Doctrines: Civil Law of The Philippines

1 DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINES DESCRIPTIONS CASES
1. Doctrine of Estoppel It is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair In the Megan Sugar Corporation v. Regional Trial Court
dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to of Iloilo, Br. 68, Dumangas, Iloilo; New Frontier Sugar
forbid one to speak against his own act, Corp., et al., G.R. No. 170352. June 1, 2011
representations, or commitments to the injury of one Based on the events and circumstances surrounding
to whom they were directed and who reasonably the issuance of the assailed orders, this Court rules
relied thereon. The doctrine springs from equitable that MEGAN is estopped from assailing both the
principles and the equities in the case. It is designed authority of Atty. Sabig and the jurisdiction of the
to aid the law in the administration of justice where RTC. While it is true, as claimed by MEGAN, that
without its aid injustice might result. It has been Atty. Sabig said in court that he was only appearing
applied by this Court wherever and whenever for the hearing of Passi Sugar’s motion for
special circumstances of a case so demand. intervention and not for the case itself, his
subsequent acts, coupled with MEGAN’s inaction
and negligence to repudiate his authority, effectively
bars MEGAN from assailing the validity of the RTC
proceedings under the principle of estoppel.
Ching vs. Nicdao G.R. No. 141181, Petitioner Ching

correctly argued that he, as the offended party, may
appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding
respondent Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA. The civil
action was impliedly instituted with the criminal
action since he did not reserve his right to institute it
separately nor did he institute the civil action prior
to the criminal action. If the accused is acquitted on
reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on
the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution
cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it
would place the accused in double jeopardy.
However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or
the accused or both may appeal from the judgment
on the civil aspect of the case within the period

therefor.
2. Doctrine of Apparent Authority It is a concept used in agency law that refers to the Philippine Realty and Holding Corp. vs. Ley Const. and
situation that arises when a principal, such as a Dev. Corp./Ley Cons. and Dev. Corp. vs. Philippine
corporation, indicates to a third party that an officer Realty and Holding Corp., G.R. No. 165548/G.R. No.
or agent is authorized to act on its behalf and the 167879. June 13, 2011.
third party relies in good faith upon such authority. The Court finds that the signature of Abcede is
It is used a defense when implied or espress actual sufficient to bind PRHC. As its construction
authority does not exist. When the defense is manager, his very act of signing a letter embodying
successfully raised, the principal is estopped from the P 36 million escalation agreements produced
denying the authority of the officer or agent. legal effect, even if there was a blank space for a
higher officer of PHRC to indicate approval thereof.
At the very least, he indicated authority to make
such representation on behalf of PRHC. On direct
examination, Abcede admitted that, as the
construction manager, he represented PRHC in
running its affairs with regard to the execution of the
aforesaid projects. Abcede had signed, on behalf of
PRHC, other documents that were almost identical
to the questioned letter-agreement. PRHC does not
question the validity of these agreements; it thereby
effectively admits that this individual had actual
authority to sign on its behalf with respect to these
construction projects.
Prudential Bank v. CA. G.R. 103957. June 14, 1993.

If a corporation knowingly permits one of its
officers, or any other agents, to do acts within the
scope of an apparent authority, and this holds him
out to the public as possessing power to do those
acts, the corporation will, as against anyone who has
in good faith dealt with the corporation through

such agents, be estopped from denying his
authority.
3. Doctrine of Lex Loci Celebrationis Under this doctrine, the law of the place where a Germann and Co. V. Donaldson, Sim and Co. 1 Phil. 63.
contract, specially a marriage, was made or A power of attorney was executed in Germany
celebrated, governs. giving the recipient authority to bring an action in
the Philippines. Said power of attorney was not
authenticated by a notary public. In Germany, no
such authentication was needed, contrary to
Philippines rules. The power of attorney was
properly made insofar as form was concerned
because it was executed in Germany. There is no
reason why lex loci celebrationis should not apply.
Insular Government vs. Frank 13 Phil 236, G.R.No.2935.

March 23, 1909. Mr. Frank being fully qualified to
enter into a contract at the place and time the
contract was made, he cannot therefore plead
infancy as a defense at the place where the contract
is being enforced. Although Mr. Frank was still a
minor under Philippine laws, he was nevertheless
considered an adult under the laws of the state of
Illinois,the place where the contract was made. No
rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing
upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a
contract are determined by the law of the place
where the contract is made. Matters connected to its
performance are regulated by the law prevailing at
the place of its performance. Matters respecting a
remedy, such as bringing of a suit, admissibility of
evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon
the law of the place where the suit is brought.
4. Doctrine of Lex Loci Delicti Commissi It is the Latin term for "law of the place where the Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. CA G.R. 122191. With the
delict [tort] was committed"[1] in the conflict of widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex
laws. Conflict of laws is the branch of law regulating loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on
all lawsuits involving a "foreign" law element where tort liability have been advanced to offer fresh
a difference in result will occur depending on which judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In
laws are applied. The term is often shortened to lex keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort
loci delicti. liability, we find here an occasion to apply the "State
of the most significant relationship" rule, which in
our view should be appropriate to apply now, given
the factual context of this case.
In applying said principle to determine the State

which has the most significant relationship, the
following contacts are to be taken into account and
evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place
where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties,
and (d) the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered.
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that

over-all injury occurred and lodged in the
Philippines. There is likewise no question that
private respondent is a resident Filipina national,
working with petitioner, a resident foreign
corporation engaged here in the business of
international air carriage. Thus, the "relationship"
between the parties was centered here, although it

should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere
labor law violations. From the record, the claim that
the Philippines has the most significant contact with
the matter in this dispute, raised by private
respondent as plaintiff below against defendant
(herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly
established.
Navida, et.al. vs. Dizon, Jr., et.al. G.R. No. 125078.

CHIQUITA argues that the courts a quo had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases filed
before them. The Amended Joint-Complaints sought
approximately P2.7 million in damages for each
plaintiff claimant, which amount falls within the
jurisdiction of the RTC. CHIQUITA avers that the
pertinent matter is the place of the alleged exposure
to DBCP, not the place of manufacture, packaging,
distribution, sale, etc., of the said chemical. This is in
consonance with the lex loci delicti commisi theory
in determining the situs of a tort, which states that
the law of the place where the alleged wrong was
committed will govern the action. CHIQUITA and
the other defendant companies also submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC by making
voluntary appearances and seeking for affirmative
reliefs during the course of the proceedings. None of
the defendant companies ever objected to the
exercise of jurisdiction by the courts a quo over their
persons. CHIQUITA, thus, prays for the remand of
Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of
General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City,
respectively.
5. Doctrine of Lex Loci Rei Sitae It is the Latin term for “law of the place where the Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Company
property is situated”. It is a doctrine which states v. The Collector of Internal Revenue. G.R. No. L-46720,
that the law governing the transfer of title to June 28, 1940. He extended his activities with respect
property is dependent upon, and varies with, the to his intangibles, so as to avail himself of the
location of the property for the purposes of the protection and benefits of the laws of the
conflict of laws. Conflict is the branch of public law Philippines, in such a way as to bring his person or
regulating all lawsuits involving a "foreign" law property within the reach of the Philippines, the
element where a difference in result will occur reason for a single place of taxation no longer
depending on which laws are applied. obtains- protection, benefit, and power over the
subject matter are no longer confined to California,
but also to the Philippines. In the instant case, the
actual situs of the shares of stock is in the
Philippines, the corporation being domiciled therein.
And besides, the certificates of stock have remained
in this country up to the time when the deceased
died in California, and they were in possession of
one Syrena McKee, secretary of the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company, to whom they have
been delivered and indorsed in blank. This
indorsement gave Syrena McKee the right to vote
the certificates at the general meetings of the
stockholders, to collect dividends, and dispose of the
shares in the manner she may deem fit, without
prejudice to her liability to the owner for violation of
instructions. For all practical purposes, then, Syrena
McKee had the legal title to the certificates of stock
held in trust for the true owner thereof. In other
words, the owner residing in California has
extended here her activities with respect to her
intangibles so as to avail herself of the protection
and benefit of the Philippine laws. Accordingly, the

jurisdiction of the Philippine Government to tax
must be upheld.
Manila Gas Corporation vs. Collector of Internal

Revenue, 62 Phil. 895 (1935). The absence of flight
operations to and from the Philippines is not
determinative of the source of income or the situs of
income taxation. The test of taxability is the `source';
and the source of an income is that activity which
produced the income. Unquestionably, the passage
documentations in these cases were sold in the
Philippines and the revenue therefrom was derived
from a business activity regularly pursued within
the Philippines. The word `source' conveys one
essential Idea, that of origin, and the origin of the
income herein is the Philippines
6. The Operative Fact Doctrine The law is recognized as unconstitutional but the Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, March
effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its 14, 2008, G.R. No. 166006. The doctrine of operative
declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies
matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the
of the operative fact doctrine is an admission that effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing
the law is unconstitutional. that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot
always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of

unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on
those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it
was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of

unconstitutionality would put the accused in double
jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
Francisco I. Chavez v. National Housing Authority, R-II

Builders, Inc., R-II Holdings, Inc., Harbour Centre Port
Terminal, Inc., and Mr. Reghis Romero II. G.R. No.
164527, August 15, 2007. When the petitioner filed
the case, the JVA had already been terminated by
virtue of MOA between RBI and NHA. The
properties and rights in question after the passage of
around 10 years from the start of the project’s
implementation cannot be disturbed or questioned.
The petitioner, being the Solicitor General at the time
SMDRP was formulated, had ample opportunity to
question the said project, but did not do so. The
moment to challenge has passed.
7. Doctrine of Relations That principle of law by which an act done at one Alhambra Cigra vs SEC, G.R. No. L-23606, July 29,
time is considered by a fiction of law to have been 1968. "Since the privilege of extension is purely
done at some antecedent period. It is a doctrine statutory, all of the statutory conditions precedent
which, although of equitable origin, has a well- must be complied with in order that the extension
recognized application to proceedings at law; a legal may be effectuated. And, generally these conditions
fiction invented to promote the ends of justice or to must be complied with, and the steps necessary to
prevent injustice end the occurrence of injuries effect the extension must be taken, during the life of
where otherwise there would be no remedy. The the corporation, and before the expiration of the term of
doctrine, when invoked, must have connection with existence as original fixed by its charter or the general
actual fact, must be based on some antecedent law, since, as a rule, the corporation is ipso facto dissolved
lawful rights. It has also been referred to as "the as soon as that time expires. So where the extension is
doctrine of relation back”. by amendment of the articles of incorporation, the
amendment must be adopted before that time. And,
similarly, the filing and recording of a certificate of

extension after that time cannot relate back to the
date of the passage of a resolution by the
stockholders in favor of the extension so as to save
the life of the corporation. The contrary is true,
however, and the doctrine of relation will apply,
where the delay is due to the neglect of the officer
with whom the certificate is required to be filed, or
to a wrongful refusal on his part to receive it. And
statutes in some states specifically provide that a
renewal may be had within a specified time before
or after the time fixed for the termination of the
corporate existence”
8. Fair Use Doctrine The general public is given the right to reproduce a The Philippines has not had any case brought before
work subject to specific limitations. Under the courts to challenge fair use in this context. To
Philippine law, fair use of a work for criticism, illustrate the point, we must draw on American
comment, news reporting, teaching, including court decisions. In Princeton University vs.
multiple copies for classroom use, scholarship, Michigan Document Service, Inc. (unreported, 1992),
research and similar purposes does not infringe the U.S. Court did not consider photocopying of
copyright. Fair use has no exact definition under the materials for compilation in course packs as fair use
law. However, authorities have agreed on the because photocopying was done by a commercial
following criteria enumerated in sec. 185.1 of the vendor. On the other hand, in another case, the U.S.
Code: Court tended towards the more fundamental aim of
protecting the progress of science and the arts. In
1.) the purpose and character of the use, Williams vs. Wilkins Co. (487 F2d 1345) it gave the
including whether such use is of a opinion that medical science would be seriously hurt
commercial nature or is for non-profit if library photocopying was stopped.
educational purposes; the nature of the
copyrighted work; the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

2.) The effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Traditionally, fair use is more easily accepted when

the purpose of copying is educational in character
and purpose than when it is commercial or for
profit. It does not mean, however, that all copying
for educational or classroom purposes is fair use.
9. Fraus Et Jus Nunquam Cohabitant “Fraud and Justice never agree together.” A maxim Republic v. CA, G.R. No. L-60169, March 23, 1990. Of
meaning that fraud corrupts justice regardless of the course, we are well aware of the rule reiterated in
good faith or just intentions” Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Santos, that,
generally, the State cannot be put in estoppel by the
mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. In that
very case, however, citing 31 CJS 675-676, we went
further by saying:
“Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed

to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens,
and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby
thing; and subject to limitations xxx, the doctrine of
equitable estoppel may be invoked against public
authorities as well as against private individuals”
Republic of the Philippines v. Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., Et

al., Spouses Eduardo and Arcelita Marquez and Rural
Bank Of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. G.R. No. 155394.,
February 17, 2005. In any event, the verification
survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Melencio
Mangahas on February 15, 1988 came almost
twenty-two (22) years after the February 28, 1966
certification of Jose Mendigoria; more than twenty-

one (21) years after the issuance of Agunoy Sr.’s Free
Patent No. 314450 on January 18, 1967 and its
registration as Original Certificate of Title No. P-
4522 on February 6, 1967; and more than eight (8)
years reckoned from July 31, 1979 when, upon the
death of the wife of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., the heirs
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Sale
in favor of Joaquin Sangabol. In the meanwhile, for
about half a decade thereafter, ownership over the
properties transferred from one buyer to another,
with each and every transferee enjoying the
presumption of good faith. If only on this score
alone that the present petition must fall.
There can be no debate at all on petitioner’s

submission that no amount of legal technicality may
serve as a solid foundation for the enjoyment of the
fruits of fraud. It is thus understandable why
petitioner chants the dogma of fraus et jus nunquam
cohabitant.
Significantly, however, in the cases cited by

petitioner Republic, as well as in those other cases
where the doctrine of fraus et jus nunquam
cohabitant was applied against a patent and title
procured thru fraud or misrepresentation, we note
that the land covered thereby is either a part of the
forest zone which is definitely non-disposable, as in
Animas, or that said patent and title are still in the
name of the person who committed the fraud or
misrepresentation, as in Acot, Animas, Republic vs.
CA and Del Mundo and Director of Lands vs.

Abanilla, et al. and, in either instance, there were yet
no innocent third parties standing in the way.
Here, it bears stressing that, by petitioner’s own

judicial admission, the lots in dispute are no longer
part of the public domain, and there are numerous
third, fourth, fifth and more parties holding Torrens
titles in their favor and enjoying the presumption of
good faith. This brings to mind what we have
reechoed in Pino vs. Court of Appeals and the cases
therein cited:
Even on the supposition that the sale was void, the

general rule that the direct result of a previous
illegal contract cannot be valid (on the theory that
the spring cannot rise higher than its source) cannot
apply here for We are confronted with the
functionings of the Torrens System of Registration.
The doctrine to follow is simple enough: a
fraudulent or forged document of sale may become
the ROOT of a valid title if the certificate of title has
already been transferred from the name of the true
owner to the name of the forger or the name
indicated by the forger.
It is even worse in this case because here, there is no

forger to speak of. The remark of Land Inspector
Jose Mendigoria about the abandonment by Eusebio
Perez and Valenciano Espiritu cannot, by itself, be
fraudulent. And, for all we know, that remark may
even turn out to be the truth. What petitioner
perceives as fraud may be nothing more than the

differences of professional opinions between Land
Inspector Jose Mendigoria and Geodetic Engineer
Melencio Mangahas. But regardless of who between
the two is correct, the hard reality is that the
properties in question are no longer floating objects
on a spring that cannot rise higher than its source, as
they are now very much ashore and firmly standing
on the high solid ground of the Torrens system of
land registration.
10. Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet Literally meaning "no one gives what he doesn't Egao vs CA, G.R. No. L-79787. June 29, 1989. Deeds of
have" is a legal rule, sometimes called the nemo dat sale of patented lands, perfected within the
rule, that states that the purchase of a possession prohibited five (5) year period are null and void
from someone who has no ownership right to it also (Sec. 124, Public Land Act). No title passed from the
denies the purchaser any ownership title. Egaos to Marfori which could be validly transferred
to herein respondents Bontilao and Dignos. Nemo
Also, where goods are sold by a person who is not dat quod non habet (nobody can dispose of that which
their owner, and who does not sell them under the does not belong to him).
authority or with the consent of the owner, the
buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the While the government has not taken steps to
seller had, unless the owner of goods is by his assert its title, by reversion, to a homestead sold in
conduct precluded from denying the seller's violation of the Public Land Act, the vendor or his
authority to sell. heirs is better entitled to the possession of the said,
the vendee being in no better situation than any
intruder.
Accordingly, respondents who are not innocent

purchasers for value have no standing to question
petitioners' right to the land and to file an action for
quieting of title.
Del Rosario v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 187056, September 20,

2010. Since the donation in this case was one made
inter vivos, it was immediately operative and final.
The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed
perfected from the moment the donor learned of the
donee’s acceptance of the donation. The acceptance
makes the donee the absolute owner of the property
donated.
Given that the donation in this case was

irrevocable or one given inter vivos, Leopoldo’s
subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in
the property to Asuncion should be regarded as
void for, by then, he had no more rights to assign.
He could not give what he no longer had. Nemo dat
quod non habet.
The trial court cannot be faulted for passing

upon, in a petition for probate of what was initially
supposed to be a donation mortis causa, the validity
of the document as a donation inter vivos and the
nullity of one of the donor’s subsequent assignment
of his rights and interests in the property. The Court
has held before that the rule on probate is not
inflexible and absolute. Moreover, in opposing the
petition for probate and in putting the validity of the
deed of assignment squarely in issue, Asuncion or
those who substituted her may not now claim that
the trial court improperly allowed a collateral attack
on such assignment.
11. Doctrine of Processual Presumption Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if ATCI Overseas Corporation, Amalia G. Ikdal and
pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that Ministry of Public Health-Kuwait v. Ma. Josefa Echin.
foreign law is the same as ours. G.R. No. 178551, October 11, 2010. In the present case,
the employment contract signed by Gran specifically
states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not
provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for
termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the
law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to
apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should
govern all matters relating to the termination of the
employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a

foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law
is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded
and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take
judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to
know only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the

pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the
International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
approach or processual presumption comes into
play.
Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and

C.F. Sharp & Company Inc., G.R. No. 112573. February
9, 1995. Alternatively in the light of the absence of

proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption of
identity or similarity or the so-called processual
presumption 10 may be invoked. Applying it, the
Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar
with the Philippine law on service of summons on a
private foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
provides that if the defendant is a foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines,
service may be made: (1) on its resident agent
designated in accordance with law for that purpose,
or, (2) if there is no such resident agent, on the
government official designated by law to that effect;
or (3) on any of its officers or agents within the
Philippines. In as much as SHARP was admittedly
doing business in Japan through its four duly
registered branches at the time the collection suit
against it was filed, then in the light of the
processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a
resident of Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the
jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed
to have assented to the said courts' lawful methods
of serving process. 27
Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons

on it by the Japanese Court was valid not only under
the processual presumption but also because of the
presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty.
We find NORTHWEST's claim for attorney's fees,

litigation expenses, and exemplary damages to be

without merit. We find no evidence that would
justify an award for attorney's fees and litigation
expenses under Article 2208 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Nor is an award for exemplary damages
warranted. Under Article 2234 of the Civil Code,
before the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should be
awarded, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled
to moral, temperate, or compensatory damaged.
There being no such proof presented by
NORTHWEST, no exemplary damages may be
adjudged in its favor.
12. The Renvoi Doctrine The doctrine whereby a jural matter is presented In the Matter of the Testate Estate of Edward E.
which the conflict of laws rules of the forum refer to Christensen, Deceased. Adolfo C. Aznar, Executor and
a foreign law which in turn, refers the matter back to Lucy Christensen, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
the law of the forum or a third state. When reference Heir-appellees, v. Helen Christensen Garcia. G.R. No. L-
is made back to the law of the forum, this is said to 16749, January 31, 1963. It is argued on executor’s
be "remission" while reference to a third state is behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen
called "transmission." of the State of California, the internal law thereof,
which is that given in the Kaufman case, should
govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen’s will, such
law being in force in the State of California of which
Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other
hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable,
and in accordance therewith and following the
doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of
the testamentary provision in question should be
referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile,
which is the Philippines.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code

is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in
In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ
ession and the conflict of laws rules of California are
to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and
appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re
Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State,
but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as
are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the
law of the domicile in the determination of matters
with foreign element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the
domiciliary law should govern in most matters or
rights which follow the person of the owner.
Testate Estate of Bohanan v Bohanan, et al. 106 Phil. 997.

