Interpretation of Statutes

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
LLB 4 t h SEMESTER
Harinath J, Radhakrishna ANV and Aravinda Reddy 1

SNO IMPORTANT SHORT QUESTIONS

1 MEANING OF LITERAL RULE (GRAMMATICAL, PLAIN, NATURAL, ORDINARY AND POPULAR)

AND ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
2 HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION
3 INTERPRETATION CLAUSE
4 CONSEQUENCES OF REPEAL (EFFECT OF REPEAL)
5 INTERPRETATION OF SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL (ADJECTIVE) LAWS
IMPORTANT LONG QUESTIONS
6 RULES OF CONSTRUCTION UNDER THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897

7 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION
EJUSDEM GENERIS (of the same kind); STATUTE MUST BE READ AS A WHOLE
(EXVISCERIBUS ACTUS); NOSCITUR A SOCIIS. [Latin, it is known by its associates]
8 GOLDEN (LOGICAL) RULE OF INTERPRETATION. HOW IS IT DIFFERENT FROM
GRAMMATICAL RULE?
9 MISCHIEF RULE AND ITS IMPORTANCE (HEYDON'S RULE)
10 RULE OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES, ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
11 BENEFICIAL (LIBERAL) CONSTRUCTION, WITH ILLUSTRATIONS.
12 INTERNAL AIDS OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (PREAMBLE IMPORTANT)
13 EXTERNAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (IMP - LEGISLATIVE DEBATES,
REFERENCE TO STATUTES IN PARI MATERIA)
14 WHAT ARE THE WAYS TO RESOLVE A CONFLICT BETWEEN PARENT LEGISLATION AND
SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION?
IMPORTANT CASES
15 GRAMMATICAL INTERPRETATION
16 PROSTITUTES SOLICITING THE PASSERSBY FROM BALCONIES AND WINDOWS OF THEIR
HOUSES
17 WHETHER A STUDENT IS A CONSUMER OR NOT?
18 RULE OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES (TOLARAM Vs. THE STATE OF
BOMBAY) (SECTIONS 82 & 83 OF IPC)
19 CONSEQUENCES OF REPEAL (EFFECT OF REPEAL)
20 INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND PROCEDURAL LAW, WHICH WILL
PREVAIL?
PAPER-III: INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES SYLLABUS

Unit-I: Meaning and Definition of Statutes — Classification of Statues — Meaning and

Definition of Interpretation — General Principles of Interpretation — Rules of
Construction under the General Clauses Act, 1897.
Unit-II: Grammatical Rule of Interpretation — Golden Rule of Interpretation – Rule of

Interpretation to avoid mischief.
Unit-III: Interpretation of Penal Statutes and Statutes of Taxation — Beneficial

Construction — Construction to avoid conflict with other provisions — Doctrine of
Harmonious Construction.
Unit-IV: External Aids to Interpretation — Statement of objects of legislation, Legislative

debates, identification of purpose sought to be achieved through legislation — Internal
Aids to Interpretation — Preamble, title, interpretation clause, marginal notes,
explanations etc. — Presumptions.
Unit-V: Effect of Repeal — Effect of amendments to statutes — Conflict between parent

legislation and subordinate legislation — Methods of interpreting substantive and
procedural laws.
Suggested Readings: 1. Vepa P. Sarathi: Interpretation of Statutes, Eastern Book Co, 2.

Maxwell: Interpretation of Statutes, Butterworths Publications 3. Crawford: Interpretation
of Statutes, Universal Publishers. 4 Chatterjee: Interpretation of Statutes. 5. G.P. Singh:
Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Wadhwa and Company, 6. Cross, Statutory
Interpretation, LexisNexis.
SHORT ANSWERS
1. MEANING OF LITERAL (GRAMMATICAL, PLAIN, NATURAL, ORDINARY AND POPULAR) RULE,

ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES.

ANSWER: Meaning of Grammatical/Literal Rule:

Grammatical/Literal rule of interpretation is the primary rule of interpretation. The first
interpretation is literal or grammatical interpretation. The epithets ‘natural’, ‘literal’,
‘grammatical’ and ‘popular’ are employed almost interchangeably.
Literal Rule is where the Judges interpret the legislation that the Parliament has passed. Here
the Judges rely on the exact wording of the statute for the case. They don’t interpret meaning.
Grammatical interpretation is an elementary principle of interpretation that the plain intention
of the legislature as expressed by the language employed is to be accepted and given effect to.
In the case of grammatical interpretation, only the verbal expression of law is taken into
consideration and the Courts do not go beyond what is expressed by words. The dictate of words
is known as ‘litra legis’. The grammatical or literal construction is totally confined to the words or
expressions used in the language of the statute. It does not look beyond what has been stated.
The consequence is no consideration. It remains firm on the letter of law even if injustice or
hardship is caused.
Definition of Literal Rule:

Brett M.R. called the literal rule as a ‘cardinal rule’ that “wherever you have to construe a
statute or document you do no construe it according to the mere ordinary general meaning of the
words, but according to the ordinary meaning of the words as applied to the subject-matter with
regard to which they are used”.
Generally, the Courts must take it for granted that what Legislature has said. Courts have no
liberty to add to or take from or modify the letter of the law.
Viscount Simon LC says, “The natural and ordinary meaning of words should not be departed
from unless it can be shown that the legal context in which the words are used requires a different
meaning”.
The term ‘grammatical construction’ was used by Salmond. He explains, interpretation is of
two kinds, which may be distinguished as ‘literal’ and ‘functional’. The literal interpretation is that
which regards exclusively the verbal expression of the law. It does not look beyond the ‘literal
legis’ (letter of Law). Functional interpretation, on the other hand, is that which departs from the
letter of the law and seeks elsewhere for some other and more satisfactory evidence of the true
intention of the legislature. It is essential to determine with accuracy the relation which subsists
between these two methods, in other words, we have to determine the relative claims of the
letter and spirit (legislative intent and, object of statute) of enacted law.
Eight rules of Grammatical/Literal Rule

Under grammatical/Literal rule the Judge considers what the statute actually says rather than
what it might mean. The following “Eight Rules” are the heart or centre of all the grammatical
interpretation:
1. Define the terms or words being considered and then adhered to the defined meanings;
2. Do not add meaning to established words and terms. What was the common usage in the
culture and time period when the passage was written;
3. Avoid using words or phrases out of context. The context must define terms and how
words are used;
4. Do not separate interpretation and historical investigation;
5. Be certain that words as interpreted agree with the overall premise;
6. Use the known and commonly accepted meanings of words, not obscure meanings for
which there are no precedent;
7. Even though many documents may be used there must be general unity among them;
8. Base conclusions on what is already known and established or can be reasonably from all
known facts.
Where the meaning of the statutory word is plain and unambiguous it is not then for the Judges
to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to its plain meaning because

they consider the consequences for doing so would be inexpedient (not advantageous), or even
unjust or immoral.
Examples of Grammatical/Literal Rule

Fisher v. Bell, under the Restrictive of Offensive Weapons Act, 1959, it is an offence to offer for
sale certain offensive weapons including flick knives. James Bell, a Bristol Shopkeeper, displayed a
weapon of this type in his shop window in the arcade a Broadmead. The Divisional Court held that
he could not be convicted because giving the words in the statute a light literal meaning. Bell had
not offered the knives for sale. In the Law of Contracts, placing something in a shop window is not
technically an offer for sale; it is merely an invitation to offer. It is the customer who makes an
offer to the shopkeeper.
R. v. Harris, where the defendant bit the nose of the victim. The statute stated the offence was
‘to stab or wound’. Under the Literal Rule, biting is not stabbing, cutting or wounding (implying
the use of an instrument). The defendant was proven not guilty.
Advantages of literal/grammatical rule:

1. When the literal rule applied, there is no scope for the Judges’ own opinions or prejudices
to interfere.
2. The literal rule respects parliamentary supremacy and upholds the separation of power.
3. The literal rule encourages drafting precision, promotes certainty and reduces litigation.
Disadvantages of literal/grammatical rule:

1. The grammatical rule fails to recognise that the English language itself is ambiguous and
that words may have different meanings in different contexts.
2. The use of grammatical rule can sometimes lead to absurdities and loopholes which can be
exploited by an unmeritorious litigant.
3. Judges have tended to over-emphasize the literal meaning of statutory provisions without
giving due weight to their meaning in a wider context.
4. Emphasizing the literal meaning of words assumes an unobtainable perfection in
draftsmanship.
5. It ignores the limitations of language.
6. Sometimes application of the literal rule may lead to injustice. For example, in London
and North Eastern Railway Co. v. Berriman, a railway worker was killed whilst oiling a
track. Under the statute, compensation is provided on the death of workers ‘replacing or
relaying’ track. The statute did not cover oiling and so compensation was not given. This
can undermine public confidence in the law.
Case Laws in India:

In K. N. Farms Industries (Private) Limited v. the State of Bihar, AIR, 2009, SC 3031, the meaning of
the word "land" was in question. "Land" under Section 2 (f), Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of
Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 as applicable to the State of Jharkhand
means "land which is used or capable of being used for agriculture or horticulture and includes
land which is an orchard, kharhur or pasturage or forest land or even land perennially submerged
underwater or the homestead of a land-holder."
"Explanation I.—'Homestead' means a dwelling house for the purpose of living or to let out on
rent together with any courtyard, compound, attached garden, orchard and out-building and
includes any out-building for the purpose connected with agriculture or horticulture and any tank,
library and place of worship appertaining to such dwelling house.
Explanation 11.—Land perennially submerged under water shall not include submerged in the bed
of a river." The Supreme Court held that if a tank appurtenant to the dwelling house is land it

follows that any tank appurtenant to agricultural/horticultural land used to irrigate or water such
agricultural/horticultural land will also be land. When the tank is specifically referred to as land in
Explanation I in the definition of "land" in Section 2 (f), it is not possible to accept the contention
that no tank can be land. Thus, it is not possible to exclude land perennially covered with water,
which includes tanks, from the definition of land.
In S. A. Venkataraman v. Union of India, AIR 1954, SC 375, an inquiry had been made against the
appellant under the Public Service Enquiries Act. On receiving the report of the Enquiry
Commissioner, the appellant was given an opportunity under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution to
show cause and was ultimately dismissed. Later on, he was charged under Sections 161 and 165,
Indian Penal Code and Section 5 (2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. On the question whether
his trial violated Article 20 (2) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court held that proceeding before-
the Commissioner was not prosecution and therefore his trial was legal.
2. HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION.
ANSWER:
The rule of harmonious construction plays a significant role in interpreting two or more statues
or two or more parts of a statute when they conflict with each other. It follows a very simple rule
that every statute has a purpose and intent as per law and should be read as a whole.
It is the duty of the courts to avoid “a head-on clash” between two sections of the same act
and, “whenever it is possible to do so, to construe provisions which appear to conflict possible so
that they harmonise”.
The rule of harmonious construction is the thumb rule to the interpretation of any statute. An
interpretation which makes the enactment a consistent whole should be the aim of the Courts and
construction which avoids inconsistency or repugnancy between the various sections or parts of
the statute should be adopted. The Courts should avoid “a head-on clash”, in the words of the
Apex Court, between the different parts of enactment and conflict between the various provisions
should be sought to be harmonized. The normal presumption should be consistency and it should
not be assumed that what is given with one hand by the legislature is sought to be taken away by
the other. The rule of harmonious construction has been tersely explained by the Supreme Court
thus, “When there are, in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each
other, they should be so interpreted, that if possible, the effect should be given to both”. A
construction which makes one portion of the enactment a dead letter should be avoided since
harmonization is not equivalent to destruction
Harmonious Construction should be applied to statutory rules and courts should avoid absurd
or unintended results. It should be resorted to making the provision meaningful in the context. It
should be in consonance (agreement, harmony) with the intention of Rule makers. Rule of
Harmonious construction is applicable to subordinate legislature also.
As stated by Venkatarama Aiyar, J.; “The rule of construction is well settled that when there
are, in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be
so interpreted that; if possible, the effect should be given to both. This is what known as the rule
of Harmonious Construction”.
That effect should be given to both is the very essence of the rule. Thus a construction that
reduces one of the provisions to a “useless lumber (disused or cumbersome)” or “dead letter” is
not harmonious. To harmonise is not to destroy. It is a settled rule that an interpretation which
results in hardship, injustice, inconvenience or anomaly should be avoided and that which
supports the sense of justice should be adopted. The Court leans in favour of an interpretation

which conforms to justice and fair play and prevents injustice. On a summary of the case-law, the
following principles are discernible (noticeable):
1. It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the Act and to
construe the provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other in such a manner as
to harmonise them.
2. The provision of one section cannot be used to defeat the provision contained in another
unless the court, despite all its effort, is unable to find a way to reconcile their differences.
3. When it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in contradictory provisions,

the courts must interpret them in such a way so that effect is given to both the provisions
as much as possible.
4. Courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that reduces one provision to a useless
number or a dead lumbar is not harmonious construction.
5. To harmonize is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it otiose (serving

no practical purpose or result).
Cases:
In Bengal Immunity Company v. the State of Bihar, AIR 1955, SC 661, the question of solving
the conflict between Article 286 (1), explanation (as it then stood) to Article 286 (1) (a), and Article
286 (2) was before the Court.
Article 286 (1) said: 'no law of a State shall impose a tax on the sale of goods where such sale takes
place (a) outside the State'. The explanation to Article 286 (1) (a) stated: 'for the purposes of sub-
clause (a) a sale shall be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods have actually
been delivered as a direct result of such sale for the purpose of consumption in that State.' Article
286 (2) said: 'Except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, no law of a State shall
impose a tax on the sale of any goods where such sale took place in the course of inter-State trade
or commerce'. The respondent argued that they were entitled to tax the sales made by the
appellant, a registered dealer under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, in the course of inter-State
trade or commerce because the goods had been delivered in the respondent State for
consumption in that State. Applying the principle of harmonious construction, the Supreme Court
held that the conflict between the said provisions could be solved if the explanation to Article 286
(1) (a) was interpreted as limited only to the Article 286 (1) (a) because the only purpose of the
explanation was to explain the meaning of the phrase outside sale used in Article 286 (1) (a). The
explanation, therefore, could not be extended to Article 286 (2) either as an exception or as a
proviso thereto. Venkatarama Ayyar, J., in his minority opinion stated that it is a cardinal, rule of
construction that when there are in a statute two provisions which are in conflict with each other
so that both of them cannot stand, they should, if possible, be so interpreted that effect can be
given to both and that construction which renders either of them inoperative and useless should
not be adopted except in the last resort.
In D. Sanjeevayya v. Election Tribunal, AIR 1967, SC 1211, the election of the appellant to the
State Legislative Assembly was challenged by a petitioner who prayed that he be declared elected
in place of the Appellant. During the pendency of this petition, the appellant got elected to the
Rajya Sabha and so resigned from the Assembly. He filed a writ petition in the High Court with the
prayer of a direction to be issued to the Election Commissioner for proceeding with the holding of
a by-election of the seat vacated by him under Section 150 of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951. The High Court dismissed his petition. The Supreme Court, agreeing with the decision of
the High Court, held that Section 150 could not be interpreted in isolation because the Court had

to keep in mind the other related provisions in the Act such as Sections 84 and 98 (c) If the
appellant's arguments that the Election Commissioner should start making arrangements for by-
election immediately after the resignation of a member even though an election petition against
that member is pending are accepted, the effect of it could lead to an absurdity never intended by
the Parliament. Such will be the case where, for instance, the election petitioner wins his petition
against the member vacating his seat and is declared elected. In such a situation there will be two
persons representing the same constituency which could never have been the will of the
legislature. Construing Section 150 harmoniously with Sections 84 and 98 (c), therefore, will lead
to the conclusion that while enacting Section 150 the Parliament did not intend that the election
petition should stand dismissed with the resignation of the member against whom the petition
has been brought.
3. INTERPRETATION OR DEFINITION CLAUSES.

