ll put burn out. (b)(3), (b)(6) will be in on that.

22:02:11 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) I got you Lima Charlie on FD2 how
me.

22:02:20 : The plan was to have (b)(3), (b)(6) as a quarter team on

(b)(3), (b)(6)
FD3, Break.

22:02:26 : Right now, no comm with (b)(3), (b)(6) . Can you reach out
to him and get him back on FD2?

22:02:32 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: (b)(3), (b)(6) on FD2. When he hits the ground he’s going
to be up on FD3.
22:02:49 (b)(3), (b)(6) : From there sparkling the eight movers?
22:02:52 There’s one too many people on that [EXPLETIVE] radio.
22:02:53 (b)(3), (b)(6)
FS: [laughing]

22:02:55 BS: Dude, you can’t even -- they’re like stepping on

Page 909
 everybody.

22:03:01 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: (b)(3), (b)(6) this is (b)(3), (b)(6) on FD2.

22:03:07 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) go ahead and remain on FD2 for now.
Once we get on the ground, if we get stalled on FD3
we’ll switch [INAUDIBLE]
22:03:15 (b)(3), (b)(6) [INAUDIBLE] (b)(3), (b)(6) send your traffic. [INAUDIBLE]

22:03:19 BS: See, they’re stepping on each other

22:03:23 (b)(3), (b)(6)
FS: Word.

22:03:24 FS: , this is (b)(3), (b)(6) . I’ve got your sparkle in

(b)(3), (b)(6)

sight. Currently searching, unable to acquire those

three individuals.
22:03:33 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Roger. (b)(3), (b)(6). We’ve got two of the PAX are underneath
the east side of that building on the north side,
there’s an opening -- it kind of looks like a garage.
The other PAX -- one of the three from (b)(3), (b)(6) moved back
to the east to the original building we had a laser on
--

22:03:49 PC: 3 minutes. 3 minutes.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

22:03:52 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Copy. 3 minutes. 3 minutes.

22:03:57 BS: (b)(3), (b)(6) , are you still up the Helo common?
[INAUDIBLE]

22:04:00 (b)(3), (b)(6) : .

Roger. Stand by, one.
(b)(3), (b)(6)
22:04:04 BS: this is (b)(3), (b)(6) to confirm you’re running
(b)(3), (b)(6)
heading for me, please.

22:04:08 BS: Southeast man, it was the same thing it was 20 minutes
ago.

Page 910
22:04:11 (b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Roger. Heading will be approximately a [INAUDIBLE] --

22:04:15 [INAUDIBLE] (b)(3), (b)(6) [INAUDIBLE].

22:04:18 [INAUDIBLE] 090, thanks.

22:04:29 BS: Dude, I had eyes-on his sparkle, but I do not see those
(b)(3), (b)(6) people.
22:04:35 FS: And (b)(3), (b)(6) , this is (b)(3), (b)(6) . I’ve got eyes-on in the
area, searching for the movers.

22:04:42 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Roger, they went in the east side of the building. It
looks like there’s a doorway on the north side eastern
sector of the wall.

22:04:56 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Roger, and I’ve got eyes-on it looks like that little
overhang that’s on the east side. Are you talking
about the door right to the right of it?

22:05:06 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Affirm. There’s a door on the north side and then two
of the PAX that are there, one walked back to the
original building they were leaving.
22:05:15 FS: I see the (b)(3), (b)(6) coming down Airborne Valley.

22:05:18 (b)(3), (b)(6)

BS: Oh.
22:05:19 FS: That’s the nose. You don’t have to worry about it.

22:05:22 BS: Oh. I’m searching -- These dudes -- this (b)(3), (b)(6) put
their damn IR lights on so you won’t see them until the
last second. They put them on like real light. Oh, I
see it. Lost it. Which one was I looking at?

Page 911
22:05:41 (b)(3), (b)(6) : 23/61
22:05:44 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Go for (b)(3), (b)(6) .
22:05:50 (b)(3), (b)(6) : 23/61 relayed back on tentative exfil plan for
[INAUDIBLE]
22:05:54 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: (b)(3), (b)(6) , Gun 1 has you in sight. We’ll be making
left hand circles about 20.

22:06:00 (b)(3), (b)(6) PC: That’s a good copy 11.

22:06:02 (b)(3), (b)(6) : , we’ll be making a 2300 to 2315 exfil.
(b)(3), (b)(6)
22:06:10 (b)(3), (b)(6) : copy. 2300 and 2350.
22:06:14 (b)(3), (b)(6) : 2315. 2315.
22:06:18 (b)(3), (b)(6) : One copy.
22:06:21 BS: Still don’t see (b)(3), (b)(6) .
(b)(3), (b)(6)
22:06:24 FS: Ah, they --
22:06:26 (b)(3), (b)(6)
: (b)(3), (b)(6) from (b)(3), (b)(6) . Request you to talk to (b)(3), (b)(6)

see how much head wind.

22:06:30 FS:
(b)(3), (b)(6) At our 1 o’clock low.
22:06:34 :
(b)(3), (b)(6) 6-1.
22:06:39 EX17 PC: (b)(3), (b)(6) . Could you guys sparkle, please?

22:06:42 BS:
(b)(3), (b)(6) And roger. You one minute?
22:06:46 EX17 PC: Negative, but our lane direction isn’t matching up just
give them a little better idea where we’re landing.
22:06:51 [INAUDIBLE]

22:06:51 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: (b)(3), (b)(6) , could you sparkle LZ?

22:06:56 (b)(3), (b)(6) : 23/2 burn is on [INAUDIBLE]

22:07:01 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Do we have burn in sight?
22:07:19 (b)(3), (b)(6)
: (b)(3), (b)(6) .

22:07:28 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Not even a minute out and you’re requesting a damn
sparkle.

Page 912
22:07:41 (b)(3), (b)(6) : on fires.
(b)(3), (b)(6)

22:07:45 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: this is

(b)(3), (b)(6) . Go ahead. (b)(3), (b)(6)

22:07:49 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) verify your next FAARP time?
22:07:52 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Roger, we got 2+30 left on station. The next FAARP
time will be 0030.

22:08:01 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Copy. Thanks.

22:08:04 [INAUDIBLE] -- or correction, commencing assault on 63.

22:08:18 (b)(3), (b)(6) : request to do a perimeter scan of 500

(b)(3), (b)(6)

meters and take a look at that BDA sight where we took

the original engagement.
22:08:29 (b)(3), (b)(6) 361 copy. Perimeter scan, 500 meters. Don’t have the
original grid on the original site --

22:08:34 (b)(3), (b)(6) PC: (b)(3), (b)(6) , 1 minute. 1 minute.

22:08:37 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Copy 1 minute. 1 minute. Burn’s out.

22:08:39 (b)(3), (b)(6) : [INAUDIBLE] -- the grid you can get it from (b)(3), (b)(6) or
(b)(3), (b)(6) .

22:08:43 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) , copy.

22:08:46 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6)

22:08:56 (b)(3), (b)(6)

BS: LZ is still ICE.
(b)(3), (b)(6)
.
22:09:16 BS: -- (b)(3), (b)(6) Current LZ looks like
it’s still on the green zone. I do see little fields.
It’s probably new crops in, looks like mild to light
dust and winds at altitude are currently out of the
north -- or correction -- yeah.

22:09:33 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Let’s say 1 through 5 they were on the turn.

Page 913
22:09:34 PC: Alright, good copy.
22:09:36 BS: You think that’s more accurate?
22:09:38 FS: What’s that? I have they are phenomenal dude?

22:09:41 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Yeah, I don’t know if escape bad ones or not, but --

22:09:46 BS: I just saw a flash. Did you see a flash?

22:09:48 FS: Yeah, they’re being shot at.

22:09:52 H17 traffic. (b)(3), (b)(6) CH-47 transitioning south
[INAUDIBLE]

22:09:55 BS: What is that?

22:09:58 FS: Dude, I think they just got shot.
22:10:01 BS: (b)(3), (b)(6) . Are you shot?

22:10:03 FS: Are you on that, (b)(3), (b)(6) ?

22:10:05 FS: I’m on it, sir? (b)(3), (b)(6) is down.

22:10:12 Roger.
(b)(3), (b)(6)

22:10:13 BS: Coalition traffic; we have a Fallen Angel. Fallen

Angel. It’s (b)(3), (b)(6) 0.

22:10:26 BS: [EXPLETIVE].

22:10:33 FS: (b)(3), (b)(6)

.

22:10:39 BS: We pushed (b)(3), (b)(6)

22:10:41 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) s (b)(3), (b)(6) go ahead.

22:10:42 FS: Roger. We have a Fallen Angel. (b)(3), (b)(6) was shot
(b)(3), (b)(6) down in the Tangi Valley [INAUDIBLE]
22:10:45 BS: Coalition traffic, anybody out there? We have a Fallen

Page 914
 Angel. (b)(3), (b)(6) , CTAF.

22:10:50 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) , H-17. Say location.

22:10:53 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Location Tangi Valley. Tangi Valley and we’re up on
338.45 on (b)(3), (b)(6) in the green plain text.

22:10:58 [INAUDIBLE].

22:11:01 FS: Roger, what we’re remaining [INAUDIBLE]

(b)(3), (b)(6) 33/45
22:11:04 BS: Roger. Roger. Right now, currently it’s one Chinook
down. How copy?
22:11:08 Roger. (b)(3), (b)(6) is down.

22:11:11 That’s a good copy. We’re already made on (b)(3), (b)(6)

SATCOM [INAUDIBLE].

22:11:21 BS: 1 this is 2. Do you have anything?

22:11:24 BS: We got nothing at this time. We got a wreckage on

fire.

22:11:28 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Alright, the calls been made to X.

22:11:31 BS: I have (b)(3), (b)(6) right now down in the Airborne Valley by
Hotel coming in on CTAF.
22:11:38 FS: Right, I’m going stay up here and develop things,
(b)(3), (b)(6) . Where are you at?
22:11:43 FS: Roger, we are circling over head. I saw where the
[EXPLETIVE] explosion came from, man. I’m searching
the buildings. If I see [EXPLETIVE] anybody with a
weapon, I’m firing.
22:11:52 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) . Helo common.

Page 915
22:11:58 FS: .
22:11:59 BS: , it’s (b)(3), (b)(6) . Go.
(b)(3), (b)(6)

22:12:11 BS: , this is (b)(3), (b)(6) on Helo common. Go.

22:12:17 FS: Did you see any survivors down there?
22:12:19 BS: I’m not seeing any.
22:12:20 BS: No, I’m not seeing anything right now. It is a ball of
(b)(3), (b)(6)
fire. It looks bad.
22:12:24 FS: Okay.
22:12:26 BS: Another explosion.
22:12:28 FS: I got secondary’s. Are they shooting them still?
22:12:34 BS: No. I got secondary. I think that’s fuel.
22:12:46 FS: That was (b)(3), (b)(6) ; correct?
22:12:50 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) . Helo common.

22:12:52 BS: Yeah that was (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
22:12:57 BS: And (b)(3), (b)(6) this is (b)(3), (b)(6) , Helo common. Go.
22:13:01 FS: (b)(3), (b)(6) --

22:13:02 (b)(3), (b)(6) : ,

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) . We’ll pick up the scan from the
crash site 500 meters out if you guys want to search
from 500 meters and out, we’ll take inside of that.

22:13:14 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: (b)(3), (b)(6), copy. Just keep me posted if you see anybody
on the ground or it looks like survivors. We got a
couple (b)(3), (b)(6) aircraft on CTAF right now.
22:13:24 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) , copy for searching.
22:13:33 FS: Give me the grids for that, Scott.

22:13:35 (b)(3), (b)(6)

BS: Yeah, I’m going to lay [INAUDIBLE] right now.
22:13:38 (b)(3), (b)(6) , [INAUDIBLE] do you have a grid right
now?
22:13:41 BS: I’ll say it.

Page 916
22:13:42 FS: Roger the grid to follow, Go ahead, (b)(3), (b)(6)

22:13:45 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: I got it.

22:13:47 BS: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

How copy?
22:14:00 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Roger. I copy (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Over.
22:14:03 (b)(3), (b)(6) : And aircrafts in Tangy Valley. Can you guys meet us
over secure and pass the grid to where the aircrafts
are located?
22:14:11 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Roger. Right now we are up on Helo Common on 50.65.
22:14:18 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Roger. Good copy.
22:14:18 (b)(3), (b)(6)
FS: Read that grid back to them real quick.
22:14:20 BS: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6) How copy?
22:14:30 (b)(3), (b)(6) : That’s a good copy. Say again altitude.
22:14:33 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Altitude 6267. It’s in the Tangi Valley.
22:14:40 : Roger. (b)(3), (b)(6) copys all.
(b)(3), (b)(6)

22:14:45 (b)(3), (b)(6) [INAUDIBLE]

22:14:47 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) this is (b)(3), (b)(6) [INAUDIBLE]

22:14:49 BS: (b)(3), (b)(6) 3 go for (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
22:14:51 FS: (b)(3), (b)(6)

22:14:53 (b)(3), (b)(6) Yeah, (b)(3), (b)(6) , (b)(3), (b)(6) . Understand that you’re
going to establish yourself as the on-scene commander.
Break. At this time, we’ll be pushing the DS AWT
[INAUDIBLE] --
22:15:01 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) this is (b)(3), (b)(6) on Helo Common.
22:15:04 (b)(3), (b)(6) : [INAUDIBLE] and just pull them into the ROZ also be
pushing additional assets possibly up here to Shank.
Currently, the Pathfinders and QRF are spinning up at
this time. Over.
22:15:13 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) standby one.

Page 917
22:15:15 (b)(3), (b)(6)
BS: [INAUDIBLE] -- and currently --
22:15:17 BS: [INAUDIBLE] -- we got a hold of them on CTAF through --
on 50.65. That’s going to be our Helo Common. 50.65.
22:15:25 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Roger. (b)(3), (b)(6) copy. 50.65. That is the Helo
Common air battle net.
22:15:32 BS: Hey fireman, as of right now I do not see any survivors
(b)(3), (b)(6) on the ground; we’re currently scanning around.
22:15:37 FS: Hey tell them this area is still hot -- wake up --
22:15:40 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) Roger. What’s the status of
friendly forces in that area? We expect [INAUDIBLE] --
22:15:48 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) .
22:15:51 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: -- currently the status is: hostiles on the area.
We’re trying to find out where the shots were fired
from. We do not have all friendlies in sight as of
right now. We’re still trying to develop the
situation.
22:16:05 [INAUDIBLE] --
22:16:05 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

22:16:09 FS: -- push in your direction over

22:16:11 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Affirm, copy all.
22:16:15 AMC: (b)(3), (b)(6) -- we’re orbiting to the
east of the crash site. What do you want us to do?
Return to(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cor stay out and orbit?
22:16:23 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Anybody aboard (b)(3), (b)(6) flight have not been able to
do this, this time if you can try to reach anybody that
was up this push or any other frequency you might have.
22:16:31 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) , continue to orbit. Stand by for further
instructions.
22:16:35 BS: Roger, are you looking for the (b)(3), (b)(6) on the (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) set?
22:16:41 FS: That’s a negative. We are just trying to get a hold of
them either on (b)(1)1.4a or on (b)(1)1.4a . Do you have any
other frequencies you might be able to try, we’d

Page 918
 appreciate it.
22:16:50 (b)(3), (b)(6)
BS: That’s a roger.
22:16:53 FS: What are you seeing down there, (b)(3), (b)(6) ?
22:16:54 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) . Do you guys have a
[INAUDIBLE] on board the aircraft?
22:16:56 [INAUDIBLE]
22:16:59 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: The two qalats directly to the south is [INAUDIBLE]
22:17:03 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Do you have SA for us?
22:17:05 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: I’m searching the [INAUDIBLE] --
22:17:06 [INAUDIBLE] That’s a negative

22:17:07 FS: --the area to the west in the tree line looking for any
movement. I don’t see anything. I’m just searching
for anybody who could have potentially fired it and if
I find them, I’m engaging.
22:17:21 FS: Roger. Understand. We’re up with (b)(3), (b)(6) right now.
They’re mobilizing the Pathfinders. Just keep me
abreast because we can’t have them coming into this
area if it’s still hot.
(b)(3), (b)(6)

22:17:29 FS: Roger. I copy.

22:17:32 BS: Where do you think it came from? This direction we
were looking, was it to the left?

22:17:35 FS: Dude, I can’t --

22:17:36 BS: I saw a shot fired, but it was close in.
22:17:39 FS: It was very close.
22:17:41 [INAUDIBLE]
22:17:42 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Hey, (b)(3), (b)(6) when I saw the shots fired, it was really
close, man. It has to be one of those qalats about 100
meters within.
22:17:47 [INAUDIBLE] orbiting 3 miles [INAUDIBLE]

Page 919
22:17:49 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Yeah, dude. I’m looking at it.
22:17:52 (b)(3), (b)(6) : This is (b)(3), (b)(6) go.
22:17:55 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: How are you looking man?

22:17:56 Hey you’ve got anything from (b)(3), (b)(6) [INAUDIBLE]

22:17:57 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: I don’t see anything [INAUDIBLE]

22:18:02 [INAUDIBLE] Let me give them a call.
22:18:03 AMC: Roger that. We’re staying on station.
22:18:11 FS: Yeah, our CMOS declared on something, dude.

22:18:20 FS: (b)(3), (b)(6) , you down there?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

22:18:22 BS: [INAUDIBLE] Yeah, we’re here. He’s good. He’s good.

22:18:25 FS: Alright, I’m just making sure. RC wants [INAUDIBLE]

declared on something.
22:18:28 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Yeah, I saw the flares go off. It was red.
22:18:39 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

22:18:41 (b)(3), (b)(6)

BS: the fire just got him.
22:18:43 AMC: (b)(3), (b)(6) , go ahead.
22:18:45 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) guidance is to RTB you’re advised
and come back. Over.

22:18:50 AMC: We’ll proceed back to(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cthis time.

22:18:56 AMC: (b)(3), (b)(6) [INAUDIBLE] to RTB to(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

22:19:03 BS: Roger, (b)(3), (b)(6) copies all.

22:19:08 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Hey, are the ground troops moving this way?

22:19:14 BS: Yeah, we think they’re moving this way time now.

22:19:18 FS: Alright.

Page 920
22:19:19 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Hey, just try to keep us updated from time to time. I
know you’re busy. We’re up on (b)(3), (b)(6) freq just for
your SA.

22:19:24 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Alright. WILCO.

22:19:33 BS: I want to say it came from one of these qalats in this
area. [EXPLETIVE], man.
22:19:51 (b)(3), (b)(6)
BS: Alright. (b)(3), (b)(6) is -- went back to(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cin
case you weren’t copying.
22:19:54 FS: Yeah, I’m copying it, dude.
22:20:17 BS: Alright. Oh, God. [EXPLETIVE], man. I wonder if it
came from the [EXPLETIVE] tree line or a window, man
because I’m not seeing anybody. I’m not seeing anybody
any survivors.
22:20:32 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: I don’t see crap. I don’t know dude. Just --
[INAUDIBLE] back up, man. There’s the qalats that are
right there along the bottom of that -- bottom of that
ridge line.
22:20:44 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) , commo check fox.

22:20:47 (b)(3), (b)(6) : [INAUDIBLE] yeah, 40 [INAUDIBLE] --

22:20:48 BS: Yeah, right here. Right were my head’s at.
22:20:48 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Yes. Exactly.
22:20:51 BS: That’s the one I keep looking at and I’m not seeing
anybody, but that’s where I swear it came from.
22:20:53 : , standby for BFT.
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
22:21:07 : , now I can show you red on BFT.
22:21:13 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Hey, (b)(3), (b)(6) , the best I can tell that -- It had to
have come from one of those qalat structures at the
bottom of the north side of that ridge.
22:21:22 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) [INAUDIBLE]
22:21:23 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Yeah, it looks like it came straight up at them.

Page 921
22:21:24 (b)(3), (b)(6) : check in AM QRF
(b)(3), (b)(6) on REDCON 2.
22:21:31 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Roger, have you REDCON 2.
22:21:35 FS: What altitude are you staying at?
22:21:37 (b)(3), (b)(6)
BS: I’m holding us out on TAGL at about 110 knots pulling
the guts out of it.
22:21:42 FS: Alright, just keep your speed up. If you start
dropping low -- we don’t have any fidelity on any of
these shooters.

22:21:51 BS: Yeah, I’m trying to stay fast and high.

22:21:54 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Yeah, roger.
22:21:58 FS: Do you guys have the (b)(3), (b)(6) crew moving this way,
(b)(3), (b)(6) ?

22:22:02 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Yeah, [INAUDIBLE] on the 60 series building moving this
way.

22:22:06 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Alright, they’re sending the Pathfinders up right now.
We can’t bring them in here until we figure out where
that fire came from.

22:22:07 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) currently you have [INAUDIBLE] (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and that’s in the Tangi Valley

break [INAUDIBLE] --

22:22:14 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: Yeah, roger.

22:22:27 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) Helo Common

22:22:30 [INAUDIBLE]
22:22:32 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: Dadgummit, man.
22:22:33 [INAUDIBLE]

22:22:35 : this is
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) [INAUDIBLE]
(b)(3), (b)(6)
22:22:37 Roger, any luck raising anybody onboard the FALLEN

Page 922
 ANGEL.

22:22:39 [INAUDIBLE]
22:22:44 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Roger.
22:22:46 (b)(3), (b)(6) : What’s the guidance for the QRF. Are we going to be
REDCON 2 for BHO?

22:22:52 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: QRF, this is (b)(3), (b)(6) just to find your grid, the
grid is 80146461 and currently we’re looking at about
2400 pounds of fuel over the Tangi Valley. How copy?

22:23:10 (b)(3), (b)(6) : on X-ray I just copy, so we’re looking for

(b)(3), (b)(6)

X-ray guidance for us.

22:23:17 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: I copy that. I’m just trying to give you a heads-up on
how much fuel we’ve got and currently the area is still
hostile. There’s still a lot of stuff going on so
REDCON 2 is the least thing you need to do.
22:23:40 (b)(3), (b)(6) : (b)(3), (b)(6) how much station time do
you have left?

22:23:44 BS: Would you say about 2 hours?

22:23:45 (b)(3), (b)(6) FS: 2 hours. Yeah.
22:23:46 BS: (b)(3), (b)(6) this is (b)(3), (b)(6) , it looks like
about 2 hours of station time as of right now.

22:23:55 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Roger, that’s a good copy.

22:24:01 FS: ,
(b)(3), (b)(6)(b)(3), (b)(6) . We’re continuing
[INAUDIBLE]-- INAUDIBLE] a lot of secondaries on the
(b)(3), (b)(6) ground [INAUDIBLE]

22:24:04 AMC: (b)(3), (b)(6) this is (b)(3), (b)(6) were you calling.

Page 923
22:24:09 (b)(3), (b)(6) BS: this is
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) go.
22:24:12 [INAUDIBLE]

22:24:12 AMC: Were you calling us?

22:24:13 BS: Negative, we’re currently talking on our (b)(3), (b)(6) and
(b)(3), (b)(6)
we’re trying to figure out where this cam

22:24:23 AMC: Copy, we’re going to hit the FAARP level 1 east gravel.

22:24:27 BS: Copy, level 1 east travel.

------------------------------END OF TRANSCRIPT-------------------------------------------

Page 924
 SECRET //REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO

OBJ LEFTY GROVE—EXTORTION 17 CRASH As of 092300z AUG 11

5 AUG 2011, Sayedabad District, Wardak Province

MISSION: Coalition Forces (CF) and 7 x APU Soldiers conducted a HAF to capture/kill Qari Tahir (LEFTY GROVE) IOT disrupt TB networks and
collect actionable intelligence on TBSL. (1 x TF Soldier accompanied assault force.)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TARGET SIGNIFIGANCE: Qari Tahir (LEFTY GROVE) is assessed to be the new overall TB Commander of the Tangi Valley following the death of Din
Mohammad (DUNLAP, EKIA) operating in Sayed Abad District, Wardak Province. Qari Tahir is directly associated with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d ).

RESULTS: 6 x EKIA, 1 x CH-47 Shot down by suspected RPG with 38 PAX (30 US, 7 Afghan Partner Unit, 1 Contract Interpreter) and 1 x Military
working dog onboard, 38 FKIA.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c —EXTORTION 17 CRASH

The Assault Force (AF), (b)(1)1.4a,
TF / TM
(b)(1)1.4c conducted a HAF
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c EXTO RPG
raid with an infil HLZ approx 2km from the OBJ. Upon infil, AF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
PID’d armed MAMs demonstrating hostile intent and engaged
with AWT in self-defense, resulting in 6 x EKIA.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
While moving to contain the OBJ, AF reported multiple MAMs
squirting from the target compound and requested Immediate
Reaction Force (IRF) support to interdict.
At 2130z the IRF was directed to infil and interdict the squirters (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
that had moved Northwest of the objective area.
EX ite
At 2209z, while enroute to contain suspected combatants, the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
IRF acft (1 x CH-47 callsign Extortion 17), escorted by AC-130
and AWT, was struck from a suspected RPG approximately 4
(b)(3), (b)(6)
km from OBJ Lefty Grove. The acft had 38 personnel
onboard. Fires and ISR assets were immediately shifted to the SUPPRESSION ivo POO
70x 30mm
site with no reports of movement.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Due to location and enemy situation, AF moved by foot 3.9 km

to secure the crash site. AF arrived at 0015z and immediately
secured the area. TF Pathfinder (RC-East Quick Reaction (b)(3), (b)(6)
Force) infil’d to HLZ, linked up shortly after at the crash site, 120x 30mm
and assisted TM(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
B) in securing the immediate area. 6x EKIA
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

AF arrived at the crash site at 0015z and immediately secured

the area. The AF reported 6 x FKIA initially, but had to pull
back from the site due to secondary explosions and burning
wreckage. At 0328z, GFC assessed no survivors.
At 0726z, TF , the BSO, linked up with the AF to lead in
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
evacuation of the remains and debris. Remains of 38 x FKIA
were recovered. Throughout the day, the AF and BSO element
were provided with multiple aerial resupplies and EOD / CSAR Page 925
pax / equipment in order to continue recovery operations. The
TM AF was replaced by a TM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c J (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, AF early on 7 AUG11. Sayedabad District, Wardak Province
TM AF exfiltrated crash site at 091530z AUG 11.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Populated Rural
 SECRET //REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO, GIRoA
SECRET //REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO

EXTORTION 17 CRASH—SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (1/3)

Sayedabad District, Wardak Province
AF Timeline on OBJ Lefty Grove
1
1/B(b)(1)1.4a,
TM (b)(1)1.4c
Route of March
1831Z: AF,(b)(1)1.4a,
TM off-set infil complete, HLZ
(b)(1)1.4c to OBJ Lefty Grove from HLZ
(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

2 Squirter Route of March

1901Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) ,AWT, PID’d 8 x
MAMs w/ RPGs and AK-47s demonstrating hostile 5
intent.
1905Z: cleared hot by (b)(3), (b)(6) (JTAC).
(b)(3), (b)(6)
1910Z: AWT engaged 8 x INS w/ 60 x 30mm.
Result is 5 x EKIA. 1 x INS remained, multiple INS
squirted Northwest along the road. 2
1917Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) requested immediately re-
(b)(3), (b)(6)
attack original strike area. Result was1 x EKIA.
4
3 OBJ LEFTY GROVE
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
1924Z: AF reached Objective Rally Point (ORP).

X ENGAGEMENTS
(b)(3), (b)(6) 3
4 60 x 30mm; 5x EKIA
1950Z: AF commenced callout on 10 series 60 x 30mm; 1 x EKIA
buildings.
2133Z: 10 series clear; Bldg 69 clear; AWT strike
area SSE = 6xEKIA, 2xAK-47, 1x RPG, 6 x frag
grenades.

5
2100Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) reported that squirters from OBJ
area have stopped and entered a compound IVO
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c .
2130Z: the IRF was directed to infil and interdict (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
the squirters that had moved Northwest of the
objective area.

Page 926
 SECRET //REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO

EXTORTION 17 CRASH—SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (2/3)

Sayedabad District, Wardak Province
Extortion 17 Crash Timeline:
2154Z: Extortion (EX) 17/16 W/U FOB enroute
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
to HLZ to insert the IRF in order to contain
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
squirte OBJ area.
N

6
2209Z: EX 17 was RP inbound on a 120 heading
following the southern side of the green zone 100-
150ft AGL. (b)(3), (b)(6) has visual of EX 17 on short EXTORTION 17
final for LZ . 100-150 ft AGL
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
2209:48Z: All four AWT crewmembers identified a 40 Knots
distinctive red flash from the approximate POO. Both
back-seaters (NVS) immediately identified a second
flash (RPG impacting right side of EX 17). EX 17
immediately started to spin and descend rapidly. 6
7
2210:10Z: “Extortion is down” reported on AWT
internal comms. 9
2210:35Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) reports to (b)(3), (b)(6) hat EX17
is “down”. EX 17 impacted the ground VIC
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c with an approximate heading of 7
330.
(b)(3), (b)(6)
8 70x 30mm 8 EXTORTION 17 Crash Site
2211Z:(b)(3), (b)(6)breaks left, descended, and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
suppre e POO (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c with
70x 30mm in self-defense.(b)(3), (b)(6)established left
hand orbits at 1000ft AGL and maintains security over
EX 17.
TF Pathfinder HLZ
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
9 Assessed RPG
2230Z: AF at OBJ Lefty Grove initiated movement to
crash site by foot. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
0015Z: AF arrived at and secured crash site.

10 10
2345Z: TF Pathfinder infil at HLZ 650m SW of crash.
0027Z: AF conducted link-up with 20 x pax from TF
Pathfinder. GFC reported crash site secure, confirmed (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
6 x FKIA, but had to pull back from the site due to Page 927
secondary explosions and burning wreckage.
0328Z: GFC assessed no Survivors.
 SECRET //REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO

EXTORTION 17 CRASH—SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (3/3)

Sayedabad District, Wardak Province
Recovery Timeline: Debris Site B Debris Site C
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
11 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

0721z: BSO (b)(1)1.4a,

(TF linkup complete with TM
(b)(1)1.4c
at
crash site. Crash site was centrally
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
located in vicinity of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c at this time. Debris Site A
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
1155z: BSO departs crash site with the remains of all
38 x FKIA. TF Pathfinder and TM remain
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
to continue site sanitation and provide security.

12 A B C D E

Throughout the afternoon of 6 AUG 11, heavy rains

forced the BSO to delay multiple attempts to reinforce
the crash site. Furthermore, the rains created a flash
flood of up to 2 feet of rushing water that filled the
riverbed, scattered debris, and ultimately delayed the
Debris Site E
site sanitization. The debris field is depicted in blocks
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
A-E. The main fuselage, nose, and 2 x engines were
found in the riverbed (site A).
B C

2230z: TM , a CSAR element , and EOD

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
linked up with TM at the crash site.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
12 A
2253z: RIP completed; (b)(1)1.4a,
TM assumed security
(b)(1)1.4c D
and sanitization duties with TF Pathfinder (b)(1)1.4a,
and .
(b)(1)1.4c

2253z: (b)(1)1.4a,
TM moved to exfil HLZ.
(b)(1)1.4c
11
0006z: (b)(1)1.4a,
TM reported, exfil complete.
(b)(1)1.4c

Throughout 7 and 8 AUG 11,(b)(1)1.4a,TM ,(b)(1)1.4a,

TF
(b)(1)1.4c ,
(b)(1)1.4c
and enablers continued to destroy and break apart
debris using torches, saws, thermite grenades, and
high explosives. Multiple resupplies were conducted
via air delivery and by(b)(1)1.4a,
TF t. Inclement weather
(b)(1)1.4c
delayed the clearing and sanitization efforts.
E
081405zAUG11: Vast majority of remaining debris and
recovered items were taken away via a BSO convoy.

091536zAUG11: (b)(1)1.4a,
TM exfil complete 53 PAX.
(b)(1)1.4c

091657zAUG11:(b)(1)1.4a,
TM RTB.
(b)(1)1.4c
Debris Site D Page 928
091745zAUG11: Extortion 17 Crash Site deemed
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
100% clean.(b)(1)1.4a,
TF hauled all remaining debris
(b)(1)1.4c
away and all friendly forces have RTB.
 SECRET //REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO

EXTORTION FLIGHT ROUTES (1/2)

AF Infil Flight Route

IRF Infil Flight Route

IRF HLZ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Crash Site Squirter Location

OBJ Lefty Grove

AF HLZ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

FOB
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 929
 SECRET //REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO

EXTORTION FLIGHT ROUTES (2/2)

AF Infil Flight Route

IRF Infil Flight Route

Crash Site IRF HLZ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Squirter Location

OBJ Lefty Grove

AF HLZ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 930
 SECRET //REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO

1/B OFFSET INFIL ROUTE (1/2)

INFIL HLZ to Objective Rally Point

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Route Overview: Walking Time | Distance Covered | Elevation Change

OFFSET 40 min 2K 6845FT -Page
6594
931 ft
 SECRET //REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO

1/B OFFSET INFIL ROUTE (2/2)

Objective Rally Point to OBJ LEFTY GROVE

INFIL

OBJ

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Route Overview: Walking Time | Distance Covered | Elevation Change

100M Page 932
 SECRET //REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO

1/B ROUTE OF MARCH TO THE CRASH SITE

Crash Site
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

1/B TM Rte of March

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
to the Crash Site
Squirter Bed-down

Page 933
OBJ Lefty Grove
7
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
Archived Log 2.1.4

SECRET

Log Name: TF (b)(1)1.4a,

(b)(1)1.4c JOC LOG 09 Period From: 8/9/2011 Period To: 8/10/2011
AUG 2011 2:45:00 AM 2:45:00 AM
Font Size /
SIGACT? Zulu Time Entry Initials

10Aug2011
107 LOG ARCHIVED
0224Z
10Aug2011 (b)(3),
(b)(6)
106 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - TM (b)(1)1.4c - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 2: RTB
(b)(1)1.4a,

0224Z
10Aug2011 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - TM -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
: EXFIL
105
0154Z COMPLETE
10Aug2011 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - TM - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : AF PZ
104
0140Z PO
10Aug2011
103 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - TM - : RTB
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

0135Z
10Aug2011 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - TM - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : FINAL
102
0132Z RO X DET ES, 26/45/70
10Aug2011 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - TM (b)(1)1.4a,
(b)(1)1.4c -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
: EXFIL
101
0128Z CO
10Aug2011 TF (b)(1)1.4a, - TM - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : AF PZ
100 (b)(1)1.4c

0117Z POSTURE

10Aug2011 TF - TM - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : AF

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

99 CONSOLIDATED B 145; MOVING TO EXFIL HLZ, 4 X

0058Z DETAINEES
10Aug2011 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - TM (b)(1)1.4c - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a,
: AF
98
0056Z PREPARING TO MOVE TO EXFIL HLZ, 4 X DETAINEES
10Aug2011
97 TF (b)(1)1.4a, - TM (b)(1)1.4c - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : RTB
(b)(1)1.4a,

0047Z
(b)(1)1.4c

10Aug2011 TF (b)(1)1.4c - TM (b)(1)1.4c - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : FINAL ROLL-UP,

(b)(1)1.4a,
(b)(1)1.4a,

96 5 X NEES, R SERIES 4/4/5;

0037Z BLDG 404 HBIED
10Aug2011 TF (b)(1)1.4a,
(b)(1)1.4a,
- TM (b)(1)1.4c - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : EXFIL
95 (b)(1)1.4c

0027Z COMPLETE
10Aug2011 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - TM (b)(1)1.4a, OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : BLDG 40,
94 (b)(1)1.4c

0021Z 60 CURE AL S
10Aug2011
93 TF (b)(1)1.4a, - TM (b)(1)1.4a, - OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : AF PZ POSTURE
0020Z
(b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4c

10Aug2011 TF (b)(1)1.4a,
(b)(1)1.4c TM (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
BLDG 145

Page 934

(b)(2)
Archived Log 2.1.4

Page 935

(b)(2)
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. PAGE NO.
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency 1 5
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED

FROM TO
HHC 10TH COMBAT AVIATION FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cAFG HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
BRIGADE 2000 12 AUG 11 0800 13 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
NO. INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
IN OUT

1 0245 (b)(3), (b)(6) OPENS LOG LOG OPENED

BTL CPT REPORTS THAT (b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTS TOC NOTIFIED PULLED
2 0245 FALLEN ANGEL OF A AH-64 (b)(3), (b)(6) ISO OBJ LEFT UP BLT DRILL DUTIES
GROVE ASSUMED
3 0245 INFORMED DIVISION OF FALLEN ANGEL CALLED DIVISION
4 0245 S2 REPORTS CALLING CMD FOR AN ISR ASSET TOC INFORMED,
S2 REPORTED THE ISR ISO OF FA IS SKY
5 0248 TOC INFORMED
RAIDER
MEDOPS REPORTS TF (b)(3), (b)(6) FA AT GRIDS
6 0249 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
TOC INFORMED
BTL NCO FALLEN ANGEL NOTIFIED TO ALL
7 0249 NOTIFIED UNITS
UNITS ON (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c GRID (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6) CALLS DIVISION SINCE FALLEN

