Paul Romer: Ideas, Nonrivalry, and Endogenous Growth : Charles I. Jones
Paul Romer: Ideas, Nonrivalry, and Endogenous Growth : Charles I. Jones
Charles I. Jones†
Stanford University, Stanford CA 94305-5015, USA
chad.jones@stanford.edu
Abstract
In 2018, Paul Romer and William Nordhaus shared the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel. Romer was recognized “for integrating technological
innovations into long-run macroeconomic analysis”. This article reviews his prize-winning
contributions. Romer, together with others, rejuvenated the field of economic growth. He
developed the theory of endogenous technological change, in which the search for new ideas by
profit-maximizing entrepreneurs and researchers is at the heart of economic growth. Underlying
this theory, he pinpointed that the nonrivalry of ideas is ultimately responsible for the rise in
living standards over time.
Keywords: Economic growth; endogenous growth theory; ideas; nonrivalry; technical change
JEL classification: O3; O4
I. Introduction
When Paul Romer began working on economic growth in the early
1980s, a conventional view among economists (e.g., in the models
taught in graduate school) was that productivity growth could not be
influenced by anything in the rest of the economy. As in Solow (1956),
economic growth was exogenous. Other models had been developed in the
1960s, as discussed further below, but these failed to capture widespread
attention. Romer developed endogenous growth theory, emphasizing that
technological change is the result of efforts by researchers and entrepreneurs
who respond to economic incentives. Anything that affects their efforts,
such as tax policy, basic research funding, and education, for example, can
potentially influence the long-run prospects of the economy.
Romer’s fundamental contribution is his clear understanding of the
economics of ideas and how the discovery of new ideas lies at the heart of
economic growth. His 1990 paper is a watershed (Romer, 1990a). It stands
*I am grateful to Ufuk Akcigit, Pete Klenow, Per Krusell, Paul Romer, and Chris Tonetti for
helpful comments and suggestions.
†Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research.
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860 Paul Romer: ideas, nonrivalry, and endogenous growth
as the most important paper in the growth literature since Solow’s Nobel-
recognized work. In this article, I review Romer’s prize-winning work,
putting it into the context of the surrounding literature and providing a
retrospective on how this research has led to the modern understanding of
economic growth. The remainder of this introduction seeks to distill these
insights into several pages, while the rest of the article delves more deeply
into the details.
The history behind Romer’s path-breaking 1990 paper is fascinating
and is engagingly presented by Warsh (2006). Romer had been working
on growth for around a decade. The words in his 1983 dissertation and
in Romer (1986) grapple with the topic and suggest that knowledge and
ideas are important to growth. Of course, at some level, everyone knew
that this must be true (and there is an earlier literature containing these
words). However, what Romer did not yet have – and what no research
had yet fully appreciated – was the precise nature of how this statement
comes to be true. By 1990, though, Romer had it, and it is truly beautiful.
One piece of evidence showing that he at last understood growth deeply is
that the first two sections of the 1990 paper are written very clearly, with
brilliant examples and precisely the right mathematics serving as the light
switch that illuminates a previously dark room.
Here is the key insight: ideas – designs or blueprints for doing
something or making something – are different from nearly every other
good in that they are nonrival. Standard goods in classical economics
are rival: as more people drive on a highway or require the skills of a
particular surgeon or use water for irrigation, there are fewer of these
goods to go around. This rivalry underlies the scarcity that is at the heart of
most of economics and gives rise to the fundamental theorems of welfare
economics.
Ideas, in contrast, are nonrival: as more and more people use the
Pythagorean theorem or the Java programming language or even the design
of the latest iPhone, there is not less and less of the idea to go around.
Ideas are not depleted by use, and it is technologically feasible for any
number of people to use an idea simultaneously once it has been invented.
Consider oral rehydration therapy, one of Romer’s favorite examples.
Until recently, millions of children died of diarrhea in developing countries.
Part of the problem is that parents, seeing a child with diarrhea, would
withdraw fluids. Dehydration would set in, and the child would die. Oral
rehydration therapy is an idea: dissolving a few inexpensive minerals,
salts, and a little sugar in water in just the right proportions produces
a solution that rehydrates children and saves their lives. Once this idea
was discovered, it could be used to save any number of children every
year – the idea (the chemical formula) does not become increasingly scarce
as more people use it.