ANSWER:
The legislation can lay down legal definition of its own language, if
such bodies are embodied in the code itself, it becomes binding on the
courts. When the acts itself provides a dictionary for the words used, the
court must first look into that dictionary for interpretation. In Mayor of
Portsmouth v. Smith, the Court said that the introduction of the
interpretation clause is a novelty.
There have been both the criticism and the appraisal made in
reference to the inclusion of definition clause in a statute. In Mayor of
Portsmouth v. Smith, the Court observed: “the introduction of
interpretation clause is a novelty.” When the act itself provides the
dictionary for the words used, the court must first look into that dictionary
for interpretation. And then, there has been a criticism made as to the
utility of definition clause or the interpretation clause. Despite this, there
has been an inclusion of definition clause in most of the statutes so
created, whether in the Indian Statutes or the statutes abroad.
Talking of the pros of adding definitions to a statute, these definitions

help greatly to the one who reads the statute. Following are the benefits
that arise by adding meaning to the frequent and important words of a
statute:
1. It provides some kind of certainty and idea as to what extent is the

meaning of the phrase or the word so defined can be taken. Without
having any definition to a word, it becomes ambiguous as to what
the statute or the legislature had the intention of the word so added.
2. When a word has been defined in a statute, it saves the same word
to be defined everywhere in a statute, since the word so defined are
frequently used. It is a great help to those reading and making in
use the statutes.
3. By adding definition to a word, it is helpful as one can easily
understand as to what the statute is intended to say. A statute thus
may well provide with the definition of a word which suits the
legislation and can differ with the general meaning of the word and
yet still stand authoritative.

4. There are different meanings to a word when used as different

dictionaries provide with quite different meanings, hindering the
interpretation of a word and, thus the provision in a statute.
Providing with a definition in the statute itself makes a lot easier to
understand of what the word in the statute really means and would
help interpret further on if need be, thus eliminating the ambiguity
as to the meaning of a word or phrase in a statute.
As to the cons of adding meaning or definition to a word in legislation,

there has been a criticism made on it.
On drawing a balance between them while comparing both the pros

and cons of adding a definition clause to a statute, it seems the pros have
a higher persuasive value of adding meaning to a statute than of the cons
of it.
To sum up, the object of a definition is to avoid the necessity of

frequent repetitions in describing the subject matter to which the word or
expression defined is intended to apply. A definition contained in the
definition clause of a particular statute should be used for the purpose of
that Act. Definition from any other statute cannot be borrowed and used
ignoring the definition contained in the statute itself.
1. RESTRICTIVE DEFINITIONS
As stated above, a statute may define a word even artificially, setting up

of its ambit, whether to make restrictive of a definition or to make it
extensive. When a word is defined to ‘mean’ something, the definition
prima facie is restrictive in nature and is exhaustive.
A restrictive definition means that the meaning so defined in the

statute for a particular word has a very restrictive ambit, so much so that
its meaning cannot go beyond what has been defined. There is nothing
that can be included in the meaning beyond what has been stated. There
is seldom any scope for interpretation in case of a restrictive definition.
Where ‘means’ is employed, it shows that the definition enacted is hard

and fast and that no other meaning can be assigned to the word “defined”
that is put down in the definition.
When in the definition clause given in any statute the word “means” is
used, what follows is intended to speak exhaustively. When the word
“means” is used in the definition it is a “hard-and-fast” definition and no
meaning other than that which is put in the definition can be assigned to
the same.
2. EXTENSIVE DEFINITION
When the word defined contains ‘include’ in the meaning, the

definition is extensive in nature.

In case of an extensive definition, the definition of the word has the

scope and ambit to go beyond what has been stated and it also gives the
scope to interpret and incorporate as to what all can be included in that
definition.
If a word is to mean one thing and include other things as well, then it
does not mean that the former thing will also be included in the meaning
along with the latter things.
The word ‘include’ is very generally used in the interpretation clause in

order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of
the statute, and when it is so used those words or phrases must be
construed as comprehending, not only such things, as they signify
according to their natural import, but also those things which the
interpretation clause declares that they shall include.
In State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners’

Association, the court gave the word ‘district judge’ under Art. 236(a)
of the Constitution an extensive definition saying that the word would
include the hierarchy of specialized civil courts viz. Labour courts and
industrial courts which are not expressly included in the definition.
But the word ‘include’ is susceptible of another construction, which

may become imperative if the context of the act is sufficient to show that
it was not merely employed for the purpose of adding the natural
significance of the words or expressions used. This may be equivalent to
‘mean and include’ and for the purpose of the act must invariably be
attached to those words or expressions. Thus, the word include may
sometimes be used in the context of mean and would thus limit or bar
further inclusion of other things into the meaning of the word or phrase of
the Act.
The word ‘include’ may in exceptional cases be construed as equivalent to

‘mean and include’.
A definition section may also be written as ‘ is deemed to include’

which again is an inclusive or extensive definition and such a form is used
to bring in by a legal fiction something within the word defined which
according to its ordinary meaning is not included within it.
Wherein a definition by way of amendment replace mean by include, it

is construed to give a wider meaning and perspective to the definition and
that the earlier definition which was limited and restricted to the meaning
so defined and to such things defined would no longer be applicable.
3. EXHAUSTIVE DEFINITION
A definition using ‘mean and include’ is considered as exhaustive. This

means that the definition will embrace only what is compared within the

ordinary meaning of the ‘means’, together with what is mentioned in the

‘includes’ part of the definition.
Thus, a definition may both mean and includes wherein one thing would
mean such and such thing and others would include things more than
what is stated. Thus, it can include and exclude both in the sense that at
one place in the definition it can include things and at the other place of
the same definition it can exclude other things to be incorporated.
The definition of ‘transfer of property’ in the Gift Tax Act, 1958 came
into jeopardy as the words ‘disposition, conveyance, assignment,
settlement, delivery and payment’ were used in the definition which
signifies different modes of transfer of property. here it was construed
that the partition of a Hindu Undivided Family would not be included in
this definition as the meaning cannot be extended to a transfer of
property where there is no tax applied.
4. AMBIGUOUS DEFINITIONS
There are definitions that are ambiguous in itself. This happens when
the definition itself is not clear as to its scope and meaning and there
requires further interpretation of those words or phrases in order to
understand or make it applicable to a certain case. It is presumed that the
definitions given by the legislature in the statute will have an effect to the
extent that there might not be any requirement to interpret the word
further on and that the meaning so provided would be sufficient in itself,
yet, there are definitions that the legislature makes which are ambiguous
and require further interpretation.
It must be read in the context of the phrase which it defines, realizing that
the function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to a word or
phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain but not to
contradict it or supplant it altogether.” Thus, in case a definition clause is
ambiguous and does not provide with a sufficient meaning, there requires
interpretation for the word in the sense that it should apply to the case.
Also, in order to understand in complete the meaning of the word, it

should not be read in isolation and should require taking the help of other
provisions or the definition for the same word provided in different
statutes. This, in turn, provides rather a specific and precise meaning to
the word so defined in ambiguity and helps in understanding applying it to
the relevant situation and to situation wherever necessary..
For example, the phrase ‘immovable property’ has nowhere been defined
to exhaustive sense that it is sufficient to not to look anywhere else in
order to understand the meaning of the phrase.

The immovable property has been defined under three provisions in 3

different statutes. They are the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the
General Clauses Act, 1897 and the Registration Act, 1908.
1. Section 3, Transfer of Property Act, 1882

“Immovable property” does not include standing timber, growing crops or
grass.
2. Section 3(26), General Clauses Act, 1897

“Immovable property” shall include land, benefits to arise out of the land,
and things attached to Earth, or permanently fastened to anything
attached to the Earth.
3. Section 2(6), Registration Act, 1908

“Immovable property” includes land, buildings, hereditary allowances,
right to ways, lights, ferries, fisheries or any other benefit to arise out of
the land, and things attached to Earth, or permanently fastened to
anything which is attached to Earth, but not standing timber, growing
crops nor grass.
In this, the definition given in the Transfer of Property Act is not sufficient
and help of the other two provisions from the General Clauses Act and the
Registration Act is taken which provides somehow a broader perspective
and meaning to the phrase. The definitions themselves cannot provide
with an exhaustive meaning and hence there requires interpretation of
the provisions.
Wide words used in an interpretation clause may thus be given a limited

meaning having regard to the context as a whole for a word in a statute
whether it be in the body of the statute or in the interpretation clause is
not to be construed without reference to the context in which it appears.
However, it will not be correct to say that a wide word in an inclusive
definition should be given a limited scope by reference merely to the
ordinary meaning of the word defined.
5. DEFINITIONS WHEN SUBJECT TO CONTRARY EXTENT
In context to the definitions of this kind, Lord Dunedin said, “it is a novel and unheard of the idea
that an interpretation clause which might easily so expressed as to cover certain sections and not
cover others should be when expressed in general terms divided up by sort of theory applicana
singula singulis, so as not to apply to the sections where the context suggests no difficulty of
application.
If the legislature defines a term, in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary, those terms
shall be used as proposed. But where there is a context otherwise required, the terms or the words
shall be given a meaning different from that defined in the statute and thus comes into play the part
of the interpretation.
The definitions many times contain phrases like ‘unless the context
otherwise requires’ or ‘unless there is anything repugnant in the subject
or context’. In these situations, a contrary context may be used for the

purpose of the situation in the case. And even if it has not been expressly
stated in the definition, it is imperative to make the interpretation of the
words so used if so required.
An argument based on contrary context which will make the inclusive

definition inapplicable to any provision in the Act cannot be accepted as it
would make the definition entirely useless.
When the application of the definition of a term in a provision containing

that the term makes it unworkable and otiose (serving no practical
purpose or result), it can be said that the definition does not apply to that
provision because of the contrary context.
While finding the meaning of the word ‘insurer’ in various sections of the
Act (Insurance Act, 1938), the meaning to be ordinarily given to it is that
given in the definition clause. But this is flexible and there may be
sections in the Act where the meaning may have to be departed from on
account of the subject or context in which the word had been used and
that will give effect to the opening sentence of the definition.
The definition of the word shall also be amended if there is a change

made in the provisions of the Constitution and the Act and both do not
cohere with each other due to the definition. If there is an amendment
made in the Constitution or Act or both due to which some provisions do
not have conformity with each other which include the usage of the
meanings of the words which remain unamended, the words so defined
are useless and redundant.
Similarly in construing the word ‘workman; in Section 33-C(2) of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it was held that the word included a
dismissed workman although, in the definition of that word as given in
Section 2, a dismissed workman is included only for the purpose of
industrial disputes in Section 10.
The court not only has to look at the words but the context, the
collocation and the object in order to interpret the meaning to relate the
matter.
CONCLUSION
The definition clause so added in an Act provides with a lot of help in

determining the meaning of a word in a statute. Whereas it becomes
cumbersome to find the correct contention of a word used in a statute,
the inclusion of definition or interpretation clause becomes helpful by
providing the required context or meaning of the word so used in a
statute, either once, or several times.
4. CONSEQUENCES OF REPEAL (EFFECT OF REPEAL).

ANSWER: In‌‌general, the term repeal stands for to cancel or to revoke. But in the context of law, it
means to “abolish statutes”. Repeal of statutes means the abolition of the law, and once if any
statute is abolished then it is considered void and possesses no effects. In addition, there is no
basic difference between amendment and repeal. Both the term amendment and repeal is used
for stating a similar expression that is the substitution or omission or addition.
As per Halsbury’s Laws of England, the term repeal stands for revoking and abolishing an act and
all its effects which cause it to cease to be a part of statutes of books or body of law.
According to the Black’s law dictionary, the term repeal means a legislative act which abrogates or
obliterates an existing statute.
There exist two types of statutes temporary and perpetual. Temporary statutes tend to have
effects for a specific period of time. They have no effects after the expiry of the specific period,
however, the permanent or the perpetual statute is the one in which the statute remains effective
until it is substituted or repealed by the legislative act. The power to repeal a statute is conferred
to the legislature is similar to the powers it has for the enactment of a statute. For example, the
Companies Act, 2013 repealed the Companies Act 1956, the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
repealed the previous Criminal Procedure Code, etc. such power of repealing a statute is similar
and coextensive to the power of making or enacting a law. Both the union and the state legislature
are empowered with such power however they are restricted to delegate the power of repealing.
What are the objects of the Repealing Act?

The primary object of this act is to bring necessary changes in the existing law for changing socio-
economic and cultural conditions from time to time. The purpose of this Act is to remove the
outdated or obsolete matter from the body of law. After the removal of obsolete matter, it is the
court that decides whether the new provision meets its goal and has different intentions or not.
This act is the editorial revision by abolishing obsolete and unnecessary matter of the statute and
adding new and proper information in the books of the statute.
What are the kinds of repeal?

There are two types of repeal:
1. Express repeal
2. Implied repeal
Express repeal
Express repeal is an expression which means the abolition of the previously enacted statute by the
newly enacted provisions of a statute through expressed words embedded under the new statute
enacted. The statute which has been repealed is called repealed statute and the one which
replaces the earlier statute is called the repealing statute. In general, when an earlier statute or
some of its provisions are repealed through express words embedded under the newly enacted
statute stating that the provisions are now of no effect is called the express repeal.
What are the essential features that constitute express repeal?

 The first and foremost feature is that there must be a repealing statute.
 The earlier statute must be repealed by the new enacting or repealing statute.
 The enacted statute must have clear intention showing the effect of the repeal.
 So it is understood that any earlier statute or provision of the statute can be removed or
repealed by the enacted statute showing incompatibility with the previous one.
Implied repeal
The term implied means implicit or hinted. So when a statute becomes obsolete and it is inferred
that it is no longer and shall be repealed with the newly enacted statute then this process of
repealing is called implied repeal.