8 0249 ANGEL IN IMM ROZ EIGHTPENCE IN SUPPORT OF DIVISION NOTIFIED
OBJ LEFTY GROVE
(b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTS (b)(3), (b)(6)
9 0250 TOC INFORMED
(b)(3), (b)(6) ARE NOTIFIED
BTL NCO REPORTS UPDATED CALL SIGN FOR FA
INFORMED ALL UNITS
10 0251 IS EX 17 CH-47 (b)(3), (b)(6) OVERHEAD ATT (b)(3), (b)(6)
VIA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
AND OSC
NOTIFIED BTL NCO THAT FALLEN ANGEL IS IN
11 0251 IMM ROZ EIGHTPENCE AND DIVISION WAS NOTIFIED BTL NCO
WORKING WITH TF FOR THE ROZ
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)
FECC REPORTS ROZ IN SUPPORT OF OBJ LEFTY
12 0253 NOTIFIED TOC
IS BEING USED FOR FA ROZ
DIVISION NOTIFIED US THAT IMM ROZ
13 0253 NOTIFIED TOC
EIGHTPENCE TO BE USED FOR FALLEN ANGEL
14 0254 FIRES REPORTS (b)(3), (b)(6) HAS A 9 MIN ETA NOTIFIED TOC
S2 REPORTS THE SET FOR THE FA ISO
15 0255 NOTIFIED TOC
TF (b)(3), (b)(6) IS SIJAN
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , AND THE CHAPLAIN
16 0255 COMMAND NOTIFIED
ARE ALL NOTIFIED
TF (b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTS EX 17 HAD 31 PAX ON
17 0255 NOTIFIED TOC
BOARD AC
BTL NCO CONTACTED (b)(3), (b)(6) ON VENTRILO
TO FIND OUT HOW MANY PAX WERE ON BOARD.
18 0255 NOTIFIED CHOPS
(b)(3), (b)(6) REPLIED WITH 31 PAX INCLUDING
CREW MEMBERS
BTL NCO CONTACTED (b)(3), (b)(6) ON VENTRILO
19 0256 TO CONFIRM THAT THERE WERE 31 PAX ON CH- NOTIFIED CHOPS
47
20 0256 FECC REPORTS BONE 11 ISO FA ETA 15 MINS NOTIFIED TOC
TF (b)(3), (b)(6) ON VENTRILO REPORTS THAT
21 0257 PB70 IS THE ON SCENE COMMANDER AT THIS NOTIFIED CHOPS
TIME ON FREQ 50.600
22 0258 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTS UPDATED FA GRIDS VC NOTIFIED ALL UNITS
TYPED NAME AND RANK OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE
(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE APD PE V3.00ES

Page 936
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. PAGE NO.
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency 2 5
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED

FROM TO
HHC 10TH COMBAT AVIATION FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
, AFG HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
BRIGADE 2000 12 AUG 11 0800 13 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
NO. INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
IN OUT

8014 6461 VIA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTS NIPPER BLACKOUT
23 0259 NOTIFIED TOC
INITIATED
FIRES REPORTS AN UPDATED GRID (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
24 0259 TOC INFORMED
TO FALLEN ANGEL SITE
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
25 0259 (b)(3), (b)(6) ON STATION LOGGED
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ON (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS CHANGE
26 0259 NOTIFIED CHOPS
TO THE AIR BATTLE NET TO FREQ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ON (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
TEAM IS MOVING TOWARDS THE FALLEN ANGEL
27 0300 NOTIFIED CHOPS
SITE. THEY REPORT THAT THE AIRCRAFT IS ON
FIRE.
TF REPORTS ON VENTRILO THAT
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
28 0301 THE TEAM IS APPROX 300 METERS AWAY NOTIFIED CHOPS
FROM THE FALLEN ANGEL SITE.
VENT TM MOVING FORWARD, 300M AWAY,
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
29 0301 TOWA RASH SITE, NO REPORT OF PAX OUT LOGGED
OF A/C, AND A/C ON FIRE
30 0301 PRI PX CALLED FOR FALLEN ANGEL LOGGED
31 0302 TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cREPORTS(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TM RC2 NOTIFIED TOC
BTL NCO REPORTS GROUND ELEMENT HAS
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
32 0302 NOTIFIED TOC
ARRIVED AT FA SITE
33 0302 (b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTS ABN(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c NOTIFIED TOC
34 0304 (b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTS BONE 11 ON STATION OVER FA NOTIFIED TOC
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTS GROUND FORCE ISO OBJ
LEFTY IS BREAKING OFF OBJ TO SUPPORT AND
35 0304 NOTIFIED TOC
SECURE FALLEN ANGEL SITE 56 PAX ENROUTE
TO FA SITE
BTL NCO CONTACTED TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TO
36 0305 SEND THERE FALLEN ANGEL REP HERE TO THE NOTIFIED CHOPS
TOC
37 0305 (b)(3), (b)(6) NOTIFIED/PRESENT LOGGED
38 0306 SPOOL PATHFINDER PER F6 REDCON 2 LOGGED
STILL REPORT AT 300M FOR TEAM FROM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
39 0307 LOGGED
SITE
40 0308 (b)(3), (b)(6) 2X A-10 ETA ISO FALLEN ANGEL LOGGED
41 0308 (b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTS (b)(3), (b)(6)TO SUPT FA 2X A-10 NOTIFIED TOC
TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cREPORTS TM AWT AT REDCON
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
42 0308 NOTIFIED TOC
2 IF NEEDED FOR FALLEN ANGEL
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS ON (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c THAT
THE NEW ON SCENE COMMANDER IS (b)(3), (b)(6) ,
MSN READY UH IS ON REDCON 1 ALONG WITH
43 0309 NOTIFIED CHOPS
PFDRS WILL INSERT AT GRID (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
WHICH IS A HILLTOP NEAR THE FALLEN
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
ANGEL SITE
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS PATH ARE RC 1 AND
44 0310 BTL NCO INFORMS TOC
ARE GOING TO LAUNCH ONCE LZ IS SECURED AT
TYPED NAME AND RANK OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE
(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE APD PE V3.00ES

Page 937
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. PAGE NO.
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency 3 5
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED

FROM TO
HHC 10TH COMBAT AVIATION FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
, AFG HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
BRIGADE 2000 12 AUG 11 0800 13 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
NO. INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
IN OUT

LZ AT GRIDS (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

BTL NCO CONTACTS TF

BTL NCO REQUEST NUMBER OF PATHFINDERS ON
45 0310 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ON
A/C
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

REDCON 1 PFDRS LAUNCH TO GRID VC

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c BTL NCO NOTIFIED
46 0312
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TERRAIN
BTL NCO NOTIFIED TF
BTL NCO NOTIFIED (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c NOT TO LAUNCH
47 0314 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c VIA
UNTIL APPROVED BY (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
BTL NCO INFORMED (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c THAT THE MSN
READY UH’S AND PFDRS WILL NOT LAUNCH
48 0314 NOTIFIED CHOPS
UNTIL APPROVED BY(b)(3), (b)(6) , (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
ACKNOWLEDGES
(b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTS CHAPLAIN HAS BEEN
49 0317 BTL DRILL UPDATED
NOTIFIED LEGAL AND SAFETY ARE ENROUTE
BTL NCO REPORTS
WHO: (b)(3), (b)(6) (289/295)
WHAT: ENGAGED 8 X INS CARRYING AK’S AND
RPG’S AT (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c . (b)(3), (b)(6) ENGAGED
WITH APPROXIMATELY 60 ROUNDS OF 30MM AND
DISTRIBUTED VIA E-
50 0318 RECEIVED CLEARANCE OF FIRES FROM B(b)(3), (b)(6)
MAIL
(GFC). (b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTED 5 X EKIA.
WHEN: 052349DAUG11.
WHERE: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , VIC OLD COP
(b)(3), (b)(6)
TANGI.
WHY: MEETS CCIR #13
(b)(3), (b)(6)
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS ON VENTRILO THAT
51 0319 THE GROUND FORCES ARE 45 MIN AWAY FROM NOTIFIED CHOPS
THE FALLEN ANGEL SITE
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS GROUND TM ETA
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
52 0320 NOTIFIED TOC
45M
CHOPS REPORTS THERE ARE 20 PATHFINDER AT
53 0322 NOTIFIED TOC
RC 1 AT SHA
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS ON (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c THAT
54 0324 NOTIFIED CHOPS
THE GFC IS LB ON FREQ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)

PER BTL NCO NOTIFIED

55 0326 GFC(b)(1)1.4a,
LB (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)
TERRAIN
TF REPORTS GOURD FORCE COMMANDEER IS BTL NCO INFORMS ALL
56 0326 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)
LB FREQ IS(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c UNITS VIA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
BT CO INFORMS AL TS ON VENTRILO CS
57 0327 NOTIFIED CHOPS
AND FREQ OF GFC CS(b)(3), (b)(6) FREQ/ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
58 0328 (b)(3), (b)(6)REPORTS HG ET MIN TO E NOTIFIED TOC
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS NAWT (b)(3), (b)(6) ARE
59 0328 NOTIFIED TOC
GOING TO LAND AT SHA AND GO REDCON 1
(b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTS CHAPLAIN IS ON R&R
60 0329 UPDATED BTL DRILL
CHAPLAIN ASSISTANT NOTIFIED
61 0331 TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cREPORTS PH-NIGHT AWTS NOTIFIED TOC

TYPED NAME AND RANK OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE APD PE V3.00ES

Page 938
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. PAGE NO.
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency 4 5
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED

FROM TO
HHC 10TH COMBAT AVIATION FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
, AFG HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
BRIGADE 2000 12 AUG 11 0800 13 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
NO. INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
IN OUT

(360) (b)(3), (b)(6)(377) W/D BAF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

S2 REPORTS SEEING POSSIBLE 2X IR SIGS NOTIFIED TOC BTL NCO

62 0334 APPROX 10-15 METERS SOUTH WEST OF CRASH NOTIFIED TF
SITE BEHIND A WALL (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
S-2 REPORTS 2X IR SIGNALS SW OF SITE 10-
63 0339 LOGGED
15M FROM FA BEHIND WALL
64 0345 FIRES REPORTS (b)(3), (b)(6)IS OS OF FA LOGGED
(b)(3), (b)(6)REPORTS (b)(3), (b)(6) 2X A-10’S IS ON
65 0345 NOTIFIED TOC
STATION OVER HEAD OF FA SITE
TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cREPORTS PH-NIGHT AWTS
66 0347 NOTIFIED TOC
(360) (b)(3), (b)(6)(377) W/U BAF
(b)(3), (b)(6)
CHOPS GIVE DATED TOC ON CURRENT
67 0348 CHOPS UPDATED TOC
SITUATION
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS TEAM IS APPROX
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
68 0349 650 METERS FROM CRASH SITE ETA TO CRASH NOTIFIED TOC
SITE IS 15MIN
TF REPORTS THAT THEY WANT TO LAUNCH
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
69 0350 FROM DIV (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
PATHFINDERS
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c SENDS ROUTE OF FLIGHT AC1
GRID (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , RELEASE POINT
70 0351 NOTIFIED CHOPS
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS THE PATHFINDER HLZ
71 0354 BTL NCO INFORMS TOC
AT GRIDS (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) R BLACKOUT IS 60%
72 0355 UPDATED BTL DRILL
COMPLETE
19 PAX ON 2X UH-60'S TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)
73 0356 LOGGED
(b)(3), (b)(6) PATHFINDER CDR
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS ON (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c THAT
74 0356 NOTIFIED CHOPS
19 PFDRS ARE ON THE MSN READY UH 60’S
BTL NCO REPORTS GROUND ELEMENT ARE 150
75 0402 NOTIFIED TOC
METERS OUT
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
76 0404 SUPPORT WITH PATH FINDERS (b)(3), (b)(6) NOTIFIED TOC
(b)(3), (b)(6) W/U SHA 0404
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS THERE IS 1 FRIENDLY
77 0405 NOTIFIED TOC
SPOTTED 10-15M OUT SIDE OF CRASH SITE
TF (b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTS 33 PAX IN A/C PLUS
78 0406 LOGGED
5 CREW ON A/C TOTAL OF 38 PAX
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS 1 CF SM RECOVERED
79 0407 NOTIFIED TOC
FROM FA SITE BY PB 65
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS AWT SPOTTED 4
VEHICLES MOVING TOWARD FA SITE AT A HIGH
80 0408 NOTIFIED TOC
SPEED AWT IS GOING TO SUPPRESS FIRE IVO
VEHICLES
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS PATHFINDER ARE W/D
81 0413 NOTIFIED TOC
AT FA SITE PATHFINDER 26 IS GROUND
TYPED NAME AND RANK OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE
(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE APD PE V3.00ES

Page 939
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. PAGE NO.
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency 5 5
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED

FROM TO
HHC 10TH COMBAT AVIATION FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
, AFG HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
BRIGADE 2000 12 AUG 11 0800 13 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
NO. INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
IN OUT

COMMANDER
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS AWT SUPPRESSED
82 0414 DURING INFILL AND SUPPRESSED WHEN A/C NOTIFIED TOC
LEFT HLZ
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS TEAM IS AT THE
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
83 0415 CRASH SITE AT THIS TIME AND THAT THE 20 NOTIFIED CHOPS
PFDRS ARE WD AT HLZ
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS PATHFINDER ARE 500M
84 0416 NOTIFIED TOC
FROM FA SITE ENROUTE TO SITE
S2 REPORTS INTERCEPT INSURGENTS PLAN
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
85 0416 NOTIFIED TOC
TO FIRE ON CF AROUND FA SITE
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS TOTAL PAX ON GROUND
86 0417 AT FA SITE IS 47 PAX 20 PF (b)(1)1.4a, 27 TM
(b)(1)1.4c NOTIFIED TOC
PAX’S
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS 47 PAX ON THE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

87 0418 TEAM THAT IS SECURING THE FALLEN ANG NOTIFIED CHOPS

SITE.
BTL NCO REPORT (b)(1)1.4a, 47 TEAM MEMBERS SECURE
(b)(1)1.4c
88 0420 LOGGED
SITE ATT
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS 3 VEHICLES SPOTTED
1 KILOMETER AWAY FROM THE FALLEN ANGEL
89 0421 NOTIFIED CHOPS
SITE, 1 VEHICLE IS A JINGLE TRUCK, TWO
OTHERS ARE UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.
CHOPS REPORTS 23 PAX FORM TM(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cARE (b)(3), (b)(6)
90 0424 GOING TO SHA ON MH-47’S AND WILL WAIT AT NOTIFIED TOC
SHA UNTIL NEEDED
TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cREPORTS PH-NIGHT AWTS
91 0423 NOTIFIED TOC
(360)(b)(3), (b)(6)(377) W/D SHA
(b)(3), (b)(6)
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
92 0424 SUPPORT WITH PATHFINDERS (b)(3), (b)(6) GA NOTIFIED TOC
(b)(3), (b)(6) W/D SHA 0424

93 0427 TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cREPORTS AWT W/D SHK

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c RTO ANNOUNCED
BTL NCO CONTACTED (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TO FIND OUT
94 0429 WHAT FREQ THE PFDRS ARE ON, THEY ARE ON NOTIFIED CHOPS
FREQ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS PFDRS ARE 400M FROM
95 0433 NOTIFIED TOC
FA SITE
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS (b)(3), (b)(6)
96 0433 LOGGED
W/U (BHO @ 0453)
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS THAT (b)(3), (b)(6) IS A
AT THIS TIME TO DO BHO WITH (b)(3), (b)(6), PFDRS
ARE 300 METERS AWAY AND CLOSING,
97 0433 NOTIFIED CHOPS
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c EPORTS THAT PFDRS ARE IN
COMMS(b)(1)1.4a,
WITH(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3),
TEAM (b)(6)
AND IS BEING OVER
WATCHED BY (b)(3), (b)(6)
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS AM AWT FALLEN ANGEL
98 0436 NOTIFIED TOC
SECURITY (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U SHA 0431
FFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE
(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE APD PE V3.00ES

Page 940
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. PAGE NO.
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency 6 5
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED

FROM TO
HHC 10TH COMBAT AVIATION FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
, AFG HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
BRIGADE 2000 12 AUG 11 0800 13 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
NO. INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
IN OUT

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS AM AWT FALLEN ANGEL

99 0440 SECURITY (b)(3), (b)(6) ON STATION NOTIFIED TOC
0440
DIV UPDATE VIA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c FRIENDLY KIA’S
100 0441 TOC NOTIFIED
UNK, NO GROUND CONTACT ATT
RTO REPORT (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c AWT (b)(3), (b)(6)
101 0442 LOGGED
(b)(3), (b)(6) IS ON STATION ATT

(b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTS NIPR BLACKOUT IS

102 0446 TOC NOTIFIED
COMPLETE
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS PFDRS ARE 100
103 0447 NOTIFIED CHOPS
METERS AWAY FROM THE FALLEN ANGEL SITE.
AWT SPOTTED 6 INS ON TOP OF A ROOF OF A
104 0455 TOC NOTIFIED
QALLAT TRYING TO GAIN PID FOR WEAPONS
BTL NCO CONTACTED (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TO FIND OUT
IF PFDRS HAVE LINKED UP WITH THE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
105 0455 NOTIFIED CHOPS
TEAM. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CONFIRMS THEY HAVE NOT
LINKED UP AT THIS TIME.
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS AWT IS TRACKING 6
106 0458 PAX ON A ROOF TOP TO THE NW OF THE QALAT, NOTIFIED CHOPS
AWT IS TRYING TO PID FOR WEAPONS.
(b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTS AWT HAS EYE ON THE
PATHFINDER’S AND THE AWT IS SCANNING ALL
107 0501 TOC INFORMED
SECTORS AROUND THE FA SITE WITH GOOD
COMMS WITH TM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)
PATHFINDERS REPORT THEY ON SCENE ATT VIA
108 0501 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cHAVE COMMS W/ GROUND ELEMENTS & TOC NOTIFIED
APACHES
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS TOTAL PAX ON FA
109 0502 TOC NOTIFIED
SITE 67 PAX
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS PFDRS CONDUCTED
110 0502 LINK UP WITH TEAM AT THIS TIME. 67
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c NOTIFIED CHOPS
TOTAL PAX ON THE FALLEN ANGEL SITE.
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS (b)(3), (b)(6) IS ON SITE
111 0505 AT THE FA WITH 5 VEHICLES 20 PAX AND TOC NOTIFIED
LINKED UP WITH LB (b)(3), (b)(6)

CHOPS REPORTS THAT 5 VEHICLES 20 PAX FROM

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cCS (b)(3), (b)(6) HAVE LINKED UP WITH
112 0506 NOTIFIED CHOPS
PAX AT FALLEN ANGEL SITE. 87 TOTAL PAX AT
THIS TIME.
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS (b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTED
113 0508 TOC NOTIFIED
CRASH SITE IS SECURED BY GROUND FORCES
PATHFINDERS REPORT VIA(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c THE FALLEN
114 0509 NOTIFIED CHOPS
ANGEL SITE IS SECURED AT THIS TIME.
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c OVER(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cGUIDANCE TO
115 0511 PFDRS CONTINUE TO SECURE AND ASSIST LOGGED
CASUALTIES
116 0515 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS SPEED BALLS ARE NOTIFIED CHOPS

TYPED NAME AND RANK OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE APD PE V3.00ES

Page 941
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. PAGE NO.
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency 7 5
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED

FROM TO
HHC 10TH COMBAT AVIATION FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cAFG HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
BRIGADE 2000 12 AUG 11 0800 13 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
NO. INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
IN OUT

LOADED WITH CLASS 1 AND CLASS 5 AREA TOO

HOT FOR AIRCRAFT TO LAND AT FA SITE,
HOWEVER CSAR BIRD MIGHT BE ALE TO, AND
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c WILL LOAD SPEEDBALLS ON THAT

AIRCRAFT
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS THERE ARE ZERO
117 0517 NOTIFIED CHOPS
SURVIVORS FROM THE FALLEN ANGEL SITE.
S-2 REPORTS THAT FREEDOM IS REPORTING A
GROUP OF PAX 300MS FORM THE CRASH SITE IS
118 0520 TOC NOTIFIED
BEING FIRED ON BY GROUND ELEMENTS AT FA
SITE
BTL NCO REQUEST CONFIRMATION OF GROUND NO CONFIRMATION
119 0521
ELEMENT IN CONTACT FROM TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c RECEIVED
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL AWT(b)(3), (b)(6)TOC NOTIFIED UPDATED
120 0525
(b)(3), (b)(6) W/U SHA 0525 FLT TRACKER
BTL NCO RECEIVES 5W’S FROM TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

WHO: (b)(3), (b)(6) (289/295)

WHAT: ENGAGED 8 X INS CARRYING AK’S AND
RPG’S AT (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c . PB 65 ENGAGED
WITH APPROXIMATELY 60 ROUNDS OF 30MM AND TOC INFORMED SENT
121 0533
RECEIVED CLEARANCE OF FIRES FROM B (b)(3), (b)(6) 5W’S TO (b)(3), (b)(6) COC
(GFC). (b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTED 5 X EKIA.
WHEN: 052349DAUG11.
WHERE: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , VIC OLD COP
TANGI.
WHY: MEETS F6 CCIR #13 (b)(3), (b)(6)

BTL NCO RECEIVES 5W’S FOR TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

WHO: EX17 (175)

WHAT: FALLEN ANGEL WHILE CONDUCTING TF
(b)(3), (b)(6) OPERATIONS IN VICINITY OLD COP

TANGI. GROUND FORCES REPORTED EX 17 SHOT

DOWN BY RPG. EX 17 WAS ON APPROACH INTO
TF LZ WITH 33 X HAF PAX AND 5 X CREW
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
MEMBERS. GROUND FORCES IN VIC OF CRASH
SITE MOVED TO CRASH LOCATION IOT SECURE TOC INFORMED SENT
122 0533
THE SITE. 20 X PFDRS WERE INFILLED NEAR 5W’S TO (b)(3), (b)(6) COC
THE CRASH LOCATION AND HAVE ARRIVED AT
THE CRASH SITE. CURRENTLY (b)(3), (b)(6) ARE
OVERHEAD OF THE CRASH SITE AND ARE
CONDUCTING BATTLE HANDOVERS WITH (b)(3), (b)(6)
FOR REFUEL OPERATIONS. PATHFINDERS HAVE
REPORTED 0 X SURVIVORS AT THE CRASH SITE.
WHEN: 060243DAUG11
WHERE: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
WHY: MEETS (b)(3), (b)(6) CCIR #6
123 0535 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS PFDRS HAVE NOTIFIED CHOPS
TYPED NAME AND RANK OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE
(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE APD PE V3.00ES

Page 942
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. PAGE NO.
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency 8 5
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED

FROM TO
HHC 10TH COMBAT AVIATION FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
, AFG HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
BRIGADE 2000 12 AUG 11 0800 13 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
NO. INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
IN OUT

RECOVERED 60% OF THE HEROES AT THE FALLEN

ANGEL SITE.
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS AWT HAS LASERED 10
124 0547 PAXS ON A ROAD AND WILL POSSIBLY ENGAGE TOC NOTIFIED
THEM
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c SPOT REPORT, AWT REPORTS 10
125 0548 INDIVIDUALS ON THE ROAD, AWT COULD NOTIFIED CHOPS
POSSIBLY ENGAGE
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 3 PASSES GEN GROUND PLAN
IN SAYD A BAD, 1 RCT CIED, 1 WEAPONS
PLATOON AND (b)(3), (b)(6) TAC WILL SP AT 0540,
TASK TO SECURE ROUTE(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cFROM HIGHWAY
1. 1 PLATOON C-CO 2-4 HAVE SP’D TO ROUTE
AT THIS TIME. 2 PLATOONS FROM STORM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
A RCT FROM BARAKI BARAK WILL SP IN 30
MIN TO IBRAHIM QILL. THOSE 2 PLATOONS
WILL PUSH WEST TO THE 85 NORTHING TO
SECURE THE FALLEN ANGEL SITE FROM THE
126 0555 NORTH AND SECURE THE RATLINE THAT NOTIFIED CHOPS
INFLUENCES MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE FALLEN
ANGEL SITE. TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cWOULD LIKE TO
INSERT TM ON OP (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c BY AIR TO
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
SECURE THE LOCK FROM HIGHWAY 1 TO THE
CRASH SITE. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c AND(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cARE
DETERMINING IF IT IS FEASIB NSERT
(b)(3), (b)(6)
THE FTF ON OP (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. BY ESTABLISHING
THE FTF THEY CAN CONDUCT SPEEDBALL
RESUPPLIES AND DO A GROUND MOVE TO
RESUPPLY PAX AT THE FALLEN ANGEL SITE.
IMM ROZ EIGHTPENCE EXPANDED TO 10NM ISO (b)(3), (b)(6) NOTIFIED
127 0625
FALLEN ANGEL TOC
TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cREPORTS PH-NIGHT AWTS
128 0637 TOC INFORMED
(360) (b)(3), (b)(6)(377) W/U SHA
(b)(3), (b)(6)
FINDER PORT THEY HAVE RECOVERED 33
129 0707 TOC INFORMED
OF 38 PAX FROM THE A/C
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS THE PFDRS HAVE
130 0711 RECOVERED 33 OUT OF 38 HERO’S AT THE NOTIFIED CHOPS
FALLEN ANGEL SITE AT THIS TIME.
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS AM AWT FALLEN ANGEL
131 0717 SECURITY (b)(3), (b)(6) ON STATION TOC INFORMED
0715
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 47 REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL AWT
132 0719 TOC INFORMED
(b)(3), (b)(6) W/D SHA 0719
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cREPORTS DQRF (b)(3), (b)(6) (300) BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
133 0808
(404) W/U BAF UPDATED TRACKER
(b)(3), (b)(6)
REPORTS VIA(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cTHAT THEY HAVE
134 0825 &15MIN OF ON STATION TIME LEFT UNTIL TF & TOC NOTIFIED
THEY WILL NEED TO CONDUCT A REFUEL FOR
ICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE
(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE APD PE V3.00ES

Page 943
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. PAGE NO.
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency 9 5
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED

FROM TO
HHC 10TH COMBAT AVIATION FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cAFG HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
BRIGADE 2000 12 AUG 11 0800 13 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
NO. INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
IN OUT

BOTHE A/C THAT’S OVERHEAD ATT

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cREPORTS DQRF AWT (b)(3), (b)(6)(300) BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
135 0849
(404) W/D SHA
(b)(3), (b)(6) UPDATED TRACKER
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS EOD MOVE (DAY MSN BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
136 0918
RDY) (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U BBJ 0918L UPDATED TRACKER
FIRES REPORTS HAWG 54 PERFORMS
137 0925 SUPPRESSIVE FIRES FOR AIR DROP VIC FALLEN NOTIFIED TOC
ANGEL
PATHFINDER 26 REPORTS TO PATHFINDER 06
THAT THE A/C IS STILL BURNING AND
INFORMED THEM THAT THEY WILL HAVE TO RON. BLT CPT/TOC INFORMED
138 0933
THE A/C IS UNRECOVERABLE, ALSO THEY ARE CREWS AND AWARE
STILL WORKING ON INFILLING MORE PAX ON
THE SITE
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS AM AWT FALLEN ANGEL
BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
139 0935 SECURITY (b)(3), (b)(6) OFF STATION
UPDATED TRACKER
0935
PATHFINDER 26 REPORTS THEY NEEDED FIRE
140 0939 BLT CPT/TOC INFORMED
EXTINGUISHERS ATT
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS AM AWT FALLEN ANGEL BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
141 0941
SECURITY (b)(3), (b)(6) W/D SHA 0941 UPDATED TRACKER
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS AM AWT FALLEN ANGEL
142 0941 TOC INFORMED
SECURITY (b)(3), (b)(6) W/D SHA 0941
TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cREPORTS DAY CH (b)(3), (b)(6) BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
143 0952 (b)(3), (b)(6)
(177/166) W/U BAF UPDATED TRACKER
AM AWT FALLEN ANGEL SECURITY (b)(3), (b)(6)
144 1000 TOC INFORMED
(b)(3), (b)(6) W/U SHA 1000
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cREPORTS DAY CH (b)(3), (b)(6) BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
145 1027
(177/166) W/D SHA UPDATED TRACKER
S-2 REPORTS LODI IN (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c AO
146 1035 (b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTS INS ARE PLANNING TO TOC INFORMED
ATTACK FA SITE OF THE CH-47
TOC INFORMED
147 1053 35 HEROES FOR THE CH-47 CRASH SITE
PERSONNEL NOTIFIED
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS THEY HAVE RECOVER
148 1058 35 HERO AND IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT 30 OF TOC INFORMED
THEM ARE US MIL, AND 5 ARE UNKNOWN
CHOPS REPORTS THAT THE 2ND C130 DROP HAS
149 1129 TOC INFORMED
BEEN COMPLETE
CHOPS REPORTS (b)(3), (b)(6) UH-60 WILL BE
150 1157 TOC INFORMED
MOVING THE MORTUARY TEAM TO SHK
PFDR26 REPORTS THAT THEY HAVE EXACTED A
151 1158 TOC INFORMED
TOTAL OF 38 HERO
PFDR6 REPORTS TO PATHFINDER 26 THAT THE
AREA THAT THEY ARE IN IS NOT SAFE TO MOVE
152 1158 TOC INFORMED
OUT OF UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE OF THE EXFILL
PLAN TO GET THE RANGERS AND THE
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TYPED NAME AND RANK OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE APD PE V3.00ES

Page 944
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. PAGE NO.
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency 10 5
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED

FROM TO
HHC 10TH COMBAT AVIATION FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cAFG HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
BRIGADE 2000 12 AUG 11 0800 13 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
NO. INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
IN OUT

PLATOON OUT OF THIS AREA

(b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTS THERE ARE A TOTAL OF

39 HERO LOADED INTO THE TRUCK HEADING TO
153 1159 HIGHWAY 1 AND CURRENTLY ANOTHER GROUND TOC INFORMED
UNIT BY HIGHWAY 1 IS TAKING HEAVY
CONTACT.
PFDR06 RELAYS TO PFDR26 THAT THEY NEED
STICK WITH THERE PLAN OF MAKING MOVES TO
154 1200 TOC INFORMED
GET OUT OF THE AREA WITH OUT GETTING IN
HARMS WAY
UPDATED TO SECURED HEROES AT THE SITE
155 1200 TOC INFORMED
THERE ARE 38 HEROES ATT
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cTM WILL BE IN ROUTE AT
156 1201 TOC INFORMED
APPROXIMATELY 05MIN
PFDR06 WANT PFDR26 TO INFORM HIM IF THE
RANGER BEGAN TO MOVE OUT OF THE SAFE AREA
157 1202 BECAUSE THERE IS A TALIBAN GROUP NAME: TOC INFORMED
CREEK IN THAT AREA AND THEY ARE TALKING
FIRE WITH THE GROUND FORCES
AW76 HAS COMPLETED BHO WITH THE PB
158 1228 ELEMENT AND HAS 7 PAX TO DROP OFF AT HLZ TOC INFORMED
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c GRID: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cREPORTS DAY CH (b)(3), (b)(6) BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED

159 1232 (b)(3), (b)(6)
(177/166) W/U SHA UPDATED TRACKER
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS PH DAY CH-47 W/U
160 1232 TOC INFORMED
SHK HEADING TO SITE
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS AM AWT FALLEN ANGEL
BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
161 1236 SECURITY (b)(3), (b)(6) W/D SHA
UPDATED TRACKER
1236L MC
RTO REPORTS PH DAY CH-47 IS 10 MIN OUT OF
162 1244 TOC INFORMED
HLZ
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS PH-DAY CH (b)(3), (b)(6)
163 1253 TOC INFORMED
(177/166) INFIL COMPLETE
TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cREPORTS DAY CH (b)(3), (b)(6) BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
164 1312
(177/166) W/D SHA 1312L UPDATED TRACKER
PFDRS26 RELAY TO PATHFINDER 06 THAT THEY
165 1347 HAVE ALL HEROES LOADED ON TO THE TRUCK TOC INFORMED
ATT
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)RELAY OVER VIA THAT
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
166 1351 TO SPOIL UP A DAY CREW WITH
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TOC NOTIFIED
AT LEAST 1 CH-47
(b)(3), (b)(6) RELAYS TO FALCON66 THAT
167 1354 THERE ARE 40 INFANTRY GUYS ON THE GROUND TOC INFORMED
ATT ALSO THERE IS A(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TM OVER HEAD
TYPED NAME AND RANK OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE
(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE APD PE V3.00ES

Page 945
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. PAGE NO.
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency 11 5
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED

FROM TO
HHC 10TH COMBAT AVIATION FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cAFG HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
BRIGADE 2000 12 AUG 11 0800 13 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
NO. INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
IN OUT

PROVIDING SECURITY (b)(3), (b)(6) ALSO RELAYS

THAT THE CH-47’S ARE GOING BACK TO SAL
AND PICKUP 35 PAX TO INFIL.. (b)(3), (b)(6)
STATES THAT THERE IS NO GROUND LOWBOY
CAPABILITY OF GETTING THIS A/C AT THE
ALTITUDE OF 10,800FT.
FALLEN ANGEL SECURITY PM AWT (b)(3), (b)(6) BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
168 1408
(b)(3), (b)(6) W/U SHA 1404L UPDATED TRACKER
NGEL SECURITY PM AWT (b)(3), (b)(6)
169 1410 (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U SHA 1404L MORTUA RS TOC INFORMED
AND ASSESSMENT TM
TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cREPORTS SSM#5 PAX MOVE/(b)(3), (b)(6)
170 1416 TOC INFORMED
(b)(3), (b)(6) (346/587) W/U SAY
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TEAM 046) &
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
171 1421 TOC INFORMED
(364) WD GDE 0951Z
(b)(3), (b)(6)
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cREPORTS SSM#5 PAX MOVE/ (b)(3), (b)(6)
172 1433 (b)(3), (b)(6)/AV54 (346/587) W/D GDE MORTUARY TOC INFORMED
AFFAIRS AND ASSESSMENT TM
PH-DAY AWT ISO FALLEN ANGEL (b)(3), (b)(6) BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
173 1454
(b)(3), (b)(6) W/D SHA 1450L UPDATED TRACKER
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS DAY AWT ISO FALLEN
174 1454 TOC INFORMED
ANGEL (b)(3), (b)(6) W/D SHA 1450L
BTL CPT RELAYED THE FOLLOWING ARE PAX
SCATTER AROUND THE SITE AS FOLLOWS:
20 CAB PATHFINDER
175 1514 40 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c BAE
20 MOUNTAIN PAX AND 5 VEHICLES FROM TF (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
60 GHOST ELEMENT FROM OP SHR FROM TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

PH-DAY CH (b)(3), (b)(6) (177/166) W/U SHA 1530L BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
176 1530
ENROUTE BAF UPDATED TRACKER
SSM#5 PAX MOVE/ (b)(3), (b)(6) (346/587)
177 1548 TOC INFORMED
W/U KIA
SSM#5 PAX MOVE/ (b)(3), (b)(6) (346/587)
178 1555 TOC INFORMED
W/D PHX
SSM#5 PAX MOVE/ (b)(3), (b)(6) (346/587)
179 1603 TOC INFORMED
W/U PHX
SSM#5 PAX MOVE/ (b)(3), (b)(6) (346/587)
180 1609
W/D BAF
SSM#5 PAX MOVE/ (b)(3), (b)(6) (346/587)
181 1619
W/U BAF
CHOPS CONFIRMED WITH DIV THAT THERE ARE
30 X HERO AND WILL BE TAKEN TO SAYED ABAD
182 1515
AND 5 X MH-47 WILL THEN TRANSFER THEM TO
SHK.
TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cREPORTS DAY CH (b)(3), (b)(6) BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
183 1608
(177/166) W/D BAF MC UPDATED TRACKER

TYPED NAME AND RANK OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE

(b)(3), (b)(6)
US EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE APD PE V3.00ES
Page 946
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. PAGE NO.
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency 12 5
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED

FROM TO
HHC 10TH COMBAT AVIATION FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
, AFG HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
BRIGADE 2000 12 AUG 11 0800 13 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
NO. INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
IN OUT

BLT CPT RECEIVES UPDATED GRID:(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

184 1618
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
185 1655 SECURITY PM AWT (b)(3), (b)(6) OFF
UPDATED TRACKER
STATION 1655
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
186 1701 SECURITY PM AWT (b)(3), (b)(6) W/D SHA
UPDATED TRACKER
1701L
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS DAY AWT ISO FALLEN BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
187 1711
ANGEL (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U SHA 1701 UPDATED TRACKER
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS DAY AWT ISO FALLEN BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
188 1711
ANGEL (b)(3), (b)(6) ON STATION 1711 UPDATED TRACKER
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
189 1830 SECURITY PM AWT (b)(3), (b)(6) WU SHA
UPDATED TRACKER
1829
FALLEN ANGEL SECURITY PM AWT (b)(3), (b)(6) BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
190 1842
(b)(3), (b)(6) ON STATION 1842 UPDATED TRACKER
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS PH REPORTS DAY AWT
BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
191 1849 ISO FALLEN ANGEL (b)(3), (b)(6) OFF
UPDATED TRACKER
STATION 1849
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS PH-DAY AWT ISO
BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
192 1855 FALLEN ANGEL (b)(3), (b)(6) WD SHA
UPDATED TRACKER
(b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTS ROZ EIGHT PANCE HAS
193 2022
BEEN EXPANDED TO 20 NM DUE TO WX
PATHFINDERS ARE REPORTING 90% OF THE (b)(3), (b)(6)

194 2118 WRECKAGE HAS BEEN WASHED AWAY BY A FLASH

FLOOD
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS PF 29 REPORTED DUE
TO FLASH FLOODING 90% OF THE A/C WAS WASH
195 2125
AWAY ONLY THE REAR TAIL ROTOR AND SHEET
METAL FROM THE FRONT AFT SECTION REMAIN
BTL NCO RECEIVES 5W’S FROM TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
WHO: (b)(3), (b)(6) (300) (b)(3), (b)(6) (404)
WHAT: SUPPRESSIVE FIRES
WHEN: 061426DAUG11 DISTRIBUTED VIA E-
196 2130
WHERE: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c IVO OP (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c MAIL
WHY: MEETS FALCON CCIR #33 (RELEASE OF
MUNITIONS BY TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cAIRCRAFT IOT
SUPPRESSES INS POSITIONS OR ACTIONS).
(b)(3), (b)(6) RECEIVED A REPORT VIA(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
THAT THE WATER RESUPPLY IS STILL ENROUTE
TO THE PATHFINDER AO, THE MORTUARY
197 2130 TOC INFORMED
AFFAIRS, JCAT AND (b)(3), (b)(6) L BE
ENROUTE AT FIRST LIGHT. THE TEAM RIP
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
WILL BE DELAYED DUE TO WEAT
198 2135 PATHFINDERS REPORT VIA(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cTHE REST OF TOC INFORMED
FFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE
(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE APD PE V3.00ES

Page 947
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. PAGE NO.
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency 13 5
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED

FROM TO
HHC 10TH COMBAT AVIATION FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
, AFG HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
BRIGADE 2000 12 AUG 11 0800 13 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
NO. INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
IN OUT

