PFR Cases Family Code Art 1 73

G.R. No.
103047 September 2, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F.
Cardenas. As ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to
1
the solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was declared
in default. Trial proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated
without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing
of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the
marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was
issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to
Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the
couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter,
the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's
brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her
marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar,
regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that
there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro
Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO
who were allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as
said license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS

Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to
apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the
marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish the
2
alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties.
It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show
that there was no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the
certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. It declared the
3
marriage between the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to
cancel the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the
certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record
adequately proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for
relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no
part in the procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that the certification and
the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption
regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void, respondent
appellate court disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar,
regularly performed his duties when he attested in the marriage contract that marriage license no.
3196182 was duly presented to him before the solemnization of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to
Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations
was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage
4
license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage,
absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record
or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to
prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by an officer having

custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or
entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to
be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged
with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications
for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued
and such other relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently
proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself,
not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is
mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage
was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those
commonly known as a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to
a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the
contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially
unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her.
Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the
petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly
declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate
in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion
between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the
contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed,
a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been
presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage
license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed
by respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
#Footnotes
1 Filed on February 19, 1987 and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-50117.
2 Decision dated June 30, 1987, issued by Presiding Judge Antonio P. Solano, Quezon
City RTC, Branch LXXXVI; Rollo, pp. 46-48.
3 Sixteenth Division, penned by Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, with Mr. Justices Ricardo J.
Francisco and Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, concurring; Decision dated November 27,
1991, Rollo, pp. 38-42.
4 Articles 53 (4) and 58, New Civil Code.
5 Article 80 (3), New Civil Code.
6 Article 70, New Civil Code.

G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19
May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N.
Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines,
he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo
D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him
and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime,
he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they
obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented
to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married
civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most Holy
Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of Manila
and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having
been married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant
[Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the
city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain
Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father accompanied them,
and who, together with another person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That although
marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was
indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage
license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola,
with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued
by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no.
2770792 was ever issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed,
this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish
Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F")
with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and expenses for
the church wedding and reception were jointly shared by his and defendant's parents. After the
church wedding, he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose
Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support him financially, he and
defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their marital
relationship turned bad because it became difficult for him to be married he being a medical
student at that time. They started living apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling
before they eventually separated in 1978. It was during this time when defendant's second son
was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against
defendant in the United States in 1981 and later secured a judicial separation of their conjugal
partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service was
engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, he
made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed marriage
license was obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the
religious wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"),
March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent
to and received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued Certifications
dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh.
"C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office." Upon his inquiry,
the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified copy of the marriage contract of
plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"),
wherein it noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19,
1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal
on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the
Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael
Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship
after they met and were introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she was compelled
by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose
her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on
her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she and
plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told
her not to worry. Her parents were hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla
convinced them that she will take care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff and
defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites,
without the knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969,
before a minister and where she was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had
lunch and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding,
which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since defendant's mother just came from
hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding preparations. Defendant further stated
that there was no sexual consummation during their honeymoon and that it was after two
months when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one
of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN,
11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out
plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would take
endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between the knees
which she called "intrafemural sex," while real sex between them was far and between like 8
months, hence, abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which
defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar,
plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like
amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then would
take barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away
from drugs but failed as it has become a habit to him. They had no fixed home since they often
moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a half years, and during all those times, her
mother-in-law would send some financial support on and off, while defendant worked as an
English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their marriage
became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in
their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United
States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his
daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they
returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since. His grandsons
practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his daughter's expenses
for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's
family that attended to all the preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her
sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in civil rites some time prior to
the church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff
inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable differences
with defendant and in order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each other;
that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the United States on June 14, 1983
(Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a certain
Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his adverse testimony,
plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage license
appearing in the marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious. 6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial court
made the following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence
of a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications
(Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality
of San Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage
license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage license no. 2770792
appearing on the marriage contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969
(Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence,
particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and
Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May
19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B.
Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the
requisite marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-
69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in
accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the
Office of the Solicitor General for its record and information. 7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court
of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained
that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is
overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan
testified that they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is
registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already retired." With said
testimony We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties'
marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar
of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no
such marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed to locate the book wherein
marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for
scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage license
no. 2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere
perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective with respect to an essential
requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not substantiated with facts on
record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a
Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties
herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of
regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from the
contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a marriage license
was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a
marriage arising from the admitted "fact of marriage."9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage
contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.

Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of the
parties are Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of
marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and
void on the ground of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued by the Local Civil
Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of
such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of
suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all date relative
to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage
is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in
default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the
absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that
will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one
of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar
should be read in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it
was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a
specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of
the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the
document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite
diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having the custody
of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified
tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or
entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in
connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and deserved
to be accorded probative value.
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11
March 1994. It reads:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic)
to Marriage License Number 2880792, 16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila

March 11, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar
The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:
This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office with
regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said
number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem.
September 20, 1994

The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License Application was
filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this
Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil
Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever legal
intent it may serve.
July 25, 2000

Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded work
cannot give you our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said
statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and
determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both
certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the
fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said
person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the
logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that
all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other
things the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of the
:Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did
you bring with you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.

Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your office
maintains as required by the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
xxxx
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the number
issued by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792 the office of the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him
how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office. Did you ask this
2887092, but you could not find the record? But for the moment you cannot locate the
books? Which is which now, was this issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to
locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of
regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is
effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted and
acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one
which may be overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that
an official act or duty has been regularly performed. x x x.21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by
other evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor
of the first and second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No.
2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be
found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily
accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with great
favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. 24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years
producing two offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the
petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991. 27 We are
not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in
the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. 28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which
the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy
families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not
the concern of the family members alone. 29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction
is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code
of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage."30
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 31
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest sentiments.
As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like this one,
where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and
female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from
inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She
pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came
two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man
"Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and
Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a
person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the
result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his
first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition,
docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines
Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as
a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in a
man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery 2 in Bangkok,
Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction
surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact
undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to
have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male"
to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper
of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American
fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or
for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with
the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always
felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s
misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way
taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-
awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their
dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition
despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to
interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil
Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender
from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals 7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that
the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in
the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals
granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP
Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under
Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As
found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or
for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible
with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to
the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled
by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA
9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. 14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions
for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the
law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of
name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name
are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first
name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner
and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to
make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion,
changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the
civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or
any compelling reason justifying such change. 19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by
the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that
he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was
not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper
remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as
the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept.
More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at
all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the
change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must
look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical
or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made
through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. 23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of

clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the
like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected
or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided,
however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: 24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion
that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship,
civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial
decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a
person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among
those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law,
expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate
or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such
matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family
relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage,
divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is
fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn
child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall
be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later
than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either
parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and
hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or,
in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where
the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the
time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the
absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this
connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male
from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or
bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." 35 Thus,
the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone
sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-
known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and
remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable
through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in
the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through
the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry
for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in
his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground
of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is
wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various
laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of
women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case
of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, 41 among others. These laws underscore the public
policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be
granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for
courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make
or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what
proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on
a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform
with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized
as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that
matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or
interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the]
realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social
convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
Petitioner went for his elementary and high school, as well as his Bachelor of Science in
1
Statistics and Master of Arts, in the University of the Philippines. He took up Population Studies
Program, Master of Arts in Sociology and Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology at the University of
Hawaii, in Manoa, Hawaii, U.S.A. Rollo, p. 48.
2
This consisted of "penectomy [surgical removal of penis] bilateral oschiectomy [or orchiectomy
which is the surgical excision of the testes] penile skin inversion vaginoplasty [plastic surgery of
the vagina] clitoral hood reconstruction and augmentation mammoplasty [surgical enhancement
of the size and shape of the breasts]." Id.
3
On January 23, 2003, January 30, 2003 and February 6, 2003.
4
Penned by Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr. Rollo, pp. 51-53.
5
Id., pp. 52-53 (citations omitted).
6
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78824.
7
Special Sixth Division.
Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with Associate Justices Marina L.

8
Buzon and Aurora Santiago-Lagman concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-33.
9
Resolution dated September 14, 2006, id., pp. 45-46.
An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a
10
Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the
Civil Register Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for the Purpose Articles 376 and 412
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
11
Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966, 30 March 2005, 454 SCRA 155.
12
Id.
13
K v. Health Division, Department of Human Resources, 277 Or. 371, 560 P.2d 1070 (1977).
14
Under Section 2 (6) of RA 9048, "first name" refers to a name or nickname given to a person
which may consist of one or more names in addition to the middle names and last names. Thus,
the term "first name" will be used here to refer both to first name and nickname.
15
The last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. – xxx xxx xxx
Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general,
the petitioner may either appeal the decision to the civil registrar general or file the
appropriate petition with the proper court.
16
SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. – Any person having direct and personal
interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change of first
name or nickname in the civil register may file, in person, a verified petition with the local civil
registry office of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or
changed is kept.
In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country and it would not be
practical for such party, in terms of transportation expenses, time and effort to appear in person
before the local civil registrar keeping the documents to be corrected or changed, the petition
may be filed, in person, with the local civil registrar of the place where the interested party is
presently residing or domiciled. The two (2) local civil registrars concerned will then
communicate to facilitate the processing of the petition.
Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries may file
their petition, in person, with the nearest Philippine Consulates.
The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall be
processed in accordance with this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first names or nicknames
may be availed of only once.
SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. – The petition shall be in the form of an
17
affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any person authorized by the law to administer oaths.
The affidavit shall set forth facts necessary to establish the merits of the petition and shall show
affirmatively that the petitioner is competent to testify to the matters stated. The petitioner shall
state the particular erroneous entry or entries, which are sought to be corrected and/or the
change sought to be made.
The petition shall be supported with the following documents:
(1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the registry book
containing the entry or entries sought to be corrected or changed;
(2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or entries upon
which the correction or change shall be based; and
(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil registrar or the
consul general may consider relevant and necessary for the approval of the petition.
In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall likewise be supported with the
documents mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph. In addition, the petition shall be
published at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation. Furthermore, the petitioner shall submit a certification from the appropriate law
enforcement agencies that he has no pending case or no criminal record.
18
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, 21 May 1992, 209 SCRA 189.
19
Supra note 11.
20
Id.
21
In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc.2d 6, 513 N.E.2d 828 (1987).
22
Lee v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392 (2001).
23
Id.
24
Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 420.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Beduya v. Republic of the Philippines, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).
28
Salonga, Jovito, Private International Law, 1995 Edition, Rex Bookstore, p. 238.
This, of course, should be taken in conjunction with Articles 407 and 412 of the Civil Code
29
which authorizes the recording of acts, events and judicial decrees or the correction or change
of errors including those that occur after birth. Nonetheless, in such cases, the entries in the
certificates of birth are not be corrected or changed. The decision of the court granting the
petition shall be annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of the civil register in the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar. (Co v. Civil Register of Manila, supra note 24)
The error pertains to one where the birth attendant writes "male" or "female" but the genitals
30
of the child are that of the opposite sex.
Moreover, petitioner’s female anatomy is all man-made. The body that he inhabits is a male
31
body in all aspects other than what the physicians have supplied.
32
Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edition (2004), p.1406.
33
Words and Phrases, volume 39, Permanent Edition, p. 106.
In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 2003-Ohio-7221 (No. 2002-T-0149, slip op.,
34
Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio App. 11 Dist., December 31, 2003), citing
Webster’s II New College Dictionary (1999).
35
Id.
36
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619.
37
Article 1, Family Code.
38
Article 2(1), Id.
39
These are Articles 130 to 138 of the Labor Code which include nightwork prohibition, facilities
for women, prohibition on discrimination and stipulation against marriage, among others.
These include Article 333 on adultery, Articles 337 to 339 on qualified seduction, simple
40
seduction and acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party and Articles 342
and 343 on forcible and consented abduction, among others.
41
Section 3(jj)(4).
G.R. No. 191425 September 7, 2011
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 30 September 2009 as
well as the Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The appellate court affirmed the 19 November 2007 Decision 4 of Branch 215 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031.
The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused Rowena Geraldino
(Geraldino) was acquitted for the prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Facts
The appellate court recited the facts as follows:
On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an Information against
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. ("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino ("Geraldino") for the crime of Bigamy. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
"That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA,
and as said marriage has not been legally dissolved and still subsisting, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent or second marriage with her [sic] co-accused
ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented and agreed to be married to her co-accused
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA."
Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted by counsel, refused to enter his plea.
Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on the other hand,
entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 14, 2005. On even date, pre-trial conference was
held and both the prosecution and defense entered the following stipulation of facts:
"1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Jesusa Pinat
Nollora solemnized on April 6, 1999 at Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte;
2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino
on December 8, 2001 in Quezon City;
3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted that he contracted

the second marriage to Rowena P. Geraldino;
4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the Certificate of Marriage

with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December 8, 2001;
5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as admitted in
her Counter-Affidavit."
The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTC’s resolution is whether or not the second
marriage is bigamous. Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated and the case was set for initial
hearing. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution

As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies of prosecution witnesses were
as follows:
"xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in
Saudi Arabia while she was working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital.
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and on April 6, 1999, they got married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic]
in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit ‘A’). While working in said hospital, she heard
rumors that her husband has another wife and because of anxiety and emotional stress, she left Saudi
Arabia and returned to the Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival in the Philippines,
the private complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a second marriage with
co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 (Exhibit ‘B’) when she secured a certification
as to the civil status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit ‘C’) from the National Statistics Office (NSO)
sometime in November 2003.
Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena P. Geraldino at the latter’s
workplace in CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of the first marriage between complainant
and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly affirmed and despite this knowledge,
she allegedly still married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him so much and because they
were neighbors and childhood friends. Private complainant also knew that Rowena P. Geraldino knew
of her marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because when she (private complainant) was brought by
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the latter’s residence in Taguig, Metro Manila and introduced her to Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr.’s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was there in the house together with a friend and she heard
everything that they were talking about.
Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to Saudi Arabia to work as a Staff
Midwife thereby losing income opportunity in the amount of ₱34,000.00 a month, more or less. When
asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared that what happened to her was a tragedy
and she had entertained [thoughts] of committing suicide. She added that because of what happened to
her, her mother died and she almost got raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her alone in their
residence in Saudi Arabia. However, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her sufferings.
Instead, she just asked for the return of her money in the amount of ₱50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005,
pages 4-14).
Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the marriage between the private
complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because she was one of the sponsors in said wedding.
Sometime in November 2003, she was asked by the private complainant to accompany the latter to the
workplace of Rowena P. Geraldino in FTI, Taguig, Metro Manila. She declared that the private
complainant and Rowena P. Geraldino had a confrontation and she heard that Rowena P. Geraldino
admitted that she (Rowena) knew of the first marriage of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and the private
complainant but she still went on to marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him very much
(TSN, October 24, 2005, pages 3-5).
Evidence for the Defense
The defense’s version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed Decision, is as follows:
"Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first with private
complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that he was
a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he contracted the first marriage with the
private complainant. As a [M]uslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed
under the Muslim or Islam belief.
To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to the private complainant, Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. presented a Certificate of Conversion dated August 2, 2004 issued by one Hadji Abdul Kajar
Madueño and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
allegedly converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992 (Exhibit ‘2,’ ‘3’ and ‘4’). Aside from said
certificate, he also presented a Pledge of Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the same Hadji
Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin (Exhibit ‘7’).
He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their marriage
because she [sic] told this fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why said
private complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred having learned of his second marriage with
Rowena P. Geraldino. She [sic] further testified that Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware of his first
marriage with the private complainant and he did not tell her this fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is a
Catholic and he does not want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage.
He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was a ‘Catholic
Pentecostal’ but that he was not aware why it was placed as such on said contract. In his Marriage
Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion ‘Catholic’ was also indicated because he was keeping
as a secret his being a Muslim since the society does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also
indicated that he was ‘single’ despite his first marriage to keep said first marriage a secret (TSN,
January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).
Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueño testified that he is the founder and president of Balik
Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines and as such president, he has the power and authority to
convert any applicant to the Muslim religion. He alleged that sometime in 1992, he met accused Atilano
O. Nollora, Jr. in Mabini (Manila) who was then going abroad. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. applied to become
a Muslim (Exhibit ‘14’) and after receiving the application, said accused was indoctrinated regarding his
obligations as a Muslim. On January 10, 1992, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. embraced the Muslim faith. He
was then directed to report every Sunday to monitor his development.
In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for a certification because of the filing of
the instant case. On October 2, 2004, he issued a Certificate of Conversion wherein it is stated that
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim convert since January 10, 1992. Apart from the above-mentioned
document, their ‘Imam’ also issued a Pledge of Conversion (Exhibit ‘7’). He declared that a Muslim
convert could marry more than one according to the Holy Koran. However, before marrying his second,
third and fourth wives, it is required that the consent of the first Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if the first
wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity to secure her consent (TSN, October 9, 2006, pages 2-12).
During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim convert gets married not in accordance with
the Muslim faith, the same is contrary to the teachings of the Muslim faith. A Muslim also can marry up
to four times but he should be able to treat them equally. He claimed that he was not aware of the first
marriage but was aware of the second. Since his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino was not in
accordance with the Muslim faith, he advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-marry Rowena P. Geraldino in
accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will not be considered as a true Muslim
(TSN, June 25, 2007, pages 3-7).
Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident of bigamous marriage.
She claimed that she does not know the private complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora and only came to
know her when this case was filed. She insists that she is the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr., having been married to the latter since December 8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
contracted a first marriage with the private complainant, she confronted the former who admitted the
said marriage. Prior to their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if he was single and the latter
responded that he was single. She also knew that her husband was a Catholic prior to their marriage
but after she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert. She
also claimed that after learning that her husband was a Muslim convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.,
also got married in accordance with the Muslim rites. She also belied the allegations of the private
complainant that she was sought by the private complainant and that they had a confrontation where
she admitted that she knew that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was married to the private complainant and
despite this knowledge, she went on to marry him because she loved him very much. She insisted that
she only came to know the private complainant when she (private complainant) filed this case (TSN,
August 14, 2007, pages 2-8)."5
The Trial Court’s Ruling
In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino.
The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article 41 7 of the
Family Code, or Executive Order No. 209, and Article 180 8 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The trial court also cited Article 27 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides the qualifications for allowing Muslim men to have
more than one wife: "[N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with them in
equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases."
In convicting Nollora, the trial court’s Decision further stated thus:
The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed only to meet urgent
needs. Only with the permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second wife subject
to certain requirements. This is because having plurality of wives is merely tolerated, not encouraged,
under certain circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal Status in the Philippines by Amer M. Bara-acal
and Abdulmajid J. Astir, 1998 First Edition, Pages 64-65). Arbitration is necessary. Any Muslim husband
desiring to contract subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall notify the Shari’a Circuit Court of the
place where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to the wife or wives. Should
any of them objects [sic]; an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If said council fails to
secure the wife’s consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall, subject to Article 27, decide
whether on [sic] not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines).
Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not
comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he was a
Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith,
said accused entertained the mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody again after marrying the
private complainant. What is clear, therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just
marry anybody the second, third or fourth time. There are requirements that the Shari’a law imposes,
that is, he should have notified the Shari’a Court where his family resides so that copy of said notice
should be furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the first wife is not required since she
is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon accused Atilano
Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Shari’a law. It is the Shari’a Court that has this authority.
In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their marriage in
accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has already
been violated.
The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only. There is
no sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down. The evidence presented by
the prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew of the first marriage between private
complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,] being open to several interpretations. Private
complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the latter’s house in Taguig,
Metro Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was there standing near the door and heard their conversation.
From this incident, private complainant concluded that said Rowena P. Geraldino was aware that she
and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married. This conclusion is obviously misplaced since it could not be
reasonably presumed that Rowena P. Geraldino understands what was going on between her and
Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic that "(E)very circumstance favoring accused’s innocence must be
taken into account, proof against him must survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must
not be permitted to sway judgment" (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court, therefore, has to
acquit Rowena P. Geraldino for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. This court
hereby renders judgment imposing upon him a prison term of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate
sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, plus
accessory penalties provided by law.
b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy for failure of

the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.9
Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his temporary liberty under the same
bail bond pending appeal. The trial court granted Nollora’s motion.
Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one error of the trial court:
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged despite the
prosecution’s failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 10
The Appellate Court’s Ruling
On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nollora’s appeal and affirmed the trial court’s
decision.11
The appellate court rejected Nollora’s defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in lawful
exercise of his Islamic religion and was allowed by the Qur’an. The appellate court denied Nollora’s
invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the prejudice of the non-Muslim women who married
him pursuant to Philippine civil laws. Nollora’s two marriages were not conducted in accordance with
1avvphi1
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of the Philippines should apply. Nollora’s
claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State and render it impotent in protecting the general
welfare.
In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court denied Nollora’s motion for
reconsideration. The allegations in the motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash of Nollora’s
earlier arguments, and there was no reason for the appellate court to modify its 30 September 2009
Decision.
Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6 April 2010.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
The Court’s Ruling
Nollora’s petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate court and of the trial court.
Elements of Bigamy
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract
a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.13
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married
to Pinat;14 (2) Nollora and Pinat’s marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second
marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second marriage to Geraldino; 15 and (4) Nollora and
Geraldino’s marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora
due to his prior marriage.16
The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinat’s marriage states that Nollora and Pinat were married at
Sapang Palay IEMELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on 6 April 1999. Rev.
Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF Church officiated the ceremony. The marriage
certificate18 of Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage states that Nollora and Geraldino were married at Max’s
Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila on 8 December 2001. Rev. Honorato D.
Santos officiated the ceremony.
A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar General reads:
We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been born on February 22, 1968 from
ATILANO M. NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in our National Indices of Marriage for
Groom for the years 1973 to 2002 with the following information:
Date of Marriage Place of Marriage