For example, if we enter a car showroom it is intended that we are there to buy cars. It is implied,
similarly, if there arises any inconsistency in the statute and due to certain circumstances it
becomes necessary to repeal the statute with the new one though such situation is not expressly
stated, then it is implicit for the implication of repeal.
When the reference is not direct, then the matter is decided through the meaning and nature of
the words enshrined under the repeal clause. During the absence of provisions relating to express
repeal the continuance of any statute or legislation is presumed.
In the case of implied repeal, the burden lies over the person who asserted the implication of
repeal. However, it has also been mentioned that if the newly enacted statute shows no clear
intention or is inconsistent with the provisions of the earlier act then such an assertion or
presumption is rebutted and the act of repeal is done by inferring necessary implications.
The concept of implied repeal is loosely based on the following maxim “Leges posteriores priores
contrarias abrogant”. This means that the earlier or previously enacted law shall be obliterated or
abolished by the new one.
Under the following circumstances, the implied repeal is inferred

The first circumstance is when both the subsequent and the earlier enacted acts are inconsistent
with each other one of the two can remain effective.
When the subject of the earlier act is covered by the act and is Test of the Implied Repeal
There is the assertion against the repeal by implication. The reason for making such an assertion is
that legislature while making or enacting the law has full knowledge about the current laws on the
subject matters. If the legislature has no provision regarding the repeal of the statute then it is
asserted that the legislature has no intention to repeal the existing statute.
Municipal council, Palari v. T.J. Joseph AIR 1963 3C 1561, p. 1564
In the instant case, it was held that if an act or provision enacted is inconsistent from the act
previously enacted and one of the acts must be obliterated. The presumption, in‌ ‌this‌ ‌case,
rebutted and the implied repeal is inferred.
For the implied repeal of a statute following points are to be considered:
Whether the previously enacted laws are in direct contradiction to the later enacted laws.
The conflict between the laws is of such a nature that can’t be resolved and reconciliation
between the laws is not possible.
Whether the newly enacted act is not consistent with the previously enacted act and one has to be
obliterated.
When both the laws are of such a nature that occupy and deals with the same field.
Delhi Municipality V. Shivshanker, [AIR 1971 SC 815]
In the instant case, it was held by the supreme court of India that the test which is applied in case
of repugnancy under Article 254 of the Indian constitution while resolving the conflicts arising
between the laws enacted by the parliament and the laws created by the state legislature, this
test of determining repugnancy shall be applied in case of implied repeal of a statute. This test
includes:
 Whether there exists a direct contradiction between the two statutes or provisions.
 When the law tends to occupy the same field.
 When the legislature explicitly focused on the code of the particular subject matter
replacing the earlier law.
Ratanlal Adukia v Union of India (AIR 1990 SC 104)
In the instant case, the Supreme Court stated that the doctrine of implied repeal is loosely based
on the statement that the legislature assumed the current state of the law did not intend to
generate any vagueness by retaining the conflicting provisions. The court while implicating this
doctrine examines the nature and scope of the two enactments by giving effect to the legislative
intent.
Damji V. L.I.C (AIR 1966 SC 135)

In the instant case, it was held that section 446 embedded under the companies act 1956 is a
general provision whereas the section 15 and 41 enshrined under the Life Insurance Corporation
Act, 1956 are special provision so there exists a difference and the companies court is not
competent or have jurisdiction over the matters which falls under the ambit of Insurance
Corporation Act, 1956.
What do you mean by Repeal by Desuetude?

As it has been already stated that there are two types of statutes namely temporary statute and
the permanent statute. There exists a very thin line difference between both the statutes. A
temporary statute is enacted for specific purposes and for a specific time period and gets repealed
after the expiry of that particular period or fulfilment of that purpose. A permanent statute which
is also known as a perpetual statute is enacted with a long term goal and gets repealed by the
subsequent statute.
There are certain acts which possess the nature of permanent statute but remains inoperative or
ineffective for a long period of time as they are not applied or taken into consideration by the
court for a long period of time. Due to this, the statute loses its recognition and its applicability.
Such disobedience of act is known as Repeal by Desuetude.
The Municipal Corporation for the city of Pune and another v. Bharat forge Co. Ltd and others (J.T.
1995 (3) S.C. 312), In the instant case, the following doctrine of desuetude was highly criticized as
it was assumed that the perpetrators or the accused who have committed certain crimes and are
punished for violation of certain laws or statute which has become ineffective can be protected
and escape their criminal liability.
What are the effects or consequences of repeal?

The effects of the repeal of a statute have been described under the following heads:
1. In respect of common law
2. The general effect of repeal
3. General clause Act, 1897
1. Effects or repeal with respect to common law
 Obliteration: except as to transactions past and closed, a statute after its repeal is as
completely as if it had never been enacted.
 Depriving the rights: The effect is to destroy all inchoate rights and all causes of action
that may have arisen under the repealed statute.
 Revival: Another result of repeal under common law rule is to revive the law in force at
the commencement of the repealed statute. Thus if one statute is repealed by a second
which in turn is repealed by a third, the effect is to revive the first statute unless a contrary
intention is indicated in the third statute.
2. General consequences of repeal
The following are some general effects or consequences of the repeal of an enactment:
 Later Act abrogates prior one.
 Repealed Act ceases to exist and does not remain in force with effect from the date of
repeal.
 Except in relation to the past and closed transactions, a statute after repeal is completely
obliterated as if it had never been enacted. As such, all rights and causes of action under
the repealed statute are destroyed.
 When an Act is repealed, all laws passed under it stand repealed unless there is a saving
provision.
 No proceedings can be commenced or continued under an Act after its repeal.
 After the repeal of a statute, the law which was in force at the commencement of the
repealed statute revives.
 A law can be retrospectively amended to validate the transactions made under it, even
after its repeal.

 When an existing statute is repealed by a temporary statute, it is a temporary repeal.

After expiry of such temporary Act, the repealed Act revives.
 The statute is completely obliterated and all rights under the repealed statute are
destroyed.
3. Effects embedded under the General Clause Act, 1987
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that: where this Act, or any (Central Act) or
Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or
hereafter to be made, then unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not –
1. Revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect, or
2. Affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or
suffered thereunder, or
3. Affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurrent under any
enactment so repealed, or
4. Affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed
against any enactment so repealed, or
5. Affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege,
obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid.
Conclusion
It can be concluded that the Repeal of statutes means the abolition of the law, and once if any
statute is abolished then it is considered void and possesses no effects. In addition, there is no
basic difference between amendment and repeal. Both the term amendment and repeal is used
for stating similar expression that is the substitution or omission or addition. Both the union and
the state legislature are empowered with such power however they are restricted to delegate the
power of repealing. The primary object of this act is to bring necessary changes in the existing law
for changing socio-economic and cultural conditions from time to time. The purpose of this act is
to remove the outdated or obsolete matter from the body of law. After the removal of obsolete
matter, it is the court that decides whether the new provision meets its goal and has a different
intention or not. This act is the editorial revision by abolishing obsolete and unnecessary matter
of the statute and adding new and proper information in the books of the statute.
5. INTERPRETATION OF SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL (ADJECTIVE) LAWS.
Answer: Substantive law is the statutory or written law that defines rights and duties such as
crime and punishments (in the criminal law), civil rights and responsibilities in civil law. It is
codified in legislated statutes or can be enacted through the initiative process.
Substantive law is a statutory law that deals with the legal relationship between people or the
people and the State. Therefore, substantive law defines the rights and duties of the people.
Methods of interpreting substantive law:

Introduction: Interpreting is the process by which the Court seeks to ascertain the meaning of
particular legislation. Interpretation is the art of process of discovering and expounding the
meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case,
where that intention is rendered doubtful, among other, by reason of the fact that the given case
is not explicitly provided for in the law.
To interpret substantive law, jurists follow the following methods:
1. Strict Interpretation:
It is a sound rule of construction that the substantive law should be construed strictly so as to
give effect and protection to the substantive rights unless the statute otherwise intends.
Strict construction is one which limits the application of the statute by the words used.
According to Sutherland “strict construction refuses to extend the import of words used in a
statute so as to embrace cases or acts which the words do not clearly describe.

2. With reference to the purpose and object of the statute:

As long ago as Heydon’s case, Lord Coke said, that it was resolved that for the sure and true
interpretation of statutes four things are to be discerned (recognized) and considered:
A. What was the common law before the making of the Act,
B. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide,
C. What remedy the Parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
Commonwealth,
D. The true reason of the remedy and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such
construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.
3. Rules of harmonious Construction:

It is settled rule of interpretation that all the provisions would be read together harmoniously
so as to give effect to all the provisions as a consistent whole rendering no part of the provision as
surplusage. The well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect shall be given to
all the provisions and for that, any provision of the statute should be construed with reference to
the other provisions to make it workable, a particular provision cannot be picked up and
interpreted to defeat another provision made in that behalf under the statute.
In Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain, the essence of the rule of harmonious construction has
been explained as under:
A. It is the duty of the Courts to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the Act,
B. The provision of one Section of a Statute cannot be used to defeat the other provisions
unless the Court, despite its efforts, finds it impossible to effect a reconciliation between
them,
C. The Courts have also to keep in mind that an interpretation which reduces one of the
provisions as a ‘dead letter’ or ‘useless lumber’ is not harmonious construction.
D. To harmonise is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it otiose (serving
no practical purpose or result).
4. Prospective effect of Substantive Law:
The general rule of construction of substantive law is unless an enactment expressly provides
for the retrospective operation, it has to be construed as prospective. Unless there are words in
the statute sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed
to be prospective.
Methods or canons of interpreting Procedural Laws

Introduction: Salmond defined the ‘law of procedure’ is the branch of the law which governs the
process of litigation. It is the law of actions – using the term action in a wide sense to include all
legal proceedings, civil and criminal.
Procedural law is the ‘machinery’ for enforcing those rights and duties of Substantive Law.
Procedural law comprises the rules by which a court hears and determines what happens in civil or
criminal proceedings as well as the method and means by which substantive law is made and
administered.
Procedural law comprises the set of rules that govern the proceedings of the Court in criminal
lawsuits as well as civil and administrative proceedings. The Court needs to conform to the
standards set-up by procedural law, while during the proceedings. These rules ensure fair practice
and consistency in the ‘due processes.
The jurist’s function is to rise above particular enactment and factual situations. He must
follow some procedure or principles to expound the intent of the legislature. To interpret the
procedural law, jurists follow the following methods or procedure:

A. Rule of Liberal Construction:

It is a sound rule of construction that procedural enactments should be construed liberally and
in such manner, as to render the enforcement of substantive rights effective.
‘Liberal Construction’ means to give the language of a statutory provision, freely and
consciously, its commonly, generally accepted meaning, to the end that the most comprehensive
application thereof may be accorded, without doing violence to any of its terms.
The end of all procedure is to facilitate justice and not to defeat it. In construing a provision
which as a procedural one, the norm of ‘liberal construction’ must be borne in mind. Statutes
relating to remedies and procedure must receive a liberal construction, especially so as to secure a
more effective, a speedier, a simpler and a less expensive administration of law.
B. Harmonious Construction:
Maxim: injustum est nisi tota lege inspecta, de una aliqua ejusparticula proposita judicare vel
raspondere (It is unjust to decide or respond to any particular part of law without examining the
whole of the law).
Harmonious construction is the interpretation of statutes. It is a recognised rule of
interpretation of Statutes that the expression used therein should ordinarily be understood in a
sense in which they best harmonize with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object
of the statute and the legislature.
In a statute like the Code of Civil Procedure with its large number of sections with its numerous
orders and still more numerous rules thereunder, it is of great importance that, if possible,
construction of a particular section is not so made as to be in conflict with other specific section,
rules or orders.
C. Procedural Law, retrospective Effect:

The statutes dealing with mere matters of procedure are presumed to be retrospective in the
absence of express provision or necessary implication against retrospectivity.
In contrast to statutes dealing with substantive rights, statutes dealing with the matters of
procedure are presumed to be retrospective unless such a construction is textual inadmissible.
When an amendment Act affects the matters of procedure only, it applies to all actions pending as
well as future, because the change in procedure does not alter the substantive right of the citizens.
D. Ignoring the technical defects:

According to Lord Reid, “The canons of construction are not so rigid as to prevent a realistic
solution”.
In Mohd. Tahir v. Mohd. Wahab, it has been observed that any technical defect in the
procedure should be ignored in the issue of public concern. Violation of any procedural provision
cannot automatically make the enquiry or order void. Rules of procedure have to be interpreted
in a manner that may substantiate the cause of justice as well as to avoid delay.
6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION UNDER THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897.

Answer:
Introduction
The General Clauses Act, 1897 is a consolidating and amending Act as is clear from the long title
of the Act. The purpose of the Act is to avoid superfluity and repetition of language; and to place
in a single Act, provisions as regards definitions of words and legal principles of interpretation
which would otherwise have to be incorporated in many different Acts and Regulations.

General Rules of Construction

1. Coming into operation of enactments (Section 5): where any Central Act is not expressed to
come into operation on a particular day, then it shall come into operation on the day on
which it receives the assent.
2. Effect of repeal (Section 6): Where this Act, or any (Central Act) or Regulation made after
the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be
made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not:
a. Revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect, or
b. Affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or
suffered thereunder, or
c. Affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurrent under
any enactment so repealed, or
d. Affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence
committed against any enactment so repealed, or
e. Affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right,
privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid.
And any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or
enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act
or Regulation had not been passed.
3. Repeal of Act making textual amendment in Act or Regulation (Section 6A): Where any
(Central Act) or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any
enactment by which the text of any (Central Act) or Regulation was amended by the
express omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, then, unless a different intention
appears, the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the
enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such repeal.
4. Revival of repealed enactments (Section 7): In any Central Act or Regulation made after the
commencement of this Act, it shall be necessary, for the purpose of reviving, either wholly
or partially, any enactment wholly or partially repealed, expressly to state that purpose.
5. Construction of references to repealed enactments (Section 8),
6. Commencement of termination of time (Section 9): In any, Central Act or Regulation made
after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the
first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word ‘from’, ‘and’ for the
purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word
‘to’.
7. Computation of time (Section 10): Any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done
or taken in any Court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the
Court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or
proceeding shall be considered as done if it is done on the next working day.
8. Measurement of distances (Section 11): The distance shall, unless a different intention
appears, be measured in a straight line on a horizontal plane.
9. Duty to be taken pro-rata in enactments (Section 12): —Where, by any enactment now in
force or hereafter to be in force, any duty of customs or excise, or in the nature thereof, is
leviable on any given quantity, by weight, measure or value of any goods or merchandise,
then a like duty is leviable according to the same rate on any greater or less quantity.
10. Gender and number (Section 13):
A. Words importing the masculine gender shall be taken to include females, and
B. Words in the singular shall include the plural and vice versa.
7. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION (Rules of Statutory Interpretation).

Answer: Following are considered as general principles of interpretation:

1. The intention of Legislature predominates:

A statute is an edict (official order) of the legislature. The object of the Court in interpreting a
statute is to find out the intention of the legislature as expressed in the statute.
The intention of the legislature has two aspects. The ‘meaning of the words used’ and the
‘purpose and object’ or ‘the reason and spirit’ pervading through the statute. According to
Blackstone, the most fair and rational method for interpreting a statute is by exploring the
intention of the legislature through the most natural and probable signs which are ‘either the
words, the context; and subject matter, the effects and consequences, or the spirit and reason of
the law’.
It may be concluded that the intention of Legislature is the most important factor for
administering justice in accordance with the law. If Courts fail to derive the true intention, it could
not only lead to a miscarriage of justice but may also defeat the very purpose of the statute. The
intention of Legislature must primarily be gathered from the language itself.
2. A construction to avoid absurdity is justifiable (the rule of harmonious

construction):
While interpreting the statutes, the Courts are permitted to avoid absurdity and to apply
harmonious construction.
In Sultan Begum v. Prem Chand Jain, the Supreme Court observed that:
“The rule of interpretation requires that while interpreting two inconsistent or, obviously
repugnant provisions of an Act, the Courts should make an effort to so interpret the provisions as
to harmonise them so that the purpose of the Act may be given effect to and both the provisions
may be allowed to operate without rendering either of them otiose (serving no
practical purpose or result).
3. Same word to have the same meaning unless otherwise intended:
When the Legislature uses the same word in different parts of the same section or statute,
there is a presumption that the word is used in the same sense throughout. This rule says that
“where the draftsman uses the same word or phrase in a similar context, he must be presumed to
the intent it in each place to bear the same meaning”.
Wanchoo J in Bhogilal Chunnilal Pandya v. the State of Bombay observed that “words are
generally used in the same sense throughout in a statute unless there is something repugnant in
the context.
4. Statutes should be read as a whole in its context (ex visceribus actus):

The meaning of maxim ‘ex visceribus actus’ is that every part of the statute must be construed
within the four corners of the Act. In other words, no provision should be interpreted in isolation.
Wherever the language of a provision is ambiguous and open to alternative constructions due to
uncertainty of the meaning of the words used therein, the provision has to be read as a whole in
its context. It is not permissible to omit any part of it and the construction of a section should be
made of all parts together.
It is a rule now firmly established that the intention of the Legislature must be found by reading
the statute as a whole.
5. It is better to validate a thing than to invalidate it (ut res magis valeat quam
pereat)
The maxim ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’ lays down it is better for a thing to have an effect
than to be made void. A statute should be interpreted to make it effective and operative.
In Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd., v. State of Assam, the Supreme Court observed that a
statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and
operative. However, if a statute is absolutely vague and its language is wholly intractable and
absolutely meaningless, the statute could be declared void for vagueness.