THE WRECKAGE IS UNDER 8FT OF WATER DUE TO

THE FLASH FLOOD
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
199 2230 SECURITY (TF AWT)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6) TOC INFORMED
ON STATION 2240L
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
200 0056 SECURITY (TF AWT)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)
W/D SHA 0056L MC
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS UAV TNM MOVE/FALLEN
201 0213 ANGEL RESUPPLY (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U SHA
0213
(b)(3), (b)(6)
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS UAV TNM MOVE/FALLEN
202 0234 ANGEL RESUPPLY (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U DASH
0234L
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS UAV TNM MOVE/FALLEN
203 0240 ANGEL RESUPPLY (b)(3), (b)(6) W/D SHA
0240L
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
204 0253 SECURITY (TF AWT)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)
W/U SHA 0253L
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS UAV TNM MOVE/FALLEN
205 0301 ANGEL RESUPPLY (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U SHA
0256L
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS UAV TNM MOVE/FALLEN
206 0312 ANGEL RESUPPLY (b)(3), (b)(6) W/D LZ
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 0312L

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL

207 0312 SECURITY (TF(b)(3), (b)(6)AWT) (b)(3), (b)(6)
ON ST 0312L
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
208 0313 SECURITY (SIX SHOOTER) (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) OFF ST 0313
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
209 0318 SECURITY (SIX SHOOTER) (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) W/D SHA 0318L
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS UAV TNM MOVE/FALLEN
210 0322 ANGEL RESUPPLY (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U LZ
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 0320L
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS THE 1 PATHFINDER
DROPPED OFF WITH THE SPEED BALL MSN HAS
211 0345 LINKED UP WITH THE MAIN PATHFINDER
ELEMENT FOR A TOTAL OF 20 PATHFINDERS AT
FA SITE
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
212 0417 SECURITY (SIX SHOOTER) (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) W/U SHA 0417
213 0440 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL

TYPED NAME AND RANK OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE APD PE V3.00ES

Page 948
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. PAGE NO.
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency 14 5
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED

FROM TO
HHC 10TH COMBAT AVIATION FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
, AFG HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
BRIGADE 2000 12 AUG 11 0800 13 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
NO. INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
IN OUT

SECURITY (SIX SHOOTER) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) ON STATION 0439L
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
214 0453 SECURITY (TF AWT)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)
W/D SHA 0452L
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
215 0518 SECURITY (AM AWT) (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U
SHA 0517L
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
216 0529 SECURITY (SIX SHOOTER) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) RTB(JAF)

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
217 0529 SECURITY (AM AWT) (b)(3), (b)(6) ON ST
0529L
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c FALLEN ANGEL
218 0628 SECURITY: (b)(3), (b)(6) W/D JAF
0156Z/0626
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
219 0733 SECURITY (AM AWT) (b)(3), (b)(6) OFF
ST 0731
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
220 0738 SECURITY (AM AWT) (b)(3), (b)(6) W/D
SHA 0738
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS LATE ENTRY: FALLEN
221 0742 ANGEL SECURITY (TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cAWT) (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) ON ST 0733L
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
222 0820 SECURITY(AM AWT) (b)(3), (b)(6) ON ST
UPDATED FLT TRACKER
0820L
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
223 0820 SECURITY (TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cAWT) (b)(3), (b)(6)
UPDATED FLT TRACKER
(b)(3), (b)(6) OFF ST 0820L
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
224 0827 SECURITY (TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c AWT) (b)(3), (b)(6)
UPDATED FLT TRACKER
(b)(3), (b)(6) RTB(SHR)
FALLEN ANGEL SECURITY(TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6) BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
225 1000
(b)(3), (b)(6) W/U SHA 1002L UPDATED FLT TRACKER
(b)(3), (b)(6)
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
226 1200 SECURITY(PM AWT) (b)(3), (b)(6) WU SHA
UPDATED FLT TRACKER
1200
FALLEN ANGEL SECURITY(PM AWT) (b)(3), (b)(6) BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
227 1206
(b)(3), (b)(6) ON STATION 1206 UPDATED FLT TRACKER
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS FALLEN ANGEL
BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
228 1326 SECURITY(AM AWT) (b)(3), (b)(6) W/D
UPDATED FLT TRACKER
SHA 1215L MC
FALLEN ANGEL SECURITY(TF DIV
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
229 1336
QRF) (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U SHA 1336L UPDATED FLT TRACKER

TYPED NAME AND RANK OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE

(b)(3), (b)(6)
EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE APD PE V3.00ES
Page 949
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. PAGE NO.
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency 15 5
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED

FROM TO
HHC 10TH COMBAT AVIATION FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
, AFG HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
BRIGADE 2000 12 AUG 11 0800 13 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
NO. INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
IN OUT

FALLEN ANGEL SECURITY(TF PHX DIV BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED

230 1347
QRF) (b)(3), (b)(6) ON STATION 1342L UPDATED FLT TRACKER
FALL (TF PHX DIV BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
231 1441
QRF) (b)(3), (b)(6) OFF ST 1456 UPDATED FLT TRACKER
FALLEN ANGEL SECURITY(TF PHX DIV BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
232 1704
QRF) (b)(3), (b)(6) ON STATION 1702 UPDATED FLT TRACKER
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c FALLEN ANGEL
BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
233 1715 SECURITY(PM AWT) 47/399 (b)(3), (b)(6) W/D SHA
UPDATED FLT TRACKER (b)(3), (b)(6)
1714L
(b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTS NIPR BLACKOUT HAS BEEN
234 2034 NOTIFIED TOC
LIFTED
PATHFINDERS REPORT THEY ARE AT A NEW
235 2058 NOTIFIED TOC
LOCATION. GRID (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS PM AWT FALLEN ANGEL BTL CPT/NCO INFORMED
236 DAY 3 SECURITY (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U SHA 1451L UPDATED FLT TRACKER
1451
(CH#1)
MSN RDY DAY UH 02 TANKS (b)(3), (b)(6)
237 1623
(b)(3), (b)(6) WU SHA 1623
MSN RDY DAY UH 02 TANKS (b)(3), (b)(6)
238 1634
(b)(3), (b)(6) WD SAY 1632
MSN RDY DAY UH 02 TANKS (b)(3), (b)(6)
239 1645
(b)(3), (b)(6) WU SAY 1639L
MSN RDY DAY UH 02 TANKS (b)(3), (b)(6)
240 1648
(b)(3), (b)(6) WD SHA 1648
DAY UH 02 TANKS (b)(3), (b)(6)
241 1702 (b)(3), (b)(6) WU SHA 1702
MSN RDY DAY UH 02 TANKS (b)(3), (b)(6)
242 1825
(b)(3), (b)(6) W/D SHA 1722L MC
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
FFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE
(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE APD PE V3.00ES

Page 950
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. PAGE NO.
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency 16 5
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED

FROM TO
HHC 10TH COMBAT AVIATION FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cAFG HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
BRIGADE 2000 12 AUG 11 0800 13 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
NO. INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
IN OUT

262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269

TYPED NAME AND RANK OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE APD PE V3.00ES

Page 951
Mon 8/22/2011 5:47 PM

Dale,

Here is our timeline from the events on 6-8 Aug 11. Our C/S here are (b)(3), (b)(6) with AMC is
(b)(3), (b)(6) I used all three acft for each event that I did.

6 Aug 2011

Movement(b)(1)1.4a,
to from
(b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

1600Z: : W/U EAGLES ETA

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 1645Z
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

1642Z: : W/D EAGLES

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Hero movement from Sayed Abad(b)(1)1.4a,

to (b)(1)1.4c

1804Z: W/U 3 EAGLES. EN ROUTE SAYED ABAD. ETA 1820Z

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

1819Z: ARRIVAL SAYED

1838Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U W/ FALLEN ANGELS. ETA 1852Z

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

1851Z: FLIGHT ARRIVAL

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

1931Z: REFUEL COMPLETE: GOING TO LVL2

Infil(b)(1)1.4a,
of (b)(1)1.4c
Rangers to replace Rangers
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

2035Z: : W/U 54 EAGLES. ETA INFIL 2045Z

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

2049Z: : INFIL COMPLETE, 54 EAGLES.

2100Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) : ARRIVAL FOR REFUEL AND LVL2

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

2347Z: : MOVING TO LEVEL 1 FOR 0001Z EXFIL

2352Z: : WU FOR 0001Z EXFIL

7 Aug 2011

Page 952
 0003Z: : EXFIL COMPLETE
(b)(3), (b)(6)

0010Z: : BSO DROP OFF COMPLETE. 48 EAGLES 1 CAD ETA 0021Z (We took the BSO
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

back to Sayed Abad after exfil(b)(1)1.4a,

of Rangers)
(b)(1)1.4c

We then refueled(b)(1)1.4a,
at and RTB(b)(1)1.4a,
(b)(1)1.4c to (b)(1)1.4c
.

8 Aug 2011

I tried to find the log with exact times for our events on the 8th but no joy. The following times are
estimated.

1420Z: Departure from

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

1500Z: Exfil of 20 Pathfinders and a portion of the TM Rangers with all 3 acft.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

1510Z: Wheels down , refuel

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

1530Z: Wheels up enroute EXFIL remainder of TM

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Rangers.(b)(3), (b)(6)and
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c only
(b)(3), (b)(6)

1540Z: Exfil complete. PZ clean

1550Z: Arrival . Offload / Refuel

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

1600Z: Departure enroute

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c with TM
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Rangers
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

1645Z: Arrival
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

EOM

Let me know if you need anything else.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 953
Archived Log 2.1.4

SECRET

Log Name: TF JOC LOG 08

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Period From: 8/8/2011 Period To: 8/9/2011
AUG 2011 5:48:00 AM 5:48:00 AM
Font Size /
SIGACT? Zulu Time Entry Initials

09Aug2011
80 LOG ARCHIVED
0244Z
09Aug2011 TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
- OBJ LEFTY GROVE PR: ALL HEROES W/D IN
79 (b)(3), (b)(6)
0225Z GERMANY
09Aug2011 TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
- K/S - OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c: LN'S ATTEMPTING TO
78 (b)(3), (b)(6)

0122Z RECOVER BODIES OF EKIA

08Aug2011
77 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - TM - OBJ
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : RTB (b)(3), (b)(6)
2349Z
08Aug2011 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
76 TF - TM - OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : RTB (b)(3), (b)(6)
2342Z
08Aug2011 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - TM - OBJ
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : EXFIL
75
COMPLETE
(b)(3), (b)(6)
2342Z
08Aug2011 TF
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c- TM - OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : FINAL ROLL-UP, 2 X
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

74 DETAINEES, 10 SERIES 3/2/6/0; 20 SERIES 1/1/4/0; 30 (b)(3), (b)(6)

2326Z SERIES 2/1/0/0; 120 SERIES 3/7/9
08Aug2011 TF
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c- TM - OBJ
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : FINAL ROLL-UP, 1
73 X DETAINEE, 10 SERIES 4/3/11/0; 990 SERIES SLEEPERS
2324Z
(b)(3), (b)(6)

4/0/0/0 + 2
08Aug2011 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
72 TF - TM - OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : EXFIL COMPLETE (b)(3), (b)(6)
2323Z
08Aug2011 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - TM - OBJ
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : BIP
71 (b)(3), (b)(6)
2303Z COMPLETE; AF MOVING EXFIL HLZ
08Aug2011 TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c- TM - OBJ
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : TQ/SSE REVEALS
70
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

NSTR; AF WILL E1 XD
(b)(3), (b)(6)
2258Z
08Aug2011 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
69 TF - TM - OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : RTB (b)(3), (b)(6)
2231Z
08Aug2011 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
68 TF - TM - OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : EXFIL COMPLETE
2158Z
(b)(3), (b)(6)

08Aug2011 TF
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c- TM - OBJ
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : BLDG 999 IS
67 MOSQUE SLANT 4/0/0/0, 4 X SLEEPERS OUTSIDE THE (b)(3), (b)(6)

2154Z MOSQUE; 10 SERIES 4/3/10/0

08Aug2011 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
66 TF - TM - OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c : AF PZ POSTURE (b)(3), (b)(6)
2141Z

Page 954

(b)(2)
Archived Log 2.1.4

Page 955

(b)(2)
OVERALL CLASSIFICATION:

SECRET

Weapon System
Classified By: USAACECC1975
Derived From: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
Declassify On: 20360826

Page 956

1
 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

JCAT Mission (U)

(U/FOUO) The Joint Combat Assessment Team investigates

battle damage and shoot downs to determine the threat
weapon system used in the attack and the enemy TTP
employed, enabling the commander to determine the best
counter-tactics to defeat the threat. Additionally JCAT
cooperates with the acquisition and test community, and the
Survivability Information Analysis Center to share lessons
learned, archive survivability data, and reduce future aircraft
vulnerabilities.

Page 957

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO 2
Page 3 redacted for the following reason:
---------------------
(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4c, (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 958
 SECRET

CH-47D EXTORTION17
84-24175
05 AUG 2011
(TF
(b)(3), (b)(6)
)(b)(3), (b)(6)

Team Insertion
Tangi Valley (Wardak Province), Afghanistan

PROBABLE OG-7
Joint Combat Assessment Team – Bagram
Operation Enduring Freedom

IJC SIGACT: 08-0796, USCENTCOM PR Event: 11-021

CIDNE: 20110806030042SVC8019464682, CJTF-1: CRS3

Page 959

SECRET 4
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Team Composition (U)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

JCAT, TF Falcon, Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ASDAT, USAACE, Ft Rucker, Alabama

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ASDAT, USAACE, Ft Rucker, Alabama

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ASDAT, USAACE, Ft Rucker, Alabama

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ASDAT, USAACE, Ft Rucker, Alabama

Date Assessment Conducted: 05–26 Aug 2011

Page 960

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO 5
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

Overview of Incident (U)

Aircraft (U) CH-47D
Tail Number (U) 84-24175
Mission (U) Team Insertion
Unit (U) (b)(3), (b)(6) (TF (b)(3), (b)(6)

Time (U) 05 2209Z AUG 2011 / 06 0239D AUG 2011

Formation (U) Single ship
Flight Profile (U) Final approach to landing zone
Province / Locality (U) Wardak / Tangi Valley
Specific Location (U) MGRS: 42S VC 80190 64700
LAT/LON: N 34° 01' 21.93" E 068° 47' 07.55"
Terrain (U) Populated mountain valley
Weapons Load (U) 3 x M240-H
Airspeed / Altitude (U) ~50 kts, decelerating / ~100-150 ft AGL
Heading (U) ~137° M
Attitude (U) UNK (< 326 ft AGL)
ASE (U) AN/ALQ-212(V)/ICMD, APR-39A(V)1
ASE Response (U) UNK
Weather (U) Winds: 10005KT, Vis: 9000 HZ, Ceil: FEW 120, 22°C, PA 6605
Illumination Level (U) Red: Night, 0% illumination (Moon at -54°, set at 1702Z)
Crew/Pax (U/FOUO) 5x Crew; Pax: 25 USMIL, 7 Afghan National Army, 1 Afghan civilian
interpreter, 1 combat assault dog
Casualties (U/FOUO) 30 US KIA, 7 ANA KIA, 1 AFCIV KIA, 1 CAD KIA
Threat (S) Probable OG-7 via RPG
Damage (S) Weapon detonation caused 122” of aft red rotor blade to depart the aircraft
resulting in a severe mechanical and dynamic imbalance causing loss of
control with simultaneous catastrophic structural failure.
Est. Repair Time (U) N/A. Aircraft to be attrited. Page 961

SECRET 6
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET/REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO

Area Overview (1:1M ONC)(U)

(b)(1)1.4a

RC-East
Page 962

SECRET/REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO 7

052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET/REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO

Area Overview (1:250K JOG)(U)

(b)(1)1.4a

Page 963

SECRET/REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO 8

052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET/REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO

AUAB-CAOC/ISRD SAFIRE Report (U)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 964

SECRET/REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO 9

 [Threat brief from AMB]

21 JUL 11 @ 0220L:
RPG DIRECTED AT MH-47 N
DURING A DELIBERATE
OPERATION

04 JUN 11 @ 2110L:
UH-60L WAS ENGAGED WITH
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
SAF. ROUNDS BURNED OUT
WITHIN 1 ROTOR DISK OF THE
A/C.

OFFSET

06 JUN 11 @ 0040L:
CH-47D WAS ENGAGED FROM
5-6 POO’S AND HAD
APPROXIMATELY 14 RPGS
FIRED AT THEM ALONG WITH
SAF. AIRCRAFT MAEUVERED
AND ABORTED INFIL OF
05 JUN 11 @0450L:
DELIBERATE OP. OBSERVED POSS RPG OR LARGE TRACER
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SAFIRE ROUND DIRECTED AT(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c REPORTS ROUNDS
COMPLEX ATK WERE FIRED AT THE 7 O'clock POSITION OF BB CHALK 2 FROM
IDF APPROX 2-3Km AWAY.
IED F/C 23 JUN 11 @ 0300L:
IED STRIKE BB IDENTIFIED 2X FLASHES OF LIGHT VICINITY VC 81972 51726
DIRECT FIRE AND ONE RPG AIRBURST BETWEEN THE TWO Page AIRCRAFT.
965
CACHE AIRCRAFT CONTINUED MISSION.
OTHER (SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

Mission Timeline (U)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 966
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SECRET 11
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

One Minute Inbound(U)

(S) At 22:08:36Z Extortion 17 (EX-17) ALL TIMES ZULU
EX17 Last recorded
announced they were 1 minute from landing
GPS point (BFT)
at (b)(1)1.4a . 11 seconds later at
22:08:47Z, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ) replied,
informing EX-17 that the LZ was still being
“burned” then at 22:08:59Z that the LZ was
“Ice.” At approximately 22:09:40Z EX-17 was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
engaged by a volley of a minimum of two and
a maximum of three RPGs. (b)(3), (b)(6)
Assessed position when hit
later described the POO as an enemy
position in the qalats to the southeast of EX-
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
17. At ~22:09:45Z the second PG in the EX17 final position
volley impacted EX-17 on the underside of 136°M, 61 meters from hit
the aft red rotor blade. At the time of impact, 355°M,
the blade was located within the retreating 220 meters
half of rotation relative to the longitudinal axis
of the aircraft (right side). The PG detonated
5.5 inches from the leading edge and 122
inches inboard of the blade tip on the bottom
of the rotor blade. The PG detonated on Assessed (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
contact and immediately compromised the Point of Origin
structural integrity of the blade spar box
(comprised of a steel rod surrounded by a
titanium and fiberglass box). As the spar box
distorted due to weapon and flight dynamics,
a 10-foot portion of the blade body (behind
the spar box and constructed of lightweight
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
fiberglass and honeycomb) was severed from
the rotor blade. The resultant imbalance
affected the entire airframe and drive-train N
(b)(1)1.4a
subsystem. A sudden and violent ~3.75 Hz
oscillation of the entire aft rotor system led to
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
the separation of the aft pylon within 2 seconds. This caused an immediate loss in lift as well as an unrecoverable clockwise spin.
The forward rotor system, unable to compensate for the loss of lift and stability throughout the airframe, was stressed beyond
design limits and separated in flight. The fuselage subsequently impacted the ground. The entire event (from weapon impact to
crash) likely lasted less than 5 seconds. Page 967

SECRET 12
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET/REL TO USA, ACGU

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
Interview (S)
• (S) During the interview of the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c crews,
the two front seat pilots stated they witnessed a flash. They
associated this with a suspected PG weapon, viewed from
their peripheral vision. They stated that the weapon appeared
to detonate on the aft pylon of EXTORTION 17, viewed
through their Night Vision Goggles.

• (U) To ensure accurate weapons characterization, the pilots

were provided a series of 8 videos from the VSIS (Visual
Signatures of Improvised SAMs) collection, to assist in the
identification of the suspected munition. The signature
identification videos included MANPADS, RPGs, and Rockets.
RPG In Flight
• (S/REL) The video which best represented the munition was
“RPG Rear View NVG”, as identified by the crews of
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

isual ignatures of mprovised AMs

http://www.msic.dia.smil.mil/misc_documents/vsis/VSIS.php RPG Rear View NVG Video
Page 968

SECRET/REL TO USA, ACGU ASDAT Interview #2, 39:30 13

052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

Angle of Arrival and Impact Area (U)

(U/FOUO) The angle of

arrival and the area if
impact within the rotor
disk is an approximation
based on evidence
derived from EX17 as well
as event specific live fire
testing.

Page 969

SECRET 14
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET//NOFORN

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
Imagery (U)
1. Final BFT Point: 42S VC 79926 64990 (57 kts; 326 ft AGL; Heading 137°)
2. Probable Location at Hit: 42S VC 80153 64722 (50m from FA site @ Heading 317°)
3. Final Wreckage Location: 42S VC 80187 64688 (location of main fuselage)
4. Probable SAFIRE POO: 42S VC 80167 64530 (as reported by (b)(3), (b)(6)

5. (b)(1)1.4a : (b)(1)1.4a (planned HLZ for insertion)

3
4

N
5
Note: Grid size is 1000m.
Tick mark resolution is 100m.
Page 970

SECRET//NOFORN 15
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET//NOFORN

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
Imagery (U)
2. Probable Location at Hit: 42S VC 80153 64722 (50m from FA site @ Heading 317°)
3. Final Wreckage Location: 42S VC 80187 64688 (location of main fuselage)
4. Probable SAFIRE POO: 42S VC 80167 64530 (as reported by (b)(3), (b)(6) )

2
2
3
3
4

N
5
4
Note: Grid size is 100m.
Tick mark resolution is 10m.

SECRET//NOFORN 16
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

Debris Field (U)

1. FWD PYLON
2. Cockpit and Engines
42S VC 80190 64690
3. AFT Pylon
4. Fuselage Debris
3 5. Fuselage Debris

N
Debris fields 4 and 5 are the result
of a post crash flood of the Logar
River bed They are not directly
50m attributable to crash dynamics.

SECRET 17
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF CONFIDENTIAL

Forward Pylon (U)

NEXT SLIDE

CONFIDENTIAL 18
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF CONFIDENTIAL

Forward Pylon (U)

(C) This portion of aft red

rotor blade showing weapon
effects was located near the
forward pylon and associated
debris.

(U) It is unknown if this

portion of blade was placed
there by the recovery team or
by event dynamics.

CONFIDENTIAL 19
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

Debris Field (U)

1. FWD Pylon
2. Cockpit and Engines
42S VC 80190 64690
3. AFT Pylon
4. Fuselage Debris
3 5. Fuselage Debris

N
Debris fields 4 and 5 are the result
of a post crash flood of the Logar
Riverbed. They are not directly
attributable to crash dynamics.
50m
SECRET 20
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF CONFIDENTIAL

Cockpit and Engines (U)

N

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CONFIDENTIAL 21
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

Debris Field (U)

1. FWD Pylon
2. Cockpit and Engines
42S VC 80190 64690
3. AFT Pylon
4. Fuselage Debris
3 5. Fuselage Debris

N
Debris fields 4 and 5 are the result
of a post crash flood of the Logar
Riverbed. They are not directly
attributable to crash dynamics.
50m
SECRET 22
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF CONFIDENTIAL

Aft Pylon (U)

N
CONFIDENTIAL 23
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF CONFIDENTIAL

Aft Red Rotor Blade (U)

(C) Weapons effects were found on the red aft rotor blade. Prior to JCAT arrival on the
scene, first responders cut the rotor blade in two locations, and piled all the aft rotor blades
together next to the aft pylon (located out of frame to the right in the picture below).

(b)(3), (b)(6)
N

CONFIDENTIAL 24
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF CONFIDENTIAL

Aft Red Rotor Blade (U)

Page 980

CONFIDENTIAL 25
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

Collection Methodology (U)

1. (U/FOUO) On site, a Joint Combat 1.
Assessment Team forensic expert initially
identified aircraft components showing visible (b)(3), (b)(6)

signs of weapons effects.

2. (U) On BAF, recovered aircraft components

were unloaded, methodically inspected then
2.
sorted and placed in a two-dimensional layout
by position on the aircraft.

3. (U) All minor aircraft components and

residual soil were sifted and thoroughly 3.
inspected for weapon effects and contextual
forensic evidence.

Page 981

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO 26
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

Wreckage Recovered to Bagram AB (U)

(U/FOUO) The wreckage was reduced on site, packed into a container, and shipped to
Bagram AB where JCAT thoroughly examined all pieces for weapons effects.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 982

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO 27
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

Correlated View of Weapon Impact

Site on Aft Red Blade (S)
(Bottom Side-Leading Edge)
(S) Weapon angle of impact was approximately
40˚ relative to the bottom surface of the blade

Total chord depth = 32” Leading Edge

Spar Box
Blade Body
40˚
Trailing Edge
Blade Cross-Section
(Chord)

(S)Point of impact was 5.5” from leading edge of blade

(S)Weapon angle of impact was approximately

15˚ relative to the leading edge of the blade

15˚
Leading Edge Blade Root
4
5
Spar Box Bottom Surface of Blade
Blade Tip

Impact
2Site
Blade Body
Trailing Edge
3
1

Total blade length = 334”

(S)Point of impact was 122” from blade tip Page 983

SECRET 28
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

Expanded View of Weapon Impact Site

on Aft Red Blade (S)
Bottom of Blade-Trailing Edge

1
3

Outboard Blade-Tip

Bottom of Blade-Leading Edge Inboard Blade-Root

Page 984

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO 29
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

Expanded View of Weapon Impact Site

on Aft Red Blade (S)
Bottom of Blade-Trailing Edge

(U) Radials show 3

post detonation
paths for warhead
fragments
2
1

(U) Fragment paths

do not uniformly
radiate from POI due
to warhead angle of
attack and blade (U) 3 fragment
rotation (313MPH) sample cores
are not the
result of weapon
impact

(S) Point of Impact

~ 4
5

Outboard Blade-Tip Inboard Blade-Root

Page 985
Bottom of Blade-Leading Edge
SECRET 30
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF CONFIDENTIAL

ARL Testing (U)

(U) Background

(C) On 22 August 2011, the U.S. Army

Research Laboratory, CONFIDENTIAL
CH-47 Chinook
Survivability/Lethality Analysis Main Rotor Blade Vulnerability Investigation (U)
Directorate (ARL/SLAD) executed
four test events at the request of the Test Setup/Results
ASDAT with Bulgarian OG-7V and
Iranian Saegheh Anti-Personnel
RPGs (provided by NGIC).
(C) The results from test B4 (OG-7V) RPG

nearly matched the results

witnessed in the combat event.

Approximate
(U) Test Setup Shotline

(U) Initial threat engagement

scenario was based upon ASDAT
data from the combat incident.
(U) The RPG was detonated in a
dynamic configuration (launched CONFIDENTIAL

from RPG-7 launcher).

(U) Blade was not structurally
loaded.
Page 986

CONFIDENTIAL 31
 CONFIDENTIAL
CH-47 Chinook
Main Rotor Blade Vulnerability Investigation (U)

Test Results – Bottom (Impact) Surface

Comparison to Combat Incident

Bottom
Bottom Surface
Surface

Approximate
Shotline

Leading Edge Approximate

Leading Edge Shotline

Primary
Band of Primary
Fragmentation Band of (U) ASDAT INSERT:
3 fragment sample
Fragmentation cores in incident blade
are not the result of
weapon impact

Page 987
CONFIDENTIAL
32
 CONFIDENTIAL
CH-47 Chinook
Main Rotor Blade Vulnerability Investigation (U)

Conclusions

•The Threat that caused the damage to the CH-47 MRB in the
combat incident was an RPG.

• The RPG was an anti-personnel variant, likely an OG-7V.

ARL Assessment

•The test results from ARL Test B4 nearly matched the data
(images) provided by the ASDAT.
• Minor variances in the results (test versus combat incident),
mostly the loss of material in the trailing edge, were due to the
blade spar separation and material contact with the ground.
•While the spar did not sever in test B4, if loaded, it is highly likely
that the spar would have failed as witnessed in the combat event.

Page 988
CONFIDENTIAL
33
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF CONFIDENTIAL

ARL Test Fragment Analysis

(C) ??? Waiting for ARL Data ???. RPG

Approximate
Shotline
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

Bulgarian OG-7V Fragmentation Sample Lot

Page 989

CONFIDENTIAL 34
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF CONFIDENTIAL

Incident Fragment Analysis

(C) The aft red rotor blade was

X-rayed by the Craig Hospital
(Bagram) radiology department.

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) Retained fragment locations

were identified and marked on the
blade surface.

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Fragment locations were (b)(3), (b)(6)

cored from the blade. Fragments (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
were removed from the cores and
shipped to the Missile and Space
Intelligence Center for analysis.
Page 990

UNCLASSIFIED 35
CONFIDENTIAL
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

Fragment Comparison
UNCLASSIFIED

(S) Incident Fragment

2x3x4mm
Iron 95.78%
Aluminum 2%
Silicon 1.47%
Manganese 0.76%.

(C) ARL Test OG7V Fragment

2x3x4mm
Iron xx.xx%
Aluminum x%
Silicon x.xx%
Manganese 0.xx%.
Page 991

SECRET 36
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

Probable Threat Weapon

OG-7 Variant (S)
(U) Introduced in 1970, produced by Russia,
Bulgaria, Romania, Iran, and Egypt. The OG-7 was
developed to provide RPG-7-equipped forces an
accurate direct-fire fragmentation round out to 170
meters and an indirect-fire fragmentation round
capable of reaching nearly 1 kilometer.
NGIC

(U) MAX EFFECTIVE RANGE: 170 m (Direct) OG-7 Antipersonnel Round

(U) MAX RANGE: 1000 m (In-Direct)

(U) MUZZLE VELOCITY: 150 m/s

(U) FUZE: Point Initiating, Point Detonating (PIPD)

(U) WARHEAD: Fragmentation body, which is little

more than a hollow steel pipe filled with explosive.
On impact more than 65% of the warhead body is
converted into fragments having masses of more
than .5 grams. The warhead is filled with 210 - 350
grams of explosive (model dependant) which is 95%
RDX and 5% binder.

(U) PG rocket motors use a double base propellant

of nitroglycerin and nitrocellulose. Page 992

SECRET Source: NGIC SPIRIT 37

052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

Summary (U)
(S) At 052209Z AUG11 EXTORTION17 was subjected to a volleyed RPG attack and shot
down while inserting an Immediate Reaction Force in the Tangi valley, Wardak province,
Afghanistan.

(S) EXTORTION17 was the lead element of two CH-47Ds with security being provided by
an AWT conducting an insertion mission in the Tangi Valley. The flight had entered the
Tangi valley traveling from NW to SE when EXTORTION17 at less than one minute from
touchdown was engaged by multiple RPGs from a point of origin approximately 200m to
their south. The second in a 2-3 round volley of RPG munitions fired struck
EXTORTION17 along the bottom forward surface of the aft red rotor blade spar-box. The
weapon caused 122 inches of the outboard blade to depart the rotor system. The
resultant imbalance effected the entire airframe and drive-train subsystem. A sudden and
violent ~3.75 Hz oscillation of the entire aft rotor system led to the separation of the aft
pylon within 2 seconds. This caused an immediate loss in lift as well as an
unrecoverable clockwise spin. The forward rotor system, unable to compensate for the
loss of lift and stability throughout the airframe, was stressed beyond design limits and
separated in flight. The fuselage and separated pylon assemblies then impacted the
ground. The entire event (from weapon impact to crash) likely lasted less than 5 seconds.
Forensic lab analysis and comparative live fire testing indicate the propelled grenade was
a variant of the OG-7.

(S) The enemy engagement of EXTORTION17 resulted in a catastrophic and total loss of
the aircraft, aircrew and all passengers. Page 993

SECRET 38
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

Tactical Observations (U)

Planning

AMC considerations:

• Designate a crewmember to go into TOC and receive a mission

update

• Team Brief/Rehearsal with revised METT-TC

• Direct AWT scheme of maneuver and actions on contact

Prioritize signature reduction and security for insertion aircraft

Ensure that both AH-64Ds are on station supporting the

insertion

• Properly account for team integrity/security

Page 994

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO 39
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

Tactical Observations (U)

Planning (Continued)

• Accurate threat assessment of area surrounding intended HLZ

Prior operations and threats encountered within the past 30 days

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

• ISR deck and distribution of sensors

Wealth of assets, ineffective coordination and asset awareness

AC-130 did not engage POO, or coordinate actions against it

No designation, storing, or transmission of POO coordinates by any

platform

• ARSOA mission familiarity and proficiency versus RA, NG, AR

Page 995

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO 40
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

Tactical Observations (U)

Other Considerations

• One set of objective products provided to one crewmember

Eliminated any opportunity to establish a COP

Denied crews mission analysis process to identify limitations and

resultant capabilities even if it was at the cockpit level

• Lack of threat weapon signature familiarity

The primary ASE system is the aircrew member

During and after being engaged, the ability to accurately

characterize a weapon system allows for the timely application of

TTPs even if it is the next crew being briefed at the FOB

Page 996

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO 41
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

Tactical Observations (U)

Other Considerations (Continued)
Hostile Fire Detection System (HFDS)

• Participating aircrews were not aware EX17 was being fired upon until it
was hit

Point of origin was never positively identified or actioned

• The ability to detect hostile fire in a timely manner directly effects mission
survivability

Crew may maneuver out of harm’s way

Enemy location is immediately available for suppression and
engagement
Enemy location can be passed to supporting platforms and ground
forces
Enemy location and activity is immediately available as SIGACT or for
follow on IPB

• HFDS message architecture must be non proprietary and Joint Page 997

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO 42
 UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

Appendix 1. Multiple Source References (U)

TITLE (U) DATE (U) ORIGINATOR (U)
Vulnerability Red./Ballistic Hardening SCG 02 OCT 95 PM-AEC
CH-47D SCG 3 May 2005 PEO, Aviation
OEF, ONE SCG 28 Mar 2002 OASD
ALARACT 031/2004 09 MAY 04 DAMO-ODI
CJTF-101 SCG 01 NOV 08
CH-47D Technical Manual (TM 1-1520-240-23-1) 08 Nov 2006 US Army
KO-7V Lethality Analysis Jun 2007 ASIC
OG-7M Lethality Analysis Mar 2007 ASIC
OG-7V Lethality Analysis Mar 2007 ASIC
OG-7VMZ Lethality Analysis Mar 2007 ASIC
Interview with PB65/70 Crew Members 11 Aug 2011 ASDAT
Interview with EX16 Crew Members 14 Aug 2011 ASDAT
Final Report for S-5KP Vulnerability/Lethality Characterization 20 Mar 2007 JASP
S-5K/S-5K1 - NAIC-1340-333-99 Jan 1999 NASIC
S-5 Rocket Threat to Aircraft D-AIM-1346-001-09 Feb 2009 MSIC
Milan Anti-Tank Guided Missile System Digest (DIA-15-1107-009) 5 Jul 2011 DIA
Fagot Missile Description (DI-1145-0038Q-07) Jul 2007 MSIC
SA-7 Surface-to-Air Missile System Description (DI-1346-0051Q-08 ) Jan 2008 MSIC Page 998
UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO 43
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF UNCLASSIFIED

Appendix 2: Maintenance Data (U)

1. Aircraft 84-24175 is a total loss and will be attrited.

Page 999

UNCLASSIFIED 44
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF UNCLASSIFIED

Appendix 3: Medical Data (U)

1. Medical data for the crew and passengers are not available for this report at
time of publishing.

Page 1000

UNCLASSIFIED 45
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF UNCLASSIFIED

Appendix 4: Contributing Data (U)

Page 1001

UNCLASSIFIED 46
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

Speculated RPG Impact – AH Gun Tape (U)

(b)(1)1.4a
Gun 1 view at 221025

Area of 1st burst

2d burst

3d burst
(b)(1)1.4a
Gun 2 view at 221025

(b)(1)1.4a

- Flash visible to both AH crews @ 220948

- AC130 crews report 3 shots in ~9 seconds
- Gun 1 begins shooting @ 221019
- Detonation first visible at 221025
Detonation
- Detonation associated with 1st round of
3rd 30mm burst (b)(1)1.4a
Page 1002

SECRET 47
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

Aircraft Positions – 052209ZAUG (U)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

EX17

57 KTS
326 AGL
2209z

(U/FOUO) The only available flight tracks from participating aircraft are derived from Blue Force
Tracker (BFT). As BFT has a 1/minute capture rate, exact positions at the time of weapon impact
were not recorded. Extortion’s position in this graphic is derived from eyewitness accounts and
debris field dispersion. positions are derived from gun tape footage at the
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

GPS time noted. Page 1003

SECRET 48
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF UNCLASSIFIED

Dismissed Candidate Weapons

HEAT PG

In any engagement assessment, the

process begins with consideration given
S-5K
to all weapons. Facts of the individual
event guide the assessment toward a
particular family of weapons and
eventually to a specific model of weapon.
The following pages provide information
regarding weapon systems discounted in
the Extortion 17 engagement. MANPADS

ATGM Page 1004

UNCLASSIFIED 49
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF UNCLASSIFIED

Dismissed Candidate Weapons

PG-7 Variants (U)
Fielded in 1961, millions have been produced

Max Effective Range: 300 m (moving)

500 m (stationary)

Max Range: 950 m (self-destruct)

PG-7S
Initial Velocity: 120 m/s

Max Velocity: 300 m/s

Armor Penetration: 260 – 500 mm RHA

Warhead Types: CE Unitary, CE Tandem,

FRAG, HE, Thermobaric, ILLUM, Incendiary
Iranian Nader

Explosive Composition: 95% RDX (PG-7L uses

HMX only).

Propellant: Double base propellant of

nitroglycerin and nitrocellulose.

Page 1005
PG-7 HEAT
UNCLASSIFIED Source: NGIC SPIRIT 50
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

PG-7 Damage and Fragmentation (U)

(S) These pictures illustrate damage caused to a UH-60 transition section and tailboom by a PG-7
variant. Of note are the two concentric rings of damage. At center is the most severe damage caused
by the explosively formed copper penetrator (EFP). Naturally formed fragmentation radiates outward
from the impact location.

Dispersion is concentrated from warhead mid-section

UH-60L
UH-60L SHOCKER36
SHOCKER36
SECRET AF,19 Mar 2009 SECRET AF,19 Mar 2009

Page 1006

SECRET 51
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF CONFIDENTIAL

PG-7 Damage and Fragmentation (U)

(C) These pictures illustrate damage caused to a CH-47 rotor blade via a static test with an Iranian Nader
(PG-7 variant). The Nader is a High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) round and possesses similar capabilities
to the standard PG-7 variant seen throughout the OEF theater.