Since the laws of the State of Nevada allow the
testator to dispose of all his property according to
his will, his testamentary dispositions depriving his
wife and children of what should be their legitimes
under Philippine laws, should be respected and the
project of partition made in accordance with his
testamentary dispositions respected, and with the
project of partition made in accordance with his
testamentary dispositions approved.
13. Doctrine of Nullum Tempus Occurrit Regi It is the Latin of "no time runs against the king", Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil 693. If the statute of
sometimes abbreviated nullum tempus. It states that limitation or prescription cannot run against the
the crown is not subject to statute of limitations. This state, it is difficult to understand how in the same
means that the crown can proceed with actions that action they may be used as a defense against a
would be barred if brought by an individual due to public officer who has been forcibly, with threats
the passage of time. and intimidation, ousted from a public office by the
Government itself as was done in the present case.
The principle that acts of limitation do not bind the
King (the State) or the people, applies to proceeding
by quo warranto, the rule being that the
representative of the state may file an information
on behalf of the people at any time; and the lapse of
time constitutes no bar to the proceeding, in
conformity with the maxim Nullum tempus occurrit
regi. For the state to claim that the statutes of
limitation do not apply to it and yet insist that it may
plead such statutes to bar the action of quo warranto
brought by one of its public officials whom it itself
has ousted from office, appears to us to be unjust,
unfair, unreasonable, and not within the
contemplation of sound jurisprudence.
Mindanao Development Authority, now the Southern

Philippines Development Administration v. The Court of
Appeals and Francisco and Bansing. G.R. No. L-49087,
April 5, 1982. In any event, the real plaintiff in this
case is the Republic of the Philippines and
prescription does not run against the State (De la
Vina vs. Government of the P.I., 65 Phil. 262, 265;
Republic vs. Ruiz, L-23712, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA
348).
The maxim is nullum tempus occurrit regi or nullum

tempus occurrit reipublicae (lapse of time does not
bar the right of the crown or lapse of time does not
bar the commonwealth). The rule is now embodied
in article 1108(4) of the Civil Code.
It is a maxim of great antiquity in English law. The

best reason for its existence is the great public policy
of preserving public rights and property from
damage and loss through the negligence of public
officers. (34 Am Jur. 301; Ballentines's Law
Dictionary, p. 891; U.S. vs. Nashville, Chattanooga &
St. Louis Railway Co., 118 U.S. 120,125).
Thus, the right of reversion or reconveyance to the

State of lands fraudulently registered or not
susceptible of private appropriation or acquisition
does not prescribe (Martines vs. Court of Appeals, L-
31271, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 647, 655; Republic vs.
Ramos, 117 Phil. 45, 49).
The government officials concerned were negligent

in not intervening in the land registration
proceeding or in not promptly asking Ang Banging
to reconvey the disputed lot to the Commonwealth
or to the Republic of the Philippines.
Such negligence does not prejudice the State. The

negligence or omissions of public officers as to their
public duties will not work an estoppel against the
State (10 R.C.L. 705, cited in Bachrach Motor Co. vs.
Unson, 50 Phil. 981, 990; Central Azucarera de Tarlac
vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 104 Phil. 653, 656;
People vs. Ventura, 114 Phil. 162, 169).
14. Doctrine of Indefeasibility of Torrens Titles A doctrine that a certificate of title, once registered, De Pedro vs Romasan, GR 158002. According to the
should not thereafter be impugned, altered, report, the land claimed by the petitioners was
changed, modified, enlarged or diminished except in covered by the title under the name of respondent
a direct proceeding permitted by law. corporation, the petitioners’ claim for damages had
no leg to stand on.
15. Doctrine of Piercing the Veil of Corporate The doctrine used whenever a court finds that a San Juan Structural v. Court of Appeals 296 SCRA
Fiction corporate fiction is used to defeat public 631(1998). The Court finds no reason to pierce the
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend corporate veil of Respondent Motorich. Petitioner
crime, or to confuse legitimate issues, or that a utterly failed to establish that said corporation was
corporation is the mere alter ego or business conduit formed, or that it is operated, for the purpose of
of a person or where the corporation id so organized shielding any alleged fraudulent or illegal activities
and controlled. One of the advantages of a corporate of its officers or stockholders, or that the said veil
form of business organization is the limitation of an was used to conceal fraud, illegality or inequity at
investor’s liability to the amount of the investment. the expense of third persons like petitioner. Veil can
This feature flows from the legal theory that a only be disregarded when it is utilized as a shield to
corporate entity is separate and distinct from its commit fraud, illegality or inequity, defeat public
stockholders. However, the statutorily granted convenience, confuse legitimate issues or serve as a
privilege of a corporate veil may be used only for mere alter ego or business conduit of a person or an
legitimate purposes. instrumentality, agency or adjunct of another
corporation.
David Winship v. Phil. Trust Co., G.R. L-3869, January

31, 1952. During war, we may pierce the veil of
corporate identity, and go to the very nationality of
the controlling stockholders regardless of where the
incorporation had been made. Thus a German-
controlled corporation, even if incorporated in the
Philippines, was considered an enemy corporation
during the war for the purpose of freezing its assets.
A contrary rule may endanger Philippine security.
16. The de facto Corporation Doctrine Formulate to safeguard the security of commercial Seventh Day Adventist Conference Church of Southern
transactions whenever they involve the corporation. Philippines, Inc. v Northeastern Mindanao Mission of
Parties dealing with said corporation are secured by Seventh Day Adventist, Inc. G.R. No. 150416 Juy 21,
the fact that the transactions entered into with said 2006. “The de facto doctrine thus effects a
corporations may be sued upon and they can compromise between two conflicting public
recover. That is why aside from the other two interest[s]—the one opposed to an unauthorized
requisites there must be a set of officers (i.e. assumption of corporate privileges; the other in
assumption of corporate powers) or directors favor of doing justice to the parties and of
because of the principle that a corporation can only establishing a general assurance of security in
act through its officers. business dealing with corporations.”
In view of the foregoing, petitioners’ arguments

anchored on their supposed de facto status hold no
water. We are convinced that there was no donation
to petitioners or their supposed predecessor-in-
interest.
Well-entrenched is the rule that a Certificate of Title

is generally a conclusive evidence of [ownership] of
the land. There is that strong and solid presumption
that titles were legally issued and that they are valid.
It is irrevocable and indefeasible and the duty of the
Court is to see to it that the title is maintained and
respected unless challenged in a direct proceeding.
The title shall be received as evidence in all the
Courts and shall be conclusive as to all matters
contained therein.
According to Art. 1477 of the Civil Code, the

ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to
the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery
thereof. Here, transfer of ownership from the
spouses Cosio to SDA-NEMM was made upon

constructive delivery of the property on February 28,
1980 when the sale was made through a public
instrument. TCT No. 4468 was thereafter issued and
it remains in the name of SDA-NEMM.
17. Unjust Enrichment The principle that no person may unjustly enrich Chieng vs. Spouses Santos, GR 169647, August 3, 2007.
himself at the expense of another (Nemo cum The principle of unjust enrichment obliges the
alterius detrimento locupletari potest) is embodied respondents to pay the remaining balance of the
in Article 22 of the New Civil Code. There is unjust loan plus interest. Relieving the respondents of their
enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, obligation to pay the balance of the loan would,
and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or indeed, be to sanction unjust enrichment in favor of
with damages to another. The main objective of the respondents and cause unjust poverty to petitioner.
principle of unjust enrichment is to prevent one
from enriching oneself at the expense of another. It In the exercise of our mandate as a court of justice
is commonly accepted that this doctrine simply and equity, we hold, pro hac vice, that respondents
means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or are still liable to pay the remaining balance of the
enrich himself inequitably at another’s expense. loan. Respondents Eulogio and Teresita Santos are
hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner Antonio Chieng,
substituted by William Chieng, the balance of the
loan amounting to P93,000.00, plus legal interest of
12% per annum from 30 July 1992 up to the finality
of this Decision, and an additional legal interest of
12% per annum from the finality of this Decision up
to its satisfaction.
18. Pari Delicto A doctrine that provides that courts will not enforce Hulst vs. PR Builders Inc., GR 156364, September 3,
an invalid contract and that no party can recover in 2007. A universal doctrine which holds that no
an action where it is necessary to prove the existence action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal
of an illegal contract in order to make his or her case. contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific
performance, or to recover the property agreed to be
sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or
damages for its violation; and where the parties are

in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will
be given to one against the other. This rule, however,
is subject to exceptions that permit the return of that
which may have been given under a void contract
to: (a) the innocent party (Arts. 1411-1412, Civil
Code); (b) the debtor who pays usurious interest
(Art. 1413, Civil Code); (c) the party repudiating the
void contract before the illegal purpose is
accomplished or before damage is caused to a third
person and if public interest is sub served by
allowing recovery (Art. 1414, Civil Code); (d)the
incapacitated party if the interest of justice so
demands (Art. 1415, Civil Code); (e) the party for
whose protection the prohibition by law is intended
if the agreement is not illegal per se but merely
prohibited and if public policy would be enhanced
by permitting recovery (Art. 1416, Civil Code); and
(f) the party for whose benefit the law has been
intended such as in price ceiling laws (Art. 1417,
Civil Code) and labor laws (Arts.1418-1419, Civil
Code).
Menchavez vs. Teves, G.R. No. 153201. January 26,

2005. Avoid contract is deemed legally nonexistent.
It produces no legal effect. As a general rule, courts
leave parties to such a contract as they are, because
they are in pari delicto or equally at fault. Neither
party is entitled to legal protection.
A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces

no civil effect. It does not create, modify or
extinguish a juridical relation.[24] Parties to a void

agreement cannot expect the aid of the law; the
courts leave them as they are, because they are
deemed in pari delicto or “in equal fault.” To this
rule, however, there are exceptions that permit the
return of that which may have been given under a
void contract. One of the exceptions is found in
Article 1412 of the Civil Code, which states:
“Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or

forbidden cause consists does not constitute a
criminal offense, the following rules shall be
observed:
“(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting

parties, neither may recover what he has given by
virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of
the other’s undertaking;
“(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at

fault, he cannot recover what he has given by reason
of the contract, or ask for the fulfillment of what has
been promised him. The other, who is not at fault,
may demand the return of what he has given
without any obligation to comply with his promise.”
On this premise, respondent contends that he can

recover from petitioners, because he is an innocent
party to the Contract of Lease. Petitioners allegedly
induced him to enter into it through serious
misrepresentation
19. Res Ipsa Loquitur Latin for "the thing speaks for itself," a doctrine of Professional Services Inc. vs. Agana, GR 126297,
law that one is presumed to be negligent if January 31, 2007;
he/she/it had exclusive control of whatever caused It is the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an
the injury even though there is no specific evidence injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances,
of an act of negligence, and without negligence the may permit an inference or raise a presumption of
accident would not have happened. negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case,
and present a question of fact for defendant to meet
with an explanation. Stated differently, where the
thing which caused the injury, without the fault of
the injured, is under the exclusive control of the
defendant and the injury is such that it should not
have occurred if he, having such control used proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation that the injury arose from the
defendant’s want of care, and the burden of proof is
shifted to him to establish that he has observed due
care and diligence. From the foregoing statements of
the rule, the requisites for the applicability of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of
an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was
under the control and management of the defendant;
(3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary
course of things, would not have happened if those
who had control or management used proper care;
and (4) the absence of explanation by the defendant.
Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumentalist
the “control and management of the thing which
caused the injury. In this jurisdiction, res ipsa
loquitur is not a rule of substantive law, hence, does
not per se create or constitute an independent or
separate ground of liability, being a mere
evidentiary rule. In other words, mere invocation
and application of the doctrine does not dispense

with the requirement of proof of negligence.
Joaquinita P. Capili v. SPS. Dominador Cardana and

Rosalita Cardana. G.R. No. 157906, November 2, 2006.
The fact, however, that respondents’ daughter,
Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting tree
within the school’s premises shows that the tree was
indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and
calls for application of the principle of res ipsa
loquitur.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1)

the accident was of such character as to warrant an
inference that it would not have happened except for
the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must
have been caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive management or control of the
person charged with the negligence complained of;
and (3) the accident must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.
In the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of

Appeals,15 this Court held:
As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa

loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence.
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained

in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or

presumed, and while the mere happening of an
accident or injury will not generally give rise to an
inference or presumption that it was due to
negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing
or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction,
that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the
facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may
be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit
an inference of negligence on the part of the
defendant, or some other person who is charged
with negligence.
Where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality

which caused the injury complained of was under
the control or management of the defendant, and
that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such
as in the ordinary course of things would not
happen if those who had its control or management
used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as
sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the
injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s
want of care.
The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa

loquitur is that petitioner’s negligence is presumed
once respondents established the requisites for the
doctrine to apply. Once respondents made out a

prima facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to
petitioner to explain. The presumption or inference
may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and,
under appropriate circumstances a disputable
presumption, such as that of due care or innocence,
may outweigh the inference.
20. Ignorantia Legis non Excusat It is a Latin maxim meaning ignorance of law is not Agustin De Luna, et al., v. Jose Linatoc, G.R. No. L-
an excuse to a criminal charge. The purpose of this 48403, October 28, 1942. Mistake of law does not
maxim is that if ignorance is considered an excuse, a make a contract voidable, because ignorance of the
person charged with criminal offenses or a subject of law does not excuse anyone from its compliance (art.
a civil lawsuit would merely claim that s/he is 2, Civil Code; 8 Manresa, 646, 2d ed.). That the
unaware of the law in question to avoid liability. petitioners did not know the prohibition against
Ignorantia juris non excusat is also known as partition of the conjugal partnership property
ignorantia legis non excusat. during marriage (art. 1432, Civil Code) is no valid
reason why they should ask for the annulment of the
sales made Exhibits C and D and recognized in
Exhibit I.
The United States v. Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272 March

19, 1910. The question then squarely presents it self,
whether in this jurisdiction one can be held
criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake
as to the facts, does an act for which he would be
exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he
supposed them to be, but which would constitute
the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor
had known the true state of the facts at the time
when he committed the act. To this question we
think there can be but one answer, and we hold that
under such circumstances there is no criminal
liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance

or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad
faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if

such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to
negative a particular intent which under the law is a
necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in
larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in
crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent,"
and works an acquittal; except in those cases where
the circumstances demand a conviction under the
penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and
in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of
the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime
or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any
wrongful act committed by him, even though it be
different from that which he intended to commit.
(Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited;
McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit
vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7
Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs.
State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7
Met., 500.)
21. Lex prospicit, non respicit The law looks forward, not backward. Antonio v. Reyes, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353. In
these cases, we explained that the interpretation or
construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of
the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only
when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may
have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties
who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted

in good faith, in accordance therewith under the
familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”
Alfredo Tolentino, et al., v. Antonio O. Alzate, et al.,

G.R. No. L-9267, April 11, 1956. Republic Act No.
1199 was approved on August 30, 1954. Said Act
enumerates the cause whereby a tenant may be
dispossessed of the land among them being the
desire of the alndlord to cultivate the land "through
the employment of farm machinery and
implements." And it is therein provided that in order
that the mechanization may be undertaken it is
necessary that "the landholder shall, at least one year
but not more than two years prior to the date of his
petition to dispossess the tenant file notice with the
court and shall inform the tenant in writing in
language or dialect known to the latter of his
intention to cultivate the land himself, either
personally or through the employment of
mechanical implements, together with a certification
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources that the land is suited of mechanization."
(Section 50, paragraph a.) It is now contended by the
tenants that because the landlord had not complied
with this requirement before filing the present
petition for mechanization, the industrial to proceed
with the hearing of the case.
We find this claim to be without merit. While it is

true that under the new Act there is need to comply
with the above procedural requirement in order that
a landlord may dispossess a tenant and give

jurisdiction to the industrial court to act on the
matter, the same cannot be invoked in the present
case it appearing that the petition herein was filed
on August 12, 1954, or prior to the approval of
Republic Act No. 1199. It is a well known rule that
"Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided" (Article 4, new Civil Code). Or,
as this Court well said, "A statute operates
prospectively and never retroactively, unless the
legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest
either by the express terms of the statute or by
necessary implication" (Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phi.,
543). There is nothing in said Act which would make
its provisions operate retroactively even with respect
to the provision regarding mechanized farming.
22. Dura Lex Sed Lex The law may be hard to observe or difficult to obey, Anselma Diaz, guardian of Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina
but it remains the law and must be therefore and Miguel, all surnamed Santero, and Felixberta
followed just the same. This is the plain and simple Pacursa, guardian of Federico Santero, et al., petitioners,
meaning and implication of the above cited Latin v. Intermediate Appelate Court and Felisa Pamuti Jardin,
maxim which is well known in a special way by G.R. No. L-66574, February 21, 1990.
those in the legal profession. The Latin principle is
objectively right and the legal experts are Senator Tolentino, while supporting the majority
professionally right as well when invoking the Latin view of this Court states:
truism – but only by virtue of the following three
fundamental premises: In the present article, the Code Commission took a
step forward by giving an illegitimate child the right
Firstly, that the law is just in its objective content, of representation, which he did not have under the
just for the subject party concerned, and just to the old Code. But in retaining without change
society as a whole it is mandated for observance. In provisions of the old Code in Article 992, it created
other words even but there is an iota of injustice in an absurdity and committed an injustice, because
the law in conjunction with any of the said while the illegitimate descendant of an illegitimate
qualifying factors, a law may be difficult to comply child can represent, the illegitimate descendant of a
with, but an unjust law it remains. Thus it is that it legitimate child cannot. The principle that the
loses its nature and finality as a law. illegitimate child should succeed by operation of law
only to persons with the same status of illegitimacy
Secondly, that the law equally applies to all – has thus been preserved. And this is unfair to the
“without fear or favor”. This simply means that illegitimate descendants of legitimate children. Dura
everybody has exactly the same standing – the same lex, sed lex.
basic human dignity and the basic human rights –
before the law. This is the cornerstone of the majesty Salem Alex Palo y Toyur v. Hon. Francis J. Militante,
of the law: it bows to no one for consideration of Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cebu, 7th
power and wealth. Judicial Region, Branch XII, G.R. No. 76100, April 18,
1990. It is suggested that petitioner's deprivation of
Lastly, that the law is interpreted and applied by a the benefits of probation was a product of
legal system that is not simply working as designed misunderstanding or miscommunication and that he
and expected – but categorically working according would not have pleaded guilty had that amendment
to the demands of social justice specially in terms of by Presidential Decree No. 1990 been brought to his
its distributive dimension that is provident of public attention. We are, however, bound by the actual
welfare or common goods. proceedings that transpired and not by what is
represented to have been a party's intent. Yet,
assuming that there is some truth in said surmise,
from what has been said and while one may
empathize with petitioner's submission, still even if
he had not pleaded guilty the end result would have
been the same. From the judicial record, a guilty
verdict, and even a higher penalty, would have been
a distinct probability. All told, dura lex sed lex is the
trite dictum which those caught in the toils of the
law have to live with, including the changes therein
and the misapprehensions thereon.
23. Doctrine of Stare Decisis The operation of the doctrine of stare decisis is best Tala Realty Services v. Banco Filipino Savings and
explained by reference to the English translation of Mortgage Bank. G.R. No. 137980. June 20, 2000. It is
the Latin phrase. “Stare decisis” literally translates about a disagreement between parties on which
as “to stand by decided matters”. The phrase “stare lease contract should prevail. The Court ruled that tt
decisis” is itself an abbreviation of the Latin phrase is the policy of the court to maintain judicial stability
“stare decisis et non quieta movere” which in accordance to stare decisis. The case involves the
translates as “to stand by decisions and not to same questions relating to similarly situated
disturb settled matters”. Basically, under the conditions which the court already litigated abd
doctrine of stare decisis, the decision of a higher decided upon and the rule on stare decisis is a bar to
court within the same provincial jurisdiction acts as attempt to relitigate the same issue (“stare decisis et
binding authority on a lower court within that same non quieta movere” – follow past precedents and do
jurisdiction. The decision of a court of another not disturb what has already been settled.) Stare
jurisdiction only acts as persuasive authority. The decisis should apply if the facts are substantially the
degree of persuasiveness is dependent upon various same even if the parties may be different.
factors, including, first, the nature of the other
jurisdiction. Second, the degree of persuasiveness is Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting, G.R. No.
dependent upon the level of court which decided 166562, March 31, 2009. The principle of stare decisis
the precedent case in the other jurisdiction. Other enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
factors include the date of the precedent case, on the established by this Court in its final decisions. It is
assumption that the more recent the case, the more based on the principle that once a question of law
reliable it will be as authority for a given has been examined and decided, it should be
proposition, although this is not necessarily so. deemed settled and closed to further argument.
Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the
same issues, necessary for two simple reasons:
economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the
principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare

decisis was applied by the English courts and was
later adopted by the United States.
To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the

doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina

should not be applied retroactively for being
contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer
new. The same argument was also raised but was
struck down in Pesca v. Pesca, and again in Antonio
v. Reyes. In these cases, we explained that the
interpretation or construction of a law by courts
constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute
is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this
Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted,
that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on
the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of “lex
prospicit, non respicit.”
24. Doctrine of Lex Nationalii Citizenship is the basis for determining the personal Juan Miciano v. Andre Brimo, GR No.22595, November
law applicable. 1, 1927. Though the last part of the second clause of
the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed
Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that “laws of in accordance with the laws in force in the
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, Philippine Island”, this condition, described as
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding impossible conditions, shall be considered as not
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee
abroad.” This is the rule of lex nationalii in private in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are
require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition further defined as those contrary to law or good
by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall
its citizen, over whom it exercises personal govern in his testamentary dispositions. The court
jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal approved the scheme of partition submitted by the
capacity of such citizen. judicial administrator, in such manner as to include
Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines
might be, he or she will be governed by the law of Bellis vs. Bellis. G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967. The
his nationality (Philippine Laws) with respect to his Supreme Court held that the said children are not
or her family rights and duties, or to his status, entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law,
condition or legal capacity. being the national law of the deceased, there are no
legitimes. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos
G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount
of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be
applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code,

render applicable the national law of the decedent,
in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard
to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed.
Intestate and testamentary successions, both with

respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may he the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
25. Nemo ex alterius incommode debet No man ought to be made rich out of another’s Jacobus Bernhard Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., G.R. No.
lecupletari injury. 156364, September 3, 2007.
Ineluctably, the HLURB Decision resulted in the

unjust enrichment of petitioner at the expense of
respondent. Petitioner received more than what he
is entitled to recover under the circumstances.
Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the

maxim, nemo ex alterius incommode debet
lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of
another’s injury), states:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of

performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.
The above-quoted article is part of the chapter of the

Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of
which were formulated as basic principles to be
observed for the rightful relationship between
human beings and for the stability of the social
order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring
from the fountain of good conscience; guides for
human conduct that should run as golden threads
through society to the end that law may approach its
supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of
justice.[48] There is unjust enrichment when a
person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or
property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
A sense of justice and fairness demands that

petitioner should not be allowed to benefit from his
act of entering into a contract to sell that violates the
constitutional proscription.
This is not a case of equity overruling or supplanting

a positive provision of law or judicial rule. Rather,
equity is exercised in this case “as the complement
of legal jurisdiction that seeks to reach and to
complete justice where courts of law, through the
inflexibility of their rules and want of power to
adapt their judgments to the special circumstances
of cases, are incompetent to do so.”[
The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in

this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to
ensure restitution. Equity jurisdiction aims to do
complete justice in cases where a court of law is
unable to adapt its judgments to the special
circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of
its statutory or legal jurisdiction.
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the

Department of Public Works and Highways, Commission
on Audit and the National Treasurer, v. Carlito Lacap,
doing business under the name and style Carwin
Construction and Construction Supply, G.R. No. 158253
March 2, 2007.Article 22 of the Civil Code which
embodies the maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode
debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out
of another’s injury) states:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of

performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.
This article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on

Human Relations, the provisions of which were
formulated as “basic principles to be observed for
the rightful relationship between human beings and
for the stability of the social order, x x x designed to
indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain
of good conscience, x x x guides human conduct
[that] should run as golden threads through society
to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal
which is the sway and dominance of justice.” The
rules thereon apply equally well to the Government.
Since respondent had rendered services to the full
satisfaction and acceptance by petitioner, then the
former should be compensated for them. To allow
petitioner to acquire the finished project at no cost
would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for
the petitioner to the prejudice of respondent. Such
unjust enrichment is not allowed by law.
26. Parens patriae Literally, parens patriae means father of the country. Melchora Cabanas v.Francisco Pilapil. G.R. No. L-
This doctrine has been defined as the inherent 25843, July 25, 1974. The Constitution provides for
power and authority of the state to provide the strengthening of the family as the basic social
protection to the persons and property of the unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as
persons non-sui juris. Non-sui juris persons are in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his
those who lack the legal capacity to act on his own interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation
behalf like the child or the insane persons. has been filed should resolve according to the best
interest of that person. The uncle here should not be
the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the
immediate relative of the minor child and it is
assumed that the mother shall show more care
towards the child than the uncle will. The
application of parens patriae here is in consonance
with this country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in
favor of the family hence preference to the parent
(mother) is observed.
The People of the Philippines v. Domiciano Baylon

G.R. No. L-35785, May 29, 1974. As was noted in a
recent case, People v. Molina, 32 it is manifest in the
decisions of this Court that where the offended
parties are young and immature girls like the victim
in this case, 33 there is a marked receptivity on its
part to lend credence to their version of what
transpired. It is not to be wondered at. The state, as
parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize
the risk of harm to those, who, because of their
minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves
fully. Those of tender years deserve its utmost
protection. Moreover, the injury in cases of rape is
not inflicted on the unfortunate victim alone. The
consternation it causes her family must also be taken
into account. It may reflect a failure to abide by the
announced concern in the fundamental law for such
institution . 34 There is all the more reason then for
the rigorous application of the penal law with its
severe penalty for this offense, whenever warranted.
It has been aptly remarked that with the advance in
civilization, the disruption in public peace and order

it represents defies explanation, much more so in
view of what currently appears to be a tendency for
sexual permissiveness. Where the prospects of
relationship based on consent are hardly minimal,
self-restraint should even be more marked.
27. Solutio indebiti Refers to the juridical relation which arises Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals and B.P.
whenever a person unduly delivers a thing through Mata and Co., Inc. G.R. No. 97995, January 21, 1993.
mistake to another who has no right to demand it. The instant case fulfills the indispensable requisites
of solutio indebiti as defined in Article 2154 that
If something is received when there is no right to something (in this case money) has been received
demand it, and it was unduly delivered through when there was no right to demand it and (2) the
mistake, the obligation to return it arises. same was unduly delivered through mistake. There
is a presumption that there was a mistake in the
payment "if something which had never been due or
had already been paid was delivered; but he from
whom the return is claimed may prove that the
delivery was made out of liberality or for any other
just cause."
While petitioner may indeed opt to avail of an action

to enforce a constructive trust or the quasi-contract
of solutio indebiti, it has been deprived of a choice,
for prescription has effectively blocked quasi-
contract as an alternative, leaving only constructive
trust as the feasible option.
Petitioner argues that the lower and appellate courts

cannot indulge in semantics by holding that in
Article 1456 the recipient commits the mistake while
in Article 2154, the recipient commits no mistake. 26