6. Express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another (expressio unius est
exclusio alterius):
The maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ indicates that if one or more things of a
particular class are expressly mentioned in an enactment that means that other things belonging
to the same particular class are excluded from the domain of the enactment. Again, where two
expressions have been used in a statute one of which generally includes the other, the more
general expression excludes the less general.
In India, the fundamental rights under Articles 15, 16 and 19 are available to the citizens of
India and not to other persons and non-citizens thus are expressly excluded, as they are not
citizens. However, Indian citizens may claim these freedoms through their legal persons because
the relief ultimately goes to the citizens and not to the legal persons.
7. Expression precludes implication (expressum facit cessare tacitum):

The Maxim ‘expressum facit cessare tacitum’ is analogous to the principle ‘expressio unius
personae vel rei, est exclusion alterius’ and it connotes that when there is express mention of
certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded. In other words, the maxim lays down
that express words put an end to implication.
8. Contemporaneous expression is the best and strongest in the law (Contemporanea

exposito est optima et fortissimo in lege):
The maxim ‘Contemporanea expresition est fortissimo in lege’ means that ‘contemporaneous
expression is the best and strongest in the law’. The language of a statute must be understood in
the sense in which it is understood when it was passed. Those who live at on near the time when
it was passed may reasonably be supposed to be better acquainted than their descendants with
the circumstances to which it has related, as well as with the sense then attached to legislative
expressions.
The principle that the language used by the lawmakers must be interpreted in its natural and
ordinary sense suggests that the sense must be the same which the words used ordinarily had at
the time the statute was enacted.
9. Associated words (noscitur a sociis):

The word ‘noscitur’ means to know and ‘sociis’ means association. Therefore, ‘noscitur a sociis’
means, too know from the association. ‘Noscitur a sociis’ means ‘the meaning of a doubtful word
may be ascertained by a reference to the meaning of words associated with it.
The rule of construction ‘noscitur a sociis’ as explained by Lord Macmillan ‘The meaning of a
word is to be judged by the company it keeps’. As stated by the Privy Council, in Angus Robertson
v. George Day, “it is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament
with reference to words found in immediate connection with them”.
10. Ejusdem generis (of the same kind):

The term ‘Ejusdem generis’ means ‘of the same kind’. The rule of ‘ejusdem generis’ provides
that where words of specific meaning are followed by general words, the general words will be
construed as being limited to persons or things of the same general kind or claws as those
enumerated by the specific words. The rule of ejusdem generis is the rule of construction which
lays down that when particular words are followed by general words, the meaning of the general
words is to be understood with reference to the particular words; the general words are limited to
the same kind as the particular words. This rule restricts the meaning of general words to things
or matter of the same kind (genus) as the preceding specific words.
The rule of ‘ejusdem generis’ is also known as ‘Lord Tenderen’s rule’. For example, in the
expression “bread, butter, jam etc.” a series of words are used which are edibles. Therefore, they
constitute one genus. Here the word ‘etc.’ is a general word. It may carry any meaning but

restricted to edibles only. Thus, ‘etc.’ here may mean ‘biscuit’ or ‘cake’ since they are also edibles
but it cannot mean an ‘apple’.
8. GOLDEN (LOGICAL) RULE OF INTERPRETATION. HOW IS IT DIFFERENT FROM GRAMMATICAL

RULE?
Answer:
What is the Golden Rule?
The golden rule is a modification of the literal rule; Golden rule allows a departure from strict literal
Rule By recourse to consequences of applying a natural and ordinary meaning. The golden rule is used
to remove absurdity. It comes into existence where some doubt existed as to the meaning of a word.
Origin of Golden rule -

In the year 1857, for the first time, Lord Wensleydale propounded the golden rule of
interpretation, in Grey Vs. Pearson. Thereafter this rule has become famous by the name of
Wensleydale's Golden rule.
Meaning of Golden rule -

The golden rule or British rule departs from its strictly literal rules, it is elaboration or extension of
the literal rule. The golden rule of interpretation allows judges to depart from a word normal meaning in
order to avoid an absurd result
According to Maxwell, "The golden rule is that words of Institute must prima facie be given their
ordinary meaning.
According to the golden rule in the construction of a statute, the Court must adhere to the
ordinary meaning and grammatical construction of the words used.
It is a modification of the principle of literal or grammatical interpretation.
The golden rule can be used in two ways -
the golden rule can be used in a narrow sense and wider Sense.
Importance of the Golden rule of Interpretation -

1) it departs from its strictly literal rules
2) the courts adopt the golden rule of interpretation in order to arrive at a perfect interpretation which
would bring out the true meaning of the language, in the process of giving effect to the real intention of
the Legislature.
The golden rule in nutshell -

The golden rule of Interpretation contains the following points
 Modification of literal rule

 Different from the literal rule
 Application of literal rule may lead to an absurd interpretation of a statute.
 Golden rule tries to avoid the absurd and abnormal result.
Application of Golden Rule -

Application of golden rule depends upon the consequences. Where the situation demands the
application of the golden rule it is important to consider the effect or consequences, which would result
come out from it, for the of one point out the real meaning of the words.
Advantages and disadvantages of Golden rule -

Here are some advantages and disadvantages of the golden rule which are as follows -
Advantages of Golden rule -
1. With the help of golden rule errors in drafting can be corrected immediately.
2. Decisions are made more in line with Parliament intentions.
3. It helps to give a rational result.
4. It helps in closing any loophole.
5. It brings common sense to the law.
6. It allows the court to make sensible decisions
7. It prevents parliament from having to pass amending legislation
8. It respects the authority of parliament because it only allows wording to be altered in very limited
situations where the outcome would be absurd or repugnant
Disadvantages of the golden rule -
1. Infringe separation of powers.

2. Judges have no power to intervene for pure justice where there is no absurdity.
3. Judges cannot add or modify a statute.
4. It only allows judges to change the wording of statutes in very limited circumstances
5. Micheal Zander describes it as a feeble parachute because it is not much use
6. It could not be used in cases like Berriman case because although the situation could be considered
unfair it was not absurd or repugnant
7. It is unpredictable and lacks guidelines
Relevant case laws -
Lee Vs Knapp 1967 (2) QB 442- (accident case)
In this case, the interpretation of the world 'stop' was involved. Under section 77(1) of
the road traffic Act, 1960 a driver causing an accident shall stop after the accident. In this
case, the driver stopped for a moment after causing an accident and then moved away.
Applying the golden rule the Court held that requirement of the section had not been followed
by the driver as he had not stopped for a reasonable time of period requiring interested
persons to make necessary inquiries for him about the accident.
In Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. the State of Punjab, AIR 2001, SC 2524, the question of
interpretation of the words ‘abuse of his powers’ in the expression ‘abuse of his powers or
habitual failure to perform his duties’ in Section 22 of Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 was involved.
The Supreme Court observed that to find the meaning of a word not defined in an enactment the
Courts apply the ‘subject of the enactment where the word occurs and have regard to the object
which the legislature has in view. In selecting one out of the various meanings of a word regard
must always be had to the context. ‘Abuse of power’ in the context implies a willful abuse or an
intentional wrong. An honest though the erroneous exercise of a power or indecision is not an
abuse of power.
The distinction between Grammatical and Golden Interpretation

X` GRAMMATICAL INTERPRETATION GOLDEN INTERPRETATION
1 It is also called as the 'Literal Interpretation' It is also called as 'Functional Interpretation'
It depends upon the letter of enacted law (litera It depends upon the 'spirit' of the enacted law
2 legis) and the 'legislative intent'
3 It interprets only the 'verbal expression' of the It looks beyond the 'litera legis'. It seeks
statute. It does not go beyond the 'litera legis' elsewhere for some other and more satisfactory

intention of the Legislature. evidence to find out the truth.

Where the Grammatical Interpretation fails, the
In the Grammatical Interpretation, the words Logical Interpretation comes into help, i.e. to
construed according to the popular or dictionary find out 'sententia legis' (legislative intent) from
meaning of the term. It gives the plain (natural/ other sources, i.e. the external and internal aids
4 ordinary) meaning. of the statute.
5 It is used frequently It is used rarely
Logical Interpretation developed after the
6 It is the most traditional one Grammatical Interpretation came into existence.
Lord Wensleydale propounded this rule in the
7 This is a very old rule case of Grey Vs. Pearson.
9. MISCHIEF RULE AND ITS IMPORTANCE (HEYDON'S RULE).
Answer:
Introduction
The mischief rule is the third rule of statutory construction traditionally applied by English
Courts. The other two are the ‘Plain meaning rule’ (also known as ‘primary rule’ or ‘literal rule’ or
‘grammatical rule) and the golden rule.
The Mischief rule is narrower application than the golden rule or the plain meaning rule, in that
it can only be used to interpret a statute and, strictly speaking, only when the statute was passed
to remedy a defect in the common law. The application of the Mischief rule gives the Judge more
discretion than the literal and the golden rule as it allows him to effectively decide on Parliament’s
intent.
Meaning of Mischief Rule

The Mischief rule of construction is “that Courts must adopt that construction which shall
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy” by looking to what the law was before the statute
was passed in order to discover what gap or mischief the statute was intended to cover. ‘Mischief
rule’ is the rule of interpretation in which the interpretation is done in such a way so as to
suppress the mischief intended to be remedied by the statute”
The Mischief Rule says that Judges must go deep to see the intention of legislature and object
of the statute to find out what is the mischief sought to be remedied by the legislature. For this
purpose, the Court may take the assistance of counsels, refer all materials, connected with the
statute, such as press, agitation, comments of legal experts, journals, debates on the floor of
Parliament, Law Commission Reports etc.
The mischief rule is applicable only when the words in question are ambiguous and are
reasonably capable of more than one meaning. The Court is entitled to ascertain the intention of
the Legislature to remove the ambiguity by construing the provision of the statute as a whole
keeping in view what was the mischief when the statute was enacted and to remove which the
Legislature enacted the statute. It would be the duty of the Courts to adopt that construction
which would advance the object underlying the Act.
The main aim of the mischief rule is to determine the ‘mischief and defect’ that the statute in
question has set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy.

Heydon’s Rule
The Mischief Rule was first laid in Re Heydon’s case. In this case, a college had certain
properties in its own name. The management had given certain lands to W and his son for their
lives and after them to S and G. In England, during 16 th Century, there existed a system called
‘Doubling of Estates’ and the giving of property in the above way was valid. During those days
misappropriation of the properties of ecclesiastical and religious institutions was going on through
the system of doubling of estates. To prevent the doubling of estates, the England parliament
enacted “The Statute-31 Henry-VIII”. Under this Act, the properties of the college were taken
away by Crown and also the previous leases and instruments were cancelled. Heydon challenged
it in the Court. The Court took the guidance of the mischief rule of interpretation and upheld the
Statute-31 and also the act of the Crown.
The object of the Parliament was to protect the properties of ecclesiastical (relating to the
Christian Church or its clergy) and religious institutions. The Statute-31 provided the remedy to
protect with that object.
In Heydon’s case, the Court ruled that there were four points to be taken into consideration
when interpreting a Statute. In this case, Lord Coke observed the following “That for the sure and
true interpretation of all statutes in general (by the penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of
the Common Law) four things are to be considered:
Ist: what the Common Law before the Act?
2nd: What was the mischief and effect for which the Common Law did not provide?
3rd: What remedy the Parliament hath (had) resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
Commonwealth? and
4th: The true reason of the remedy and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such
construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy and to suppress subtle
inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief and ‘pro privato commodo’ and to
add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the cure and remedy according to the true
intention of the makers of the Act ‘pro bono Publico’.
Mischief Rule was applied in Smith v. Hughes. It deals with the Street Offences Act, 1959,
where it states that the common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street for the purpose of
prostitution, where a street indicated that it was a place and not a person. The overall case was to
deal with cleaning up the street for people to walk along the streets without being molested or
solicited by prostitutes. The prostitute would be penalised and arrested and would be found
guilty of the offence if they were to be soliciting in the streets. In this case, the question was
whether a woman who had tapped on a balcony and hissed at men passing by was guilty of an
offence under the Act. Parker LCJ found her guilty. He says, “I approach the matter by considering
what the mischief is aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean
up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by
common prostitutes. Viewed in that way, it can matter little whether the prostitute is soliciting
while in the street or standing in a doorway or on a balcony”.
Purposive Construction
The mischief (Heydon’s) rule is also known as the rule of ‘purposive construction’ since it
emphasizes advancing the purpose and the object of the statute.
Relevant cases in India:
In Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration AIR, 1965, SC 881, the officers of the respondents,
while rounding up stray cattle, were beaten up by the appellants the owners of the cattle. When
prosecuted for an offence under Section 332, Indian Penal Code the appellants pleaded right of
private defence of property. They also contended that the cattle were not abandoned within the
meaning of Section 418, Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 in that abandoned means
completely leaving a thing as a final rejection of one's responsibilities so that it becomes
ownerless as have been described in the dictionaries. The Supreme Court, while rejecting this

argument, held that it is not necessary that the dictionary meaning of a word is to be always
adhered to even if the context of an enactment does not so warrant. In the present instance, to
know the mind of the legislature, it is expedient to see what mischief was intended to be
suppressed and what remedy advanced. So interpreted, the word abandoned must mean let loose
or left unattended.
In M. Nizamuddeen v. M/s. Chemplast Sunmar Limited, AIR 2010, SC 1765, the words "in or
through the port areas" are used in Rule 5 of the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 made
under Section 25, Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. There is a prohibition on the manufacture,
handling or storage of hazardous substances in Coastal Regulation Zone under the Coastal
Regulation Zone Notification of 1991. An exception to this was, however, carved out permitting
transfer of hazardous substances from ships to ports, terminals and refineries and vice-versa "in
the port areas". The Supreme Court held that the words "in the port areas", have to be given
purposive construction, and so construed they must be read as "in or through the port areas", the
words as used in Rule 5 of the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986.
10. RULE OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES, ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
Answer:
What is Penal Statute?