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How does the nonrivalry of ideas explain economic growth? The key
is that nonrivalry gives rise to increasing returns to scale. The “standard
replication argument” is a fundamental justification for constant returns to
scale in production. If we wish to double the production of computers from
a factory, one way to do this is to build an equivalent factory across the
street and populate it with equivalent workers, materials, and so on. That
is, we replicate the factory exactly. This means that production with rival
goods is, at least as a useful benchmark, a constant returns process.
What Romer stressed is that the nonrivalry of ideas is an integral part
of this replication argument: firms do not need to reinvent the idea for a
computer each time a new computer factory is built. Instead, the same idea
(i.e., the detailed set of instructions for how to make a computer) can be
used in the new factory, or indeed in any number of factories, because it
is nonrival. Because there is constant returns to scale in the rival inputs
(the factory, workers, and materials), there is therefore increasing returns
to the rival inputs and ideas taken together: if you double the rival inputs
and the quality or quantity of the ideas, then you will more than double
total production.
Once you have increasing returns, growth follows naturally. Output per
person then depends on the total stock of knowledge; the stock does not
need to be divided up among all the people in the economy. Contrast this
with capital in a Solow model. If you add one computer, you make one
worker more productive. If you add a new idea – think of the computer
code for the first spreadsheet, or a word processor, or even the Internet itself
– you can make any number of workers more productive. With nonrivalry,
growth in income per person is tied to growth in the total stock of ideas
(i.e., an aggregate) not to growth in ideas per person.
It is very easy to get growth in an aggregate in any model, even in
a Solow model, because of population growth. More autoworkers produce
more cars. In a Solow model, this cannot sustain per capita growth because
we need growth in cars per autoworker. However, according to Romer, this
is not the case: more researchers produce more ideas, which ultimately
makes everyone better off because of nonrivalry. Throughout history –
25 years, 100 years, or even 1,000 years – the world is characterized by
substantial growth, both in the total stock of ideas and in the number of
people making them. Because ideas are nonrival, this is all that is required
for sustained growth in living standards.
Finally, the increasing returns associated with nonrivalry means that
a perfectly competitive equilibrium with no externalities will not exist
and cannot decentralize the optimal allocation of resources. Instead, some
departure is necessary. Romer emphasized that both imperfect competition
and externalities to the discovery of new ideas are likely to be important.
Imperfect competition provides the profits that incentivize entrepreneurs to
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innovate. Later inventors and researchers benefit from the insights of those
who came before.
Research on economic growth has been monumentally influenced by
Romer’s contributions. While it can be difficult to adequately compensate
for the knowledge spillovers, the 2018 Nobel Prize in economics is a well-
deserved reward.
The remainder of this article is laid out as follows. Section II discusses
Romer’s early contributions to growth, especially Romer (1986). Section III
turns to the key insights of the 1990 paper. Section IV provides a brief
survey of the many research directions that this paper opened up. Finally,
Section V steps back and considers precisely how Romer’s insights lead to
an understanding of sustained exponential growth. Section VI concludes.1
1
The scientific background report prepared by the Prize Committee (2018) contains an excellent
overview of the contributions of both Romer and Nordhaus, and how they are linked.
2
Microsoft Academic (https://preview.academic.microsoft.com) allows you to sort by the number
of citations, while Google Scholar does not.
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3
Some examples include Becker et al. (1990), David (1990), DeLong and Summers (1991),
Murphy et al. (1991), Stokey (1991), Young (1992), Easterly et al. (1993), Mulligan and Sala-i-
Martin (1993), Quah (1993), Parente and Prescott (1994), Sachs and Warner (1995), Stokey and
Rebelo (1995), Galor and Weil (1996), Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996), Olson (1996), Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (1997), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Nordhaus (1997), Weitzman (1998),
and Hall and Jones (1999).
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4
Note that s could be an investment rate in physical capital, human capital, or knowledge,
depending on the interpretation of K, and it is typically endogenized and, in turn, depends
on policy.
5
Romer (1993) introduced this “ideas versus objects” language.