On the other hand, private respondent, invoking the
appellate court's reasoning, would impress upon us
that under Article 1456, there can be no mutual
mistake. Consequently, private respondent contends
that the case at bar is one of solutio indebiti and not
a constructive trust.
Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc., v. City of Manila and

Marcelo Sarmiento, as City Treasurer of Manila,
G.R. No. L-17447, April 30, 1963. In refutation of the
above stand of appellants, appellee avers tht the
payments could not have been voluntary.At most,
they were paid "mistakenly and in good faith"and
"without protest in the erroneous belief that it was
liable thereof." Voluntariness is incompatible with
protest and mistake. It submits that this is a simple
case of "solutio indebiti"
In a recent case, We said: "The appellants argue that

the sum the refund of which is sought by the
appellee, was not paid under protest and hence is
not refundable. Again, the trial court correctly held
that being unauthorized, it is not a tax assessed
under the Charter of the Appellant City of Davao
and for that reason, no protest is necessary for a
claim or demand for its refund" (Citing the Medina
case, supra; East Asiatic Co., Ltd. v. City of Davao,
G.R. No. L-16253, Aug. 21, 1962). Lastly, being a case
of solutio indebiti, protest is not required as a
condition sine qua non for its application..
28. Legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet A Latin maxim which means “The construction of People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270. The application and
law obtains the force of law.” The interpretation interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part
placed upon a written law by a competent court has of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said
the force of the law. Judicial decisions applying and law since the Supreme Court’s application and
interpreting the law shall form part of the legal interpretation merely established the
system of the Philippines. contemporaneous legislative intent that the
construed law purports to carry into effect.
Secretary of Justice ve. Catolico, 68 SCRA 607. Judicial

Decisions of the Supreme Court are authoritative
and precedent setting while those of the inferior
courts and Court of Appeals are merely persuasive.
Indeed it is the duty of the judges to apply the law
as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
29. Prejudicial Question The doctrine that comes into play generally in a People versus Adelo Aragon L-5930, February 17, 1954.
situation where civil and criminal actions are The Supreme Court defined it as one which arises in
pending and the issues involved in both cases are a case, the resolution of which question is a logical
similar or so closely related that an issue must be antecedent of the issues involved in said case and
pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the the cognizance of which pertains to other tribunal.
criminal action can proceed. Thus, the existence of a
prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the In the action of bigamy, if the accused claims that the
criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter first marriage is null and void, and the right to
pending final determination of the former. It is one decide such validity is vested in another tribunal,
which must be decided first before a criminal action the civil action for nullity must first be decided
may be instituted or may proceed because a decision before the action for bigamy can proceed; hence the
therein is vital to the judgment in the criminal case. validity of the first marriage is a prejudicial
question.
Quimbao vs. Osorio G.R. No. L-48157. Whether the

administrative case between the private parties
involving the lot subject matter of the ejectment case
constitutes a prejudicial question which would

operates as a bar to said ejectment case.
Petition Granted, the SC held No prejudicial

question. A prejudicial question is understood in
law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in
said case and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal
The Doctrine of Prejudicial Question comes into play

generally in a situation where civil and criminal
actions are pending and the issues involved in both
cases are similar or so closely related that an issue
must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case
before the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the
existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is
alleged in the criminal case to cause the suspension
of the latter pending final determination of the
former.
30. . Action De in Rem Verso Action de in rem verso is an action for unjust Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. v. RRN
enrichment. In an action de in rem verso, the Incorporated, G.R. No. 172525, October 20, 2010.
plaintiff should show that enrichment was Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads: Every
bestowed, that the enrichment caused an person who, through an act of performance by
impoverishment, that there is no justification for the another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
enrichment and impoverishment, and that the possession of something at the expense of the latter
plaintiff has no other adequate remedy at law, without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
including no remedy under an express or implied him.
contract. In Roman law, action de in rem verso is an
action brought against a paterfamilias or a slave- In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the
owner who benefited from the transaction of a child essential elements must be present: (1) that the
or slave. defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff

has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the
defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4)
that the plaintiff has no other action based on
contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.
An accion in rem verso is considered merely an

auxiliary action, available only when there is no
other remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and
quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action under
any other institution of positive law, that action
must be resorted to, and the principle of accion in
rem verso will not lie.
As found by both the CIAC and affirmed by the CA,

petitioner failed to prove that respondent's free use
of the manlift was without legal ground based on
the provisions of their contract. Thus, the third
requisite is missing.
31. Doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum A Latin expression meaning a personal action dies Lapuz-Sy v. Eufemio, G.R. No. L-30977, January 31,
persona with the person. Some legal causes of action can 1972. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes
survive the death of the claimant or plaintiff, for this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent
example actions founded in contract law. However, spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation;
some actions are personal to the plaintiff, and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses
defamation of character being one notable example. can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
Therefore, such an action, where it relates to the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal
private character of the plaintiff, comes to an end on
separation already rendered. Being personal in
his death, whereas an action for the publication of a
character, it follows that the death of one party to
false and malicious statement which causes damage the action causes the death of the action itself.
to the plaintiff's personal estate will survive to the
benefit of his or her personal representatives. When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need
The principle also exists to protect the estate and for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The
executors from liability for strictly personal acts of heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of
the deceased, such as charges for fraud. the spouse takes place during the course of the suit
(Article 244, Section 3). The action is absolutely
dead.
A further reason why an action for legal separation

is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if
property rights are involved, is that these rights are
mere effects of decree of separation, their source
being the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come into existence, so that before the
finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the
pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and
definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily
remain unborn.
Santos v. Sec. Of Labor, et.al , G.R. No. L-21624,

February 27, 1968. Invoking the doctrine of actio
personalis moritur cum persona, the death of the
deceased terminates any action. Furthermore, public
office is a public trust; it is personal and that which
cannot be passed to his heirs.
The Court held that the jurisdiction of the court had

attached before the death of Santos and the same
jurisdiction continues until the termination of the
suit. Death will not dislodge jurisdiction on the
money claim – it subsists. The court went on the
merits despite the death of the deceased with the
case pending.
32. Doctrine of Alter Ego A doctrine based upon the misuse of a corporation Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. vs. Araneta, Inc. GR L-31061. It is a
by an individual for wrongful or inequitable doctrine well established and obtains both at law
purposes, and in such case the court merely and in equity that a corporation is a distinct legal
disregards the corporate entity and holds the entity to be considered as separate and apart from
individual responsible for acts knowingly and the individual stock holders or members who
intentionally done in the name of the corporation. compose it, and is not affected by the personal
The doctrine imposes upon the individual who uses rights, obligations, and transactions of its
a corporation merely as an instrumentality to stockholders or members. The property of the
conduct his own business liability as a consequence corporation is its property and not that of the
of fraud or injustice perpetuated not on the stockholders, as owners, although they have equities
corporation, but on third persons dealing with the in it. Properties registered in the name of the
corporation. corporation ordinarily have no interest in the
individual property of its stockholders unless
transferred to the corporation, “even in the case of a
one-man corporation.” The mere fact that one is
president of a corporation does not render that
property which he owns or possesses the property of
the corporation, since the president, as individual,
and the corporation are separate similarities.
Similarly, stockholders in a corporation engaged in
buying and dealing in real estate whose certificates
of stock entitled the holder thereof to an allotment in
the distribution of the land of the corporation upon
surrender of their stock certificates were considered
not to have such legal or equitable title or interest in
the land, as would support a suit for title, especially
against parties other than the corporation.
Concept Builders, Inc. vs NLRC GR 108734. It is a

fundamental principle of corporation law that a
corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its
stockholders and from other corporations to which it
may be connected. But, this separate and distinct
personality of a corporation is merely a fiction
created by law for convenience and to promote
justice. So, when the notion of separate juridical
personality is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, or is
used as a device to defeat the labor laws, this
separate personality of the corporation may be
disregarded or the veil of corporate fiction pierced.
This is true likewise when the corporation is merely
an adjunct, a business conduit or an alter ego of
another corporation. The conditions under which the
juridical entity may be disregarded vary according
to the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.
No hard and fast rule can be accurately laid down,
but certainly, there are some probative factors of
identity that will justify the application of the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, to wit: (1)
Stock ownership by one or common ownership of
both corporations; (2) Identity of directors and
officers; (3) The manner of keeping corporate books
and records; and (4) Methods of conducting the
business. The SEC en banc explained the
"instrumentality rule" which the courts have applied
in disregarding the separate juridical personality of
corporations as "Where one corporation is so
organized and controlled and its affairs are
conducted so that it is, in fact, a mere
instrumentality or adjunct of the other, the fiction of

the corporate entity of the "instrumentality" may be
disregarded. The control necessary to invoke the
rule is not majority or even complete stock control
but such domination of instances, policies and
practices that the controlled corporation has, so to
speak, no separate mind, will or existence of its own,
and is but a conduit for its principal. It must be kept
in mind that the control must be shown to have been
exercised at the time the acts complained of took
place. Moreover, the control and breach of duty
must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss for
which the complaint is made." The test in
determining the applicability of the doctrine of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction is as (1) Control,
not mere majority or complete stock control, but
complete domination, not only of finances but of
policy and business practice in respect to the
transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to
this transaction had at the time no separate mind,
will or existence of its own; (2) Such control must
have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or
wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or
other positive legal duty or dishonest and unjust act
in contravention of plaintiff's legal rights; and (3)
The aforesaid control and breach of duty must
proximately cause the injury or unjust loss
complained of. The absence of any one of these
elements prevents "piercing the corporate veil." In
applying the "instrumentality" or "alter ego"
doctrine, the courts are concerned with reality and
not form, with how the corporation operated and the
individual defendant's relationship to that

operation. Thus the question of whether a
corporation is a mere alter ego, a mere sheet or
paper corporation, a sham or a subterfuge is purely
one of fact.
33. Doctrine of Privity of Contract This doctrine provides that a contract cannot confer Marquez and Gutierrez Lora vs. Varela and Varela G.R.
rights or impose obligations arising under it on any No. L-4845. The principle underlying defendants'
person or agent except the parties to it. The basic objection is one of substantive law, recognized
premise is that only parties to contracts should be under common law, where no one could sue for a
able to sue to enforce their rights or claims to breach of a contract who was not a party thereto,
damages as such. and the action allowed to be brought only in the
name of the one holding the legal title. The
requirement was based upon the doctrine of privity
of contract.
Yu vs. CA G.R. 86683. Honorable Cesar V.
Alejandria, Presiding Judge said: Resolving
plaintiff's motion embodied in the complaint for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction after
hearing, but without prejudging the merits of the
case, and finding from the evidences adduced by the
plaintiff, that the terms and conditions of the agency
agreement, Exhibit "A-inj." between the plaintiff and
The House of Mayfair of England for the exclusive
distributorship by the plaintiff of the latter's goods,
apertain to them; that there is no privity of contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant; that the
controversy in this case arose from a breach of
contract by the FNF Trading of Germany, for having
shipped goods it had purchased from The House of
Mayfair to the Philippines; The House of Mayfair
was demanding payment of 4,500.00 from the FNF

Trading for restitution of plaintiff's alleged loss on
account of the shipment of the goods in question
here in the Philippines and now in the possession of
the defendant; it appears to the Court that to restrain
the defendant from selling the goods it has ordered
from the FNF Trading of Germany, would be
without legal justification.
34. Doctrine of indefeasibility of torrens titles A doctrine that a certificate of title, once registered, De Pedro vs Romasan GR 158002. According to the
should not thereafter be impugned, altered, report, the land claimed by the petitioners was
changed, modified, enlarged or diminished except in covered by the title under the name of respondent
a direct proceeding permitted by law. corporation, the petitioners’ claim for damages had
no leg to stand on.
35. Doctrine of Mortgagee in Good Faith The rule that all persons dealing with property Cavite Devt. Bank vs. Sps. Lim GR 131679. Despite the
covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, as buyers or fact that the mortgagor is not the owner of the
mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what mortgaged property, his title being fraudulent, the
appears on the face of the title. The public interest in mortgage contract and any foreclosure sale arising
upholding the indefeasibility of a certificate of title, therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy.
as evidence of the lawful ownership of the land or of This is the doctrine of "the mortgagee in good faith".
any encumbrance thereon, protects a buyer or This principle is cited by petitioners in claiming that,
mortgagee who, in good faith, relied upon what as a mortgagee bank, it is not required to make a
appears on the face of the certificate title. detailed investigation of the history of the title of the
property given as security before accepting a
mortgage.
Bank of Commerce vs. Spouses San Pablo GR 167848. A

mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the
certificate of title of the mortgagor of the property
given as security, and in the absence of any sign that
might arouse suspicion, the mortgagee has no

obligation to undertake further investigation. This
doctrine pre-supposes, however, that the mortgagor,
who is not the rightful owner of the property, has
already succeeded in obtaining Torrens title over the
property in his name and that, after obtaining the
said title, he succeeds in mortgaging the property to
another who relies on what appears on the title. This
is not the situation in the case at bar since Santos
was not the registered owner for he merely
represented himself to be the attorney-in-fact of the
spouses San Pablo. In cases where the mortgagee
does not directly deal with the registered owner of
real property, the law requires that a higher degree
of prudence be exercised by the mortgagee.
36. Doctrine of Clean Hands A person who has acted wrongly, either morally or Nancy L. Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
legally, will not be helped by a court when Bank, G.R. No. 188302, June 27, 2012. An implied trust
complaining about the actions of someone else. could not have been formed between the Bank and
Tala as this Court has held that "where the purchase
A legal doctrine which is a defense to a complaint, is made in violation of an existing statute and in
which states that a party who is asking for a evasion of its express provision, no trust can result
judgment cannot have the help of the court if he/she in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud.
has done anything unethical in relation to the
subject of the lawsuit. Thus, if a defendant can show The bank cannot use the defense of nor seek
the plaintiff had "unclean hands," the plaintiff's enforcement of its alleged implied trust with Tala
complaint will be dismissed or the plaintiff will be since its purpose was contrary to law. As admitted
denied judgment. Unclean hands is a common by the Bank, it "warehoused" its branch site holdings
"affirmative defense" pleaded by defendants, which to Tala to enable it to pursue its expansion program
must be proved by the defendant. and purchase new branch sites including its main
branch in Makati, and at the same time avoid the
real property holdings limit under Sections 25(a) and

34 of the General Banking Act which it had already
reached x x x .
Clearly, the Bank was well aware of the limitations

on its real estate holdings under the General
Banking Act and that its "warehousing agreement"
with Tala was a scheme to circumvent the limitation.
Thus, the Bank opted not to put the agreement in
writing and call a spade a spade, but instead
phrased its right to reconveyance of the subject
property at any time as a "first preference to buy" at
the "same transfer price". This agreement which the
Bank claims to be an implied trust is contrary to law.
Thus, while we find the sale and lease of the subject
property genuine and binding upon the parties, we
cannot enforce the implied trust even assuming the
parties intended to create it. In the words of the
Court in the Ramos case, "the courts will not assist
the payor in achieving his improper purpose by
enforcing a resultant trust for him in accordance
with the 'clean hands' doctrine." The Bank cannot
thus demand reconveyance of the property based on
its alleged implied trust relationship with Tala.
The Bank and Tala are in pari delicto, thus, no

affirmative relief should be given to one against the
other. The Bank should not be allowed to dispute the
sale of its lands to Tala nor should Tala be allowed
to further collect rent from the Bank. The clean
hands doctrine will not allow the creation or the use
of a juridical relation such as a trust to subvert,
directly or indirectly, the law. Neither the Bank nor

Tala came to court with clean hands; neither will
obtain relief from the court as the one who seeks
equity and justice must come to court with clean
hands.
Serrano vs. NSDB 10 SCRA 626. He who comes into

equity must come in clean hands
37. Doctrine of part performance An equitable principle that allows a court to Rosario Carbonnel v.Jose Poncio, Ramon Infante, and
recognize and enforce an oral contract despite its Emma Infante, G.R. No. L-11231, May 12, 1958. Subject
legal deficiencies and provides a way around the to a rule to the contrary followed in a few
statutory bar to the enforcement of an oral contract. jurisdictions, it is the accepted view that part
By applying the doctrine, a party can establish the performance of a parol contract for the sale of real
existence of a contract despite the lack of any written estate has the effect, subject to certain conditions
evidence. Generally, without written evidence, a concerning the nature and extent of the acts
contract does not satisfy the formal requirements set constituting performance and the right to equitable
by the legislature under the statute of frauds. The relief generally, of taking such contract from the
doctrine is an exemption to this as it allows failure to operation of the statute of frauds, so that chancery
comply with the statute of frauds to be overcome by may decree its specific performance or grant other
a party’s execution, in reliance on an opposing equitable relief. It is well settled in Great Britain and
party’s oral promise, of an oral contract’s in this country, with the exception of a few states,
requirement. that a sufficient part performance by the purchaser
under a parol contract for the sale of real estate
removes the contract from the operation of the
statute of frauds.
The true basis of the doctrine of part performance

according to the overwhelming weight of authority,
is that it would be a fraud upon the plaintiff if the
defendant were permitted to escape performance of
his part of the oral agreement after he has permitted

the plaintiff to perform in reliance upon the
agreement. The oral contract is enforced in harmony
with the principle that courts of equity will not allow
the statute of frauds to be used as an instrument of
fraud. In other words, the doctrine of part
performance was established for the same purpose
for which, the statute of frauds itself was enacted,
namely, for the prevention of fraud, and arose from
the necessity of preventing the statute from
becoming an agent of fraud for it could not have
been the intention of the statue to enable any party
to commit a fraud with impunity.
When the party concerned has pleaded partial
performance, such party is entitled to a reasonable
chance to; establish by parol evidence the truth of
this allegation, as well as the contract itself. "The
recognition of the exceptional effect of part
performance in taking an oral contract out of the
statute of frauds involves the principle that oral
evidence is admissible in such cases to prove both
the contract and the part performance of the
contract".
Marta C. Ortega v. Gabriel Leonardo, G.R. No. L-11311,

May 28, 1958. "The continuance in possession may,
in a proper case, be sufficiently referable to the parol
contract of sale to constitute a part performance
thereof. There may be additional acts or peculiar
circumstances which sufficiently refer the possession
to the contract. Continued possession under an oral
contract of sale, by one already in possession as a
tenant, has been held a sufficient part performance,

where accompanied by other acts which characterize
the continued possession and refer it to the contract
of purchase. Especially is this true where the
circumstances of the case include the making of
substantial, permanent, and valuable
improvements."
It is also stated that "The making of valuable

permanent improvements on the land by the
purchaser, in pursuance of the agreement and with
the knowledge of the vendor, has been said to be the
strongest and the most unequivocal act of part
performance by which a verbal contract to sell land
is taken out of the statute of frauds, and is ordinarily
an important element in such part performance.
Possession by the purchaser under a parol contract
for the purchase of real property, together with his
making valuable and permanent improvements on
the property which are referable exclusively to the
contract, in reliance on the contract, in the honest
belief that he has a right to make them, and with the
knowledge and consent or acquiescence of the
vendor, is deemed a part performance of the
contract. The entry into possession and the making
of the improvements are held on amount to such an
alteration in the purchaser's position as will warrant
the court's entering a degree of specific
performance."
Again, it is stated that "A tender or offer of payment,

declined by the vendor, has been said to be
equivalent to actual payment, for the purposes of

determining whether or not there has been a part
performance of the contract. This is apparently true
where the tender is by a purchaser who has made
improvements. But the doctrine now generally
accepted, that not even the payment of the purchase
price, without something more, is a sufficient part
performance.
And the relinquishment of rights or the compromise

thereof has likewise been held to constitute part
performance.
In the light of the above four paragraphs, it would

appear that the complaint in this case described
several circumstance indicating partial performance:
relinquishment of rights continued possession,
building of improvements, tender of payment plus
the surveying of the lot at plaintiff's expense and the
payment of rentals.
Hence, as there was partial performance, the

principle excluding parol contracts for the sale of
realty, does not apply.
The judgment will accordingly be reversed and the

record remanded for further proceedings. With costs
against appellee.
38. Doctrine of Immutability and Inalterability of Once a judgment has become final and executory, it Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hermin Arceo, Romeo L.
a Final Judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered or modified. The Santos, Macario A. Ignacio, Agnes D.C. Marquez and
court loses jurisdiction over the judgment to amend Rodel V. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 158270, July 21, 2008.
(except for clerical errors) or alter the same but it When a final judgment is executory, it becomes
retains jurisdiction to execute it during the its immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be
lifetime. modified in any respect either by the court which
rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine is
The doctrine that has a two-fold purpose: 1) to avoid founded on considerations of public policy and
delay in the administration of justice and thus, sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors,
procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judgments must become final at some definite point
judicial business and 2) to put an end to judicial in time.
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which
is precisely why courts exist. The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a
final judgment has a two-fold purpose: (1) to avoid
The doctrine admits several exceptions, like: (1) the delay in the administration of justice and thus,
correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of
pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; judicial business and (2) to put an end to judicial
(3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which
transpire after the finality of the decision rendering is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot
its execution unjust and inequitable. drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of
every litigant must not hang in suspense for an
indefinite period of time.
Records reveal that the RTC decision had attained

finality. Per certification issued by the Postmaster of
San Fernando, Pampanga, petitioner LBP received a
copy of the RTC decision on December 3, 2001. It
had fifteen (15) days, or until December 18, 2001, to
file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal the
RTC decision. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration only on December 20, 2001, or two
(2) days beyond the reglementary period. At that
time, the RTC decision was already final and
executory. It is well-settled that court orders and
decisions become final and executory by operation
of law. It is the lapse of time which renders a court

decision final and immutable.
Tan Tiac Chiong v. Cosico, A.M. No. CA-02-33, July 31,

2002, 385 SCRA 509. The Court, in dismissing the
administrative complaint filed against CA Justice
Rodrigo Cosico, necessarily sustained the recall of
the entry of judgment made by Justice Cosico, as
ponente, in a criminal case appealed to the CA. The
Court explained that the recall of entry of judgment
might have been an error of judgment, for which no
judge should be administratively charged, in the
absence of showing of any bad faith, malice, or
corrupt purpose. It noted that Justice Cosico had
recalled the entry of judgment to afford due process
to the accused, because the CA decision had been
sent to the house of the counsel of the accused but
had been returned with the notation “Moved Out.”
The CA was thus prompted to resend the decision to
the counsel’s new address, thereby allowing the
accused to file a motion for reconsideration.
39. Doctrine of Res Judicata The Latin term for "a matter already judged", and Spouses Rodolfo A. Noceda and Erna T. Noceda v.
may refer to two things: in both civil law and Aurora Arbizo-Directo, G.R. No. 178495, July 26, 2010.
common law legal systems, a case in which there has The principle of res judicata lays down two main
been a final judgment and is no longer subject to rules, namely: (1) the judgment or decree of a court
appeal. The term is also used to refer to the legal of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes
doctrine meant to bar (or preclude) continued the litigation between the parties and their privies
litigation of such cases between the same parties, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit
which is different between the two legal systems. In involving the same cause of action either before the
this latter usage, the term is synonymous with same or any other tribunal; and (2) any right, fact, or
"preclusion". matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily

involved in the determination of an action before a
In the application of the doctrine of res judicata, if it competent court in which a judgment or decree is
is doubtful whether a second action is for the same rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
cause of action as the first, the test generally applied judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
is to consider the Identity of facts essential to their between the parties and their privies whether or not
maintenance, or whether the same evidence would the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters
sustain both. If the same facts or evidence would of the two suits are the same. These two main rules
sustain both, the two actions are considered the mark the distinction between the principles
same within the rule that the judgment in the former governing the two typical cases in which a judgment
is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the may operate as evidence. The first general rule
two actions rest upon different states of facts, or if above stated, and which corresponds to the afore-
different proofs would be required to sustain the quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the
two actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the Rules of Court, is referred to as "bar by former
maintenance of the other. judgment"; while the second general rule, which is
embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section and
There are two kinds of res judicata: FIRST, bar by rule, is known as "conclusiveness of judgment.”
prior judgement (b); and SECOND, conclusiveness
of judgment (c). The elements of the said doctrine Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment,
are: such material fact becomes binding and conclusive
on the parties. When a right or fact has been
(1) a former final judgment rendered on the merits; judicially tried and determined by a court of
(2) the court must have had jurisdiction over the competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for
subject matter and the parties; and such trial has been given, the judgment of the court,
(3) identity of parties, subject matter and cause of as long as it remains unreversed, should be
action between the first and second actions. conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them.[13] Thus, petitioners can no longer question
respondent’s ownership over Lot No. 1121 in the
instant suit for quieting of title. Simply put,
conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of
particular facts or issues in another litigation
between the same parties on a different claim or
cause of action.[14]
Furthermore, we agree that petitioners instituted the

instant action with unclean hands. Aware of their
defeat in the previous case, they attempted to thwart
execution and assert their alleged ownership over
the land through their purported purchase of a lot
from Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon. This later transaction
appears to be suspect. A perusal of G.R. No. 119730
reveals that the Court was not unaware of Dahipon’s
alleged claim over the same parcel of land. It noted
that Dahipon did not even bother to appear in court
to present her free patent upon respondent’s
request, or to intervene in the case, if she really had
any legitimate interest over the land in question.[15]
In any event, petitioners’ assertion of alleged good
title over the land cannot stand considering that
they purchased the piece of land from Dahipon
knowing fully well that the same was in the adverse
possession of another.
Thus, we find no reversible error in the appellate

court’s ruling that petitioners are in fact buyers in
bad faith.
Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, G.R. Nos.