 A penal statute is one which imposes a pecuniary penalty or other punishment for an
offence.
 A Penal Statute is one which provides a penalty for some offence of a public nature.
 Penal Statutes provide for penalties for disobedience of the law by the offender by
making him liable to imprisonment, fines, forfeiture or even death. If the Statute
enforces obedience to the command of the law by punishing the offender and not
merely redressing an individual, who may have suffered the statute is penal.
The Rule of Strict Construction of Penal Statute

The rule is stated by Mahajan C.J. in Tolaram v. State of Bombay, is that “If two possible and
reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the Court must lean towards that
construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes a
penalty. It is not competent for Court to stretch the meaning of an expression used by the
legislature in order to carry out the intention of the legislature.
In State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, the Supreme Court held that it is settled rule of
interpretation that where a statute is penal in character, it must be strictly construed and
followed.
The basic rule of strict construction of a penal statute is that a person cannot be penalized
without a clear letter of the law. Presumptions or assumptions have no role in the interpretation
of penal statutes. They are to be construed strictly in accordance with the provisions of law.
Nothing can be implied. In such cases, the Courts are not so much concerned with what might
possibly have been intended. Instead, they are concerned with what has actually been said.
Guiding principles of Strict Construction of Penal Statutes

From the rules enunciated by different Courts in different cases, the following guiding principles
can be formulated:
1. In criminal cases, strict construction is the general rule of construction.
2. If the Penal Section covers only some cases of persons, their essence cannot be extended to
cover other persons. Section 82 of IPC deals with an act done by a child below 7 years of
age. Section 83 deals with acts of children who are above seven but below 12 years of age.
The two sections make no provision for an infant who is of exact 7 years. It is submitted
that such an infant should be dealt with under Section 82 of the code because penal

statutes are to be interpreted strictly. In order to warrant a conviction for an offence a case
must fall within the ambit of the definition of the offence charged and the rule is that the
benefit of all reasonable doubts must always go the accused.
3. If there is no ambiguity, and the act or omission by the accused falls clearly within the
mischief of the statute, the statute is to be interpreted like any other law i.e., the full effect
will be given to the statute.
4. Penal statutes generally have a prospective operation. No penal statute should be given a
retrospective operation Article 20(1) of the Indian Constitution.
5. Where certain procedural requirements have been laid down by a statute to be completed
in a statute dealing with punishments, the Court is duty-bound to see that all these
requirements have been complied with before sentencing the accused.
Relevant Cases:
In Ravula Hariprasad Rao v. State, AIR 1951, SC 204, a servant of the appellant delivered petrol to
three cars without taking coupons from them. This was in violation of clauses 5 and 22 of the
Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941 made under Rule 81(2) of the Defence of India Rules. Since no
coupons were taken from them, necessary endorsements were also not made at the back of the
coupons as required by clause 27A of the Order. On being prosecuted for these illegal omissions,
the appellant proved that on the day of the occurrence he was out of the station. Consequently, in
the absence of mens rea, he could not be punished. The Supreme Court held that mens rea was an
essential element to be proved under clauses 5 and 22. Since the appellant was out of the station
on the day, he could not be held responsible for the mistakes of his servant who should have
taken coupons from the customers. But the appellant was guilty under clause 27A because this
provision casts a strict liability on the petrol dealer. The object of this enactment was that the
petrol dealer should set up complete machinery to ensure that necessary endorsements are made
on the coupons against which petrol is supplied. Even if the endorsements could not be made
because of the fault of the servant, the appellant could not escape liability because he has failed
to ensure the compliance of the law.
In Kedar Nath v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954, SC 496, an offence under an Act punishable with
imprisonment or fine or both was committed by the appellant in 1947. The Act was amended and
the punishment in the form of the fine was enhanced to the tune of an amount equivalent to the
amount procured by the offender through his offence. The Supreme Court held that this enhanced
punishment could not be meted out to the offender in view of clear provisions of Article 20(1) of
the Constitution which says that no penal statute should be given a retrospective operation.
Principles of Strict Construction of Penal Statutes as laid down by Maxwell

According to Maxwell, the strict construction of penal statutes seems to manifest itself in four
ways:
The First Way: Express Language:
The first requirement is that the offence in the statute must be manifestly defined with
accurate terms and without any ambiguous meanings. An act or omission may be treated as an
offence and it depends upon the definition given by the concerned penal statute.
Second Way: Explanation of offence:
The Legislature must explain the elements of an offence. It must mention clearly the essential
condition in which the act of a person can be treated as an offence.
Third Way: Punishments:
Imposing punishments is the essential ingredient of the penal statures. For the graver offences,
punishment should be severe such as imprisonment (rigorous or simple) and for the lighter
offences penalty by way of fines. For certain offences, either imprisonment or penalty or both
may be prescribed.
Fourth Way: Jurisdiction and Procedure:
The criminal act must be inquired and tried by the competent Court in the prescribed
procedure.

11. BENEFICIAL (LIBERAL) CONSTRUCTION, WITH ILLUSTRATIONS.

Answer:
Meaning of ‘Beneficial Statute’ [Welfare or Socio-economic or Remedial Statute]

A Statute which purports to confer a benefit on individuals or a class of persons, by relieving
them of onerous obligations under contracts entered into by them or which tend to protect
persons against oppressive act from individuals with whom they stand in certain relations is called
beneficial legislation or statute.
Beneficial statutes may be in the form of ‘Remedial Statutes’ or ‘Welfare Statutes’ or ‘Socio-
economic statutes’.
A remedial statute is one which remedies defect in the pre-existing law, Statutory or otherwise
for the benefit of the society and to suit to the changed conditions of society.
A welfare statute is one which aims to look after the well-being of the people by keeping good
health and enjoying all good things in life.
A Socio-economic statute is one which is made with the object of securing social and economic
welfare of the deprived classes of society and the economic development of the nation.
The Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV (Articles 36 to 51) of the Constitution are
beneficial legislation to the citizens. As per Directives, the Indian Government enacted several
statutes for the benefit of people. Some of them are the Employees’ Provident Fund and other
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948, the Employees’ Pension Scheme, 1995, the Payment of
Gratuity Act, 1972, the Payment of Bonus Act, 1972, the Employees’ Family Pension Scheme, 1971,
the Right of Children to Free Remuneration Act, 1976 etc.
Rule of Beneficial Construction of Statutes

The beneficent construction rule depends upon the legal maxim ‘Salus Populi est suprema lex’
i.e., the welfare of the people is the supreme for the law.
The welfare or beneficial statutes contain certain beneficial provisions and remedies. The
legislature intends to render benefits to the weaker sections.
The Courts while interpreting the beneficial or welfare statutes and other statutes should
follow the following principles or guidelines.
1. The Courts should take the generous view: The principle established in the construction of
a statute is that there is no room for taking a narrow view, but that the Court is entitled to
be generous towards the persons on whom the benefit has been conferred.
2. Courts should adopt that construction which advances, fulfils, and furthers the object of
the Act rather than the one which would defeat the same, and render the protection
illusory.
3. A beneficial piece of legislation has to be construed in its correct perspective so as to
fructify, the legislative intent underlying its enactment.
4. When two views are possible on its applicability to a given set of employees, that view
which furthers the legislative intent should be preferred to the one which frustrates it.
5. Construction should serve the purpose of the enactment and should not defeat it.
Construction should be such that no part of the enactment is rendered otiose or
surplusage.
6. When beneficial legislation is construed, a wider interpretation must be given for the
advantage of the section of people, the target group of the enactment.
7. While construing the beneficial legislation, the Courts must look at them as they are
constitutionally valid or not.
8. Courts should adopt a construction which advances the policy of the legislation to extend
the benefit rather than one which curtails the benefit.
9. Literal construction is not the invariable rule. The court should construe meaningfully in
appropriate cases. If literal meaning produces an anomalous (deviating from what is

standard, normal, or expected), absurd and unjust result which may be violative of
Constitution, the court should avoid it and adopt a construction which would advance the
object and purpose of the provision of the statute.
10. The Court should make a purposeful interpretation so as to ‘effectuate’ the intention of
the legislature and not a purposeless one in order to ‘defeat’ the intention of the
legislators wholly or in part.
11. According to beneficent construction, where an Act does not expressly confer a right to
the workman but does not indicate any negative intention either, that Act must be
construed in the interest of the workmen.
12. Benignant (beneficiary) provision must receive a benignant construction and even if two
interpretations are permissible, which furthers the beneficial object should be preferred.
13. The language of a beneficial statute must be construed so as to suppress the mischief and
advance its object.
Illustrations
1. In B. Shah v. Presiding Officer, AIR 1978, SC 12, the question before the Court was the
interpretation of Section 5 of the Maternity Benefits Act, 1961 under which an expectant mother
employee could take a maximum of twelve weeks of maternity leave, pre-birth and post-birth, on
full salary. The facts, in that case, were that a woman worker who went on maternity leave was
paid seventy-two days wages calculated on the basis of the six-day week for twelve weeks
omitting twelve Sundays. She contended that she should be paid wages for eighty-four days as a
week consisted of seven days. The Supreme Court ordered to pay wages for eighty-four days and
stated that the statute is a beneficial piece of legislation intended for the purpose of achieving
social justice for women workers. Article 42 of the Constitution has recognised it as a Directive
Principle of State Policy. The policy behind Section 5 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 is that the
mother worker should not only be able to meet her both ends during the leave period but also be
able to revitalise some of her diluted energy with a view to maintaining her efficiency as a worker
as also to be able to nurse her new-born child. Being beneficial legislation with such a noble
object in view, the enactment has to be interpreted beneficially.
2. In Spring Meadows Hospital v. H. Ahluwalia, the Supreme Court has held that if the parents
have hired the services of a hospital for the benefit of their child they and the child can maintain
independent actions against the hospital for deficient services.
3. In Andhra University v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner of Andhra Pradesh and other,
and Osmania University v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and another, AIR 1986, SC 1234,
the Supreme Court held that the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,
1952 is a beneficent piece of social welfare legislation aimed at promoting and securing the well-
being of the employees and the court will not adopt a narrow interpretation which will have the
effect of defeating the very object and purpose of the Act. Once it is found that there is an
establishment (in the instant cases the Department of Publications and Press of the University)
which is a factory engaged in an industry specified in Schedule I and employing twenty or more
persons, the provisions of the Act will get attracted to the case and it makes no difference to this
legal position that the establishment run by a larger organisation which may be carrying on other
additional activities falling outside the Act.
12. INTERNAL AIDS OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (PREAMBLE IMPORTANT).

Answer:
 Interpretation means the process of ascertaining the true meaning of the words used in a
statute.
 The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature
conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used.

 As stated by Salmond, “By interpretation or construction is meant, the process by which

the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of
authoritative forms in which it is expressed.”
Jurists take the help of both Rules and Aids in the interpretation of Statutes. As stated by the
Supreme Court in K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulum, interpretation of statute
being an exercise in the ascertainment of meaning, everything which is logically relevant should
be admissible. A Rule is a uniform or established course of things. There are three rules of
interpretation of statutes- Literal, Golden and Mischief. Aid, on the other hand, is a device that
helps or assists. For the purpose of construction or interpretation, the court has to take recourse to
various internal and external aids.
Internal Aids
Internal aids mean those aids which are available in the statute itself, though they may not be part
of enactment. Some Internal Aids are-
1. Title of the Statute

Long title – Every Statute is headed by a long title and it gives the description of the object of an
Act. For e.g. the long title of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is – “An Act to consolidate and
amend the laws relating to the procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature”.
In recent times, the long title has been used by the courts to interpret a certain provision of the
statutes. However, it is useful only to the extent of removing the ambiguity and confusions and is
not a conclusive aid to interpret the provision of the statute.
Cases
1. In Re Kerala Education Bill, the Supreme Court held that the policy and purpose may be
deduced from the long title and the preamble.
2. In Manohar Lal v. State of Punjab, the Long title of the Act is relied upon as a guide to decide
the scope of the Act.
Although the title is a part of the Act, it is in itself not an enacting provision and though useful in
case of ambiguity of the enacting provisions, is ineffective to control their clear meaning.

Short Title – The short title of an Act is for the purpose of reference & for its identification. It
ends with the year of the passing of the Act. For e.g. Section 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, says –“This Act may be cited as the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It shall come into force
on the first day of January 1909.”
Even though the short title is a part of the statute, it does not have any role in the interpretation of
the provisions of an Act.
2. Preamble
The main objective and purpose of the Act are found in the Preamble of the Statute. It is a
preparatory statement and contains the recitals showing the reason for the enactment of the Act.
E.g. the Preamble of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, is “Whereas it is expedient to provide a general
Penal Code for India; it is enacted as follows”. The preamble is an intrinsic aid in the
interpretation of an ambiguous act.
Parliamentary practice to include the preamble as part of the Act was discontinued since long
and generally long title has replaced it. The preamble of a statute is a prefatory statement at its
beginning, following the title and preceding the enacting clause declaring the policy and purpose,
the reasons and motives for, and the objects sought to be accomplished by the Act. References to
the statement of objects and reasons is permissible for understanding the background, the
antecedent state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute and the evil,
which the statute was sought to remedy. The preamble being a part of statute can be read along
with other portions of the Act to find out the meaning of words in the enacting provisions as also
to decide whether they are clear or ambiguous. The preamble is a key to open the minds of the
makers of the Act and the mischief, which they intended to redress.
Cases
In Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse Co. Ltd., Chitty, LJ .held: "it is a settled rule that
preamble cannot be made use of to control the enactment themselves where they are expressed in
clear and unambiguous terms. The preamble affords a clue to the scope of the statute where the
words construed in them without the aid of preamble are capable of more than one meaning. One
must not create or imagine an ambiguity in order to bring in the aid of the preamble.
In Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, Madholkar J. observed: "It is cardinal principle of
construction that where language of an Act is clear, the preamble must be disregarded though,

where the object or meaning of an enactment is not clear the preamble may be resorted to explain
it. We cannot start with the preamble for construing the provisions of an Act, though we could be
justified in resorting to it, if any, we will be required to do so.
In A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, the Supreme Court has held that it is a well-established rule
of interpretation that only when the Act is ambiguous a preamble can be made use of to throw
light on the express provisions of the enactment. When the enactment itself is expressed in clear
and unambiguous terms the preamble cannot be made use of to control it. An ambiguity cannot be
created or imagined just to draw a clarification from the preamble, as that would mean frustration
of the main Act.
In Kashi Prasad v. State, the court held that even though the preamble cannot be used to defeat the
enacting clauses of a statute, it can be treated as a key for the interpretation of the statute.
3. Interpretation or Definition Clause:

The Legislature has power to define the words, expressions and terms that may be used in the
enactment even artificially. Almost every Act contains an interpretation or definition clause in
which those words, terms or expressions that may be repeatedly used in the body or different
sections of the Act, are defined. For example, section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has
defined Degree, Judgment, Order, Public Officer, Legal Representative etc. because these terms
are repeatedly used by the Code in its various sections, Rules and Orders. The object of a
definition is to avoid the necessity of frequent repetitions in describing the subject matter to
which the word or expression defined is intended to apply.
A definition contained in the definition clause of a particular statute, not from any other statute,
should be used for the purpose of that Act.
4. Headings and Title of a Chapter

Maxwell stated that the headings prefixed to sections or sets of sections in some modern statutes
are regarded as preamble to those sections. They cannot control the plain words of the statute but
they may explain ambiguous words.
Cases

1. In Krishnaiah v. State of A.P. and Others, it was held that headings prefixed to sections cannot
control the plain words of the provisions. Only in the case of ambiguity or doubt, heading or sub-
heading may be referred to as an aid in construing provision.
2. In Durga Thathera v. Narain Thathera and Another, the court held that the headings are like a
preamble which helps as a key to the mind of the legislature but do not control the substantive
section of the enactment.
5. Marginal or Side Notes

Marginal or side notes may be found to give a concise indication of the contents of the sections, and
to enable a reader at a glance to know through them the drift of the section. It is settled rule of
interpretation that a marginal note being merely catchwords to a section should not be looked into
while interpreting the language of the said section, as that is no part of the section. The general
assumption is that the marginal notes are prepared by the person drafting the Bill and are in the
nature of the gist of the sections and are not put by, or assented to by the legislature.
Cases
In Wilkes v. Goodwin Banks, LJ held that the side notes are not part of the Act and hence
marginal notes cannot be referred.
6. Illustrations
An Illustration to a section has the purpose to illustrate the principle enshrined in the statutory
provision, it does not exhaust the full content of the section, which it illustrates but equally it can
neither curtail not expand its ambit. Illustrations are examples provided by the legislature for
better understanding of the statute.
Cases
In Mahesh Chandra Sharma v. Raj Kumari Sharma, it was held that illustrations are parts of the
Section and help to elucidate the principles of the section.
7. Exceptions
An ‘exception’ means an omission or leaving out. An exception exempts something
which would otherwise fall within the purview of the general words of the statute. An
exception exempts absolutely from the operation of an enactment. An exception is intended
to carve out or take out it was from the main enactment, a portion which but for it, would fall
within the main enactment.
Example: Section 136 of the Indian Penal Code provides:

“Harbouring deserter: Whoever, except as hereinafter excepted, knowing or having

reason to believe that an officer, soldier, sailor or airman, in the Army, Navy or Air Force of
the Government of India, has deserted, harbours such officer, soldier, sailor or airman, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
years, or with fine, or with both.
Exception: This provision does not extend to the case in which the harbour is given by a
wife to her husband.
8 Proviso
The name of a clause inserted in an act of the legislature, a deed, a written agreement, or other
instrument, which generally contains a condition that a certain thing shall or shall not be done, in
order that an agreement contained in another clause shall take effect.
It always implies a condition, unless subsequent words change it to a covenant; but when a
proviso contains the mutual words of the parties to a deed, it amounts to a covenant.
A proviso differs from an exception. An exception exempts, absolutely, from the operation of an
engagement or an enactment; a proviso defeats their operation, conditionally. An exception takes
out of an engagement or enactment, something which would otherwise be part of the subject-
matter of it; a proviso avoids them by way of defeasance or excuse.
A proviso is to provide examples of a specific case which would otherwise fall within the general
language of the main enactment. It excludes, excepts and restricts the application of a section and
its effect is confined to that case.
Cases
In CIT vs. Ajax Products Ltd, it was held that whether a proviso is construed as restricting the
main provision or as a substantive clause, it cannot be divorced from the provision to which it
stands as a proviso. It must be construed harmoniously with the main enactment.
9. Explanations
An Explanation is added to a section to elaborate upon and explain the meaning of the words
appearing in the section. The purpose is not to limit the scope of the main section but to explain,
clarify, subtract or include something by elaboration. Thus, the object of an explanation is to

provide additional support to the dominant object of the main provision in order to make it
meaningful and purposeful.
10. Schedules
The schedule forms an important part of the statute. This should be read along with section
enactment. Schedules at the end contain minute details, which add information to the provisions
of the express enactment. The expression in the schedule, however, cannot override the
provisions of the express enactment.
11. Punctuation
Punctuation is one of the minor elements of the statue. It should be given importance only when
there is proper punctuation used and when there is no doubt about its meaning.
12. Saving Clause

A saving clause is generally employed to restrict repealing Acts; to continue repealed Acts in
force as to existing powers inchoate rights, penalties incurred and pending proceedings upon
repealed statutes. A saving clause in the nature of an exception to certain rights, obligations,
penalties etc. may be found in any part of the statute.
13. EXTERNAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (IMP - LEGISLATIVE DEBATES, REFERENCE

TO STATUTES IN PARI MATERIA).
Answer: Materials which are not included in the Statute and of which aids are sought in
interpreting the statute is known as ‘externals to interpretation’ of the statute. They are called as
‘surrounding circumstances’. These are also called ‘external sources of the statute’ or ‘extraneous
sources of interpretation’.
External or extrinsic aids may be employed in the construction of Statutes if the words and
language employed are not free from ambiguity and which cannot be cleared even by resort to
intrinsic aids. Extrinsic aids in the construction of statutes are permitted to explain the state of the
law at the time it was passed, but not to interpret the Act. Further, resources to extrinsic aid in
interpreting a statutory provision would be justified only within well-recognised limits; and
primarily the effect of the statutory provisions must be judged on a fair and reasonable
construction of the words used by the Statute itself.
In Babua Ram v. the State of U.P., the Supreme Court explained the importance of external aid
thus: “Now we consider the external aid to get at the crux of the question.
External aid to interpretation is the secondary source, the following are known external aids to
interpretation:
1. Statement of Objects and Reasons for Legislation
It is usual with the minister or promoter of a bill in the legislature to attach a Statement of
Objects and Reasons when he introduces it in the legislature. It is not a part of the bill. It explains
the objects and reasons which necessitates the passing of the Statute in the legislature. It is only
the expression of the mover. The objects and reasons seek to propound the objective which it
stands for, so that the members of the House may be convinced of the necessity of introducing the
bill.

The Statement of Objects and Reasons might be admissible not for construing the Act but for
ascertaining the conditions which prevailed when the legislation was enacted.
2. Legislative Debates [Proceedings in Legislature]
Minister, while introducing the Bill gives a Statement in the Legislature. Later section-wise
discussion takes place. Legislature gives their opinion through their statements. Some members
propose amendments. A detailed debate takes place in the legislature and the Bill will be passed
by the majority vote and becomes a Statute.
P.V.Narsimha Rao v. State, it has been observed that “It would be seen that as per the decisions
of the Supreme Court, the statement of the Minister who had moved the Bill in Parliament, can be
looked at to ascertain mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation and the object and
purpose for which the legislation is enacted. The statement of the Minister is not taken into
account for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of the enactment.”
3. Historical Setting [The events leading up to the introduction of the bill]
The ‘historical settings’ means the course of events which give rise to the enactment. It is also
called ‘Historical Facts’, ‘Historical background’, ‘Parliamentary History’, History of Legislation’ and
Surrounding Circumstances’.
The state of affairs existing at the time when a law was enacted, are called ‘historical facts’.
The Court is entitled to look into such historical facts as may be necessary to understand the
subject-matter of the statute or to consider the surrounding circumstances or the course of events
influencing the introduction of the bill. The Court may take into account such facts or the events
of the time which may help it to consider whether the statute was intended to alter the law or to
leave it exactly where it stood before.
The rule laid down in Heydon's case, that to a certain extent the surrounding circumstances
which led to the passing of the Act can be considered for the purpose of construing a statute – are
now well-recognised.
In Kashmir Singh v. Union of India, the Supreme Court has observed that the Courts while
construing an ongoing statute must take into consideration the changes in the societal condition.
The Courts should also take into consideration development in science and technology.
4. Reference to other statutes
A. Reference to Statutes in Pari Materia
‘Pari’ means ‘same’, ‘Materia’ means subject-matter. Hence, ‘pari materia’ means ‘same
subject-matter’ and ‘Statutes in pari materia’ would refer to the statutes on the same subject
matter. The two statutes are said to be in pari materia when they deal with the same subject,
person or thing.
The rule of construction of statutes in ‘pari materia’ means the rule to the exposition of one Act
by the language of another act. According to Maxwell, “light may be thrown on the meaning of a
phrase in a statute by reference to a specific phrase in an earlier statute dealing with the same
subject matter.”
Lord Mansfield states, “Where there are different statutes in pari materia made at different
times, or even expired, and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed
together, as one system and as explanatory of each other”.
Unless there is an indication of any change in the meaning, as may be deduced from the
purpose of the Act, the words as used in the Act deals, with the similar matters would be
construed as having the same meaning.
The Statutes in pari materia can be lawfully referred to determine the meaning of an
ambiguous word. In other words, in order to resolve an ambiguity, help can be taken from other
statutes also, provided that they are in pari materia i.e., on the same subject matter. The meaning
of an uncertain word cannot be imported from any other statute. Only the statute in pari materia
could be legitimately called in aid.
The rule of construction of statutes in ‘pari materia’ may be called as a further extension of the
basic principle of ex visceribus Actus. According to ex visceribus actus, while interpreting any

provision of a Statute, the Court is required to see that statute as a whole. The rule of pari
materia permits to refer to the other statutes on the same subject matter.
B. Previous Legislation [Assistance of an earlier Statute]
The legislature is the competent authority to enact the Statutes on concerning subject to
remove the mischiefs. Society changes from time to time. When the society changes, the
circumstances also change. If the changed circumstances require, the Legislature may amend the
existing Act, and sometimes, it brings a fresh Act in place of the existing Act. Sometimes Courts,
while interpreting the existing Act, look towards the previous Act for its interpretation when the
intention of the legislature is not changed.
C. The assistance of later Statutes [Help from subsequent Legislation]
There are conflicting opinions relating to Assistance of subsequent statutes. One opinion is that
it is not permissible to refer to a later statute for construction of an earlier statute. According to
Coke, “such an Act should not be construed by any strained sense against the latter of the
previous Act, for of any exposition should be made against the direct letter of the exposition made
by Parliament, there would be no end of expounding”.
D. Incorporation of earlier Act into later
While law-making, legislature adopts a device of incorporation of an earlier Act into a later Act
for the sake of convenience. In order to avoid verbatim reproduction of the provision of the
earlier Act into the later, the legislature incorporates the required provisions of earlier Act or
referred to in the later Act and they form part and parcel of the later Act as if they had been bodily
transposed into it. It is presumed that such incorporation is with all the amendments made in it
till the date of incorporation.
E. Constitution of Consolidated Statutes
The primary rule of construction of a consolidation Act is to examine the language used in the
Act itself without any reference to the repealed Statutes.
It is only when the consolidation Act gives no guidance as to its proper interpretation that it is
permissible to refer to the repealed enactments for guidance and it is never legitimate to have
recourse to repealed enactments to make obscure or ambiguous that which is clear in the
Consolidation Act.
F. Codifying Statutes
Codifying statute is a statute which presents an orderly and authoritative statement of the
leading rules of law on a given subject.
Sutherland states, “statute incorporation into a Code is presumed to be incorporated without
change even though it is re-worded and re-phrased and in the organisation of the Code its original
sections are separated. Where, however, the legislative intent is clear that a change in the law is
intended, the new provision prevails. In case of ambiguity, it is permissible to resort to the prior
legislative history of the Act, the form and language of the prior statute, prior interpretation and
all matters in pari materia in order to arrive at the true meaning of the Code’s provision.
4. Foreign Decisions
Where the Indian Statute practically reproduces the English enactment, it would not be proper
to neglect the judicial decisions in England which have decided the proper construction of the
section to be one thing and not another.
5. Contemporanea Expositio [Contemporaneous exposition, or construction]
The word ‘Contemporanea’ means ‘of the same time or period’ and ‘expositio’ means
‘explanation’. The rule ‘contemporanea expositio’ is that ‘interpreting a statute or any other
document by referring to the exposition it has received from contemporary authority. In other
words, the meaning attributed to the words of a statute at the time of passing of that Statute shall
be retained by those words even subsequently.
6. Text-books
Where the language of a Statute is not precise and words employed therein are capable of
bearing more than one meaning, the textbooks may be referred to resolve the ambiguity.

However, a reference to textbooks shall not bind the Court in any manner. It shall be the
discretion of the Court either to accept or to reject the meaning given in the textbook.
14. WHAT ARE THE WAYS TO RESOLVE A CONFLICT BETWEEN PARENT LEGISLATION AND
SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION?
Answer: Conflict between Parent Legislation/Act and Subordinate Legislation
The word conflict literally means "inconsistency or repugnancy". Conflict is a situation in which
one power tends to disregard another power resulting in clash or conflict of interests between two
individuals or two authorities.
Subordinate legislation or delegated legislation is an Act/legislation, passed by virtue of
authority conferred by the parent Act/Legislation. Hence, the provision of the subordinate
legislation must be in consonance with the provisions of the parent Act and should not
surpass/super cede/ override the parent Act. In case any part of the subordinate legislation is
directly or indirectly is in conflict with the parent Act, it can be challenged on the ground that it is
ultra vires the parent Act. The expression ultra vires (ultra = beyond and vires =power) means
"beyond the power". The subordinate legislation should be passed by the subordinate authority
within the powers conferred on it by the parent Act. If the subordinate Act is made
impugning/violating/infringing the procedure laid down in the parent Act, it is to be declared void
I.e. Invalid.
The conflict between the Parent Act/legislation and subordinate Legislation takes palace under
the following circumstances—
1. When the subordinate legislation is passed ultra vires the power conferred on it by the
Parent Act.
2. When it super cedes/surpasses the Parent Act.
3. When it contradicts the existing law in force.
4. When it violates the provisions of the constitution or general law.
5. When there is an excessive delegation conferred, the subordinate legislation conflicts with
the parent Act.
6. When the subordinate legislation did not adhere to the procedure prescribed/laid down
by the parent Act.
7. If the subordinate legislation offends against any of the mandatory provisions of the
constitution or the Parent Act.
8. If the subordinate law-making authority wrongfully or unlawfully exercises its authority
while enacting the subordinate legislation.
9. When the subordinate law-making authority sub-delegates its authority.
CASE Laws: Ram Prasad V. State of U.P. (AIR 1952 All 843): In this case, conflict arose between the
Parent Act and Subordinate Legislation, section 49 of the U.P Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. The Parent
Act prescribed minimum numbers as a quorum to try. But the subordinate legislation provided for
the trial by a bench constituted under the U.P Panchayat Raj Act. It was held the subordinate
legislation void/invalid on the ground that it was In conflict with the Parent Act.
In Banwarilal vs. the State of Bihar. AIR 1961 SC 8.19 Section 12 of the Mines Act, 1952 made it
obligatory on tine Central Government to consult the Mining Board, constituted under the Act,
before making rules thereunder. The framing of the rules without consulting the Mining Board has
been held as invalid by the Supreme Court because it was ultra vires the procedure prescribed
under the Parent Act.
Similarly In Delhi Transport Undertaking vs. B.B.L. Hajery (1972) 2 SCC 744 the Supreme Court
held that the rules framed under Delhi Corporation Act, 1957 were ultra vires the parent Act. In
the said Act Section 90(1) of the Delhi Corporation Act, 1957 designates the General Manager to
be the competent appointing authority of all persons drawing a salary less than Rs. 350/- p.m. Sec-
95 provided that no person shall be dismissed by any authority subordinate to the appointing
authority. But the rules framed under the Act gave power to the General Manager to delegate all

his powers to Assistant General Manager. This rule was struck down by the Supreme Court as it
was in conflict with Sec-90 and Sec-95 of the parent Act.
CASES
15. Grammatical Interpretation
A. Sales of Green ginger were subjected to sales tax and it was contended that they were not
so liable as they constituted ‘vegetable’ which were exempted from sales tax. The
expression ‘vegetable’ is not defined in the Act. Decide whether green ginger falls within
the meaning of the term ‘vegetables’ or not. (July-2019, May-2017)
B. Vegetables are exempted from the levy of sales tax under the Sales Tax Act. A vegetable
vendor is selling betel leaves. He contends that betel leaves fall within the scope of
‘vegetables’. Discuss (Aug-18).
C. The Sales Tax Act exempted ‘vegetables’ from the levy of sales tax. Sales of betel leaves
were subjected to sales tax by the authority. It was contended that betel leaves were not
taxable as they constituted ‘vegetables’ which were exempted from tax. Decide (May-14).
D. Under the Sales-tax Act, ‘Vegetables’ were exempted from the purview of tax. A vendor
of vegetables was selling coconuts. The tax authorities levied tax from the sale of
coconuts. The vendor pleaded the exemption on the ground that coconuts fell within the
term ‘vegetables’. Can he succeed? Discuss (May-2015).
E. The Sales Tax Act exempted ‘green vegetables’ from assessment to sales tax. Sale of
sugar-cane was subjected to sales tax by the authority. The question was whether sugar-
cane fell within the term ‘green vegetables’. Decide (Aug-2013).
Answer: In the above-stated cases only green ginger comes under the vegetables and all the
remaining e.g. betel leaves, coconuts and sugar-cane do not come under vegetables. To decide
whether a given item comes under vegetable or not is very simple, here we should not go for the
dictionary meaning or botanical meaning of that item, we should use simple common sense
whether that item is used in our foods frequently or not if it is used frequently then it becomes
vegetable.
ISSUE:
Whether green ginger, chilly and lemon are vegetable or not? Yes, Green ginger, chilly and lemon
is vegetable.
Whether betel leaves, coconuts and sugar-cane are vegetables? No, they are no vegetables.
RULE & APPLICATION:

The act of sale of vegetable does not attract sales tax. Therefore, when an assistant sales tax
officer wanted to tax the sale of betel leaf, a vendor objected on the ground that betel leaf was a
vegetable. He claimed exemption. To advance his argument, he relied on the dictionary meaning
of vegetable in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary and textbooks on botany. This refers to the case of
Ramavatar Budhiprashad vs Assistant Sales Tax Officer reported in AIR 1961 SC 1325 which has
become a landmark judgement by the SC.
The SC did not accept the scientific or dictionary meaning of the word vegetable and observed
that it must be construed not in any technical sense nor from a botanical point of view, but as
understood in common parlance. It held: It has not been defined in the Act and being a word of
everyday use it must be construed in its popular sense, meaning that sense which people
conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it. It is to
be understood as understood in common language. In this view, betel leaf was not a vegetable but
a condiment. Not being a vegetable, it could not enjoy exemption from sales tax.