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that Solow had constant returns to objects and therefore diminishing returns
to capital, and this is what dooms growth in a neoclassical model. Now that
we have increasing returns to objects and ideas together, it is not clear that
diminishing returns to – well, to what? – dooms us in the same way. More
care is required to make this intuition precise, and we will come back to
this absolutely critical point a little later. Before that, however, we follow
Romer (1990a) closely and discuss the role of imperfect competition and
profits in incentivizing innovation.
are awarded a patent that gives them the exclusive right to produce with
their invention. This allows them to charge a mark-up over marginal cost,
subject to imperfect competition, and to earn the profits that ultimately
serve as the carrot that motivates the search for new ideas.
Relative to the other growth models of the time, this framework
had a ring of truth that seemed to be missing from the literature:
growth occurs because of innovation from private entrepreneurs, who are
incentivized by the prospect of earning profits from their ideas. The contrast
with other models is worth appreciating. Solow (1956) obtained growth
only by assuming exogenous technological change in which productivity
improvements occur without anyone taking any actions. AK models based
on physical capital, such as Rebelo (1991), assume that capital actually does
not face any diminishing returns, at least in some sector, and there is no
mention of new technologies being developed. Similarly, Lucas (1988) has
individuals accumulating human capital, but again there are no inventions or
new technologies. Finally, the learning-by-doing models of Arrow (1962a)
and Frankel (1962) admit that technologies can improve but this is entirely
an accidental by-product of the production process itself rather than a result
of intentional efforts to innovate.
Constructing a model in which long-run growth is driven by the active
search for new ideas by entrepreneurs who are motivated by profits was the
second key contribution of Romer (1990a).
Looking Backwards
As I mentioned earlier in this article, it is remarkable how many of the
discoveries of new growth theory were actually re-discoveries of old growth
theory. For reasons we will leave to the historians, many of the insights from
the 1960s were forgotten by the heyday of the 1980s and 1990s. It is worth
reviewing the contributions from the 1960s in light of Romer’s 1990 paper
in order to see both the similarities and the differences. In this task, we are
helped appreciably by the fact that Romer himself is careful to discuss the
earlier literature.6
Arrow (1962b) views invention as the production of information, a
commodity he describes as having “peculiar attributes” in that information
should be available free of charge (as that is its marginal cost) although
this would provide no incentive for investment in research. Uzawa (1965)
considers optimal technical change in a setting where the growth rate of
technology is determined by the fraction of the labor force working in
education. Shell (1966) clearly recognizes the failure of models of perfect
competition to deliver optimal resource allocation in the presence of ideas
6
See also Romer (1987, 1990b, 2019).
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870 Paul Romer: ideas, nonrivalry, and endogenous growth
and explicitly assumes that knowledge is a pure public good. Phelps (1966)
studies the “golden rule” for research investment that maximizes steady-
state consumption.
The two papers closest to Romer (1990a) are Nordhaus (1969a)
and Shell (1973). Nordhaus (1969a) notes the public-good characteristics
of knowledge and explicitly introduces “a multitude of temporary little
monopolies on information” based on fixed-life patents. His model
generates a steady state with exponential growth at a rate that is
proportional to the population growth rate. From the standpoint of Romer
(1990a), this was viewed as something of a limitation, though I will come
back to this point in Section IV.7
Each of the papers mentioned up until now notes that knowledge
is special, and they often speak of a public good. They also assume a
production function that exhibits increasing returns when A is included
as a factor of production, such as Y = AK α L 1−α . However, with one
exception, the papers do not clearly connect the nonrivalry of knowledge to
the increasing returns they have implicitly assumed. In fact, this particular
Cobb–Douglas specification was so common in the “exogenous A” case that
the production function was often assumed to take this form automatically,
rather than justified on first principles. It is an interesting accident that
the production function of exogenous growth models, if naively used in an
attempt to endogenize A, leads to the right destination even if the nuances
of nonrivalry are not fully appreciated. Later researchers, such as Griliches
(1979), who thought carefully about where to put ideas in a production
function, in some ways chose the natural assumption of treating knowledge
as another form of rival capital, putting the stock inside the constant returns
as in Y = Aβ K α L 1−α−β .
The clear exception to this statement is Shell (1973). Shell states that
technical knowledge is a public good and uses the replication argument
to justify constant returns to capital and labor, and therefore increasing
returns to capital, labor, and technical knowledge. He further appreciates
that this means that a perfectly competitive model cannot support innovation
because payments to conventional factors would exhaust output. Despite
this promising start, the models in Shell (1973) are less satisfying. They do
not generate stable exponential growth and are not fully worked out. Shell
is unable to provide a sharp characterization of economic growth, beyond
noting that the growth rate of productivity is projected to increase over time
under some conditions.