76265 and 83280, March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 88. The
second concept — conclusiveness of judgment —
states that a fact or question which was in issue in a
former suit and was there judicially passed upon
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far
as the parties to that action and persons in privity

with them are concerned and cannot be again
litigated in any future action between such parties or
their privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or
different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been
held that in order that a judgment in one action can
be conclusive as to a particular matter in another
action between the same parties or their privies, it is
essential that the issue be identical. If a particular
point or question is in issue in the second action, and
the judgment will depend on the determination of
that particular point or question, a former judgment
between the same parties or their privies will be
final and conclusive in the second if that same point
or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first
suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732
[1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required but
merely identity of issue.
40. Principle of Abuse of Rights The principle of abuse of rights is found under Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Appeals, 257 Phil. 783 (1989). It was elucidated that
Philippines, which states that: while Article 19 “lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the
Art. 19. “Every person must, in the exercise of his maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would
and good faith.” be proper.”
Art. 20. “Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully The Court said: One of the more notable innovations
or negligently causes damage to another, shall of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some
indemnify the latter for the same.” basic principles that are to be observed for the
rightful relationship between human beings and for
Art. 21. “Any person who wilfully causes loss or the stability of the social order." The framers of the
injury to another in manner that is contrary to Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code
morals, good customs or public policy shall which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed
compensate the latter for the damage.” to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain
fundamental precepts which were "designed to
When a right is exercised in a manner which does indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain
not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 of good conscience" and which were also meant to
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must run as golden threads through society, to the end
be held responsible. Although the requirements of that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is
each provision is different, these three (3) articles are the sway and dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost
all related to each other. among these principles is that pronounced in Article
19 which provides:
The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19
are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
(2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
speaks of the general sanction for all other and good faith.
provisions of law which do not especially provide
for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether This article, known to contain what is commonly
willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
right or duty, causes damage to another, shall certain standards which must be observed not only
indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. in the exercise of one's rights, but also in the
Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and performance of one's duties. These standards are the
has the following elements: 1) There is an act which following: to act with justice; to give everyone his
is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The
custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on
done with intent to injure. Thus, under any of these all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A
injury to another may be made the basis for an right, though by itself legal because recognized or
award of damages. granted by law as such, may nevertheless become

the source of some illegality. When a right is
Of the three articles, Art. 19 was intended to expand exercised in a manner which does not conform with
the concept of torts by granting adequate legal the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
which is impossible for human foresight to provide committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
specifically in statutory law. If mere fault or responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of
negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for conduct for the government of human relations and
damages for injury caused thereby, with more for the maintenance of social order, it does not
reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an
The absence of good faith is essential to abuse of action for damages under either Article 20 or Article
right. Good faith is an honest intention to abstain 21 would be proper.
from taking any unconscientious advantage of
another, even through the forms or technicalities of Republic, et al. v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2,
the law, together with an absence of all information 2007. The SC had the occasion to once again say that
or belief of fact which would render the transaction Article 22, NCC was formulated as basic principles
unconscientious. In business relations, it means to be observed for the rightful relationship between
good faith as understood by men of affairs. human beings and for the stability of the social
order, designated to indicate certain norms that
While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere spring from the fountain of good conscience, guides
declaration of principle, the “cardinal law on human human conduct that should run as golden threads
conduct” expressed in said article has given rise to through society to the end that law may approach its
certain rules, e.g. that where a person exercises his supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of
rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs justice. Since respondent had rendered services to
his duties in a manner that is not in keeping with the full satisfaction and acceptance by petitioner,
honesty and good faith, he opens himself to liability. then the former should be compensated for them. To
allow petitioner to acquire the finished project at no
Article 19 of the Civil Code, sets certain standards cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust
which may be observed not only in the exercise of enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice of
one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s respondent. Such unjust enrichment is not allowed
duties. These standards are the following: to act with by law.
justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe
honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, In this case, the respondent undertook works
recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: for the government, made advances for the purchase
that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct of materials and payment for labor costs. The State
set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, however refused to pay on the ground that it had an
though by itself legal because recognized or granted expired license at the time of the execution of the
by law as such, may nevertheless become the source contract. Despite the same, it is entitled to be paid
of some illegality. for completed projects.
41. Doctrine of mobilia sequuntur Doctrine holding that personal property held by a Wells Fargo v. Collector, 70 Phil 325. This case involves
person is governed by the same law that governs the collection of inheritance taxes on shares of stock
that person, so that if a person who is issued by the Benguet Consolidated Mining
legally domiciled in one jurisdiction dies with Corporation and owned by Lillian Eye. Said shares
property in a second jurisdiction, that property is were already subjected to inheritance taxes in
legally treated as though it were in the first California and are now being taxed by Philippine
jurisdiction. authorities.
Originally, the settled law in the United States is that

intangibles have only one situs for the purpose of
inheritance tax – the domicile of the decedent at the
time of death. But this rule has, of late, been relaxed.
The maxim mobilia sequuntur personam, upon
which the rules rests, has been decried as a mere
fiction of law having its origin in considerations of
general convenience and public policy and cannot be
applied to limit or control the right of the State to tax
property within its jurisdiction. It must yield to
established fact of legal ownership, actual presence
and control elsewhere, and cannot be applied if to
do so would result in inescapable and patent
injustice.
The relaxation of the original rule rests on either of

two fundamental considerations:
1. Upon the recognition of the inherent power of

each government to tax persons, properties and
rights within its jurisdiction and enjoying the
protection of its laws; or
2. Upon the principle that as to intangibles, a

single location in space is hardly possible,
considering the multiple, distinct relationships
which may be entered into with respect thereto.
The actual situs of the shares of stock is in the

Philippines, the corporation being domiciled therein.
And besides, the certificates of stock have remained
in this country up to the time when the deceased
died in California, and they were in the possession
of the secretary of the Benguet Corporation. The
secretary had the right to vote, collect dividends,
among others. For all practical purposes, the
secretary had legal title to the certificates of stock
held in trust for Eye. Eye extended in the Philippines
her activities re: her intangible personal property so
as to avail herself of the protection and benefits of
the Philippine laws.
The Collector of Internal Revenue v. Antonio Campos

Rueda, G.R. No. L-13250, October 29, 1971. The Board
found from the documents submitted to it — proof
of the laws of Liechtenstein — that said country does
not impose estate, inheritance and gift taxes on
intangible property of Filipino citizens not residing
in that country. Wherefore, the Board declared that

pursuant to the exemption above established, no
estate or inheritance taxes were collectible, Ludwig
Kiene being a resident of Liechtestein when he
passed away." 20 Then came this definitive ruling:
"The Collector — hereafter named the respondent —
cites decisions of the United States Supreme Court
and of this Court, holding that intangible personal
property in the Philippines belonging to a non-
resident foreigner, who died outside of this country
is subject to the estate tax, in disregard of the
principle 'mobilia sequuntur personam'. Such
property is admittedly taxable here. Without the
proviso above quoted, the shares of stock owned
here by the Ludwig Kiene would be concededly
subject to estate and inheritance taxes. Nevertheless
our Congress chose to make an exemption where
conditions are such that demand reciprocity — as in
this case. And the exemption must be honored."
42. Doctrine of aequitas nunquam contravent Equity never acts in contravention of the law. Air Philippines Corporation v. International Business
legis Aviation Services Phils., Inc. G.R. No. 151963,
September 9, 2004. The interests of justice require that
positive law be equally observed. Petitioner has not
sufficiently proved the injustice of holding it liable
for the negligence of its counsel. On the contrary,
there is a preponderance of evidence to demonstrate
that both law and justice demand otherwise. Much
leniency has already been shown by the lower court
to petitioner, but "aequetas nunquam contravenit
legis." Equity never contravenes the law. For these
reasons, the rendition of an unfavorable judgment
against petitioner by reason of its counsel’s simple

negligence is therefore apropos. To hold otherwise
and grant a new trial will never put an end to any
litigation," as there is a new counsel to be hired
every time it is shown that the prior one had not
been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned."
43. Doctrine of Attractive Nuissance A person who maintains in his premises a Hidalgo Enterprises Inc. v. Guillermo Balandan,
dangerous instrumentality of a character which is Anselma Anila and The Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
attractive to children if tender years at play and who 3422, June 13, 1952. The doctrine of attractive
fails to exercise due diligence to prevent such nuisance states that “One who maintains on his
children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances
is liable to a child who is injured thereby, even if the of a character likely to attract children in play, and
child is technically a trespasser. who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent
children from playing therewith or resorting thereto,
The principle reason for the doctrine is that the is liable to a child of tender years who is injured
condition or appliance in question although its thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser
danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or in the premises. American Jurisprudence shows us
alluring to children of tender years as to induce that the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not
them to approach, get on or use it, and this applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as
attractiveness is an implied invitation to such natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or
children artificial feature other than the mere water and its
location. In the case bar, the tanks themselves cannot
fall under such doctrine thus the petitioners cannot
be held liable for Mario’s death.
44. In Articulo Mortis The translation of articulo mortis is "at the point of De Loria v Felix G.R. No. L-9005, June 20, 1958. The
death" or "in the moment of death" and a marriage marriage in Articulo Mortis is valid. The law
in articulo mortis is a marriage that is performed permits in articulo mortis marriages, without
when either the bride or groom is at the point of marriage license; but it requires the priest to make
death and unable to sign a marriage license the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the
application or certificate. data usually required for the issuance of a marriage

license. The first practically substitutes the latter.
Some locales allow these marriages to be solemnized Now then, if a marriage celebrated without the
without a marriage license and to be solemnized by license is not voidable (under Act 3613) this
a ship captain, an airplane pilot, or a military marriage should not also be voidable for lack of such
commander. affidavit.
People v. Bautista G.R. No. 117685. June 21, 1999. A

dying declaration, also known as an ante mortem
statement or a statement in articulo mortis, is
admissible under the following requisites: (1) that
death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of
that fact; (2) that the declaration refers to the cause
and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3)
that the declaration relates to facts which the victim
is competent to testify to; and (4) that the declaration
is offered in a case wherein the declarant’s death is
the subject of the inquiry.
In the case at bar, the trial court correctly

rejected the ante mortem statement of the victim.
Records show that Jose Gagaza, Jr., the person who
allegedly heard the victim’s ante mortem statement,
was never presented in court to testify on the matter.
It has been held that if the dying declaration was
made orally, it may be proved by the testimony of
the witness who heard the same or to whom it was
made.
45. Doctrine of Triennial Cohabitation A doctrine of common law, which declares the Tompkins v. Tompkins 92 N.J. Eq. 113 111 Atl. 599.
presumption that the husband is impotent should The court held that under the doctrine of triennial
the wife still remain a virgin after living together cohabitation, the husband In this case is presumed to
with the husband for three years. This is in contrast be impotent. The claim of the husband that the wife
to the general presumption under our law in favor did not want carnal intercourse is hard to believe.
of potency. Such solicitation of a groom is noble; of a husband,
heroic. The husband’s plea does not inspire
confidence. Common experience discredits it. And if
in fact he had the physical power and refrained from
sexual intercourse during the five years he occupied
the same bed with his wife, purely out of sympathy
for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not
having asserted his rights, even though she balked.
The presumption of impotency has not been
overcome, and the decree of annulment will be
granted.
46. Lex Loci Contractus The law of the place where the contract was made. Zalanea vs. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 23. This Court
applied the doctrine of lex loci contractus. According
to the doctrine, as a general rule, the law of the place
where a contract is made or entered into governs
with respect to its nature and validity, obligation
and interpretation. This has been said to be the rule
even though the place where the contract was made
is different from the place where it is to be
performed, and particularly so, if the place of the
making and the place of performance are the same.
Hence, the court should apply the law of the place
where the airline ticket was issued, when the
passengers are residents and nationals of the forum
and the ticket is issued in such State by the
defendant airline.
47. Doctrine of Ultra Vires A corporation is a creature of the law and has only Atrium Management Corp. v. Court of Appeals. G.R.
such powers and privileges as are granted by the No. 109491. February 28, 2001. De Leon was
State – the ultra vires doctrine is a product of the authorized and such issuance is not an ultra vires
theory of concession; it upholds the fiduciary duty act. Ratio: De Leon as treasurer of the corporation is
of directors and officers to the stockholders or authorized to sign checks for the corporation. As a
members – such duty dictates that the corporation rule, the act of issuing checks is within the ambit of a
engage only in transactions to which the valid corporate act. And securing a loan to finance
stockholders and members bind themselves by way the activities of the corporation is not an ultra vires
of the provisions of the purposes clause. This is also act. While an ultra vires act is one committed outside
necessarily include an obligation not to enter into the object or which a corporation is created as
transactions which violate the law. defined by law of its organization and therefore
beyond the power conferred upon it by law, the act
Whether the act in question is in direct and pertained to in the case is not an illegal act. De Leon
immediate furtherance of the corporation’s business, on the other hand was negligent in confirming that
fairly incident to the express powers and reasonably such checks were issued to ET Henry as payment for
necessary to their exercise. The strict terms “direct their company’s debt with the former. That is why
and immediate” refers to the business of the she was held to be personally liable to Atrium.
corporation while the liberal terms “fairly incident”
and “reasonably necessary” with reference to the Safic Alcan & Cie v.Imperial Vegetable Oil Co., Inc. 355
powers of the corporation. With regard to the SCRA 559 (2001). The grant or donation in question
business of the corporation as the reference point, is remunerative in nature and was given in
much latitude is given to the corporation to enter in consideration of the services rendered by the heirs’
to various contracts as long as they have logical father to the corporation. The donation has already
relation to the pursuit of such business. On the other been perfected such that the corporation could no
hand, when the purpose clause used limiting words longer rescind it. It was embodied in a Board
that Court will hold such corporation to such limited Resolution. Representatives of the corporation and
business. even its creditors as the NDC have given their
concurrence. The resolution was actually carried out
Second Type of Ultra Vires: when the corporation and Estefania entered into an
agreement that the proceeds will be entered as a
When the President enters into speculative contracts, loan. Estefania accepted the donation and such was
without prior board approval, and without recorded by the corporation. The Board of Directors
subsequent submission of those contracts to the approved Estefania’s purchase of the house in New
Board for approval or ratification, nor were the York. Company stockholders formally ratified the
transactions included in the reports of the donation. The donation was a corporate act carried
corporation, such contracts do not bind the out by the corporation not only with the sanction of
corporation. It must be pointed out that the Board of the Board of Directors but also of its stockholders.
Directors, not the President, exercises corporate The donation has reached a stage of perfection
powers. which is valid and binding upon the corporation
and cannot be rescinded unless there exists legal
grounds for doing so. The SEC opinion nor the
subsequent Board Resolution are not sufficient
reasons to nullify the donation. The donation is also
not an ultra vires act. The corporation was given
broad and unlimited powers to carry out the
purpose for which it was organized which includes
the power to (1) invest and deal with corporate
money not immediately required in such manner as
from time to time may be determined(2) aid in any
other manner to any person, association or
corporation of which any obligation is held by this
corporation. The donation undoubtedly comes
within the scope of this broad power. An ultra vires
act is (1) an act contrary to law, morals, or public
order or contravene some rules of public policy or
duty. It cannot acquire validity by performance,
ratification, estoppel. It is essentially void (2) those
within the scope of the Articles of Incorporation and
not always illegal. It is merely voidable and may
become binding and enforceable when ratified by
stockholders. Since it is not contended that the
donation is illegal or contrary to any of the
expressed provisions of the Articles of Incorporation
nor prejudicial to the creditors of the corporation,
said donation even if ultra vires is not void and if
voidable, its infirmity has been cured by ratification
and subsequent acts of the corporation. The

corporation is now estopped or prevented from
contesting the validity of the donation. To allow the
corporation to undo what it has done would be most
unfair and contravene the well-settled doctrine that
the defense of ultra vires cannot be se up or availed
of in any completed transaction.
48. Trust Fund Doctrine Considers the subscribed capital stock as a trust Donnina C. Halley, v. Printwell, Inc., G.R. No. 157549,
fund for the payment of the debts of the corporation, May 30, 2011. Both the RTC and the CA applied the
to which the creditors may look for satisfaction. trust fund doctrine against the defendant
Until the liquidation of the corporation, no part of stockholders, including the petitioner.
the subscribed capital stock may be turned over or
released to the stockholder (except in the The trust fund doctrine enunciates a rule that the
redemption of the redeemable shares) without property of a corporation is a trust fund for the
violating this principle. Thus dividends must never payment of creditors, but such property can be
impair the subscribed capital stock; subscription called a trust fund ‘only by way of analogy or
commitments cannot be condoned or remitted; nor metaphor.’ As between the corporation itself and its
can the corporation buy its own shares using the creditors it is a simple debtor, and as between its
subscribed capital as the consideration therefore. creditors and stockholders its assets are in equity a
fund for the payment of its debts. We clarify that the
trust fund doctrine is not limited to reaching the
stockholder’s unpaid subscriptions. The scope of the
doctrine when the corporation is insolvent
encompasses not only the capital stock, but also
other property and assets generally regarded in
equity as a trust fund for the payment of corporate
debts. All assets and property belonging to the
corporation held in trust for the benefit of creditors
that were distributed or in the possession of the
stockholders, regardless of full payment of their
subscriptions, may be reached by the creditor in
satisfaction of its claim.
Also, under the trust fund doctrine ,a corporation

has no legal capacity to release an original subscriber
to its capital stock from the obligation of paying for
his shares, in whole or in part,] without a valuable
consideration, or fraudulently, to the prejudice of
creditors. The creditor is allowed to maintain an
action upon any unpaid subscriptions and thereby
steps into the shoes of the corporation for the
satisfaction of its debt. To make out a prima facie
case in a suit against stockholders of an insolvent
corporation to compel them to contribute to the
payment of its debts by making good unpaid
balances upon their subscriptions, it is only
necessary to establish that the stock holders have not
in good faith paid the par value of the stocks of the
corporation. To reiterate, the petitioner was liable
pursuant to the trust fund doctrine for the corporate
obligation of BMPI by virtue of her subscription
being still unpaid. Print well, as BMPI’s creditor, had
a right to reach her unpaid subscription in
satisfaction of its claim.
Boman Environmental Dev. Corp. v.CA, 167 SCRA 540

(1988).
The requirement of unrestricted retained earnings to
cover the shares is based on the trust fund doctrine
which means that the capital stock, property and
other assets of a corporation are regarded as equity
in trust for the payment of corporate creditors. The
reason is that creditors of a corporation are preferred
over the stockholders in the distribution of corporate

assets. There can be no distribution of assets among
the stockholders without first paying corporate
creditors. Hence, any disposition of corporate funds
to the prejudice of creditors is null and void.
49. Doctrine of Laches The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is Vda. de Tirona v. Encarnacion, GR 168902, 28
based upon grounds of public policy which requires, September 2007. While jurisprudence is settled on the
for the peace of society, the discouragement of imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens
stale claims and, unlike the statute of title, there is equally an abundance of cases where
limitation, is not merely a question of time but is we unequivocally ruled that registered owners may
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness lose their right to recover possession of property
of permitting a right or claim to been forced or through the equitable principle of laches. Laches
asserted. There is no absolute rule as to what means “the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
is to be determined according to its particular exercising due diligence, could or should have been
circumstances. Ultimately, however, the question of done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the right within a reasonable time, warranting the
court and, since it is an equitable doctrine, its presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
application is controlled by equitable has abandoned or declined to assert it. The defense
consideration. of laches is an equitable one and does not concern
itself with the character of the defendant’s title, but
only with whether or not by reason of plaintiff’s
long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should be
barred from asserting his claim at all, because to
allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust
to defendant. “Laches” has been defined as “such
neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in
conjunction with lapse of time and other
circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party,
as will operate as a bar in equity.” It is a delay in the
assertion of a right “which works disadvantage to
another” because of the “inequity founded on some

change in the condition or relations of the property
or parties.” It is based on public policy which, for the
peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to
a stale demand which otherwise could be a valid
claim. It is different from and applies independently
of prescription. While prescription is concerned with
the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the effect
of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is
principally a question of inequity of permitting a
claim to been forced, this inequity being founded on
some change in the condition of the property or the
relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory;
laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas
prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on
a fixed time, laches is not.
Llemos vs. Llemos, GR 150162, 26 January 2007. It is a

well-settled doctrine that laches cannot be used to
defeat justice or perpetuate fraud and injustice.
Neither should its application be used to prevent the
rightful owners of a property from recovering what
has been fraudulently registered in the name of
another.
50. Action of Reconveyance Legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful Heirs of Salonga Bituin, v Teofilo Caoleng, Sr., et al., GR
owner of the land which has been wrongfully or 157567, 10 August 2007. Well entrenched is the rule
erroneously registered in the name of another for the that an action for reconveyance prescribes in ten
purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or years, the reckoning point of which is the date of
reconvey the land to him. registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the
certificate of title over the property. In an action for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is highly
regarded as incontrovertible. What is sought instead

is the transfer of the property or its title, which has
been erroneously or wrongfully registered in
another person’s name to its rightful or legal owner,
or to one who has a better right. However, in a
number of cases in the past, the Court declared that
if the person claiming to be the owner of the
property is in actual possession thereof, the right to
seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet
title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason
for this is that one who is in actual possession of a
piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right,
the rationale for the rule being that his undisturbed
possession provides him a continuing right to seek
the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third
party and its effect on his own title, which right can
be claimed only by the one who is in possession.
Crisostomo v. Garcia, 516 Phil. 743 (2006). When

property is registered in another's name, an implied
or constructive trust is created by law in favor of the
true owner. The action for reconveyance of the title
to the rightful owner prescribes in 10 years from the
issuance of the title. An action for reconveyance
based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in
ten years from the alleged fraudulent registration or
date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property.
It is now well settled that the prescriptive period to

recover property obtained by fraud or mistake,
giving rise to an implied trust under Art. 1456 of the
Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to Art. 1144. This
ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the
date the adverse party repudiates the implied trust,
which repudiation takes place when the adverse
party registers the land.
51. Presumption of Survivorship If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons Joaquin vs. Navarro. 93 Phil. 25. Where the death of
who are called to succeed each other, as to which of the mother and her son occurred during the
them died first, whoever alleges the death of one massacre of civilians in February, 1945 and at the
prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the time when Manila was being bombarded during the
absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the war, the Supreme court upheld the ruling of the trial
same time and there shall be no transmission of court (which was reversed by the Court of Appeals)
rights from one to the other. that, from the evidence presented, the son died
before the mother. Pertinently, it was based from the
When two persons perish in the same calamity, testimony of one of the witnesses of the incident
such as a wreck, battle, or conflagration and it is not who was with Joaquin Navarro Jr., Mr. Lopez.
shown who died first, and there are no particular
circumstances from which it can be inferred, the
survivorship is presumed the probabilities resulting
from the strength and age of the sexes, according to
the following rules.
If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older

is presumed to have survived. If both were above
the age of sixty, the younger is presumed to have
survived. If one be under fifteen and the other above
sixty, the former is presumed to have survived.
52. Doctrine of implications (necessary The doctrine of implications means that “that which City of Manila and Treasurer vs. Judge Gomez. G.R. No.
implications) is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as L-37251. August 31, 1981. The Supreme Court held
much a part of it as that which is expressed”. that the doctrine of implications in statutory
construction and sustained the City of Manila’s
contention that the additional one-half percent realty
tax was sanctioned by the provision in Section 4 of
the Special Education Fund Law. The doctrine of
implications means that “that which is plainly
implied in the language of a statute is as much a part
of it as that which is expressed”. The obvious
implication is that an additional one-half percent tax
could be imposed by municipal corporations.
Inferentially, that law (the ordinance) fixed at two
percent the realty tax that would accrue to a city or
municipality. Section 4 of the Special Education
Fund Law, as confirmed by the Real Property Tax
Code (later), in prescribing a total realty tax of three
percent impliedly authorized the augmentation by
one-half percent of the pre-existing one and one- half
percent realty tax.
National Association of Trade Unions (NATU) v. Torres.