(U) The picture at left shows the bottom of the blade. The round was oriented in the direction of the ruler
(from left to right, top to bottom). A hole caused by the copper penetrator is clearly visible toward the right
side of the ruler. The picture at right shows the top surface of the blade, where the penetrator exited the
structure.

(U) Note the lack of fragmentation damage on both the bottom and top surfaces of the blade. Other
distinguishing characteristics include the hole from the copper penetrator and minor, natural fragmentation
damage to the bottom surface of the blade.

ARL Live Fire Weapon Test ARL Live Fire Weapon Test
Aug 2011 CONFIDENTIAL Aug 2011 CONFIDENTIAL

Page 1007

CONFIDENTIAL 52
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

Dismissed Candidate Weapons

S-5 Rocket (U)
(U) Production began in USSR in 1950s. Originally
designed as an unguided air-to-ground rocket for
attack aircraft. Highly proliferated, still in production.

(U) Currently employed by INS in Afghanistan as an

improvised RPG, constructed using metal tubing
and hand grips.

(S) Max Effective Range: 500 m

(S) Max Range: 6 km (motor burnout at 375 m)

(S) Burn Time: 0.71 – 1.1 seconds

(S) Max Velocity: 530 m/s (at motor burnout)

(U) Dimensions: 55 mm diameter, ~1 m in length

(included warhead and rocket motor), 3.9 kg

(S) Explosive Composition: 95% RDX, 5% Wax

(S) Fragment Dimensions: 0.13 in x 0.33 in x 0.47

in; 1.6g

(S) Armor Penetration: 228 mm of RHA steel

Page 1008

SECRET 53
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

S-5 Damage and Fragmentation (U)

(S) These pictures illustrate damage caused to an AH-1 fuselage by an S-5K rocket static test.

(S) The picture at left details the entry damage. Note the natural fragmentation damage, as well as the
increased size of fragments as compared to a PG-7 variant.

(S) The picture at right shows the exit damage, where the penetrator passed through the opposite side of
the fuselage.

Live Fire Weapons Test on AH-1 Live Fire Weapons Test on AH-1
Aug 2006 Aug 2006

Page 1009

SECRET 54
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

Dismissed Candidate Weapons

Milan and Fagot (AT-4) ATGMs (U)
(U) Milan: French and German Anti-Tank Guided Missile.
First variant was fielded in 1974. Over 330k produced,
deployed in at least 42 countries.

(C) Fagot: Russian ATGM, first variant fielded in 1982.

Produced by 4 countries, deployed in at least 26 countries.

(U) Dimensions: ~120 cm long; ~13 cm in diameter; 11-13 kg

(U) Max Range: 2000 - 2500 m

(U) Initial Velocity: 75 m/s

(U) Max Velocity: 205 m/s

(C) Armor Penetration: 450 - 600mm RHA

(U) Fuze: Crush/Impact

(S) Milan Explosive Composition: 80% RDX, 20% TNT

(C) Fagot Explosive Composition: 97% HMX, 3% Wax

Page 1010

SECRET 55
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

Milan ATGM
Damage and Fragmentation (U)
(S) These pictures illustrate damage caused to a Polish Rosomak vehicle by a Milan ATGM.

(S) The picture at left details the damage caused by the penetrating function of the warhead.

(S) The picture at right shows the general damage.

(S) Note the lack of fragmentation damage to the vehicle. The primary destructive mechanism is the
explosively-formed penetrator as well as blast overpressure.

Polish Rosomak Vehicle Polish Rosomak Vehicle

May 2010 May 2010

Page 1011

SECRET 56
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

Fagot ATGM
Damage and Fragmentation (U)
(S) This picture illustrates the damage caused to an AH-1 helicopter by a Fagot (AT-4) test fire.

(S) Most of the damage to the aircraft was actually due to blast overpressure as opposed to the shaped-
charge jet. The shaped-charge jet punched a fairly small, localized hole through the aircraft doing little
collateral damage. Furthermore, little fragmentation damage was observed to the aircraft. The majority of
the damage appeared to be caused by the associated blast wave.

Live Fire Weapons Test , AH-1

Oct 1999

Page 1012

SECRET 57
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF CONFIDENTIAL

Dismissed Candidate Weapons

MANPADS (U)
(U) Man-Portable Air Defense System
Designed to be carried/operated by 1-2 personnel

(U) Gen 1 MANPADS first produced in early 1960s

Most prolific system is Russian SA-7 series

(U) Dimensions: 50-60 in long, 3 in-diameter,

10-11 kg

(U) Minimum Range: ~203 – 592 m

(U) Maximum Range: ~4.0 – 7.0 km

(U) Max Effective Altitude: ~4,000 – 25,000 ft

(C) Arming Time: 1.5 seconds

(U) 13-15 second post-launch self-destruct

(U) Max Velocity: ~Mach 1.3 – 2.2

(U) Fuze: Contact; penetration; proximity

(U) Warhead Types: HE blast; HE fragmentation

(U) Explosive Material: RDX; HMX; Al; Wax;

Page 1013

CONFIDENTIAL 58
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

MANPADS Damage and

Fragmentation (U)
(S) This DHL aircraft was hit by a confirmed SA-7 MAPADS. Note the extensive damage to the wing
structure.

DHL
22 Nov 03

Page 1014

SECRET 59
052209ZAUG2011 CH-47D EX17 84-24175 B/2-158 Tangi Valley (Wardak), AF SECRET

MANPADS Damage and

Fragmentation (U)
(S) This AH-64 was hit by a confirmed SA-16. Note the extensive fragmentation damage to the number
two engine nacelle, right side wing and fuselage.

AH-64 – IVO Habbaniyah,

Iraq – 13 Jan 2004

Page 1015

SECRET 60
 UNCLASSIFIED

US Army Aviation Center of Excellence ASDAT

Directorate of Training and Doctrine

Attn: Tactics Division - ASDAT
4507 Andrews Ave.
Ft. Rucker, AL 36362-5000
COMM
DSN (b)(2), (b)(6)

VOSIP
Team Email:
NIPR:
SIPR: (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

JWICS:
Intelink: (b)(2), (b)(6)
Page 1016

SIPR Web: (b)(2), (b)(6

61
 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

JCAT Contact Information

Operation Enduring Freedom

JCAT OEF Webpage (SIPRNet): (b)(2)

Bastion Air Field, Afghanistan Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TF
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

2D Marine Aircraft Wing HHC, 159 CAB HHC, 10 CAB

MWHS-2 (G-2, JCAT) APO AE 09355
(b)(2), (b)(6) (b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(2), (b)(6)
(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(2)

(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 1017

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Current as of 22 Aug 62

 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

JCAT CONUS Contacts

United States Army United States Navy United States Air Force
USAACE, Fort Rucker, AL NAVAIR Patuxent River, MD (HQ Det.) Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

Survivability Cell/Aircraft Shoot Down 1970 Monahan Way Bldg 11A Room
Assessment Team Wright-Patterson AFB, OH (Det. A)
001
Building 4507 Andrews Avenue (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) Wright Patterson AFB, OH 45433
Fort Rucker, AL 36362 (b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(2), (b)(6)
NAWC China Lake, CA (Det. B)
(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(2), (b)(6)

Team Chief:
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(2), (b)(6), (b)(3)

1970 Monahan Way Bldg 11A Room

Team Contact: 001
n AFB, OH 45433
(b)(2), (b)(6
(b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 1018

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO CAO: 22 Aug 11 63

 UNCLASSIFIED

OVERALL CLASSIFICATION:

SECRET

Weapon System
Classified By: USAACECC1975
Derived From: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Declassify On: 20360826

Page 1019

UNCLASSIFIED 64
 (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) Page 1020

 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 1021
 SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Report Number 3 3/CY/515749-11 FOLLOW-UP 1 TO 3/CY/515745-11 061610Z AUG 11

070053Z AUG 11
TO NATO UNIFORM
SECRET RELEASABLE TO NATO AS NATO SECRET
NATO/515749-11

Taleban Insurgents Compete to Claim Helicopter Shoot-Down in Wardak

Province, Afghanistan; Insurgents Possibly Preparing to Engage
Responders, 6 August 2011 (S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)

(U) THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED ONLY FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN

AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL INVESTIGATIVE LEADS. IT MAY NOT BE
USED IN ANY WAY THAT WILL EXPOSE OR JEOPARDIZE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH ANY FOREIGN OR
DOMESTIC COURT PROCEEDINGS OR FOR ANY OTHER LEGAL, JUDICIAL, OR
ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES.

FOR DISPLAY ONLY TO AFG

This information may be shared/disclosed visually
or verbally with GIRoA officials/representatives as appropriate.

(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) Taleban insurgents in Wardak

Province, Afghanistan, were trying to solidify their claim of
responsibility for the 6 August 2011 shoot-down of a coalition
forces helicopter in Maydan Wardak District, Wardak Province. At
least one other group had lodged a separate claim of responsibility,
but the Taleban media seemed to have accepted that Muhibullah's
group was responsible for the attack. Muhibullah's group had moved
Ayubi, the insurgent who reportedly hit the helicopter, to the
Sheniz area (3356N 06840E) of Wardak Province, probably to ensure
that he was not captured. The insurgents may have planned to have
Ayubi contact senior Taleban media officials directly, probably to
give an interview.

(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) At the same time, Taleban

insurgents arranged to move some of the bodies of insurgents killed
in a raid which had taken place near the shoot-down. The insurgents
killed in the raid were identified as associates of Gul Nabi; one of
them had been Gul Nabi's family member. Two of them were also
identified as Abdul Nabi, the brother of Fazal Rabi, and Haji
Matin's brother. Three of those killed in the raid had been members
of Mudasir's group and the other three had been members of Niaz
Muhammad's group.

(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) Mudasir's group may have been

preparing to engage coalition forces who had entered the area in
response to the shoot-down. Insurgents active in Maydan Wardak
District and possibly involved in the helicopter shoot-down have
been associated with telephone numbers (b)(2), (b)(6) , (b)(2), (b)(6) , and
(b)(2), (b)(6) .

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20360801
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
Page 1022
 SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

- - - - - - - - - - TEAR LINE - - - - - - - - - -

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

515749-11
070053Z AUG 11

Taleban Insurgents Compete to Claim Helicopter Shoot-Down in Wardak

Province, Afghanistan; Insurgents Possibly Preparing to Engage
Responders, 6 August 2011 (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(U) THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED ONLY FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL INVESTIGATIVE LEADS. IT MAY
NOT BE USED IN ANY WAY THAT WILL EXPOSE OR JEOPARDIZE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN CONNECTION
WITH ANY FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC COURT PROCEEDINGS OR FOR ANY OTHER
LEGAL, JUDICIAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Taleban insurgents in Wardak Province,

Afghanistan, were trying to solidify their claim of responsibility
for the 6 August 2011 shoot-down of a coalition forces helicopter in
Maydan Wardak District, Wardak Province. At least one other group
had lodged a separate claim of responsibility, but the Taleban media
seemed to have accepted that Muhibullah's group was responsible for
the attack. Muhibullah's group had moved Ayubi, the insurgent who
reportedly hit the helicopter, to the Sheniz area (3356N 06840E) of
Wardak Province, probably to ensure that he was not captured. The
insurgents may have planned to have Ayubi contact senior Taleban
media officials directly, probably to give an interview.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) At the same time, Taleban insurgents

arranged to move some of the bodies of insurgents killed in a raid
which had taken place near the shoot-down. The insurgents killed in
the raid were identified as associates of Gul Nabi; one of them had
been Gul Nabi's family member. Two of them were also identified as
Abdul Nabi, the brother of Fazal Rabi, and Haji Matin's brother.
Three of those killed in the raid had been members of Mudasir's
group and the other three had been members of Niaz Muhammad's group.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Mudasir's group may have been preparing

to engage coalition forces who had entered the area in response to
the shoot-down. Insurgents active in Maydan Wardak District and
possibly involved in the helicopter shoot-down have been associated
with telephone numbers (b)(2), (b)(6) , (b)(2), (b)(6) , and (b)(2), (b)(6) .

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

- - - - - - - - - - TEAR LINE - - - - - - - - - -

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, dated 20070108

DECL ON: 20320108

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Page 1023
 SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Report #2 3/CY/515745-11 061610Z AUG 11

061610Z AUG 11
TO NATO UNIFORM
SECRET RELEASABLE TO NATO AS NATO SECRET
NATO/515745-11

Taleban Insurgents Shoot Down Helicopter in Wardak Province,

Afghanistan; Five Insurgents Killed in nearby Raid, 6 August 2011
(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)

(U) THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED ONLY FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN

AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL INVESTIGATIVE LEADS. IT MAY NOT BE
USED IN ANY WAY THAT WILL EXPOSE OR JEOPARDIZE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH ANY FOREIGN OR
DOMESTIC COURT PROCEEDINGS OR FOR ANY OTHER LEGAL, JUDICIAL, OR
ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES.

FOR DISPLAY ONLY TO AFG

This information may be shared/disclosed visually
or verbally with GIRoA officials/representatives as appropriate.

(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) Taleban insurgents in Maydan Wardak

District of Wardak Province, Afghanistan, shot down a coalition
forces helicopter on 6 August 2011. The shoot-down took place as at
least five insurgents were killed in a nearby raid. The raid, which
insurgents believed was targeting Qari Tahir, Qurayshi, and Ismail,
initially dominated the insurgents' focus. Insurgents identified
some of those killed as Hamid Akhundzada, Farid Ahmad, Ahmad Shah,
and Gul Nabi, who had all been mujahidin, not local residents.
However, insurgent focus shifted quickly to the helicopter
shoot-down. Insurgents intended to get detailed information about
the reported shooter, Taleban insurgent Ayubi, probably to generate
propaganda.

(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) Insurgents were aware on 6 August

that a raid in Qari Tahir's village was targeting Qari Tahir (also
Tahar), Ismail, and Qurayshi. Tahir had been located in another
village during the raid, at the house of Habib ur-Rahman in Tong
Khel. Qurayshi had probably also not been present during the raid,
in which at least five insurgents were killed. Among those killed
were Hamid Akhundzada, Farid Ahmad, Ahmad Shah, and Gul Nabi
Akhundzada. One of those killed may have been Haji Fazil Nazir's
brother.

(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) Insurgents Ahsan and Madraz may

have been located near with or near the shooters, but Taleban
insurgent Ayubi had reportedly fired the round which hit the
helicopter. Insurgents may have been coordinating with the Taleban
shadow governor for Wardak Province, who was in Pakistan, following
the shoot-down, and may have planned to increase vigilance but
continue with unspecified plans for a group in Sayyidabad (3356N
06840E), Wardak Province. As well, insurgents near the raid and
shoot-down sites may have had IED in place to use against coalition
forces which remained in the area. Insurgents may have been
receiving information about coalition forces movements from at least

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Page 1024
 SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

one local resident. Insurgents in this group have been associated

with (b)(2), (b)(6) and (b)(2), (b)(6) .

- - - - - - - - - - TEAR LINE - - - - - - - - - -

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

515745-11
061610Z AUG 11

Taleban Insurgents Shoot Down Helicopter in Wardak Province,

Afghanistan; Five Insurgents Killed in nearby Raid, 6 August 2011
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(U) THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED ONLY FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL INVESTIGATIVE LEADS. IT MAY
NOT BE USED IN ANY WAY THAT WILL EXPOSE OR JEOPARDIZE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN CONNECTION
WITH ANY FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC COURT PROCEEDINGS OR FOR ANY OTHER
LEGAL, JUDICIAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Taleban insurgents in Maydan Wardak

District of Wardak Province, Afghanistan, shot down a coalition
forces helicopter on 6 August 2011. The shoot-down took place as at
least five insurgents were killed in a nearby raid. The raid, which
insurgents believed was targeting Qari Tahir, Qurayshi, and Ismail,
initially dominated the insurgents' focus. Insurgents identified
some of those killed as Hamid Akhundzada, Farid Ahmad, Ahmad Shah,
and Gul Nabi, who had all been mujahidin, not local residents.
However, insurgent focus shifted quickly to the helicopter
shoot-down. Insurgents intended to get detailed information about
the reported shooter, Taleban insurgent Ayubi, probably to generate
propaganda.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Insurgents were aware on 6 August that a

raid in Qari Tahir's village was targeting Qari Tahir (also Tahar),
Ismail, and Qurayshi. Tahir had been located in another village
during the raid, at the house of Habib ur-Rahman in Tong Khel.
Qurayshi had probably also not been present during the raid, in
which at least five insurgents were killed. Among those killed were
Hamid Akhundzada, Farid Ahmad, Ahmad Shah, and Gul Nabi Akhundzada.
One of those killed may have been Haji Fazil Nazir's brother.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Insurgents Ahsan and Madraz may have been
located near with or near the shooters, but Taleban insurgent Ayubi
had reportedly fired the round which hit the helicopter. Insurgents
may have been coordinating with the Taleban shadow governor for
Wardak Province, who was in Pakistan, following the shoot-down, and
may have planned to increase vigilance but continue with unspecified
plans for a group in Sayyidabad (3356N 06840E), Wardak Province. As
well, insurgents near the raid and shoot-down sites may have had IED
in place to use against coalition forces which remained in the area.
Insurgents may have been receiving information about coalition
forces movements from at least one local resident. Insurgents in
this group have been associated with (b)(2), (b)(6) and (b)(2), (b)(6) .

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Page 1025
 SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

- - - - - - - - - - TEAR LINE - - - - - - - - - -

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, dated 20070108

DECL ON: 20320108

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Page 1026
 SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

REPORT #1 Based on VHF Comms

ZNY NSH
ZKZK PP SOL NAD DE
P 061200Z AUG 11
FM USJ-800
TO NSA/CHARLIE CHARLIE NOVEMBER
NSA/PAPA ECHO
NSA/TANGO INDIA
NSA/TANGO XRAY
ZEN/ATF
ZEN/CUSTOMS
ZEN/DTAO
ZEN/FAA
ZEN/J/STF J2/J39
ZEN/JUSTICE
ZEN/NRC
ZEN/TRANSP DEPT
ZEN/TSA
ZEM
S E C R E T
QQQQ
XXMMENP01CCY11218

SERIAL: 1/CY/510079-11 DTG 060620Z AUG 11 TEXT CORRECTION

TAGS: AFU YCOM YISL YLOC YMOP YOPS YTER YWPA AF DT KN SQ

SUBJ: SUBSTANTIVE REVISION: Afghanistan/Insurgency: Insurgents

Claim Downing of Probable Coalition Aircraft, Wardak
Province, Afghanistan, 5 August 2011 (S//REL TO USA,
FVEY/RELIDO)

REQS: 1A2003-405-38 1B2003-405-38

TEXT:

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY/RELIDO) This is a revised copy. The original

report incorrectly identified the ordinance that hit the aircraft.
Please remove the original report from all manual and computer files.
The text below the TEAR LINE has also been revised.

(U//FOUO) THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT IS PROVIDED FOR

INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES ONLY BUT MAY BE USED TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL
INVESTIGATIVE LEADS. NO INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT,
NOR ANY INFORMATION DERIVED THEREFROM, MAY BE USED IN ANY
PROCEEDING (WHETHER CRIMINAL OR CIVIL), TO INCLUDE ANY TRIAL,
HEARING, OR OTHER PROCEEDING BEFORE ANY COURT, DEPARTMENT,
AGENCY, REGULATORY BODY, OR OTHER AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHOUT THE ADVANCE APPROVAL OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND/OR THE
AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT WHICH ORIGINATED THE INFORMATION CONTAINED
IN THIS REPORT. THESE RESTRICTIONS APPLY TO ANY INFORMATION
EXTRACTED FROM THIS DOCUMENT AND USED IN DERIVATIVE PUBLICATIONS
OR BRIEFINGS.

(U//FOUO) This report is based on information that cannot be

verified.

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Page 1027
 SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

INTELLIGENCE SOURCE DESCRIPTOR (U)

Identity: (S//REL TO USA, FVEY/RELIDO) Various insurgents

operating on VHF push-to-talk radios in the vicinity
of Sejawand, Afghanistan
Access: (U) Direct
Reliability: (U) Unknown
COMMENT: (U) No previous reporting available

SUMMARY (U)

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY/RELIDO) Insurgents operating on VHF

push-to-talk radios in the vicinity of Sejawand, Afghanistan,
claimed responsibility for the downing of probably a coalition
aircraft during the 2300Z hour on 5 August 2011. The insurgents
allegedly had three guns set up in the area, one of which was
responsible for downing the aircraft. Insurgent was credited
(b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
with firing the round that hit the coalition aircraft. The
insurgents may have launched further attacks against coalition
forces as rescue units responded to the crash site.

DETAILS (U)

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY/RELIDO) At 2310Z on 5 August, an

unidentified insurgent operating on radio frequency 160.0 MHz
reported that he had fired two rounds at the target, later
identified as an aircraft. The first round had missed; however,
according to the insurgent, the second round had hit the target. At
2317Z, the insurgent reported that possibly coalition elements had
entered a field, surveyed the aircraft, and then headed back to an
unspecified road. The insurgent also claimed the(b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cwere
ready for the enemy and that hopefully they would attack.

COMMET: (S//REL TO USA, FVEY/RELIDO) It was not clear

whether the insurgent had actually observed the coalition
forces move into the field or if he was merely relaying
information that had been reported to him by other
insurgents.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY/RELIDO) At 2325Z, insurgent who

(b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
was also operating on 160.0 MHz in the Sejawand (3354N 06847E) area,
claimed to have observed a column of lights moving on the road,
coming from the direction of Trah Khel (3356N 06840E), Wardak
Province, Afghanistan. At 2335Z, possibly the same unidentified
insurgent referenced earlier informed that three weapons had
(b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
been set up in the area and that the round that hit the aircraft had
been fired from the gun in the middle (not further identified). A
short while later, an unidentified insurgent claimed that both
(b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c had fired at the aircraft, but only had
(b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
actually hit the aircraft.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY/RELIDO) At 2339Z, the insurgents were

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Page 1028
 SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

preparing to further engage coalition forces, asking that a watchman

be instructed to fire a few rounds presumably aimed at the coalition
forces in the area. At 0002Z the following day, 6 August, an
unidentified insurgent claimed that four ambulances had arrived
probably at the crash site. The insurgent also granted permission
for three unidentified individuals, presumably insurgents, to go out
possibly to join other insurgents, who may have been engaging
coalition forces. A short time later at 0020Z, an unidentified
insurgent claimed that he and some of his associates were on the
road.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY/RELIDO) Insurgents active or referenced on

the frequency included ,
(b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
Hamad, Aman, Masrur, an

ISD LEXICON (U)

(U//FOUO) For further information on the ISD Lexicon, click on

the following link: (b)(2)

POC: (S//REL TO USA, FVEY/RELIDO) NSA/CSS Georgia, FGS2A4,

TransAsia Division (Afghanistan), (b)(2)
NSTS: (b)(2), (b)(6) , STU-III: (DSN) (b)(2), (b)(6) , (CMCL) (b)(2), (b)(6)
(b)(2), (b)(6)

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, dated 20070108

DECL ON: 20320108

- - - - - - - - - - TEAR LINE - - - - - - - - - -

061200Z AUG 11
TO NATO UNIFORM
SECRET RELEASABLE TO NATO AS NATO SECRET
NATO/510079-11

Insurgents Claim Downing of Probable Coalition Aircraft, Wardak

Province, Afghanistan, 5 August 2011 (S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)

(U) This is a revised copy. The original report contained

inaccurate information. Please remove the original report from all
manual and computer files.

(U) THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED ONLY FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN

AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL INVESTIGATIVE LEADS. IT MAY NOT BE
USED IN ANY WAY THAT WILL EXPOSE OR JEOPARDIZE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH ANY FOREIGN OR
DOMESTIC COURT PROCEEDINGS OR FOR ANY OTHER LEGAL, JUDICIAL, OR
ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES.

FOR DISPLAY ONLY TO AFG

This information may be shared/disclosed visually
or verbally with GIRoA officials/representatives as appropriate.

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Page 1029
 SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) Insurgents operating on VHF

push-to-talk radios in the vicinity of Sejawand, Afghanistan,
claimed responsibility for the downing of probably a coalition
aircraft during the 2300Z hour on 5 August 2011. The insurgents
allegedly had three guns set up in the area, one of which was
responsible for downing the aircraft. Insurgent was credited
(b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
with firing the round that hit the coalition aircraft. The
insurgents may have launched further attacks against coalition
forces as rescue units responded to the crash site.

(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) At 2310Z on 5 August, an

unidentified insurgent operating on radio frequency 160.0 MHz
reported that he had fired two rounds at the target, later
identified as an aircraft. The first round had missed; however,
according to the insurgent, the second round had hit the target. At
2317Z, the insurgent reported that possibly coalition elements had
entered a field, surveyed the aircraft, and then headed back to an
unspecified road. The insurgent also claimed the mujahidin were
ready for the enemy and that hopefully they would attack.

(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) At 2325Z, insurgent , who was

(b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
also operating on 160.0 MHz in the Sejawand (3354N 06847E) area,
claimed to have observed a column of lights moving on the road,
coming from the direction of Trah Khel (3356N 06840E), Wardak
Province, Afghanistan. At 2335Z, possibly the same unidentified
insurgent referenced earlier informed that three weapons had
(b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
been set up in the area and that the round that hit the aircraft had
been fired from the gun in the middle (not further identified). A
short while later, an unidentified insurgent claimed that both
(b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cand had fired at the aircraft, but only Chupan had
(b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
actually hit the aircraft.

(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) At 2339Z, the insurgents were

preparing to further engage coalition forces, asking that a watchman
be instructed to fire a few rounds presumably aimed at the coalition
forces in the area. At 0002Z the following day, 6 August, an
unidentified insurgent claimed that four ambulances had arrived
probably at the crash site. The insurgent also granted permission
for three unidentified individuals, presumably insurgents, to go out
possibly to join other insurgents, who may have been engaging
coalition forces. A short time later at 0020Z, an unidentified
insurgent claimed that he and some of his associates were on the
road.

(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) Insurgents active or referenced on

the frequency included
(b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , an

- - - - - - - - - - TEAR LINE - - - - - - - - - -

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, dated 20070108

DECL ON: 20320108

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Page 1030
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Page 1031
 Exhibit 63. PATHFINDER (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 1032
 Exhibit 64. INVESTTMINTEL ENEMY VHF

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 1033
 SECRET

The interview of the Pathfinder Commander, Platoon Leader, and

Platoon Sergeant opened at 1835 Zulu, 18 August 2011, at FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD: BG Jeffrey N. Colt, US Army

MH-47 SME SME-MH-47

GROUND FORCE A SME: SME-GFA

INTELLIGENCE SME: SME-INTEL

ASDAT SME: ASDAT3; ASDAT4

LEGAL ADVISOR: LA

COURT REPORTER: CR2

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

SECRET
Page 1034
 SECRET

BG COLT: Can you step us through sort of the sequence of events

that occurred leading to your infill and actions on the objective
or actions at the crash site.

PF PLT LDR: Sir thanks Sir, I believe it was 0200 am on the

fifth.

PF CDR: It's on the timeline there.

PF PLT LDR: So 0243 we were alerted that there was a FALLEN

ANGEL and that time we moved to the TOC where we’ll be informed on
all the information that we have at that time. We’ll get imager
freeze call signs units stuff like that, then from there PF PSG and
I would actually go out and load the birds and wait for the launch
to go I guess.

BG COLT: Who actually does and clears LZ selection at that

point for you? Who plans it?

PF CDR: The battalion selects the LZ sometimes there's an

approval process to brigade but as far as I know, my headquarters
approves my LZs is TF CDR and his planners.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

PF PLT LDR: So after that sir, we loaded the birds and we moved
to what we called east gravel, we were staging at red communication
one waiting for the launch authorization. At that time we were

SECRET
Page 1035
 SECRET

(b)(3), (b)(6)
listening to AWT talking to on men on ground as they were
maneuvering from their objective up to the crash site. Then it was
at 0400am, when we went wheels up and proceeded to the crash site
which is about a little over 10-minute flight, just a little over
10 minutes.

BG COLT: Was that BMNT then? Was getting light by then?

PF PLT LDR: Just when we touched down and LZ was just starting
to get light sir, so we were still moving period of limited
visibility. I think it was 560 meters from our LZ to the crash site
just would have been to the southeast, we moved parallel in the Wadi
up to the khalat the Lima Bravo element was already on scene, I
think they beat us about 30 minutes. So they had from there I talked
to (b)(3), (b)(6) was the GFC at the time. Establish security with
them we took security on the north end of the Wadi, they took it
on the south and also had an OP set up on the high ground to the
Southwest of the crash site.

BG COLT: Did you have any situational awareness of other fire

support or ISR platforms that were overhead at that time?

PF PLT LDR: Roger that sir, we were in communication with AWT,

they were monitoring our frequency, we were talking to them as we
were infilling they were also talking to the (b)(3), (b)(6) element on
the ground kind of liaison for us cause we didn’t have direct FM
while we were moving there, it was kind of de-conflicting you know
we do some prep set kind of thing as we move on to the crash site
sir.

BG COLT: Do you know that the AC [130] was still overhead too?

PF CDR: I knew we had more assets at that time I didn’t know

it was AC but talking to (b)(3), (b)(6) 6 he let me know that the AC
was on station some other ISR platforms and things of that nature
and as we were flying in we heard AWT reporting over(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c the
different air assets and different fire missions in the area sir.

SME-GFA: Who actually makes the decision to commit you guys

is that you (b)(3), (b)(6) ?

TF CDR: As soon as we had FALLEN ANGEL DUST ONE anyone of

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

those types’ events, they automatically get called; it's a battle

drill for us. I determine whether or not to send them right out to
aircraft and generally as soon as we get call sign frequency for
the guy on the ground, if that is a fact the case, we send him straight
out to the aircraft and start getting loaded up. Ultimately it's

SECRET
Page 1036
 SECRET

the brigade commander and then the division commander that decides
they have the authorization to launch. Division considers them a
division asset, but we do everything to prep the launch sequence
so as soon as we get the word we are not starting from scratch then
it’s literally just pulling power and executing.

SME-GFA: So you dropped down to (b)(3), (b)(6) for tactical

freq., MBITRs is that what you use?

PF CDR: Negative sir, once we linked up with them we never

established FM communication before getting to the crash site with
them, and from there we just co-located our two CP’s their RTO and
my RTO.

-GFA: Once you guys hit the ground how did you talk to (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) .

PF CDR: Through AWT, sir.

SME-GFA: So relaying.

PF PLT LDR: Roger that.

SME-GFA: Did you already have--- did you work with them at
all previously as far as establishing link up procedures or anything
like that.

PF CDR: No sir.

SME-GFA: Any issues once you got on the ground working with
those guys?
PF PLT LDR: None Sir.

SME-GFA: As I understand on the ground (b)(3), (b)(6) was in

charge?

PF CDR: Roger that sir.

SME-GFA: You guys were in support of those guys?

SME-GFA: You guys stayed on the ground for four days total?

PF PLT LDR: Yes.

PF CDR: I don't want to speak out of turn here or above my pay

grade, it is something that we have discussed before and it has been
raised up to the divisional level. Unfortunately, there has been

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quite a bit of downed aircraft event, one thing that we’ve seen
consistently is a---there's not a common FALLEN ANGEL net
established. My opinion for these types of events there should be
a common ground frequency net where the ground troop talk to and
common air to ground net that's published in a division FRAGO that
we reaches all units. So everyone knows what frequency they need
to switch to when things happen. From what I have seen historically
there has been multiple players on the ground and it take as little
while to get them talking. Luckily our AWT was on station
synchronizing this, acting as a fire wall, but we have been in
situations where there's been multiple players and just took too
long to get everyone talking.

SME-MH47: Did you---you said you all got alerted for the
FALLEN ANGEL did you go and talk to the S-2 to get a brief for the
situation on the ground?

PF CDR: Sir, that part of the common battle drill, we come

in and pull 1 over 50,000 maps we pull up blown up imagery, we get
call signs and frequencies fires coverage, ISR overhead. As much
of that that is available at that time. At a certain point in time
I sent the platoon that is launching out to the aircraft and the
TOC continues to feed them information over FM into the aircraft.
So when they were launching we were already aware there was Specter
[AC 130] overhead and we were passing the freqs to get Specter their
frequency.

SME-MH47: You have an understanding the entire events of the

night as far as the squirters and the enemy killed.

PF CDR: What we knew at point sir was that there was an element
that went in for a raid, QRF was launched and unfortunately there
was an accident. We collected the pertinent information which was
the freq.s and call signs and like the commander said we sent the
guys to the bird with that.

SME-INTEL: Do you use that data that you receive the current
(b)(3), (b)(6) and threat data to plan your routes?

PF CDR: We don't actually plan aircraft routes.

SME-INTEL: No not aircraft, your ground movement.

PF CDR: What we did is we knew the most probably LZ insertion

point and the guy on the ground picked the best route to move from
the LZ to the aircraft. There wasn't enough time sir, to actually
plan the ground route fully on a map before we launch we got in the

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aircraft to do it on the fly essentially.

TF CDR: usually what we do we call Pathfinders in it’s

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

usually the company commander and First Sergeant some time a Platoon
Leader or Platoon Sergeant would pop up and we will show them that's
why we have two big screen TV’s, one is S-2 dedicated strictly. And
we pull up the crash site, we pull up the LZ and we say here's where
you are going to have to go and the S-2 will pop up what is the threat
in the area is the first question we always ask whether it air or
ground, show us where the threat is, what’s happen what the last
SAFIREs, things like that.

BG COLT: Were you talking at that point with the (b)(3), (b)(6) TOC
here, so that you had situational awareness they were letting (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) know they were already in route?

TF CDR: Yea, I talked to

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(3), (b)(6) myself, he and I were
on the phone and as I think I mentioned yesterday, a little reluctant
to send them in immediately because we were trying to figure out
the situation on the ground, but then we said we were going to launch
them, so they knew they were enroute.

SME-GFA: Just curious when you guys go in same policy applies

the AWTs escort in or are they still focused on the ground

TF CDR: No, no same thing applies. When they came in AWTs

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

were—in fact what I had done for that because of what had just
happened I specified to the AWT to come and trail right behind them
so when they did pop up on the left and right they would be there
and one would stack higher to get a larger overview.

SME-MH47: And they did pre-assault fires into that HLZ?

TF CDR: Roger, this time they did. Again for what we talked
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

about ea ier put a few rounds down in the field make people duck
their heads and I spoke specifically to the crews that were doing
it, one of them which was (b)(3), (b)(6) our company SIP, we told
him look we are coming in here we are doing it fast, deliberately,
controlled, and putting him down and getting them out.

BG COLT: The 60’s shot? The 60’s shot?

TF CDR: No, no AWT yes sir.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-GFA: Who is controlling those fires?

TF CDR: The AWT suppressive? They are talking to the JTAC,

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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JTAC---

SME-GFA: (b)(3), (b)(6) still controlling those?

TF CDR: Now when you say controlling, they informing that

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

element that they are going to conduct that suppressive have fire
in support of the infil.

SME-GFA: So the recommendation would be a common FALLEN ANGEL

net so you guys, it only make sense to have direct comms with the
ground forces already there, and not have to go through AWT. Not
sure what the best net for that is…

TF CDR: Again what we do before we launch them out is we

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

make sure they have comms with AWT that's on station and if there
is a ground element that they have that before they take off, those
are the two big ones. They have been on the ground before by
themselves and which taken a little bit longer is the get the stack
all talking on the same net and that's created, not issues, but it
has taken more time than it would have if everybody comes in on
station knowing that ahead of time. But usually when we had some
of these FALLEN ANGELS everybody comes to that particular site and
it may take a minute before everyone is talking on the same net.
And end up going air to air or guard to figure out what freq. to
come up on.

PF PLT LDR: Typically what happens just like the time for a
FALLEN ANGEL is AWT will be the first on scene and then (b)(3), (b)(6) will
beat us there because they are closer and they have different launch
criteria. Then we’ll come usually it will be close between us and
the BSO for reaching that area. Most of the time we will be the
first ones there and always bring everyone into our platoon freq.
and same with the aircraft, so if there was actually a common freq.
that would be really helpful.

BG COLT: Anybody else?

ASDAT4: Once you are on the ground sir and you were integrated
into that group did your guys do any of the reduction of the aircraft
in preparation for the movement out of there?

PF PLT LDR: None of our guys - we carry thermite and demo,

but by the time we actually were able to recover the hero’s there
were enough elements on the ground, the Task Force(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
n EOD that
we actually didn’t lay any demo---site Bravo on the forward
transmission rotor assembly, we did try our thermite at the time,
but it was uneffective. That was the only thing we actually used

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our assets to try and reduce with thermite on site.

ASDAT4: So if you guys didn't take part in the recovery of

the aircraft, pieces and parts, did your guys, how far out did you
push and sweep the area around the crash site.

PF PSG: When we got there we linked up with Team(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cand

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c [PL and PSG], they had more than enough people to
actually conduct the sweeps so initially since they were the ground
force commanders at the time they initially just wanted us to provide
security to the north just south to the village all the way to the
east where the bridge was at. So our whole mission at that time j
became to provide security for the left over element for Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

to actually conduct the sweeps and assist them in any way we can
with moving the hero’s or picking up pieces and everything, but
initially their the one who conducted the sweeps on site.

BG COLT: Can you address to what degree the rain storm there
impacted the integrity of that crash site?

PF PLT LDR: Roger that sir, the aircraft was in three main
pieces when we arrived, it was the fuselage down in the Wadi and
then up to the northwest was the forward transmission rotor assembly
and maybe 100 meters directly north up on the hill was the rear rotor
transmission cowling all that. And it was---there was significant
amount of damage from the fire to the fuselage but it was all intact
and it was all there. And the after the flood sir, it was pushed
down to just past the bridge which was 150 to 200-meters down the
river sir.

PF CDR: I think luckily the ground forces were able to recover

the hero’s out of the Wadi before the rain storm came obviously.
One important thing to know about our tools is that we carry Jaws
of Life and combination tools and K-12 rescue saws. These tools
are meant to rip into the outer skin of aircraft and at most maybe
cut the hinges off MRAPS to get people out of them or pilots out
of an aircraft, but the welders that came from the BSO are really
the enabling element that allowed the more dense parts of the
aircraft to be taken apart, like the transmission assembly. When
I got down, when I linked up with the Pathfinders they were trying
to cut pieces with the K-12 saw, but the truth is the fact is, a
K-12 saw isn't effective on a gear box out of the rear of an aircraft.
The welders did that – they cut it apart.