The judgement lays down the basic principle that a vegetable is one that in market parlance is
known as such. This is the definition of vegetable for fiscal laws, but not so for students of botany
who would regard betel leaf as a vegetable. So the definition depends upon who asks the
question. For a botany student, betel leaf is a vegetable, but not so for a tax collector.
Even after this definition was available, controversies arose on other so-called vegetables too.
Some which travelled up to the SC are coconut, green ginger, chilly, lemon etc. Coconut was the
subject matter of the SCs decision in the case of P A Thillai Chidambar Nair vs State of Tamil Nadu
reported in AIR 1985 SC 1644. In this case under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, the
question was whether a coconut (neither tender nor dried, but a ripened one with or without
husk) could be exempted from sales tax. Justice V D Tulzapurkar and Justice Ranganath Misra held
that it was well-known that the kernel of the coconut was used as an ingredient for enhancing the
taste of food, but was hardly used as a substantial article of food on the table. On this ground,
they held that it was not a vegetable.
However, Justice Sabyasachi Mukherjee observed that it could not be categorically said that
ripened coconut could never be considered a vegetable. However, the assesse could not adduce
enough evidence to prove it. He gave the legal verdict that the burden of proof that coconut was a
vegetable was on the person who claimed it to be so. And since he was not able to discharge the
burden of proof, it could not be regarded as a vegetable in law. On this basis, the SC finally
decided that ripened coconut was not a vegetable.
Chilly and lemon were the subject matter of a decision by the SC in the case of Mangulu Sahu
Ramahari Sahu vs Sales Tax Officer, Ganjam, Orissa reported in AIR 1974 SC 390. In this case, under
the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 the question was whether chillies and lemons were vegetables. The
HC had held that they were not vegetables. It had gone on the basis that before an item could be
considered a vegetable, it had to be a principal item of food. It also considered the botanical
meaning of the word. The SC observed that technical or botanical meanings should not be
considered for tax purposes. So while the HC said they were not vegetables, the SC said they were.
Green ginger came up for decision before the SC in the case of State of West Bengal vs Wasi
Ahmed reported in AIR 1977 SC 1638. In a case under the Bengal Finance Sales Tax Act, the issue
was whether green ginger was to be regarded as a vegetable as obtained in the description
vegetable, green or dried, commonly known as sabji, tarkari or sak in item 6 of Schedule 1. If it
was treated so, it would be exempt from sales tax. The SC relied on the fact that in common
parlance green ginger was known as a vegetable. It was grown in the kitchen garden or on a farm
and was used for the table. It did not accept the view of the Sales Tax Tribunal that it was a
flavour.
CONCLUSION:
When an item is used frequently it comes under the category of vegetables and items like betel
leaves, sugar-cane, coconut etc. are not come under vegetables because they are not used widely
in our kitchens. We should not go for a dictionary or botanical meaning of the item but usage
decides whether that item qualifies to be called as a vegetable or not.
16. THE PASSERS BY MISCHIEF RULE OF INTERPRETATION – SMITH vs. HUGHES

A. THE STREET OFFENCES ACT WAS PASSED BY THE LEGISLATURE PROHIBITING
SOLICITATIONS BY PROSTITUTES AT PUBLIC PLACES. THEREAFTER, PROSTITUTES
SOLICITED FROM BALCONIES OR WINDOWS OF THEIR HOUSES. DOES IT AMOUNT TO
STREET OFFENCE? WHAT TYPE OF INTERPRETATION IS PREFERABLE? DISCUSS (MAY-
2016).
B. ‘SOLICITING IN THE STREET FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROSTITUTION’ IS AN OFFENCE
PUNISHABLE UNDER THE STREET OFFENCES ACT. A WOMAN IS MAKING SIGNS TO MEN AS
THEY PASSED IN THE STREET FROM A WINDOW. IS IT A STREET OFFENCE? (MAY-2014).
ISSUE:

Which rule of interpretation can be used in this case? Mischief rule

Whether the act of soliciting from balconies by prostitute is illegal? Yes
RULE:
Section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959: It is an offence for a prostitute to solicit men ‘in a
street or public place’.
APPLICATION:
The above-given case is similar to the case of Smith vs. Hughes (1960), and the interpretation
should be done by applying mischief rule.
Smith vs. Hughes (1960), under the Street Offences Act, 1959, it was a crime for prostitutes to
solicit in the street for the purposes of prostitution, it includes all the acts to attract them. In this
case, the prostitutes were calling men in the street from their balconies by making signs to them.
The prostitutes claimed that they are not guilty of any offence because they are not doing this act
of soliciting from streets. The judge applied mischief rule to conclude that they were guilty as the
intention of the Act was to cover the mischief of harassment from prostitutes.
The overall case was to deal with cleaning up the street for people to walk along the streets
without being molested or solicited by prostitutes. The prostitute would be penalised and
arrested and would be found guilty of the offence if they were to be soliciting in the streets. In
this case, the question was whether a woman who had tapped on a balcony and hissed at men
passing by was guilty of an offence under the Act. Parker LCJ found her guilty. He says, “I
approach the matter by considering what the mischief is aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows
that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets
without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in that way, it can matter
little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or standing in a doorway or on a
balcony”.
CONCLUSION:
In the given case the act of the prostitute soliciting men is illegal. Even though the prostitute
soliciting from her balcony or windows, by using mischief rule the intent of the legislature is to
stop the prostitutes from attracting the men, and the acts of the prostitutes from their balconies
also comes under this section and illegal.
17. WHETHER A STUDENT IS A CONSUMER OR NOT?

A. A term ‘Consumer’ is defined under the Consumer Protection Act. However, the problems
arose as to whether a student falls within the meaning of the expression ‘Consumer’. In
such a case, what type of interpretation is preferable? Discuss (July-2019 & May-2017).
ISSUE:
Whether a student is a consumer or not? It depends on the services.
RULE:
Consumer Protection Act, 1986

The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 in this respect was sufficient to fulfil the requirement of every
consumer by providing various reliefs available in the Act. In India diverse groups of consumers
are available. The consumer protection law protects the interest of every consumer irrespective of
age, sex, caste, place etc., with respect to all kinds of goods defined under “Sale of Goods Act,
1930” and every kind of services possible to be contemplated as service under the Act 1986.
This Act extends protection against Government body, statutory institutions as well as corporate
sectors. The most pragmatic feature of this Act is the recognition of consumers’ right to be
informed about the quality, purity, standard and price of goods and services, which is a potential
device to prevent exploitation.

Concept of Service and Consumer under the Act, 1986
The term ‘service’ is defined in Section 2(1)(o) of the 1986 Act:

“service of any description, which is made available to potential users, including the provision of
facilities in connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, the supply of
electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment,
amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of
any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service”.
Therefore, it is clear from the preamble of the definition that service of any kind or nature that is
rendered in exchange of consideration to direct or potential user comes within the definition of
service. Some types of services even enumerated in an explicit manner within the definition but
the definition of service is not limited to only those mentioned explicitly. For example, medical
service is not included directly in the definition. However, a series of judgments are available that
identify medical treatment and the facility associated therewith is classifiable as service under the
Consumer Protection Act.
The term “consumer” as per Section 2(1)(d) of the 1986 Act:

“Includes any person who buys any goods for consideration or hires/avails any services for
consideration”.
Therefore, the term consumer is really broad and includes any beneficiary of service without
differentiation with respect to the type of beneficiary or nature of goods or service he/she
purchases. Interestingly, the scope of service in this definition also has no limit because of the
term “any service”. Therefore, there is no bar in accommodating students into the definition of
the consumer because “any person” connected as the purchaser to “any goods” or “any service” is
the consumer as per the Act. It is, still, important to find support, outside the consumer protection
Act, in favour of the term consumer when it applies to the student in the affair of university-
students relationship.
APPLICATION:
Do Educational Institutions Fall Under the Purview of the Act?

A considerable number of decisions delivered by State and National level Consumer Forums are
available as of now which protects the right of students with regard to fees, wrong allotment of
roll numbers, delay in declaration of results, admission in excess of the allotted quota,
misrepresentation about affiliation by the educational institute to various universities etc. The
judgments related to the above-mentioned cases clearly indicate that student is a consumer as per
the Act and the universities or educational institutes fall within the category of service providers.
But the Supreme Court of India had a differing view.
In the case of Maharshi Dayanand University v. Surjeet Kaur, relying upon all earlier judgments,
the Supreme Court held that education is not a commodity. Educational institutions are not
providing any kind of service, therefore, in the matter of admission, fees etc., there cannot be a
question of deficiency of service. Such matters cannot be entertained by the Consumer Forum
under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
Further Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bihar School Examination Board v. Suresh Prasad Sinha,
Supreme Court observed that the Education Boards & Universities are not ‘Service Providers’ and
the complaints against them are not maintainable.
On the other hand, it is also necessary to assess the definition of the consumer under Section 2(1)
(d) of the Act to check that the relationship between university and student fits with the
conventional relationship of trader/service provider and consumer? If these two criteria are
satisfied then it can be said that universities/educational institute come within the ambit of
consumer protection law.
Assessment of Activities of University/Educational Institute

The functions of university/educational institutes can be divided into two main categories:
The core function of the university/educational institution such as imparting education and
advance knowledge by providing instructional and research facilities to educate and train
manpower for the development of the country for the welfare of the people, their intellectual,
academic and cultural development. Here the core functions and the activities associated with it
are inseparable and this is the statutory duty of the university/educational institutes as defined in
the Central University Act.
Secondary/Ancillary services like providing hostel or accommodation facility, auditorium, library,
laboratory, gymnasium, canteen, transport service to and from campus, internet service etc. In
addition to the above, university supplies various goods to the students like textbooks, study
materials, notes, video CD, other electronic material including software programmes etc. The
ancillary services provided by the university, undoubtedly, falls within the category of those
services and provision of goods as per the Act. For example, the hostel or accommodation facility
falls within the meaning of board and lodging, transport facility provided to the student is also
within the scope of service. The foods and beverages provided to the students through canteen
facility, the laboratory equipment, video CD, software programmes etc., obviously come within
the purview of goods as per the Act.
Commercial Activities such as consultancy, transfer of technology to the company through the
patent right and thereby enjoying royalty, handling private projects, Entrepreneurship incubation
are some of the commercial activities performed by the universities/educational institutes in
order to earn the profit. It is clearly reflected from Central University Act, 2009 that university may
enter into the partnership with industry and non-Government agencies and establish a corpus of
funds out of the profits of such partnership.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa
(Bangalore Water Supply), had considered among other things, that educational institutes are
classifiable as ‘Industry’ as defined in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 while
determining the import of the aforementioned term.
Reference of words like service, business, profit, and industry-partnership is available within the
Central University Act, 2009, itself which clearly proves that university is not a non-profit body
rather it has some business characteristics inherent in the Statutes and Acts which govern the
functions of the university.
Critical Analysis of University-Student Relationship in the Context of Consumer Protection

The students enjoy all kinds of facilities i.e. both core and ancillary services rendered by the
university or educational institutes after paying the requisite fees. Therefore, the students are
direct beneficiaries and consumer of the services rendered by the university. A student after
paying the requisite tuition fees deserves a good quality education and facilities related thereto.
Similarly, after accepting remuneration it should be the moral duty and obligation for a teacher
and university to provide adequate service in terms of good quality education.
If the teacher or university fails to comply with this requirement then it amounts to deficiency in
service because universities/institutes are imparting education in exchange for consideration. But,
it is also necessary to understand that the relationship between student and university is not an
ordinary relation of buyer and seller in the true sense. The statutory duty of the university is fixed
by certain Acts, rules and regulations. A student only after complying the requirements fixed by
the university in terms of its rules and guidelines can claim his/her entitlement as a consumer of
service rendered by the university under the Act, 1986.
In my opinion, the teacher-student relationship should not be the only deciding factor to decide
whether the various facilities provided by the university/educational institute should fall under
the term “service” as per the Act 1986 because the teacher-student relationship is totally
subjective which will vary depends upon the character of an individual teacher.

In this respect three court decisions are available and those contradicting to each other. In Taneja
v. Calcutta District Forum it is held by Calcutta High Court that the relationship between teacher
and student in an educational institute is not one of service-provider and consumer.
The same principle was almost followed in Central Academy Educational Society v. Gorav Kumar
where it was held by the court that teaching is not capable of marketization as opposed to the sale
of books or provision of accommodation is marketable and can be considered as service as per the
Act, 1986.
Whereas, in Oza Nirav Kanubhai v. Centre Head Apple Industries Ltd., the National Commission
held that private educational institutes (i.e. institutes that are not statutorily established) to be
classifiable as service providers, and students enrolled therein, or their sponsors, as consumers.
Therefore, the student-university relationship although not equivalent to a relation of consumer &
service-provider in the strict sense but complaints against the university/educational institutes are
maintainable in consumer court on the ground that student is nothing but a consumer as long as
the complaint is genuine. The student is a direct beneficiary or in other words, consumer of the
service rendered by the university is supported by the fact the provision for student’s engagement
in the academic activity of university including evaluation of teacher is available in Central
University Act, 2009 which implies that student is nothing but a direct consumer of education
service.
Rights of the Student and Responsibility of University/Educational Institute

It is imperative to understand the various rights or entitlement of the students under
university/educational institutes in absence of which the noble mission and objects of the
university get defeated. The important rights of the students which are very essential to protect
the interest of every student in the field of education are mentioned below:
1. Right to receive a good quality education.
2. Right to receive all benefits and services related to study like laboratory, library, and good
quality study materials etc.
3. Right to get proper and correct information related to terms and conditions of the
university, disclosure of fees, affiliation, quality standard and facilities available in the
university/institute etc.
4. Right against exploitation of any kind in the university/educational institute.
5. Right to care regarding the safety of students.
6. Protection from injury on campus.
7. Right to a grievance filing process.
It is the responsibility of the university/educational institutes to safeguard the rights of the
student in order to fulfil its noble objects as enshrined in the statutes and Acts of the university.
There are various provisions available in Central University Act, 2009 which empower the
university to frame rules, guidelines, and ordinances with respect to:
1. The condition of residence of the students to provide good quality accommodation,
2. The condition of residence and teaching of women students,
3. Specialised laboratory,
4. Maintenance of discipline in order to prevent ragging and for the safety of students,
5. Redressal of grievances,
6. Right to appeal against arbitrary action of any officer or authority of the university etc., in
order to safeguard the interest and betterment of the students.
However, there are lacunae in the Act with respect to two factors. An absence of redressal
mechanism at the individual student level and no direct remedy is available for the university if
found deficient in providing service or accused of unfair trade practice.
Support Available in Case Laws in Favour of Students as Consumer

The following court decisions have been quoted to substantiate the argument that student as
consumer and university as the service provider.