G.R. No. 93468. December 29, 1994. As regards the
other claim of respondent Bank that Branch
Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers are
confidential employees, having control, custody
and/or access to confidential matters, e.g., the
branch's cash position, statements of financial
condition, vault combination, cash codes for
telegraphic transfers, demand drafts and other
negotiable instruments, 23 pursuant to Sec. 1166.4 of
the Central Bank Manual regarding joint custody, 24
this claim is not even disputed by petitioner. A

confidential employee is one entrusted with
confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody,
handling, or care and protection of the employer's
property. 25 While Art. 245 of the Labor Code
singles out managerial employees as ineligible to
join, assist or form any labor organization, under the
doctrine of necessary implication, confidential
employees are similarly disqualified. This doctrine
states that what is implied in a statute is as much a
part thereof as that which is expressed, as elucidated
in several cases 26 the latest of which is Chua v.
Civil Service Commission 27 where we said:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the

details involved in its application. There is always an
omission that may not meet a particular situation.
What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an
all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to
provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-
called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced.
One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill
in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication.
Every statute is understood, by implication, to
contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make
effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction
which it grants, including all such collateral and
subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate
legis .
In applying the doctrine of necessary implication,

we took into consideration the rationale behind the
disqualification of managerial employees expressed
in Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez, 28
thus: "if these managerial employees would belong
to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not
be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of
evident conflict of interests. The Union can also
become company-dominated with the presence of
managerial employees in Union membership."
Stated differently, in the collective bargaining
process, managerial employees are supposed to be
on the side of the employer, to act as its
representatives, and to see to it that its interests are
well protected. The employer is not assured of such
protection if these employees themselves are union
members. Collective bargaining in such a situation
can become one-sided. 29 It is the same reason that
impelled this Court to consider the position of
confidential employees as included in the
disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the
disqualification of confidential employees were
written in the provision. If confidential employees
could unionize in order to bargain for advantages
for themselves, then they could be governed by their
own motives rather than the interest of the
employers. Moreover, unionization of confidential
employees for the purpose of collective bargaining
would mean the extension of the law to persons or
individuals who are supposed to act "in the interest
of" the employers. 30 It is not farfetched that in the
course of collective bargaining, they might
jeopardize that interest which they are duty-bound

to protect. Along the same line of reasoning we held
in Golden Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja 31 reiterated
in Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC, 32
that "confidential employees such as accounting
personnel, radio and telegraph operators who,
having access to confidential information, may
become the source of undue advantage. Said
employee(s) may act as spy or spies of either party
to a collective bargaining agreement."
53. Doctrine of Collateral Attack A decree of registration and registered title cannot De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro. G.R. No. 160172.
be impugned, enlarged, altered, modified, or Petitioner filed a complaint for support against her
diminished either in collateral or direct proceeding, husband to compel the latter to support their child.
after the lapse of one year from the date of its entry. The husband interposed an affirmative defense
claiming that the petitioner and she were not
In terms of marriage, as a general rule, a void married. The Supreme Court ruled that while the
marriage may be collaterally attacked. This means case was one of support, the lower court can make a
that the nullity of a marriage can be asserted even if declaration that the marriage was void to determine
it is not the main or principal issue of a case and that the rights of the child to be supported. The Supreme
no previous judicial declaration of nullity is required Court rejected the contention that a separate case for
by law with respect to any other matter where the judicial declaration of nullity must be filed first
issue of the voidness of a marriage is pertinent or before the lower court, in a case for support, can rule
material, either directly or indirectly. that the marriage was void.
Where a direct attack is necessary has been alluded

to by the Supreme Court in Ninal vs. Badayog (328
SCRA 122), when it said that for purposes other
than remarriage, no judicial declaration of nullity is
necessary. However, for other purposes, such as but
not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal

case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the
case. When such need arise, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
Ybanez v. IAC, G.R. No. 68291, March 6, 1991. A

collateral attack is not allowed. It was erroneous for
Arcidio to question the Torrens OCT issued to
Valentin in an ordinary civil action for recovery of
possession filed by the registered owner – Valentin –
of the said lot, by invoking as affirmative defense in
his answer the Order of the Bureau of Lands issued
pursuant to the investigatory power of the Director
of Lands under Section 91 of Public Land Law (CA
No. 141 as amended). Such a defense partakes of the
nature of a collateral attack against a certificate of
title brought under the operation of the Torrens
system of registration pursuant to Sec. 122, Land
Registration Act, now Sec. 103, PD 1259.
54. Doctrine of Waiver It is the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a DM Consunji, Inc. Vs CA G.R. No. 137873. Private
known right or such conduct as warrants and respondent Maria Juego filed in the Pasig Regional
inference of the relinquishment of such right. Trial Court a complaint for damages against
petitioner for the death of her husband Jose Juego.

Requisites for a valid waiver: Jose was employed by petitioner as a construction
1. waiving party must actually have the right he is worker who fell 14 floors from the Renaissance
renouncing Tower in Pasig and died. Maria availed of the death
2. he must have full capacity to make the waiver benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Petitioner is
3. waiver must be clear and unequivocal claiming that she can no longer recover damages
-waiver must not be contrary to law, public order, under the Civil Code because her prior availment of
public morals, etc. the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The trial
-when formalities are required, they must be court and CA decided in favor of Maria
complied with.
Whether Maria’s availment of the death benefits
provided under the Labor Code amounts to a waiver
of her rights to claim for damages from petition
under the Civil Code.
Maria was only ignorant of the fact and of her rights

as well. Maria’s election of the death benefits does
not bar any action inconsistent with the elected
remedy. For a waiver to become valid there must be
an intentional relinquishment of a known right.
Where one lacks knowledge of a rights, there is no
basis upon which waiver of its can rest. Waiver
requires acknowledge of the right waived with an
awareness of its consequences. Thus ignorance of
material fact negates waiver.
Velasco v. Court of Appeals 96 SCRA 616. If a

corporation waives (by selling) in favor of the GSIS
all the former’s right in a subdivision, and assumes
the payment of debts for materials used, and later
said corporation becomes insolvent, the GSIS should
answer for said debts for it has obtained the benefits
(the improvements of which the GSIS is now the
owner).
55. Doctrine of Contra Bonus Mores Means against good morals and is applied through Gashem Shookat Baksh, petitioner, v. Hon. Court of
Article 19, 20 and 21 of the New Civil Code of the Appeals and Marilou T. Gonzales, G.R. No. 97336,
Philippines. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus February 19, 1993. In the light of the above laudable
mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so
an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact
morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by
3) and it is done with intent to injure. Thus, under a woman and his representation to fulfill that
any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of
causes injury to another may be made the basis for the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress,
an award of damages. proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her
to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual
act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the
willful injury to her honor and reputation which
followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that
such injury should have been committed in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it

was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's

parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short,
the private respondent surrendered her virginity,
the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not
because of lust but because of moral seduction — the
kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not
be held liable for criminal seduction punished under
either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal
Code because the private respondent was above
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that

Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to
marry where the woman is a victim of moral
seduction.
Beatriz P. Wassmer v. Francisco X. Velez, G.R. No. L-

20089, December 26, 1964. It must not be overlooked,
however, that the extent to which acts not contrary
to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not
limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that
"any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff

and defendant applied for a license to contract
marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A,
A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954.

Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives,
friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The
bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other
apparel for the important occasion were purchased
(Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the
flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with
accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given
and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with
but two days before the wedding, defendant, who
was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff
stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My
mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city
in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the
wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest
assured returning soon." But he never returned and
was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to

marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is
not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it
when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is
quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant must
be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the

damages awarded were excessive. No question is
raised as to the award of actual damages. What
defendant would really assert hereunder is that the

award of moral and exemplary damages, in the
amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New

Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the
cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to
exemplary damages, defendant contends that the
same could not be adjudged against him because
under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the
condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of
merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of
this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... ,
reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's
opinion, however, is that considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable
award.
56. Molina Doctrine The Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the Danilo A. Aurelio v. Vida Ma. Corazon P. Aurelio, G.R.
courts in the disposition of cases involving No. 175367, June 6, 2011. This Court, pursuant to
psychological incapacity, to wit: Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10,
has modified the above pronouncements,
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. certification of the Solicitor General required in the
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still,
must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at prevent collusion between the parties and to take
“the time of the celebration” of the marriage. care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the allegations contained in respondent’s petition
the disability of the party to assume the essential are insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of
obligations of marriage. marriage based on psychological incapacity.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those Specifically, petitioner contends that the petition
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code failed to comply with three of the Molina guidelines,
as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles namely: that the root cause of the psychological
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to incapacity must be alleged in the complaint; that
parents and their children. Such non-complied such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the disability of the party to assume the essential
petition, proven by evidence and included in the obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied
text of the decision. marital obligation must be stated in the petition.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should respondent are psychologically incapacitated to
be given great respect by our courts. fulfill their marital obligations is a matter for the
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal of the
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear Molina guidelines would show that the same
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed contemplate a situation wherein the parties have
down unless the Solicitor General issues a presented their evidence, witnesses have testified,
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, and that a decision has been reached by the court
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a decision
rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. It
would certainly be too burdensome to ask this Court
to resolve at first instance whether the allegations
contained in the petition are sufficient to
substantiate a case for psychological incapacity. Let
it be remembered that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly
and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,

predilections or generalizations but according to its
own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.[18] It would thus be more prudent
for this Court to remand the case to the RTC, as it
would be in the best position to scrutinize the
evidence as well as hear and weigh the evidentiary
value of the testimonies of the ordinary witnesses
and expert witnesses presented by the parties.
Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting, G.R. No.

166562, March 31, 2009. In hindsight, it may have
been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid
set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all
cases of psychological incapacity. We said that
instead of serving as a guideline, Molina
unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all
cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into
and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the
intention of the law but unrealistic as well because,
with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can
be considered as on “all fours” with another.
57. Meeting of the Minds in a Contract of Sale This doctrine speaks of the intent of the parties in Sps. Buenaventura and Joaquin, et.al. v. CA. G.R. No.
entering into the contract respecting the subject 126376. A contract of sale is not a real contract but a
matter and the consideration thereof, and if the consensual contract, valid and binding upon the
words of the contract appear to be contrary to the meeting of the minds as to the price. If there is a
evident intention of the parties, the latter shall meeting of the mind of the parties as to the price, the
prevail over the former. contract of sale is valid, despite the manner of
paymen , or even the breach of that manner of
payment. If there is no meeting of the minds of the
parties as to the price, because the price stipulated in
the contract is simulated, then the contract is void,
according to Article 1471 of the Civil Code. It is not
the act of payment of the price that determines the
validity of a contract of sale. In the present case,
petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deed
of Sale were absolutely simulated, thus there was
meeting of the minds.
San Miguel Properties Philippines, Inc. v. Sps. Huang

G.R. No. 137290. In the present case, the SC held that
the stages of a contract of sale are: 1. Negotiation,
covering the period from the time the prospective
contracting parties indicate interest in the contract to
the time the contract is perfected; 2. Perfection,
which takes place upon the concurrence of the
essential elements of the sale, which is the meeting
of the minds of the parties as to the subject of the
contract and upon the price,; and 3. Consummation,
which begins when the parties perform their
respective undertakings under the contract of sale,
culminating upon the extinguishment thereof.
58. Ownership by Right of Accretion Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that to the Martinez Canas vs Tuason. 5 Phil 688. This is a case of
owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong boundary dispute between the owners of two estates
the accretion which they gradually receive from the (Mariquina estate and Payatas estate), in which
effects of the current of the waters. This doctrine has dispute the Tuasons claimed 30 hectares of land
3 requisites: 1. that the deposit be gradual and which had been swifted over to the Payatas estate
imperceptible; 2. that it be made through the effects side of the Mariquina River. Though the evidence
of the current of the water; and 3. that the land for the owners of the Mariquina estate was much
where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks stronger than that of the Payatas estate in this case,
of rivers. the Supreme Court, nevertheless, held that the
owner of the Payatas estate had acquired title to the
land by accretion.
59. Alluvial Formation Along the Seashore Forms Alluvial formations along the seashore forms part of Ignacio vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-12958
Part of the Public Domain the public domain and therefore, not open to the May 30, 1960. It is not disputed that the land applied
acquisition by adverse possession by private for adjoins a parcel owned by the applicant which he
persons. The adjoining registered owner of the had acquired from the Government by virtue of a
foreshore land cannot claim ownership by right of Free Patent in 1936. It has also been established that
accretion the parcel in question was formed by accretion and
alluvial deposits caused by the action of the Manila
Bay which boarders it on the southwest. Applicant
and petitioner Ignacio claims that he had occupied
the land since 1935, planting it with api-api trees,
and that his possession thereof had been continuous,
adverse and public for a period of twenty years until
said possession was disturbed by oppositor and
private respondent Valeriano. On the other hand,
the Director of Lands sought to prove that the parcel
is foreshore land, covered by the ebb and flow of the
tide and, therefore, formed part of the public
domain.
Hrs. of Navarro vs IAC G.R. No. 68166. In the light of

the vintage but still valid provision of Article 4 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which is where
the said doctrine on alluvial formations is derived,

unequivocal is the public nature of the disputed land
in the controversy of the present case, the same
being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all legal
purposes, the foreshore of Manila Bay is. As part of
the public domain, the herein disputed land is
intended for public uses, and “so long as the land in
litigation belongs to the national domain and is
reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being
appropriated by any private person, except through
express authorization granted in due form of a
competent authority.
60. Ownership of Abandoned River Beds by Riverbeds which are abandoned through the natural Sps. Galang vs. Sps. Reyes G.R. No. 184746. If indeed a
Right of Accession change in the course of waters ipso facto belongs to property was the former bed of a creek that changed
the owners whose lands are occupied by the new its course and passed through the property of the
course in proportion to the area lost. However, the claimant, then, pursuant to Article 461, the
owners of the lands adjoining the old bed, shall have ownership of the old bed left to dry by the change of
the right to acquire the same by paying the value course was automatically acquired by the claimant.
thereof – which value shall not exceed the value of Before such a conclusion can be reached, the fact of
the area occupied by the new bed. Requisites of the natural abandonment of the old course must be
application of Art. 461 of the New Civil Code in shown, that is, it must be proven that the creek
accordance to the aforementioned doctrine are: 1. indeen changed its course without artificial or
The change must be sudden in order that the old manmade intervention. Thus, the claimant, in this
river may be identified; 2. The changing of the case the Reyeses, must prove three key elements by
course must be more or less permanent, and not clear and convincing evidence. These are: 1. The old
temporary overflowing of another’s land; 3. The course of the creek; 2. The new course of the creek;
change of the river must be natural; 4. There must be and 3. The change of course of the creek from the old
definite abandonment of the government; 5. The location to the new location by natural occurrence.
river must continue to exist, that is, it must not In this regard, the Reyeses failed to adduce
completely dry up or disappear. indubitable evidence to prove the old and new
course, and the natural abandonment. In the face of

a Torrens title issued by the government, which is
presumed to have been regularly issued, the
evidence of the Reyeses was clearly wanting.
Uncorroborated testimonial evidence will not suffice
to convince the Copurt to order the re-conveyance of
the property to them.
61. Doctrine of Collateral Attack on Titles A doctrine stating that collateral attack on titles is Abobon vs Abobon, et.al. G.R. No. 155830. In order to
not allowed, pursuant to Sec. 48 of P.D. 1529, which properly assail the validity of the respondent’s TCT,
states that “A certificate of title shall not be subject he must himself bring an action for that purpose.
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or Instead of bringing that direct action, he mounted
canceled except in direct proceeding in accordance his attack as a merely defensive allegation herein.
with law.” Such manner of attack against the TCT was a
collateral one, which was disallowed by Section 48
of P.D. 1529.
Aymundo and Perla De Guzman v. Praxides J. Agbagala,

G.R. No. 163566, February 19, 2008. Upon the
expiration of said period of one year, the decree of
registration and the certificate of title issued shall
become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by
such decree of registration in any case may pursue
his remedy by action for damages against the
applicant or any other person responsible for the
fraud.
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. ―

A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with
law. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a decree of registration or patent and the

certificate of title issued pursuant thereto may be
attacked on the ground of falsification or fraud
within one year from the date of their issuance.
Such an attack must be direct and not by a collateral
proceeding. The rationale is this:
The public should be able to rely on a registered

title. The Torrens System was adopted in this
country because it was believed to be the most
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land
titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the
claim of ownership is established and recognized.
An action is deemed an attack on a title when the
object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the
title and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to
which the title was decreed. The attack is direct
when the object of the action is to annul or set aside
such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the
other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when,
in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on
the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident
thereof.
In the present case, the attack on OCT No. P-30187

was merely collateral because the action was
principally for the declaration of nullity of the deed
of donation and the other deeds of conveyance
which followed.
However, the principle of indefeasibility does not

apply when the patent and the title based thereon
are null and void. An action to declare the nullity of
a void title does not prescribe and is susceptible to
direct, as well as to collateral, attack. OCT No. P-
30187 was registered on the basis of a free patent
which the RTC ruled was issued by the Director of
Lands without authority. The petitioners falsely
claimed that the land was public land when in fact it
was not as it was private land previously owned by
Carmen who inherited it from her parents. This
finding was affirmed by the CA. There is no reason
to reverse it.
The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a

private land is null and void, and produces no legal
effects whatsoever. Private ownership of land ― as
when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a
duly registered possessory information or a clear
showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession, by present or previous
occupants ― is not affected by the issuance of a free
patent over the same land, because the Public Land
law applies only to lands of the public domain. The
Director of Lands has no authority to grant free
patent to lands that have ceased to be public in
character and have passed to private ownership.
Consequently, a certificate of title issued pursuant to
a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a
certificate issued in a judicial proceeding only if the
land covered by it is really a part of the disposable
land of the public domain.
Since the Director of Lands has no authority to grant

a free patent over privately owned land, any title
issued pursuant thereto is null and void.
Therefore, although OCT No. P-30187 was merely

collaterally attacked, it was still correctly nullified
because the free patent on which it was based was
null and void ab initio.
62. Rescission by Reason of Subject being Under Resolution of Litigation is not a condition to Luz, et.al. vs. Baylon G.R. No. 182435. It bears
Litigation rescission. Contracts which are rescissible due to stressing that the right to ask for the rescission of a
fraud or bad faith include those which involve contract under Article 1381 (4) of the Civil Code is
things under litigation, if they have been entered not contingent upon the final determination of the
into by the defendant without the knowledge and ownership of the thing subject of litigation. The
approval of the litigans or of competent judicial primordial purpose of the said provision is to secure
authority. Thus, Article 1381 (4) of the Civil Code the possible effectivity of the impending judgment
provides: “The following contracts are rescissible: (4) by a court with respect to the thing subject of
Those which refer to things under litigation if they litigation. It seeks to protect the binding effect of the
have been entered into by the defendant without the court’s impending adjudication vis-à-vis the thing
knowledge and approval of the litigans or of subject of litigation regardless of which among the
competent judicial authority.” The rescission of a contending claims therein would subsequently be
contract under Article 1381 (4) of the Civil Code only upheld. Accordingly, a definitive judicial
requires the concurrence of the following: first, the determination with respect to the thing subject of
defendant, during the pendency of the case, enters litigation is not a condition sine qua non before the
into a contract which refers to the thing subject of rescissory action contemplated under Article 1381
litigation; and second, the said contract was entered (4) of the Civil Code may be instituted.
into without the knowledge and approval of the
litigans or of a competent judicial authority. As long
as the foregoing requisites concur, it becomes the
duty of the court to order the rescission of the said
contract.
63. Doctrine of jus sanguinis Latin of right of blood, it is a principle of nationality Cirilo R. Valles v. Commission on Elections and Rosalind
law by which citizenship is not determined by place Ybasco Lopez, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000. The
of birth but by having instead one or both parents Commission on Elections ruled that private
who are citizens of the state or more generally by respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino
having state citizenship or membership to a nation citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public
determined or conferred by -ethnic, cultural or office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a
other- descent or origin Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus
sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987
Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a
Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen
ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473;
(3) and that, she renounced her Australian
citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of
Australia and her Australian passport was
accordingly cancelled as certified to by the
Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore,
there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-
54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino
citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position
of Davao Oriental governor. The Philippine law on
citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or
citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of
his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli
which determines nationality or citizenship on the
basis of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born

on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western

Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a
Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte,
and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically,
this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took
into effect and at that time, what served as the
Constitution of the Philippines were the principal
organic acts by which the United States governed
the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1,
1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August
29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law. So also, the
principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship
by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently
retained under the 19734 and 19875 Constitutions.
Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born
to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in
Australia is not tantamount to her losing her
Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the
principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent
can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her
possession of dual citizenship.
Zoilo Antonio Velez v. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a.