TF CDR: It’s designed for extraction, extraction personal

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

not disassembly of the whole aircraft, but until they got there,
that what we had.

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SME-MH47: Did you take any photograph or sketch anything?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
PF CDR: They were co-located with , and
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was snapping
all the photos and we were confident they got everything. We received
photos back here too so the answer is no.

ASDSAT3: No photos were taken by you guys.

PF PSG: Negative sir, they were all taken by (b)(3), (b)(6) , team
, when they were sending up the reports the first day they were
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

taking care of all that.

BG COLT: Any local engagements after you were on the ground

there, as far as people coming out of the village there, coming
downed trying to encroach on the site?

PF PSG: Honestly, they pretty much kept their distance. Team

engaged a couple of guys - forward observers some guys watching
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

us with radios and everything, but honestly just local nationals

walking up and seeing what was going on, negative, sir

IE: The first day they stayed inside, we didn’t see anybody.
I’d say by about the end of the first day, they knew what we were
all about what we were there for, and that’s about when life kind
of picked back up somewhat as usual. The last three days up in the
village, I guess it would be the (b)(3), (b)(6) element was just off route
Georgia, on the northwest side there and they kind of took over a
little compound on that part of the village and other than that they
kept to themselves. They didn’t -- We didn't have any issues. At
least from our part of the northern line up there to the Qalat we
didn’t have any issues with people trying to come down.

IO: Any TTP or issues with regarding area resupply, speed

balls, or anything like that? You were there quite a long time
actually.

PF PLT LDR: Yes, sir. The CDS drops are what made it
possible. The aerial -- typically what we’ve done in the past is
speed balls from Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , but the surface to air
threats didn’t allow for that so the CDS drops -- I don’t know how
many we had total. It must have been close to five or six.

PF CDR: Five or six, CDS drops, sir from the MC-130 and luckily
we were co-located with the tier one guys, because that's how we
got that stuff pushed to us. It was literally -- at one point Task
Force was saying they were good on water and my guys were calling
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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back saying they were about to go black, so literally the chain of

command here --

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c We had to call up --

PF CDR: -- called up lieutenant colonel -- I forget her name

that works the Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c up in Bagram and she helped
us. She turned back on the MC-130s to get us resupplied. But, if
we weren't co-located with them there could have existed a point
before the ground convoy made it down to resupply them where they
would have been black on water, so luckily [inaudible].

TF CDR: Yeah, those drops were instrumental in keeping

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

everybody resupplied without having both aircraft and speedballs

coming in low and exposing themselves.

PF PLT LDR: I guess, sir, one TTP that would be kind of vital
-- I don’t know if -- I’m sure it’s not common knowledge for everybody
since it didn’t get done. We have one CDS drop then another being
a lost load, and that was -- they dropped in right after night fall
and there was no -- typically they put like IR chem-lights or IR
strobe on it, and they pushed if out we couldn’t find it. ISR,
couldn’t find it, AWT, no one could find it, so maybe it’ll publish
that as a TTP for any, you know, CDS drop IR chem-lights or strobes
on the actual pallet.

BG COLT: Show me a sign [laughing].

ASDAT4: Sir, if you were in the Helo, when they were trying
to make the decision; how did the process go on what to recover as
far as parts and pieces from the aircraft to send back to BAF?

PF PLT LDR: After the fire, we called back and asked -- or

asked if there was anything in particular sensitive item wise that
we should try to recover. I know they had a number of C-cells,
things like that. The only thing that was actually recoverable was
one of the Advanced Threat Infrared Counter Measure (ATIRCM)
systems, if I butchered the acronym….

ASDAT4: I’m talking about large parts and pieces of the actual
aircraft --

PF PLT LDR: Okay.

ASDAT4: -- not individual personal affects or anything that

the crew might have carried.

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IO: That's what he was described. ATIRCM. That’s part of

the aircraft.

CRT RPT: How do you spell that, please; if you know how?

BG COLT: A-T-I-R-C-R-M; right?

IE: Right.

CRT RPT: Thank you.

ASDAT3: How about a play book for the [inaudible], the

maintenance recorders in the aircraft, by different airframe were
those locations are so in the event you find a few slides you’ve
got some pretty significant damage, you guys know a focal point on
the aircraft what to get and what's classified, what’s going to help
us paint the picture? Do you guys have a book like that? Was that
fed to you?

PF CDR: We actually do have a standardized list with pictures

for a CH-47 with the radar detection, ATIRCM, everything in the radio
suite in the back, and how to get it out. What we have spoken with
TF (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, CDR about before is pushing up a standardized list for every
single air frame. And I tell you, one recommendation is, at some
point the decision was made that no piece of the aircraft would be
left behind. We have gone on missions where we’re instructed to
pull specific pieces out of aircraft, leave them and JDAM. On this
mission, not a trace would be left behind. I would recommend, at
that point that decision is made it needs to be in the battle drills
to bring welders up on alert because you’re going to need them to
cut the more dense pieces of the aircraft and that was kind of
something that just worked together like different leaders getting
the --

BG COLT: We do need to talk VADRs though, because it’s

critical. This one didn't have one.

ASDAT3: Elements of the BSO did all the cutting on the

aircraft with the torches? Or was it a combination?

PF PLT LDR: It was actually 94th BSB from here at(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
, was
the actual welders.

PF CDR: And the CSAR guys were helping them out, were right
there cutting with them. But the tools came from the BSO.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Yeah, we don't have the welding capabilities.

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ASDSAT3: Yeah, I understand, sir. Did you happen to notice

if those guys were writing down the components that they were cutting
as they were cutting or were they just [inaudible] --

PF PLT LDR: No, sir. It was pretty much expedient method

to reduce the aircraft.

ASDSAT3: Roger. Okay.

TF CDR: A lot of those -- a good bit of what was taken out

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

of there had to be carried out in stretchers by people so it had

to be cut down into small enough sizes, and once the determination
was made that everything would come out, it wasn’t so much as take
this piece or that piece. With the fire and everything else, it
was cut into small manageable pieces; bring it up to where the
vehicles were so we could take it out.

ASDSAT3: Yeah, I understand. We just -- I have got some focal

points on the aircraft that I'm trying to separate out between
weapons, effects, and the torch. Sometimes they look very close
to each other in certain locations.

PF CDR: In the Pathfinders, we go through each aircraft with

the pilots pretty well in our pre-deployment train-up. We go
through shut down procedures for every type of airframe, but a
standardized play book for each aircraft and what’s important with
pictures on it, would be beneficial to us. We wouldn’t turn it away.

ASDSAT3: I will get with (b)(3), (b)(6) and help you guys deal with
that a little bit.

Did you happen to go and look at the components in the larger

of three piles that were we looked at where we had a few selections
at the time of your arrival as well as the rotar heads looking for
any type or small weapons effects? Is that part of your SOP when
you get there or your standard battle drill?

PF CDR: Usually, our initial battle drill is to get on the

site and do a site sweep. We’re looking for UXOs, sensitive items
that may have been thrown, but it sounds like in this situation you
guys were brought in by the ground force commander to pull security
initially, so he can speak exactly what they did on the ground. But,
as far as an SOP, yes.

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c If you’re looking for an SOP type answer --

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ASDSAT3: Not an SOP; it’s really more of the informal

priorities of work. I know you’ve got to set up security; you’ve
got to get through certain things before you can actually start
dealing with the wreckage.

TF CDR: Yeah, their number one mission in theater is PR,

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

personne ecovery, and everything else falls after that. Now, by

the time they got out there, we’d already gotten word,
unfortunately, that it didn’t look like there were any survivors,
so they were there to assist the Rangers in securing the site and
making sure that we could recover what we could.

ASDSAT3: Okay. Moving the components -- You guys didn't deal

with any of the moving of the components?

PF PSG: Negative, that was all handled from the welders

cutting it and Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c carrying it out on stretchers and
to the vehicles.

PF PLT LDR: We were providing the manpower and the stretchers

and moving everything up from the Wadi up to the vehicles.

ASDAT3: Does anybody brief the follow-on forces that come in

behind you on what to look for on that site?

PF PLT LDR: Sir, in this case the first night we went -- we

looked for the flight recorder, but because the way the fire had
burned down we were told to look for the flight recorder -- I think
this is actually the only time we hadn’t been successful in
recovering that -- by the cockpit near the pilot seat on the left
hand side and we got as much as we could, but it was still smoldering
at that point. And then, after the flood came in, we looked again
and we also -- we briefed the human remains team and the downed
aircraft assessment team as well as everyone else who was working
on the stretchers to look for the flight recorder in any of the
wreckage, but to my knowledge no one -- we had a couple, I guess,
false alarms, but we could never actually find the actual flight
recorder.

ASDSAT3: Going into the site, did you guys know that -- I heard
the word accident thrown out there, if this was a shoot down or if
it was an accident? Did you know the difference or were you briefed
the difference?

PF CDR: I think I called it an event, if I said accident, I

misspoke. We knew that it had been engaged.

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ASDSAT3: Does that drive you in your decision process at all

on how you’re going to handle the wreckage? Threat weapons effects
involved, non-threat weapons effects involved?

PF CDR: Absolutely, it does drive the decision making

process.

ASDSAT3: How were you going to handle it differently?

PF CDR: Well, one, if the aircraft goes down for something,

unfortunately, we have seen before such as rotor droop, power-margin
errors, mechanical errors, my immediate thought process goes to
enemy threat, there’s less of an enemy threat they’re in. In this
instance -- in this case we knew there was an enemy threat there.

BG COLT: I think the point he’s driving at is, are you looking
for any kind of forensic evidence of an ordnance that was shot to
confirm or deny the specific threat capability in the area and the
answer is probably “no”.

PF CDR: I would say nothing like CID, sir.

BG COLT: Right. That’s what they are.

PF CDR: Yeah. No, nothing more than a [inaudible] --.

BG COLT: Nothing CSI of aircraft shoot down.

PF CDR: Excuse me -- nothing more than a layman’s inspection.

TF CDR: We never trained that, again, because their main

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

mission is PR, you know, and then extraction type stuff. Once
that’s done then their job is really to secure the site so that you
guys or someone else can come in and make that -- whether it’s DART
or anybody else.

BG COLT: Right. The only thing is -- a thought process here

is, maybe if you had opportunity for some exposure to the different
things that they’ve observed it might be something you just put into
your scan and you’re able to put in a SITREP or something like that.
If we can’t be afforded any additional people on the ground; right?
Some cases we’re just going to blow up it in place and move on.

ASDSAT3: And that's exactly where I'm going. I understand

there were certain components found in the forward rotary-head area
that were components from the aft rotary-head that had weapons
effects to them. As we are picking up our pieces, are the folks

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that are policing up the wreckage if nothing is going to be left

on the battlefield; are folks looking for identification marks, and
things like that that would be a little indicative of threat effects?
That’s not an easy thing to do, don’t get me wrong. I don't expect
battle space owner at the lowest level to be able to do that, but
you guys possibly. And I want to be able to put an Air Force Captain
to work a little bit more training you guys on how to do some of
that and get your books set up [inaudible].

BG COLT: Anybody else?

SME-MH47: Were you ever able to talk directly to the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

element once you got on the ground?

PF PLT LDR: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c being their JTAC?

BG COLT: Right.

PF PLT LDR: Roger, as soon as we linked up with them my RTO,

my FO, I’m sorry --

SME-MH47: No, you got out of the (b)(3), (b)(6) . The (b)(3), (b)(6) was
the 60.
PF PLT LDR: Correct.

SME-MH47: When you got off that aircraft and the aircraft
departed, who’d you talk to? The AWT?

PF PLT LDR: Roger.

SME-MH47: And then the AWT relayed.

PF PLT LDR: [Indicated an affirmative response.]

SME-MH47: So, once you started your foot movement, were you
ever able to talk directly or tried to?

PF PLT LDR: Negative.

SME-MH47: Okay. There was a (b)(3), (b)(6) ment overhead that

was concerned because he couldn’t talk to (b)(3), (b)(6) and there was some
comms issues there. I guess that's a take-away then, and that was
a phone call. (b)(3), (b)(6) , he was bringing up the fact there might
have been fratricide potential in this. So, that was the only thing
I was just asking.

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SME-GFA: I guess with the comms kit guys carry right now
you have the ability to talk to the ground force -- to the TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
ground forces?

PF PLT LDR: We should [inaudible]

PF CDR: Sir, we do (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , we do it all.

TF CDR: For deconfliction purposes, for what you’re

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

getting at too is the AWT, because the AWT is talking to the stack
and that’s when they’re on the ground their primary mission is to
get a hold of the AWT to cover not only them, but also for
deconfliction.

BG COLT: Right; fills are there same, though?

TF CDR:
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Roger.

BG COLT: Anybody else?

PF CDR: Was it already discussed about the fresh 240 brass

they found on the site?
BG COLT: No. Please.

PF CDR: When I arrived, there was some of our Soldiers digging

up fresh 240 brass that they said had -- they were essentially the
second people on the scene, beside Task Force , and they said
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

to me very proudly that the 240 brass was from the Chinook, and it
proves our guys went down shooting. I don’t know if that means
anything to you guys, but --

BG COLT: Is that out of your own guys?

PF CDR: Yes, sir.

PF PLT LDR: That was [inaudible] in the orchard up by site

Charlie found a few shells of freshly fired brass.

BG COLT: Did they bring them with him?

PF PLT LDR: I know they brought out one. They gave it to the
GOlf Commander, CPT --

PF CDR: He gave it to the Chinook Company Commander; one piece

of freshly fired brass, 240.

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BG COLT: Okay.

ASDSAT3: Any other weapons’ components policed up on the

battlefield?

PF PLT LDR: We recovered all three 240H’s from the aircrafts.

Is that what you are referring to?

ASDSAT3: No [inaudible]. Keep talking. Anything else?

Did you found anything else?

PF PSG: Just the personal weapons that the heroes were

carrying in the birds. We found those scattered right there on the
ground where the main compartment of the bird was at. We collected
it up near the crash site thinking that nobody would come in. Once
the rain and the flash flood came in, we had to go searching the
Wadi looking for the pieces that had floated down with the current.

ASDSAT3: Roger. What about potentially friendly ordinance

that was on the platform? Were there Afghani’s on board. Did you
happen to find any PGs associated with the remains of the aircraft?
Expelling charge, dunnage, anything like that? Anything that was
prepackaged that maybe the charges may be been removed and you had
to put back together and thrown?

PF PLT LDR: There was one small box that had things that hadn’t
cooked off in the crash. Some blocks of C4, smoke grenades,
frag-grenades, things of that nature and they were using -- EOD was
trying to reduce the aircrafts with controlled detonations. I know
that ordinance was blown up as part of one of those explosions. I
can't remember exactly what was in the box, but I would say the vast
majority of it ended up cooking off in the wreckage.

ASDSAT3: Did anybody -- Or did you hear of anybody finding

the tail boom section at all?. We have a picture with a grid
location of tail feathers of a PG system that was found at the
location. Have you heard anything about that? Any of your folks
taking pictures?

PF PSG: Actually, I think that was one of the times that we

consolidated away whenever they were doing a controlled-det and it
was Team that found some fins from the RPGs or something in one
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

of the gardens near the village and they took it up in a zip lock
bag and took pictures of it.

ASDSAT3: And you said that was Team ?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SECRET
Page 1050
 SECRET

PF PLT LDR: Roger, sir.

PF PSG: But that would be the second --

BG COLT: 3D?

PF PLT LDR: Roger, 3D, sir. That was the element. I can’t
remember the SGT’s name, but they dated the whole TSE exploitation,
put it all in a zip lock bag, that kind of thing; so it should be
out there somewhere.

ASDSAT3: Okay, so that was policed up? You think it’s stuck
in a bag?

PF PSG: Roger. He collected the notes.

PF PLT LDR: They took photos, compass readings --

PF PSG: They even got the ten digit grid where they found the
[inaudible].

SME-INTEL: Did you guys actually see the unit police it up

and put it in a bag?

PF PSG: Yes, I was right down the western side of the wall.
The wall was about chest-high, whenever we consolidated them when
they were doing the controlled-det and he located it and he did the
whole thing and put it in a zip lock bag and took it with him.

BG COLT: Anybody else? I need you guys to run those to

ground, the shell casing and the fins.

[Background conversation]: It’s probably with the rest of the

SSE.

BG COLT: I think that's it. We just want you to know how much
we appreciate what you did. Thanks.

[The interview concluded.]

SECRET
Page 1051
 (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 1052
 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 1053
 (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 1054
Page 1 redacted for the following reason:
---------------------
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 1055
 General Timeline (OBJ Lefty Grove)
S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO NOT FOR DISSEMINATION

052210ZAUG11 – (b)(3), (b)(6) makes Fallen Angel Call

052209ZAUG11 – EXTORTION 17 Shot Down

052154ZAUG11 – (b)(3), (b)(6) Depart FOB (b)(3), (b)(6) with IRF for Infil (b)(1)1.4a

052130ZAUG11 – TF(b)(3), (b)(6)Cdr approves insertion of IRF into (b)(1)1.4a

051830ZAUG11 – (b)(3), (b)(6) Complete Infil Assault Force (b)(1)1.4a s

051700ZAUG11 – OBJ Lefty Grove CONOP Brief to TF

(b)(3), (b)(6)Cdr

051426Z – (b)(3), (b)(6) (ISR) Reports PGRID OBJ Lefty Grove

051400ZAUG11 – TF(b)(3), (b)(6)Joint Asset Allocation Meeting (JAAM) Conducted; TF

allocates ISR to TF(b)(3), (b)(6)/ Team(b)(3), (b)(6) (OBJ Lefty Grove)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

20 JUL 11 – SAFIRE – MH-47 (CJSOTF-A) Report RPG/Small Arms Fire while conducting
operations IVO Tangi Valley; Aircrew found damage due to small caliber
weapon system assessed to 7.62mm

19 JUN 11 – OBJ Lefty Grove (Qari Tahir) – Replacement for OBJ Dunlap) placed on TF(b)(3), (b)(6)
Joint Targeting List (JTL)

05JUN11 – OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 3 ; OBJ Dunlap (Din Muhammad – Tangi Valley TBSL) EKIA
SAFIRE – MH-47 (TF ) Report 3 x RPGs/Smalls Arms fire from 3 x Points of Origin; No Damage R
(b)(3), (b)(6)

Reported by Aircrew
APR 11 – COB Closure – TF (b)(3), (b)(6)/TF
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6) AO / 1 x CO US + 1 x CO ANA Events
Page 1056

Critical Event
9/6/2011 9:07 PM
WARNO TM (b)(3), (b)(6) OBJ LEFTY GROVE (Qari Tahir) – 05 AUG 11

ALCON:

TF (b)(3), (b)(6)/ TM (b)(3), (b)(6) WARNO OBJ LEFTY GROVE:

Who: TF (b)(3), (b)(6) / TM (b)(3), (b)(6)

What: Conduct HAF raid IOT c/k OBJ LEFTY GROVE IVO 42S VC 83431 62373

Where: Sayad Abad District, Wardak Province

Why: Qari Tahir (LEFTY GROVE) is a TB CDR and was the deputy to Din
Mohammad (DUNLAP-EKIA) active within the Tangi Valley, Sayed Abad District,
Wardak Province. Qari Tahir is the replacement for Din Mohammad and
assessed to be the overall TB Commander of the Tangi Valley. Qari Tahir is
associated with (b)(1)1.4a

( (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ).

When: Timeline (05 AUG 11):

1800z SP
1830z INSERT TO OFFSET
2030z TOT
NLT 2330z EXFIL

CONOP TO FOLLOW

Page 1057
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a

Page 1058
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

Page 1059
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 1060
 Date Objective Asset Asset Type Acft Type Time On Time Off
5-Aug-11 LEFTY GROVE Unmanned MQ-1 15:15 17:45
5-Aug-11 LEFTY GROVE Manned U-28 17:00 21:30
5-Aug-11 LEFTY GROVE / DOWNED HELO Unmanned MQ-9 20:00 8/6/2011 10:45
5-Aug-11 LEFTY GROVE / DOWNED HELO Manned B-350 21:30 8/6/2011 1:50
5-Aug-11 DOWNED HELO Manned MC-12 22:45 8/6/2011 3:00
5-Aug-11 DOWNED HELO Unmanned MQ-1 23:30 8/6/2011 16:15

06-Aug-11 DOWNED HELO Manned MC-12 1:00 5:00

6-Aug-11 DOWNED HELO Manned B-350 1:00 5:00
06-Aug-11 DOWNED HELO Manned MC-12 5:00 9:00
6-Aug-11 DOWNED HELO Manned B-350 5:00 9:00
(b)(3), (b)(6)
6-Aug-11 DOWNED HELO Manned MC-12 9:00 13:00
6-Aug-11 DOWNED HELO Manned B-350 9:00 13:00
6-Aug-11 DOWNED HELO Unmanned MQ-1 9:00 21:30
06-Aug-11 DOWNED HELO Manned MC-12 13:00 17:00
6-Aug-11 DOWNED HELO Manned B-350 13:00 17:00
6-Aug-11 DOWNED HELO Manned MC-12 17:00 21:00
6-Aug-11 DOWNED HELO Manned U-28 17:00 21:00
6-Aug-11 DOWNED HELO Manned MC-12 21:00 8/7/2011 1:00
6-Aug-11 DOWNED HELO Manned B-350 21:00 8/7/2011 1:00
6-Aug-11 DOWNED HELO Unmanned MQ-9 21:30 8/7/2011 10:45
6-Aug-11 DOWNED HELO Unmanned MQ-1 22:30 8/7/2011 16:15

Page 1061
 DEPARTMENT OF
F CO 2-10, TASK FORCE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
10TH COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE
FOB , AFGHANISTAN
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

APO AE 09364

AFDR-CJTF-101-KH-FCO-CO 10 AUG 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: After Action Report for Fallen Angel Extortion 1-7

1. Mission Summary: 2ND PLT was alerted that a CH-47 had crashed and was on fire in the Tangi
Valley IVO Juy Zarrin. 2ND PLT departed FOB with 20 PAX on 2 x UH60’s without full
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

extraction equipment since the AWT and ISR platforms reported the aircraft was on fire and had seen
no survivors, at that time USF where maneuvering by ground and where approximately 800 meters
away. PFDRs INFILED approximately 560meters east of the crash site and began maneuvering to
the crash site. Once arriving at the crash site PFDR 2-6 linked up LB(b)(3), (b)(6) and security was
established. Due to the large amount of ordinance onboard the aircraft which continued to “cook-off”
it was approximately 20 minutes before the recovery of the Heros could begin. The crash was
located in a whadi approximately 200 meters south of Juy Zarrin, and 150meters north of a smaller
Khalat. At that time the aircraft was still on fire, and as the fire burned out Heros where recovered
when possible, it took approximately 6 hours before all Heros could be recovered from the burning
fuselage, fortunately 38 torsos and one CAD (Combat Attack Dog) where recovered allowing ground
forces to confirm that all Heros where recovered. Due to the remote nature of the crash site, recovery
of the wreckage by vehicle was not possible, and the SAF threat did not allow for recovery via sling
load. The aircraft wreckage was located in three sections, the fuselage was located in the whadi, the
aft cowling, transmission, and rotor head were approximately 100 meters north of the fuselage, and
the forward cowling, transmission and rotor head was located 75 meters to northwest of the fuselage.
Because the aircraft fuselage was still smoldering and the fore and aft rotor assemblies weighed
several thousand pounds, recovery to RTE (b)(3), (b)(6) which runs through Juy Zarrin was not possible,
the assessment was made to sanitize the crash scene by dropping GBUs on three portions of the
wreckage. PFDRs at the site relayed our recommendation to TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and LB(b)(3), (b)(6) relayed
the same to (b)(3), (b)(6) While waiting for approval for GBU release recovery of the Heros was
accomplished by ground from TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c The decision was made to recover the
aircraft by ground to Sayed Abad. EOD utilized several CONDETs to reduce the wreckage to pieces
small enough so they could be moved by foot to RTE (b)(3), (b)(6) 94th BSB provided welders to reduce
all remaining pieces. Once (b)(3), (b)(6) conducted a survey of the crash site to confirm that the aircraft
was satisfactorily recovered PFDR and SOF where authorized to EXFIL. EXFIL of all remaining
forces was conducted by SOA.

2. AAR Comments:
Issue:

Discussion:

Recommendation:

Page 1062
3. Timeline: All times given are local.

DATE Event
6-Aug-11
02:43 2ND PLT NOTIFIED AND GOING REDCON 1
02:45 CH-47 W/ 32 PAX HIT BY RPG AND ON FIRE
03:03 PFDR'S LOADING 2 UH-60'S
GRID TO LZ VC 80613 64330
04:00 2ND W/U WITH 20 PFDR
04:12 2ND W/D HLZ VC 80691 64330
04:15 33 PAX PLUS 5 CREW ON CH-47
05:00 PFDR 2-9 CALLS IN ON SATCOM EXTREMELY LOW ON H20 AT CRASH SITE
05:07 CRASH SITE SECURE
05:17 ZERO SURIVORS CH-47 DESTROYED
07:10 33/38 HERO'S RECOVERED
10:52 35 HERO'S 30 US
12:30 38 HERO'S RECOVERED
14:35 ALL HERO'S OUT ON CONVOY
8/7/2011 03:10 (b)(3), (b)(6) IS INSERTED AT CRASH SITE WITH RANGER PLT
03:51 (b)(3), (b)(6) LINKS UP WITH 2ND PLT
05:00 (b)(3), (b)(6) ARRIVES BACK AT FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

07:25 2ND PLT RECEIVES CDS DROP

11:00 HUMAN REMAINS TEAM/ A/C INVESTIGATION TEAM COMPLETE;
A/C PARTS CONSOLIDATED FOR GBU DROP
PFDRS/RANGERS MOVING OFFSITEFOR BOMBDROP THEN WILL CONDUCT
BDA
13:30 WAITINGON (b)(3), (b)(6) TO APPROVE GBU DROP PFDRS OFF-SITE
15:50 (b)(3), (b)(6) REPORTS EOD WILL CONDUCT A CONTROL DET OF LARGE A/C PIECES
TO MAKE THEM SMALL ENOUGH TO CARRY TO THE ROAD OFF COMS FOR
ABOUT 10 MIN
18:15 FRIENDLY: VC 8572 6128 RPG AND SMALL ARMS; " (b)(3), (b)(6)
19:00 RECEIVE ORDER TO KEEP PFDR'S ON GROUND/ PLAN TO RIP PLT'S
8/8/2011 06:40 CDS DROP RECEIVED
12:10 UPDATE: RED WILL EXFIL TONIGHT AND BSO WILL PROVIDE 2X D CO PLTS
FOR SITE SECURITY
13:15 UPDATE: (b)(3), (b)(6) INTENT FOR EXFIL IS VIC PATROL
W/ RCP TO SAYEDABAD
14:31 V CANCELLED RESCHEDULEDFOR 9 AUG 11 10:00 HRS
(b)(3), (b)(6)
15:30 W/U TO SAYEDABAD
16:32 W/D AT SAYEDABAD
(b)(3), (b)(6)
17:30 LINK UP WITH (b)(3), (b)(6) FOR CONVOY FROM SAYEDABAD TO
JOY-ZARIN

Page 1063
 19:20 PFDR'S MOVED TO HIGHER GROUND RED SP ATT
20:00 UPDATED PFDR LOC: VC 80178 64757, PLAN NOW TO WAIT UNTIL EOD
W/ (b)(3), (b)(6) VISIT ON 9 AUG
21:15 RADIO CHECK- GOOD COMMS
8/9/2011 03:30 (b)(3), (b)(6) D 7-0 MAKE LINK UP WITH (b)(3), (b)(6) AT FALLEN ANGEL SITE
05:20 LINKEDUP WITH 2ND PLT ANDIS TRACKING EXTRACTION TIMELINE
ALSO MAKE PLAN IF EXTRACTION FAILS AND GROUND PATROL LEAVES
06:15 REQUEST CHANGE TO EXTRACTION PLAN
(b)(3), (b)(6)
10:05 EPORTS TO (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c THAT ELEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)IS IN CONTACT AT
VC 808 638
13:05 (b)(3), (b)(6) ARIVE BACK AT FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

17:50 2ND PLT/RANGERS SPING TO HLZ (b)(3), (b)(6) FOR PICKUP AT

1930L AWT W/U IN 15MINTO SUPPORT MOVEMENT
20:30 2ND PLT ARRIVES BACK AT FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

4. Point of contact is the undersigned at (b)(6), (b)(2), (b)(3) .

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Commanding

Page 1064
 (b)(3), (b)(6)

From: AF (b)(1)1.4a,
TF LNO
(b)(1)1.4c

Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2011 3:40 PM

To: INVEST TM (b)(3), (b)(6) ADV
Subject: RE: OBJ LEFTY GROVE COCNOP Brief(b)(1)1.4a,
to CDR
(b)(1)1.4c

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
CAVEATS: NOFORN
TERMS: NONE

Sir, 
 
OBJ LEFTY GROVE was briefed to the  CDR at approximately 1630Z. 
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

 
 
V/R, 
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c,(b)(6), (b)(2)

 
 
From: INVEST TM (b)(3), (b)(6) ADV
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2011 7:18 PM
To: AF (b)(1)1.4a,
TF LNO
(b)(1)1.4c

Cc: INVEST TM MH47

Subject: OBJ LEFTY GROVE COCNOP Brief(b)(1)1.4a,
to CDR
(b)(1)1.4c

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
CAVEATS: NOFORN
TERMS: NONE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Can you give me the approximate time you briefed OBJ LEFTY GROVE to TF
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

CDR
Thanks

(b)(3), (b)(6)

SCAMPI (b)(6), (b)(2)

DERRIVED FROM: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

DECLASSIFY ON: 25 YEARS FROM DATE OF SOURCE
DATE OF SOURCE: 1 MAY 2006

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

1
Page 1065
CAVEATS: NOFORN
TERMS: NONE

DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

DECLASSIFY ON: 25 YEARS FROM DATE OF SOURCE
DATE OF SOURCE: 1 MAY 2006

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
CAVEATS: NOFORN
TERMS: NONE

2
Page 1066
 SECRET

MC-130 CJSOAD-A OPERATIONAL SUMMARY (OPSUM) VER 3.4

MISSION DATA

AOR OEF
Callsign (b)(3), (b)(6) Mission Type(s) PAX/LOG Click Click Click
Number of A/C 1
Aircraft Type MC-130H OP(S) Supported
Tail Number A0281 Unit(s) Supported CJSOTF, TF
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
MSN % Effectiveness 100 Mission Number(s) 5WT1500BC218
ASR Number (s)

Date 6-Aug-11 Total PAX Moved 11 Airdrop

Actual T/O (Z) 1625 Detainees Moved WEIGHT # X TYPE / ISO ?
Actual Land (Z) 0120
Total Cargo Moved K lbs 1.1
Flight Hours 3.5 Fuel Onloaded x 1000 lbs 9.0 No. Small Vehicles
Total Sortie Count 7 Fuel Offloaded x 1000 lbs No. Large Vehicles

Post BMNT Requested Yes Daylight Ops Requested Yes

(Daylight Ops = after sunrise)
Post BMNT Executed Yes Daylight Ops Executed Yes

SORTIE INFORMATION

Location LND/TO/TOT Pax D/O Cargo, Det, etc. Dropped Off Pax P/U Cargo, Det, etc. Picked Up
OAIX 1625 2
OASH 1700/1730
OAJL 1805/1810 7
OASA 1840/1855 2
OASH 1920/2220 9 19xHR
OAIX 2250/0005 2 19xHR P (1.1)
OASH 0030/0050 P (1.1) 19xHR
OAIX 0120 19xHR

TOTAL 11 11

PAX / CARGO NO SHOW

ORGANIZATION PAX CARGO P/U D/O MSN IMPACT

NARRATIVE
Significant Events or Observations, SAFIRES, Jamming, Interference, Maintenance Issues, etc. entered here.
NSTR

Regardless of the crew's location, this OPSUM is required to be completed and placed within its respective date's OPSUM folder after
EVERY mission. Data may be phoned in or e-mailed to the CJSOAC JOC if necessary.

SECRET
Page 1067
Page 1 redacted for the following reason:
---------------------
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 1068
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 1069
 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(2), (b)(6) (b)(2), (b)(6) (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 1070
 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(2), (b)(6) (b)(2), (b)(6) (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c,, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 1071
 (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a

Page 1072
 (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

Page 1073
 ILLUM GUIDELINES

FROM (b)(3), (b)(6)

ILLUM % Moon Angle

>25 % >30*
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c >,= 25% 0-30*
<25% <30*

Page 1074
 (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
Page 1075
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. NO. OF PAGES
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans 1 3
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TOC FOB
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c FROM TO
HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
0001 4 AUG 11 0800 4 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
NO. IN OUT
1 0001 TIC RESPONSE DEP STATION NOTIFIED BTLNCO
(b)(3), (b)(6)
UPDATED TRACKER SB
2 0012 TIC RESPONSE W/D SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
3 0015 MSN RDY NIGHT UH (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U BAF NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
4 0020 MSN RDY NIGHT UH UNABLE TO GO TO GAM DUE TO LOW
ILLUM AND CLOWD COVERAGE RTB TO SHA FOR REFUEL
5 CONT AND WX UPDATE LOGGED

6 0042 MSN RDY NIGHT UH IS DROPPING OFF 4 PAX GOING TO GAM

AND WILL TRY TO GO TO GAM AT DAY BREAK (b)(3), (b)(6)

7 CONT WILL CONTINUE DOWN TO GDZ AND SAL FOR OTHER PART LOGGED
OF MISSION
8 0052 MSN RDY NIGHT UH (b)(3), (b)(6) W/D SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
9 0129 GS CH W/U SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
10 0154 GS CH W/D ABN NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
11 0157 GS CH W/U ABN NOTIFIED BTLNCO
(b)(3), (b)(6) UPDATED TRACKER SB
12 0201 GS CH W/D GDA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
13 0212 GS CH W/U GDA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
14 0227 GS CH W/D SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
15 0245 TF CONFIRMS
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6) RETURN FLIGHT IS AT 1600 LOGGED

16 0335 CONT TRAINING (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO

UPDATED TRACKER SB
17 0405 AWT SPINNING UP TO PROVIDE OVERWATCH FOR VEHICLE LOGGED
ROLL OVER (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

18 0418 VEHICLE ROLL OVER SECURITY W/U SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO

(b)(3), (b)(6) UPDATED TRACKER SB
19 0425 VEHICLE ROLL OVER SECURITY ON NOTIFIED BTLNCO
STATION UPDATED TRACKER SB
20 0422 MSN RDY NIGHT UH (b)(3), (b)(6) W/D SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
21 0520 CONT TRAINING (b)(3), (b)(6) W/D SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
22 0753 P6 BFC/PAX MOVE (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
23 0800 SOUTH FARP IS OPEN AND OPERATIONAL LOGGED

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE

DA FORM 1594, NOV 1962 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE. APD PE v3.00ES

Page 1076
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. NO. OF PAGES
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans 2 3
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCA PERIOD COVERED
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c FOB
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c FROM TO
HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
0848 04 JUL 11 2205 04 JUL 11
ITEM TIME
INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
NO. IN OUT
24 0848 W/D BAM NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
25 0915 W/U BAM NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
(b)(3), (b)(6)
26 0939 W/D MAD NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
27 0946 W/U MAD NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
28 0949 SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
29 1001 (b)(3), (b)(6)
CAR NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
30 1003 CAR NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
31 1011 (b)(3), (b)(6) W/D BAM NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
32 1017 (b)(3), (b)(6) SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
33 1119 MSN RDY DAY UH HERO MISSION (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SB
34 1430 ESCORT
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (PM AWT) WU SHA
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
35 1455 NOTIFIED AWT,
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)
ACKNOWLEDGED
36 1519 MSN RDY DAY UH HERO MISSION WD SHA MC UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
37 1557 TF REQUESTS AWT ISO
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c AT (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)
THEY
(b)(1)1.4a REQUEST AWT PROVIDE OVERWATCH FOR A
38 TRAFFIC JAM THAT LOOKS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS (ONST UPDATED TRACKER
1632L) NOTIFIED AWT
39 1630 (b)(3), (b)(6) SHA MC UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
40 1705 REPORTS
(b)(3), (b)(6)THEY HAVE CONDUCTED SUPPRESSIVE FIRE LOGGED
WITH 60 ROUNDS 30MM
41 1815 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ID F RESPONSE/TRAFFIC JAM UPDATED TRACKER
WD SHA MC NOTIFIED BTL NCO
42 1856 TF REQUESTS AWT ISO (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6) AT
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c LOGGED NOTIFIED AWT
(b)(1)1.4a FOR TIC SUPPORT (SAF/RPG)
43 1911 TIC RESPONSE (PM AWT) (b)(3), (b)(6)WU SHA UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
44 1924 TF MEDEVAC MM(E)08-04N 1xC/1xA/1xA(US MIL)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c UPDATED TRACKER
SHA-JAG-SHA ETD: 0830L
45 2155 OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c AWT (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U SHA UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
46 2205 OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CH (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U SHA UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE

DA FORM 1594, NOV 1962 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE. APD PE v3.00ES

Page 1077
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. NO. OF PAGES
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans 3 3
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TOC FOB
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c FROM TO
HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
2210 04 AUG 11 2347 04 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
NO. IN OUT
47 2210 (b)(3), (b)(6) APPROVED OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , NOTIFIED BY LOGGED
(b)(3), (b)(6)

48 2218 OP(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

CH EX17/ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cW/U SHA UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
49 2218 OP(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
UH (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U SHA UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
50 2347 OP(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cMSN PUSHED RIGHT DUE TO WX (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c UPDATED TRACKER
AND UH &CH RTB NOTIFIED BTL NCO
51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE

DA FORM 1594, NOV 1962 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE. APD PE v3.00ES

Page 1078
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. NO. OF PAGES
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans 1 2
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TOC FOB
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c FROM TO
HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
0004 05 AUG 11 1300 05 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
NO. IN OUT
1 0005