7
Phelps (1966) also derived the result, discussed in detail below, that long-run growth in per capita
income is driven by population growth. Judd (1985) obtains this result in an expanding-variety
set-up. The learning-by-doing models of Arrow (1962a) and Sheshinski (1967) contain a similar
result.
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8
For example, as of January 2019, the Nordhaus paper had 297 citations and the Shell paper had
143 citations, both from Google Scholar. Nordhaus also has a book-length treatment published in
the same year (Nordhaus, 1969b) but it is focused on other questions related to inventive activity
rather than on the source of sustained exponential growth.
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been increasing over time. It is interesting to ask to what extent models that
have been designed to explain growth in the past century can help us to
understand growth since the Industrial Revolution, and even before. Kremer
(1993) first documented that the prediction of Romer (1990a) that growth
rates should be increasing in the overall size of the economy (captured by
H̄ in the model and proxied by population in the data) actually holds up
very well when one looks at economic growth over thousands of years.9
Subsequent research by Galor and Weil (2000), Jones (2001), Hansen and
Prescott (2002), and Lucas (2002) explored the causes of growth over the
very long run; see the review of unified growth theory in Galor (2005) for
more details.
Much of Acemoglu’s work on the direction of technical change can
be interpreted as adding a second dimension to Romer (1990a): what if
researchers can invent two different kinds of ideas? In Acemoglu (1998),
ideas can augment either skilled labor or unskilled labor. Acemoglu (2003)
revisits the famous Uzawa theorem and asks if there is any reason why
technical change would tend to be labor-augmenting instead of capital-
augmenting. Acemoglu et al. (2012) consider environmental damage and
study a world in which firms can invent “clean” or “dirty” technologies.
Finally, Hemous and Olsen (2016) and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018)
study the effects of automation on economic growth, unemployment, and
inequality.
The connections between economic growth and international trade have
been explored in a wide range of papers. Krugman (1979) and Grossman
and Helpman (1989, 1991a) were some of the early and very influential
papers. Romer himself explored this topic in Rivera-Batiz and Romer
(1991) and Romer (1994). More recent papers include Atkeson and Burstein
(2010), Ramondo et al. (2016), and Arkolakis et al. (2018).
In the end, this all-too-brief review has omitted many other topics and
lines of research that have been influenced by Romer’s work. When an
author has been cited more than 80,000 times, I suppose this is inevitable.
9
Lee (1988) has an elegant model that combines a Romer-like production function for ideas
with a Malthusian dynamic for population to predict that the growth rate of technology will itself
grow exponentially over time.
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rate of 2 percent per year for something like the past 150 years?10 In this
section, I’d like to step back and provide an overview of the modern answer
to this question – or at least the answer that I find most persuasive – and
to show how this answer ties directly to Romer’s work.
A t
= θ L At = θ s̄ A L̄, (10)
At
10
I think of the growth literature as consisting of two main branches. (1) How do we understand
frontier growth? (2) Why are some countries so much richer than others? While there is obviously
some overlap between these two questions, it is helpful to think of them as conceptually distinct.
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11
To see this, let k ≡ K/L and a ≡ A/L. Then y = k α a β (1− s̄K )1−α−β so that gy = αgk + βg a .
However, in the steady state, gk = gy and g a = g A , as there is no population growth. Combining
these equations gives the result.
12
The way I’ve stated this ignores another subtlety: the linear differential equation itself gives rise
to dynamic increasing returns. For example, suppose A t /At = s̄ L̄ and Yt = Aβt [(1 − s̄) L̄]1−β .
These equations can be combined to yield Yt = Aβ0 exp(β s̄ L̄)[(1 − s̄) L̄]1−β , which obviously
exhibits increasing returns to scale. So it would not be correct to say that all increasing returns
have been eliminated, and a perfectly competitive model with no externalities cannot decentralize
the optimal allocation here. On a related point, one could naturally ask of such a model: “why
does the idea production function look this way?” The nonrivalry of ideas would be one possible
answer.