Fernando Poe, JR., G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004.
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution
expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a

natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of
age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately

preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to

include "those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to

be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
Constitution. Through its history, four modes of
acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res
judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue.
Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could
qualify a person to being a “natural-born” citizen of
the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption
of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in
Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus
sanguinis or blood relationship would now become
the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would

tend to indicate that the earliest established direct
ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather
Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of
Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo
Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death
certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a
resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old
at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The
certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe,
showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an

Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Español
mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was
an “uncertified” copy of a supposed certificate of the
alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez
on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their
marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same
certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five
years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and
Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried,
and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ,
would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939
to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old,
married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen,
twenty-one years old and married.
64. Doctrine of political question These are non-justiciable cases that are beyond the Mabanag v. Vito, 78 Phil. 1. It was held that if
jurisdiction, competence or ability of even the ratification of an amendment is a political question,
Supreme Court to decide. a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a
political question. The two steps complement each
The so-called Political Question Doctrine holds that other in a scheme intended to achieve a single
it would be a meaningless, inconsistent, objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory
contradictory and unacceptable self-referential process as provided in section I of Article XV of the
invalidation for a Supreme Court to even take up the Philippine Constitution “consists of (only) two
validity or legitimacy or Constitutionality of the distinct parts: proposal and ratification.” There is no
revolution, coup d'etat, or other political process logic in attaching political character to one and
that established that Constitution and the Court. withholding that character from the other. Proposal
to amend the Constitution is a highly political
function performed by the Congress in its sovereign
legislative capacity and committed to its charge by
the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is
even in dependent of any intervention by the Chief

Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous
attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard
public interest, there is less reason for judicial
inquiry into the validity of a proposal.
Gonzales v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-28196. The Senate and

the House of Representatives passed resolutions No.
1, 2 and 3. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill,
which, upon approval by the President, on June 17,
1967,became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that
the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be
submitted, for approval by the people, at the general
elections which shall be held on November 14,
1967.Two cases were filed against this act of
Congress: One is original action for prohibition, with
preliminary injunction by Ramon A. Gonzales, in L-
28196, a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter.
Another one is by PHILCONSA, in L-28224, a
corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and
non-partisan organization the objective of which is
to uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and to
defend its Constitution against erosions or
onslaughts from whatever source.
The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress

acting as a constituent assembly violates the
Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and,
hence, subject to judicial review.
65. Doctrine of Lis pendens Lis pendens literally means a pending suit. Doctrine Voluntad v. Spouses Dizon. The Court allowed the
that refers to the jurisdiction, power or control issuance of an alias writ of execution against the
which a court acquires over a property involved in a transferees pendente lite, who had knowledge of the
suit, pending the continuance of the action, until pending litigation on the basis of the annotation of
final judgment. the notice of lis pendens on their titles. The Court
clarified therein that there was no need for the
The reason behind the doctrine are first, o protect victorious [parties] to file a separate action to enforce
the rights of the party causing the registration of the their right to recover the property as against the new
lis pendens, second is to advise third persons who registered owners.
purchase or contract on the subject property that
they do so at their peril and subject to the result of Associated Bank v. Pronstroller, G.R. No. 148444, July
the pending litigation. It may involve actions that 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 113. The Court affirmed the
deal not only with title or possession of a property judgments of the trial and appellate courts
but also with the use and occupation of a property. cancelling the titles of the spouses Vaca, who were
The litigation must directly involve a specific transfereespendente lite of Associated Bank, despite
property which is necessarily affected by the the fact that the spouses Vaca were not parties to the
judgment. The notice of lis pendens is a notice to the case between Associated Bank and the Pronstrollers.
whole world that a particular real property is in
litigation. The inscription serves as a warning that The Court explained therein:
one who acquires interest over litigated property Admittedly, during the pendency of the case,
does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the respondents timely registered a notice of lis pendens
result of the litigation over the property to warn the whole world that the property was the
subject of a pending litigation.
Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit,
refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a
court acquires over property involved in a suit,
pending the continuance of the action, and until
final judgment. Founded upon public policy and
necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the
properties in litigation within the power of the court
until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the
defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent
alienation.
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a twofold

effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation
within the power of the court until the entry of the
final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final
judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a
purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the
litigation to the judgment or decree that the court
will promulgate subsequently.
This registration, therefore, gives the court clear

authority to cancel the title of the spouses Vaca,
since the sale of the subject property was made after
the notice of lis pendens.
Upon Associated Bank’s MR, the spouses Vaca filed

a motion to intervene arguing that they had a real
interest in assailing the July 14, 2008 Decision, which
ordered the cancellation of their title. The Court
denied the intervention. It was held that the interests
of the spouses Vaca in the subject property were
properly represented in the action by their
transferor/vendor Associated Bank, which was
already a party thereto. As transferees pendente lite,
the spouses Vaca stand exactly in the shoes of their
predecessor-in-interest, Associated Bank.
66. Lack of Capacity to Sue Means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his Columbia Pictures, Inc., et.al, vs. CA. G.R. No.
civil rights, or does not have the necessary 110318. August 28, 1996. The Supreme Court
qualification to appear in the case, or does not have discussed the grounds for a motion to dismiss under
the character or representation he claims such as on the Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to sue
account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of and that the complaint states no cause of action.
juridical personality or any other general Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff
disqualifications of a party. is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not
have the necessary qualification to appear in the
case, or does not have the character or
representation he claims. On the other hand, a case
is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon
proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-
interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause
of action. The term “lack of capacity to sue” should
not be confused with the term “lack of personality to
sue.” While the former refers to a plaintiff’s general
disability to sue, such as on account of minority,
insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality
or any other general disqualifications of a party, the
latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real
party- in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be
a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the
ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the
second can be used as a ground for a motion to
dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the
face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
Applying the discussion to the instant petition, the

ground available for barring recourse to our courts
by an unlicensed foreign corporation doing or
transacting business in the Philippines should
properly be “lack of capacity to sue,” not “lack of
personality to sue.” Certainly, a corporation whose
legal rights have been violated is undeniably such, if
not the only, real party-in-interest to bring suit
thereon although, for failure to comply with the
licensing requirement, it is not capacitated to

maintain any suit before our courts.
Evangelista, et. Al vs. Santiago. G.R. No. 157447. April

29, 2005. The Supreme Court said that first, it should
be clarified that “the plaintiff has no legal capacity to
sue” and “the pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action” are two different grounds for a
motion to dismiss or are two different affirmative
defenses. Failure to distinguish between “the lack of
legal capacity to sue” from “the lack of personality
to sue” is a fairly common mistake. The difference
between the two is explained by this Court in
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.
In the present case, the Court assumes that the

respondent is raising the affirmative defense that the
Complaint filed by the petitioners before the trial
court stated no cause of action because the
petitioners lacked the personality to sue, not being
the real party-in-interest. It is the respondent’s
contention that only the State can file an action for
annulment of his certificates of title, since such an
action will result in the reversion of the ownership
of the Subject Property to the State.
67. Doctrine of Ostensible Agency The doctrine which imposes liability, not as the Professional Services Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et.al., En
result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but Banc, GR No. 126297, February 2, 2010. The Court,
rather because of the actions of a principal or an while affirming the existing doctrine that hospitals
employer in somehow misleading the public into as a general rule are not civilly liable for the tortuous
believing that the relationship or the authority acts of their medical consultants in view of the
exists. absence of an employer-employee relationship
between, nonetheless made the following pro hac

vice doctrinal pronouncements on the liability of the
respondent hospital based on the doctrines of
“ostensible agency” and “corporate negligence”,
thus:
After gathering its thoughts on the issues, this Court

holds that PSI is liable to the Aganas, not under the
principle of respondeat superior for lack of evidence
of an employment relationship with Dr. Ampil but
under the principle of ostensible agency for the
negligence of Dr. Ampil and, pro hac vice, under the
principle of corporate negligence for its failure to
perform its duties as a hospital.
The Court cannot speculate on what could have

been behind the Aganas’ decision but would rather
adhere strictly to the fact that, under the
circumstances at that time, Enrique decided to
consult Dr. Ampil for he believed him to be a staff
member of a prominent and known hospital. After
his meeting with Dr. Ampil, Enrique advised his
wife Natividad to go to the Medical City General
Hospital to be examined by said doctor, and the
hospital acted in a way that fortified Enrique's belief.
This Court must therefore maintain the ruling that
PSI is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr.
Ampil as its ostensible agent.
All this notwithstanding, we make it clear that PSI’s

hospital liability based on ostensible agency and
corporate negligence applies only to this case, pro
hac vice. It is not intended to set a precedent and

should not serve as a basis to hold hospitals liable
for every form of negligence of their doctors-
consultants under any and all circumstances. The
ruling is unique to this case, for the liability of PSI
arose from an implied agency with Dr. Ampil and
an admitted corporate duty to Natividad.
Megan Sugar Corporation v. Regional Trial Court of Ilo-

Ilo, Branch 68, Dumangas, Ilo-Ilo; New Frontier Sugar
Corporation and Equitable PCI Bank. G.R. No. 170352,
June 1, 2011. MEGAN can no longer deny the
authority of Atty. Sabig as they have already clothed
him with apparent authority to act in their behalf. It
must be remembered that when Atty. Sabig entered
his appearance, he was accompanied by Concha,
MEGAN’s director and general manager. Concha
himself attended several court hearings, and on
December 17, 2002, even sent a letter[28] to the RTC
asking for the status of the case. A corporation may
be held in estoppel from denying as against innocent
third persons the authority of its officers or agents
who have been clothed by it with ostensible or
apparent authority.[29]Atty. Sabig may not have
been armed with a board resolution, but the
appearance of Concha made the parties assume that
MEGAN had knowledge of Atty. Sabig’s actions
and, thus, clothed Atty. Sabig with apparent
authority such that the parties were made to believe
that the proper person and entity to address was
Atty. Sabig. Apparent authority, or what is
sometimes referred to as the "holding out" theory, or
doctrine of ostensible agency, imposes liability, not

as the result of the reality of a contractual
relationship, but rather because of the actions of a
principal or an employer in somehow misleading
the public into believing that the relationship or the
authority exists.
68. Doctrine of Reformation of Written Reformation of an instrument is that remedy in Veluz vs. Veluz et. al. G.R. No. L-23261, July 31, 1968.
Instruments equity by means of which a written instrument is Plaintiff prayed that judgment be issued "ordering
made or construed so as to express or conform to the the reformation of the deed of sale to express the
real intention of the parties when some error or true intention of the parties, to wit: the same be
mistake has been committed. It is predicated on the made as a deed of mortgage ... " and that defendants
equitable maxim that equity treats as done that be ordered to pay actual and moral damages and
which ought to be done. The rationale of the attorney's fees.
doctrine is that it would be unjust and unequitable
to allow the enforcement of a written instrument The Court viewed, based upon the allegations, and
which does not reflect or disclose the real meeting of the relief prayed for, in the complaint, that the action
the minds of the parties. However, an action for is clearly one for the reformation of an instrument as
reformation must be brought within the period contemplated in Articles 1359 and 1365 of the Civil
prescribed by law, otherwise, it will be barred by the Code of the Philippines.
mere lapse of time.
The lower court is in error. The action for
reformation of instrument should not be confused
with the action for annulment of contract.
Reformation of instrument presupposes a valid,
existing contract, in which there had been a meeting
of the minds of the parties but the instrument drawn
up and signed by them does not correctly express
the terms of their agreement. Annulment of a
contract, on the other hand, presupposes a defective
contract in which the minds of the parties did not
meet, or the consent of one was vitiated. The equity

of reformation is ordinarily limited to written
agreements, and its purpose is to establish and
perpetuate the true agreement; annulment, on the
other hand, is intended to declare the inefficiency
which the contract already carries in itself and to
render the contract inefficacious.
Rosello – Bentir vs. Leanda . G.R. No. 128991. April 12,

2000. Petitioner entered into a contract of lease of a
parcel of land with Defendant for a period of 20
years starting from 1968. P is the lessee; D is the
lessor. In 1989, D sold the leased premises to the Co-
Defendant. P questioned the sale alleging that it had
a right of first refusal. P filed a case seeking
reformation of the expired contract of lease on the
ground that its lawyer inadvertently omitted to
incorporate in the contract of lease executed in 1968.
The action for reformation did not prosper since the
purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to
secure an authoritative statement of the rights and
obligations of the parties for their guidance in the
enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith and
not to settle issues arising from the breach thereof, it
maybe entertained only before the breach or
violation of the law or contract to which it refers.
Here, P brought the present action for reformation
after an alleged breach or violation of the contract
was already committed by D.
69. Doctrine of Public Policy The doctrine under which, as applied to the law of Sy Suan v. Pablo L. Regala, G.R. No. L-9506, June 30,
contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or 1956. It is a general rule that agreements against
uphold a transaction when its object, operation, or public policy are illegal and void. Under the
tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as
welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty. applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will
not recognize or uphold any transaction which, in its
object operation, or tendency, is calculated to be
prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality,
or to civic honesty. The test is whether the parties
have stipulated for something inhibited by the law
or inimical to, or inconsistent with, the public
welfare.
An agreement is against public policy if it is

injurious to the interests of the public, contravenes
some established interest of society, violates some
public statute, is against good morals, ends to
interfere with the public welfare or society, or as it is
sometimes put, if it is at war with the interests of
society and is in conflict with the morals of the time.
An agreement either to do anything which, or not to
do anything the omission of which, is in any degree
clearly injurious to the public and an agreement of
such a nature that it cannot be carried into execution
without reaching beyond the parties and exercising
an injurious influence over the community at large
are against public policy. There are many things
which the law does not prohibit, in the sense of
attaching penalties, but which are so mischievous in
their nature and tendency that on grounds of public
policy they cannot be admitted as the subject of a
valid contract.
The question whether a contract is against public

policy depends upon its purpose and tendency, and
not upon the fact that no harm results from it. In
other words all agreements the purpose of which is
to create a situation which tends to operate to the
detriment of the public interest are against public
policy and void, whether in the particular case the
purpose of the agreement is or is not effectuated.
70. Doctrine of Self-help Doctrine in juridical science which holds that a German Management & Services, Inc., v. Hon. Court of
person has the right to exclude another from the Appeals and Ernesto Villeza. G.R. No. 76217 September
enjoyment and disposal of his property, with 14, 1989. Both the Municipal Trial Court and the
authority to use such force as may be reasonably Regional Trial Court have rationalized petitioner's
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops
unlawful physical invasion or usurpation thereof. of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of
self-help enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil
Code. 11 Such justification is unavailing because the
doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the
time of actual or threatened dispossession which is
absent in the case at bar. When possession has
already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial
process for the recovery of property. This is clear
from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n
no case may possession be acquired through force or
intimidation as long as there is a possessor who
objects thereto. He who believes that he has an
action or right to deprive another of the holding of a
thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if
the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."
People vs Depante, C.A., 58 O.G. 926
If the propety is immovable, there should be no

delay in the use of force to recover it; a delay, even if
excusable, such as when is due to the ignorance of
the dispossession, will bar the right to the use of
force.
71. Doctrine of Regalian All lands of public domain, waters, minerals, coal, Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of Resources, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000. All
potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial State. Incontrovertible evidence must be shown that
or commercial, residential, or resettlement lands of the land is alienable or disposable in order to
the public domain, natural resources shall not be overcome such presumption. It does not negate
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the native title to lands held in private ownership since
exploration, or utilization of any of the natural time immemorial.
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twentyfive years, except as to water rights for Cariño vs Insular Government, 41 Phil 935. An Igorot
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses applied for the registration of a certain land. He and
other than development of water power, in which his ancestors had held the land as owners for more
cases, beneficial use may by the measure and the than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot
limit of the grant. customs. There was no document of title issued for
the land when he applied for registration. The
government contends that the land in question
belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all
lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those
with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no
prescription against the Crown.
The land in question does not belong to the Spanish

Crown under the Regalian Doctrine. Law and justice
require that the applicant should be granted title to
his land.
The United States Supreme Court, through Justice

Holmes declared:
“It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say

that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the
land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it will be presumed to have been
held in the same way from before the Spanish
conquest, and never to have been public land.”
There is an existence of native title to land, or

ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of
possession under a claim of ownership since time
immemorial and independent of any grant from the
Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura
regalia.
72. Guardian ad litem An independent party appointed in family law Borbon v. CA G.R. No. 138495 Dec. 9, 2004. Petitioner,
disputes to represent parties that cannot represent through his brother, Candido Borbon, filed with the
themselves, such as minors, developmentally Regional Trial Court, Branch 145, Makati City a
disabled, or elderly. complaint for reconveyance of property against
spouses Renato and Princesita Sitay, Amparo
Investment Corporation and Ernesto Catindig,
docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1135. Petitioner, in his
complaint, alleged that the contracts of sale and
mortgage of the subject property are all void because
of lack of consent on his part as he was then
suffering from acute schizophrenia. On June 9,
1997, the trial court appointed Candido Borbon as
petitioner’s guardian ad litem.
Felimon Tse and Alice Tse thru their guardian ad litem

Esmaela Dawat, v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.
L-20708, August 31, 1967. In accordance with Article
316, paragraph 1 of the New Civil Code, the father
and the mother have, with respect to their
unemancipated children, the duty to represent them
in all actions which redound to their benefit. In the
present case, the basic petition shows that the same
was filed in the name of the minor petitioners,
assisted by their mother as their guardian ad litem.
Whether the latter was or was not actually
appointed by the lower court in that capacity seems
to be of little consequence considering that under the
legal provision just cited she may be deemed to have
filed the petition jointly with her children or in their
behalf.
Lastly, it may not be amiss to remember that the

jurisdiction of courts over the subject matter
depends upon the nature of the action or proceeding
and not upon the capacity or incapacity to sue on the
part of one of the parties; neither is it an absolute
pre-requisite to jurisdiction over an action by a
minor that he sue by guardian ad litem. The action is
not deemed void on such ground alone because if
the lack or absence of a guardian ad litem constitutes
any defect at all, the same is amendable. In the
present case, it is clear that the lower court was fully
cognizant of the fact that the mother of the
petitioners appeared as their guardian ad litem. This
being so, the lack of any positive proof that no order
appointing her as such has ever been issued justifies
the presumption either that she was actually so

appointed or that the lower court inferentially
authorized her appearance as such.
73. Doctrine of Act-of-God The doctrine that requires all human agencies to be MIAA v. Ala Industries Corp., G.R. No. 147349,
excluded from creating the cause of the mischief. February 13, 2004. First, processing claims against
Such doctrine cannot be invoked to protect a person the government are certainly not only foreseeable
who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible and expectable, but also dependent upon the human
adverse consequences of loss or injury. Since the will. Second, the Christmas season is not a
delay in payment in the present case was partly a casofortuito, but a regularly occurring event. Third,
result of human participation ‐ whether from active the occurrence of the Christmas season did not at all
intervention or neglect ‐ the whole occurrence was render impossible the normal fulfillment of the
humanized and was therefore outside the ambit of a obligation. Fourth, MIAA cannot argue that it is free
caso fortuito. from any participation in the delay. It should have
laid out on the compromise table the problems that
would be caused by a deadline falling during the
Christmas season. Furthermore, it should have
explained to ALA the process involved for the
payment of AL’s claim.
74. Doctrine of Res Nullius Res nullius, is a Latin-based legal term that refers to
Sps. Gulla vs Labrador G.R. No. 149418 July 27, 2006.
a property or object that has no owner or has been The spouses Gulla insisted that the trial court erred
abandoned. The term is derived from Roman law in relying on the survey report of Engr. Magarro. In
and, when translated, literally means "nobody’s contrast, their evidence showed that Lot A, with an
property." There are a variety of objects that can be
area of 562 square meters, is alienable and
claimed as res nullius and are considered ownerlessdisposable, and is covered by a 1936 tax declaration
property, meaning they are free to be owned. under the name of Alfonso Bactad. Since the
property is located within the salvage zone, it is res
In this definition, the object, or ‘res’, must be nullius, hence, could not have been acquired by the
something a person can claim to own. While the law Labradors through accession under Article 440 of
covers animals and land, the object in question the New Civil Code. They also insisted that the trial
cannot be a person, though its original meaning court had no jurisdiction to declare them entitled to
covered slaves as property rather than as people. As the possession of Lot A since the Republic of the
stated by law, if the owner of an object abandons or Philippines was not a party to the case. The spouses
gives up his property, then it is automatically Gulla concluded that they cannot be held liable for
deemed res nullius. Traditionally, the abandoned monthly rentals, actual damages and attorney’s fees,
property can then be owned by any person and the since the claimed title over the subject property is
person who first takes possession of said property is fraudulent.
deemed its rightful owner. Res nullius does not
apply to any object or property that has been stolen The trial court, the RTC and the CA were one in
or illegally acquired, only to property that has no ruling that the 562-square-meter property, Lot A, is
owner or has been abandoned. part of the public domain, hence, beyond the
commerce of men and not capable of registration. In
fact, the land is within the salvage zone fronting the
China Sea as well as the property covered by OCT
No. P-13350 in the name of respondents. The
provision relied upon is Article 440 of the New Civil
Code, which states that “the ownership of property
gives the right by accession to everything which is
produced thereby, or which is incorporated or
attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.” The
provision, however, does not apply in this case,
considering that Lot A is a foreshore land adjacent to
the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by
the ordinary flow of the tides. Such property belongs
to the public domain and is not available for private
ownership until formally declared by the
government to be no longer needed for public use.
Respondents thus have no possessory right over the
property unless upon application, the government,
through the then Bureau of Lands, had granted them
a permit.
75. Doctrine of Force Majeure Force majeure is generally intended to include risks Japan Airlines v. CA, G.R. No. 118664, August 7, 1998.
beyond the reasonable control of a party, incurred The Mt. Pinatubo eruption prevented JAL from
not as a product or result of the negligence or proceeding to Manila on schedule. Such event can be
malfeasance of a party, which have a materially considered as "force majeure" since the delayed
adverse effect on the ability of such party to perform arrival in Manila was not imputable to JAL. When
its obligations, as where non-performance is caused JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to
by the usual and natural consequences of external Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption,
forces (for example, predicted rain stops an outdoor whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and
event), or where the intervening circumstances are meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred,
specifically contemplated. cannot be charged to JAL. Indeed, in the absence of
bad faith or negligence, JAL cannot be liable for the
amenities of its stranded passengers by reason of a
fortuitous event.
Asset Privitization Trust vs. T.J. Enterprises, G.R. No.