2 0013 A/C
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c W/D SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SH
3 0024 OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c AWT (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c W/U SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SH
4 0030 OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c AWT (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ON ST NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SH
5 0236 OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c AWT (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c OFF ST NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SH
6 0246 OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c AWT (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c W/D SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SH
7 0304 OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c AWT (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c W/U SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SH
8 0304 OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c W/U SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SH
9 0310 OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c AWT (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ON ST NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SH
10 0315 OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c W/D OBJ NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SH
11 0320 OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c W/U OBJ NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SH
12 0323 OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c W/D BBJ NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SH
13 0324 OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c AWT (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c OF ST NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SH
14 0735 NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SH
15 1116 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c FINDS UXO- (b)(3), (b)(6) CONTACTS (b)(3), (b)(6) FREPORTS
EOD
16 1120 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c BDOC CALLS EOD

17 1135 LOGGED
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

18 1214 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c MEDEVAC MM(E)08-05B 1xA/1xL/1xD(ANA) UPDATED TRACKER

GHZ-BSD-GHZ
19 1221 MM(E)08-05B (b)(3), (b)(6) WU GHZ UPDATED TRACKER

20 1241 MM(E)08-05B WD GHZ MC UPDATED TRACKER

21 1257 TF MEDEVAC MM(E)08-05C 2xA,2xB/2xL,2xA/4xA(US

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c UPDATED TRACKER
MIL) SHA-CHA-SHA
22 1259 MEDEVAC ESCORT WU SHA
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
23 1300 MM(E)08-05C (b)(3), (b)(6) WU SHA UPDATED TRACKER

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE

DA FORM 1594, NOV 1962 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE. APD PE v3.00ES

Page 1079
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. NO. OF PAGES
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans 2 2
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TOC FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c FROM TO
HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
1309 05 AUG 11 2236 05 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
NO. IN OUT
24 1309 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c MEDEVAC MM(E)08-05D 1xA/1xL/1xD(LN) GHZ UPDATED TRACKER
-QAR-GHZ
25 1321 MM(E)08-05D (b)(3), (b)(6) WU GHZ UPDATED TRACKER

26 1331 MM(E)08-05C WD SHA MC UPDATED TRACKER

27 1346 MM(E)08-05D WD GHZ MC UPDATED TRACKER

28 1409 MEDEVAC ESCORT WD SHA MC UPDATED TRACKER

29 1415 ARYAN EAMR (DAY MSN RDY) (b)(3), (b)(6) WU SHA UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
30 1520
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

31 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c LOGGED

32 1531 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c NOTIFIED AWT

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

33 1535 AWT STOOD DOWN, TROOPS NO LONGER IN CONTACT NOTIFIED AWT

34 1711
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

35 TO STAY TO THE NORTH OF THE PTDS NOTIFIED ALL

COMPANIES
36 1740 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6) IS GOING 0-0 LOGGED
AND THEY WILL HAVE TO RON AT THIS POINT
37 2116 TF MEDEVAC MM(E)08-05L 1xB/1xL/1xA(US MIL)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c UPDATED TRACKER
SHA-SOL-SHA ETD 2130
38 2140 MM(E)08-05L (b)(3), (b)(6) WU SHA UPDATED TRACKER

39 2210 MM(E)08-05L WD SHA MC UPDATED TRACKER

40 2216 OBJ LEFTY AWT WU SHA

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
41 2227 CMD VISIT/GARDA RETROGRADE/PAX MOVE (b)(3), (b)(6) WU SHA UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
42 2228 UPDATED TRACKER
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
43 2236 OBJ LEFTY CH EX 17/ (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, WU SHA UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
44

45

46

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE

DA FORM 1594, NOV 1962 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE. APD PE v3.00ES

Page 1080
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. NO. OF PAGES
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans 1 3
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED
TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cTOC FOB
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c FROM TO
HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
0006 06 AUG 11 0242 06 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
NO. IN OUT
1 0006 LOG OPENED OPENED LOG

2 0006 FUEL BLIVTS/KICKER BOX SLING (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cW/D ALT NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SH
3 0014 SENDS IN THE 5 W'S FOR ENGAGEMENT, GUN
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 1
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
ENGAGES 8 ENEMY WITH RPG,AK WITH 60MM
4 CONT. (GROUND FORCE CMDR) GIVES CLEARENCE OF FIRES
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
BDA REPORTED-NO CIVILIAN INJURED, NO STRUCTURES
5 CONT. DAMAGED, CONFIRMED 5 EKIA RTO ACK'S, 5 W'S SENT
TO
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
6 0021 OBJ LEFTY AWT (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
W/D SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SH
7 0029 FUEL BLIVTS/KICKER BOX SLING W/U ALT NOTIFIED BTLNCO
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c UPDATED TRACKER SH
8 0033 FUEL BLIVTS/KICKER BOX SLING W/D SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SH
9 0037 OBJ LEFTY AWT W/U SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c UPDATED TRACKER SH
10 0043 OBJ LEFTY AWT ON ST NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SH
11 0050 FUEL BLIVTS/KICKER BOX SLING (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cW/U SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER SH
12 0109 INFIL OF 17 MORE PAX INTO
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c LZ
(b)(1)1.4a, -WAITING ON
(b)(1)1.4c PASSED VIA FM FROM
LZ APPROVAL FROM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)TO CH'S
13 0110 LZ
(b)(1)1.4a, APPROVED CH'S WILL RE PO IN EAST GRAVEL IF
(b)(1)1.4c PASSED VIA FM FROM
DECIDES TO SEND 17 ADDITIONAL PAX
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)TO CH'S
14 0125 FUEL BLIVTS/KICKER BOX SLING W/U BSN NOTIFIED BTLNCO
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c UPDATED TRACKER SH
15 0141 FUEL BLIVTS/KICKER BOX SLING W/D GHZ NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER PS
16 0143 APART TRNG WU SHA AND GREEN ON BFT
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER PS
17 0155 OBJ LEFTY OFF ST NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER PS
18 0211 OBJ LEFTY (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cWD SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER PS
19 0218 OBJ LEFTY WU SHA NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER PS
20 0219 FUEL BLIVTS/KICKER BOX SLING (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cW/U GHZ NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER PS
21 0224 OBJ LEFTY ON ST NOTIFIED BTLNCO
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c UPDATED TRACKER PS
22 0225 OBJ LEFTY WU SHA 0225 TO INFIL 32 PAX NOTIFIED BTLNCO
UPDATED TRACKER PS
23 0242 FALLEN ANGEL EX 17 EVENT LOG OPENED

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE

DA FORM 1594, NOV 1962 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE. APD PE v3.00ES

Page 1081
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. NO. OF PAGES
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans 2 3
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TOC FOB
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c FROM TO
HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
0242 06 AUG 11 1404 06 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
NO. IN OUT
24 0255 OBJ LEFTY CH (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
25 0318 FUEL BLIVTS/KICKER BOX SLINGS WD SHA MC UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
26 0337 APART TRNG WD SHA MC UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
27 0404 FALLEN ANGEL SUPPORT W/PFDR (b)(3), (b)(6)WU SHA UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
28 0424 FALLEN ANGEL SUPPORT (b)(3), (b)(6)WD SHA MC UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
29 0431 AM AWT WU SHA
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
30 0720 OBJ LEFTY AWT WD SHA MC UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
31 0733 ARYAN EAMR (DAY MSN RDY) WU SHR UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
32 0759 ARYAN EAMR (DAY MSN RDY) WD SHA MC UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
33 0908 EOD MOVE (b)(3), (b)(6)WU SHA UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
34 0923 EOD MOVE WD SHA MC UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
35 1129 RESUPPLY (b)(3), (b)(6) WU SHA UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
36 1201 TF MEDEVAC MM(E)08-06G 1xA/1xL/1xC(ANA)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c UPDATED TRACKER
SHA-EBK-LTG-SHA
37 1212 MM(E)08-06G (b)(3), (b)(6) WU SHA UPDATED TRACKER

38 1213 MEDEVAC ESCORT WU SHA; RESUPPLY WD SHA MC

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
39 1214 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c WU SHA UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
40 1233 TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6) WU SHA UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
41 1236 AM AWT WD SHA MC UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
42 1254 MM(E)08-06G WD SHA MC UPDATED TRACKER

43 1256 MEDEVAC ESCORT WD SHA MC UPDATED TRACKER

NOTIFIED BTL NCO
44 1314 (b)(3), (b)(6) WD SHA, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
AT SHA FOR REMAINDER OF UPDATED TRACKER
DUTY DAY MINUS FLIGHT TIME HOME NOTIFIED BTL NCO
45 1338 TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c MEDEVAC MM(E)08-06H 1xA/1xL/1xC(ANP) UPDATED TRACKER
GHZ-POI-GHZ
46 1404 FALLEN ANGEL SECURITY (PM AWT) WU SHA
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE

DA FORM 1594, NOV 1962 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE. APD PE v3.00ES

Page 1082
 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PAGE NO. NO. OF PAGES
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency
is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans 3 3
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TOC FOB
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c FROM TO
HOUR DATE HOUR DATE
1404 06 AUG 11 2318 06 AUG 11
ITEM TIME
INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
NO. IN OUT
47 1410 MM(E)08-06H IS CANCELLED UPDATED TRACKER

48 1531 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c WU SHA UPDATED TRACKER

NOTIFIED BTL NCO
49 1608 RTB
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c WD BAF MC UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
50 1646 (b)(3), (b)(6)REPORTS
THAT (b)(3), (b)(6)IS HAVING MX ISSUES AND
THERE WILL BE A 15-30 MINUTE DELAY, (b)(3), (b)(6) ARE
51 CURRENTLY ON STATION AND ARE OFFICIALLY BINGO.
THERE WILL BE A GAP IN COVERAGE, HAVE DIV MSN
52 RDY AND(b)(3), (b)(6)
STANDING BY REDCON 1 TO LAUNCH IN CASE LOGGED
OF FURTHER DELAY.
53 1711 (b)(3), (b)(6) ARE ON STATION, DELAY RESULTED IN 15 LOGGED
MINUTE GAP IN COVERAGE AT SITE
54 1935 REPORTS
(b)(3), (b)(6) RTB ATT DUE TO WX LOGGED

55 1948 FALLEN ANGEL SECURITY (PHOENIX AWT) WD BAF MC UPDATED TRACKER

NOTIFIED BTL NCO
56 1951 FALLEN ANGEL SECURITY (PM AWT) WD SHA MC UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
57 2228 FALLEN ANGEL SECURITY (TF 310 AWT) (b)(3), (b)(6) WU SHA UPDATED TRACKER
NOTIFIED BTL NCO
58 2251 TF (b)(3), (b)(6) MEDEVAC MM(E)08-06K UPDATED TRACKER
5xA/4xA,1xL/4xA(US)1xD(TERP) SHA-POI-SHA VC 96621 66597
59 2258 MM(E)08-06K WU SHA UPDATED TRACKER
(b)(3), (b)(6)

60 2318 MM(E)08-06K WD SHA UPDATED TRACKER

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE

DA FORM 1594, NOV 1962 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE. APD PE v3.00ES

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Page 1088
 SECRET

The interview of the AC-130 Aircrew opened at 1405 Zulu on

19 August 2011, at Bagram AFB.

PERSONS PRESENT

JSOAC SME SME-JSOAC

MH-47 SME SME-MH47

INTELLIGENCE SME SME-INTEL

GROUND FORCE ARMY SME SME-GFA

GROUND FORCE NAVY SME SME-GFN1

GROUND FORCE ARMY SME SME-GFN2

ASDAT SME ASDAT2

Derived from: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

SECRET

Page 1089
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SME-JSOAC : It is currently 1405Z 19 August 2011, we are back

again with the (b)(3), (b)(6) crew. Right now we have (the) aircraft

commander (and) the navigator. Just for context, we now have in

for the investigation team more of the ground side: SME-GFA,

SME-GFN1, SME-GFN2, IO, SME-MH47, ASDAT2, and SME-INTEL. These

folks have not had an opportunity to listen to all the testimony

from yesterday; so they have not heard that [testimony], all

they heard is me giving a five minute spiel on what we talked

about, you saw. Specifically, what we want to dig into a little

bit today is after the incident, what you saw from the point of

origin (POO), the activity there, and kind of some of those

events. These guys may also ask you about the squirter tracking

from the ground, perspective, things like that as well. I don’t

intend for you to rehash the whole event so just start there,

from the shot, and if you would please, since you were one of

the three who actually saw the RPG shots, could you start with

SECRET

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 SECRET

that and talk about what you saw, what your geometry was on the

target, where you were sitting in the aircraft.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: (I was) the aircraft commander on (b)(3), (b)(6)

that night.
(b)(3), (b)(6) We were on (the) southern part of the orbit, and

we were essentially [performing a] 1.5 nautical mile radius

wheel, counter clock wise around the helicopter landing zone

(HLZ) at the point when I saw the rocket propelled grenade

(RPG0. Now the helo was calling one minute out and we set up a

contract to put down our burn, which is actually just a football

(field) size flash light,infrared flashlight that you can see

on NVGs. We put that out and then approximately a few seconds

had passed when we put that down (our burn), which was roughly

here [pointing at map]. The helos were coming from the

northwest, so it was quite a ways away, the distance was over a

click [1KM]. I say we were about right (here)[pointing at map],

(in) the portion over the southwest to the south, when I saw

three fairly rapid succession RPG shots, they went south to

north from what I saw. What we talked about yesterday, I didn’t

see any obstruction in the line of the flight path of that RPG.

It was very readily identifiable to me as a RPG shot: I saw a

bright flash, followed by a comet like stream of sparks leaving

the RPG shot. It was one, two, and then a slight pause, and then

a third shot; and from my perspective, I could definitely tell

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that the second one hit the helicopter. And then I saw a fairly

large explosion, and then that explosion just staying fairly

stationary, I couldn’t tell if it really dropped straight down,

it just seemed fairly stationary to me at that point. The illum

on that night was zero percent, the moon had already, set so I

was on night vision goggles (NVG) and I could just see lights.

There wasn’t a lot of cultural lighting in the area, so this

stood out as very significant. When I saw the RPG shots I

immediately maneuvered the aircraft to get our sensor, his

(operator’s) eyes on the area, and at that point he identified

the third RPG shot as well as the downed helo ,and then he

immediately started scanning around and found activity in this

compound right here [pointing at map]. At that point ---- I’ve

done as much as I can in terms of what I can see on the ground

due to the illumination. The navigator was sitting right next

the screens, he can see what they were looking at and you can

probably describe what----

SME-GFA: When you say you identified the third shot, that was

after the bird had been, after Extortion [17] had been hit?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Been hit. Yes Sir.

SME-GFA: Space and time between the first shot to third

approximately?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Seconds, I say maybe 5 to 6 seconds.

SECRET

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SME-GFA: So two shots go near simultaneous, one hits--

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: One, two, and then--

SME-GFA: Bird drops, third shot goes.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: I could not tell if it dropped like I said

[inaudible]

SME-GFA: The bird was hit then you see the third shot.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Yes, I saw an explosion third shot going

pass ---

SME-GFA: Did you see any air burst, RPG airburst, or anything

similar to that?

NAVIGATOR: Then once we got the infrared sensor operator in the

vicinity, , we got the ISR sensor in the area immediately after

(b)(3), (b)(6) [AWT – AH-64] came through and did the containment

fires in this area over here. We had our eyes in the area on the

Northeast corner of this building [pointing at map], there is a

castle-like turret and there was at least two people on top of

that turret when we initially saw the activity in that court

yard. They quickly moved down, it was about a three to four

story building is what it looked like in this area, on the north

side where that turret was. After they climbed down from the

turret area, there was a lot of activity going on; they were

passing objects back and forth between each other. We were not

able to VID [visual identification]or PID [positive

SECRET

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 SECRET

identification] anything in particular as to what they were

passing, but there was definitely transfer of equipment going

on. That lasted probably for about 2 or 3 minutes, and then

everybody was down on the bottom level and we paid particular

attention to this compound due to the increased activity:

anywhere from 8 to about 10 personnel that we saw moving around,

in and amongst the buildings within the walls of that compound.

We were postured pretty much that if anybody exited, we would

start with warning shots in between the downed helo and the

personnel, and then if they continued, obviously with the rules

of engagement (ROE) we looked at we would engage to maintain

the integrity of the crash site and any survivors that were on

the ground.

NAVIGATOR: We talked a little bit yesterday about that having

been on the ground, and not having any way to actually gauge it.

I believe that the difference in terrain elevation from the

bottom of the wadi to the actual buildings here is about 15ft or

so, and I want to say the tower there, being that it was on

about the third or fourth story and elevated itself, was

probably about 50ft. That’s just a guess, don’t know for sure,

but the difference between the height of this tower and the

bottom of the wadi was pretty elevated. So that could have

aided in the potential for their shot there. The other thing we

SECRET

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 SECRET

talked about yesterday too was possibly presence of a night

vision device from the guys that were actually shooting the

RPG’s, being that it was extremely low illum[ination], we

believe there was a good possibility that those folks had NVGs.

SME-GFN1: So yesterday, when we talked to the -64 pilots, they

were talking about a village that could have possibly back lit

them-----from the angles, did you guys see any significant light

coming from this?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Not that I can recall. I don’t remember

any significant cultural lighting in the area.

SME-GFA: Just your normal Afghan village lighting?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Correct, yeah. Even when we track the

squirters [term used to describe personnel running off target

area] to a ---out here to this other village [pointing at map],

which was still about a click to the southeast, to where the

helo actually went down, there was not any lighting in that

little village either. There really wasn’t whole lot of

cultural lighting going in that entire valley.

ASDAT2: Can you put your idea of cultural lighting into

perspective because talking to the 10th Combat Aviation Brigade

(CAB) guys, they considered that to be a really bright valley.

And you guys are saying there is not much cultural lighting at

all. Could you put that in perspective, could you do some kind

SECRET

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 SECRET

of comparison so we can get an idea what not much is to you

guys?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Yea, a few lights here and there, yea there

were probably a few lights here and there, but there wasn’t

enough lighting in the area provided for me to actually see what

was on the ground. So from my perspective, when I say not much

cultural lighting, it’s not much light that it’s usable for me

to detec on NVG’s any discernable on the ground.

SME-JSOAC: Again what were you’re AGL [above ground level]?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: It’s about 7000 AGL. That might put it in

perspective a little bit and it’s totally different probably for

a helo that’s right down there, a few lights might be

significant for them to pick up, but that amount of light is not

going to get me enough to see anything on the ground.

SME-GFA: What about lighting at the point of origin compound?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: There were a few buildings there, so yea

there were probably a few lights in that village, but it wasn’t

like every----

SME-GFA: But it was lit?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Yea, there were probably a few lights in

that village but not enough so I can see anything; I couldn’t

make out the buildings or the tower that they were seeing. So

from our perspective it wasn’t much.

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SME-JSOAC: Could you ID the tower from the low-light TV? Is

that how you ID’ed the tower?

NAVIGATOR: The IR (tv) with the illum[ination] being so poor on

the night that this, for Lefty Grove, for the TV to see anything

in the narrow field of view pretty much it was essential to use

the burn. So, we really were not using the TV a whole lot for

anything other than specifically burning the HLZ; when we were

told to , at the one minute out call, any sort of flash burn to

just get oriented. So the TV was really kind of hindered by the

low illum on this night. So, that being the case, searching the

area and hopefully he will be here in a few minutes, searching

the area there was not a lot of lights to actually give us a

“hey this is a certain compound, or this is a certain series

that is on Lefty Grove.” We couldn’t readily identify anything

in particular. The other night when we flew and the

illum[ination] was great. Obviously, we could track the helos

with the light TV, we can count the compounds, track large

lights, and vehicles, all that kind of stuff without using the

burn, but just because it was zero illum that night, it was

pretty ineffective for seeing anything in particular.

SME-GFA: Could you guys see--- did you have eyes on Extortion

prior to the impact?

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 SECRET

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: No Sir, they were blacked out so I could

see the AWT moving into their position, and I knew the general

direction they were coming from, and usually we’ll have our TV

operator on the HLZ, on the infrared, and scanning around trying

to find the Helos. So, I can see the symbology in my HUD [heads

up display] and get a rough perspective on their flight path and

on good illum [inaudible] nights I can see their shadows on the

ground and that will help me get eyes on their position, so I

can help scan, but on that particular night we couldn’t see

anything. Our IR was actually on the 280-Bravo squirters, and

our TV was on the HLZ because we were trying to lock down ------

SME-GFA: One sensor down here and one on the HLZ?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Yes and the AWT were providing the escort

for Extortion.

SME-GFA: Did you guys scan these buildings at all prior to----

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: We did prior to the infil, and we didn’t

see any activity at that point. It was probably the whole span

was maybe 15 minutes from when we had eyes on the HLZ, when we

heard the quick reaction force (QRF) was going to be launched,

and this was the coordinates for the HLZ. We weren’t tasked to

do it, but we took it upon ourselves to go over there and find

the HLZ and do a scan of the area prior to the infil. So from

our perspective, we were going outside our bubble, but that is

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normally what we do, so we are happy to do it, But the helos

were on helo common and we had good communication with (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) on fires, but Extortion never came up on Fires, all

talking on their helo interplane---. So we pulled up their plan

to figure out what the plan was, and that’s the only way that we

knew where the HLZ was at and that this QRF was going in that

direction on that time line.

SME-GFN1: So you guys were detached from 1/B at this point and

up working both the squirter problem at the HLZ is that

accurate?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Yes that is accurate. We were working

both. Our primary tasking was to maintain eyes on the 280 Bravo

series squirters and that’s what we were doing, but we also knew

that an infil was coming in so we were trying to posture for

that as well.

NAVIGATOR--And we talked about this, we talked about this

yesterday, also the fact that the two squirters that initially

left the AWT engagement that we tracked almost 2 kilometers to

the northwest, since they had gone from two to five to eight

total. We perceived that as the greater threat, and there was a

large number of folks down there to the southeast and we wanted

to keep eyes on them just in case they started to flee or move

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once the helos touched down. So that was one of the main reasons

why we were locked on in the area where the 280 Bravo was.

SME-GFN1: Was that a conversation you guys had with the AH-64

pilots?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: We did, we told them we were tracking

these individuals in this compound and we put down our laser

spot so they could use their LST to get eyes on that area. We

had successfully accomplished that handover prior to them

getting on station. They were coming back from forward arming

and refueling point (FARP) when the QRF was launched ----

IO: [inaudible] [inaudible]. Was that a coded laser or anything

almost looks he used his ALT to slew to---?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: It was a 1688.

IO: He was looking around and all of sudden you would see him

kind of lock up to you.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Yes Sir, we passed our laser code and were

able to find him.

IO: Here is kind of the question here, if this is kind of,

pictorially, the ten series buildings which was Lefty Grove to

begin with, how would you articulate your orbit in order to keep

the initial objective under it? Were you basically over flying

the POO sight and stuff like that, prior to that [the crash];

cause my issue here is you guys were in the area for three hours

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AIRCRAFT COMMANDER –You bet sir

IO--right over the top of this, even though they may --- did you

ever notice the Apaches or anybody drift that way prior to

coming back from the mission?

right over the top of this,

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER : I’m not sure which way they egressed to

the FARP, but they were mainly in the objective area of Lefty

Grove for the entire night, and they were on station. It was 15

minutes from when the QRF was getting spun up to when they

actually infilled, and the helos coming back from the FARP were

in the area as well

IO: I’m sorry, say that again.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Sir, the AWT was in the area of the HLZ,

scanning around as well prior to 15 minutes----

IO: Right, but not prior to that right?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: No sir.

IO: They worked the objective, went to the FARP, and then they

actually took off about ten minutes prior, went almost direct.

And then, by me watching his forward looking infra-red (FLIR)

tape it looks like he was having difficulty identifying it and

that’s when he asked you several times, can you sparkle it, and

then he would pick it back up.

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AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: We initially tried a talk on, but then we

said “hey we can put the sparkle down” and watch then move to

the LST.

IO: Did you physically hear Extortion 17 call ‘one minute’?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: On helo common I think we did. Because we

would have known, which we heard a ‘three minute out’ call from

him, and then there was a significant pause, then we heard the

‘one minute out’ it was on helo common( communications) though,

it was not on fires. And that’s how we knew to put the burn on.

SME-JSOAC: Also, now we have the left scanner, the one that I

was talking about last night that had one unaided eye and one

monocle and the Television Sensor Operator. So these are the

other two crew members who actually saw the launch if you have

any questions for them.

SME-GFN2: I’ve got a couple of questions. I just want to back

it up to the planning, sorry I was not here yesterday; so, the

planning, was it purely via PowerPoint, or was it a telephone

call from the JTAC, or anything?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: No, it was what we call an ‘alert launch,’

so it was in a notification within an hour of takeoff. So we

were handed the products and told to launch.

SME-GFN2: So you got the products..

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER We got the COF (concept of fires) essentially

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SME-GFN2: You had the products so you had the initial

allocation, right? Who is going, the responsibilities on the

target, and the standard via the brief? Is there an SOP

(standing operating procedure) that if you move off that area

that you assume a certain responsibility, gunship has as PLO’s?

Or are you working it out in the air?

NAVIGATOR: We initially got a copy of the concept of fires,

which gave the assets that were going to be on station and their

altitude blocks, the micro and macro GRG for Lefty Grove, and

then a sensor de-confliction plan. All of those are really

entering arguments until actions on (the objective) and then the

JTAC, basically-- we take direction from the JTAC on what he

wants us to look at. After the AWT PID’d the 8 pax north of

building 110, moving westbound, and (b)(3), (b)(6) cleared them on

the 8 pax, we requested immediately to go overhead and that was

so that if anybody actually left the engagement site, we would

be able to track them. Which is exactly what we did; we passed

down immediately to (b)(3), (b)(6) that we had two of the pax from

the engagement site squirting to the northwest. He told us to

maintain track, and then I believe he talked to the ground force

commander and we were pushing to try to engage, since these guys

had already been PID’d hostile and engaged them with AWT. We

were trying to get 40mm to engage these two squirters and the

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JTAC came back and said that ground force commander had elected

to use that as a follow on (action), rather than engage those

guys. So, maintain track on the two squirters that we found and

that’s when we were able to….280 (280 refers to the specific

group of squirters they were tracking).

SME-GFN2: Gotcha.

NAVIGATOR: So, we maintained track all the way out up to 2

kilometers and like we talked about yesterday, what is the

ground force commander thinking? We are thinking about that in

the aircraft, at that point they were too far away to logically

go and interdict those two squirters on foot, so that’s when we

believe the idea of the IRF and QRF was brought up.

SME-GFN2: Ok, so just adding on to that question. So, all of

sudden, was there a definite FRAGO on the IRF being infilled or

was this kind of something that you are kind of figuring out as

you were going along.

NAVIGATOR: Figuring, we were figuring it out as we went along.

SME_GFN2: So, there was no distinct ‘this is what’s going to

happen, this is the HLZ they’re going to.’ ---

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: From (b)(3), (b)(6) ? No. Yea he said they

were going to launch QRF for a follow-on, but all the

coordination was on helo common to figure out where that HLZ

was going to occur. If the EWO (Electronic Warfare

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SECRET

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Officer) was here, there was some MIRC traffic going back as

well from like (b)(3), (b)(6) ,[another voice said yep] it was also

verifying that the grids for the HLZ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cfor the QRF.

SME-GFN2: So you were, you mention that you were tasked to

light up HLZ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

, who tasked you to do that?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: The helo Extortion flight.

SME-GFN2: Extortion, ok, so did you have positive sat comms on

a sat check with (b)(3), (b)(6) , as it was waiting to launch on the

IRF?

NAVIGATOR: We had comms with hem on Fires. We had them on FD-2,

they were on their way in, I don’t know how far out it was. He

was trying to reach (b)(3), (b)(6) on FD-3, but was not getting

them. So, he talked to me and he was asking us to relay to

(b)(3), (b)(6) that they were going to shift to FD-2 primary,

because FD-3 wasn’t working. So I relayed to (b)(3), (b)(6) : ‘hey

we are going to stay on FD-2, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) 3 are both

going to be on the same fires net once they get on the ground.’

So, that message was passed, but we definitely did have good

comms with (b)(3), (b)(6) prior to them to ingress into the area.

SME-GFN1: But he never passed any specific instructions for you

guys?

NAVIGATOR: No Sir.

SME-JSOAC: Do you normally monitor helo common?

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NAVIGATOR: Yes sir, if the radio is available.

SME-GFA: So you guys are tracking the 280 squirters with one

sensor on them that was tasked by JTAC, or is that part of the

COF [concept of fires]?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: It was initially part of COF for us to

track----

SME-GFA: Because (b)(3), (b)(6) was the primary squirter right? Or you

guys?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: They were the warden, so they were

maintaining eyes on the objective area and we were tasked to do

the first squirters, which was the 280. So we maintained track

on them and then if they had anything additional outside of

that. So, that was our task via the COF, but then it was also

tasked via (b)(3), (b)(6) to maintain eyes those individuals.

SME-GFA: So the 280 becomes a group of up to 13 pax and in tree

line areas?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Well yea, you can see the whole path, the

whole time line, on how many pax they pick up, and where they

pick them up, starts from that first page right there. So you

can see the initial AWT engagement. [referencing the AC-130

graphics during the discussion]

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SME-GFA: So they engaged five--- like eight pax at this point

kill six, two keep going and a couple more come out of the 280

series.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Well no there is not even a 280 series; we

just label these the 280.

NAVIGATOR- Yea, the JTAC actually labeled them 280 just because

they were going northwest.

SME-GFA: Ok got it, so that’s a follow on label?

NAVIGATOR: Yes sir.

SME-GFA: Ok.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: And there is the time line, they proceed

down this road---

NAVIGATOR actually they were moving tactically through the trees

here the whole time.

SME_GFA: And the crowd continues to build as they go along?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: You’ve got it; here they pick up two more,

they move to three, move to five and you can see the time stamps

on their route

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: [inaudible] [paper rattling]

compound they were waiting on the outside and people would come

out and meet up with them and run, and tactically move again and

they were hiding under a bridge at one point and then more pax

met up with them , I think that were ----

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SME-GFA: Did you guys see weapons, did you get PID on the

weapons?

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: No we didn’t see any PID weapons.

SME-GFA: So --somehow you find out that the IRF is spinning up,

but you never knew what the actual mission of the IRF was?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: to interdict the squirters is what we

assessed.

SME-GFA: So you got that?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Yes sir.

SME-JSOAC: But that was not given to you, you assessed that

through your internal cockpit comms.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: It was all moving in that direction because

the JTAC, (b)(3), (b)(6) , when these guys were farther and farther

west into the north, we say ‘ok, they’re going to use these as a

follow on objective.’ So, that’s the only positive

communication and we knew, ‘ok they are going to launch and what

we have seen in the past they will launch someone else to go and

interdict these squirters.’ I don’t know if it was ”Okay

attention on the net, this QRF is launching to interdict these

squirters, here is the TOT ---

SME-GFA: You say you don’t know that ?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: That was not broadcast but what was

broadcast over the net was that we are going to use this as a

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follow-on objective and then on helo common we start picking up.

Ok, this is what’s going on, (b)(3), (b)(6) traffic for the Team

(b)(3), (b)(6) on that objective---

SME-GFA: is who?
(b)(3), (b)(6)

SME-GFN1: is the (TF) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c officer.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: And that traffic was spinning up, saying

‘ok, these guys are going to this HLZ,’ but I think we’ve got

the MIRC logs.

IO: At the time of the aircraft downing, you had the pax count

at 8, is that right?

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Sir, yea there was 8 in the tree

line ,

NAVIGATOR: They stopped underneath; the terrain here is actually

pretty significant, probably about a 20ft drop off from the road

down to the tree line where they stopped. When we came back to

these guys, we initially passed them off to (b)(3), (b)(6) , they

maintained eyes on in the area, we came back this was after the

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c element moved to interdict the 1/A/1 and 1/A/2

squirters. Those were the additional squirters that were in the

area, we basically swapped sensors with (b)(3), (b)(6) . So, we went

looking for the 1/A/1 and 1/A/2 and (b)(3), (b)(6) had the 280 squirters.

After (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c pushed through]

IO: Incidentally, did they ever find and/or engage them?

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TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Negative, sir.

IO: Negative? I didn’t think so. Okay. So, (b)(3), (b)(6) , at this

point now, is watching the eight MAMs [military age males] in

the elbow of the road --

NAVIGATOR: Yes, sir.

IO: -- in the tree line.

NAVIGATOR: Yes, sir.

IO: Okay.

NAVIGATOR: When we brought our sensor back, IR got on the

position and we watched three of the 280 squirters move off to

the west and then up to the north to this next compound; this

next little village up there. That’s when we labeled them 280B,

so the 280A was still a group of five --

IO: --five?

NAVIGATOR: Right; and then the 280B went up to these buildings;

this big one right here and then there was another small

building off to the west.

IO: Okay, and where was this pole like object that was

referenced?

NAVIGATOR: [Looking through documents.] The 280B squirters

were down here about 500 meters to the southeast of HLZ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

and the turret that we saw --

IO: I’m with you –OK, I understand

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NAVIGATOR: -- where the people were was much closer to where

the crash site was --

IO: I’m absolutely clear.

SME-GFA: (b)(3), (b)(6) was looking at something in the wood

line. Do you guys have any idea what they were looking at?

SME-GFN1: He said there looked like there was something --

SME_GFA: There’s a tower. It’s sitting in the middle of the

trees.

SME-GFN1: -- like a tower in the wood line.

NAVIGATOR: Which line were you looking at?

SME-GFA: I don’t know. You look at the feed, it was all in

lat/long. But, it looked like a group of trees with a tower and

--

NAVIGATOR: We never saw that.

SME-GFA: It looked like a big turret kind of tower. So, did

somebody tell you to go look at HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

? I think you said

they did; right?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Well, no. Not specifically.

IO: Did you take it as an implied task to be prepared to burn

HLZ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: That’s normally what we do, and that’s why

we establish COMs with the helos prior to their infil, when we

hear they are spinning-up and we asked them, “would you like us

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to put the burn down,” and they said “affirmative, one minute

out,” we said “we got it.”

SME-GFA: Did you guys get a launch time, a TOT (time on target)

time?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: We got a TOT, and the original TOT –

NAVIGATOR-in the initial traffic we were passed the grid for HLZ

(b)(3), (b)(6) as it’s depicted on the product, sir: VC8067064160. We

were passed: “There’s 30 PAX. 280 land heading on HLZ (b)(3), (b)(6) ,

GU2 is going to be the primary JTAC on that bird.” The initial

infil time we were passed was 2150Z and they were going to be

operating on FD3. So, like we talked about, there were

significant delays getting Extortion into the HLZ. I talked

with (b)(3), (b)(6) about the issue with (b)(3), (b)(6). We pushed everybody to (b)(3), (b)(6)
,

so that was no longer an issue.

SME-GFA: You talked to (b)(3), (b)(6) when?

IO: I’m sorry, say --

NAVIGATOR: That was while they were in bound.

SME-GFA: In bound?

IO: Say the original TOT again.

NAVIGATOR: The original TOT that we were passed was 2150.

IO: Okay and 2209 --

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: This is an important fact too, in my mind,

was the initial run-in – let’s see

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IO: -- Right, it’s about a 120, but you said he was going to

land 280?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Right, they were originally going to come

in something like this and it ended up -- We saw their feed,

their BFT tracker and they’re initially coming here, and then

they’re like, “well, I don’t know what’s going through,” you

know their comms but they end up coming through and switching

it.

IO: Did you know that? Or, did you assume that based on a land

heading of 280 because the route did take them out to northwest,

and Chalk 2, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c did fall off at the six-minute point,

approximately, entered left hand holding oriented toward that

objective, but lead continued around with the intent to land

280? My understanding was that he was going to approach from

the northwest, make a pedal turn and --

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: We did not get that from the flight. We

assumed with their landing heading that they would be coming in

from that direction, so --

SME-JSOAC: But you were tracking their BFTs as they [inaudible]

--

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: No, we weren’t.

SME-JSOAC: You were not?

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AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: This is after the fact, because we were

like, “Why was there that large delay,” because we heard them

call 3 minutes out, and then we’re like, okay, we’ve got like 2

minutes before the call for the burn and there was a significant

amount of time. Several minutes had passed from when we

anticipated hearing that ‘one minute out’ call. We had a

discussion whether or not to call the helos and see what the

delay was. We’re like, “Well, they could be in a critical phase

of flight here. We don’t want to bug them. We’ll see what

boils down. We’ll give them a little more time.” Then, we

heard the ‘one minute out’ call and then we but the burn down

[inaudible].

SME-GFN1: Now, there was some discussion -- people questioning,

whether there was a request for a burn or a sparkle much earlier

than one minute out. Do you guys -- can you guys speak about

that?

IO: I think the request for sparkle was actually the (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) elements that where asking to sparkle it and that was so

they could slew their TADs --

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: to the 280 Bravos. Yes, sir.

SME-GFN1: Okay.

IO: Actually, it was to slew their TADs to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. As they

came back out they asked for sparkle and you can see it in their

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TADs they’re searching for it. They asked to sparkle and he

locks up on what I presume to be your --

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: -- our laser.

SME-GFA: Any COMs traffic with GU2? Any taskers in there or is

it just COMs check type stuff --

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: This is a COM check -- he was having

difficulty talking to (b)(3), (b)(6) just in general and I think

that was probably due to terrain and -- at the altitude we were

at we had good COMs (communication) with him. The only thing

that he had asked us to do was to make sure that (b)(3), (b)(6)

knew that we were going to be operating on FD2. So both JTACs

were on the same freq when they got on the ground.

SME-GFA: But your understanding was you’re getting tasked from

GU2 once it hit the ground?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: We’ve -- Yeah -- I don’t remember exactly

who was going to be tasked to which JTAC. I know the discussion

was had, but I can’t remember exactly who (b)(3), (b)(6) --

how they had worked out the allocation of assets.

SME-GFA: I guess going back to the post-RPG launch. Did you

guys put out a net call, “Hey POO, did you slew a sparkle to

that area?”

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: [inaudible] -- we told them. Yes, sir --

that there was -- we had RPGs.

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NAVIGATOR: Yeah, AWT immediately called it on the helo common

and then we got our sensors in the area. And initially, when the

IR moved to the location of the crash, personally it was -- the

strength of an idea. I didn’t believe that was a helicopter

because there was nothing. It was just a fire ball. So, we

kept searching in the area, and then finally went back to it,

and realized that yes, that was actually the helicopter and then

on the AWT tape you can hear about 20 seconds after the helo

actually went down is when I told (b)(3), (b)(6) that Extortion had

been hit by an RPG.