a) April 06, 1999 b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN
a) December 08, 2001 b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA (2nd District)19
Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense. He alleged
that his religion allows him to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed of
Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages,20 Nollora cannot deny that both marriage
ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential
Decree No. 1083. The applicable Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws read:
Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature, consequences and
incidents are governed by this Code and the Shari’a and not subject to stipulation, except that the
marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property relations of the spouses.
Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following essential
requisites are complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after
the proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age and any
Muslim female of the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from any impediment under the
provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is presumed to have attained puberty upon
reaching the age of fifteen.
x x x.
Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but the ijab and
the qabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage
and the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed
or marked by the contracting parties and said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the
marriage. One copy shall be given to the contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by
the solemnizing officer who shall keep the third.
Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under Muslim law to
solemnize marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Shari’a District Court or Shari’a Circuit Court or any person designated
by the judge, should the proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the
solemnization.
Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of
the Shari’a judge, office of the Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other
suitable place agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the contracting parties
(mahr-musamma) before, during or after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the value thereof
has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall, upon petition of the wife, be determined by the
court according to the social standing of the parties.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a marriage between
a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code,
the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the
Philippines] shall apply." Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the claim that
Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed
religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy. 21
Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is "single." Moreover, both
of Nollora’s marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the
declaration of one’s religion in the marriage certificate is not an essential requirement for marriage, such
omissions are sufficient proofs of Nollora’s liability for bigamy. Nollora’s false declaration about his civil
status is thus further compounded by these omissions.
[ATTY. CALDINO:]
Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you indicated here as your religion,
Catholic Pentecostal, and you were saying that since January 10, 1992, you are already a [M]uslim
convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that you are already a [M]uslim convert since January 10, 1992.
However, in your marriage contract with Jesusa Pinat, there is no indication here that you have
indicated your religion. Will you please go over your marriage contract?
[NOLLORA:]
A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didn’t know why they did not place any
Catholic there.
xxx
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with respect to your marriage contract
with your co-accused in this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us, Mr. Witness,
considering that you said that you are already a [M]uslim convert on January 10, 1992, why in
the marriage contract with Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there your religion as Catholic, Mr.
Witness?
A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping, I was keeping it as a secret my
being my Balik-Islam, that’s why I placed there Catholic since I know that the society doesn’t
approve a Catholic to marry another, that’s why I placed there Catholic as my religion, sir.
Q: How about under the column, "civil status," why did you indicate there that you’re single, Mr.
Witness?
A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier married. 22 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that your faith be indicated as Catholic when
in fact you were already as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage contract?
xxx
[A:] I don’t think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so we can get married under the Catholic
rights [sic] because after that we even got married under the [M]uslim rights [sic], your Honor.
xxx
Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you required under your faith to secure the
permission of your first wife to get married?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa Nollora?
A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was very mad at me, at the start, she
was always very mad, ma’am.23
In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity of his marriage to Geraldino. Nollora
1avvphi1
may not impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself from criminal liability; otherwise,
we would be opening the doors to allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies.
As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:24
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio,
may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and
allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to
thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538
promulgated on 30 September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February 2010 are AFFIRMED.
Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04-
129031 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment with a term of two years, four months and one
day of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum of his
indeterminate sentence, as well as the accessory penalties provided by law.
Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision dated October 21, 1999 of the Court
1
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment dated August 5, 1996 of the
2
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein
petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a
prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution of the appellate court, dated
3
September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The
former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in
Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia
de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio
behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce
against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on
February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgen sa
4
Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic)
among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no
marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information filed by the City
5
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. 6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial
nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was
granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned
in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty
to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6)
Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED. 7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia
was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals, the trial court ruled that want of a
8
valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not
be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur, which held that9
the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses
may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the
matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition
anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court
stressed that following People v. Bitdu, everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one
10
does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the
consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate
court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio
and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this
decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED. 11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent
declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The
reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of
12
contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the
fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian
court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code and
13
given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17 of the Civil Code, a
14
declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign

jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the doctrine
in Mendiola v. People, allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign
15
divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. However, the denial
16
was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700,
Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The
dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first
marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since
herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable
doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE
THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS
AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL
INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN
PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE
THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. 17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so,
whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of
the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly,
which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of
criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like
other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of
criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the
intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that
his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case
is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis, which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur,
18
stressing that under Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a
19
party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as
everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in
good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing
Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first
determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, we 20
laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No.
20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of

the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in
Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the
cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED. 21
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia
by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the
two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab
initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR
22 23
No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such
declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and
purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of
the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married." The
24
records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020,
hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in
this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the
two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at
the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce
be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case,
25
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage
was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can
be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such
judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as "void."26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but
twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later
before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired,
although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs
no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of
an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that
justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed
bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good
faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated
September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground
that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent
marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43
(trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10
September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children,
namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a
customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December 1981,
Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as
husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her
father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported
marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract
would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of
their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin, married
to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in
the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single
individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and
Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against
Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on
the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid
marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in
accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties
during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children.
A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from
the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied.
Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence
before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave
Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September
2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite
repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial
court to consider the case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight
to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during
trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of
February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and
Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the
National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with
Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court
ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because
of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this
case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because
they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because she
was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley who were
both of legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in
her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not
legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by
Benjamin’s parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance
inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to
Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under
TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own
money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their
purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos.
61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783.
However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units were
purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos.
61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of
Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena
in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to
Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties
covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share
reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at
Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared
NONEXISTENT.
Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos.
17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950,
188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628,
194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638, 194639,
198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered
owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo
B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for
Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven
(37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties
acquired from petitioner’s money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties of
the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five
(5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of income from these
five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722,
respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and surrender
control and possession of these properties including the documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-ownership
of the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in
favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his
conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2)
properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties’ children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General
and the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order
dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision before
the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that
there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of
evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would be
deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence.
She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed despite the
presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration
of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action was based on his prior
marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before
Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court
committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article
148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being
claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him
exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782
and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in
their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the
names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared equally. However, the
share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena
while Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that would
show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision
and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties under
TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the
respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common and to
be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under
his first marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision
stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution,
the Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s ruling
that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s
decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-
existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the
trial court’s decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that she waived her right
to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and
Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable
institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is
addressed to the discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s presentation of evidence was
scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4
and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at
Sally’s instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in
case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the date of
the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting
Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could
not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial court’s prior warning due to
the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to
present her evidence because all the postponements were at her instance and she was warned by the
trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence on 28
November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to
have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued failure
to present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to
proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case because she was waiting
for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial court’s denial of her
demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary restraining
order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an
inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the
deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties. 10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin
because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further
alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to
Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real
properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was the
informant in their children’s birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin
introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real
property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not
the informant in the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial
court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally
entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was
valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of
the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to
Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were
issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued
for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage
License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification
enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a
marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license. 12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally
was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was
certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records Management
and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director
III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office.15 The documentary and testimonial
evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial
court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest" 16 and "a simulated marriage, at
the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives,
friends and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives." 17 In short, it was a
fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof
of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in
Bernice’s birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982 18 while
Sally was the informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally were
married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did
not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio
and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized
without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from
the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a
license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License
No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City
for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 20 which made their
marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the
general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are
absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning." 21 Thus, the Court of
Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects
the trial court’s decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands." 22 While the Court of Appeals did
notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring
that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s discussion that
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous. The trial court stated:
1âwphi1
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be
null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there
being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their
marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first
marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. In
People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting marriage
against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code.
Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage
license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in
any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the
same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid
marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for
validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. 24 In this case, there was really no subsequent
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The
supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In
short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented
themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s
father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even
admitted that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their
respective spouses which included Sally x x x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in
accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the
names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in
the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally 28 with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin"
while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a
single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. 29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without
proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148
of the Family Code.30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing
the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She
further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his
partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to
establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred
from the decision or order itself.32 In this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did
not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sally’s continued refusal to present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary
words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he
acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September
29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25,
2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee
Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo
of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of
Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage
with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in
jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a
motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007,
the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a determination for failure of
both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing
despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty
Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any
right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to
the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to
acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the
United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the
$2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such
was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion
for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely
give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as
a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the
nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It
further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended
to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal
gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE

CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST,
HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT. 8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer
to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and
willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it.
According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to
the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The
parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the
purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment 9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage
was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply 10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole
purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of
lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the
purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of
marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages
where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been
referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into
solely for the legitimization of a child. 12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time
of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration
status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 15 established the principal
test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a
sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.
"This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986
(IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into
for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from
determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration
laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and,
therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited
purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose
marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country,
the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The
Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent
permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every
contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary,
they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no
exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage
without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake
of representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an end to it
as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They
must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as
merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, 19 which declared as valid
a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid
marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or
sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first
necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited
purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such
marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC
went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their
consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means
for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature
and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be
similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition
of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract
and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under
Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code
provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of
a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as
fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. 24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that
the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. 26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was
also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage.
Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a
clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a
joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding
that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose
to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to
create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void
ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.
There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any
way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an
1âwphi1
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to
acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their
objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship.
There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie,
albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance
with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for
purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not
void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid. 28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on
the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the
realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. 29 The right to marital
privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live
together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. 30 Thus,
marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, 31 are equally valid. Love,
though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It
cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or
fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family
Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1)
non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a
pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug
addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a
ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading
immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3),
the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no
injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer
to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a
marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its
benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the
courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a
marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient
situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and
caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be
entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
[G.R. NO. 167746 : August 28, 2007]
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner, v. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying
petitioner's appeal and affirming the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch
143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of
marriage.
The antecedent facts are:
A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara
alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license,
went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for
them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro,
a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. 4 They got married on the same day, 8 December
1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit
Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties
securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on
the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to
Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985,
respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate
lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and
ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract 5 and its entry on file.6
Answering petitioner's petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their
marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from
the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioner's representation, respondent
gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter
named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992. 7 Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three
children.8 Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for
concubinage.9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60. 10 Respondent prays that the petition for
annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per month
as support for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; and
cralawlibrary
3. To pay the costs.11
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioner's appeal. His
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April
2005.12
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued
and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties'
marriage contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under
Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.13
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for
Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage
license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the Marriage
License No. 7054133 despite the fact that the same was not identified and offered as evidence during
the trial, and was not the Marriage license number appearing on the face of the marriage contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling laid
down by this Honorable Court in the case of Sy v. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000
[330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the observance
of procedural rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants. 14
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there
was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a
"fixer" who arranged everything for them.15 The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and
not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs. 16 He and
respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license
from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the place.
The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because
the certification states that "Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto
Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario" 17 but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their
marriage license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect
at the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)18 in relation to Article 58 of the same
Code.19
Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties
states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and cralawlibrary
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 21
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The
cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the
marriage void are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due
search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued
to the parties. The Court held that the certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry
as to the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he
being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license
that would render the marriage void ab initio.
In CariÃ±o v. CariÃ±o,23 the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court held
that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the
marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and
not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the
petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year
after the ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is
that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage
void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the
petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also
issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. 25 The certification moreover is precise in that it
specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara
and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No.
7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal
purpose or intents it may serve.26
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the
issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. 27 The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure
to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive.
Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an
officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. 28 Significantly,
apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in
Carmona, Cavite.29
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither
he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient
basis to annul petitioner and respondent's marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or
municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license
despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are
considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. 30 An irregularity in any of
the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 31
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No.
7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number
7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a
mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the
numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore
does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to
the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, 32 petitioner cannot pretend
that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place
without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because he
"initiated it."33 Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He
knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went
through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself
from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or
suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the
institution of marriage betrays his bad faith. 34
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year
utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding
ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary a
whimper on the part of the petitioner.Ï‚Î·Î±Ã±rÎ¿blÎµÅ¡ Î½Î¹râ€ Ï…Î±l lÎ±Ï‰ lÎ¹brÎ±rÃ¿
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de
Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the
Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioner's testimony as follows'
WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose de
Manuguit church.
WITNESS
I don't remember your honor.
COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License? cralaw library
WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I don't know if
it is good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.
COURT
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already a
Marriage Contract? cralaw library
WITNESS
Yes your honor.
COURT
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage
Contract issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033.
WITNESS
Yes your honor.35
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at
that time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing
whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding. 36
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner - - that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged everything
for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the
Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel - - will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or
clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any
showing to the contrary.37 Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or
not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing
officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be
presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether
the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law. 38
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the
marriage.39 Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The
Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002

(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a
sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge
solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license
and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed
away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast properties" left by
Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired
Commodore of the Philippine Navy. 1âwphi1.nêt
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan
Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having
been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the
marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February
2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of
travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then
requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the
requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another
date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of
provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He
also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just
suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and
admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia
assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day.
When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the
same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court
of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid
despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by
the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office
of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her
marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and
reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative
case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own
shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for
Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall
be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record
of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a
true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate
with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage
license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9
May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot
issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous
spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000,
found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and
for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on
respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court
judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as
defined by the Supreme Court. 1âwphi1.nêt
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy, respondent judge held office and
1
had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However,
he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not
fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate
court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject
the officiating official to administrative liability." (Emphasis supplied.)
2
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of solemnizing a
marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held that:
"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law
they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make
mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of
elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons." 3
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur
therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he
cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license.
In People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void,
4
and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the
marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the
marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
1âwphi1.nêt
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has
consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the
legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration
of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined. Disciplinary actions of this
5
nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of
every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by
the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Court's constitutional power to discipline
judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and
impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.
6
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse
likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002
denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano
Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by
reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the
capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut
Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE 4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant
case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for
legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation.
The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. 6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when
his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise
capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. 7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration
of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief
has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. 8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino
citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in
the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its
duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of
his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue
raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues
and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the
case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first
place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was
added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at
hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties
are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American
citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried
an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings 9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce
them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of
foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those
whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here
and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread
consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites
for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
"divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file
either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious
process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties
appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient
remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still
remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent
concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. 15 Furthermore, respondent
must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in
Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter
into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O.
No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is
now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed

Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON
CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City,
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law.
The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed
the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)"
based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact
with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the
RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."
Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General
in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition
and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the
case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the
petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides
that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate
dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this
case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 10 In other words, the petition in the RTC
sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and
(2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese
judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines 11 on bigamy and was
therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only
the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to
realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband
in the prior, pre-existing marriage." 14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a
bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning"
are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate
the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on
its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing
the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a
court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held
that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the
venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not
have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he
substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution,
the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of
personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC
considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of
divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x
x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that
"[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be
taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x." 24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original
Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza emphasized that the
"validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition. 28 Moreover, the
verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required
under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the
petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay
and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review. 30 The
public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the
Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion. 31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the
petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court
explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during
the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already
vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be
expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the
"injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The
latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the
disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution. 34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status
or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present
case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially
Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by
Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x." 38 The
Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should
therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that
"[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked." 41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She would
like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her
and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-
Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife
can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a
fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b)
of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the
office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the
seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean
that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the
petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-
trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew.
It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on
claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits.
In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable
on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial
the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides
that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under
a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine
courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They
cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is
under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign
judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a
person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or
final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign
judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its
merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party
expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary
trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a
foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a
Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad. 65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine
public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove
the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25,
in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made
in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to
rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act
No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, 66 which the State
has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court
declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition
for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns
his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under
Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis
of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity
of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances 68) his most intimate human relation, but
also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a spouse’s right in a
marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between
Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify"
the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any case, Section 2(a)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the
husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question
the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a)
states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article
35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the
prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the
civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the
husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest
of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of
protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party
and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. 79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous
marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned
only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for
recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for
an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and
other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the
dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children, 84 the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to
determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act
of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In other
words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on
the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine
courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply
in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative
intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely
because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results
from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws
allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the
Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it
was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision
in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice are to be served." 91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino
spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country.
If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—
the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to
correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free
to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have
jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign
divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for
the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the
Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo
full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is
not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment
on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or
on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment.
Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a
foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the
rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent
with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the
foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of
the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact 92 that needs to
be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines. 1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to
prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93 The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles
89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he
term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2
March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition
for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

April 24, 2018
G.R. No. 221029
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and
set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
1 2
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional

Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED. 3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of
Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of divorce
Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of
initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in newspaper of general
circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting
of the trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern
Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes
of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the
Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a
Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that
based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement
of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended
Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment
alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO
MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die proceedings, a
divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband
are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said
Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously
registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese
national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall not be bothered and
disturbed by aid entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the
marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her
marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO. 4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment.
Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form
and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March
6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the

Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce. 5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New
Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they are in
the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of
another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and
duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and
civil relations, inclusing marriages."
6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese
husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former,
capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al. ruling
7
that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the
legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to
the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it
was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v.
Judge Romilo, Jr. where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by
8
the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two types:
(1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. In this jurisdiction, the following
9
rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 10
2. Consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two
11 12
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad. 13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. 14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Shortly
16
thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987. Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the
17
Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26. This provision was originally deleted by
18
the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet
meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209. As modified, Article 26 now states:
19
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine
law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely
20
because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
21
because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction
22
recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still
be determined by our courts. 23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to
avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the
latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is
recognized by his or national law. The aim was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino
24
women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even after
the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps
have already married again. 25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign
citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held
in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III: 26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties
were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized American
citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter
dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine
law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as
foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage, but
their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a
favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo
pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and
for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would not appear
anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no
longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered
and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin and Van Dorn already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated
28 29
and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and
property relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their minor
daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement,
alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following
the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the
divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has
jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked
jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his
Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this
jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad.
There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal
property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not
valid in this jurisdiction x x x.
30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-
husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was
alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred
that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the
Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot,
especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the
effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in
this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them
both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides in
the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served. 31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be
recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et
al. and Medina v. Koike.
32 33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain
a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her second
husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a
husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns
his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under
Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis
of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity
of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also
to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These
property interests in marriage included the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity
of the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a
marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between
Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x 34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which
was granted. Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign
1âwphi1
divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied
the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse
recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz
v. Sto. Tomas, et al. and Garcia v. Recio, the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse
35 36
must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including
the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in
a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the
right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity.
When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the
former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to
Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under
Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the
Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the
law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound
to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires
that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does
not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouth of
lawmakers. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words to have used words
37
advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should be departure." 38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the
divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter
of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Law have ends to achieve, and statutes
39
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. As held in League of
40
Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.: 41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is
couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and
bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the
rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective
measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her countr. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the
42
foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his
or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the
subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize
the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses
are severed by operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the
City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the
nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain
classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce
the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional. 43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its decision
is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may be subjected to
judicial review. The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices
44
persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must
45
discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more
exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes
46
with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that
it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. 47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are
those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. It includes the right to free
48
speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote. On the
49
other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights and powers
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for
50
which some individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public interest, public safety or
the general welfare. It essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy,
51
overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter. 52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with respect to
the acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court.
In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites of the equal
53
protection clause. Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated
54
by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a
foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political,
economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too
unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More
importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and
void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in
accordance with the national law of the foreigner. 55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the
same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not
for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference
of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives
undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment

because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her
alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of
the Family Code. In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused
56
of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with
whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not
lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before the RTC in accordance with the
mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the
bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanism"
are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the
dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is
no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous,
costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos to
marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign
nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support what he
intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the
rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other
evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong, that a person takes ordinary care of his
57
concerns, that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the
59
law and fact, that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
60
lawful contract of marriage, and that the law has been obeyed. It is whimsical to easily attribute any
61 62
illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a
foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of
genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of
the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are more
often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive
behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictated on
the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the
realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right marital privacy
allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live together or
live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages
entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money,
status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though
the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage. 63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State. Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general
64
prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by
Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was
categorical about this point. Their exchange reveal as follows:
65
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer
specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a general
law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce
law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily to
encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the
mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce
law?
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you. 66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine
courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage
on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature. On March 25, 1943,
67
pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese
Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive
Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and
provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for
at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against
the other to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable
insanity. When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it
68
ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed. From August 30, 1950, upon the
69
effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by Filipino
citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized. 70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-
institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17 th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos.
116 1062 2380 and 6027 were filed in the House of representatives. In substitution of these bills,
71 72 73 74
H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the
Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on Population
And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with
134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute
divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as
follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of a

petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if
pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the

Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse
during the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to
them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim of
rape;
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of a
petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or both
spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal
separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years
of age or over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent
of the parents guradian or personl having substitute parental authority over the party, in that
order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited with the
other and both lived together as husband and wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband and wife;
d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the
same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such
incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or
appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or
supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition for
absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether or
not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to
another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual
as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of the
marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any
attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions
that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it
also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups.
To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a
state religion.
76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of
the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they
are good for country. While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences
77
which are governed by the Family Code. It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that
78
the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with
other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is
equally mandated to actively promote its total development. It is also obligated to defend, among
79
others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial to their development. To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce
80
these obligation s if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce
initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children are almost always the
helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation
passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354
("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-
Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic
autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the
dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men. 81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino
citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still
require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent
relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the
Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being
branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the
parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The
irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is
meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without
denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to
indigenous customs. 82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of
communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system
that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too
uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect
humans more often than not create imperfect unions. Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality
83
for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is not found
and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing
marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it. In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be
84
discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San
Luis quoted:
85
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never
be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is
find a balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt
to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where
these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render
every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law
in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus
when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according
to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore,
87
be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent. 88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's
petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the
entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of
the divorce decree will not suffice. The fact of divorce must still first be proven. Before a a foreign
89 90
divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.
The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b)authenticated by the seal of his office. 92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court
allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate General in
Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner
and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b)
of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus,
We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce. 93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible a
a written act of the foreign court. As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by
94
the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings
challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do
so.95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in
the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. 96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it,
as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons
and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason
of their judicial function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and
October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN
PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence
as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 226013, July 02, 2018
LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO, Petitioner, v. RYOJI* MORISONO AND LOCAL

CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
105 (RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated July
18, 2016 of the RTC in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 which denied petitioner Luzviminda
Dela Cruz Morisono's (Luzviminda) petition before it.
The Facts
Luzviminda was married to private respondent Ryoji Morisono (Ryoji) in Quezon City on
December 8, 2009.3 Thereafter, they lived together in Japan for one (1) year and three (3)
months but were not blessed with a child. During their married life, they would constantly
quarrel mainly due to Ryoji's philandering ways, in addition to the fact that he was much
older than Luzviminda.4 As such, she and Ryoji submitted a "Divorce by Agreement"
before the City Hall of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan, which was eventually approved on
January 17, 2012 and duly recorded with the Head of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan on
July 1, 2012.5 In view of the foregoing, she filed a petition for recognition of the foreign
divorce decree obtained by her and Ryoji6 before the RTC so that she could cancel the
surname of her former husband in her passport and for her to be able to marry again.7
After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the RTC set the case for hearing.
Since nobody appeared to oppose her petition except the government, Luzviminda was
allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. After the presentation and absent any objection
from the Public Prosecutor, Luzviminda's formal offer of evidence was admitted as proof of
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, and as part of the testimony of the
witnesses.8
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision9 dated July 18, 2016, the RTC denied Luzviminda's petition. It held that
while a divorce obtained abroad by an alien spouse may be recognized in the Philippines –
provided that such decree is valid according to the national law of the alien – the same
does not find application when it was the Filipino spouse, i.e., petitioner, who procured the
same. Invoking the nationality principle provided under Article 15 of the Civil Code, in
relation to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, the RTC opined that since petitioner is a
Filipino citizen whose national laws do not allow divorce, the foreign divorce decree she
herself obtained in Japan is not binding in the Philippines;10 hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly denied
Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree she procured with Ryoji.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as

follows: first, Philippine laws do not provide for absolute divorce, and hence, the courts
cannot grant the same; second, consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the Civil Code,
the marital bond between two (2) Filipino citizens cannot be dissolved even by an absolute
divorce obtained abroad; third, an absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are
both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws; and fourth, in mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry.13
The fourth rule, which has been invoked by Luzviminda in this case, is encapsulated in
Article 26 (2) of the Family Code which reads:
Article 26. x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise. have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This provision confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts
cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under
the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of
foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the
children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts. The
rationale for this rule is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to
his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he
or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national
law.14 In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,15 the Court held:
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce,
whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in
another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do
not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of
the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her
alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is
not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the
Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in
this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than
that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.16 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
According to Republic v. Orbecido III,17 the following elements must concur in order for
Article 26 (2) to apply, namely: (a) that there is a valid marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) that a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.18 In the same case, the Court also initially
clarified that Article 26 (2) applies not only to cases where a foreigner was the one who
procured a divorce of his/her marriage to a Filipino spouse, but also to instances where, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding,
and obtained a favorable decree.19
However, in the recent case of Republic v. Manalo (Manalo),20 the Court En Banc extended

the application of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code to further cover mixed marriages
where it was the Filipino citizen who divorced his/her foreign spouse. Pertinent portions of
the ruling read:
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino
citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry. x x x.
We rule in the affirmative.
xxxx
When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of
child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise
acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute
divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live
together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the
civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are
freed from the marital bond.
xxxx
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The
letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who
initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the
foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can
We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by
the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or
from the words of a statute there should be no departure."
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to

mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the
Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true
intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not
to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. x x x.
xxxx
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation

where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce
decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the
Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the
laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the
Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated
proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In
both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are
severed by operation of the latter's national law.
xxxx
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a

Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and
substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are
political, economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems
and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien
spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by
a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien
against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law
of the foreigner.
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino

who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce
decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine
and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and
obligations in an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were
it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner
spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction
between them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they
initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment
gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
xxxx
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total
isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provisions. Aside from
strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively
promote its total development. It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of
children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development. To our mind, the State cannot effectively
enforce these obligations if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to
those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. x x x.
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We

disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing
"mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would
enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law.
Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being
branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not
only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the
subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section
2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and. against
unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to
live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the
advancement of communication and information technology, as well as the improvement
of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world,
mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all
marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create
imperfect unions. Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the
attainment of the individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not found and
achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of
existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are of
rotten quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being mutual and shared commitment between
two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one
is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to
it. x x x.21 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a
Filipino and an alien citizen may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of
who between the spouses initiated the divorce; provided, of course, that the party
petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the Filipino
citizen – must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it.22
In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's
petition to have her foreign divorce decree recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored on
the sole ground that she admittedly initiated the divorce proceedings which she, as a
Filipino citizen, was not allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such
ground relied upon by the RTC had been rendered nugatory. However, the Court cannot
just order the grant of Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree,
as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of her. "Divorce by Agreement" obtained, in
Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce. Notably,
the RTC did not rule on such issues. Since these are questions which require an
examination of various factual matters, a remand to the court a quo is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2016 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105 in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant case is REMANDED to the
court a quo for further proceedings, as directed in this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Caguioa, J., maintains dissent in RP vs. Manalo. See separate concurring opinion.
[ G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018 ]
STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Amended Decision[1] dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 104253 that set aside its former Decision dated November 25, 2015, which in turn,
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, granting
petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11, 2000 in Japan
pursuant to the wedding rites therein. After two (2) years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a divorce
decree in said country dissolving their marriage.[2] Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner filed a Petition
for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40,
Camarines Norte. In its Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the petition and recognized
the divorce between the parties as valid and effective under Philippine Laws. [3] On November 25, 2015,
the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
In an Amended Decision[4] dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its findings and recalled and
set aside its previous decision. According to the appellate court, the second of the following requisites
under Article 26 of the Family Code is missing: (a) there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.[5] This is because the divorce herein was consensual in nature,
obtained by agreement of the parties, and not by Sakai alone. Thus, since petitioner, a Filipino citizen,
also obtained the divorce herein, said divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines. In addition, the
CA ruled that petitioner's failure to present authenticated copies of the Civil Code of Japan was fatal to
her cause.[6]
On May 2, 2016, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following arguments:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER LAW
WHEN IT HELD THAT THE SECOND REQUISITE FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE SECOND
PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE IS NOT PRESENT BECAUSE THE
PETITIONER GAVE CONSENT TO THE DIVORCE OBTAINED BY HER JAPANESE HUSBAND.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER LAW
WHEN IT HELD THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENT ON THE
SUBMISSION OF AUTHENTICATED COPIES OF [THE] CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN RELATIVE TO
DIVORCE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES.[7]
Petitioner posits that the divorce she obtained with her husband, designated as Divorce by Agreement
in Japan, as opposed to Judicial Divorce, is the more practical and common type of divorce in Japan.
She insists that it is to her great disadvantage if said divorce is not recognized and instead, Judicial
Divorce is required in order for her to avail of the benefit under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, since their divorce had already been granted abroad. [8] Moreover, petitioner asserts that
the mere fact that she consented to the divorce does not prevent the application of Article 26 for said
provision does not state that where the consent of the Filipino spouse was obtained in the divorce, the
same no longer finds application. In support of her contentions, petitioner cites the ruling in Republic of
the Philippines v. Orbecido III wherein the Court held that a Filipino spouse is allowed to remarry in the
event that he or she is divorced by a Filipino spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship. [9] As to the
issue of evidence presented, petitioner explains that the reason why she was unable to present
authenticated copies of the provisions of the Civil Code of Japan relative to divorce is because she was
unable to go to Japan due to the fact that she was pregnant. Also, none of her friends could obtain a
copy of the same for her. Instead, she went to the library of the Japanese Embassy to photocopy the
Civil Code. There, she was issued a document which states that diplomatic missions of Japan overseas
do not issue certified true copies of Japanese Law nor process translation certificates of Japanese Law
due to the potential problem in the legal interpretation thereof. Thus, petitioner maintains that this
constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules on Evidence. [10]
We grant the petition.
The issue before Us has already been resolved in the landmark ruling of Republic v. Manalo,[11] the
facts of which fall squarely on point with the facts herein. In Manalo, respondent Marelyn Manalo, a
Filipino, was married to a Japanese national named Yoshino Minoro. She, however, filed a case for
divorce before a Japanese Court, which granted the same and consequently issued a divorce decree
dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, she sought to have said decree recognized in the Philippines and
to have the entry of her marriage to Minoro in the Civil Registry in San Juan, Metro Manila, cancelled,
so that said entry shall not become a hindrance if and when she decides to remarry. The trial court,
however, denied Manalo's petition and ruled that Philippine law does not afford Filipinos the right to file
for a divorce, whether they are in the country or abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners,
or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country.
On appeal, however, the Court therein rejected the trial court's view and affirmed, instead, the ruling of
the CA. There, the Court held that the fact that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted should not affect the application nor remove him from the
coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code which states that "where a marriage between
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law." We observed that to interpret the word "obtained" to mean that the
divorce proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien spouse would depart from the true intent of
the legislature and would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is, specifically, to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country
where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The subject provision, therefore,
should not make a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same
place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
[12]
Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly rules that despite the
fact that petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is assumed that she
initiated the same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the exception provided under Paragraph 2
of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue
of the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant petitioner's Petition for Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment for she has yet to comply with certain guidelines before our courts
may recognize the subject divorce decree and the effects thereof. Time and again, the Court has held
that the starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.[13] This means that the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. [14] Since both
the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24 [15] of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court applies.[16] Thus, what is required is proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested
by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.[17]
In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute the existence of the divorce
decree, rendering the same admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the pertinent
Japanese Law on divorce considering that Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not
among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. [18]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended
Decision dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings
and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Carpio, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), J., I concur in result. See Separate Opinion.
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID
NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his
death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8
months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December
11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After
their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to
Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under
the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of
action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the
petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following
issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially
so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and
void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after
it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their
father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code
which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
2
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the
allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which
produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. However, upon motion of
3
petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
(FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
time of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
5
Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to
6 7
Article 58. The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its
8
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the
9
sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is
10
the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. This is why the Family Code
11
considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" and case law considers it "not just an
12
adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a
14
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous
and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required
in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
such persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and
15
suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their
names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without
any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age
of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and
that we now desire to marry each other." The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what
16
nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the
five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a
cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year
continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period
regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may
have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five
years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a
cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to
validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party
was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements
of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement
and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public
that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge
of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. The Civil
17
Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar
shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought
to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple
marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during
the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or
18
where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in
that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered
felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. The law sanctions monogamy.
19
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed.
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their
five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a
perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.
Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's
marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code cannot be applied even by analogy to
20
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by
the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either
party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit,
not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to
have taken place and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
21
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity
22
is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no
legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-
ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect on the children born to such void
23
marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the
Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond
between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there
was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void
hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity
of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original
24
rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as
well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the
nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring
25
of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for
no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be
material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after
the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such
marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable
marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the
parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But 26
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity
27
can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action
28
or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either
29
party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
1âwphi1
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in
the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED. 1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC,

Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior
existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque
R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-
Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to
him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. 1 Four
children were born out of that marriage. 2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted
another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. 3 When respondent Judge
solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the
marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage
between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew
was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the
benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. 4 According to him, had he known that the
late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he
(Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack
of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that
respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of
P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit
the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the
affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two
separate affidavits 5 of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a
member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively;
and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left
their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent
Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question
in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must
concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of
marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years
[and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications
of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.6 cräläwvirtualibräry
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their
separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself,
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage.
Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. 7 In fact, in his Comment,
he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him
from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and
Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits
which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time
already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree
of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are
not severed. Elsewise stated,legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize
the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the
case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not
severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time
between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for
exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to
solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special application to
judges, 8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the
law and basic legal principles. 9 And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure
to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 10 cräläwvirtualibräry
ACCORDINGLY , the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED,with

theMODIFICATIONthat the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez
is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,

vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166, 2 declaring
that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding
instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus
they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September
1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex
thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had
already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless,
after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live
together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the
child’s birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist
and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City (trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner
and that the latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife and
Reinna Tricia as his child."4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the
marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to
sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution
due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he
got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never
seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000, 5 the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when,
on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter
is not, and could not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be
subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child
was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals
frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as
his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that
petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward
him of his being irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998
executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial
court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There
was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no
collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a
marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter
that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings. The
proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the
child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and
respondent.7 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the
legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March
1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a competent court
in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant. 8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals. 9 Hence
this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent
because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without
a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained
a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived together as husband and
wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a
marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the appearance of a
prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an action for
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial
court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an
affirmative defense in the instant action for support. Citing several authorities, 11 petitioner claims that a
void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another
independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties. The refiling of
another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be presented would
entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would increase
the burden of the courts.12 Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with
respondent and his vigorous denial of the child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition. 13
In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the
finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court,
she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be
repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation
of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was
uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she adds that
despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to
DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation. 15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial
court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing
the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action
for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage.
Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and that their affidavit
(of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for
at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is not valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court
that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support. 18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine
the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second,
whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked.19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises,
a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to
pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits.
Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity. 22
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did
not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit
stating that they had been living together for more than five years. 24 However, respondent herself in
effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination, thus—
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife for
the last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage.
The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame
and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. 26 In the instant case, there was no
"scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which
petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever;
it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to
obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to
support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 28
The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit
waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus
stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3,
1995 at Better Living, Parañaque, Metro Manila;30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the
testimony of the latter, but also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his testimony
wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used
to visit petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a
result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage,
though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the
marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3,"
"C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and
"G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen
putting the wedding ring on petitioner’s finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2")
respondent is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner. 31
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig
City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago
from the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
33566.1 The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Criminal Case No. 72322 convicting her of bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997,3 Leonila G.

Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded “not
guilty,” while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit.5 redarclaw
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang
since 2 June 1974,6 asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old
widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and
parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was
“without responsibility.”7 redarclaw
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in
the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single
when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his
second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she
argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified
for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April
1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos.
Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and
September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the
subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that
she had already introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the
trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first
marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily
duped by a person like Santos.8 redarclaw
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, “her marriage was
celebrated without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the
Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the
celebration of their marriage.”9 Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows:10 redarclaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G.

Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six (6)
years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was
void ab initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family
Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the
parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the
celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not
lived together as husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she
argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively rendered their marriage null and
void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus:11 redarclaw
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as
it was celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused
wants this court to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos,
something this court can not do. The best support to her argument would have been the
submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this
court cannot declare their marriage null and void in these proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof
beyond reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the
former had not known of the previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses’ narration. It
likewise disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the
appellate court simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her
marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for
bigamy.12 redarclaw
THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case,
because she was not aware of Santos’s previous marriage. But in the main, she argues
that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by
the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara,13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the
absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any
of those marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously
lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is
extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met
him in 1993. Without completing the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage
without a license is void.
In the Comment14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances
the argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues
as regards her husband’s subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner’s denial of any
knowledge of Santos’s first marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial
evidence supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the
subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides: LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
In Montañez v. Cipriano,15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows: LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b)
the marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the
second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that
the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it
not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v.

Nepomuceno, Jr.16 instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous
subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla17 likewise states that the knowledge of the second
wife of the fact of her spouse’s existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable
cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.
The Ruling of the Court
The penalty for bigamy and petitioner’s

knowledge of Santos’s first marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry
each other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As
explained in Nepomuceno:18 redarclaw
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties
depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without
being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of
the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the
information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner’s knowledge of Santos’s

marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as
shown by the totality of the following circumstances:19 (1) when Santos was courting and
visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of
him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil
status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared with petitioner who
had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had already told
petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual
findings of the RTC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the
CA. Indeed, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great
respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and
demeanor of the witnesses during the trial.20 redarclaw
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she
was validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts’
imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed,
meted out to her the penalty within the range of prision correccional as minimum
to prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla21 holds that the second

spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to
Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that “a person,
whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another
already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of
bigamy.”22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in
the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to
twelve years. Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the
sentence imposable on her is the penalty next lower in degree,23prision correccional, which
has a duration of six months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating
nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting
of two years, four months and one day to four years and two months of imprisonment.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum
term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a
duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner

resulting from her marriage to
Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second
or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity.25 If the accused
wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense
during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case.26 In this case,
petitioner has consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the
ground that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are
void ab initio.28 redarclaw
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it
could not pass judgment on the validity of the marriage. The CA held that the attempt of
petitioner to attack her union with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and
facts,29 and given that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for
review,30 this Court now resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos
took place without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly
explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated
under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads as follows: LawlibraryofCRAlaw
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in
an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing
officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been exempted from a
marriage license had they cohabited exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years
before their marriage.31 redarclaw
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February
199632 and that after six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without
any objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited
her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with
her, as she was residing in the house of her in-laws,34 and her children from her previous
marriage disliked him.35 On cross-examination, respondent did not question the claim of
petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets.36 redarclaw
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each
other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have
cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact.
Although the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as
required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the
solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five
years before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the
issuance of the Certificate of Marriage,37 in which the solemnizing officer stated under oath
that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was solemnized under
Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case

of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the
marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the

misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage
without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be
acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage
license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the
law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit
marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as
bigamy, punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct
character of this special bond between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had
the occasion to emphasize that the State’s penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered
nugatory by allowing individuals “to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be
flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment.”
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner’s illegal acts of feigning a
marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so
would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage.40 redarclaw
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will “lend its aid to x x x one who
has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of
action is founded.”41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which
involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42As
a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in
issue.43
redarclaw
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal
case of bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured
without a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false
Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license
requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband
and wife for at least five years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal
marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing fully well that they had not yet
complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code.
Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her
illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
The applicability of People v. De Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on
the ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case,
the Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on
18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19
August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the
marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to
contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a
Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for
seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this
Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that “marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.”45 It must
be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties.46|||In keeping
therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for
bigamy.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago
is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice.
She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as
minimum to four years of prision correccional as maximum plus accessory penalties
provided by law.
SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary
Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 179620 August 26, 2008 (Under E. VOID MARRIAGE and
G. VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
MANUEL G.ALMELOR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA T.
ALMELOR, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the community of their whole lives. It likewise
involves a true intertwining of personalities.1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the petition for
annulment of judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Piñas,
Branch 254. The CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong remedy.
The Facts
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January
29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral.3 Their union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne, born on
October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel Homer, born on July 4,
1994.4 Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician,
respectively.5
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their
marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The
case, docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital where they
worked as medical student clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person who got
along well with other people. They soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they got married. 6
Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye, Manuel was the
picture of a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described
Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel's unreasonable way of
imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple. 7 Leonida complained
that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. Manuel's deep
attachment to his mother and his dependence on her decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida. 8
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions were first
aroused when she noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance, she caught
him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. 9 She also found
several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. 10 Her worse fears were confirmed when she
saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. 11 When she confronted
Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since
then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children. 12
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida's claim. Dr. del
Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida.
She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the
eldest child).13 She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. 14 Such incapacity is marked by
antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and there. He, however,
maintained that their marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for annulment filed by
Leonida came as a surprise to him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against him was their professional rivalry. It
began when he refused to heed the memorandum15 released by Christ the King Hospital. The memorandum
ordered him to desist from converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or secondary hospital. 16 Leonida's
family owns Christ the King Hospital which is situated in the same subdivision as Manuel's clinic and
residence.17 In other words, he and her family have competing or rival hospitals in the same vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He denied maltreating them. At most,
he only imposed the necessary discipline on the children.
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing wrong for him to return the
love and affection of the person who reared and looked after him and his siblings. This is especially apt now
that his mother is in her twilight years.18 Manuel pointed out that Leonida found fault in this otherwise healthy
relationship because of her very jealous and possessive nature. 19
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of female friends. He
wanted to avoid any further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead conjured up stories about
his sexual preference. She also fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in his possession to cast
doubt on his masculinity.20
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually
stayed at Manuel's house during his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a witness to the generally
harmonious relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida. True, they had some
quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship. But there was nothing similar to what Leonida described
in her testimony.21
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed another
man. He denied that such an incident occurred. On that particular date, 22 he and Manuel went straight home
from a trip to Bicol. There was no other person with them at that time, except their driver. 23
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by presenting his own expert
witness. However, no psychiatrist was presented.
RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with the following
disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989 and all its effects under
the law null and void from the beginning;
2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties with forfeiture of
defendant's share thereon in favor of the same parties' children whose legal custody is awarded to
plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its finality in the Book
of Entry of Judgment and to issue an Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto; and
b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Piñas City and Manila City to cause the
registration of the said Entry of Judgment in their respective Books of Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.

SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. It
ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the allegations in
the complaint and of the evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in this case (sic)
there is more than meets the eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with hetero
sexual marriage. This is reason enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as a
special contract exclusively only between a man and a woman x x x and thus when homosexuality
has trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to correct the situation [Article
45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code]. This is of course in recognition of
the biological fact that no matter how a man cheats himself that he is not a homosexual and forces
himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will surely come a time when his true sexual
preference as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting him and thus jeopardizing the solidity, honor,
and welfare of his own family.25
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for
annulment of judgment with the CA.26
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower court's jurisdiction; that it had
no jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute community of property and forfeit his conjugal share in favor of his
children.
CA Disposition
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court
AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 254),
in Las Piñas City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs. 27
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary remedy of petition for
annulment of judgment. Said the appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision rendered by the lower
Court. But the remedy assuming there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment but
an ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or corrected only by appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the subject of
an ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess in the exercise
thereof. "Excess" assuming there was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof. 28
Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF
THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID ON THE
GROUND OF PETITIONER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE
OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.29
Our Ruling
I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice and
in the Court's exercise of equity jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall
be dismissed.30 This is to prevent the party from benefiting from one's neglect and mistakes. However, like
most rules, it carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all rules of procedures is to
achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.31
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the ordinary remedies are
available or no longer available through no fault of petitioner. 32 However, in Buenaflor v. Court of
Appeals,33 this Court clarified the proper appreciation for technical rules of procedure, in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and, therefore,
they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that while the
Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and
periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these
rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations . Also, in some cases the
Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of time where a stringent
application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the demands of
substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.34 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules governing
appeals.35 It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality. 36
After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence of this Court to consider his
petition before the CA instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to the lower court for
annulling his marriage on account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time that this Court is
faced with a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,37 petitioner Delia R. Nerves elevated to
the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for six (6) months. The CSC ruled
Nerves, a public school teacher, is deemed to have already served her six-month suspension during
the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated without back wages. On appeal, Nerves
stated in her petition, inter alia:
1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution of the
Philippines and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91)
petitioner is filing the instant petition with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme
Court.38 (Underscoring supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the inappropriate mode of
appeal.39 The CA opined that "under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x x
appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review." 40
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied with the Administrative
Circular. The Court stated:
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only
a minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit. Hence, the Court of
Appeals should have overlooked the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice to
the parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which should be
liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. As it has been said, where the rigid
application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate
grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case from the operation of the
rules.41 (Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,42 petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy by
filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal. In the interest of
justice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court prima facie committed grave abuse of
discretion in rendering a judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great injustice. The Court
elucidated in this wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from
the strict application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial
justice.43 (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to the present petition
and treating petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, considering that what is at stake is
the validity or non-validity of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right to appeal
is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts
should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that
every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free
from the constraints of technicalities.45
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a
review of the case on the merits to attain the ends of justice. 46
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's counsel that prejudiced his right to appeal.
His counsel, Atty. Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the denial of her
notice of appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at the first instance. She also erroneously
filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather than pursue an ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's incompetence. These gravely worked to the
detriment of Manuel's appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Still, this Court has
recognized certain exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty and property; or
(3) where the interest of justice so require.47
The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or gross negligence
of petitioner's former counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be made to suffer for his
counsel's grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity demand that he be allowed to ventilate his
case in a higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained thus:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act
performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of
his client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty,
which resulted in the client's being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of
his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground. In the instant case, higher
interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present evidence on their
defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the lawyer's mistakes. This Court will always be
disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and
downright incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their clients, of
their day in court.49 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the
demands of justice require it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a case involving the
sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a party the fullest opportunity
to establish the merits of one's action.50
The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence in Government Service Insurance System v.
Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.52 Said the Court in Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto
and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the power to except a particular
case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it. 53
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per
se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent in his quest, he
fought back all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at him.
The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no basis at all because the supporting grounds
relied upon can not legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code." It went further by
citing Republic v. Molina:54
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels
and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect,
or failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological
incapacity.55
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines set in Molina.
What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally
predominant among homosexual individuals.56 She wanted to prove that the perceived homosexuality
rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage between Manuel and Leonida on
the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke surely there is fire.
Although vehemently denied by defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to establish with
certainty that defendant is really a homosexual. This is the fact that can be deduced from the totality
of the marriage life scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even including his own close
friends doubted his true sexual preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15
December 2003). After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the rumor she
heard but defendant did not do anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the truth of all
his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing happened after that. There may
have been more important matters to attend to than to waste time and effort filing cases against and
be effected by these people and so, putting more premiums on defendant's denials, plaintiff just the
same married him. Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to either exculpate or nail to the cross
defendant for his act of initially concealing his homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the end, only one
thing is certain - even during his marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his real preference
continued and even got thicker, reason why obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and solid
family; and in so failing, plaintiff and their children became his innocent and unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous over even small
details in the house (sic) like wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in
knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December 2003); but these
admissions of defendant taken in the light of evidence presented apparently showing that he had
extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN,
14 February 2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the
homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits "L"
and "M"), the doubt as to his real sex identity becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus
thereof of defendant may be the name of the game in this case; but the simple reason of
professional rivalry advanced by the defendant is certainly not enough to justify and obscure the
question why plaintiff should accuse him of such a very untoward infidelity at the expense and
humiliation of their children and family as a whole.57
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and
that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public
perception of Manuel's sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of
Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a
ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may be annulled when the consent
of either party was obtained by fraud,58 such as concealment of homosexuality.59 Nowhere in the said
decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his
marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. 60 It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not
homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad
faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both parties. An
allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has
enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances61 constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those
cited, but its concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations 62 of the Committees on the Civil
Code and Family Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on the grounds for
legal separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of
"concealment," while in the article on legal separation, there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in
legal separation, the ground existed after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed at the
time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they add the phrase "existing at the
time of the marriage" at the end of subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the suggestion. 63
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that serves as a
valid ground to annul a marriage.64 Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is
constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It indicates that questions of
sexual identity strike so deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which is the exclusive sexual bond
between the spouses.65 In Crutcher v. Crutcher,66 the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which would
make the marriage relation so revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to discharge
the duties of a wife, and would defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the natural course of
things, they would cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting her health. 67
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal overtones are
significantly different. Divorce is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility
to a healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond in our jurisdiction. At
most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more than eleven (11) years,
which produced three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly,
she failed to discharge this onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital consent was found in Villanueva v.
Court of Appeals.68 In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant resorted to baseless portrayals
of his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the
instant case, are generally binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or
violence compelled him to do so, thus -
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely
consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable
and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to
deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he
was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of
self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm's way. x x x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter
was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could not have
impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an
outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. x
xx
xxxx
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the
grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue
influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of these
grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld. 69
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into account petitioner's
homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its existence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 70 The State and the public have vital interest in the
maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by fabricated evidence. 71 Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community or conjugal
property.
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly.
In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife
for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing
such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written consent
of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal partnership.
In a valid marriage, both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of the property regime, jointly.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of Manuel and Leonida. In the
same breath, the trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children. Considering that the marriage is
upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuel's share in the property regime is unwarranted.
They remain the joint administrators of the community property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition
in the trial court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. RUBEN T. REYES, Associate Justice
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family
Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings
into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the
court a quo and the Court of Appeal, Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his
1 2
attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first
met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986,
the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed,
shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia
Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened
Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred,
because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs.
Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and
where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express
resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's
pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up
Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of
her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he
underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April
up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his
efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros
Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code"
(docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied
its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and
incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the
court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which
requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for
more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to
enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does
not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more
or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the
sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide
an insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes
suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa
preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes
proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed
out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the
exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage
voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious
than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and
void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be
modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental
faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental
incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or
nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of
consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while
subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital
obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be
deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain
the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence.
Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent
with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called
selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the
Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which
describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added
that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no
voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they should
make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab
initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there
are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or
incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or
mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does
not know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely,
he might not have consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for
voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the
consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating
the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean
Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of
defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent
and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there
is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason
that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He
emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not
consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really
removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in
general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of
consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the
validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is
eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however,
felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be
classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be
convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect
has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has
been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the
action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one
might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no
longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In
response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should
not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree.
Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this
matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect
in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a
psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity,
there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences
of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological
incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is
understanding of the consequences of marriage. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the
grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the
impotence that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect
to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice
Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in
medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so
that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage
is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological
incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the
celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later
becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the
marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured.
Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to
remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the
beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other
hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes
manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other
provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are
lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental
and physical incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a
species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9,
1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen
who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak
phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it
from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of
understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to
go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate
on it and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of
marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with
Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon
Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages
annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is
automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective
in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the
problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On
the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of
cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were
for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within
which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The
Committee approved the suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the
provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some
resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has
been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June
1994); thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the
giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which reads:
9
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila

matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or
secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment,
nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or
construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, giving an account on how the third paragraph of
10
Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator
intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage

because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon
297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . .

(cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982,
canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term
anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the
conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological
disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier
Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the

essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality
can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This
particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the
contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding
contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education
of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort,
obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological
disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address
to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological
defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving
consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of
the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of
11
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the
Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand
in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity"
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage
to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have
some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be
carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate
in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family
Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman

entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and
the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the
specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled
waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the
unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and
correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals its decision are as follows:
1
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . .
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they
went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married
life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were
supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant
just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was
no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on the
second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during
their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her
mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join
them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual
intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta
time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the
same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this
period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not:
even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag,
a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin,
while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine
was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept
confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to
return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his
penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes
the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a
Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by
reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz:
(1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any
differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if
either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He
further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical
technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on
March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according
to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she
always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his
hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did
not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against
him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of
his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young
and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr.
Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr.
Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no
evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an
erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters,
the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that
the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is
capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having
sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties
and that the evidence is not fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by
the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the
Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera.
Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City.
Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the
parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a
psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex
with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court
without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the
burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's
conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court
on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is
misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage,
the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage
or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent
is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the
pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined
by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented
evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon
petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code
provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment
without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This
only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife
(private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the
truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of
facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a
basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial
evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical
disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates
an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019,
January 4, 1995). 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of
both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged
psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be
necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, — i.e.,
physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would not
want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the
question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is
suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private
respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical
disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or
asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to
find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his
doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection. Since
5
it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of
private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end
of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of
the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want
carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he
refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989)
that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he
deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins
vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it
is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the
declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal
expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the
innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life
to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her
life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness
or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which
can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the
admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife
whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance
to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality
disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants
within the contemplation of the Family Code. 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno
120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the
cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an
ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in
the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a
shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in
deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults
who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment
to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in
its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions
to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still
many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the
present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the
Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court
in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991
1 2
decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, which declared the marriage of
3
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a
verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in Manila;
4
that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
"immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with
his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since
then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very
intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel
resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later,
Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus
shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a
highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served;
and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to
free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live
together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were
due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their
marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3)
Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on
July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie
Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita
Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted
documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared
only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect
interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code)
and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision
tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our
culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied heavily on the trial court's
5
findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter
referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family
rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad

range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he
or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse,
as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to
cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then
there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent
to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the
marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders
them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
6
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice
7
Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences"
and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along
with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your

findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are

psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with
other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to
prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on
Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-
vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty
experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici
curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National
9
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C.
Puno, a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank
10
these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on
December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench
and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it
11
"as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
12
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical.
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified
13
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given
qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence
— what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling
becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the
totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be
examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July
24, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:
1
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby
declared valid."2
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for
Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos,
solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of
the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and
129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the]
parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to
petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where
the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of
Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which
was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May
8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential
Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5)
children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was
transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee
Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air
Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she as
an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through
telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss,
Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she
was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in
different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for
work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider.
Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her
weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe
in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their
house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was
still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacañang.
When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she
became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and
construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel.
As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that
day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned
violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day,
October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical
Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in
Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the
reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella,
Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as
cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation
(Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude
towards appellee and their children, x x x."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality
of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological
incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and
clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also
be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of
marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-
complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and
explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation.
The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the
interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would
make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he
[was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in
the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an
expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an
incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known
the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and
[was] incurable." 4
Hence, this Petition. 5
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:
6
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional
Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses
should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition." 7
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she
presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to
determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have
been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests
himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no
choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of
respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina, the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation
8
of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code were laid down by this Court as
9
follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally
'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
x x x x x x x x x
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.'
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
x x x x x x x x x
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095." 10
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
11
incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the
testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to
sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide
material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his
acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing
that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully
employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk,
failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that
he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
1âwphi1
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At best, the evidence presented
12
by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural
requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the
alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for
her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring
personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love
transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always
disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the
modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital
obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals

dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment 3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and
Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm
instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36
years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel 4 at
the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding 5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish,
Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. 6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April
1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void.
He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that
respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the
present.8
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent

persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment
and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, 10 and instead introduced
the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boy’s
parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage. 11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in
fact, no such incident occurred. 12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told
some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither. 13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company
(Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the
group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in
her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by
the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place. 15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy
letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in
the commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the
one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. 17 He
likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he
discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold. 18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it
appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner
that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. 19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and
ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts. 20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to
monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in
August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left
her for good in November 1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist,
and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that
petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other
hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on
love, trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also
pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that
petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to
all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated
stories, told lies and invented personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her
husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from
David’s act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot. 26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the
Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she
had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson &
Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although
she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours.
She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8
December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not
fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes
Santos was employed with Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the
latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor
her husband’s whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her
monthly budget of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other
lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the
totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part. 32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the
allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by
his assistant,33 together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological
Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive
behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that
might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent. 34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i)
he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological evaluation, and (ii) he
made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the
results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s propensity
to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among
others−had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent
and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her
marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part
of the parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan
Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,
which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion. 38 Subsequently, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican. 39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate
court reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely
honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented
was insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in
the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological
incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He
contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the
RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the
conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the
appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while
giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. 42 The Court is likewise guided by the
fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner.
Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent. 43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the
crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets
the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These
standards were definitively laid down in the Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also
known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing
the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely
affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 47 In fact, even
before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein
the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by
Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned. 49 Yet
what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly
onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under
the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even
as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in
our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution
of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full
enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage." 51 Marriages with such persons were
ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married,
among others. A party’s mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of
1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited
as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929. 54 Divorce on the ground of a spouse’s
incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation. 55 Upon
the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was
classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage. 56 The mental capacity, or lack
thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab
initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is
one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges
on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract. 59 The initial common
consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute
a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code
revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of
consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but
was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. 60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the
1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with
the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage." 61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code
committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage
only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for
annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were
psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would
amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning
with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage." 65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of
marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case.
Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence
[to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto." 67 Jurisprudence since then
has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." 68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal
wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently
recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow
some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was
for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law." 70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged,
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts.
In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no
case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision
committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may
be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in
psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate
ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently
applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides
courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time,
the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case
perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36.
There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely
primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should
govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered
opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable,
considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of
psychological incapacity was derived from canon law, 73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a
solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil
law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation
and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 75 Still, it must be emphasized that
the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though
the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and
subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought
on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court
interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in
denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution,
which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection
accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social
institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal
aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever
socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative
enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on
the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family.
This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines
marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect
married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal
separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective
of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory
definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically

incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of
marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which
in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend
against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not
further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among
persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of

petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in
1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected"’ by the state.
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological–not
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s."
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the

Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It
is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence
—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. 77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating
his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. 78 This requirement however was dispensed
with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. 79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code
mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous
opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s participation in
the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the
great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals
to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently
lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question remains whether
her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36
and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his
spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his
wife’s behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon
which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2)
expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was
tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioner’s
evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally
honest with petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to
establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be
considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the
Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or
Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence
is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological
incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would
necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial
court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual
and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing
personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her
actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others. 81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes
by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in
particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2)
major hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a
couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems
(sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and
repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an
individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then
incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the
lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see,
relationship is based on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are
our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to
tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this
relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love,
trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and
fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner,
testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioner’s officemates and ask him (sic) on the
activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on
page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual
basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the
extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also
lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there
is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she
persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is pathological
and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to

perform the basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Ma’am.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of
respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a]
pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself." 84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record,
particularly the trial transcripts of respondent’s testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of
petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held
in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the
spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. 86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner’s
witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez’s
common conclusion of respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of
petitioner’s version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of
petitioner’s factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity
drawn therefrom by petitioner’s expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of
psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her
actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her
occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making
her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In
persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented
by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological
incapacity.87
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and
even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious
characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural
child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared
only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such
circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that
respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any
prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to
induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to
distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were
emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths,
which according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality
would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic
meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to
adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a
reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not
convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage
hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best.
Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to the truth, her
avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may
be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the
circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds
for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between
misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The
fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated
consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own
inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial
court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets
of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the
marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed
this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision
despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its attention. 88 Such deliberate ignorance is in
contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the
marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the
part of respondent.90 Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondent’s psychological incapacity was
considered so grave that a restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting
respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically
defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and
employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical
understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral
significance and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the
depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert
Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality
constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the
Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in
terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty
impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and
reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial
consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of
due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also
by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage
in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the
veracity of petitioner’s allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent’s version as
correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this
matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of
facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain
that respondent’s condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect. 95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring
to make their marriage work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she
continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the
conclusion that respondent’s condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s condition is
incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a
remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized
respondent’s condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this point.
The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on
10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made
explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision
of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by
first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee, 96 then the opinion of canonical
scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological
incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion expressed during the deliberations that
"psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." 100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on
psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of
psychological incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own
ruling that remained silent on whether respondent’s psychological incapacity was incurable.
Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be
established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time
of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial court’s decision that required a
medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case
was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument

that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of
that law as of the date the statute in enacted. 103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical
considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case,
there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was
curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the
appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection,
there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on
appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have
seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the
psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court
level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a
case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical
diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that
effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the
evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has
been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic
Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity,
were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that
annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article
36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been
inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love
with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court
placed undue emphasis on respondent’s avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court
decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more
than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED. DANTE O. TINGA, Associate Justice
G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,

vs.
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in
our laws, has become a clichéd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case,
however, with much ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily
imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the
way the concept was formulated—free in form and devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The
petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution 2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of
the challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a
gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially
attracted to Rowena’s close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to
court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a
freshman.3
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a certain
degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first
meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and
jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that
month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket. 4
However, Edward’s ₱80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and daily
sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to
Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home. As his family was
abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward
agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place. 5
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old,
and she, 20.6 The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was treated like a
prisoner—he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and
warned the latter not to leave Rowena.7 At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to his
brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents’ home and live with them. Edward relayed
this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could live on
their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would
be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home. 8
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents. His
family then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him. 9
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live
with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways. 10
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the
latter’s psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720. 11
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties. 12 In
the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and
deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings. 13
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if
there was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits. 14
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated, and
made the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again
Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is
currently unemployed. He is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He
presented himself at my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for Nullification of
Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P.
Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his parents
are also in the business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This said
virtues are said to be handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet
and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried his luck in
being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as
well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a
full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his friends even
during his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient wife. She
is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her
boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the foundation of
their intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having
problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that she
actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that
they should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both
young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is rich.
In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and she already
bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped to
Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to
locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could
not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek help from petitioner’s
parents. When the parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the
country so respondent decided to go back to her home for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind
at their home. After a few days of separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she
wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when he arrived at their house, respondent
confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even
threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again. Respondent would call by
phone every now and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent
went to the extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the
newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make amends and at this point in time[,]
respondent brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify
her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondent’s uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very
same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually
never applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of
petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home.
Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent
even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will commission their military friends to
harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he should perish, the
authorities should look for him at his parents[‫ ]ۥ‬and relatives[‫ ]ۥ‬houses. Sometime in June of 1996,
petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament and they
forgave him and supported him by giving him military escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them
that he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred
for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to
live instead to[sic] the home of petitioner’s parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the
idea and claimed that she would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be
away from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever
he would inherit from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing
[that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own family. When respondent refused to live
with petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home
of his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he
would not be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore,
respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-
founded. The break-up was caused by both parties[’] unreadiness to commitment and their young age.
He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically
involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sach’s Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon
swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as to
commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is
absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social
interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds
it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent, as
aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type of
person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of

woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is
seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good
fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used force and
threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really no
chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before submitting to
marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution
solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is
evidently clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware of
their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening their relationship by his weak
behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be
unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she
is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality
Disorder that started since childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties display
psychological incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for them to take. 15
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision16 declaring the marriage of the parties null and
void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.17 The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal. 18
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision 19 in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867,
reversed and set aside the trial court’s ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological
incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied
only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to
be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of
the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina 21 needed for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 22 The CA faulted the lower court for
rendering the decision without the required certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the OSG’s
reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the petition. 23 The CA later denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution. 24
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15,
2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.25
In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of respondent’s
psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points
out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he
avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during the trial;
and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and notices. 27
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum, 28 that the annulment petition filed before the RTC
contains no statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root
cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or
clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus,
the OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina29 were not satisfied.30
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the
marriage between the parties is null and void.31
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of jurisprudence
interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code,
Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero
elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals: 33
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the
Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-
Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute
divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP
and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault
divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the
effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses,
with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have
obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute
divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss
the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started
holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as —
‘a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
law.’
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino
people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are
founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would
encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority
of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute
divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable
alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on
grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again
prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid
the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed
by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law,
the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code
decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes.
The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages
in the present Civil Code, to wit:
‘(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
‘Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.’
‘Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe.’
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be dissolved or
annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment
of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with
Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz
of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic
Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes
that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages;
marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family;
the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a
woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also
informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among
husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly.34
In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision
even before the session was over:
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the
celebration."
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" and to "mentally
incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a
defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage."
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense,
insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop
Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said
that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge
. . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one
but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36
is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is
incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how
they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the
possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested
that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations,"
hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages
that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage
which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void
from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now
open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time,
took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage:
"3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization."
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with
respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between
two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full
tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to
capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage,
not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of
married couples have found themselves in limbo—freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the
Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law
sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law
Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the
Family Code—and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally
inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for
psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old
canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to be ‘capable according to law’ in order to give valid consent;
Canon #1082 required that persons ‘be at least not ignorant’ of the major elements required in
marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be
present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related
grounds for annulment called ‘lack of due discretion’ and ‘lack of due competence.’ Lack of due
discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding
and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of
carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony."
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders
such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of
proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in
several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in
persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was
nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this
kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept
proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof
of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony. 36
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so
doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The
Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. 37 The law is then so designed as to allow some
resiliency in its application.38
Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible
cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 40 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The
intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.41 This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made between
the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary judgment
and the incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the
difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on
the assumption that they are capable according to positive law to enter such contract, there remains the
object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a different locality, and prior to the
conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is the
hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with
the psychological process of giving consent because it has been established a priori that both have
such a capacity to give consent, and they both know well the object of their consent [the house and its
particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The
contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological act is both valid
and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed towards an object which is not available.
Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent
but with positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of consent, but
he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity
with respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to
understand as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations
of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample
which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case imply
a grave psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and
freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so – that is to say, they arise from certain
physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact
the higher faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of free human acts. The evidence
from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may
impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect to its frequency
[nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality].
However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher faculties remain
intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have an adequate understanding of what marriage is
and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though is
whether such a person can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be
able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit
consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial steps
taken by church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or
incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the
intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly deliberating and its judgment
lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the
influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it
was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a
decision made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is
precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is always and continuously under
such an irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think
that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and
evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be juridically ineffective
for this one reason that he cannot posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be
exercised in a normal way and with usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the
consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an object
that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more clearly
through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the inability to
give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his
opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they are usually able to
evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent.
However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience
difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise
treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of positing the object of consent from
the point of view of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually
leaves the process of knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of
consent: the delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence
cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in
the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a mature
evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed
that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the moment of consent but also, and
especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in such
a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have no
difficulty in understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of
those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this ground
as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted
in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the
will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the impotence
that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject
incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly renders that
person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the long
tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are not
capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where one of
the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin
a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity
could be due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual
consortium, which goes to the very substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a
spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The canon speaks, not of the
bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or contributing to
the good of the other party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of
contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring the
economic good and the financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale
of the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for detained and individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns a
person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent may
have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable
of assuming them because of his "constitutional immorality."
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of
responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the
moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it
means that the actual fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration that
must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to assume the obligations of
marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to assume and fulfill the
obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in facto
esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the respondent to
assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person, precisely on the
basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had
violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder.
A lack of empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense of
entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise
common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order to achieve
one’s ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of them
is the right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically centered
around the good of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to
be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of these
rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some characteristic
features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism,
and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality was
understood to be invalidating of marriage – that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the
inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its obligations.
Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the
obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as
an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of matrimonial consent is
understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph
of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more
adequate juridical structure to account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The
homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person
is usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person
so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly
does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is
unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the
matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the
defect of the object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity
specified by the canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the
clause is a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to
the psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in the psychic
constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the person is
incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this
juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution
which impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in one’s
consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference
being that there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the development of the habit, while
one accepts as given one’s psychic constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the source
of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom. 42
Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine
whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower court’s
judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 43 ruled that the findings of the trial court are final
and binding on the appellate courts.44
Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the
pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 45 explained that when private respondent testified
under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented
evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic
marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, 46 thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench
and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—
subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church—while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other—shall
walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage
and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.47
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in the ponencia of
then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the
result" and another three—including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero—took pains to compose their
individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case must
be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according to its
own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say
that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual
milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court."48
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, 49 the Court has applied the aforesaid standards,
without too much regard for the law’s clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as
"courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in
Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed
by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s
exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." 50 The unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior,
moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very
foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court,
Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly,
the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals.51
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are
ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the
public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. 52 The
Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse,
domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it
refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of
physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. 53 Let it be noted that in Article 36,
there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. 54 To
indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a
stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern for
the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicial
declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the
normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality
disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the
latter’s disorder recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply
declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, 55 there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each
case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996,
eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who
provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral
pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.56
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making,
must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. 57
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a
party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended
to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of
new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in
psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that
of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a
person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent
to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are
now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual
anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from
assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality
the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal
decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as
presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be ‘other
oriented’ since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must
have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but
involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends,
according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill
the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and
faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of
a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual
choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable
expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case
for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional
categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the
marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to
assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An
advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered
into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out
marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into." 58 1avvphi1
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish

the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of
the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos60 asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. 61 Verily, the evidence must show a
link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.62 Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, 63 an option for
the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment
and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in
the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule,
however, does not dispense with the parties’ prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate,
produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disorders—to repeat, dependent
personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent.
We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders as follows—
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a person’s recent and long-
term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes but are
deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or
anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders
are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become less obvious
in middle or old age. An individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of character
traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational
adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic,
paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead
to trouble getting along with other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and often a
tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not
unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead to
interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of
personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave
activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to certain
personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and
dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the oral
stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from
fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an inability
to engage in intimate relationships. However, later researchers have found little evidence that early
lawphil.net
childhood events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the etiology of
antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other personality
disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related
to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have found that low
cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of
aggression and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low
platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in antisocial
personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline
patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in
a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized
into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who have
these disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality disorders.

Individuals who have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder not otherwise specified," that can be
used for other specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the
specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy
may be long-term.64
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner—
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such

individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are
easily hurt by others’ comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a
quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder
may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow
others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even
when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own,
volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable
or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. 65 and antisocial
personality disorder described, as follows—
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional behavioral
limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years, disregard for the
rights of others (either through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite
commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There is often a
façade of charm and even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of
others and the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals who
are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of
others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The term
described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in reasoning. lawphil.net
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic" personality disorders,
the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.66
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case,
finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the
marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties’ psychological incapacity. We further
consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses’ deportment, arrived at the
same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make
most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he
believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and
is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. 67 As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense
of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with
antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This
finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of
others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by society.68 Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive
and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of
committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5,
2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011
DANILO A. AURELIO, Petitioner,
vs.
VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari, 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
set aside the October 6, 2005 Decision2 and October 26, 2006 Resolution, 3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988.
They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.
On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.4 In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and
petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective
essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity
was present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that
her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void, even if
As succinctly summarized by the CA, contained in respondent’s petition are the following allegations, to
wit:
x x x The said petition alleged, inter alia, that both husband and wife are psychologically incapable of
performing and complying with their essential marital obligations. Said psychological incapacity was
existing prior and at the time of the marriage. Said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of
financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working
wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated
between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the maintenance of the family. He
refused to foot the household bills and provide for his family’s needs. He exhibited arrogance. He was
completely insensitive to the feelings of his wife. He liked to humiliate and embarrass his wife even in
the presence of their children.
Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings
change very quickly – from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences.
Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or
disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she
wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted their
relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of marital life led to the
breakdown of their marriage. Private respondent manifested psychological aversion to cohabit with her
husband or to take care of him. The psychological make-up of private respondent was evaluated by a
psychologist, who found that the psychological incapacity of both husband and wife to perform their
marital obligations is grave, incorrigible and incurable. Private respondent suffers from a Histrionic
Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features; whereas petitioner suffers from passive aggressive
(negativistic) personality disorder that renders him immature and irresponsible to assume the normal
obligations of a marriage.5
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss6 the petition. Petitioner principally argued that
the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for
the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
On January 14, 2003, the RTC issued an Order 7 denying petitioner’s motion.
On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the
RTC in an Order8 dated December 17, 2003. In denying petitioner’s motion, the RTC ruled that
respondent’s petition for declaration of nullity of marriage complied with the requirements of the Molina
doctrine, and whether or not the allegations are meritorious would depend upon the proofs presented by
both parties during trial, to wit:
A review of the petition shows that it observed the requirements in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (268
SCRA 198), otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine. There was allegation of the root cause of the
psychological incapacity of both the petitioner and the respondent contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of
the petition. The manifestation of juridical antecedence was alleged in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the
petition. The allegations constituting the gravity of psychological incapacity were alleged in paragraph 9
(a to l) of the petition. The incurability was alleged in paragraph 10 of the petition. Moreover, the clinical
finding of incurability was quoted in paragraph 15 of the petition. There is a cause of action presented in
the petition for the nullification of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Whether or not the allegations are meritorious depends upon the proofs to be presented by both
parties. This, in turn, will entail the presentation of evidence which can only be done in the hearing on
the merits of the case. If the Court finds that there are (sic) preponderance of evidence to sustain a
nullification, then the cause of the petition shall fail. Conversely, if it finds, through the evidence that will
be presented during the hearing on the merits, that there are sufficient proofs to warrant nullification, the
Court shall declare its nullity.9
On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA via petition for certiorari 10 under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
On October 6, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [the] instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.11
In a Resolution dated October 26, 2004, the CA dismissed petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that respondent’s complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the Family Code and
the Molina doctrine revealed the existence of a sufficient cause of action.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising two issues for this Court’s consideration, to wit:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE
PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE ARE SUFFICIENT FOR
THE COURT TO DECLARE THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN VIDA AND
DANILO.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER’S ACTION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO DISMISS BY THE TRIAL COURT IS
PATENTLY AND UTTERLY TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION; AND THAT APPEAL IN DUE COURSE IS NOT A
PLAIN, ADEQUATE OR SPEEDY REMEDY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 12
Before anything else, it bears to point out that had respondent’s complaint been filed after March 15,
2003, this present petition would have been denied since Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-
11-1013 prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss in actions for annulment of marriage. Be that as it may,
after a circumspect review of the arguments raised by petitioner herein, this Court finds that the petition
is not meritorious.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 this Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in the
disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity, to wit:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
decision.
essential obligations of marriage.
Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.15
This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the above
pronouncements, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor General
required in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code
mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.16
Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in respondent’s petition are
insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Specifically, petitioner contends that the petition failed to comply with three of the Molina guidelines,
namely: that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint; that such
illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied marital obligation must be stated in the petition. 17
First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity
was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family
backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of
their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the
same as the root causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to
bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist
reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features.
Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality
Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave,
lawph!1
incorrigible and incurable.

Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were
alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondent’s allegations
fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that "the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."
It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
their marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal of the Molina
guidelines would show that the same contemplate a situation wherein the parties have presented their
evidence, witnesses have testified, and that a decision has been reached by the court after due
hearing. Such process can be gleaned from guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a decision rendered by
the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at
first instance whether the allegations contained in the petition are sufficient to substantiate a case for
psychological incapacity. Let it be remembered that each case involving the application of Article 36
must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. 18 It would thus be more prudent for this Court to
remand the case to the RTC, as it would be in the best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as
hear and weigh the evidentiary value of the testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses
presented by the parties.
Given the allegations in respondent’s petition for nullity of marriage, this Court rules that the RTC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so
patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.19 Even assuming arguendo that this Court were to
agree with petitioner that the allegations contained in respondent’s petition are insufficient and that the
RTC erred in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss, the same is merely an error of judgment correctible
by appeal and not an abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 20
Finally, the CA properly dismissed petitioner’s petition. As a general rule, the denial of a motion to
dismiss, which is an interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari. Petitioner’s remedy is to reiterate
the grounds in his motion to dismiss, as defenses in his answer to the petition for nullity of marriage,
proceed trial and, in case of an adverse decision, appeal the decision in due time. 21 The existence of
that adequate remedy removed the underpinnings of his petition for certiorari in the CA. 22
WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2005 Decision and
October 26, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004

vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72,
declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-
Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan.
They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there
for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial
Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume
his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after
their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays
with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial
support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned
from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given
address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service
of summons by publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the
summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation
giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the
lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case
to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion existed
between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to
ensure that the evidence submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted
respondent’s motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his
family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-

Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to make
proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the
Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s psychological incapacity, the trial court
held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as
husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and
unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the
Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which
characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be traced to respondent’s
mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life. 5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed
to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive
portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on
the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal.
The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after the celebration
of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take steps to make
them Japanese citizens. But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor communicated
with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines but he did not bother to
see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court
rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and
creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer in
a marriage where the other spouse is not around and worse, left them without even helping
them cope up with family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required under
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals
and Molina8 and Santos vs. Court of Appeals. 9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this
case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological
incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite respondent’s failure to
comply with the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not
automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in
the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any
severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set
in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and
sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 11 Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Article
36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 for
the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s."
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
xxx
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos:
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshio’s psychological

incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He
abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he
never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After
respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing
that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an
actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented
evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert
witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. 16 There was no showing
that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We
cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately
after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to
be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.18
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the
present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In
proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse.
We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to
determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in
general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the State
cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to her
husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of the
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
x-------------------x
G.R. No. 127449 March 31, 2005
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner
Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife,
Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave
of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer
denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated. 1
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura
and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and
exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus
attorney’s fees of P100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,] particularly the
plaintiff’s separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank [and] Trust Company[,]
by ceding, giving and paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount of P3,675,335.79
or P1,837,667.89 together with 12% interest per annum from the date of this decision and one-
half (1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the
amount of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his mother, the
herein defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden family name Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries of properties.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the
appellate court, respondent filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly support pendente lite of their
son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, praying that it be denied or that
such incident be set for oral argument. 3
On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the support pendente
lite to P20,000.4 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the said Resolution. 5
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioner’s appeal for lack
of merit and affirming in toto the trial court’s decision. 6 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied. From the abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the monthly support for the
son.7 Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to question these two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari8 and the Petition for Certiorari9 were ordered
consolidated by this Court.10
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals decided the case not
in accord with law and jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF

P2.5 MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM
THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;
2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEY’S FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF

LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL
BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE

ONE-HALF OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE DATE OF
ITS DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE
GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA
MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID
SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO
RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES;
AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES’ MINOR
CHILD TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY
13 YEARS OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS TWO
PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON.11
In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO

SET RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES’ SON FOR
HEARING.12
THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVY’S MONTHLY
SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES. 13
IN RESOLVING RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVY’S SUPPORT,

THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES
SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONER’S OBJECTIONS THERETO,
INSTEAD OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN
SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT IS "TOO MINIMAL." 14
LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN

OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD
TO INCREASE JAVY’S SUPPORT.15
With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulated:
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the testimonies
not only of the parties particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the two
psychologists, awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into
marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy
parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; that he
was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was and always would be his first
priority; that he was unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his
son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in times of
trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving defendant–appellee and their son; that he
had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as proved by his reluctance and later,
refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to
suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years
the parties were together but also after and throughout their separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial court’s decision on the ground that unlike those arising from a
breach in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not be
awarded. While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme Court where
damages by reason of the performance or non-performance of marital obligations were
awarded, it does not follow that no such award for damages may be made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral and exemplary
damages in the total amount of 7 million pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its discretion,
found full justification of awarding at least half of what was originally prayed for. We find no
reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.16
The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code, which
read as follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219 17 of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in
which moral damages may be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be
noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a
need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages, therefore,
the trial court and the Court of Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on which the moral
damages were based were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would have
no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on Article 36
of the Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of
the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. . . .18
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof
of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful and hence
as grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of
psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while
at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as
psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was
negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the
marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had
knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to
have been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the
basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private
respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the
award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages
cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.19
With respect to the grant of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation the trial court explained, thus:
Regarding Attorney’s fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiff’s act or
omission has compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of litigation to protect
her interest (par. 2), and where the Court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered. (par. 11)20
The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is fully justified, the
award of attorney’s fees and costs of litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified. 21
The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity,
and his act in filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly
compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on petitioner’s psychological
incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with the
obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
Furthermore, since the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock in
the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the conjugal
partnership in the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme
Court has held that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the
liquidation of property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993,
226 SCRA, pp. 572 – 573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was
ruled in this case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein
shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous
proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired
during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary
is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code
enumerates what are conjugal partnership properties. Among others they are the following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common
fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the
spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the
common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each
spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an inventory of what
are the parties’ conjugal properties and what are the exclusive properties of each spouse, it was
disclosed during the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who worked first as Branch
Manager and later as Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received
separation/retirement package from the said bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which after
certain deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net amount of P3,675,335.79 and
actually paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown debts or
obligations other than those deducted from the said retirement/separation pay, under Art. 129 of
the Family Code "The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the
profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion
or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlement or unless there has been a voluntary
waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code." In this particular case, however,
there had been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor had there been any voluntary
waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wife’s share in the conjugal partnership properties.
The previous cession and transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in their residential
house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque, Metro
Manila, in favor of the defendant as stipulated in their Compromise Agreement dated July 12,
1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually
intended to be in full settlement of any and all demands for past support. In reality, the
defendant wife had allowed some concession in favor of the plaintiff husband, for were the law
strictly to be followed, in the process of liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling
and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom their only child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9).
Here, what was done was one-half (1/2) portion of the house was ceded to defendant so that
she will not claim anymore for past unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to their
only child as his presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the
conjugal properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of
the separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal
partnership properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or
profession of said defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the Family Code.
For the same reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares of stock of the
plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies. 22
The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for him to give
one-half of his separation/retirement benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and half of
his outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies to the
defendant-appellee as the latter’s share in the conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the Compromise
Agreement entered into by the parties. In the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had
agreed that henceforth, their conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were taken
for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/retirement benefits

which plaintiff-appellant received from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as
Vice-President of said company for the reason that the benefits accrued from plaintiff–
appellant’s service for the bank for a number of years, most of which while he was married to
defendant-appellee, the trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true with the outstanding
shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies. As
these were acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the time he was married to defendant-appellee,
the latter is entitled to one-half thereof as her share in the conjugal partnership. We find no
reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.23
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of
Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the
general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime
applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,24 this Court expounded on the
consequences of a void marriage on the property relations of the spouses and specified the applicable
provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions
of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a
remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it
provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares
and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the
other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case
of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture
shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first
paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male
or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned
in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through

their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered
as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the
couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of
the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that —
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in co-
ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-
ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the
common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or
still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination
of the cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the marriage.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common
property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction
to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve
incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner
and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares,
as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by
them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in
relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to
govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the
property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between
common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying
paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms,
to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e.,
the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void
marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very
beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring
for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously
contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on
the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in
relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a
subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to
have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable
marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of
void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject
to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed,
nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code
on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain
in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses. 25
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered
by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included
or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in
common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the
basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot
since he is about to turn twenty-five years of age on May 27, 2005 26 and has, therefore, attained the age
of majority.
With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would also now be moot,
owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained the age of
majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated
December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby
MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation
and costs are deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner from
Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioner’s shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in
the Provident Group of Companies is sustained but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest
of said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals’ Resolutions of
September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the support pendente lite in favor of the
parties’ son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly,
DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact
MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion
in the lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against
petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J
alleged among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg.,
as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued
at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April
25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only
sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the
present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she
would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to
the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence;
out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of
approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto; sometime
in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another
woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her
knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R.
Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the
possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized
to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that
a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from
exercising any act of administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null
and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all
properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper
management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The
marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and
unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for
lack of merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with
another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA
229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage
(citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845).
Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted by
respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another woman is illegal and
void. However, as to whether or not the second marriage should first be judicially
declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra
v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it
was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous
rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and
Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no

property in his possession is an issue that may be determined only after
trial on the merits.
1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra
v. GSIS and the absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September 11,
2
1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from
receipt within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on
the ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
denying the motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It explained that the case of Yap
3
v. CA cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have
4
relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with the
successional rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for separation of property corollary
with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of
the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the status of the
marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by
petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of
marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the properties
involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with other incidents of their
marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has jurisdiction,
the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy
ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse decision,
reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain
real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza, contends that SP. No.
6 7
1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent
must be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of
Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is
required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of
private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and
distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the
former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is
from the beginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.
8 9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where the
Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous
marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions
stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be
nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void
or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the same
issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in
11
the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's share of
the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or
annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial
declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service
Insurance System, that "although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such
nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras, however, the Court turned around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling
12
once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse
and the correction of the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second
marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and
void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy the Court reverted to the Consuegra case
13
and held that there was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according
to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be
regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
14
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage
be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what is
16
now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne out
by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees
where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a

final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but also
voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked

only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether
or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly
proposed that the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final

judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except
as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno,

however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to
produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final

judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it include
the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void? Justice
Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some judgments, even if
the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter be
made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a judicial
declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the other
members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are presumed valid
until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members affirmed. Justice Puno
remarked that if this is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might
result in confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in
the provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well as
collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that there
should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not declare
for himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the other members affirmed.
Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that
point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the assumption
that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise the
defense that he has no liability because the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista
added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of
the marriage because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a
unilateral declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof.
Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed
that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be

invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes

of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage,

the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve the
objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute

nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a
previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original
wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes

of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration of
absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre
v. Terre. The Court, in turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged with grossly
19
immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than
complainant while his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that
the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that
the same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose,
according to petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely." As it
is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee
members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would
clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the
interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation,
partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for
the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes.
In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an
earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a
party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another
marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an
absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage, why
should the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other
evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the Family
20
Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family life." So crucial are marriage
21
and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification
22
of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential
requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing
more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on
very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-
ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official
state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society.
Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the
contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be
contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to
be included in the application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where
the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly,
quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same
is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His
misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact
anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for purposes
of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno
suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested
that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only," which the Committee
approved. (Emphasis supplied)
24
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary,
petitioner suggests that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of
the properties alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court
would not be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues
of possession and ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or
partition as the petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the
separation of their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide
for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of
the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases,
25
are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be,
shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad
faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are
none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children,
the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by
operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in
bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated
as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage
shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary
disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will
simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary
civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the
effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to
the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom
the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the
incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no
reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated
February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. Bidin and Melo, JJ., concur. Feliciano, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner,

vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
DECISION
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by the
deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death benefits” is now the subject of the controversy
between the two Susans whom he married. 1âwphi1.nêt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first was on
June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom
he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second was on November 10,
1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no
children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary
tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM,
[and] Pag-ibig,” 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial
(GSIS) and burial (SSS).” 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money
against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least
one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as “death
benefits” which she (petitioner) received from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-
ibig.” Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to
declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence
of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she
became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself
as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended
that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized
without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage
certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
–
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO
(sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot
issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this
archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for whatever legal purpose it
may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the
amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S.
Cariño, plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS

OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE
CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE

INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY
CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE
OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN
ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes
other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two
marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the
subject “death benefits” of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the
absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall
within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-
issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the
certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and
that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial
court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in
her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue
and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed
validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to
respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage,
there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and
petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan
Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree
declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the
spouses according to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void ab
initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of
property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on
“Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and
woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 17 -
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions ...”
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him
or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or
spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage,
having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid
(between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee
presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in
the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and
the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the
same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs.
And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code
governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the
absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party
of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any
or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party.
In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during
the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between
them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably,
even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee,
Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof.
As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed
to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner
as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by,
intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra
v. Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement
benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding that:
“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her
status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his
death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage
or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband’s share in the property here in dispute....”
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage
can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting,
still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership
formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just
and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of
one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to
the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.” 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a
prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the
Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified
that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only
for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second
marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or
she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule
applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for
themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like
for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and
separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence,
testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in
fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the
status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with
the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay
respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement
as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993

vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique,
Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking
Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively
dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.
1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who
had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that
Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead," and second,
2
Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to
circumvent the law on marriage. 3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica
Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance
meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months
until they returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his
seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose,
Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another
employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in
January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that
Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left
Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home.
He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England
proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena
Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all
returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet
Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker
despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse
to give him such information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not report the
matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her
daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given
birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished
to leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of life
in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving
as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave
Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22 December 1982 for England. She
further claimed that she had no information as to the missing person's present whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the dispositive portion
of which reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, July
17, 1987) this Court hereby declares as presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker
Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance. 4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a
well founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently
established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition for Review where the
following allegations are made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there existed a
well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was already dead;
and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration that the petition
was a proper case of the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41, Family
Code. 5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a well-founded
belief that his wife is already dead."
6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code which
provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it superseded, the following
7
crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been
shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to
enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard
8
than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such
absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code,
9
upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements. 11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to prove that he
had complied with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent
spouse is already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such
diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching for a missing
12
spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the
defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had not
exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the whereabouts of
his wife, he fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the
parents of his first wife, who lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of
securing information concerning her whereabouts. He admits that he had a suspicion
only that his first wife was dead. He admits that the only basis of his suspicion was the
fact that she had been absent. . . .
13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his
attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique
after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the
British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many
14
millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to inquire
the whereabouts of your wife?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to London
and I went to London to look for her I could not find
her (sic). (Emphasis supplied)
15
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt
on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake,
to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical difference
between London and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could
mean one — place in England, the port where his ship docked and where he found
Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave home to visit relatives in Pasay
City, Kalookan City, or Parañaque, would announce to friends and relatives, "We're
going to Manila." This apparent error in naming of places of destination does not appear
to be fatal.
16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and
London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three
hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or
London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there — which is in effect
what Nolasco says he did — can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her
personal background even after she had married respondent too convenient an excuse to justify his
17
failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his
wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned
letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from
their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his
testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial,
it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case,
admissibility is not synonymous with credibility. As noted before, there are serious doubts to
18
respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely tended to show
that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that
she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in January 1983, he
cut short his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the delay
of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November
1983 when be finally reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica
Parker without inquiring about her parents and their place of residence. Also, respondent failed to
19
explain why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities in London and Liverpool
in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and respondent's
subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a
well-founded one.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, the Court stressed that:

20
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply
interested. It is a relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter
period by virtue of any contract they make. . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
21
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of
them leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on
marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial
court in the same proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw, the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when they find it
22
impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still
the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of
the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law does not
view marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a

woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family
life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.
23
. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which
the State bas the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most
fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the
following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. . . .
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article
149:
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution
which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family
relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement
destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. 24
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent
wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the trial court's
decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both Decisions
are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.
Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES,J.:
The Court of Appeals Decision1 dated June 23, 20042 and Resolution dated September 28,
20043 reversing the Resolution dated April 2, 20034 and Order dated June 4, 20035 of the Social
Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 4-15149-01 are challenged in the present petition for
review on certiorari.
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in
Barcelona, Sorsogon.6
More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Sorsogon a petition7 to declare Alice presumptively dead.
By Order of December 10, 1970,8 the CFI granted the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition notwithstanding the publication of the
Notice of Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice Diaz is hereby declared to
[sic] all legal intents and purposes, except for those of succession, presumptively dead.
SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon
contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon. 10
On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) since 1960 and
a retiree pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died. 11
Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was granted P12,00012 by the SSS.
Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death benefits 13 which was also granted by
the SSS on April 6, 1998.14
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa)
contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that
Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa,
and the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings, paid for Bailon’s
medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by respondent to the SSS in support of
her claims are spurious.
In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit
dated February 13, 199915 averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who cohabited
as husband and wife as early as 1958; and they were reserving their right to file the necessary court
action to contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent as they personally know that Alice is
"still very much alive."16
In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian of
"Aliz P. Diaz," filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailon’s death, 17 he further
attesting in a sworn statement18 that it was Norma who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses.
Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims for death benefits as Bailon’s beneficiaries
before the SSS.20
Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster, Naga City recommended the
cancellation of payment of death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an order for the
refund of the amount paid to her from February 1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits; the
denial of the claim of Alice on the ground that she was not dependent upon Bailon for support during his
lifetime; and the payment of the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension to Bailon’s beneficiaries
according to the order of preference provided under the law, after the amount erroneously paid to
respondent has been collected. The pertinent portions of the Memorandum read:
1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been misled by misrepresentation in
declaring the first wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz, as presumptively dead.
xxxx
x x x the Order of the court in the "Petition to Declare Alice Diaz Presumptively Dead," did not
become final. The presence of Aliz [sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.
xxxx
3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz. He, being in bad faith,
and is the deserting spouse, his remarriage is void, being bigamous.
xxxx
In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting spouse and who remarried, thus his
marriage to Teresita Jarque, for the second time was void as it was bigamous. To require affidavit of
reappearance to terminate the second marriage is not necessary as there is no disappearance of Aliz
[sic] Diaz, the first wife, and a voidable marriage [sic], to speak of. 21 (Underscoring supplied)
In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000, 22 advised respondent that as
Cecilia and Norma were the ones who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses, she should return
the P12,000 paid to her.
In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999, 23 the SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of her
monthly pension for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her
marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted while the latter’s marriage with Alice was still
subsisting; and the December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did not become
final, her "presence" being "contrary proof" against the validity of the order. It thus requested
respondent to return the amount of P24,000 representing the total amount of monthly pension she had
received from the SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.
Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits by letter to the SSS
dated October 12, 1999.24 In a subsequent letter dated November 27, 199925 to the SSC, she reiterated
her request for the release of her monthly pension, asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not
declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and subsisting for
all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his beneficiary.
The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21, 2000, 26 maintained the denial of her claim
for and the discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her, however, that she was not
deprived of her right to file a petition with the SSC.
Respondent thus filed a petition27 against the SSS before the SSC for the restoration to her of her
entitlement to monthly pension.
In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning, under protest, the amount
of P12,000 representing the funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and her siblings
"forcibly and coercively prevented her from spending any amount during Bailon’s wake." 28
After the SSS filed its Answer29 to respondent’s petition, and the parties filed their respective Position
Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit 30 dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch
attesting that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only recently come to know of the petition filed by
Bailon to declare her presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as Bailon could have easily
located her, she having stayed at her parents’ residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she found out
that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even after their separation.
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was void and,
therefore, she was "just a common-law-wife." Accordingly it disposed as follows, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the
legitimate spouse and primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.
Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS the amount of P24,000.00
representing the death benefit she received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May 1999 as
well as P12,000.00 representing the funeral benefit.
The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising
from the demise of SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e) and (k) as well as
Section 13 of the SS Law, as amended, and its prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this
Commission of its compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED.31 (Underscoring supplied)
In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.
After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this Commission comes to the inevitable
conclusion that the petitioner is not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.
xxxx
There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to the declaration of the then CFI of
Sorsogon (10th Judicial District), the first wife never disappeared as the deceased member represented
in bad faith. This Commission accords credence to the findings of the SSS contained in its
Memorandum dated August 9, 1999,32 revealing that Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona,
Sorsogon, after her separation from Clemente Bailon x x x.
As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the deceased member using artifice and by
exerting fraud upon the unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving the deceased
member the right to marry anew. x x x [I]t is clear that the marriage to the petitioner is void, considering
that the first marriage on April 25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously annulled, invalidated or
otherwise dissolved during the lifetime of the parties thereto. x x x as determined through the
investigation conducted by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning spouse, not Alice Diaz
Bailon.
xxxx
It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the petitioner was just a common-law wife of
the deceased member, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary beneficiary, to the
latter’s death benefit. x x x
xxxx
It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the legitimate surviving spouse and primary
beneficiary of Clemente Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of death benefit she
received from the SSS for the period from February 1998 until May 1999 pursuant to the principle
of solutio indebiti x x x
Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually defrayed the cost of the wake and burial of
Clemente Bailon, she must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was earlier given to her by the SSS
as funeral benefit.33 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration 34 having been denied by Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a
petition for review35 before the Court of Appeals (CA).
By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April 2, 2003 Resolution and June 4,
2003 Order of the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits due her.
Held the CA:
x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue of whether or not the decision of the
then CFI, now RTC, declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but, more
importantly, whether or not the respondents SSS and Commission can validly re-evaluate the findings
of the RTC, and on its own, declare the latter’s decision to be bereft of any basis. On similar import, can
respondents SSS and Commission validly declare the first marriage subsisting and the second
marriage null and void?
xxxx
x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person presumptively dead never attains finality as the
finding that "the person is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris tantum," the second
marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the competent
court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the
reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be filed. Nowhere does the law
contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly declare the second marriage null and
void on the basis alone of its own investigation and declare that the decision of the RTC declaring one
to be presumptively dead is without basis.
Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the decision of the regular
courts under the pretext of determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members.
Notwithstanding its opinion as to the soundness of the findings of the RTC, it should extend due
credence to the decision of the RTC absent of [sic] any judicial pronouncement to the contrary. x x x
x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually possesses the authority to declare the

decision of the RTC to be without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the principle of fair
play and thus its findings are of doubtful quality considering that petitioner Teresita was not given ample
opportunity to present evidence for and her behalf.
xxxx
Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil
Registry is no longer practical under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first marriage to restore as
the marital bond between Alice Diaz and Clemente Bailon was already terminated upon the latter’s
death. Neither is there a second marriage to terminate because the second marriage was likewise
dissolved by the death of Clemente Bailon.
However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance
with the Civil Registry where parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already inutile, the
respondent SSS has now the authority to review the decision of the RTC and consequently declare the
second marriage null and void.36 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration 37 which were both denied for
lack of merit.
Hence, the SSS’ present petition for review on certiorari 38 anchored on the following grounds:
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OF JURISDICTION.39
The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the findings of facts of the SSC on the
prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the SSC to
determine to whom, between Alice and respondent, the death benefits should be awarded pursuant to
Section 540 of the Social Security Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give respondent due
process or ample opportunity to present evidence in her behalf.
The SSS submits that "the observations and findings relative to the CFI proceedings are of no moment
to the present controversy, as the same may be considered only as obiter dicta in view of the SSC’s
finding of the existence of a prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice by virtue of which
Alice has a better right to the death benefits." 41
The petition fails.
That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS coverage, benefits and
contributions, there is no doubt. In so exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much less
reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law as it did in the case at bar when it declared that the
December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained through fraud and subsequently disregarded the same,
making its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and Alice’s marriage on the one hand and
the invalidity of Bailon and respondent’s marriage on the other.
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted as an appellate court. The
law does not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in the exercise of
its authority to determine the beneficiaries of the SSS.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of
the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration.42
Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage
so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of
the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or
contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under
any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It
follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the second marriage. 44
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years 45 when Bailon
sought the declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a requirement
then for purposes of remarriage. 46
Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity
of the second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second marriage to
prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first marriage, for it
must also be shown that it had not ended when the second marriage was contracted. The presumption
in favor of the innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong and of the legality of his second
marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the continuance of life of the first spouse or of the
continuance of the marital relation with such first spouse.47 (Underscoring supplied)
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, 48 it is terminated by final judgment of
annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the
subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus
Article 42 thereof provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated
by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry
of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the
fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of the
Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage. 49
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit
or by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the
subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been
contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as
legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.51
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by judicial

declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:
x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of
dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be
raised, because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except in a
direct action for annulment.52 (Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio53 instructs:
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83,
paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife
having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed dead,
still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had
died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment
should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the
liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be
carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse," as expressly provided in
Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding. 54 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage
had been perfectly valid.55 Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
good ab initio.56
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s
marriage prior to the former’s death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary
of Bailon.
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues raised has been rendered
unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
This is an appeal1 assailing the Decision2 dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution 3 dated March 20,
2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467.
The facts are as follows:
On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadeo-Matias filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tarlac City a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wilfredo N. Matias
(Wilfredo).4 The allegations of the petition read:
1. [Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and curr[e]ntly a resident of 106 Molave
street, Zone B, San Miguel, Tarlac City;
2. [Wilfredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was assigned in Arayat,
Pampanga since August 24, 1967[;]
3. The [petitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on January 7, 1968 in Imbo, Anda,
Pangasinan x x x;
4. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their conjugal home at 106
Molave street, Zone B, San Miguel, Tarlac City;
5. [Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979, he set out from their
conjugal home to again serve as a member of the Philippine Constabulary;
6. [Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never
made contact or communicated with the [p]etitioner nor to his relatives;
7. That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the National Police Commission,
[Wilfredo] was already declared missing since 1979 x x x;
8. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding [her]
beloved husband [Wilfredo], but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts,
[neither] did they have any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he was assigned to a
place frequented by the New People's Army;
9. [W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the [p]etitioner never gave up hope,
and after more than three (3) decades of waiting, the [petitioner is still hopeful, but the times had
been tough on her, specially with a meager source of income coupled with her age, it is now
necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive;
10. [T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death or at least a
declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court;
11. That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under
P.D. No. 1638 as amended.
The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to Branch 65 of the Tarlac City
RTC. A copy of the petition was then furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Subsequently, the OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein respondent Republic of the
Philippines (Republic).5
On January 15, 2012, the RTC issued a Decision6 in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the petition. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:7
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declared (sic) WILFREDO N. MATIAS absent
or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines for purposes of
claiming financial benefits due to him as former military officer.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiorari.8
On November 28, 2012, the CA rendered a decision granting the certiorari petition of the Republic and
setting aside the decision of the RTC. It accordingly disposed:
WFIEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated
January 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, branch 65, Tarlac City, in Special Proceeding no. 4850 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the petition is DISMISSED.
The CA premised its decision on the following ratiocinations:
1. The RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis of Article 41 of the
Family Code (FC). Article 41 of the FC does not apply to the instant petition as it was clear that
petitioner does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition was invoking the presumption of
death established under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code, and not that provided for under
Article 41 of the FC.
2. Be that as it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead should have been
dismissed by the RTC. The RTC is without authority to take cognizance of a petition whose sole
purpose is to have a person declared presumptively dead under either Article 390 or Article 391
of the Civil Code. As been held by jurisprudence, Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely
express rules of evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead—
which presumption may be invoked in any action or proceeding, but itself cannot be the subject
of an independent action or proceeding.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast. Hence, this appeal.
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal.
The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner is not
an authorized suit and should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC's decision must, therefore,
be set aside.
RTC Erred in Declaring the Presumptive Death of Wilfredo under Article 41 of the
FC; Petitioner's Petition for the Declaration of Presumptive Death Is Not Based on
Article 41 of the FC, but on the Civil Code
A conspicuous error in the decision of the RTC must first be addressed.
It can be recalled that the RTC, in the fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision, granted the petitioner's
petition by declaring Wilfredo presumptively dead "under Article 41 of the FC." By doing so, the RTC
gave the impression that the petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner was
likewise filed pursuant to Article 41 of the FC.9 This is wrong.
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that would have
warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC because petitioner was not seeking to remarry. A
reading of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of death established therein is only
applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law. Thus:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death of
Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death,
petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to claim for
the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended."10
Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of
remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article 390 or
Article 391 of the Civil Code11as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code
express the general rule regarding presumptions of death for any civil purpose, to wit:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he
shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years
shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate
among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not
been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not
been known for four years.
Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death of Wilfredo
was misleading and grossly improper. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by
petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC.
Petitioner's Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death Ought to Have Been

Dismissed; A Petition Whose Sole Objective is to Declare a Person Presumptively
Dead Under the Civil Code, Like that Filed by the Petitioner Before the RTC, Is Not
a Viable Suit in Our Jurisdiction
The true fault in the RTC's decision, however, goes beyond its misleading fallo. The decision itself is
objectionable.
Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo
under the Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This is because, in our
jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person declared presumptively dead under the
Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any authority to take cognizance of the
same.
The above norm had its conceptual roots in the 1948 case of In re: Petition for the Presumption of
Death of Nicolai Szatraw.12 In the said case, we held that a rule creating a presumption of death 13 is
merely one of evidence that—while may be invoked in any action or proceeding—cannot be the lone
subject of an independent action or proceeding. Szatraw explained:
The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a
person is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been
established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a
special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent
court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot
be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In this case, there
is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent
husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the
ascertainment of a particular fact, for the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been
unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a
declaration that the petitioner's husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if
judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is
already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory,
would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it
cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or
matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide
finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or establish
finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such
controversy is decided by a final judgement, or such right or status determined, or such particular fact
established, by a final decree, then the judgement on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon
the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to
no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that
a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven
years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality
or become final. (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
The above ruling in Szatraw has since been used by the subsequent cases of Lukban v.
Republic14 and Gue v. Republic15 in disallowing petitions for the declaration of presumptive death based
on Article 390 of the Civil Code (and, implicitly, also those based on Article 391 of the Civil Code).
Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw, Gue and Lukban collectively, we are able to ascertain the

considerations why a petition for declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil Code was
disallowed in our jurisdiction, viz:16
1. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that only allow a court
or a. tribunal to presume that a person is dead upon the establishment of certain facts.
2. Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action
brought exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of the said
articles actually presents no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action,
there would be no actual rights to be enforced, no wrong to be remedied nor any status to be
established.
3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article 390 or Article
391 of the Civil Code, in an action exclusively based thereon, would never really become "final"
as the same only confirms the existence of a prima facie or disputable presumption. The
function of a court to render decisions that is supposed to be final and binding between litigants
is thereby compromised.
4. Moreover, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Articles 390 and 391 of
the Civil Code would be unnecessary. The presumption in the said articles is already
established by law.
Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take cognizance of a petition that—
like the one filed by the petitioner in the case at bench—only seeks to have a person declared
presumptively dead under the Civil Code. Such a petition is not authorized by law. 17 Hence, by acting
upon and eventually granting the petitioner's petition for the declaration of presumptive death, the RTC
violated prevailing jurisprudence and thereby committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA, therefore,
was only correct in setting aside the RTC's decision.
II
Before bringing this case to its logical conclusion, however, there are a few points the Court is minded
to make.
It is not lost on this Court that much of the present controversy stemmed from the misconception that a
court declaration is required in order to establish a person as presumptively dead for purposes of
claiming his death benefits as a military serviceman under pertinent laws. 18 This misconception is what
moved petitioner to file her misguided petition for the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo and
what ultimately exposed her to unnecessary difficulties in prosecuting an otherwise simple claim for
death benefits either before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office (PVAO) or the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP).
What the Court finds deeply disconcerting, however, is the possibility that such misconception may
have been peddled by no less than the PVAO and the AFP themselves; that such agencies, as a matter
of practice, had been requiring claimants, such as the petitioner, to first secure a court declaration of
presumptive death before processing the death benefits of a missing serviceman.
In view of the foregoing circumstance, the Court deems it necessary to issue the following guidelines—
culled from relevant law and jurisprudential pronouncements—to aid the public, PVAO and the AFP in
making or dealing with claims of death benefits which are similar to that of the petitioner:
1. The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing soldier without
requiring the claimant to first produce a court declaration of the presumptive death of
such soldier. In such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make their own determination, on the
basis of evidence presented by the claimant, whether the presumption of death under Articles
390 and 391 of the Civil Code may be applied or not. It must be stressed that the presumption
of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises by operation of law, without need
of a court declaration, once the factual conditions mentioned in the said articles are
established.19 Hence, requiring the claimant to further secure a court declaration in order to
establish the presumptive death of a missing soldier is not proper and contravenes established
jurisprudence on the matter.20]
2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only present before the PVAO
or the appropriate office of the AFP, as the case may be, any "evidence" which shows that the
concerned soldier had been missing for such number of years and/or under the circumstances
prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Obviously, the "evidence" referred to
here excludes a court declaration of presumptive death.
3. The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the evidence submitted by the
claimant and determine their sufficiency to establish the requisite factual conditions specified
under Article 390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order for the presumption of death to arise. If the
PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is sufficient,
they should not hesitate to apply the presumption of death and pay the latter's claim. 4. If
the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is not sufficient to
invoke the presumption of death under the Civil Code and denies the latter's claim by reason
thereof, the claimant may file an appeal with the Office of the President (OP) pursuant to the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a petition for review with the CA
under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Court. And finally, should such recourse still fail, the claimant may file
an appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court.
While we are constrained by case law to deny the instant petition, the Court is hopeful that, by the
foregoing guidelines, the unfortunate experience of the petitioner would no longer be replicated in the
future.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution
dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467 are AFFIRMED. The Court
declares that a judicial decision of a court of law that a person is presumptively dead is not a
requirement before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office or the Armed Forces of the Philippines can
grant and pay the benefits under Presidential Decree No. 1638.
Let a copy of this decision be served to the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office and the Armed Forces of
the Philippines for their consideration.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, Martires, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., dissent. See separate opinion.
G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the Decision 2 dated January
12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-
92 (a) dismissing petitioner's petition for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent and (b)
ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Also assailed is the
March 5, 1998 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13,
1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition
for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia,
who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never
cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child died
during delivery on August 29, 1988. 4
In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,5 Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that
petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a
month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which
private respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her
pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely. Private respondent also prayed for the
payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of
P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and the award of attorney’s fees
and costs, but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00,
respectively. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant
petition for review based on the following assigned errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF
THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD, INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND
IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO
COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR IN AWARDING

MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID AWARDS
NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY LAW.7
The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated
consent; and (b) whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney’s fees and costs.
The petition is partly granted.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the
instant case, are generally binding on this Court. 8 We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or
violence compelled him to do so, thus –
To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged coerced
consent which supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on
November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when
Orlando took serious step to have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged
inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando
solely in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not altogether
bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy which was then already pending against
him. Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly decided
ahead with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even the very outcome of the present
case disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the bigamy case still pending
with this Court x x x Orlando must be hoping against hope that with a decree of annulment
ensuing from this Court, he may yet secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in
this perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable.
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not
freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind
a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to
wit: the harassing phone calls from the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by
three men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the
threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New People’s Army
whom appellant claimed to have been hired by appellee and who accompanied him in going to
her home province of Palawan to marry her.
The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard
in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the
rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s
way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with
the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the
police regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the
judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that
the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could
not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is
flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his
inability to copulate with the appellee. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his
client had a sexual relationship with the appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that sometime in
January 1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel where "the sexual act was consummated,
with the defendant on top" x x x.
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant resorted to
undermining the credibility of the latter by citing her testimony that her child was born, and died,
on August 29, 1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death as appearing in the
registry of deaths of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x.
To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is inconsequential, as there
is no controversy regarding the date of death of appellee’s fetus. Nevertheless, during the
continuation of the cross-examination of the appellee, she declared that her child was
prematurely born on August 29, 1988, matching the date in the certification of the Civil Registrar
x x x. The Court is not prepared to disbelieve the appellee and throw overboard her entire
testimony simply on account of her confusion as to the exact date of the death of the fetus,
especially when she herself had presented documentary evidence that put August 29, 1988 as
the date her fetus died.
Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the appellee’s evidence continues
in his argument that if indeed there is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in
December 1987, then she could not have a premature delivery on August 29, 1988, as she had
testified during the trial, because the 35-week period of pregnancy is complete by that time.
Whether the appellee’s impression that she had delivered prematurely is correct or not will not
affect the fact that she had delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988. In the light of appellant’s
admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his failure to
attribute the latter’s pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot complain that he was
deceived by the appellee into marrying her.
Appellant also puts in issue the lower court’s appreciation of the letters allegedly written by him
to the appellee. During his cross-examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters,
appellant identified the seven (7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but denied the remaining
six (6) x x x. The letters admitted by the appellant contained expressions of love and concern for
his wife, and hardly the rantings of a man under duress. During the re-direct examination,
however, appellant suddenly changed mind and denied authorship of those seven (7) letters,
claiming that he was forced to admit them because he was threatened with harm by the
appellee. If he was laboring under duress when he made the admission, where did he find the
temerity to deny his involvement with the remaining six (6) letters? The recantation can only be
motivated by a hindsight realization by the appellant of the evidentiary weight of those letters
against his case.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be
annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation
is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend
upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The
failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the
grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit
with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld. 9
We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code
provides that attorney’s may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable under the
circumstances, as in the instant case.
We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual and legal basis.
There is nothing in the records or in the appealed decision that would support an award of moral
damages. In justifying the award, the Court of Appeals merely said thus:
It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless portrayal of her by the
appellant as the perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x 10
However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any testimony of private
respondent detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to
moral damages.
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral
suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he
suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to prove
them during the trial. Indeed, respondent should have taken the witness stand and should have
testified on the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other emotional and
mental suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain his claim for moral damages. Mere
allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No other
person could have proven such damages except the respondent himself as they were extremely
personal to him.
As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not entitled to exemplary
damages. This is clear in Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must
show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case
liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that
such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the
question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show
that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the
stipulation for liquidated damages.
Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no exemplary
damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages. 12 In the
instant case, private respondent failed to satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages, thus she
is not likewise entitled to exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing
petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage with private respondent, is AFFIRMED. However,
the award of moral and exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010
ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his
deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code is the legal issue to be determined
in this appeal brought by the petitioner whose action for that purpose has been dismissed by the lower
courts on the ground that he, not being a party in the assailed marriage, had no right to bring the action.
Antecedents
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a
petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949
between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. 1 The case was docketed as Special
Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza
and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without
a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the
marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his
being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of
the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in
interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being
void ab initio.2
Ruling of the RTC
On October 18, 2000, 3 the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:
Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby resolved to DISMISS the
petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had long prescribed) and 2)
petitioner is not a party to the marriage (contracted between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato
on December 26, 1949 and solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration on November 14, 2000.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error that:
The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the petitioner is not a
party to the marriage.
In its decision dated January 30, 2003, 4 however, the CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus:
While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning does not
prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the proper party, which in
this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. In the instant case, the petition was filed
by Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-spouse, who is not a party to the marriage contracted by
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The contention of petitioner-appellant that he is considered a
real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as he stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, is simply misplaced. Actions for annulment of marriage
will not prosper if persons other than those specified in the law file the case.
Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the subject petition.
More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a party to said
case.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on appeal are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
The petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-

G.R. CV. NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 49 AT CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-

G.R. CV NO. 69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209
AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek
the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
Ruling
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the
mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a
valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the
marriage is contracted.6 As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be
changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law.7 To illustrate, a marriage between a
stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the
Family Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of a
marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The
Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in
force at the time of the marriage ceremony.8
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative
Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such
limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. 9 Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to
marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural
rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15,
2003.10
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,11 the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are
excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those
celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26,
1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate
the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no
application to the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog,12 the children were allowed to file after the death
of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father’s marriage to their stepmother
contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the Court distinguished
between a void marriage and a voidable one, and explained how and when each might be impugned,
thuswise:
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their
original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it
is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court
of competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place.
And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in
which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any
parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and
upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-
existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in
direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage
cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party
can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to
that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the
cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. 13
It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be
construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a
marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval,14 the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be
benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that
every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. 15 Thus, only the
party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action. 16 Interest within the meaning of the
rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the
case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest.
One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an
action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of
cause of action.17
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. Assuming
that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of
Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the
petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the
estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil
Code, as follows:
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter
shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the
deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceased’s
estate.18 Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior
determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or
illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s surviving heir. Such prior
determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this case. We
reverse their error, in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresenciano’s
surviving wife,19 stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant
to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required
a marriage license for their validity;20 hence, her participation in this action is made all the more
necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage
license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a
marriage license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein:
xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial
power. It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court [that] the action should be
1avvphi1
dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. 21
We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 entitled Heirs
of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and
Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were the legal owners of the property
involved therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 was decided on November 26, 2009, and the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on June 23, 2010. As a defendant in that action, the
petitioner is reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were
the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another indispensable
party whose substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely affect. The petitioner should
likewise implead Leila.
The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present action, however,
considering that Section 11,22 Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of
parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in
order to implead her, for under the same rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may
be made "on motion of any party or on (the trial court’s) own initiative at any stage of the action and on
such terms as are just."
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.
We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals.
Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano
Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its records are returned to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, in Cataingan, Masbate, for further proceedings, with instructions to first
require the petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead Leonila Honato and her
daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants; then to determine whether the late Cresenciano
Ablaza had any ascendants, descendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate) at the time of his death
as well as whether the petitioner was the brother and surviving heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza
entitled to succeed to the estate of said deceased; and thereafter to proceed accordingly.
No costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner,
vs.
RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
59550 which dismissed the petitioner’s petition under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to
annul the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15 in Special Proceedings No. NC-
662 nullifying the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent Rodolfo S. Ancheta, and of the
resolution of the appellate court denying the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.
This case arose from the following facts:
After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila. They had eight children during their coverture, whose names and dates of births are as follows:
a. ANA MARIE B . ANCHETA – born October 6, 1959
b. RODOLFO B. ANCHETA, JR. – born March 7, 1961
c. VENANCIO MARIANO B. ANCHETA – born May 18, 1962
d. GERARDO B. ANCHETA – born April 8, 1963
e. KATHRINA B. ANCHETA – born October 29, 1965
f. ANTONIO B. ANCHETA – born March 6, 1967
g. NATASHA MARTINA B. ANCHETA - born August 2, 1968
h. FRITZIE YOLANDA B. ANCHETA – born November 19, 19703

On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their
children. On January 25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 40, against the respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial
separation of property with a plea for support and support pendente lite. The case was docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. M-3735. At that time, the petitioner was renting a house at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM
Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. 4
On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement 5 where some of the conjugal
properties were adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children, including the following:
b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos. 120082 and TCT No. 120083-Cavite)
located at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, registered in the name of the family Ancheta. Biofood Corporation
under TCT No. 310882, together with the resort Munting Paraiso, Training Center, four-storey building,
pavilion, swimming pool and all improvements. All of the shares of stocks of Ancheta Biofoods
Corporation were distributed one-third (1/3) to the petitioner and the eight children one-twelfth (1/12)
each.6
The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise agreement. Conformably thereto, the
respondent vacated, on June 1, 1994, the resort Munting Paraiso and all the buildings and
improvements thereon. The petitioner, with the knowledge of the respondent, thenceforth resided in the
said property.
In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On June 5, 1995, he filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the
petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-662.
Although the respondent knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at No.
72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, "where she may
be served with summons."7 The clerk of court issued summons to the petitioner at the address stated in
the petition.8 The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the petition by substituted service on June
6, 1995 on the petitioner’s son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal, Carmona,
Cavite.9
On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a Return of Service to the court stating that
the summons and a copy of the petition were served on the petitioner through her son Venancio
Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6, 1995:
RETURN OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the complaint and its annexes was
received by the herein defendant thru his son Venancio M.B. Ancheta [III] as evidenced by the
signature appearing on the summons. Service was made on June 6, 1995.
June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite.
(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR.

Sheriff10
The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22, 1995, the respondent filed an "Ex-
Parte Motion to Declare Defendant as in Default" setting it for hearing on June 27, 1995 at 8:30 a.m.
During the hearing on the said date, there was no appearance for the petitioner. The public prosecutor
appeared for the State and offered no objection to the motion of the respondent who appeared with
counsel. The trial court granted the motion and declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the
respondent to adduce evidence ex-parte. The respondent testified in his behalf and adduced
documentary evidence. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition and
declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio. 11 The clerk of court issued a Certificate of Finality of
the Order of the court on July 16, 1996. 12
On February 14, 1998, Valentine’s Day, the respondent and Teresita H. Rodil were married in civil
rights before the municipal mayor of Indang, Cavite.13
On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with the Court of Appeals
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite in
Special Proceedings No. NC-662. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59550. The petitioner
alleged, inter alia, that the respondent committed gross misrepresentations by making it appear in his
petition in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 that she was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF
Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, when in truth and in fact, the respondent knew very well
that she was residing at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. According to the petitioner, the
respondent did so to deprive her of her right to be heard in the said case, and ultimately secure a
favorable judgment without any opposition thereto. The petitioner also alleged that the respondent
caused the service of the petition and summons on her by substituted service through her married son,
Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, a resident of Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, where the respondent was a
resident. Furthermore, Venancio M.B. Ancheta III failed to deliver to her the copy of the petition and
summons. Thus, according to the petitioner, the order of the trial court in favor of the respondent was
null and void (1) for lack of jurisdiction over her person; and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by
the respondent. She further contended that there was no factual basis for the trial court’s finding that
she was suffering from psychological incapacity. Finally, the petitioner averred that she learned of the
Order of the RTC only on January 11, 2000. Appended to the petition, inter alia, were the affidavits of
the petitioner and of Venancio M.B. Ancheta III.
The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court to render Judgment granting the
Petition.
1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14,
Naic, Cavite).
2. Ordering respondent to pay petitioner
a. ₱1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
b. ₱500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. ₱200,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus P7,500.00 per diem for every hearing;
d. ₱100,000.00 as litigation expenses;
e. Costs of suit.14
On July 13, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the following ground:
We cannot give due course to the present petition in default or in the absence of any clear and specific
averment by petitioner that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Neither is there any
averment or allegation that the present petition is based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction. Nor yet that, on the assumption that extrinsic fraud can be a valid ground therefor, that it
was not availed of, or could not have been availed of, in a motion for new trial, or petition for relief. 15
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution, appending thereto an
amended petition in which she alleged, inter alia, that:
4. This petition is based purely on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
5. This petition has not prescribed; it was filed within the four-year period after discovery of the
extrinsic fraud.
6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could not have been availed of in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief.
7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches and/or estoppel.
8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
were no longer available through no fault of petitioner; neither has she ever availed of the said
remedies. This petition is the only available remedy to her. 16
The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial court nullifying her and the respondent’s
marriage was null and void for the court a quo’s failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct an
investigation on whether there was collusion between the parties, and to order the Solicitor General to
appear for the State.
On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion.
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court alleging that the CA erred as follows:
1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which was sought to be annulled.
2. In finding that the Petition was procedurally flawed.
3. In not finding that the Petition substantially complied with the requirements of the Rules of
Court.
4. In failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court.
5. In not even considering/resolving Petitioner’s Motion to Admit the Amended Petition; and in
not admitting the Amended Petition.
6. In failing to apply the Rules of Procedure with liberality. 17
An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to annul a
judgment or final order or resolution in civil actions of the RTC may be based on two grounds: (a)
extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition
precedent, namely, the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. 18 The petitioner must allege in the
petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, under Rule 38
of the Rules of Court are no longer available through no fault of hers; otherwise, the petition will be
dismissed. If the petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or relief from judgment
through her own fault or negligence before filing her petition with the Court of Appeals, she cannot
resort to the remedy under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or
negligence.19
It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer available through no fault
of her own. The petitioner must also explain and justify her failure to avail of such remedies. The
safeguard was incorporated in the rule precisely to avoid abuse of the remedy. 20 Access to the courts is
guaranteed. But there must be limits thereto. Once a litigant’s rights have been adjudicated in a valid
final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to sue anew. The
prevailing party should not be vexed by subsequent suits.21
In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA that the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, and petition for relief, were no longer available through no fault of her own. She merely
alleged therein that she received the assailed order of the trial court on January 11, 2000. The
petitioner’s amended petition did not cure the fatal defect in her original petition, because although she
admitted therein that she did not avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief from
judgment, she did not explain why she failed to do so.
We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the original petition and denying
admission of the amended petition. This is so because apparently, the Court of Appeals failed to take
note from the material allegations of the petition, that the petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud
but also on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, on her claim that the summons and the
copy of the complaint in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 were not served on her. While the original petition and
amended petition did not state a cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground
of extrinsic fraud, we rule, however, that it states a sufficient cause of action for the nullification of the
assailed order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of the petitioner,
notwithstanding the absence of any allegation therein that the ordinary remedy of new trial or
reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47
of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or
over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary
remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer
available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by
the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a
direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is
invoked,22 unless barred by laches.23
In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the Court of Appeals, in light of the
material averments therein, were based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of jurisdiction of the
trial court over the person of the petitioner because of the failure of the sheriff to serve on her the
summons and a copy of the complaint. She claimed that the summons and complaint were served on
her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, who, however, failed to give her the said summons and
complaint.
Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the original petition and its annexes will show that it
is, prima facie meritorious; hence, it should have been given due course by the Court of Appeals.
In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,24 we held that jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court
over the person of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its
authority or by service of summons. The service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to
inform him that a case has been filed against him and, thus, enable him to defend himself. He is, thus,
put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such service in the absence of
a valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and void. 25 Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the
court on the person of the defendant even if he knows of the case against him unless he is validly
served with summons.26
Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either by handing a copy thereof to him in
person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to her. 27 However, if there is
impossibility of prompt service of the summons personally on the defendant despite diligent efforts to
find him, service of the summons may be effected by substituted service as provided in Section 7, Rule
14 of the said Rules:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.— If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies of defendant’s office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof. 28
In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,29 we held that the modes of service should be strictly followed in order
that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Thus, it is only when a
defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that substituted service may be made
by stating the efforts made to find him and personally serve on him the summons and complaint and the
fact that such effort failed.30 This statement should be made in the proof of service to be accomplished
and filed in court by the sheriff. This is necessary because substituted service is a derogation of the
usual method of service. It has been held that substituted service of summons is a method
extraordinary in character; hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances
categorized by statutes.31
As gleaned from the petition and the amended petition in the CA and the annexes thereof, the
summons in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 was issued on June 6, 1995. 32 On the same day, the summons was
served on and received by Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, 33 the petitioner’s son. When the return of
summons was submitted to the court by the sheriff on June 21, 1995, no statement was made on the
impossibility of locating the defendant therein within a reasonable time, or that any effort was made by
the sheriff to locate the defendant. There was no mention therein that Venancio Mariano Ancheta III
was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, where the
petitioner (defendant therein) was allegedly residing. It turned out that Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III
had been residing at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that his father merely showed him the summons
and the complaint and was made to affix his signature on the face of the summons; he was not
furnished with a copy of the said summons and complaint.
4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, I have
been residing on the adjoining land consisting of two (2) lots later apportioned to my father as
his share of the conjugal partnership. Since then, I have been residing therein up to the present.
5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence situated on my father’s lot),
my father came to see me and then asked me to sign and I did sign papers which he (my father)
and the Sheriff did not allow me to read. Apparently, these papers are for the Summons to my
mother in the case for annulment of marriage filed by my father against her. I was not given any
copy of the Summons and/or copy of the complaint/petition. 34
We, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the original petition of the
petitioner and the amended petition for annulment of the assailed order grounded on lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner.
The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the merits of the final order of the trial
court. However, we cannot but express alarm at what transpired in the court a quo as shown by the
records. The records show that for the petitioner’s failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial
court granted the motion of the respondent herein to declare her in default. The public prosecutor
condoned the acts of the trial court when he interposed no objection to the motion of the respondent.
The trial court forthwith received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment
against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor. The actuations of the trial
court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code, which reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of
facts or confession of judgment.35
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court
(now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation.— If the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exits, and if there is
no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.36
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. 38
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin39 reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,40 regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the State.41 The trial court, abetted by the ineptitude, if not sheer negligence of the public
prosecutor, waylaid the Rules of Court and the Family Code, as well as the rulings of this Court.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous
participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. 42
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion.
Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing
any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If
the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but
instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The
prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the
presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which
the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy
families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not
the concern of the family members alone. 43 Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or a
family should stay together must not depend on the whims and caprices of only one party, who claims
that the other suffers psychological imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her marital duties
and obligations.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated July 13, 2000 and September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are hereby SET
ASIDE and REVERSED. Let the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 be remanded to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings conformably with the Decision of this Court and Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., (Chairman), on leave.
G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner,
vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
1
CA-G.R .. CV No. 88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision of the Regional Trial
2
Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.
The factual antecedents are as follow:
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in
Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they
eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two children, namely: Jerome T.
Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was
engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Francisco, California.
During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in the USA:
PHILIPPINES
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
House and Lot with an area of 150 sq. m. ₱1,693,125.00

located at 1085 Norma Street, Sampaloc,
Manila (Sampaloc property)
Agricultural land with an area of 20,742 sq. ₱400,000.00
m. located at Laboy, Dipaculao, Aurora
A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 hectares ₱490,000.00
located at Maria Aurora, Aurora
3
A parcel of land with an area of 175 sq.m. ₱175,000.00
located at Sabang Baler, Aurora
3-has. coconut plantation in San Joaquin ₱750,000.00
Maria Aurora, Aurora
USA
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
House and Lot at 1155 Hanover Street, Daly

City, California
$550,000.00
(unpaid debt of $285,000.00)
Furniture and furnishings $3,000
Jewelries (ring and watch) $9,000
2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup truck $13,770.00
Bank of America Checking Account $8,000
Bank of America Cash Deposit
Life Insurance (Cash Value) $100,000.00
4
Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuities $56,228.00
The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s parents. The parties herein secured a loan from a
bank and mortgaged the property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the couple paid a
total of ₱1.5 Million for the redemption of the same.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December
2002,Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc
property for ₱2.2 Million. According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his
family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed that David agreed toand
executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of David’s father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3
December 2003 stating that: 1) the ₱1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property shall
be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia ₱750,000.00, which is
equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that David
shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties situated in the
Philippines. David was able to collect ₱1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc property, leaving
5
an unpaid balance of ₱410,000.00.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior
Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24 June
2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005. The California court granted to Leticia the
6
custody of her two children, as well as all the couple’s properties in the USA. 7
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of
Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to comply with his
obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer all conjugal properties in the
Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; 3)
the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of
the purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment
of₱50,000.00 and ₱100,000.00 litigation expenses. 8
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29 June
2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal
partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of
liquidation, including attorney’s fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal partnership. 9
The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:
1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital
infidelity which can result intothe forfeiture of the parties’ properties in favor of the petitioner and
their two (2) children.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the
same can be included in the judicial separation prayed for.
3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and
respondent David A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter’s property rights
over their conjugal properties.
4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the ₱2.2 [M]illion
sales proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the ₱1.5 [M]illion used to
redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests and charges.
5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
6. Whether or not the attorney’s feesand litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable
against their conjugal properties.
Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:
Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and presumptive
legitimes.
10
On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:
1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared DISSOLVED;
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe parties in the Philippines are
hereby ordered to be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras only, with the properties in the
United States of America remaining in the sole ownership of petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a.
Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce decree issuedby the Superior Court of California,
County of San Mateo, United States of America, dissolving the marriage of the parties as of
June 24, 2005. The titles presently covering said properties shall be cancelled and new titles be
issued in the name of the party to whom said properties are awarded;
3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the preceding

paragraph are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, his two minor children with petitioner
LeticiaNoveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must
be annotated on the titles covering the said properties.Their share in the income from these
properties shall be remitted to them annually by the respondent within the first half of January of
each year, starting January 2008;
4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to petitioner Leticia
Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her two
minor children with respondent David A. Noveras as their presumptive legitimes and said
legitimes must be annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in
the income from these properties, if any, shall be remitted to them annually by the petitioner
within the first half of January of each year, starting January 2008;
5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena, respondent David A.
Noveras shall give them US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition to their income from their
presumptive legitimes, while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall take care of their food, clothing,
education and other needs while they are in her custody in the USA. The monthly allowance
due from the respondent shall be increased in the future as the needs of the children require
and his financial capacity can afford;
6. Of the unpaid amount of ₱410,000.00 on the purchase price of the Sampaloc property, the
Paringit Spouses are hereby ordered to pay ₱5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras and
₱405,000.00 to the two children. The share of the respondent may be paid to him directly but
the share of the two children shall be deposited with a local bank in Baler, Aurora, in a joint
account tobe taken out in their names, withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or by
their representative duly authorized with a Special Power of Attorney. Such payment/deposit
shall be made withinthe period of thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy of this Decision, with the
passbook of the joint account to be submitted to the custody of the Clerk of Court of this Court
within the same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn from the Clerk of Court only by the
children or their attorney-in-fact; and
7. The litigation expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by the parties shall be shouldered by
them individually.11
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and
personalstatus are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by virtue of
the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior Court of California, County of San
Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the parties’ marriage had already been dissolved. Thus, the
trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute community of
property regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the children, instead of
an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.
With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as absolute
community of property because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the solemnization
of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance
with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take
judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their national law. The trial
court held that as the instant petition does not fall under the provisions of the law for the grant of judicial
separation of properties, the absolute community properties cannot beforfeited in favor of Leticia and
her children. Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed to prove abandonment and infidelity
with preponderant evidence.
The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she is praying for
considering that she already acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the principle of
equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine properties to David, subject to the payment of the
children’s presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89 of the Family Code, the
waiver or renunciation made by David of his property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the equal division of the
Philippine properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the common children’s
presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered both spouses to each pay their children the amount of
₱520,000.00, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the assailedDecision
dated December 8, 2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil Case No. 828 are
hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the Philippines are
hereby divided equally between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and
respondent David A. Noveras;
xxx
4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph 2 shall
pertain to her minor children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes which shall be
annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the income
therefrom, if any, shall be remitted to them by petitioner annually within the first half of January,
starting 2008;
xxx
6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each ordered to pay
the amount of₱520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive
legitimes from the sale of the Sampaloc property inclusive of the receivables therefrom, which
shall be deposited to a local bank of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in the latter’s names.
The payment/deposit shall be made within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt ofa copy of
this Decision and the corresponding passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe Clerk of Court a
quowithin the same period, withdrawable only by the children or their attorney-in-fact.
A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:
8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) the
amount of ₱1,040,000.00 representing her share in the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc
property.
The last paragraph shall read as follows:
Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local civil registry of Quezon
City; the Civil RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times Street corner EDSA,
Quezon City; the Office of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to the children, Jerome
Noveras and Jena Noveras.
The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED. 12