167195, May 8, 2009. The matter of fortuitous events
is governed by Art. 1174 of the Civil Code which
provides that except in cases expressly specified by
the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be
foreseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable.
The elements of a fortuitous event are: (a) the cause
of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, must
have been independent of human will; (b) the event
that constituted the caso fortuito must have been
impossible to foresee or, if foreseeable, impossible to
avoid; (c) the occurrence must have been such as to
render it impossible for the debtors to fulfill their
obligation in a normal manner, and; (d) the obligor
must have been free from any participation in the
aggravation of the resulting injury to the creditor.
A fortuitous event may either be an act of God, or

natural occurrences such as floods or typhoons, or
an act of man such as riots, strikes or wars.
However, when the loss is found to be partly the
result of a person’s participation–whether by active
intervention, neglect or failure to act—the whole
occurrence is humanized and removed from the
rules applicable to a fortuitous event.
76. Doctrine of Adherence Jurisdiction Once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained PLDT vs. Dulay G.R. no. L-53446 April 19, 1989. The
up to the end of the litigation , it remains with the rule of adherence of jurisdiction until a cause is
court until the case is finally terminated . finally resolved or adjudicated does not apply when
the change in jurisdiction is curative in character.
The exception to the rule: when a newly enacted Thus in the instant case, there is nothing wrong in
statute changing the jurisdiction of a court is given holding that Courts of First Instance/Regional Trial
retroactive effect. It can divest a court of jurisdiction Courts no longer have jurisdiction over aforesaid
over cases already pending before it is which were monetary claims of labor.
filed before the statute came to force or became
effective. There is therefore no reason why P.D. 1691 should
not be given retroactive application to this pending
case. P.D. 1691 merely restored the jurisdiction
earlier vested in Labor Arbiters before the enactment
of P.D. 1367. It was intended to correct a situation
where two tribunals would have jurisdiction over
separate issues arising from the same labor conflict.
In any case, private respondents can still file an

action before the administrative machineries in the
Department of Labor and Employment. While it is
true that the respondents-employees' cause of action

has already prescribed, since Article 291 of the Labor
Code provide for a three-year prescriptive period for
all money claims arising from employer- employee
relations, equity dictates that petitioners be allowed
to file the proper action before the appropriate labor
tribunal. At the time the petitioners filed their
complaint with the then Court of First Instance, the
regular courts were the proper forum for all claims
for damages arising from employer-employee
relations. Under these circumstances, the retroactive
application of Pres. Decree 1691 should not unduly
deprive petitioners of the right to pursue their claim
in the proper tribunal if they choose to do so.
Barrameda Vda. De Ballesteros vs. Rural Bank Of

Canaman Inc. G.R. No. 176260 November 24, 2010. The
Court recognizes the doctrine on adherence of
jurisdiction. Lucia, however, must be reminded that
such principle is not without exceptions. It is well to
quote the ruling of the CA on this matter, thus:
This Court is neither unmindful nor unaware of the

doctrine on the adherence of jurisdiction. However,
the rule on adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute
and has exceptions. One of the exceptions is that
when the change in jurisdiction is curative in
character
In sum, this Court holds that the consolidation is

proper considering that the liquidation court has
jurisdiction over Lucia’s action. It would be more in
keeping with law and equity if Lucia’s case is

consolidated with the liquidation case in order to
expeditiously determine whether she is entitled to
recover the property subject of mortgage from RBCI
and, if so, how much she is entitled to receive from
the remaining assets of the bank.
77. Doctrine of Presumed Revocation Where a will which cannot be found, is shown to Gago v. Mamuyac , G.R. No. 26317, January 29, 1927.
have been in the possession of the testator when last The Doctrine of Presumed Revocation applies,
seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other which provides that: where a will which cannot be
competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or found, is shown to have been in the possession of
destroyed. the testator when last seen, the presumption is, in
the absence of other competent evidence, that the
same was cancelled or destroyed. The same
presumption arises where it is shown that the
testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be
found after his death.
The presumption is, however, not conclusive and

anyone who has proof to the contrary may rebut the
presumption.
78. Doctrine of Power to Rescind Obligations The power to rescind obligations is implied in Uniwide Holdings, Inc., vs Jandecs Trans. Co. G.R. No.
reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should 168522 December 19, 2007. The right of rescission is
not comply with what is incumbent upon him. implied in every reciprocal obligation where one
party fails to perform what is incumbent upon him
The injured party may choose between the while the other is willing and ready to comply.
fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with Certainly, petitioner's failure to deliver the units on
the payment of damages in either case. He may also the commencement date of the lease on October 1,
seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, 1997 gave respondent the right to rescind the
if the latter should become impossible. contract after the latter had already paid the contract
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless price in full.
there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
Furthermore, respondent's right to rescind the
This is understood to be without prejudice to the contract cannot be prevented by the fact that
rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, petitioner had the option to substitute the stalls.
in accordance with Laws. Even if petitioner had that option, it did not,
however, mean that it could insist on the
continuance of the contract by forcing respondent to
accept the substitution. Neither did it mean that its
previous default had been obliterated completely by
the exercise of that option.
Benos vs. Lawilao G.R. no. 172259 December 5, 2006.

The court said: The power to rescind obligations is
implied in reciprocal ones in case one of the obligors
should not comply with what is incumbent upon
him is clear from a reading of the Civil Code
provisions. However, it is equally settled that, in the
absence of a stipulation to the contrary, this power
must be invoked judicially; it cannot be exercised
solely on a party’s own judgment that the other has
committed a breach of the obligation. Where there is
nothing in the contract empowering the petitioner to
rescind it without resort to the courts, the
petitioner’s action in unilaterally terminating the
contract in this case is unjustified.
It is evident that the contract under consideration

does not contain a provision authorizing its
extrajudicial rescission in case one of the parties fails
to comply with what is incumbent upon him. This
being the case, respondents-spouses should have
asked for judicial intervention to obtain a judicial
declaration of rescission. Be that as it may, and

considering that respondents-spouses’ Answer (with
affirmative defenses) with Counterclaim seeks for
the rescission of the Deed of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage, it behooves the court to settle the
matter once and for all than to have the case re-
litigated again on an issue already heard on the
merits and which this court has already taken
cognizance of. Having found that petitioners
seriously breached the contract, we, therefore,
declare the same is rescinded in favor of
respondents-spouses.
79. Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation The doctrine that regards as mutually interrelated Molo v. Molo, G.R. No. L‐2538, September 21, 1951.
the acts of a testator destroying a will and executing Granting for the sake of argument that the earlier
a second will. In such cases, if the second will is will was voluntarily destroyed by the testator after
either never made or improperly executed, there is a the execution of the second will, which revoked the
rebuttable presumption that the testator would have first, could there be any doubt, under this theory,
preferred the former will to no will at all, which that said earlier will was destroyed by the testator in
allows the possibility of probate of the destroyed the honest belief that it was no longer necessary
will. because he had expressly revoked it in his will of
1939? In other words, can we not say that the
destruction of the earlier will was but the necessary
consequence of the testator's belief that the
revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will
was valid and the latter would be given effect? If
such is the case, then it is our opinion that the earlier
will can still be admitted to probate under the
principle of "dependent relative revocation".
This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative

revocation, and is usually applied where the testator
cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument

intended to revoke a will with a present intention to
make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute
for the old, and the new disposition is not made or,
if made, fails of effect for same reason. The doctrine
is n limited to the existence of some other document,
however, and has been applied where a will was
destroyed as a consequence of a mistake of law. (68
C.J.P. 799).
The rule is established that where the act of

destruction is connected with the making of another
will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator
meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the
efficacy of a new disposition intended to be
substituted, the revocation will be conditional and
dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition;
and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be
made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation
fails and the original will remains in full force.
(Gardner, pp. 232, 233.)
This is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation.

The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon
whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent
to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive conditions,
and hence prevents the revocation of the original
will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in
the place of that destroyed will not render the
destruction conditional. It must appear that the
revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of
a new will. (1 Alexander, p. 751; Gardner, p. 253.)
80. Doctrine of Substantial Compliance A legal principle which says that if a good faith Spouses Efren Mason and Digna Mason v. The
attempt is made to perform the requirements of the Honorable Court of Appeals and Columbus Philippines
agreement even if it does not precisely meet the Bus Corporation, G.R. No. 144662, October 13, 2003.
terms of the agreement or statutory requirements, The question of whether the substantial compliance
the performance will still be considered complete if rule is still applicable under Section 11, Rule 14 of
the essential purpose is accomplished. the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in
Villarosa which applies squarely to the instant case.
In the said case, petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner
Co. Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa) with principal office
address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with
branches at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo,
Parañaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro City, entered into a sale with
development agreement with private respondent
Imperial Development Corporation. As Villarosa
failed to comply with its contractual obligation,
private respondent initiated a suit for breach of
contract and damages at the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. Summons, together with the complaint, was
served upon Villarosa through its branch manager at
Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarosa
filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of improper service of summons and
lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the
motion and ruled that there was substantial
compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired
jurisdiction over Villarosa. The latter questioned the
denial before us in its petition for certiorari. We
decided in Villarosa’s favor and declared the trial
court without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case. We held that there was no valid service of
summons on Villarosa as service was made through

a person not included in the enumeration in Section
11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which revised the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964
Rules of Court. We discarded the trial court’s basis
for denying the motion to dismiss, namely, private
respondent’s substantial compliance with the rule on
service of summons, and fully agreed with
petitioner’s assertions that the enumeration under
the new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive,
following the rule in statutory construction that
expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules
of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize
the rule on service of summons, we said, it could
have easily done so by clear and concise language.
Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, we
stressed strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Neither can herein petitioners invoke our ruling in

Millenium to support their position for said case is
not on all fours with the instant case. We must
stress that Millenium was decided when the 1964
Rules of Court were still in force and effect, unlike
the instant case which falls under the new rule.
Hence, the cases cited by petitioners where we
upheld the doctrine of substantial compliance must
be deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is the
later case.
SPS. Heber & Charlita Edillo v. SPS. Norberto &

Desideria Dulpina. G.R. No. 188360, January 21, 2010
There was substantial compliance with the Rules

because the background facts can be found within
the four corners of the petition and its incorporated
annexes, is not a novel ruling for this Court. In the
case of Deloso v. Marapao35cralaw (involving the
same deficiency for lack of a specific and separate
statement of facts outlining the factual background
relied upon), we said:
An examination of the petition filed with the Court

of Appeals reveals that while it does not contain a
separate section on statement of facts, the facts of the
case are, in fact, integrated in the petition
particularly in the discussion/argument portion.
Moreover, the decision of the DARAB which
contains the facts of the case was attached to the
petition and was even quoted by the appellate court.
The petition also sufficiently discusses the errors
committed by the DARAB in its assailed decision.
There was, therefore, substantial compliance with

Sec. 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It is settled that
liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in
situations where there may be some excusable
formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided
that the same does not subvert the essence of the
proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable
attempt at compliance with the Rules. After all, rules
of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense; they are used only to help secure
substantial justice.
Given this precedent, it only remains for us to

determine if we can apply a liberal construction of
the Rules because a meaningful litigation of the case
can ensue given the Petitions prima facie merit.
81. Doctrine of Mirror The general rule is that a purchaser may be Lucena vs. CA, G.R. No. 77468, August 25, 1999.
considered a purchaser in good faith when he has One who purchases real property which is in the
examined the latest certificate of title. An exception actual possession of another should, at least make
to this rule is when there exist important facts that some inquiry concerning the right of those in
would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable possession. The actual possession by a person other
man to go beyond the present title and to investigate than the vendor should, at least put the purchaser
those that preceded it. Thus, it has been said that a upon inquiry. He can scarcely, in the absence of such
person who deliberately ignores a significant fact inquiry, be regarded as a bona fide purchaser as
which would create suspicion in an otherwise against such possessors.
reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for
value. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts Amancio, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 152627,
which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, September 16, 2005.
and then claim that he acted in good faith under the Being a corporation engaged in the business of
belief that there was no defect in the title of the buying and selling real estate, it was gross
vendor as has been held in other cases, if the buyer negligence on its part to merely rely on the seller’s
fails to take the ordinary precautions which a assurance that the occupants of the property were
prudent man would have taken under the mere squatters considering that it had the means
circumstances, specially in buying a piece of land in and the opportunity to investigate for itself the
the actual, visible and public possession of another accuracy of such information.
person, other than the vendor, constitutes gross
negligence amounting to bad faith.
In this connection, it has been held that where, the

land sold is in the possession of a person other than
the vendor, the purchaser is required to go beyond
the certificate of title to make inquiries concerning
the rights of the actual possessor. Failure to do so
would make him purchaser in bad faith.
82. Doctrine of Extrajudicial Partition Without creditors to take into consideration, it is Cua Vs. Vargas et.al. G.R. No.156536 October 31, 2006.
competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an The Supreme Court said that the procedure outlined
agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The
upon a plan different from those provided by the rule plainly states, however, that persons who do
rules from which, in the first place, nothing can be not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial
inferred that a writing or other formality is essential settlement will not be bound thereby. It
for the partition to be valid. contemplates a notice that has been sent out or
issued before any deed of settlement and/or
partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all
interested parties to participate in the said deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after
such an agreement has already been executed as
what happened in the instant case with the
publication of the first deed of extrajudicial
settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute

constructive notice to the heirs who had no
knowledge or did not take part in it because the
same was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement of publication is geared for the
protection of creditors and was never intended to
deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the
decedent’s estate. In this connection, the records of
the present case confirm that respondents never
signed either of the settlement documents, having
discovered their existence only shortly before the
filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74,
these extrajudicial settlements do not bind
respondents, and the partition made without their
knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are

concerned.
Bautista v. Bautista et.al G.R.no. 160556 August 3,

2007. The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case
at bar being invalid, the action to have it annulled
does not prescribe.
Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid, it

transmitted no rights to Teofilo’s co-heirs.
Consequently, the subsequent transfer by Angelica
and Alegria of ½ of the property to Pacita and her
husband Pedro, as well as the transfer of ½ of the
property to Cesar Tamondong is invalid, hence,
conferring no rights upon the transferees under the
principle of nemo dat quod non habet.
83. Doctrine of a Good Father of a Family or The Supreme Court described a good father of a Picart v. Smith, G.R. No. L‐12406, March 15, 1918.
Reasonably Prudent Man. family by first stating who is not. He is not and is The Supreme Court described a good father of a
not supposed to be omniscient of the future; rather, family by first stating who is not. He is not and is
he is one who takes precautions against any harm not supposed to be omniscient of the future; rather,
when there is something before him to suggest or he is one who takes precautions against any harm
warn him of the danger or to foresee it when there is something before him to suggest or
warn him of the danger or to foresee it.
A good father of a family is likewise referred to as

the reasonable man, man of ordinary intelligence
and prudence, or ordinary reasonable prudent man.
In English law, he is sometimes referred to as the
man on top
Antonio Francisco, substituted by his heirs: Nelia E.S.

Francisco, Emilia F. Bertiz, Rebecca E.S. Francisco,
Antionio E.S. Francisco, Jr., Socorro F. Fontanilla, and
Jovito E.S. Francisco v. Chemical Bulk Carriers,
Incorporated. G.R. No. 193577, September 7, 2011. The
heirs of Francisco argue that the Court of Appeals
erred when it ruled that Francisco was liable to CBCI
because he failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family when he bought the diesel fuel.
They argue that since Francisco was blind, the
standard of conduct that was required of him was
that of a reasonable person under like disability.
Moreover, they insist that Francisco exercised due
care in purchasing the diesel fuel by doing the
following: (1) Francisco asked his son to check the
identity of Bacsa; (2) Francisco required direct
delivery from Petron; (3) Francisco required that he
be named as the consignee in the invoice; and (4)
Francisco required separate receipts from Bacsa to
evidence actual payment.
Standard of conduct is the level of expected conduct

that is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of the person,
time and place. The most common standard of
conduct is that of a good father of a family or that of
a reasonably prudent person. To determine the
diligence which must be required of all persons, we
use as basis the abstract average standard
corresponding to a normal orderly person.
However, one who is physically disabled is required

to use the same degree of care that a reasonably

careful person who has the same physical disability
would use. Physical handicaps and infirmities, such
as blindness or deafness, are treated as part of the
circumstances under which a reasonable person
must act. Thus, the standard of conduct for a blind
person becomes that of a reasonable person who is
blind.
84. Mercado vs Espiritu Doctrine Sale of real estate, made by minors who (or actively In the Mercado case, the minors who pretended or
misrepresented) to be of legal age, when in fact they actively misrepresented their age were estopped
are not, is valid and they will not be permitted to from contesting the contract executed by him.
excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the However, in the case of Bambalan vs Maramba (51
obligations contracted by them or to have them Phil 417 G.R. No. L-27710, 1928), it was not applied
annulled (Mercado vs Espiritu, 37 Phil 215, 1917) because the minors passively misrepresented or did
not pretend their age and his minority was known to
the purchaser. This was also the same in the case of
Braganza v. Villa Abrille (105 Phil. 456 G.R. No. L-
12471, 1959) where it held that failure of minor to
disclose his minority when making contract does not
constitute fraud
85. Burca Doctrine Moy Ya Lim Yao et al vs. The Commissioner of

By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman Immigration. G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971 41
who marries a Filipino citizen, dies not by mere fact SCRA 292. By constitutional and legal precepts, an
of marriage automatically become a Filipino Citizen alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen, dies not
(Burca vs Republic, L-24252, January 30, 1967, 19 by mere fact of marriage automatically become a
SCRA 186) Filipino Citizen. The reason is that she must possess
all the qualification and none of the disqualifications
for naturalization as held in Ly Giok Ha et al vs
Galang (L-31332, March 13, 1966). This rule was
applied to natural-born Filipino in the case of
Austria vs Conchu (L-20716, June 22, 1965), in the case

of naturalized Filipino in Lao Chay et al vs Galang (L-
19977, October 30, 1964) and by election. However,
the said case was reversed
86. Doctrine Of Apparent Sign Easements are inseparable from the estate to which Uy v. CA,G.R. No. 120465, September 9, 1999. Agents
they actively or passively pertain. The existence of are not a party with respect to that contract between
apparent sign under Art. 624 is equivalent to a title. his principal and third persons. As agents, they only
It is as if there is an implied contract between the render some service or do something in
two new owners that the easement should be representation or on behalf of their principals. The
constituted, since no one objected to the continued rendering of such service did not make them parties
existence of the windows. to the contracts of sale executed in behalf of the
latter.
The fact that an agent who makes a contract for his

principal will gain or suffer loss by the performance
or nonperformance of the contract by the principal
or by the other party thereto does not entitle him to
maintain an action on his own behalf against the
other party for its breach. An agent entitled to
receive a commission from his principal upon the
performance of a contract which he has made on his
principal's account does not, from this fact alone,
have any claim against the other party for breach of
the contract, either in an action on the contract or
otherwise. An agent who is not a promisee cannot
maintain an action at law against a purchaser merely
because he is entitled to have his compensation or
advances paid out of the purchase price before
payment to the principal.
87. Error Placitandi Aequitatem Non Tollit A clerical error does not take away equity. Ingson vs Olaybar, G.R. No. L-28734, December 4, 1928.
Out of the foregoing descriptive narration of the
history of the case, there arise certain definite points.
The first point is that the clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros made a mistake in
informing the clerk of this court that the attorney for
the defendant was notified on August 19, 1927, of
the order denying his motion for a new trial, when
the true date was September 24, 1927. The second
point is that while this court accepted in good faith
the original statement of the clerk of the Court of
First Instance of Occidental Negros, in the motion
presented by the attorney for the appellant in which
he attempted to set right the court, he did no more
than make an assertion and ask the court to revise
the record to substantiate the truth assertion,
without corroborating his allegation by the
necessary affidavits. The question now is what to be
done at this late date. An error was made but the
case is an old one and some violence will have to be
done to regular proceduree if it be reinstated.
There is in civil law what is known as errors in fact.

There is in the common law what is known as a
mistake of fact. In applying the principles relating to
errors in fact and a mistake of fact, the courts are
guided by the maxim Error placitandi aequitatem non
tollit ("A clerical error does not take away equity"),
and the maxim Error scribentis nocere non debit (An
error made by a clerk ought not to injure; a clerical
error may be corrected").
Comparatively speaking, this is a trivial case. Yet

trivial or not, the litigant has a right to review. He
would have had that right had not a clerk made a
mistake. That mistake should now be set right.
Dislike of taking time to investigate to the detail a
small matter, hesitancy in acknowledging error, and
pride in maintaining one's position at any cost, must
all give away to the doing of exact justice. The
prayer is addressed to the conscience of the court. It
should there receive equitable and just
consideration.
88. Doctrine of Culpa Aquiliana In Culpa Aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when an act Spouses Erlinda Batal and Frank Batal v. Spouses Luz
or omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where the San Pedro and Kenichiro Tominaga, Callejo, Sr. and
defendant is guilty of intentional tort, 8 moral Chico-Nazario, JJ. G.R. No. 164601, September 27, 2006
damages may aptly be recovered. This rule also
applies, as aforestated, to contracts when breached Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two
by tort. different senses: either as culpa aquiliana, which is
the wrongful or negligent act or omission which
creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an
obligation between two persons not formally bound
by any other obligation, or as culpa contractual,
which is the fault or negligence incident in the
performance of an obligation which already existed,
and which increases the liability from such already
existing obligation. Culpa aquiliana is governed by
Article 2176 of the Civil Code and the immediately
following Articles; while culpa contractual is
governed by Articles 1170 to 1174 of the same Code.
Articles 1170 and 1173 provide:

ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of their

obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay,
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages.
ART. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor

consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
of the time and of the place. When negligence
shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and
2202, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence

which is to be observed in the performance, that
which is expected of a good father of a family shall
be required.
In the present case, it is clear that the petitioners, in

carrying out their contractual obligations, failed to
exercise the requisite diligence in the placement of
the markings for the concrete perimeter fence that
was later constructed. The placement of the
markings had been done solely by petitioner Frank
Batal who is not a geodetic engineer. It was later
discovered that it was not he but his wife, petitioner
Erlinda Batal, who is the licensed geodetic engineer
and who is, therefore, the one qualified to do the
work. Petitioner Frank Batal’s installation of the
concrete cyclone monuments had been done without
the adequate supervision of his wife, Erlinda. As a
result, the placement of the monuments did not

accurately reflect the dimensions of the lot. The
respondents, upon assurance given by petitioner
Frank Batal that they could proceed with the
construction of the perimeter fence by relying on the
purported accuracy of the placement of the
monuments, erected their fence which turned out to
encroach on an adjacent easement. Because of the
encroachment, the respondents had to demolish and
reconstruct the fence and, thus, suffered damages.
Elcano vs. Hill, G. R. No. L-24803, May 26,1977, 77

SCRA 98. A separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminality prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
snowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
receiver damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award
of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e), Section 3, Rule III,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here
hold, in reiteration of Garcia that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.
89. Distingue Tempora et Concordabis Jura Distinguish times and you will harmonize laws. The United States v. Alvir, G.R. No. L-3981, January 14,
1908. The defendant did not appeal nor attempt to
appeal from the judgment of the court below. After
having undergone his term of imprisonment, and
upon a writ of attachment being issued against his
property to enforce the payment of the P500, which,
according to the judgment, he was required to pay
the offended party, he filed a motion asking the
court to permit him to keep the child in his own
house and to be released from the obligation of
paying to the offended party the P15 monthly, as
ordered by the court below. The accused based his
claim on article 149 of the Civil Code. The motion of
the accused was overruled by the court in the
following terms:
The court holds that such option can not be

exercised by an accused against whom final
judgment ordering him to support the offspring has
been entered in a cause instituted against him for
seduction, ravishment, or rape, in view of the fact
that the provision contained in article 149 is not
applicable to cases wherein the obligation to provide
support constitutes one of the findings of the
decision rendered in criminal causes.
From the above decision the accused has appealed to

this court, and the question at issue now is, whether
the party who provides the subsistence is in this case
entitled to claim that the person who enjoys the
same shall live with him in his own house, and there
receive the support which he is under obligation to

provide. It is a juridical maxim, distingue tempora et
concordabis jura.
90. Ex Dolo Malo Non Oritur Actio Out of fraud no action arises. Titong vs CA, G.R. No. 111141 March 6, 1998.
Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the
requirements of good faith and just title. As aptly
observed by the trial court, the plaintiff's admitted
acts of converting boundary line (Bugsayon River)
into a ricefield and thereafter claiming ownership
thereof were acts constituting deprivation of the
rights of others and therefore "tantamount to bad
faith." To allow petitioner to benefit from his own
wrong would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo
non oritur actio (no man can allowed to found a claim
upon his own wrongdoing). Extraordinary
acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest
ownership over the property upon petitioner. Art.
1137 of the Civil Code states that "(o)wnership and
other real rights over immovables prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith."
Petitioner's alleged possession in 1962 up to
September 1983 when private respondents entered
the property in question spanned twenty-one (21)
years. This period of time is short of the thirty-year
requirement mandated by Art. 1137.
R.B. Industrial v. Enage, G.R. No. L-27741, July 29,

