The Case of Georgia
The Case of Georgia
The Case of Georgia
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. .
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Cambridge University Press and Southern Political Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Politics.
http://www.jstor.org
RECENT RESTRICTIONSUPON NEGRO
SUFFRAGE:THE CASE OF GEORGIA*
JOSEPHL. BERND AND LYNWOOD M. HOLLAND
High Point College and Emory University
D URING THE DECADEAND A HALF which has elapsed since the in-
validation of the white primary by the U. S. Supreme Court,'
advocates of white supremacy in Georgia, as in other states in the
deep South, have employed several techniques to keep colored per-
sons away from the ballot boxes. The passage, meanwhile, of the
Civil Rights Act of 1957,2 the deliberations of the Eighty-Sixth
Congress and the activities of the Civil Rights Commission and the
Department of Justice evince an increasingly active role by federal
authorities in implementing the guarantees of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments.
The principal aims of this paper are to describe and analyze the
tactics of obstruction in Georgia and to suggest specific legal pro-
cedures and measures for curbing practices which deny to Negro
citizens the equal protection of the laws. An assumption is that most
of the obstacles erected in Georgia are typical of resistance in the
deep South and that weapons of discrimination,found to be effective
in one state, are likely to be used in other states. In fulfillment of
its chief aims, the paper discusses the impediments found in several
aspects of the franchise process: registration, purging of registration
lists, voting and electoral structure. A final section of the paper is
devoted to an appraisal of the impact of discrimination upon Negro
suffrage and of the prospects for reform.
"'AtlantaConstitution,September8, 1948.
`Georgia Code Annotated, 1933, 34-301, 302.
"8GeorgiaCode Annotated, 1933, 34-401 (55) provided that the registration
lists be considered "prima facie evidence of the right of the person whose
name appears thereon to vote."
"The hearings were conducted under the most severe time pressures.
Registration ended July 5, 1946; the tax collectors were given ten days to
1959] RESTRICTIONS ON NEGRO SUrFRAGE: IN GEORGIA 491
acy has been dominant ideologically, and political power has been
stabilized in the hands of its advocates.
But successful operation of the plan in Georgia may have en-
couraged its use elsewhere. Louisiana, for instance, attempted the
largest single purge, involving about three thousand voters in
Ouachita County. Here the purge was illegal on its face because
Louisiana's statutory procedures were not followed.22 Whether
accomplished without litigation, or ultimately invalidated by a
federal court, the challenge-purgehas usually achieved its immediate
goal, the disenfranchisement of colored votors in an impending
election. It is employed when challengers are assured of the co-
operation of the registrars, and its success rapidly becomes a fait
accompli because of the "law's delay."
color away from the "white folks' ballot boxes."29 But just before
the Georgia General Assembly convened in 1949, a U.S. court voided
the Boswell Amendment of Alabama. The test, requiring applicants
for registration to "understand and explain," was hopelessly vague,
said the court, with no directions for its application or for evaluating
the answers. As applied, the law rejected a heavy proportion of
Negroes and no whites. If experts, even judges, disagreed as to the
meaning of constitutional provisions, could lay registrars, unguided,
be expected to decide?30
With the Alabama decision as a negative guide, the Georgia
lawgivers enacted a law which required re-registrationof all voters.
Two tests were provided, as previously noted, reading and writing,
or ability to answer ten of thirty questions of an objective nature.31
But the 1949 law did not produce a white primary. Many voters
were afraid to submit to examination under its terms. Others re-
sented the necessity of standing a test before being permitted to
retain a right or privilege which they had previously enjoyed. The
expense was a drain upon the marginal economy of many small
counties. Under heavy pressure from citizens and local officials, the
Talmadge administration secured from the General Assembly in
1950 an amendment to the law.32 Voters registered under the old
provisions would remain eligible to cast ballots.
Although the 1949 act offered explicit and detailed provisions
for registrationprocedure, the counties continued to display the most
varied of extra-legal or illegal practices. The State Supreme Court
ruled that the law was valid and non-discriminatoryon its face,33
but a 1955 survey by the Bureau of Public Administration of the
University of Georgia revealed that scarcely a single county was
conducting its registration in full accord with the statute. Racial
discrimination was not a principal reason for this record of non-
enforcement, although there was some discriminationand the padded
lists of white voters were an invitation to fraud which was some-
times accepted. Lack of funds for efficient personnel and operation,
ignorance of the law, and a tradition for laxity also hampered
29A phrase popular with the late Eugene Talmadge during his successful
1946 primary campaign. See Americus Times-Recorder, July 11, 1946.
.0Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (1949). See also Strong, op. cit., pp.
21-25. Cf., Key, op cit, pp. 632-635.
"Georgia Laws, 1949, 1204-1227.
82Georgiz Laws, 1950, 126-131.
`3Franklin v. Harper, 55 S.E. (2d) 221 (1949); 205 Ga. 779 (1949).
1959] RESTRICTIONS ON NEGRO SUFFRAGE: IN GEORGIA 497
The Board of Registrars shall have the right and shall be charged
with the duty of examining from time to time the qualifications of each
elector whose name is entered upon the list of qualified voters, and
shall not be limited or estopped by any action taken at any prior time.43
personal malice, Crews sought to avoid the onus of "willful" intent to deprive
the victim of his civil rights. The court said an officer could consistently
hold both motives, and the conviction of Crews was upheld.
"1Davis v. Schnell, op. cit., p. 878.
"2See Carr, op. cit., pp. 56-190.
506 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS [Vol. 21
1938); Albert B. Saye, "'The County Unit Vote," The Georgia Review, IV
(Spring, 1950), 16-24; Tarleton Collier, "Georgia, Paradise of Oligarchy," in
Robert S. Allen (ed.), Our Sovereign State (New York, 1949).
""South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
"Ibid., pp. 277-278.
"Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, 556. Quoted with approvalin Harts-
field v. Bell, civil, #6385, Northern District of Georgia (1958).
19591 RESTRICTIONS ON NEGRO SU1oFRAGE: IN GEORGIA 511