SME-GFA: Yeah, I guess the reason I’m asking is because AH’s

(attack helicopter) is saying POO in this area up here. You

guys are saying down here --

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: We saw them engage right away.

SME-GFA: Yeah, I mean, he shot his gun [inaudible] up here

pretty quickly, but I think they were tracking all along for

both the POO from this area right here and I’m just --

IO: You’re absolutely right. That’s what he kept articulating

yesterday. You guys were clear on the tape, it was on a turret

type building, and as a matter of fact, after he had made his

shots and he continues to work the area, you can see him begin

to pick up on that and he starts looking at the turret area very

specifically.

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NAVIGATOR: And, part of that too is Striker asked us were we,

We told (b)(3), (b)(6) that we could laze again to get his eyes on

the activity that we were seeing, that I talked about earlier,

down there in the bottom level of that three-to-four story

building. When we looked in this area that was the only

activity we actually saw. We didn’t see anything up and around

here, but there is definitely eight to ten people in the bottom

level of that building, you know, moving back and forth between

buildings, coming together to talk, moving around. Which goes

into, also, as we were sitting there we were watching the MIRC

traffic-- we got the (b)(3), (b)(6) , was getting chatter

that the folks on the ground were looking to attack the downed

Helo. That’s in the MIRC logs as well.

SME-GFA: This is what we are -- I think the JTAC, (b)(3), (b)(6) ,

eventually labeled 1A group of folks; right?

NAVIGATOR: I believe so.

SME-GFA: We were talking about a group of folks 500 meters to

the west of the crash site.

NAVIGATOR: That was our initial call and I believe that at that

time our INS point, which is just basically where the aircraft

was orbiting around, was actually on the HLZ and was actually

reading the distance from the HLZ to the –POO site

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SME-GFA: I think someone came on and clarified that it was

actually south of the crash site.

NAVIGATOR: Right; and I believe that (b)(3), (b)(6) (ref. A-10

Thunderbolt Aircraft ---nickname (b)(3), (b)(6) ) was the one that

actually clarified. We were tracking the crash site. We were

tracking the POO and with everything that was going on. All the

activity that we were watching on the ground with the folks,

that was a misspeak on my part, but we were definitely in

contact with both-- the supposed POO-site and the crash site.

MSE-GFA: When did (b)(3), (b)(6) come on station?

NAVIGATOR: 45 minutes to an hour after the helo went down.

IO: And who is that?

IE: [several speakers]. (b)(3), (b)(6) . (A-10 aircraft)

SME-GFN2- Did you ask them to come over?

NAVIAGTOR: I believe that was all worked through G87 and

through the Task Force. To get assets on-station. Basically,

we didn’t request anybody. We were passing all the information

that we were seeing and then the C2 elements were working on

getting more folks

SME-GFA: Okay, so from your guys’ crew who all saw the three

RPGs?

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: I saw one of them, sir.

IO: I’m sorry?

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TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: I saw one of them.

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Yes, sir, because I was burning the

LZ at the time and the pilot said that he saw the two RPGs. I

slewed over to his HUD, which I just went dead nuts, pretty

much, that’s zero in my azimuth at -20 in elevation and my

sensor, which puts him directly where his HUD is looking and I

saw the helo was already on the deck. a big fire ball already

and the third RPG came in from the POO site and it went straight

over the helo and it looked like they were just putting off

another round just to ensure that they got the helo, or

whatever. But, as soon as I did that the IR slaved to me and he

saw individuals on the roof handing objects down to the second

level, and they started heading down to the second level, and

they were all running around the compound, moving in between

buildings erratically. I mean they were running in between the

compounds and all that, and that’s when AWT put suppressive fire

out there.

SME-INTEL: Sir, that’s consistent with the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was that

one individual said that he could not shoot as quickly, but yet

again two shots were fired, then he shot again when he was

supposed to be -- he was on the radio but he was called to fire—

to engage

SME-GFA: Who picked up that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ?

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SME-INTEL: I don’t know who picked it up specifically, but it’s

from the message traffic from the MIRC [inaudible].

IO: You got it documented?

SME-INTEL: Yes, sir. It is. I have it.

IO: Can you guys talk us through a little bit of the confusion

here then for the launch of the Pathfinder element?

NAVIGATOR: We had heard on, I believe it was SAT, that the

Pathfinder element was ready to infil on (b)(3), (b)(6) t, but were being

held. I don’t believe we actually ever got a launch call,

however, we did see the IR strobe of the (b)(3), (b)(6) flight coming

up from the southeast towards HLZ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

. This was already after

the --

IO: --(b)(3), (b)(6) element. Right. The 1B.

NAVIGATOR: Yeah, the Rangers moved up. They basically came up

here almost due east of the crash site and then cut across this

field. They were already -- The majority of the Rangers on the

ground were in the vicinity of the crash site by the time

(b)(3), (b)(6) came into the area. Basically, we watched (b)(3), (b)(6) come

in and land.

IO: And you think he landed where?

NAVIGATOR: I believe it was in this general area of HLZ(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

,

but even after we watched the Pathfinder get out of the

helicopter and we could see them, but we had absolutely no

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contact with them and were unsure if the assault force on the

ground actually had contact with the Pathfinders either.

IO: Did you quickly understand though that they were relaying

through the AWT? They had commo with them.

NAVIGATOR: No. No, sir. I did not.

IO: In fact, they would have been talking to them on Fires.

NAVIGATOR: We never heard (b)(3), (b)(6) or the Pathfinders on Fires,

sir, on FD2

IO: Okay.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: We had CSAR-A (combat search and rescue-

afghanistan) up as well. I heard nothing -- no traffic on that.

We were trying to pull up any frequency that we think they might

have been on and we didn’t have any joy

SME-GFA: As the on-scene commander, they are required to check

in with you guys; check-in and check-out; right?

IO: I don’t think they could have known that yet.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Yeah, they probably didn’t know that we had

established that, but I don’t know [inaudible] --

SME-GFN1: Only the people that were COMs with you at the time

would have known that unless it got passed positively --

[inaudible] [several people talking]

SME-GFA: But this is –

SME-JSOAC: Was there a ROZ established at this point?

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AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Not for that particular site. There was

still a ROZ Lefty Grove.

SME-INTEL: Quick question, was (b)(3), (b)(6) on target?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Yeah, I’m trying to remember what time they

checked off

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: They were on for the majority of Lefty

Grove and at one point they checked out. I can’t --

SME-INTEL: They checked out and then (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ) came

in after?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: I remember (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c came in after the crash.

SME-MH47: As all these forces started flowing in sir, what

happened to the building, the cylinder building and the

personnel there? Did you see them move out?

NAVIGATOR: They stayed in the main building, and as time

progressed there was less activity going on inside thjose

buildings. So initially after the RPG shots they were moving

around very quickly having small meetings and then moving around

mor,e and then even as we continued to watch through the night,

you know it started to slow down two hours after the crash and

when we actually departed station.

IO: What could we do better?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: I think the coordination for the infil

could have definitely gone better. I think knowing what the

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plan was and who was going to be looking at what. We had a lot

of assets on Lefty Grove, still; they were conducting a call-out

on the 60 series, so I think the de-confliction between what

assets were going to go over here and what assets were going to

stay on Lefty Grove to facilitate that call-out. That

coordination probably could have gone better -- could have been

better and I think -- I’m not sure, it just appeared to us the

whole plan for getting into this area was rushed, I guess. I

don’t know if that’s the case, but that’s kind of one thing that

I thought might have been done a little bit better.

NAVIGATOR: One of the other things that we did talk about --

kind of what you’re hitting on, sir, is about the fact that, you

know, for three hours we had been burning holes in the sky.

You’ve got AWT flying around, so there’s a lot of noise going on

and basically, this entire valley knows that there’s something

happening in this area. So, to do an infil on the X or Y, you

know, having that element of surprise in the beginning of an

operation is good, but by the time we’ve been there for three

hours, and the party’s up, bringing in another air craft like

that, you know, may not be the most tactically sound decision.

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: At this point, (b)(3), (b)(6) already

sent a team to interdict those two squirters down by his

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position and they never found them. I mean, that’s an issue

right there.

IO: I’m sorry, say that one more time.

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: (b)(3), (b)(6) sent the team down by

the Lefty Grove objective --

SME-GFA: That was the 1A1, 1A2 squirters.

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: -- yeah (b)(3), (b)(6) is tracking two

individuals. One was wounded, the other one was taking care of

him and then once they sent a team out to interdict those

individuals, they took contact from them, but they never found

them. The team went and searched for them. They found their

hold-up site in a tree line with motos (ref. motorcycles), cell

phones, bed rolls, everything like that. But they never found

those individuals. So, there were still two individuals at that

point out there that they knew were hostile, still had weapons

and still had the intent of engaging the friendlies at that

point, from what we saw in the back because they had already

took contact from them. Not only that, but they engaged the

individuals in the beginning, you know, and they are all PID’d

with weapons. It’s just didn’t feel comfortable to us to bring

another helo in, especially not having a ground team down there

securing an LZ for them.

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AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: To the ‘X’ -- you know, when the original

Op was to an off-set essentially, to hike in on foot to the

objective for the element of surprise and you’re bringing in a

Helo, essentially an X to these squirters that we we’re tracking

after we’d been there for three hours. I think that’s what

we’re getting at.

NAVIGATOR: I think also, too, going back, the original

engagement with the AWT, they had PID all eight of those

individuals hostile. We tracked two off, and the fact that we

were tracking them the entire way -- two clicks. There were

several opportunities where we could have engaged with 40MM

ensuring 0 CDE (Collateral Damage Estimate) on any buildings.

The opportunity was definitely there for us to engage those two

guys or even provide containment fires to try to slow their

movement. I think that that was also probably [inaudible] --

IO: Did you ask to engage them?

NAVIGATOR: Yes, sir.

IO: And it was denied by 2-3; right?

NAVIGATOR: Yes, sir.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: I think he spoke with (b)(3), (b)(6) , the Ground

Force Commander and he said, “No. No-go. Just maintain eyes-

on.”

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TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: At one point, too, we also tried to

get (b)(3), (b)(6) eyes back on them to re-PID them and (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) didn’t want to do that because he didn’t want to burn those

individuals because he knew he was going to bring the QRF to

engage those individuals.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-JSOAC: They are linguists that fly on just to listen in.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: And that was one thing that may have

facilitated figuring out all the activity that was in the area,

because these guys had moved off target quite a ways --

IO: But (b)(3), (b)(6) was on the target. Is there a different asset

that you have that allows him to do that?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Well, let’s see. We’ve got (b)(3), (b)(6) ,

that’s up there that can monitor that stuff and I don’t know

what traffic they were pushing.

SME-INTEL: Sir, the issue would be is the (b)(3), (b)(6) allows them

real-time intel versus having to process it back [in the rear].

IO: Okay, my bad.

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TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Okay, most of the time, too, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) what they’re usually tasked to do is just to put buzzer on

so individuals can’t do push-to-talk or GSM or anything like

that.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: But it seems like there’s a lot of

coordination going on in the area. So, with these individuals

who were monitoring and then another group that --

IO: What was the LIMFAC on you guys having that guy up with you

that night?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Just availability and then resource

allocation. A lot of them are going to just -- assets for re-

supply missions on our M28s that are going into different areas

and that’s one of the primary defenses [inaudible] --

TELEVISION SENSOR OPERATOR: Because right now we’re sharing two

DSOs for our asset, the Talons, and then the Whiskeys down in

Kandahar.

SME-JSOAC: The M28s are a new small air lift platform, unarmed,

that goes around and resupplies the VSO sites. So having the

DSOs on board there is really about Aircraft Survivability

Equipment listening in so that’s why they probably allocated it

on the M28.

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: That would be a nice asset to have onboard.

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IE: -- [inaudible] so, it couldn’t have got on the air craft

anyway. There’s only three DSOs here.

SME-MH47: The TOT you had was 2150 initially? Was that ever

updated or did it just go event-driven?

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: It was updated. They actually passed -- I

think it ended up being 2210.

IO: Okay, it’s going to be pretty close to 2210.

NAVIGATOR: Yes, sir.

SME-INTEL: When you said three DSOs available, is that for all

Afghanistan?

IE: No, three DSOs available to CJSOAC (Combined Joint Special

Operations Aviation Command) here, and there are about three or

four down at Kandahar and then you have your TSO and possible

some manual capability on the U-28s but I’m not sure about that.

[The interview was concluded]

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The interview of (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) opened at 14

Zulu, 20 August 2011, via video t nce from FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
.

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD: BG J. Colt, US Army

LEGAL ADVISOR: LA

GROUND FORCE A SME: SME-GFA

GROUND FORCE N1 SME SME-GFN1

GROUND FORCE N2 SME SME-GFN2

COURT REPORTER: CR2

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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LA: And you’re the (b)(3), (b)(6) ?

: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) , also sir

Delta Company 1/75.

LA: Thank you, it will be another minute while I get this

mic (microphone) set up.

LA: Alright gentlemen, you all know that this is high

visibility so obviously we got a General Officer appointed duty
investigation by CENTCOM to make sure we have all the I’s dotted
and the T’s crossed and our report is going to be as accurate
and complete and unlikely to be second guessed by bunch of folks
outside the military. We want to make sure that everyone is
sworn to the record, so I’m going to ask you to go ahead and
raise your right hand and tell me I do or I don’t based what I’m
about to ask you. Go ahead and raise your right hand please.
Do you swear that the statement that you provide be true and
accurate to best of your knowledge and belief?

(b)(3), (b)(6) : Both say “I do”.

LA: Roger and thank you very much.

BG Colt: Could you please begin with an explanation of when

you were alerted and then if you would then walk us through your
actions with response to the aircraft shoot down of Extortion
17.

The night the aircraft was shot down my first Platoon Delta Company from Team(b)(3), (b)(6)was
(b)(3), (b)(6)

out on a mission on the border of name Nangarhar/Laghman Provinces we were out on target
simultaneously as the Team(b)(3), (b)(6)platoon was and both elements were troops in contact, both working
fire missions clearing through enemy engagement areas, so I was tracking some of their activities going
on, on a SAT net as we were reporting up, however about half way through the operation I was told to
begin reporting all SAT net that would terminate with (b)(3), (b)(6) [ (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, instead of TF in(b)(3), (b)(6)].
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Something we have never done in our entire rotation everything typically drawn to ATLAS 14 or G01
there at Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c s [in FOB ]. So something was definitely up at that point,
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

however we were still in contact filtering through and then we were given the call to conduct exfill as
quickly as possible and not to worry about conducting SSE on the engagement site which also something
entirely unlikely and unusual for us. Typically that is always the case we will go through and conduct the
SSE around the on those areas. So something was definitely up at this point in time though we were, we
were not aware of what was happening, but we conducted a daylight exfill on the morning of 6 August,
it was probably about 0200, 0230 somewhere in that timeframe. As we were sitting in PZ posture we

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were talking to some of the air assets specifically the Viper the fixed wing and they alerted us that there
was a, we had inquired, “hey what is going on with Team(b)(3), (b)(6)we heard they were in contact and some
stuff was going on”, they alerted us and said, “yeah roger, there is a downed aircraft and they were
working the recovery [and trying to develop] the picture on the ground at that time. From there we
conducted exfill on the THUNDER flight from , picked us up at about 0230 on 6 August. En-route
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

back the THUNDER flight lead kind of gave us the quick debrief on Team(b)(3), (b)(6), correction; Team(b)(3), (b)(6)
was out on target and made contact, called in QRF as they found multiple squirters. Only that QRF
aircraft Extortion 17 was shot down. The initial report was they were looking to infil a Ranger platoon,
then they had made mention that our Thunder Package may drop us off(b)(1)1.4a, at (b)(1)1.4c
and then push down to
(b)(3), (b)(6)to support, at that point we offered, “hey anything we can do to help, have no idea what’s going

on, on the ground really, but let us know”.

BG Colt: Can you describe what a THUNDER Package is please?

: Roger Sir, a THUNDER Package is

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a from ARSOA.

BG Colt: OKAY, thank you, we will ask some more clarifying

questions later, thanks, continue.

: Yes sir, so then we offered our services

(b)(3), (b)(6)

letting them know if there is anything we can do to help, that

we would be more than happy to. We returned to base here at FOB
, linked in with Team
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6) and of course, as soon as
we got out of the bus and got back on the camp we started
getting the reports and began monitoring ISR and all SAT traffic
trying to get up to speed on everything that was happening.

BG Colt: Any question at this point?

IO: The THUNDER call signs what are they?

: Sir, the THUNDER flight lead is THUNDER(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) ,
the AMC is THUNDER(b)(3), (b)(6)
, and the other two aircraft are THUNDER(b)(3), (b)(6)
and THUNDER(b)(3), (b)(6)
.

IO: Okay, thank you.

(b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir

BG Colt: It’s a quick follow up question, can I ask what

was your situation awareness was or what you think the team
situational awareness was with regard to the red element or 1/B

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element that was up here? Listing to SAT traffic did you think
they were in contact and in need or urgent need of an IRF?

(b)(3), (b)(6): No Sir, really the only person that would have
been monitoring it was myself and the RTO, I was on the SAT net
for the majority of the operation again because we were in
contact so I was trying to feed the SITREPS as clearly and
concisely and quickly as possible, but no, there wasn’t any
apparent need for an IRF in the fact that the red element there
at (b)(3), (b)(6) was in any sort of imminent danger, that they were
being overrun or anything of that nature, no sir.

BG Colt: OKAY, Can you describe how you were activated and
in ultimately inserted in support of the downed aircraft please.

: Roger sir, we came back from the mission,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

again we could continue to monitor, and get updates get the best
picture we could. We completed post mission products and
requirements from our mission. We were told at that point, there
was going to be an element from team (b)(3), (b)(6) that would be inserted
to conduct the relief-in-place of 1/B at a time undetermined, we
didn’t know at that point in time whether if it was going to be
us or 1 Troop from(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
. So we completed all of our
requirements. We got a few hours of sleep, probably four hours
of sleep or so and then at a point somebody came and got me and
woke me up and said you guys have been notified you are going to
be the element to go and relieve 1/B at the crash site. You need
to get up and get spinning on this.

BG Colt: OKAY, could you talk us through the actual infil

and the relief in place please?

(b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes sir, we came from(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

flew down to FOB
conducted a link-up with the EOD element from Sharana as
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

well as the CSAR package. From there we stood by for about an

hour as the THUNDER –the same THUNDER flight that had been
bringing us around the last few days, went and picked up the
remains and returned them back to FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c . As soon as the
remains were clear of the ramp on the THUNDER flight, we loaded
up, we took our entire assault force and we conducted an infil
to the Northeast about 3 kilometers on the ridge line. It was a
night time infil about a 3 km movement…..BG Colt: talking.

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BG Colt: Points of clarification then, Lift one into the

vicinity of the crash site in an offset was EOD and CSAR by
themselves and they also back hauled the remains. Can you just
clarify that for me please?

: Sir, there was only one lift that conducted

(b)(3), (b)(6)

infil for that relief-in-place. The EOD and CSAR elements were
co-located with my platoon. They were attached to us throughout
the duration of the operation, conducting infil and exfill with
us.

BG Colt: Can you tell me what the composition of the CSAR

package was please?

: Roger sir, they had one CCT and three PJ’s.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Four total PAX (passengers).

BG Colt: Okay thank you, can you continue then? After you
got boots on the ground, can you articulate the time and actions
thereafter?

: Sir, I don’t have an exact time in front of me

(b)(3), (b)(6)

when we actually got boots on the ground. I know it took us just

over an hour, about an hour and fifteen to walk in, conduct
link-up with the 1/B leadership there. We conducted link-up in
vicinity of the bridge that was our link-up point in this
village. And then their (b)(3), (b)(6) t walked us in, he and
(b)(3), (b)(6) had known each for quite some time. We
conducted link-up, he walked us in and we dropped off our squads
kind of ducks in a row as we walked in we dropped off a squad as
we went and the headquarters element moved right to the CP for a
debriefing on where the crash site was and what bases to work.

BG Colt: Okay and when you did that infil was that a zero
illumination dark walk-in?

(b)(3), (b)(6) : Yeah, Roger sir.

BG Colt: Okay, can you characterize or articulate any of

the conversation regarding how they found the crash site when
they first arrived?

: What we were briefed they came up on the crash

(b)(3), (b)(6)

site and they found the main hull was burning in the Wadi from

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there they kind of just pushed out their security positions.

When we showed up on the site, they briefed us on two different
locations the crash material and the crash site material, which
was later to be identified as Alpha and Bravo.

BG Colt: At any time did anybody in the hand off ever elude
to the possibility that there were IR beacons or strobes on when
they first arrived at the crash site?

: No sir, no one made mention of any IR beacons

(b)(3), (b)(6)

or strobes when they arrived.

BG Colt: Just for your edification --- this is kind of a

spurious report we are trying to dispel, but I appreciate your
candid and honest answer to that. Can we characterize it that
you arrived after or before the flash flood occurred?
(b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, we arrived after the flash flood.

BG Colt: Okay, any questions from you guys? Can you

continue to talk us through your actions on until your exfill
please? And if you would also characterize any of the local
exchanges or interaction and if you ever or any of your soldiers
ever had any kind of warning shots fired, thank you.

: Yes sir, as we conducted relief from replacing

(b)(3), (b)(6)

1/B, they continued to walk us through all their security

positions, we then assumed the role of those security positions.
Once we were 100 percent their men pulled off the line and moved
back toward the CP. Like I said before, the leadership took us
to the two crash site locations that they were aware of,
(b)(3), (b)(6) and myself as well as the CSAR leadership and
the EOD tech from Team (b)(3), (b)(6) that was with us, showed us where
those locations were at, so we were tracking. From there, first
priority was security and then immediately got the CSAR team to
work with their saws that was the first thing that they did,
they moved up to site Bravo specifically and started cutting as
much as they could while we still had the cover of darkness. No
interaction from the population during this period of darkness
whatsoever, no shots were fired, we were only there for a few
hours at this point until the sun came up and then we began the
period of daylight. And from here sir, it was a lot of the
same, just continued to cut with CSAR until their batteries were

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depleted. We maintained security; we rotated our men on the

security line down into the Wadi, at this point I think it was
still just above knee deep, we were wading into the Wadi trying
to pull out as many pieces (of the aircraft) as we could. We
found several portions of human remains, within the Wadi and
then just adjacent to the Wadi and in some of the trees and all
the terraces. So (b)(3), (b)(6) and I personally headed that
mission up – we walked around, we had a few bags and we policed
up every bit of human remains that we could possibly find in
that area. At this point really the only significant, not
really any significant interaction with the local populace,
there was the occasional local Afghan that would walk up and try
to see what was going on. We did have our Afghan (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
, we had seven of them with us we had them at the friction
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

points which was primarily down south on the Wadi by the bridge
so they could interdict any kind of, deter anyone from coming
too close to the crash site.

BG Colt: I don’t know if you are familiar with some of the

media reports, but how would you characterize the access of any
of the locals to potential wreckage in the debris field and
anything on that line of thought, please?

: Yes sir, I saw the report a couple of days

(b)(3), (b)(6)

after that really infuriated me. From the time we showed up on

the crash to when we left 72 hours later there was absolutely
zero local interface or any interaction with any crash site
materials - none whatsoever.

SME-GFA: So when you guys got there, you relieved 1/B and
Pathfinders were still onsite, correct?
(b)(3), (b)(6) : That is correct Sir.

SME-GFA: And correct me if I’m wrong, but the (b)(3), (b)(6)

element had some outside security is that true?

: Roger sir, they still had the outer cordon,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

they didn’t have any folks right on top of the wreckage or just
outside for security purpose. They were in the villages
primarily in their vehicles, at night the BSO remained in their
vehicles, they really only kind of came out during the daytime
at which point (b)(3), (b)(6) would come down on occasion, conduct

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link-up with myself and kind of review priorities and they had
some welders that eventually came in, that I requested, both
welders did a great job and then they rotated a lot of their
junior guys through carrying litters, just humping the equipment
out.

BG Colt: Are one of you guys going to ask him about that
the building that we think the POO was? [directed to the
panelists]

SME-GFA: When we talked to AC-130 pilots yesterday, they

are pretty fairly certain they know where the point of origin of
RPG shot was. Did you guys get any information on that and do
you have any information whether that building was cleared or
not?

: Gentlemen, talking to my team leader and squad

(b)(3), (b)(6)

leader that were adjacent to where that suspected RPG fin was
at, they went over, kind of identified that it was in the
vicinity of one of the locations to the southwest where
Pathfinder element was holding security. He started going
around checking squad leaders kind ’a going up to them to see
what they were looking at and recognizing out there. Taking
picture of it and documented its location with the grid off the
Garmin [GPS]. The adjacent buildings to it had already been
searched on the beginning daylight cycle on that first day we
were out there to confirm or not whether or not if there any
locals in the vicinity and yet that building was uninhabited and
nothing else significant to report from that building sir.

SME=GFA: Since we don’t have a common graphic that we can

all look at, the AC-130 crew believes it was a building almost
directly to the south of the crash site that had a couple of
significant towers on it, does that ring a bell?

: No sir, I can’t say that it does ring a bell

(b)(3), (b)(6)

to be honest with you.

SME-GFA: Okay, I think kind of what we are kind of digging

into I believe is whether that information was passed down to
any of the ground elements and anybody given a task to go and
clear and search that building, doesn’t sound like that happened
though, or at least with you guys.

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: That’s correct sir, like

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

mentioned that the fin there was of significance. We think two

compounds in the vicinity of this, the crash site and that’s in
our Clamshell/EXSUM there. One of our security positions in our
squad was up on some high terrain; they identified the bag and
seated in their position, found out upon further investigation
with EOD that was an RPG initiation system, an initiation
device. So we confiscated that, secured it, and then cleared the
two compounds that it was kind of sitting on a wall right in
between the two compounds. We cleared those two with really
nothing significant to report from those.

SME-GFA: Okay, when we are talking the RPG initiator we

talking the tail fin correct?
(b)(3), (b)(6) : I meant it’s an IED initiation system.

SME-GFA: Okay, I remember seeing a picture of that. The

actual RPG tail fin that I think you guys found, did you find
that?

: I think we may be talking about two different

(b)(3), (b)(6)

locations now apparently the information you are talking about

sir, you are saying the AC-130 reporting that to the south
correct?

SME-GFE: Yes.

: Yea, the only fin we talked about and made

(b)(3), (b)(6)

reference to is the fin we found in the vicinity of the

Pathfinders element and the Pathfinders element from the crash
site to the Northeast kind of over northeast of the perimeter.

SME-GFA: Do you know what happened to that tail fin? We are

still trying to track that down.

: That was sent out – with the rest -- the mass

(b)(3), (b)(6)

amounts of the equipment and wreckage that was sent out with the
BSO element.

SME-GFA: Do you know specifically who that was handed over

to - by name?

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: No sir, during those three days there was just

(b)(3), (b)(6)

every piece of item every item from that helicopter was carried
out on a litter from 10’s of different the BSOs also on multiple
flatbed trucks that just kept doing turns. I don’t know who
actually has it.

SME-GFA: Yeah roger, we are still trying to track that

down, it’s obviously of interest. Just, I think to clarify I
think we are miss-communicating a little bit, the AC-130
identified the building compound where they think the RPG fire
came from, which it’s not the same, I don’t believe it’s the
same location where the RPG fin was found, so kind of two
different locations to the best of my knowledge, not really in
relation, not the same location I guess I should say. Okay thank
you.
(b)(3), (b)(6) : Roger sir, that’s what we are tracking as
well.

BG Colt: Okay, I think I have about three more questions

and as one, how would you characterize the site as far as been a
sterile location on your departure? Two, if you can articulate
when you were actually exfilled off the site--who was remaining
there after you left? And lastly, is there anything about this
particular relief in place or down aircraft scenario that there
was some specific lesson that we should glean from it?

(b)(3), (b)(6) : Roger sir, when we departed the crash site

locations after about 72 hours, the site was definitely 100
percent sterile. We conducted an exfill with the Pathfinder
element; they fell under our task organization for exfill. We
linked-up with (b)(3), (b)(6) , I believe was the call
sign of (b)(3), (b)(6) , the brigade battle space owner, we
conducted a walkthrough of the crash site area a minute after
meeting with him. At that point there was a few items remaining,
but I would say we were probably somewhere between 95 and 97
percent complete. He was very pleased with the efforts and the
synchronization across the board. He then departed, a couple
hours later we were 100 percent complete, I personally with
(b)(3), (b)(6) , conducted a walkthrough of each of the five
crash site locations or where there was wreckage and it there
nothing there to be found. At that point again we linked-up with

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the Pathfinders, we conducted movement to our exfill HLZ, which

was the same location we conducted infil from three nights
prior, it’s on a ridgeline kind of in the middle of nowhere,
there no compound anywhere to be found. We conducted that
movement under the cover of darkness and the Pathfinders were
the first to exfill and then the THUNDER package came and turned
around and did a second lift and picked up my element and
returned us to(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
. And sir, as far as to what we can glean
from this operation and things that could be learned from it and
things that we could do in the future as far as our portion of
it as the crash site recovery, I know that we all pray that this
never takes place again. However, in the event that it does
there are large pieces of each one of these types of aircraft
that being utilized and special equipment is definitely needed
to reach, when we are out to separate different sections to get
in a more manageable pieces to be extracted from the site
required a couple hundred pounds worth of high explosive
ordinance to be able to separate some of those pieces and parts.
Additionally, I know that the BSO and the engineer crew that
they brought in, brought about 3 to 5 foot, not sure how much
quantity that is, tanks to be able to cut through with the BROCO
torches and different acetylene torches as well. However
effective that may have been, it was also a very time consuming
process to try and cut each one of those with the torches and
some of it was not going to be disassembled with those torch
systems that they had therefore, requiring a lot of the
explosive charges that we had to do to separate those,
specifically the rotor systems. One thing of interest that did
actually aid in kind of destruction and separation of some of
that stuff is that the rotor heads and the transmission itself
that was inside the CH-47 had a magnesium base apparently that
we were able to ignite and that helped to melt down especially
those three, four heavy sections that were there from the rotor
and the transmission, sir.

BG Colt: Okay, thank you that is valuable. Anything else

you would like to add?

: Sir, I think just having the option of using

(b)(3), (b)(6)

kinetic strike if you have that capability as well not being

afraid to use the demolitions, I know there’s a lot of fear

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initially, kind of early on with hey we are going to spread this

stuff trying to destroy it, and the point that we were trying to
kind of make was we got this area surrounded by an inner and
outer cordon, there is not a local within hundreds of meters
here. Its okay if it spreads a little bit, we got it contained,
we can clean it up, but we can’t move it if it’s so heavy. So it
took us a little while to get to that point where we could
destroy it because just using the blades is not ever going to be
enough.

BG Colt: Okay, thanks, anything from you guys at all? I

there are two questions or couple questions from (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) .

LA: You guys reference sites A and B, do you have a graphic

that shows where they were, just so that we are talking apples
and apples? And if you do I can give you my email, you can send
to me on the(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
.

: Yeah, that will be the easiest thing to do sir

(b)(3), (b)(6)

looking at the EXSUM here. First, one of the thing we did when
we got on site we conducted a sweep, determined all the
different locations and then we sent it up on HPW with the name
and location of the photos and the grids attached. So there was
five different locations, but yeah…. [inaudible] [voices
speaking over].

: Roger, if you could send us the clamshell and

(b)(3), (b)(6)

the EXSUM, send us what you are looking at there that would be
great. We probably already have it, but to make sure we do and
we are talking the same sites, that would be terrific. That’s
all I got sir.

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----------------------------
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 1142
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The interview of the TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR opened at 1835 Zulu, 18

August 2011 at FOB(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
.

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD: BG J. Colt, US Army

LEGAL ADVISOR: LA

GROUND FORCE ARMY ADVISOR: SME-GFA

GROUND FORCE NAVY ADVISOR: SME-GFN1

INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR: SME-INTEL

MH-47 ADVISOR: SME-MH47

NG AVIATION ADVISOR: SME-NGB

ASDAT TEAM MEMBERS: ASDAT1; ASDAT2

COURT REPORTER: CR2

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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BG Colt: Could you please give us your assessment on the

templates that you have seen in the battle space and thoughts
about threat and Tangi and so forth.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: Okay sir, you want me specifically around

Tangi Valley? I will go back a little bit further than our
tenure here, we had 3rd Brigade 10th Mountain Division here in
Logar and Wardak the first day, they owned some more battle
space than the the 173rd Brigade and then we took over for 173rd.
About two and a half years ago they built a COP in the middle
of Tangi Valley that was after I believe I got the chronology
right here after they had cleared the Tangi Valley several
times. In the three years that we have had US presence in
Logar and Wardak, they have cleared the valley about seven
times. In that process my assessment of Tangi Valley is they
are mostly isolationist and we have kind of made them that way
because we went in and pissed a lot of people when we did these
clearing operations. My assessment of the valley is they are
mostly isolationists who don’t want anybody in their valley -
it's a fertile valley. They are isolated from everything else
they’ve never had any government system there. It is the only
trafficable pass between Logar and Wardak provinces otherwise
you have to down to Ghazni or over to Kabul to go around. In
the assessment of--- that place being viewed as a sanctuary of
insurgent activity, the Third Brigade 10th Mountain put a COP
right in the middle of it. So the valley itself is 10 to
15-kilometers long depending on where you measure it from, they
put it right in the middle. With their idea they could project
combat power out of that, but like I said, the people there
were not interested in security. People were just kinda wanted
to be left alone. In the two, two and a half years the COP
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was in there we probably maintained about a kilometer

bubble around the COP - and that's it. And that was not a
permissive environment. Throughout the process of kind of
evaluating, talking to 173rd Commander, evaluating it for
myself and determining it’s a very small population in Tangi
Valley compared to the rest of Logar and Wardak. I had a full
US Company and ANA Company committed to that COP which was one
kilometer bubble around the COP which influenced zero people.
So I made the decision that we are going to isolate the valley
and start work our way in – because the other thing with the
Tangi Valley is it was air centric. We did a couple of ground
resupply operations and it was a battalion effort to get into.
They probably reduced about 25 IEDs on their way in - in the
stretch of four or five kilometers. Lots of small arm fire and

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mostly IED threat because like I said they just didn't want us
in there. There's no kind of command and control, there is no
army of insurgents in the Tangi Valley that can mass combat
power to overrun the COP or do anything other than harassing
fire and ambushes when we did patrols from inside. So I made
the decision we were going to isolate the valley put
checkpoints on either end to control access in and out
searching vehicles in and out--- kind of determine whether it
was a sanctuary or support zone or somewhere from which the
insurgents could export their terrorist activity elsewhere, but
really had no indications of that, the only line of
communication that I see right now is down to the south into
Logar Province into western Baraki Barak. So that's kind of my
assessment of the valley - is that it is transitory for some
leaders. Every once in a while a high level leader would pop
up on and that’s--we continue to go in there our focused
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

targeting force, our battle space owner who owns it Task Force
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and with TF guys. So we go out pluck out these
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

leaders if we can get them but that's essentially to stop the

facilitation, it’s essentially a rest stop for them. And like
I said the people there are probably very easily swayed by some
money - yeah you can stay at my house that kind of thing. Other
than that it was very low level local fighters who just didn't
want security forces in their valley. That's the assessment of
the valley as I see it.

BG Colt: Did TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c do any house clearing at all

after the shoot down?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: We as a brigade did some because I had

Task Force(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4con the east side of the valley and as a matter
of fact I think they killed about 20 bad dudes running around
because that took a lot of pressure off the crash site itself.
We did some NAI clearances it was not forced. We have done
enough pissing people off in the valley itself, so we did some
NAI cleara
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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houses, mostly abandoned ones, but they were in the NAI’s that
I set for them. But we didn't do any large scale clearances.

BG Colt: Okay. Can you talk to the command relationships

between you and Task Force or Team(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cthere? How they
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

operate in our battlespace?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: Yes sir. No command relationship

obviously but completely transparent, completely. Essentially
Task Force , Team(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cand now(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4chere works Logar and
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Wardak in accordance with my priority we have a --- I have a

weekly meeting with their J2, J3 and their commander. I set
priorities for the week, they look at those and they say what
target decks they have. I give them my (High Payoff Target
List) HPTL and they go after that in accordance with my area
priorities in accordance with my HPTL. If they don't have
something that pops up they will go after something they are
looking at but, every single time it is coordinated with me at
the brigade level and point to point between the TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
commander and the battalion commander battle space owner. We
have said “no” on a couple of occasions and they did not go -
they will n onduct an operation without our concurrence. So
there's no (b)(1)1.4a, cut, it is me at the brigade level and the
(b)(1)1.4c

battalion commanders looking at it going, Okay I understand

where you are going. We are not around you know -- there will
be no conflict with it so we don’t officially cut the for
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

them to operate in.

BG Colt: Okay. Anybody else?

SME-GFA: Sir when we go into crash recovery effort who is

actually in charge of that, I mean who does that belong to? Is
that you or(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: For this particular instance?

SME-GFA: Yes, sir.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: It kind of morphed as time went on, but I

took it as mine because I'm the battle-space owner first with--
-the only people we had on site were Rangers and then
Pathfinders. When I sent in Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, the battalion
commander was on leave, but (b)(3), (b)(6) was in command. As he
came in closer, I said you report to the ground owner until you
take over the site. So it was essentially, I guess, the platoon
(b)(3), (b)(6) on the ground at the time owned it first and once we got

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more forces in because I introduced---I put a lot of OPs on the

high ground from one company and another company that was
escorting the convoy in, another company that was clearing
NAI’s, and I had another company from another battalion in the
eastern part of the AO. So at that point it morphed up to me
after TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c commander established himself on the site, and
all along the site, it was his until I introduced other units
to it, but then it became my operation.

BG Colt: You assumed it though you were not directed to

take it? Is that true? You assumed control within your own
battle space of that site as opposed to being directed by any
higher authority to go establish force for the specified task
and purpose.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: Yes, sir and I think that was just kind of
an assumption made on everybody’s part because as soon as I got
woken up it was okay all---- obviously a team effort, but
that's when I make the decision here's how we are going to cut
this thing. As soon as I had Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c kind of get
his pieces in place and then I told him okay, since it is now
a---Once it was confirmed there weren’t any survivors and it’s
a recovery mission and this is mine. That's kind of how I went
about it. I never got a directive or order or FRAGO or
anything.