1968 Eastern's cause of action is anchored on the
deed of assignment and affidavit both executed by
Kittilstvedt on December 29, 1959 conveying to

Eastern all his rights under Ordinary Timber License
1286-'59 (New). But did Eastern acquire any right
under these documents to entitle it to sue for the
performance of any prestation thereunder by
Kittilstvedt?
The Supreme Court answer is No. First, the

license had already expired. There was no license to
transfer. Second, the license itself says that such
license is non-transferable. And, Eastern is duty
bound to be guided by that prohibition. Third, the
conveyance was illegal. Ex dolo malo non oritur
actio. A party to an illegal contract cannot come to
court and ask to have his illegal objects carried out.
91. Ex Pacto Illicito Non Oritur Actio A Latin maxim which means that From an illicit Lita Enterprises v. Second Civil Cases Division, G.R. No.
contract no action arises. A right does not arise from L-64693 April 27, 1984. The parties herein operated
an unlawful act. A right to file an action does not under an arrangement, comonly known as the "kabit
arise upon an unlawful agreement. To render an system", whereby a person who has been granted a
agreement valid, it should comply with the certificate of convenience allows another person
requisites of a valid contract. who owns motors vehicles to operate under such
franchise for a fee. A certificate of public
convenience is a special privilege conferred by the
government . Abuse of this privilege by the grantees
thereof cannot be countenanced. The "kabit system"
has been Identified as one of the root causes of the
prevalence of graft and corruption in the
government transportation offices. In the words of
Chief Justice Makalintal, "this is a pernicious system
that cannot be too severely condemned. It
constitutes an imposition upon the goo faith of the
government.
"Ex pacto illicito non oritur actio" [No action

arises out of an illicit bargain] is the tune-honored
maxim that must be applied to the parties in the case
at bar. Having entered into an illegal contract,
neither can seek relief from the courts, and each
must bear the consequences of his acts.
Teja Marketing and/or Angel Jaucian v. Honorable

Intermediate Appellate Court and Pedro N. Nale.
G.R. No. L-65510, March 9, 1987. "'Ex pacto illicito'
non oritur actio" (No action arises out of illicit
bargain) is the time-honored maxim that must be
applied to the parties in the case at bar. Having
entered into an illegal contract, neither can seek
relief from the courts, and each must bear the
consequences of his acts." (Lita Enterprises vs. IAC,
129 SCRA 81.)
However, as the purchase of the motorcycle for

operation as a trimobile under the franchise of the
private respondent Jaucian, pursuant to what is
commonly known as the "kabit system", without the
prior approval of the Board of Transportation
(formerly the Public Service Commission) was an
illegal transaction involving the fictitious
registration of the motor vehicle in the name of the
private respondent so that he may traffic with the
privileges of his franchise, or certificate of public
convenience, to operate a tricycle service, the parties
being in pari delicto, neither of them may bring an
action against the other to enforce their illegal

contract [Art. 1412 (a), Civil Code].
92. Res Inter Alios Acta This is a technical phrase which signifies acts of Harold V. Tamargo v. Romulo Awingan, Lloyd
others, or transactions between others. Neither the Antiporda and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., G.R. No. 177727,
declarations nor any other acts of those who are January 19, 2010. The rule on res inter alios acta
mere strangers, or, as it is usually termed, any res provides that the rights of a party cannot be
inter alios ada, are admissible in evidence against prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
any one when the party against whom such acts are another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession
offered in evidence, was privy to the act, the is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible
objection ceases; it is no longer res inter alios. against his or her co-accused and is considered as
hearsay against them.
The reason for this rule is that:
on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience,

a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are
evidence against him. So are his conduct and
declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man
should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized
strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by
the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or
conduct be used as evidence against him.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an
admission made by a conspirator under Section 30,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration

of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or

declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the

conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence may be given in evidence against co-
conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown
by independent evidence aside from the
extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the
admission of a conspirator may be received against
his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the
conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than
the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the
common object and (c) it has been made while the
declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the
alleged co-conspirators without violating their
constitutional right to be confronted with the
witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which

was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence
was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy.
There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or
circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession
could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted
confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence
against respondents, had no probative value and
was inadmissible as evidence against them.
Cruz vs CA, G.R. No. 126713 July 27, 1998.

Respondent Court found that several deeds of sale
and real estate mortgage, which petitioners executed

when they sold or mortgaged some parcels
adjudicated to them under the DPP, contained the
statement that the vendor/mortgagor was the
absolute owner of the parcel of residential land and
that he or she represented it as free from liens and
encumbrances. On the basis of these pieces of
evidence, Respondent Court held that petitioners
were estopped from claiming that there was a co-
ownership over the disputed parcels of land which
were also covered by the DPP. Petitioners contend
that Respondent Court, in so ruling, violated the res
inter alios acta rule.
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Res inter alios

acta, as a general rule, prohibits the admission of
evidence that tends to show that what a person has
done at one time is probative of the contention that
he has done a similar acts at another time. Evidence
of similar acts or occurrences compels the defendant
to meet allegations that are not mentioned in the
complaint, confuses him in his defense, raises a
variety of irrelevant issues, and diverts the attention
of the court from the issues immediately before it.
Hence, this evidentiary rule guards against the
practical inconvenience of trying collateral issues
and protracting the trial and prevents surprise or
other mischief prejudicial to litigants.
The rule, however, is not without exception.

While in admissible in general, collateral facts may
be received as evidence under exceptional
circumstances, as when there is a rational similarity

or resemblance between the conditions giving rise to
the fact offered and the circumstances surrounding
the issue or fact to be proved. Evidence of similar
acts may frequently become relevant, especially in
actions based on fraud and deceit, because it sheds
light on the state of mind or knowledge of a person;
it provides insight into such person's motive or
intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan; or it
reveals a mistake.
93. Impossibilium Nulla Obligation Est A maxim meaning that a legal obligation that is Ramon A. Gonzales v. Hon. Francisco I. Chavez, in his
impossible to perform must be of no legal capacity as Solicitor General, Presidential Commission on
obligation. Good Government, and Commision on Audit. G.R. No.
97351, February 4, 1992. As to matters that are of
great pith and moment, suffice it to say that the
recent Benedicto "compromise" agreement, not to
mention the SMC-UCPB Compromise settlement, is
sub judice or under advisement not only of the
Sandiganbayan but also of this Honorable Court in
separate "incidents," and suffice it to state that the
relationship, obtaining between the Government
offices/agencies and the Office of the Solicitor
General as counsel, is not at all like one that simply
would obtain between private client and private
lawyer in private practice, although constant
consultation and advice are sine qua non in both
types of relationship. The relationship is rather one,
created as it is by law, where imposed upon OSG is
the responsibility to present to the courts the
position that will uphold the best interests of the
People, the Government and the State, albeit the

same may run counter to its client's position or route
of action. At any rate, the PCGG through nationwide
TV broadcast and print media, publicly announced
that PCGG had disposed with or otherwise did not
need the legal services of the Lawyer of the
Government, and thus OSG descended, not the
unmerited remark of having "abandoned" the ill-
gotten wealth cases, but the time-honored principle
of impossibilium nulla obligatio est, i.e., there is no
obligation to do impossible things (Lim Co Chui v.
Paredes, 47 Phil. 463), without in any way casting
any aspersion on the moral integrity of any
Commissioner or PCGG official, as made clear by
the Solicitor General to the President in a meeting
with PCGG.
Hence, in the light of all the foregoing

circumstances, at rock-bottom precisely so as not to
prejudice "the interest of the Government" (Orbos),
the Solicitor General withdrew as counsel for PCGG
in all said cases by filing a notice of "Withdrawal of
Appearance with Reservation."
Chui vs Posadas, G.R. No. L-23487, February 11, 1925.

It may possibly be, as intimated by Judge Cooley in
his standard treatise on Taxation, volume 2, page
901, that "there might be excuses for non-payment
which would justify the interference of the courts."
The maxim is: Impossibilium nulla obligatio est.
There is no obligation to do impossible things. But
here, there is no allegation in the complaint that the
inability of the Chinese to pay their taxes on time

was due to any order by the Government or to any
action taken by the Government, and no allegation
that the delay in payment was caused by the fault of
him to whom it was to be paid. On the contrary, the
averment in the complaint is that the Chinese closed
their homes and stores and stayed therein "as a
result of a mutual agreement had thereon."
94. Lex Neminem Cogit Ad Vana The law compels no one to perform a vain or useless W. E. Hicks v. Manila Hotel Company, G.R. No. L-9973,
act. November 6, 1914. The legitimate object is to enable
the party upon whom it is made to perform his
contract and discharge his liability agreeable to the
nature of it without a suit at law; and whenever such
party wholly denies the right of the other to assert
title in himself or unqualifiedly refuses performance
of the obligation, a demand is made useless, and
therefore unnecessary, since lex neminem cogit ad
vana. For the same reason and upon the same
principle the failure to make a demand before suit
may be cured by proof that the defendant could not
have complied with the demand if it had been made;
as where a person contracts to assign his interest in
certain lands to another within a specified time upon
payment of consideration therefor, and the vendor
prior to the stipulated time assigns his interest to a
stranger. In such case a request by the vendee for the
performance of the contract is unnecessary. The rule
stated otherwise is to the effect that where a party
bound to the future performance of a contract puts it
out of his power to perform it, the other party may
treat this as a breach and sue him at once, having
thus an immediate right of action for breach of the

contract by anticipation.
95. Longi Temporis Possessio The acquisition of title to property by long period of Gallosa v. Arcangel, G.R. No. L-29300 June 21, 1978. A
possession, or by continued or uninterrupted rudimentary knowledge of substantive law trial
possession. procedure is sufficient for an ordinary lawyer to
conclude upon a causal perusal of the 1967
complaint that it is baseless trial unwarranted.
What the plaintiffs seek is the "annulment" of a

last will trial testament duly probated in 1939 by the
lower court itself. The proceeding is coupled with an
action to recover the lands adjudicated to the
defendants by the same court in 1943 by virtue of the
probated will, which action is a resuscitation of The
complaint of the same parties that the same court
dismissed in 1952.
It is evident from the allegations of the complaint

trial from defendants' motion to dismiss that
plaintiffs' 1967 action is barred by res judicata, a
double-barrelled defense, trial by prescription,
acquisitive trial extinctive, or by what are known in
the jus civile trial the jus gentium as usucapio, longi
temporis possesio and praescriptio.
Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December 3, 1974, 61 SCRA

284. It is evident from the allegations of the
complaint trial from defendants' motion to dismiss
that plaintiffs' 1967 action is barred by res judicata, a
double-barrelled defense, trial by prescription,
acquisitive trial extinctive, or by what are known in
the jus civile trial the jus gentium as usucapio, longi

temporis possesio and praescriptio
96. Nemo cum alterius detrimento protest Natural law is clear in that no one shall be enriched Pacific Merchandising v. Consolacion Insurance, G.R.
by the injury or loss of another No. L-30204 October 29, 1976. As the trial court aptly
observed "... it is only simple justice that Pajarillo
One cannot unjustly enrich himself at the expense should pay for the said claim, otherwise he would
of another. be enriching himself without paying plaintiff for the
cost of certain materials that went into its
construction. ... It is however, that he did so only as
a receiver of Leo Pajarillo by virtue of the judgment
in Civil Case No. 50201 all of the properties of Leo
Enterprises, Inc. passed on to Pajarillo by virtue of
the judgment in Civil Case No. 50201.” This Roman
Law principle of "Nemo Cum alterious detrimento
locupletari protest" is embodied in Article 22
(Human Relations), and Articles 2142 to 2175
(QuasiContracts) of the New Civil Code. Long
before the enactment of this Code, however, the
principle of unjust enrichment which is basic in
every legal system, was already expres jurisdiction.
Serrano v. Court of Appeals, L-35529, July 16, 1984; 130

SCRA 353. It is imperative to dissect the rationale of
the insurance scheme envisioned by the Social
Security System. The Mortgage Redemption
Insurance device is not only for the protection of the
SYSTEM but also for the benefit of the mortgagor.
On the part of the SYSTEM, it has to enter into such
form of contract so that in the event of the
unexpected demise of the mortgagor during the
subsistence of the mortgage contract, the proceeds

from such insurance will be applied to the payment
of the mortgage debt, thereby relieving the heirs of
the mortgagor from paying the obligation. The
SYSTEM insures the payment to itself of the loan
with the insurance proceeds. It also negates any
future problem that can crop up should the heirs be
not in a position to pay the mortgage loan. In short,
the process of amortization is hastened and possible
litigation in the future is avoided. In a similar vein,
ample protection is given to the mortgagor under
such a concept so that in the event of his death; the
mortgage obligation will be extinguished by the
application of the insurance proceeds to the
mortgage indebtedness.
The interpretation of the Social Security

Commission goes against the very rationale of the
insurance scheme. It cannot unjustly enrich itself at
the expense of another (Nemo cum alterius detrimento
protest). "Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith" (Article 19, Civil Code). Simply put,
the SYSTEM cannot be allowed to have the
advantage of collecting the insurance benefits from
the private life insurance companies and at the same
time avoid its responsibility of giving the benefits of
the Mortgage Redemption Insurance plan to the
mortgagor. The very reason for the existence of the
Social Security System is to extend social benefits.
For SSS to be allowed to deny benefits to its

members, is certainly not in keeping with its policy
"to establish, develop, promote and perfect a sound
and viable tax-exempt social security service suitable
to the needs of the people throughout the
Philippines, which shall provide to covered
employees and their families protection against the
hazards of disability, sickness, old age, and death
with a view to promote their well-being in the spirit
of social justice"
97. Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Accusare No person shall be compelled to accuse himself. Villaflor vs Summers, G.R. No. 16444, September 8,
1920. The maxim of the common law, Nemo tenetur
seipsum accusare, was recognized in England in early
days, but not in the other legal systems of the world,
in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack. A
legal shield was raised against odious inquisitorial
methods of interrogating an accused person by
which to extort unwilling confessions with the ever
present temptation to commit the crime of perjury.
The kernel of the privilege as disclosed by the
textwriters was testimonial compulsion. As forcing a
man to be a witness against himself was deemed
contrary to the fundamentals of republican
government, the principle was taken into the
American Constitutions, and from the United States
was brought to the Philippine Islands, in exactly as
wide — but no wider — a scope as it existed in old
English days. The provision should here be
approached in no blindly worshipful spirit, but with
a judicious and a judicial appreciation of both its
benefits and its abuses.
Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of

our position is to go back once more to elements and
ponder on what is the prime purpose of a criminal
trial. As we view it, the object of having criminal
laws is to purgue the community of persons who
violate the laws to the great prejudice of their fellow
men. Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and
constitutional provisions, are then provided, not to
protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. No
rule is intemended to be so rigid as to embarrass the
administration of justice in its endeavor to ascertain
the truth. No accused person should be afraid of the
use of any method which will tend to establish the
truth. For instance, under the facts before us, to use
torture to make the defendant admit her guilt might
only result in including her to tell a falsehood. But
no evidence of physical facts can for any substantial
reason be held to be detrimental to the accused
except in so far as the truth is to be avoided in order
to acquit a guilty person.
98. Doctrine of Obiter Dictum These are opinions not necessary to the People of the Philippines v. Hon. Higinio Macadaeg. G.R.
determination of a case. They are not binding and No. L-4316. May 28, 1952 An obiter dictum is an
cannot have force of judicial precedents. It has been opinion "uttered by the way, not upon the point or
said that an obiter dictum is an opinion “uttered by
question pending, as if turning aside from the main
the way, not upon the point of question pending.”
“It is as if the court were turning aside from the topic of the case to collateral subjects" or the opinion
main topic of the case to collateral subjects. of the court upon any point or principle which it is
not required to decide or an opinion of the court
which does not embody its determination and is
made without argument or full consideration of the

point, and is not professed deliberate determinations
of the judge himself.
A cursory reading of the decision of this Court in G.

R. No. L-2188 ** against respondent Antonio
Guillermo discloses that the ruling of the Court that
the said respondent is not entitled to the benefits of
the amnesty is not an obiter dictum, but is a ruling of
the Court on an issue expressly raised by the party
appellant on facts or evidence adduced in the course
of the trial of his case. It is not an opinion uttered by
the way; it is a direct ruling on an issue expressly
raised by a party. It was not unnecessary to make
that ruling; the ruling was absolutely essential to a
determination of a question of fact and of law
directly in issue. It was not made without argument
or full consideration of the point; it was deliberately
entered by the Court after arguments on both sides
had been heard. This could not have avoided
determining the issue without the peril of rendering
an incomplete decision.
99. Doctrine of Ratio Decidendi "The reason" or "the rationale for the decision." It is a Sande Aguinaldo v. Honorable Commission on Electionn.
legal phrase which refers to the legal, moral, G.R. No. L-53953, January 5, 1981. It is of "no
political, and social principles used by a court to materiality" to distinguish whether the petition for
compose the rationale of a particular judgment.
disqualification against the winning candidate was
Unlike obiter dicta, the ratio decidendi is, as a
general rule, binding on courts of lower and later filed before the election or after the proclamation of
jurisdiction—through the doctrine of stare decisis. the winner since "the ratio decidendi is broad
Certain courts are able to overrule decisions of a enough to cover the present situation for it would be
court of coordinate jurisdiction—however, out of time-consuming and in the end self-defeating if at
interests of judicial comity, they generally try to this stage the pre-proclamation controversy is not
follow coordinate rationes. laid to rest. The better view, as noted
in Venezuela (G.R. No. 53532, July 25, 1980), is that
resort be had to the remedy of an election protest or
a quo warranto, whichever is proper.
100 Doctrine of Pari Materia A designation applied to statutes or general laws Philippine global Communicatins, Inc., v. Hon. Benjamin
that were enacted at different times but pertain to Relova, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of First
the same subject or object. Statutes in pari Instance of Manila, Branch XI, PHILIPPINE
materia must be interpreted in light of each other
TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORPORATION,
since they have a common purpose for comparable
events or items. CAPITOL WIRELESS, INC. and RADIO
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. L-60548 November 10, 1986. In Opinion No.
76 the view taken was that a message, to fall within
the purview of the franchise, once sent by a
transmitter within the Philippines, cannot be
received by any station within the Philippines even
for the purpose of retransmitting such message to
points outside the Philippines. I believe that the
interpretation given to the above-quoted clause was
too strict and does not conform with the spirit of
said provision. I take the view that the franchise has
reference to the destination of the message and not
to the manner of transmittal. Not as to whether it
should be sent to the point of destination directly or
through relays. The reservation in favor of the
Philippine Government under section 4 of the
franchise of "all wireless communications between

points of stations within the Philippine Islands' is
clearly intended to refer only to domestic
communications.
It should be understood, however, that no extra fees

or tolls could be collected for the transmittal of
messages from a relay station to the principal station
in Manila. For to do so would make it a domestic
service and would bring such service in competition
with the domestic radio and telegraph service of the
Bureau of Posts.
The above-quoted opinion was reiterated and

reaffirmed by the Undersecretary of Justice on
November 28, 1973, in answer to the query of the
Acting Chairman of the Foreign Trade Zone
Authority as to whether or not Globe-Mackay Cable
and Radio Corporation is "authorized under its
franchise to set a relay station inside the Foreign
Trade Zone in Mariveles, Bataan, which will receive
interstate communications for onward transmission
by its main station in Manila.
The above-stated opinions of the Secretary of Justice

and Undersecretary of Justice are material because
Republic Acts Nos. 4630 and 4617 are in pari
materia. As the Court has reiterated:
Statutes are said to be in pari materia when they

relate to the same person or thing, or to the same
class of persons or things, or have the same purpose
or object. (Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol.
11, pp. 535-536) When statutes are in pari materia;
the rule of statutory construction dictates that they
should be construed together. (Black on
Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 106) ... (City of Naga vs.
Agna, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 176, 184)
City of Naga v. Catalino Agna, G.R. No. L-36049 May

31, 1976. Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative
Code and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local
Autonomy Act) refer to the same subject matter-
enactment and effectivity of a tax ordinance. In this
respect they can be considered in pari materia.
Statutes are said to be in pari materia when they

relate to the same person or thing, or to the same
class of persons or things, or have the same purpose
or object. When statutes are in pari materia, the rule
of statutory construction dictates that they should be
construed together. This is because enactments of
the same legislature on the same subject matter are
supposed to form part of one uniform system; that
later statutes are supplementary or complimentary
to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its
acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the
existing legislation on the same subject and to have
enacted its new act with reference thereto.
Having thus in mind the previous statutes relating

to the same subject matter, whenever the legislature
enacts a new law, it is deemed to have enacted the
new provision in accordance with the legislative
policy embodied in those prior statutes unless there
is an express repeal of the old and they all should be
construed together.

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1 DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINES DESCRIPTIONS CASES

Ching vs. Nicdao G.R. No. 141181, Petitioner Ching

on the civil aspect of the case within the period

Prudential Bank v. CA. G.R. 103957. June 14, 1993.

in good faith dealt with the corporation through

Insular Government vs. Frank 13 Phil 236, G.R.No.2935.

the law of the place where the suit is brought.

In applying said principle to determine the State

As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that

between the parties was centered here, although it

Navida, et.al. vs. Dizon, Jr., et.al. G.R. No. 125078.

and benefit of the Philippine laws. Accordingly, the

Manila Gas Corporation vs. Collector of Internal

The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of

was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of

Francisco I. Chavez v. National Housing Authority, R-II

similarly, the filing and recording of a certificate of

to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

Traditionally, fair use is more easily accepted when

“Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed

Republic of the Philippines v. Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., Et

certification of Jose Mendigoria; more than twenty-

There can be no debate at all on petitioner’s

Significantly, however, in the cases cited by

CA and Del Mundo and Director of Lands vs.

Here, it bears stressing that, by petitioner’s own

Even on the supposition that the sale was void, the

It is even worse in this case because here, there is no

perceives as fraud may be nothing more than the

Accordingly, respondents who are not innocent

Del Rosario v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 187056, September 20,

Given that the donation in this case was

The trial court cannot be faulted for passing

In international law, the party who wants to have a

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the

Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and

9, 1995. Alternatively in the light of the absence of

Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons

We find NORTHWEST's claim for attorney's fees,

litigation expenses, and exemplary damages to be

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code

Testate Estate of Bohanan v Bohanan, et al. 106 Phil. 997.

Mindanao Development Authority, now the Southern

The maxim is nullum tempus occurrit regi or nullum

in article 1108(4) of the Civil Code.

It is a maxim of great antiquity in English law. The

Thus, the right of reversion or reconveyance to the

The government officials concerned were negligent

Such negligence does not prejudice the State. The

David Winship v. Phil. Trust Co., G.R. L-3869, January

In view of the foregoing, petitioners’ arguments

Well-entrenched is the rule that a Certificate of Title

According to Art. 1477 of the Civil Code, the

spouses Cosio to SDA-NEMM was made upon

damages for its violation; and where the parties are

Menchavez vs. Teves, G.R. No. 153201. January 26,

A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces

extinguish a juridical relation.[24] Parties to a void