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A t −β
= θ L At At (15)
At
L At = s̄Lt . (17)
Here, equation (14) says that output is produced by a production
function that has constant returns to objects (here just labor), and increasing
returns to objects and ideas together. The parameter σ measures the degree
of increasing returns to scale in the goods production function. Notice
13
The stylized model in this section is a simplified version of the models in Jones (1995), Kortum
(1997), and Segerstrom (1998). As noted earlier, related models can be found in Phelps (1966),
Nordhaus (1969a), Judd (1985), and Gomulka (1990).
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876 Paul Romer: ideas, nonrivalry, and endogenous growth
that we are leaving out capital just to make the model as simple as
possible. Including capital does not change anything in a substantive way.
The original Romer model also distinguished between human capital and
unskilled labor, but we drop this distinction again for simplicity.
Equation (15) is the new production function for ideas. The parameter
β > 0 captures the extent to which ideas – or, more precisely, “proportional
improvements in productivity” – are becoming harder to find. Romer
(1990a) had a similar production function, but with β = 0. The evidence
discussed in the previous section suggested that β > 0 is more consistent
with the data. Bloom et al. (2019) find values of β ≈ 1/4 for Moore’s law
and semiconductor production, β ≈ 1 for firm-level data, and β ≈ 3 for the
aggregate economy.
Equation (16) is the resource constraint for labor – labor can be used to
make either goods or new ideas. For reasons that will become clear below,
we allow for population growth at an exogenous rate n.
Finally, equation (17) specifies that a constant fraction s̄ of the
population works to make ideas, so that 1− s̄ works to make goods. In richer
models (including those cited in footnote 13), this allocation is endogenized
and studied more carefully. Again, to get to the main point as quickly as
possible, it is appropriate to specify a simple rule for the allocation.
Once the model is set up this way, the beauty of Romer (1990a) emerges
naturally. First, notice that when we talk about economic growth, we are
speaking of growth in consumption per person. In the model, this is y ≡
Y /L and, from equation (14), this is given by
yt = Atσ (1 − s̄). (18)
The key insight of nonrivalry already shines in this equation: consumption
per person is proportional to the overall stock of knowledge, A, raised to
some power. This is because ideas are nonrival: each idea can raise each
person’s consumption. Contrast this with a Solow model, where yt = k tα ;
that is, consumption per person is proportional to capital per person, not to
the aggregate stock of capital. To increase the productivity of each person
in the economy, you need to give each person a computer; however, you
can increase the productivity of any number of people by inventing a single
new idea. In other words, the essential role of the nonrivalry of ideas has
already been embedded in the goods production function, exactly as in
Romer (1990a).
Taking logs and derivatives of equation (18), we see that the growth
rate of consumption per person is proportional to the growth rate of the
overall stock of ideas: gy = σg A. Therefore, the next step is to figure out
the long-run growth rate of ideas.
To do this, consider the idea production function in equation (15),
rewritten as
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A t L At
=θ β. (19)
At A t
In order for the left-hand side of this equation, A t /At , to be constant,
we need the right-hand side to be constant. This can only occur if the
numerator and the denominator on the right-hand side grow at the same
rate: gL A = βg A. Solving this for g A, we obtain
gL n
gA = A = . (20)
β β
The growth rate of the stock of ideas in the long run equals the growth
rate of research effort deflated by the extent to which ideas are becoming
harder to find, β. In the long run, research effort can only grow at the rate
of growth of the overall population.
Finally, combining this last expression with gy = σg A, we have
σn
gy = ≡ γn. (21)
β
This is the key result that explains long-run growth. In the long run, the
growth rate of consumption per person is the product of two terms, γ and
n. Here, γ measures the overall degree of increasing returns in the economy
and is itself equal to σ (the static degree of increasing returns in goods
production) deflated by β, the extent to which ideas are becoming harder to
find. The long-run growth rate is then the product of the overall degree of
increasing returns to scale and the rate at which the scale of the economy
is itself growing, n.14
Where does this result come from? It is tied intimately to the nonrivalry
of ideas. Recall that the original lesson of Romer (1990a) was that
nonrivalry implies increasing returns. However, increasing returns means
that bigger is more productive. An economy with more people will, other
things equal, have a larger number of researchers and therefore a larger
number of ideas in the long run. Because these ideas are nonrival, a larger
number of ideas raises everyone’s income, and an economy with more
people will be richer.