Jai Kumar Mittal v. Brilliant Tutorials.

In this case, it was held that the supply of defective study materials by an institute can sustain a
valid claim against it for deficiency of service.
In Bhupesh Khurana v. Vishwa Budha Parishad
Due to misrepresentation about affiliation, the National Commission held, in respect of the
recovery of the fees paid to the institute that the institute was liable to refund the fees, having
lured the students to enrol in it through deceitful tactics.
Birla Institute of Technology & Science v. Abhishek Mengi
The National Commission observed that forfeiture of fees by the educational institute without
imparting education amounts to unfair trade practice.
Sonal Matapurkar v. S. Niglingappa Institute[12]
In this case, admissions were made by the dental institute over and above the sanctioned seats as
a result of which the students were not allowed to appear in the examination by the university.
Since the students had paid huge donations and had also made an investment of time and energy,
the National Commission held that there was the deficiency in service and the complainants were
entitled to refund of the donation and compensation with interest and cost of the proceedings.
Secretary, Board of School Education Haryana, Bhiwani v. Mukesh Chand of Palwal[13]
In this case, the respondents declared the results after a period of one year and eight months of
the scheduled time. The Haryana State Commission held that there was erratic functioning on the
part of the opposite party and it had a callous attitude towards its students, which is the
deficiency in service on its part.
Therefore, the court decisions cited above clearly accepts that student is a consumer of the service
provided by the university. Although, many judgments are also available where this consumer and
service provider relationship is vehemently denied.
Critical Analysis of Three Decisions Delivered by Hon’ble Supreme Court to Restrict the Scope of
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 with respect to Educational Activity
Bihar School Examination Board v. Suresh Prasad Sinha
The issue was raised regarding the issuance of the same roll number to three different candidates
by the Bihar Board of Secondary Education and failure to declare the result of one of the
candidates. In this case, it is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that, the Consumer Protection
Act, 1986 is not applicable with respect to statutory functions statutory bodies. Here, the Board is
a statutory body and conducting the examination is in the exercise of discharging its statutory
function.
Therefore, in this case, the Bihar Board of Secondary Education is not providing any service. The
examination fee paid by the candidates is also not considered as consideration. It is true that
conducting an examination is not a marketable service.
However, the findings in case of functions performed by statutory bodies outside the scope of
service under the Act, 1986 is not supported by the earlier Supreme Court decision in the Lucknow
Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta where the Supreme Court held that the activity of the
statutory body is not exempted from the definition of service as per the Act, 1986.
Again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa
had considered among other things, that educational institutes are classifiable as ‘industry’ as
defined in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 while determining the import of the
aforementioned term.
Therefore, when there is negligence in performing the statutory duty it should not be exempted
from the purview of the consumer law. When students pay the examination fee then he/she is
entitled to get correct roll number, admit card, question paper, paper for writing the answer, the
chance of scrutiny or review of the answer sheet being a candidate of examination and other
facility provided by the examination board to every student. If there is any deficiency in the
processing of the registration number, roll number, admit card, allotment of examination centre

etc. it amounts to deficiency in service on the part of examination board because the equal
opportunity is the right of every candidate appearing in the examination.
Maharshi Dayanand University v. Surjeet Kaur
In this case, a student had enrolled in two courses simultaneously, one full-time course and one
correspondence course. Such enrolment being in contravention of the rules, the university
directed her to unenroll from one of the courses, pursuant to which she unenrolled from the
correspondence course. However, she participated in the supplementary exam in respect of the
correspondence course, despite having cancelled her enrolment therein, and passed it. However,
her having taken the exam for the correspondence being in contravention of the university rules,
the university refused to confer the degree on her.
University has the statutory power to enact laws, make ordinances in respect of the functioning of
the university. If any action taken by the student in contravention to the existing rules and
regulation of the university enforced at the time of the action then the student is liable to face the
consequences as per the existing rules. In those circumstances, the student cannot claim relief
available in the Act 1986 as a consumer of service. It should be borne in mind that the statutory
laws of the university and the rights provided in the consumer law should not contradict each
other. Statutory laws of the university and consumer protection law both are enacted in order to
make the functional activity of the university effective and at the same time to protect the right
and interest of the student safe so these two laws should reinforce each other to protect the
interest of both student and university.
P.T. Koshy & Anr. v. Ellen Charitable Trust & Ors.
Supreme Court held, in a brief order that educational institutes do not, through the performance
of educational activities, render any service, in respect of which a complaint of deficiency could be
maintained, and that consumer forums did not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate them. In view of
the above discussions and explanations, it is found that the order in the matter of P.T. Koshy does
not have support on legal and logical grounds.
Conclusion:
In view of the above discussions, it is proved that with regard to the application of the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 is justified in case of educational activity or service rendered by the
University/educational institutes. It is supported equally well on legal and logical grounds.
Students are direct consumer or beneficiary of the service or facility provided by
University/educational institutes. All kinds of activities performed by University/educational
institutes may not be classifiable as marketable service because of the nature of those particular
services but it does not support the complete exclusion of the University/educational institutes
from the scope of Consumer Protection Laws.
At the same time, a student should not get the opportunity to get any undue privilege in
contravention of the existing rules and regulations specifically mentioned in the statute and Acts
of the university with illegitimate demands as a consumer of service. Therefore, in conclusion,
University/educational institutes come within the ambit of consumer protection law as long as the
complaint is genuine on the ground that a legal right or interest of the student is prejudiced due to
inefficient and deficient service or unethical trade practice by the University/educational
institutes.
18. RULE OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES (TOLARAM Vs. THE STATE OF
BOMBAY) (SECTIONS 82 & 83 OF IPC)
A PROVISION OF PENAL STATUTE IS CAPABLE OF TWO POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS. ONE
INTERPRETATION LEADS TO CONVICTION OF ACCUSED AND THE OTHER INTERPRETATION LEADS
TO ACQUITTAL. WHICH INTERPRETATION HAS TO BE PREFERRED? GIVE REASONS (JULY-2019 &
MAY-2014).
ISSUE:

 Which rule of interpretation is applicable in this case? The strict rule of interpretation
because it is a penal statute.
RULE:
The rule is stated by Mahajan C.J. in Tolaram v. State of Bombay, is that “If two possible and
reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the Court must lean towards that
construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes a
penalty. It is not competent for Court to stretch the meaning of an expression used by the
legislature in order to carry out the intention of the legislature.
In State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, the Supreme Court held that it is settled rule of
interpretation that where a statute is penal in character, it must be strictly construed and
followed.
APPLICATION:
The basic rule of strict construction of a penal statute is that a person cannot be penalized
without a clear letter of the law. Presumptions or assumptions have no role in the interpretation
of penal statutes. They are to be construed strictly in accordance with the provisions of law.
Nothing can be implied. In such cases, the Courts are not so much concerned with what might
possibly have been intended. Instead, they are concerned with what has actually been said.
In criminal cases, strict construction is the general rule of construction.
If the Penal Section covers only some cases of persons, their essence cannot be extended to
cover other persons. Section 82 of IPC deals with an act done by a child below 7 years of age and
exempts them from all criminal liability. Section 83 deals with acts of children who are above
seven but below 12 years of age. The two sections make no provision for an infant who is of exact
7 years. It is submitted that such an infant should be dealt with under Section 82 of the code
because penal statutes are to be interpreted strictly. In order to warrant a conviction for an
offence a case must fall within the ambit of the definition of the offence charged and the rule is
that the benefit of all reasonable doubts must always go the accused.
CONCLUSION:
The given case pertains to the penal statute and the penal statutes have to be constructed
strictly.
According to Lord Esher, “If there is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in
any particular case, we must adopt that construction. If there are two reasonable constructions,
we must give a more lenient one”.
The accused in the given case is eligible to get the lenient approach and should not be punished.
19. CONSEQUENCES OF REPEAL (EFFECT OF REPEAL)

A. A law was enacted by the legislature in the year 2009. Mr. X was challenged for
committing an offence punishable under the said Act in the year 2012. When the trial
against ‘X’ is pending. Act of 2009 is repealed in the year 2013. What is the effect on the
trial against ‘X’? Discuss (Aug-2018).
B. The prohibition Act was enacted by the state legislature under which the sale, possession
transportation and consumption of liquor was an offence. Mr. X has committed an offence
punishable under the Act when the Act was in force. Later the said Act was repealed by
the same legislature. Mr. X charge-sheeted after the repeal of the Act. Is it legal? Discuss
(May-2016).
C. ‘X’ was charged for committing an offence punishable under the Prevention of Terrorism
Act. When the trial was pending the said Act was repealed by the Parliament. What is its
effect on the pending trial? (May-2014).

ISSUE:
Is the Legislature having the right to repeal an Act? Yes.
Can the trial of the accused be continued after the repeal of the Act? No, prosecution of the case
will come to an end.
RULE:
A previous law may be repealed either expressly or by implication. In both the cases, the
consequences are the same. Following are the effects of the repeal of enactment as per Section 6
of the General Clauses Act, 1897:
1. Later Act abrogates prior one.
2. Repealed Act ceases to exist and does not remain in force with effect from the date of
repeal.
3. As per general law, except in relation to the past and closed transactions, a statute after
repeal is completely obliterated as if it had never been enacted.
4. When an Act is repealed, all laws passed under it stand repealed unless there is a saving
provision.
5. No Proceedings can be commenced or continued under an Act after its repeal. However,
those cases remain unaffected by such repeal in which the proceedings have been brought
to finality before the repeal of the statute.
APPLICATION:
In State of Utter Pradesh vs. Jagmander Das, 1954 the Apex Court held that when a statute is
repealed or comes to an automatic end by efflux of time, no prosecution for the acts done during
the continuance of repealed/expired Act can be commenced after the date of its repeal/expiry
because that would amount to enforcement at repealed or a dead Act.
In Gajraj Singh v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, the Supreme Court has held that “when an
Act is repealed it must be considered, except as to transactions past and closed, as if it had never
existed. The effect thereof is to obliterate the Act completely from the record of the Parliament as
if it had never been passed, if never existed except for the purpose of those actions, which were
commenced, prosecuted and concluded while it was existing law.
CONCLUSION:
In the given case the prosecution against Mr. ‘X’ cannot be continued because the Act under
which the charges were framed was repealed before his case is finished hence the prosecution will
come to an end and Mr. ‘X’ is free of all earlier charges.
20. REPEAL AND RE-ENACTMENT, SECTION 24 OF THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897.
A. A control Act was repealed and re-enacted without modification. What is the effect on
orders and rules made under the repealed Act? (July-2019).
B. A Central Act was repealed and re-enacted without modification. What is its effect on
orders and rules made under the repealed Act? (Aug-2013).
ISSUE:
Whether the Orders and Rules made under the repealed Act are still in force after the re-
enactment of the Act? Yes.
RULE:
Section 24 in The General Clauses Act, 1897 Continuation of orders, etc., issued under enactments
repealed and re-enacted. Where any Central Act or Regulation, is, after the commencement of
this Act, repealed and re-enacted with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise
expressly provided any appointment notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, made or
issued under the repealed Act or Regulation, shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the

provisions re-enacted, continue in force, and be deemed to have been made or issued under the
provisions so re-enacted, unless and until it is superseded by any appointment notification, order,
scheme, rule, form or bye-law, made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted and when any
Central Act or Regulation, which, by a notification under section 5 or 5A of the Scheduled Districts
Act, 1874, (14 of 1874) or any like law, has been extended to any local area, has, by a subsequent
notification, been withdrawn from the re-extended to such area or any part thereof, the
provisions of such Act or Regulation shall be deemed to have been repealed and re-enacted in
such area or part within the meaning of this section.
APPLICATION:
CONCLUSION:
21. INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND PROCEDURAL LAW, WHICH WILL
PREVAIL?
If there is any inconsistency between a provision of substantive law and a provision of procedural
law, which shall prevail over the other? Discuss (Aug-2018, May-2017 and May-2016)

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INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

Harinath J, Radhakrishna ANV and Aravinda Reddy 1

SNO IMPORTANT SHORT QUESTIONS

Harinath J, Radhakrishna ANV and Aravinda Reddy 2

1 MEANING OF LITERAL RULE (GRAMMATICAL, PLAIN, NATURAL, ORDINARY AND POPULAR)

IMPORTANT LONG QUESTIONS

6 RULES OF CONSTRUCTION UNDER THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897

PAPER-III: INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES SYLLABUS

Harinath J, Radhakrishna ANV and Aravinda Reddy 3

Unit-I: Meaning and Definition of Statutes — Classification of Statues — Meaning and

Unit-II: Grammatical Rule of Interpretation — Golden Rule of Interpretation – Rule of

Unit-III: Interpretation of Penal Statutes and Statutes of Taxation — Beneficial

Unit-IV: External Aids to Interpretation — Statement of objects of legislation, Legislative

Unit-V: Effect of Repeal — Effect of amendments to statutes — Conflict between parent

Suggested Readings: 1. Vepa P. Sarathi: Interpretation of Statutes, Eastern Book Co, 2.

1. MEANING OF LITERAL (GRAMMATICAL, PLAIN, NATURAL, ORDINARY AND POPULAR) RULE,

Harinath J, Radhakrishna ANV and Aravinda Reddy 4

ANSWER: Meaning of Grammatical/Literal Rule:

Definition of Literal Rule:

Eight rules of Grammatical/Literal Rule

Harinath J, Radhakrishna ANV and Aravinda Reddy 5

Examples of Grammatical/Literal Rule

Advantages of literal/grammatical rule:

Disadvantages of literal/grammatical rule:

Case Laws in India:

Harinath J, Radhakrishna ANV and Aravinda Reddy 6

Harinath J, Radhakrishna ANV and Aravinda Reddy 7

3. When it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in contradictory provisions,

5. To harmonize is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it otiose (serving

Harinath J, Radhakrishna ANV and Aravinda Reddy 8

3. INTERPRETATION OR DEFINITION CLAUSES.

Talking of the pros of adding definitions to a statute, these definitions

1. It provides some kind of certainty and idea as to what extent is the

Harinath J, Radhakrishna ANV and Aravinda Reddy 9

4. There are different meanings to a word when used as different

As to the cons of adding meaning or definition to a word in legislation,

On drawing a balance between them while comparing both the pros

To sum up, the object of a definition is to avoid the necessity of

As stated above, a statute may define a word even artificially, setting up

A restrictive definition means that the meaning so defined in the

Where ‘means’ is employed, it shows that the definition enacted is hard

When the word defined contains ‘include’ in the meaning, the

Harinath J, Radhakrishna ANV and Aravinda Reddy 10

In case of an extensive definition, the definition of the word has the

The word ‘include’ is very generally used in the interpretation clause in

In State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners’

But the word ‘include’ is susceptible of another construction, which

The word ‘include’ may in exceptional cases be construed as equivalent to

A definition section may also be written as ‘ is deemed to include’

Wherein a definition by way of amendment replace mean by include, it

A definition using ‘mean and include’ is considered as exhaustive. This

Harinath J, Radhakrishna ANV and Aravinda Reddy 11

ordinary meaning of the ‘means’, together with what is mentioned in the

Also, in order to understand in complete the meaning of the word, it

Harinath J, Radhakrishna ANV and Aravinda Reddy 12

The immovable property has been defined under three provisions in 3

1. Section 3, Transfer of Property Act, 1882

2. Section 3(26), General Clauses Act, 1897