BG Colt: What were the conditions in your mind to vacate

that space or to move off the crash site when they ultimately
did? What conditions needed to exist in your mind?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: The first and foremost was that I was
directed, was that nothing would be left, so that was number one
in my mind and I got down on the ground and verified that
everything was -- that all the sites were cleared. And then
two, I had established several NAIs that would be cleared before
we pulled off the objective, because first of all we wanted to
gather any intel that was on the objective that was fresh and
two, kind of figure out where it came from, because at that time
it was assumed that it was a shoot-down, and we really didn’t
have a good idea of where that came from so we were trying to
figure that out. So, number one, the crash site was cleared and
number two was a series of NAIs that I established were clear.

BG Colt: Anybody else?

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SME-GFA: I’m just curious, sir; I guess there are two

khalats that are suspected POOs. Did those actually get cleared
out? I haven’t heard anyone talk about that? Do you know, sir?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: There were actually -- I’m not sure where
you’re getting --

SME-GFA: The AH’s [AH-64s], the pilots that we talked to

earlier. I did not ask TF .
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

BG Colt: This is where the aircraft went down and they

think the actual shots came from inside the inside of these two
triangles back to back. These two right here.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: I don’t know if the actual khalat was

cleared, but I know this was one of our NAIs. So, I don’t know
if we actually went into that khalat and cleared it, but this
was definitely one of our NAIs and that was actually one of the
last ones that we cleared because when I got down on the ground,
that’s what I told the TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Commander and I were sitting
on the ground with a map and I said, “have we gotten here yet,”
and he goes, “no, that’s the last place we’ve got to get to.”
We had -- I think we had four potential RPG POOs and I don’t
even remember if that was one or not.

SME-GFA: I think our main source of information, sir, is

the AH-64’s.

IO: Been spending too much time with TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c[laughing].

SME-GFA: Any issues with the C2 with the recovery efforts?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: No, I thought it went extremely smooth. I

thought it was going to get a lot more complicated than it was,
but I think it was because everybody was talking - because we
all knew each other - because we all live right here, it was all
very, very smooth. Especially with the layers of ISR and AWT
and everything over the target itself I thought it was going to
get a lot more complicated than it was but with the open
communication here, we didn’t find any friction.

IO: Okay. Thanks for that.

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TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: And then the other -- if there would have
been some frictions, then we probably -- I probably would have
requested some kind of C2 relationship, but we never established
any kind of formal C2 relationship between the Rangers, the
Pathfinders, TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c or TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c . What I told the
ground force commander, once he got in with the convoy is, “Hey,
get everybody together and figure it out.” And, they just
started talking to each other and you know, “You guys have been
on the ground. Tell me what you think.” And, essentially, what
we had was Ranger Platoon, Pathfinders, and one of my platoons
on the site itself clearing it -- clearing the sites and then
everybody else in and around in security positions.

BG Colt: How about just one other line of thought here,

and that’s the QRF. We’ve addressed that in a number of
different discussions. Do you routinely assume a role as a
standing QRF or at least somebody that’s got to be prepared to -

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: We always do on every one of their

missions and that’s one of the things that they talk about with
TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
commander and the battalion battle-space owner.

BG Colt: Is that a min force or is that what’s available

with respect to -- Is there any specifications it’s a company --
it’s a --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: It’s a platoon, sir; and that has -- I

mean, in this instance, I mean, there’s no way it would have
been cued because we’d drive in there and the Pathfinders,
obviously being resident here are the first source of aerial
QRF. But, there’s always somebody identified, especially as we
get in or around a lot of other places that they go that we can
get to quickly. That’s coordinated, but they’ve never called
for it.

BG Colt: Have you had other downed aircraft in your battle

space since you’ve been here?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: No, sir.

BG Colt: And your TOA guys show up when? October you

said?

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TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: Yes, sir. TOA is 20 October.

BG Colt: And it’s just for this relationship here, as far

as who is next? Is that the 82nd who is coming here next?

SME-GFN1: I know up in Jbad it’s – (b)(3), (b)(6) .

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: Yeah, (b)(3), (b)(6) . The brigade commander

replacing me is actually out of 3 Brigade, 1st Armored Division.
rd

It’s (b)(3), (b)(6) .

BG Colt: Okay, well, I appreciate your time tremendously.

Thanks for the support that you’ve provided to this Task Force
in this particular effort and we’re going to be in country
probably for another week and a few days and if we need to come
back to you we shall.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: Anything else that we should have talked about

that we didn’t?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: No, sir. Any thought to getting out to

the site itself?

BG Colt: Well, originally, I wanted to do that, but I was

told that this becomes a very deliberate combat operation and my
mission at this point really is to find facts without disrupting
daily operations and I recognize that this took somebody off
task for four days plus, just to do that, so that’s my train of
thought. Is that comforting?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: Sir, if you come back and you say, “No, I
must get out to the site,” the more time you give me the better.

BG Colt: Roger. Okay. I appreciate that.

[The interview concluded.]

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The re-interview of TF (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c (CDR & S3) occurred on 20

August 2011 via video teleconference.

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD: BG J. Colt, US Army

DEPUTY INV TM LEAD: IO-DEP

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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IO-DEP: Good Evening gentlemen

TF S3:
(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c Good evening Sir (b)(3), (b)(6) here and (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) .

IO-DEP: You’ve got (b)(3), (b)(6) and Brigadier

General Colt here. Before I pass it off to the boss I just want
to say I appreciate you working us in. I know this is sort of
short notice; we just got a couple of points we wanted to clear
up after reviewing some of the material from your TOC as were
are going through the different exhibits. So with that I will
pass it off to General Colt.

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BG Colt: I really, ---only two quick questions here for

this evening. One that surprised me last night was the ---as we
were reviewing the JOC LOG was that--- the entry of the sighting
at two strobes on the – what appeared to be IR strobes on the
objective; can you talk to the source of that entry?

TF S3: Yes sir, looking at the TOC log here, I assume

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

you have a copy of (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c entry number 24 at 0339 local

with the possible two survivors southwest of the crash site and
the IR strobes. I received a phone call from (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4cCHOPS a few
minutes prior to that entry stating that they had reason to
believe there were two IR strobes southwest of the crash site
and they didn’t know if they were survivors or strobes that
somehow activated in that area. And the action taken is that I
called up (b)(3), (b)(6) on the radio on FM, asked them to
look at the location southwest of the crash site. That is
probably the conversation that was captured on the gun tape that
you reviewed as well, and they were unable to confirm or deny
any survivors based on the heat of the Extortion 17 fire that
was burning for the 64s optics, and they also transitioned to
goggles, and they were unable to observe any strobes or any
personnel due to the light from that fire whiting out their
goggles. At 0412 local in our log, the (b)(3), (b)(6) Team called that
they were at the site, and at 0415, they reported on the fires
net that there were no survivors at the crash site. I did some
homework on where that report came from, that was passed via S-
voip to me and I was told tonight that (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c S-2 had monitored
(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c from a predator that was overhead that had observed
possible two strobes southwest of the site and that the S-2 at
(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c had relayed that inside the TOC at which time they made a

phone call to me.

BG Colt: Okay, I appreciate very much that comprehensive

explanation. Would you by chance know if one bravo ever in their
confirmation of no survivors make any comment or reference to
strobe lights activated on any of the bodies they found?

TF S3: Sir, I didn’t receive any—communication from one

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

bravo th indicated any strobes that were either going off or

not going off. I know sort of cursory information, but we did
receive reports from the AWT and the pathfinder via (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c ,

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that there was multiple secondary’s going over from the aircraft
during that fire.

BG Colt: [inaudible] that is generally our assessment as

well. One other question I have for you this evening was, after
the event occurred or after the entire flight was complete and
the (b)(3), (b)(6) element returned, did you do a (b)(3), (b)(6) AAR
between the AWT and the (b)(3), (b)(6) element? As overall mission
wrap, and if so, what lessons were learned or documented from
that AAR please?

TF CDR: Hey sir, when the crews got back, obviously the
(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cand we were basically

debriefing them when they came in and then we debriefed the AH
crews separately when they came in afterwards, but there was no
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

BG Colt: Okay, but since the event have either of you

conducted any kind of formal internal Task Force AAR over?

TF S3: Yes sir, since then we have gotten together with

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

the planners and the crews and gone over informal AAR as far as
anything that we might have done better, anything we could have
looked at again and things of that nature, but it was informal,
it took a few days before we finally got everything done and I
mean, the Pathfinders were out for four more days, so it was an
ongoing operation for quite some time sir.

BG Colt: Sure, just one last follow up to that, was there

any written output from that; again we are interested in just
collecting data points for the purpose of potential and
inclusion of---is it worthy of consideration as our best
practice or would be promulgated anywhere else over?

TF S3: Yes sir, we took a few notes; it wasn’t a formal

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

note captured on a computer or anything. We could probably dig

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those up and then push those up to you if you want to get those
off the written notes that we have.

BG Colt: Okay, thank you. One last question in a different

direction, because LZ selection got so much attention both from
leaders and in a process; can you describe or tell me did route
planning ever get that same level of leader examination or
consideration please?

TF S3: Yes sir, the route structure as we discussed

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

while you were down here is that at down at our level as far as
the route that was actually taken in and the entire packet is
sent up to brigade so they can look at it up there. They have
essentially the whole briefing pack with the HLZ cards, routes,
all the information is putting out in the briefing so they have
access to all the information as well.

BG Colt: Okay, I take it that the--- that second brief,

that second piece because that was not part of the original AMB,
so I’m not sure whether we have seen that product. I have
clearly seen the bread crumb chart that was the BFT drop, but
I’m not sure where----I’ve ever seen a preplanned route, if you
have one I would like to see it. The other thing is our
discussion with the (b)(3), (b)(6) elements kind of sounds like
they did not plan one over?

TF S3: There was not a paper product with a route on it

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

specifically. The crews were told when the non-standard HLZ

cards were brought out and the paper products were brought out
to the aircraft, as well as over the radio, that the ground
elements did not wish them to come in from the east, so they
were asked to come in from the northwest essentially, which is
why they flew over to Airborne [Valley] and came back and around
that route, and then were briefed on the possible threats in the
area along the detainee valley obviously.

BG Colt: Okay, I appreciate that, I really don’t at this

point have any additional questions and I wish that we would be
able to engage you in a more comprehensive discussion at one
time. Quite frankly this comes as we began to cross reference a
number of different testimonies here---that’s what we’re

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beginning to find the seams and gaps that we are doing follow
ups on now. I really appreciate your time thank you.

TF S3: Roger sir, not a problem sir, anytime.

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

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The interview of the (b)(3), (b)(6) (CDR, DCO & (b)(3), (b)(6)
S3)
occurred on 20 August 2011 via VTC at Bagram AB.

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD: BG J. Colt, US Army

INVESTIGAION TEAM DEPUTY: IO-DEP

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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Court Reporter: The beginning of the VTC was not recorded.

S3: Difficult for the AWT to be able to focus on

(b)(3), (b)(6)

where the qalats were; so it really was no different than a lot

of the other ones, but the process was different because of the
hasty nature of it, the fact that the aircraft was already
airborne and the connectivity issues that we were having.

BG Colt: How many times can you guys remember on this

rotation that you have done a branch to a plan while it was in
motion already or already in execution like this?

S3: I did reach out to the other S-3s and asked

(b)(3), (b)(6)

that, I know that when I was in Jalalabad we never did it where

we inserted a QRF. We didn’t have some situation where we
inserted the battle space owner in the morning, I called down to
attack, they also have not had the experience that they actually
had been certain of the QRF. When they were going through the
RIPTOA with Task Force(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, they did have a mission that was
called (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , I think it was and which the ARSOA guys
inserted the QRF, so that the QRF was inserted but it wasn’t
actually our aircraft that did it. I can’t think of any other
time since I have been the 3 up here that we done it. And I know
when I was down at shooter we didn’t do it.

IO-DEP: So just to clarify a branch off the main plan like

inserting the IRF on LEFTY GROVE, that didn’t happen routinely?
(b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: NO sir. Not routinely. Again just to refresh
your memory, my name is Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) [inaudible] Brigade
Commander, (b)(3), (b)(6) S3 has been the 3 for about two months, so
when you ask about the whole rotation, sir that why he was
referring [inaudible] [voice speaking over each
other]perspective of the battalion first and surveying the other
3s. (b)(3), (b)(6) can back me up on this because he covers the missions
when I am not here, very very few times have we looked at any
sequels, very few and we do a lot. We have done, I think by our
account, we’ve probably done about 400 targets just between
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Those two locations alone we’ve probably
done about 400 missions, very very few times were we had to do
any kind of sequel or any kind of branch. Some different
versions of that have included, sometimes ARSOA being used, the
160th being used to go into a target where we didn’t. We had one

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case in Tangi, where we went in initially received heavy fire;

we came back out because we felt the conditions were not set and
when the mission was shifted over to the 160th for different
HLZs, so that was another version of a kind of a branch that
took place, but then we were out of it at that point after we
did the initial push and we came back out. We shifted over to
the 160th on that night for that target. As (b)(3), (b)(6) S3 has
mentioned, we have had cases were we have put the battle spaces
owner in on the ground using for SSE or KLEs after the event.
That is a version of a sequel, but like this where we have gone
in and put an IRF or reaction force of some sort on there, I
can’t think of one off the top of my head. It might be one out
there, I just don’t remember, 100s but I can’t recall one and
I’m not sure if you can either the way this one happened.

BG Colt: Is it requirement or is it a standard practice

that you would ask to revalidate a route or just the HLZ going
to that route?

S3: It would be hard to reference it with the

(b)(3), (b)(6)

hasty because like the boss said, this is the first one we had
like this. Now when we’ve had other deliberate operations when
the plan changes, the unit has to push up the change to the plan
to get the plan reapproved, to get that change reapproved. In
terms of this with the hasty nature, this is a operation,
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

that is the only time I can remember that we done it and so it

didn’t go through the whole process partially because they are
already airborne. And so there’s some immediacy to it.

IO-DEP: You said they were airborne at the time--- so when

they—when the approval made it to the aircraft, the air mission
commander, they were already airborne and en-route to the target
at that time, was that your understanding?

S3: Yes sir, the call that I got, I was in my S-3

(b)(3), (b)(6)

office and the battle captain came in that they have to put the
reaction force into an alternate HLZ, the aircraft is already
airborne, they are just looking for approval. They said that
they ---the connectivity is down and we couldn’t print off the
TOPO. So I went down to the TOPO office and while I was looking
at it I told the battle captain to go up and brief the boss
while I looked at the TOPO and we tried to email him the TOPO so

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we could get back up and I believe that’s when TF CDR called

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

him direct.

S3: And on that night in particular once our guys

(b)(3), (b)(6)

printed out the TOPO and they brought me the HLZ on a piece of
paper I had a discussion with my guys from down stairs. Then I
picked up the phone and called TF CDR. Because we did not
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

have the connectivity I did not have the full planning products
that the battalion task force would normally provide. So we
talked about the HLZ which is normally one of my areas of
greatest concern, it’s a question of suitability of the HLZ, the
threat in the area. Suitability of the HLZ the threat in the
area, suitability HLZ is the first one I get concerned about,
whether or not if it’s close to qalats, whether or not is it on
the pinnacle, and whether we’re dealing with heavy dust landing
areas. I looked at the HLZ, we had a discussion about the HLZ,
we didn’t dig into the rock and a lot of great discussion.
[Inaudible][Voice in the back ground]I didn’t have the rock
[inaudible] [someone clearing their throat.]

BG Colt: Is it safe to say that by virtue of the ways the

risk exists around here, that at least half of the command
decision with regard to this process is focused on accidental
risk?

(b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: Absolutely Sir.

BG Colt: And not operational risk?

CDR: Absolutely, I will tell you that from my

(b)(3), (b)(6)

perspective as a commander, I look at both of those very very

heavily. We have lost aircraft here to both in terms of accident
pilot error. We have banged up aircraft on bad HLZs and we have
had aircraft shot down. So that is very much, in fact, when we
first got here, I would say that I had more concern over the
accidental risk because of the nature of the terrain and where
we were coming in from. And as the mission continued to evolve,
they kind of got much more balanced in my mind for tactical and
accidental, but accidental risk is absolutely one of the top
things that I worry about in this environment.

BG Colt: So my question is in this particular case, I sense

that there was a lot of focus on the landing area, what if, can

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you describe what was presented to you contextually about the

mission at this point? This was a sequel or a branch to a plan
that was already in action, how did you take that into
consideration with respect to operational risk at the time of
the second infil?

S3: We were told that there were groups of people

(b)(3), (b)(6)

gathering in the vicinity of where the operation was going on.

So that---, first consideration is that they didn’t say that
they were actively in contact, we know that the AWT had
engagement earlier, but it sounded from the description that we
got that a groups of people were massing not that there was
actual fight going on at that point. The other consideration
with that was that it was a 4.5K offset, so it was well away
from where all the activity was and the tendency around here, is
that when there is activity insurgents with surge towards that
activity, so 4.5 Kilometer offset is far enough away that---
that distance itself was mitigating part of the threat because
they do tend to gather when the bullets start flying. So that
was part of the consideration as well sir, was the 4.5 kilometer
offset.
(b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: And from my perspective echoing everything
that (b)(3), (b)(6) S3 just said, we are aware of the overall threat
of the Tangi valley, which has a history of it. And we track
that and we understand that very clearly. We looked at it going
into this operation, for the way they were going into and the
specific zone of the objective in the HLZ for the original
infil. As we looked at this branch 4-4.5 kilometers away and
around the corner of a major terrain feature was a factor as we
looked at the threat. In other words we felt like it was
disconnected probably more than maybe someone would assume, but
to a certain extent, it was disconnected geographically from
where the objective was, but the context of and that we
understand contextually for me, I understood contact was at the
objective and that it was fair amount of contact at the
objective, I believe we had a number of enemy KIA at that point
and that there were some individuals that were squirting off to
the left if you look at the diagram or to the west and to the
northwest. And so from that context as you asked about the
threat of the HLZ, the HLZ threat was more of the greater
context of the overall threat in the Tangi, positively with a

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certain level of stimulation in the valley because of what was

going on at the objective, but again 4 kilometer offset would
that would be one of the thought processed that was in mind for
me as I speak personally.

IO-DEP: When they told you that it was a 4.5 kilometer

offset, did they reference 4.5k from what? What is from the
original HLZ infiltration or from where the squirters where at?
How do they characterize that?

S3: They didn’t reference it sir; I assumed it was

(b)(3), (b)(6)

from the objective. Usually, when we are talking about offsets

for these missions, we are talking about offsets from the
objective, not offsets from previous [inaudible] [voice talking
over speaker]

IO-DEP: So your assumption was it was the objective?

CDR: I’m not sure if it was set specifically to me

(b)(3), (b)(6)

when I spoke to the task force commander, but I feel that it

was, that he said that he said it was four kilometers off the
objective.

BG Colt: Just a question, I apologize this is not logically

connected to that particular, our last series of questions. Has
the brigade internally to yourself and task force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

conducted any kind of either directed or formal AAR of its own

internal components following this event? And if so have they
documented any results or changed any practices as a result of
it?

S3: Sir, inside the TOC itself, we did AAR inside

(b)(3), (b)(6)

the TOC. We didn’t document it or anything else. We have made

some changes and procedures since then that now----either the
stands or the TACOPs guys are also looking at the CONOPS that we
do. So we have started to change some procedures partially
because of this event, but we didn’t capture it in any kind of
AAR, we did discuss it internally as an AAR, we just didn’t
record it.

CDR: And at the Brigade Level certainly the

(b)(3), (b)(6)

following along conversations between myself and the task force

commanders. We have spent time discussing, again nothing

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documented sir. We have spent time discussing the TTPs of the

AH-64’s in particular when it comes to providing the Cherry/Ice
call, and providing security for the CH’s inbound. We have
spent time talking about the routes and the air speeds and the
altitudes that are being used by the CH-47s on infiltration. We
have talked about the question of the HLZ selection with regard
to offset or not. At the CJTF level, we are definitely talking
about more emphasis on offset infils not just for this but
across the board, as we look at our infils in the battle space.
So there are a number of things that I think that are very much
in motion to address some of the sequence of events that
happened with EXTORTION 17 that are happening both at the
battalion and the brigade as well as the CJTF level here, but
nothing that has been formally documented yet at this stage. Be
frank, part of my intent was to let the investigation run its
course and take the results of the investigation and go from
there. I’ve seen something that I think we need to make sure we
are taking a look at, we are focused on those, but at---- partly
because we didn’t have all the facts and partly I didn’t want to
impede on the purpose of your investigation.

IO-DEP: Shifting over to the; task force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c has a

log entry number 24 at 0339 local that night. Two strobes
identified in the AOR and possible survivors, can you talk us
through that? Where did that came from? And any corroboration or
any assessment of the validity of that report.

DCO: Sir, I think the 3 might be in a better

(b)(3), (b)(6)

position to actually answer, ----

S3: It happened in the TOC and that came from—we

(b)(3), (b)(6)

heard it in the TOC; it was the S-2 that reported when they
first had the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

first time --- that I saw the Air Force had done a clip on it
and it really doesn’t look like our strobes, I think it’s debris
that’s coming down because it doesn’t move through the picture
like a person moves through a picture; that I’ve have seen on
flares, so I think it was debris coming down or something like.
I can show it to you after this sir [voice stated we have seen
it]

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I saw it for the first time about an hour ago.

IO-DEP: Yea we have seen, we looked at the same thing.

DCO: this is
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) , I was in the TOC
at the time when the report came in and the report was they
thought there were IR strobes from behind a wall. We asked for
our apaches to get a look at it, but we didn’t really understand
where specifically they were seeing the IR strobes coming from.

CDR: I think they were called and distance and a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

direction off of the air craft [inaudible] crash site. I want to

say it was a hundred or two hundred meters southwest, it was
something like they gave me distance and direction and we passed
that information on to the AWT to get a better look at those
areas. We didn’t anything to collaborate or to corroborate IR
strobes or survivors that were on the ground.

S3: The AWT said that the heat of the fire was just
(b)(3), (b)(6)

blinding everything else out and they couldn’t look in the

goggles and they could see anything under FLIR. This was the
only time I saw was when I saw that predator [inaudible]

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The interview of TF HARC CHIEF opened at 2105 Zulu, 16 August

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

2011.

PERSONS PRESENT

INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR: SME-INTEL

INTERVIEWEE: TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4cHARC CHIEF

COURT REPORTER: CR

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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SECRET

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SME-INTEL: I'm (b)(3), (b)(6) the intel lead for the

investigation team. I'm here to investigate the
circumstances surrounding the downing of the CH47 in
the Wardak Province, Afghanistan, on 6 August 2011.
Brigadier General Colt has been assigned as the
investigating officer in this case, and was appointed
by General James M. Mattis, U.S. CENTCOM McDill Air
Force Base, Florida.

His findings as to the appropriate action will be

included in the report to General James M. Mattis.

Before we begin the interview, please review and sign

the privacy act statement, which you have. And also,
too, I'm going to ask you to stand and raise your right
hand.

The witness did as directed and was duly sworn.

Questions by (b)(3), (b)(6) :

Q. For the record, please state your name, rank and duty
position.
A. My name is (b)(3), (b)(6) , United States Air
Force. I'm currently sitting as the Task Force(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
HARC Chief. And currently assigned to Fort Bragg JSOC
within the JSOC Intelligence Brigade.

Q. Okay. (b)(3), (b)(6) , just to start with the scope of the

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

A. Yeah. As far as -- I will start off with targeting

the individual. We will start there. For going after
Objective Lefty Grove to here, what we are looking at
here is a Taliban commander in Wardak Province, within
Tangi Valley. He had possibly taken over for Objective
Dunlap who is Din Mohammad who was EKIA a couple months

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earlier.

Going after Lefty Grove; one of the things from the

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

on [Objective] Lefty Grove was light

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

as compared to some of the other targets that we go

after.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Q. You said on Objective Lefty Grove that he was

associated with another individual that was EKIA'd --
A. Correct.

Q. -- do you know when that individual was EKIA'd?

A. Not off the top of my head. I think it was April
[2011]. But I can go back and check.

Q. And I'd recall from what objective he was EKIA.

A. I don't remember.

Q. Okay. All right. The next piece is in and around

the day of the target itself there, or even a couple
weeks prior, was there any (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c reporting
that --
A. Yeah.

Q. -- they had what was available, what was known and

also his highlighting to his source --
A. Okay.

Q. -- the relevancy of the sources that were provided

in that [area]--
A. Exactly. Okay. From my perspective, I've been an
RTC (Regional Task Controller) at this point in time
for about three months. So I had a fairly, I would say,
decent working knowledge of the target set.

The big thing about Tangi Valley was that we used to

have Combat Outpost (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c in there. So we used

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to have a COP. That COP was, by the time I got here,

we had removed our forces from that. So we kind of knew
that there was definitely an adversary presence in the
Tangi Valley. It wasn't one of those areas that was
free of Taliban. We had multiple reports that Taliban
was active in that area, obviously, as we were going
after targets in that area.

The HUMAN INTELLIGENCE picture that I have as of late

July 11, this comes out of our (b)(3), (b)(6) ,
(b)(3), (b)(6) , they are based out of , but run sources
(b)(3), (b)(6)

that do have access to Tangi Valley. The source that

continuously reports on the Tangi Valley, we were
getting the majority of our (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

As the coalition forces were conducting that operation,

Taliban forces actually attacked that helicopter with
small arms. They started the attack. I think it was
mostly -- mostly, it looked like small caliber weapons.
The helicopter fired back, and basically killed the
insurgents who were attacking the helicopter.

So again, just noting that there was some type of threat

in that valley from the Taliban perspective.

Q.

A.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a

Q.

A.

Q. Okay. Is there any other reporting during that time

period?
A. No. That's probably the closest that I have within
that 30-day window.

Q. Okay. Now, let's go even further back and, kind of,

describe what the threat to aircraft or even coalition
forces was in the Tangi Valley. Give us a snap shot
of that up to the last six months or so.
A. Exactly. The last six months or you want to go 90
days?

Q. About 90 days. If you have got anything more past

that, we will see where we are at?
A.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Q. Okay.

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A. And that actually puts some truth to this. It says

Din Mohammad, so we are just talking about Din Mohammad,
who is objective Dunlap, was killed on 6 June [2011]
in Tangi Valley, Sayyidabad District by coalition
forces after he was trying to attack coalition force
helicopters in the Tangi Valley. So that's what we had
coming out at that IIR.

Q. Does it highlight -- through your research, does it

say what objective he was actually killed on?
A. I don't have that. Again, I can go back and take a
look at which objective that was.

Q. So 6 June [2011], Dim Mohammad is killed. Dim

Mohammad is accessed to be who?
A. Dim Mohammad is supposed to be Objective Dunlap.

Q. What's the significant in the Tangi Valley?

A. He's the Taliban commander. So he's the guy within
that AO.

Q. So he's being assessed as the Taliban senior leader?

A. Yes -- Uh-hmm.

Q. Okay. Anything else from that report?

A. Not from that reporting, no. That was 9 June [2011].

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Again, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c goes through within that assessment

to say that, you know, this is a continuing threat
within the Tangi Valley, but they access it as a
moderate threat.

Q. Okay.

SECRET
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A. The next piece of reporting that I have that fits

within that timeframe comes from May 11 [2011] and it
late May [2011]. There's no date on this. But it's
an (b)(3), (b)(6) and that is going -- (b)(3), (b)(6),
so it's a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
report. It's very brief.
Again, it's out of Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c . And it says
something to the effect that over 100 Taliban plan to
travel from (b)(3), (b)(6) Province through Tangi Valley to
possibly shoot down the coalition force aircraft.

Q. So the threat migrating through --

A. Correct.

Q. -- [inaudible] going into Tangi Valley --

A. From (b)(3), (b)(6) into Tangi Valley.

Q. And when do we think that COP(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c closed? Was it

April?
A. I think that's it. Again, it's before my time. So
as I knew about it, you know, there was always, Hey,
we pulled out of Tangi, and that's definitely the area.

Q. When did you arrive here?

A. I arrived here 2 May.

Q. Okay.
A. And that's the last piece I have for that piece of
May reporting. We can go back a little bit further now
into April.

Q. Sure.
A.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

And he states in that meeting there -- this is on 25

April -- that in general, the Taliban are very
comfortable in the Tangi Valley, and don't fear daytime
air strikes or coalition force raids. However, there

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is fear regarding helicopter raids especially at night

because the Taliban's communication system is hampered
after 1800 typically when most of the cell phone
networks are still down.

Q. So 1800 local?
A. Correct.

Q. And the cell phone coverages --

A. It goes down typically. You will see that's very
commonly throughout Afghanistan.

And then they stated at night, in the area other Taliban

are dependent on radios. Their communication with
radios is not nearly as effective as it is during the
day when they are using cell phones.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

He also said that Taliban fighters have access to small

arms, so PKM, AK47, RPGs possibly some sniper rifles.
The heaviest type of weaponry that within the Tangi
Valley is 82 millimeter rockets.

Q. 82 millimeter rockets or mortars?

A. He states that they are rockets. We would call them
mortars.

Q. Okay.
A. In addition, he talks a little bit in the same
reporting about early warning networks. He said that
typically the Taliban used watchmen or guards at the
local bizarres [markets] and at cell phone towers where
they can climb up and get a better view of the area.
But that was the majority that he talked about as far
as early warning network.

Q. Okay. Go through the next one. Continue on.

A. Okay. In April, we have another IIR that talks about
the Tangi Valley something I think I can reference, a

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possible helicopter shoot down. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c .

It talks a little bit about the early warning system

throughout the Tangi Valley, and how it varies from
small, little village enclave to small little village
enclave. It says that typically in every Bizarre,
there's probably one or two Taliban security guards who
are posted at all times to include during night.

They watch the local area, and the roads for coalition
forces. And will use cell phones when they can to
communicate information back and forth between Taliban
members.

Again, same as the other source stated, they will post

Taliban members on guard towers, positions where they
can view -- see the valley, have good sight, good
overwatch.

Q. Can you put this in the scope of the timeline -- you

said this report was in April [2011] of when?
A. April 2011.

Q. April what?
A. Oh, the date?

Q. Yeah.
A. The date is 10 April [2011].

Q.
A.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

That finishes out April reporting that I have regarding

anything that can be taken for use with the current
situation. I will go a little bit further back now to
March 11 [2011]. And this is reporting that came out
of (b)(3), (b)(6) it's their March wrap
up for SIGACT (Significant Activities) reporting.
This reporting covers the dates from 18 to 31 March
[2011].

SECRET
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Q. Team (b)(3), (b)(6) is with who? Is that the TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

asset
or --
A. No. I think that's an International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) asset.

Q. So ISAF or Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)?

A. I'm not sure. I would have to go back and take a look.

Q. Okay. Just curious if it's a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

. If it's not TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , it's --
A. This is not TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
.

Q. But this is just prior to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c being unoccupied?

A. Um-hmm.

And this just talks about reporting. It's a quick

little blurb. It says "Reporting indicates that
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , also known as
Objective (b)(1)1.4a, , was possibly involved in a recent
(b)(1)1.4c

surface-to-air attack against the task force attack

helo during an extract in Tangi Valley.

Q. Does that specifically correlate to an operation that

we've done?
A. No, it does not. My assessment would be that would
be that would be a battle space. But I don't have the
background on this reporting.

Q. Okay.
A. The next piece of reporting that I have would be,
again, in March [2011]. This is going to be around 20
March; it's an IIR. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c . And
this is a quick blurb about an attack possibly going
to take place during the day. It says "Unknown as to
the exact attack date, but the primary target being any
type of helicopters that land in COP(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
."

Q. So indication there is intent to -- measured intent

to engage?
A. Correct -- at COP(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
.

Q. Okay.
A. And as far as overall (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c reporting,
the last piece that I will take about -- and I went back

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and I also, kind of, searched to see if I could find

the names for those responsible. I could talk about
those just real quick.

Prior to, one of the only pieces of reporting that I

have is on 6 and 7 Marc 2011]. This comes
from -- again, from our(b)(3), (b)(6) team ( (b)(3), (b)(6) . (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c , who we spoke earlier. And he just talks

on that day about some reflections on the IED
(Improvised Explosive Device) attack that happened on
28 February [2011] in the vicinity of COP(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ,
resulting in the death of two U.S. Soldiers.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, , a Taliban commander. He

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

says within the valley, he's and IED (Improvised

Explosive Device), IDF (Indirect Fire) and DF (Direct
Fire) attack commander. And he said that Mullah
Mohebullah who was one of the suspects that we killed
after -- that we thought was responsible for the
helicopter downing. He was actually responsible for
part of that attack. He was part of it.

Q. And that takes us back all the way back approximately

180 --
A. Exactly.

Q. Okay. And if we could get a copy of that.

A. I have already got you guys one.

Q. Okay. As well as a singular product that you put

together. Understanding, too, that the(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c it may just be a general area, not
necessary specifically, that's where the events, kind
of, occurred.
A. And you want this on power point. I would guess,
probably one slide per entry if I could do it
geo-location and a significant reporting?

Q. Yes. And if you can do an overview of where it was

at, and we can dive into it. So just a general overview,
then each report --
A. Perfect.

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Q. And just have the IIR number --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- or in patent of what (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is in it -- Task Force

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

A. So just one slide, or do you want multiple?

Q. If you can do one slide --

A. Yes.

Q. -- that's fantastic. If you need multiple, then not

an issue. As long as it's legible, readable and it's
not too cluttered.
A. Busy?

Q. Yeah. If it's not too busy, we will be good to go.

So we would be great with that.

Okay. So we talked about right now -- kind of follow-up,

we talked about in around the target date itself,
nothing really specific about the target. We talked
about 180 from the target to the left; that it gives
us indications of talking about the intent to attack.
But it also gives us some reflections for the task force
based on the target, the individuals' intents. And
also, too, is a manner in which they are going to conduct
attacks --
A. Uh-hmm.

Q. And also, too, is the impacts on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c).

A. Correct.

Q. And then also is the weapons systems that are possibly

the weapons systems that are possibly in there as well
as outline how the early warning networks conducted
observations.
A. Uh-hmm.

Q. Now, we can going to focus on is the post-strike, the

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c related to post-strike, and kind of
focus on, too, is how did it lead us to the individual
responsible for the RPG shooting.
A. Okay. The post-strike information -- and I can go

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back and pull this. I didn't bring that in right now.

But I want to say the strike happened on the 5th [August].
And I think the 6th [August], we started to get some
reporting on who was actually responsible for the shoot
down.

On the 7th, I think we had IIRs that came in from

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF).
Two of those that were reporting that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

and(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c were the two that were responsible for the
tual downing of the CH47. There was also some (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)reporting, again, from our collection platform that

alluded to the same names possibly being involved.

That morning as that came in, I -- like I do every

morning -- I sit and I talk with (b)(3), (b)(6) , the senior
analyst from (b)(3), (b)(6) . And
(b)(3), (b)(6) and I kind of came up, and he was like, Hey, I
have got voice that's talking about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c And I said, Hey, I have got (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

And we started to work that intel piece there. And

by -- I can't remember the exact time, but some time
that morning, we were able to get some pretty good

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Q. Okay. And I've got a question now. And that's good

roll-up there. But, kind of, describe to me, how are
the targets vetted? Is a coordination with some type
of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c --
A. Um-hmm.

Q. -- individual -- I'm sorry. I used the wrong term,

not target. How are the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c sources
vetted across RC East? Can you describe for me the
process for that. So that there's --
A. Like an RC East source?

Q. Yes.

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A. The RC East source as far as I know, are graded on

a scale. So the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c team that's working
with them will start their meetings, and actually grade
that source and say, Hey, we think this guy is solid,
maybe he's the middle of the road or maybe he's poor.
And that's a little bit different than how we do this
Sierra 37.

Q. But how then, too, is that synchronized with CJSOTF

A, CJTF and (b)(3), (b)(6) teams? How do they de-conflict
sources -- they realize that they are not working the
same source --
A. Oh, okay. I understand --

Q.
A.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Q. Okay. Is there any formal meeting where you sit down

and vett it up to the channels as well?
A. As far as sitting down with each one of those players?

Q. What does the play that United States

Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A),
ISAF Joint Command (IJC), ISAF have in this effort to
corroborate -- basically, provide oversight and management of
the human intelligence sources in Afghanistan? Do you have
any --
A. That, I will have to get back to you. I'm not sure
what it is.

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Q. The kind of question I'm asking here is, if CJSOTF

has got an IIR that says same things that (b)(3), (b)(6) is
reporting, how do we know they are not to the same source,
or not coming the same area or region? We have
collaborating stories -- it sounds like it matches the
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c .
A. Right.

Q. The only reason I ask it -- to put into the context

though is how do we know that our sources are
de-conflicted. You need to walk me through that
process.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Q.

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A. Okay.

Q.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

A.

Q. Correct.
A. Okay. I understand.

Q. Trying to put that into context, that there is a

process to look that. And then if there ever is that
situation where it comes up where you realize you are
working the same source by who different task forces,
how does that get resolved as far as de-confliction of
that individual?
A.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Q.

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on the last 180 day reporting, and then post-strike.

Just do a quick summary of that.
A. And show how we got to the target?

Q. Correct. And what you might highlight, too, is the

signals intelligence (SIGINT) piece and when that came
in exactly.
A. Yes.

Q. My understanding of it now is to build the picture

of how that was led up to this. It was signals
intelligence & human intelligence together --
A. Um-hmm.

Q.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

A.

SME-INTEL: If afterwards, you feel there's something that you

missed or if there's a gap or something you want to share,
or you find something that may be relevant to the
investigation, please come forward and provide it to
us. We can put you back on the record for it.

If we have any questions, each night we will do a roll-up

of where we are --

HARC CHIEF: Okay.

SME-INTEL: So more IIRs may come out and re-engage with you and
whatever individuals we've already interviewed. But
we will let you know if we need to do that.

I appreciate the work that you are doing here and the
support, and then also the support that you guys have
provided us as well -- this investigation team.

HARC CHIEF: If you have any other questions, please let me know.

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The inquiry closed at 2136 Zulu, 16 August 2011.

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