An implication of this statement is that if two otherwise identical
economies have different population growth rates, the economy with the
higher rate of population growth will grow faster: the growth rate of
14
In my earlier work on this topic, I have typically written the idea production function in terms
of the level change rather than in terms of the percentage change: A t = θ L At Aφt . The two
expressions are equivalent, with β ≡ 1 − φ. Here, the Romer case corresponds to β = 0, which
is then φ = 1 in my earlier work. Similarly, the overall degree of increasing returns to scale is
γ ≡ (σ/β) = σ/(1 − φ). The “φ” approach makes clear the connection to increasing returns
in that 1/(1 − φ) measures the dynamic increasing returns associated with the idea production
function. Both approaches have their merits.
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878 Paul Romer: ideas, nonrivalry, and endogenous growth
researchers will be higher, so the growth rate of ideas will be higher, and
this delivers a higher growth rate of income per person.
In this way, the relaxation of the empirically problematic assumption
that β = 0 allows the crucial role of nonrivalry to come to the forefront.
Why has the United States grown at 2 percent per year for the past 150
years? According to this theory, an important part of the explanation is that
research effort has itself been growing exponentially. By any measure, we
have been throwing ever larger quantities of resources into the hunt for new
ideas. Just as more workers produce more cars, more researchers generate
more ideas. Exponential growth in research effort leads to a growing stock
of knowledge, and the fact that this knowledge is nonrival translates this
into growing income per person.
Notice that it is precisely the nonrivalry of ideas that is crucial. If you
try to replace knowledge with capital in this story, it no longer works. In
the presence of population growth, it is easy to get aggregate capital to
grow, just as we have gotten the aggregate stock of knowledge to grow.
However, because capital is rival, growth in the aggregate capital stock at
the rate of population growth does not translate into growth in capital per
person or income per person. In contrast, because knowledge is nonrival,
growth in the aggregate stock of knowledge at the rate of population growth
will cause income per person to grow.
The result that long-run growth in income per person is proportional
to the rate of population growth might well seem surprising, and perhaps
even controversial. This is a point that is still being debated in the growth
literature. It leads to many additional questions. Should Germany be richer
than Luxembourg because it has more people? Should Ghana grow faster
than China because it has a faster rate of population growth? Both these
questions highlight the fact that ideas flow across borders, so an individual
country’s economic performance is not intimately tied to its own population
(see Coe and Helpman, 1995; Eaton and Kortum, 1996; Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare, 2005). What happens to growth if population growth
comes to an end? These and other questions are raised by this theory of
economic growth. Jones (2005) and Bloom et al. (2019) are two useful
references for the reader who would like to learn more about this general
topic.
The initial paragraphs of this section might appear superficially critical
of Romer (1990a), but I hope by now that I have conveyed that the truth is
actually the opposite. Removing the AK structure from the idea production
function allows the importance of nonrivalry to be fully appreciated. Such
AK structures were in vogue during the late 1980s, so it was natural for
Romer to include one. But this inclusion turned out to be a distraction from
the central contribution that Romer himself emphasized: the nonrivalry of
ideas is what makes sustained exponential growth possible.
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VI. Conclusion
Beginning in the 1980s, the field of economic growth experienced a
renaissance. Insights from the 1950s and 1960s were rediscovered, but
the field, pushed forward by Romer, Lucas, Barro, Aghion and Howitt,
Grossman and Helpman, and many others, achieved new heights and opened
door after door for future research. Romer’s ultimate contribution stems
from an appreciation that ideas, because they are nonrival, are in their very
essence different from other goods. Romer was the first to truly understand
the implications of nonrivalry – and the increasing returns that it implies
– for economic growth.
We have a theory of endogenous technological change emphasizing
the role of entrepreneurs and researchers, motivated in part by the profits
associated with the discovery of new ideas. We have a world where the
fundamental theorems of welfare economics no longer hold; there is an
important role for government beyond simply providing secure property
rights and stepping aside. And we have an understanding of sustained
exponential growth, like that experienced in many countries for the past
150 years.
Romer’s contribution is essentially a beautiful theorem about the way
the world works, of a kind that is extremely rare. It will be remembered
and built upon for as long as economics exists.
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