In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized the California
Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him because said judgment was part of the
pleading presented and offered in evidence before the trial court. David argues that allowing Leticia to
share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia considering that
the latter was already granted all US properties by the California court.
In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the
USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in
June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their
properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition for judicial separation ofconjugal properties.
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage
between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, we stated that:
13
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must beproven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense. 14
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must
comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court.15
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may
be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must beaccompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may
be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, asthe case
may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to
prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals, we relaxed the requirement on certification where we
16
held that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured the divorce and that
divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of
foreign divorce decree duly authenticatedby the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient."
In this case however, it appears that there is no seal from the office where the divorce decree was
obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts did with respect to the
17
property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin
with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of
the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court
thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration of
marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification isjudicially approved and
refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code. 18
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4 and
6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her
obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused
that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year
and reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the
guiltyor absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree ofjudicial separation of
property. (Emphasis supplied).
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial
separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court
ratiocinated:
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid cause
and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal dwelling
without intention of returning. The intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic]
abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or her whereabouts within the period of three
months from such abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his
hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the
alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back to the USA to visit her and their
children until the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in October
2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution of marriage
with the California court. Such turn for the worse of their relationship and the filing of the saidpetition
can also be considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the Philippines. 19
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in
the trial court’s decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the
absolute community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for more
than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been
proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David decided to
go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David
has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha
Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name
of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. Third and more significantly,
20
they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for
judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolves the
absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
(Emphasis supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community
regime and the following procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case
of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with
their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article
94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to
each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets,
which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or
division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary
waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in
accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal
dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the
majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are
deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no
such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.
At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall
adopt the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial court’s Decision with respect
to liquidation.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the
California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the
absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children’s presumptive
legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property. While
1âwphi1
both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing
where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from the community property.
Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the
benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of ₱120,000.00
incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of
₱300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at
least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No.
7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the criminal
case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia
and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of ₱120,000.00 or in the
respective amounts of ₱1,040,000.00.
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The children
arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community,
which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their respective
shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps.
Paringit in the amount of ₱410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the
amount of ₱520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom. 21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV
No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner,

vs.
LUCITA G. ONG, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 59400 which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Branch 41, Dagupan City granting the petition for legal separation filed by herein respondent, as well as
the Resolution2 of the CA dated April 26, 2002 which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married on July
13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila. They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and
Princeton who are now all of the age of majority.3
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family
Code4 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging that her life with
William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct. 5
Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost every day,
with physical violence being inflicted upon her; William would shout invectives at her like "putang ina
mo", "gago", "tanga", and he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair, bang her head against concrete wall
and throw at her whatever he could reach with his hand; the causes of these fights were petty things
regarding their children or their business; William would also scold and beat the children at different
parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the
children, he would turn his ire on her and box her; on December 9, 1995, after she protested with
William’s decision to allow their eldest son Kingston to go to Bacolod, William slapped her and said, "it
is none of your business"; on December 14, 1995, she asked William to bring Kingston back from
Bacolod; a violent quarrel ensued and William hit her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms;
when William hit her on the stomach and she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the head
then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house; she then went to her sister’s house in
Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their parents house in Dagupan;
the following day, she went to her parent’s doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries. 6
William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting language
against her, or whipped the children with the buckle of his belt. While he admits that he and Lucita
quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house in Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila, he
claimed that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills condominium and only went back to their Tondo
house to work in their office below. In the afternoon of December 14, 1995, their laundrywoman told him
that Lucita left the house.7
On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal

separation of plaintiff and defendant, with all the legal effects attendant thereto, particularly the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, for which purpose the parties
are hereby ordered to submit a complete inventory of said properties so that the Court can
make a just and proper division, such division to be embodied in a supplemental decision.
SO ORDERED.8
The RTC found that:
It is indubitable that plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William) had their frequent quarrels and
misunderstanding which made both of their lives miserable and hellish. This is even admitted by
the defendant when he said that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife.
Defendant had regarded the plaintiff negligent in the performance of her wifely duties and had
blamed her for not reporting to him about the wrongdoings of their children. (citations omitted)
These quarrels were always punctuated by acts of physical violence, threats and intimidation by
the defendant against the plaintiff and on the children. In the process, insulting words and
language were heaped upon her. The plaintiff suffered and endured the mental and physical
anguish of these marital fights until December 14, 1995 when she had reached the limits of her
endurance. The more than twenty years of her marriage could not have been put to waste by
the plaintiff if the same had been lived in an atmosphere of love, harmony and peace. Worst,
their children are also suffering. As very well stated in plaintiff’s memorandum, "it would be
unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship, abandon the comforts of her
home and be separated from her children, whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which is
already beyond her endurance.9
William appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC decision. In its Decision dated October 8,
2001, the CA found that the testimonies for Lucita were straightforward and credible and the ground for
legal separation under Art. 55, par. 1 of the Family Code, i.e., physical violence and grossly abusive
conduct directed against Lucita, were adequately proven. 10
As the CA explained:
The straightforward and candid testimonies of the witnesses were uncontroverted and credible.
Dr. Elinzano’s testimony was able to show that the [Lucita] suffered several injuries inflicted by
[William]. It is clear that on December 14, 1995, she sustained redness in her cheek, black eye
on her left eye, fist blow on the stomach, blood clot and a blackish discoloration on both
shoulders and a "bump" or "bukol" on her head. The presence of these injuries was established
by the testimonies of [Lucita] herself and her sister, Linda Lim. The Memorandum/Medical
Certificate also confirmed the evidence presented and does not deviate from the doctor’s main
testimony --- that [Lucita] suffered physical violence on [sic] the hands of her husband, caused
by physical trauma, slapping of the cheek, boxing and fist blows. The effect of the so-called
alterations in the Memorandum/Medical Certificate questioned by [William] does not depart from
the main thrust of the testimony of the said doctor.
Also, the testimony of [Lucita] herself consistently and constantly established that [William]
inflicted repeated physical violence upon her during their marriage and that she had been
subjected to grossly abusive conduct when he constantly hurled invectives at her even in front
of their customers and employees, shouting words like, "gaga", "putang ina mo," tanga," and
"you don’t know anything."
These were further corroborated by several incidents narrated by Linda Lim who lived in their
conjugal home from 1989 to 1991. She saw her sister after the December 14, 1995 incident
when she (Lucita) was fetched by the latter on the same date. She was a witness to the kind of
relationship her sister and [William] had during the three years she lived with them. She
observed that [William] has an "explosive temper, easily gets angry and becomes very violent."
She cited several instances which proved that William Ong indeed treated her wife shabbily and
despicably, in words and deeds.
xxx
That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to bear upon [Lucita] by
[William] have been duly established by [Lucita] and her witnesses. These incidents were not
explained nor controverted by [William], except by making a general denial thereof.
Consequently, as between an affirmative assertion and a general denial, weight must be
accorded to the affirmative assertion.
The grossly abusive conduct is also apparent in the instances testified to by [Lucita] and her
sister. The injurious invectives hurled at [Lucita] and his treatment of her, in its entirety, in front
of their employees and friends, are enough to constitute grossly abusive conduct. The
aggregate behavior of [William] warrants legal separation under grossly abusive conduct. x x x 11
William filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA on April 26, 2002. 12
Hence the present petition where William claims that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR

EVIDENCE THAT THE PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION WAS INSTITUTED BY THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF REMOVING FROM PETITIONER
THE CONTROL AND OWNERSHIP OF THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES AND TO
TRANSFER THE SAME TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S FAMILY.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR

EVIDENCE REPUDIATING PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S CLAIM OF REPEATED PHYSICAL
VIOLENCE AND GROSSLY ABUSIVE CONDUCT ON THE PART OF PETITIONER. 13
William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest control and
ownership of properties belonging to the conjugal partnership; these properties, which include real
properties in Hong Kong, Metro Manila, Baguio and Dagupan, were acquired during the marriage
through his (William’s) sole efforts; the only parties who will benefit from a decree of legal separation
are Lucita’s parents and siblings while such decree would condemn him as a violent and cruel person, a
wife-beater and child abuser, and will taint his reputation, especially among the Filipino-Chinese
community; substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked which warrant an exception to
the general rule that factual findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal; the findings of the
trial court that he committed acts of repeated physical violence against Lucita and their children were
not sufficiently established; what took place were disagreements regarding the manner of raising and
disciplining the children particularly Charleston, Lucita’s favorite son; marriage being a social contract
cannot be impaired by mere verbal disagreements and the complaining party must adduce clear and
convincing evidence to justify legal separation; the CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita and
her witnesses, her sister Linda Lim, and their parent’s doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzanzo, whose testimonies
are tainted with relationship and fraud; in the 20 years of their marriage, Lucita has not complained of
any cruel behavior on the part of William in relation to their marital and family life; William expressed his
willingness to receive respondent unconditionally however, it is Lucita who abandoned the conjugal
dwelling on December 14, 1995 and instituted the complaint below in order to appropriate for herself
and her relatives the conjugal properties; the Constitution provides that marriage is an inviolable social
institution and shall be protected by the State, thus the rule is the preservation of the marital union and
not its infringement; only for grounds enumerated in Art. 55 of the Family Code, which grounds should
be clearly and convincingly proven, can the courts decree a legal separation among the spouses. 14
Respondent Lucita in her Comment, meanwhile, asserts that: the issues raised in the present petition
are factual; the findings of both lower courts rest on strong and clear evidence borne by the records;
this Court is not a trier of facts and factual findings of the RTC when confirmed by the CA are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal; the contention of William that Lucita filed the case for
legal separation in order to remove from William the control and ownership of their conjugal properties
and to transfer the same to Lucita’s family is absurd; Lucita will not just throw her marriage of 20 years
and forego the companionship of William and her children just to serve the interest of her family; Lucita
left the conjugal home because of the repeated physical violence and grossly abusive conduct of
petitioner.15
Petitioner filed a Reply, reasserting his claims in his petition, 16 as well as a Memorandum where he
averred for the first time that since respondent is guilty of abandonment, the petition for legal separation
should be denied following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code. 17 Petitioner argues that since
respondent herself has given ground for legal separation by abandoning the family simply because of a
quarrel and refusing to return thereto unless the conjugal properties were placed in the administration of
petitioner’s in-laws, no decree of legal separation should be issued in her favor. 18
Respondent likewise filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions. 19
We resolve to deny the petition.
It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The rule finds more stringent application where the CA upholds the findings of fact of
the trial court. In such instance, this Court is generally bound to adopt the facts as determined by the
lower courts.20
The only instances when this Court reviews findings of fact are:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse
of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 21
As petitioner failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptional circumstances, the
general rule applies.
Indeed, this Court cannot review factual findings on appeal, especially when they are borne out by the
records or are based on substantial evidence.22 In this case, the findings of the RTC were affirmed by
the CA and are adequately supported by the records.
As correctly observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that there was no day that he did not
quarrel with his wife, which made his life miserable, and he blames her for being negligent of her wifely
duties and for not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their children. 23
Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous accounts of the instances when William displayed
violent temper against Lucita and their children; such as: when William threw a steel chair at
Lucita;24 threw chairs at their children;25 slapped Lucita and utter insulting words at her;26 use the buckle
of the belt in whipping the children; 27 pinned Lucita against the wall with his strong arms almost
strangling her, and smashed the flower vase and brick rocks and moldings leaving the bedroom in
disarray;28 shouted at Lucita and threw a directory at her, in front of Linda and the employees of their
business, because he could not find a draft letter on his table; 29 got mad at Charleston for cooking steak
with vetchin prompting William to smash the plate with steak and hit Charleston, then slapped Lucita
and shouted at her "putang ina mo, gago, wala kang pakialam, tarantado" when she sided with
Charleston;30 and the December 9 and December 14, 1995 incidents which forced Lucita to leave the
conjugal dwelling.31
Lucita also explained that the injuries she received on December 14, 1995, were not the first. As she
related before the trial court:
q. You stated on cross examination that the injuries you sustained on December 14, 1995 were
the most serious?
a. Unlike before I considered December 14, 1995 the very serious because before it is only on
the arm and black eye, but on this December 14, I suffered bruises in all parts of my body, sir. 32
To these, all William and his witnesses, could offer are denials and attempts to downplay the said
incidents.33
As between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the general denial for William, the Court gives
more weight to those of the former. The Court also gives a great amount of consideration to the
assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses as trial court judges enjoy the unique
opportunity of observing the deportment of witnesses on the stand, a vantage point denied appellate
tribunals.34 Indeed, it is settled that the assessment of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is
entitled to great respect and weight having had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of
the witnesses while testifying. 35
In this case, the RTC noted that:
William’s denial and that of his witnesses of the imputation of physical violence committed by
him could not be given much credence by the Court. Since the office secretary Ofelia Rosal and
the family laundrywoman Rosalino Morco are dependent upon defendant for their livelihood,
their testimonies may be tainted with bias and they could not be considered as impartial and
credible witnesses. So with Kingston Ong who lives with defendant and depends upon him for
support.36
Parenthetically, William claims that that the witnesses of Lucita are not credible because of their
relationship with her. We do not agree. Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label a
witness’s testimony as biased and unworthy of credence37 and a witness’ relationship to one of the
parties does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony. 38 Considering the detailed and
straightforward testimonies given by Linda Lim and Dr. Vicente Elinzano, bolstered by the credence
accorded them by the trial court, the Court finds that their testimonies are not tainted with bias.
William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in order for her
side of the family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy his
reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings could control the
properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning hard to believe. What benefit would
Lucita personally gain by pushing for her parents’ and siblings’ financial interests at the expense of her
marriage? What is more probable is that there truly exists a ground for legal separation, a cause so
strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from the courts. As aptly stated by the RTC,
...it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship, abandon the
comforts of her home and be separated from her children whom she loves, if there exists no
cause, which is already beyond her endurance. 39
The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label him as a wife-
beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear
on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucita’s decision to seek relief from the courts, but
because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of
legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides
that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. The
abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than
one year.40 As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not
constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
As a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family
as a basic social institution.41 The Constitution itself however does not establish the parameters of state
protection to marriage and the family, as it remains the province of the legislature to define all legal
aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it and put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect the same.42 With the enactment of the Family Code, this has been
accomplished as it defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes
the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of
nullity and those for legal separation. 43 As Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a ground for
legal separation, the Court has no reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA, and grant
her the relief she is entitled to under the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010
MARIO SIOCHI, Petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO GOZON, WINIFRED GOZON, GIL TABIJE, INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., and
ELVIRA GOZON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 169977
INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MARIO SIOCHI, ELVIRA GOZON, ALFREDO GOZON, and WINIFRED GOZON, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
This is a consolidation of two separate petitions for review, 1 assailing the 7 July 2005 Decision2 and the
30 September 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74447.
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land (property) covered by TCT No. 5357. 4 The property is
situated in Malabon, Metro Manila and is registered in the name of "Alfredo Gozon (Alfredo), married to
Elvira Gozon (Elvira)."
On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite City Regional Trial Court (Cavite RTC) a petition for
legal separation against her husband Alfredo. On 2 January 1992, Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens,
which was then annotated on TCT No. 5357.
On 31 August 1993, while the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario)
entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell5 (Agreement) involving the property for the price of ₱18
million. Among the stipulations in the Agreement were that Alfredo would: (1) secure an Affidavit from
Elvira that the property is Alfredo’s exclusive property and to annotate the Agreement at the back of
TCT No. 5357; (2) secure the approval of the Cavite RTC to exclude the property from the legal
separation case; and (3) secure the removal of the notice of lis pendens pertaining to the said case and
annotated on TCT No. 5357. However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply
with these stipulations. After paying the ₱5 million earnest money as partial payment of the purchase
price, Mario took possession of the property in September 1993. On 6 September 1993, the Agreement
was annotated on TCT No. 5357.
Meanwhile, on 29 June 1994, the Cavite RTC rendered a decision 6 in the legal separation case, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal separation between petitioner and
respondent. Accordingly, petitioner Elvira Robles Gozon is entitled to live separately from respondent
Alfredo Gozon without dissolution of their marriage bond. The conjugal partnership of gains of the
spouses is hereby declared DISSOLVED and LIQUIDATED. Being the offending spouse, respondent is
deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to their child Winifred R. Gozon whose
custody is awarded to petitioner.
Furthermore, said parties are required to mutually support their child Winifred R. Gozon as her needs
arises.
SO ORDERED.7
As regards the property, the Cavite RTC held that it is deemed conjugal property.
On 22 August 1994, Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their daughter,
Winifred Gozon (Winifred). The Register of Deeds of Malabon, Gil Tabije, cancelled TCT No. 5357 and
issued TCT No. M-105088 in the name of Winifred, without annotating the Agreement and the notice
of lis pendens on TCT No. M-10508.
On 26 October 1994, Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney 9 executed in his favor by
Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for ₱18 million. 10 IDRI paid Alfredo
₱18 million, representing full payment for the property. 11 Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of
Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-10976 12 to IDRI.
Mario then filed with the Malabon Regional Trial Court (Malabon RTC) a complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.
On 3 April 2001, the Malabon RTC rendered a decision, 13 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
01. On the preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction:
1.1 The same is hereby made permanent by:
1.1.1 Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Inter-Dimensional

Realty, Inc. and Gil Tabije, their agents, representatives and all persons acting
in their behalf from any attempt of commission or continuance of their wrongful
acts of further alienating or disposing of the subject property;
1.1.2. Enjoining defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. from entering and

fencing the property;
1.1.3. Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Inter-Dimensional

Realty, Inc. to respect plaintiff’s possession of the property.
02. The Agreement to Buy and Sell dated 31 August 1993, between plaintiff and defendant
Alfredo Gozon is hereby approved, excluding the property and rights of defendant Elvira
Robles-Gozon to the undivided one-half share in the conjugal property subject of this case.
03. The Deed of Donation dated 22 August 1994, entered into by and between defendants
Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon is hereby nullified and voided.
04. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 October 1994, executed by defendant Winifred Gozon,
through defendant Alfredo Gozon, in favor of defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. is hereby
nullified and voided.
05. Defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. is hereby ordered to deliver its Transfer Certificate
of Title No. M-10976 to the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila.
06. The Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila is hereby ordered to cancel Certificate of
Title Nos. 10508 "in the name of Winifred Gozon" and M-10976 "in the name of Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc.," and to restore Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5357 "in the name of
Alfredo Gozon, married to Elvira Robles" with the Agreement to Buy and Sell dated 31 August
1993 fully annotated therein is hereby ordered.
07. Defendant Alfredo Gozon is hereby ordered to deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
plaintiff over his one-half undivided share in the subject property and to comply with all the
requirements for registering such deed.
08. Ordering defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon to sit with plaintiff to agree on the selling price of
her undivided one-half share in the subject property, thereafter, to execute and deliver a Deed
of Absolute Sale over the same in favor of the plaintiff and to comply with all the requirements
for registering such deed, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of this DECISION.
09. Thereafter, plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay defendant Alfredo Gozon the balance of Four
Million Pesos (₱4,000,000.00) in his one-half undivided share in the property to be set off by the
award of damages in plaintiff’s favor.
10. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon the price they had
agreed upon for the sale of her one-half undivided share in the subject property.
11. Defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon and Gil Tabije are hereby ordered to pay the
plaintiff, jointly and severally, the following:
11.1 Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) as actual and compensatory damages;
11.2 One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
11.3 Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) as exemplary damages;
11.4 Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00) as attorney’s fees; and
11.5 One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) as litigation expenses.
11.6 The above awards are subject to set off of plaintiff’s obligation in paragraph 9
hereof.
12. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay Inter-Dimensional
Realty, Inc. jointly and severally the following:
12.1 Eighteen Million Pesos (₱18,000,000.00) which constitute the amount the former
received from the latter pursuant to their Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 October 1994,
with legal interest therefrom;
12.2 One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
12.3 Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
12.4 One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) as attorney’s fees.
13. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.14
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Malabon RTC’s decision with modification. The dispositive
portion of the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 7 July 2005 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated April 3, 2001 of the RTC, Branch 74,
Malabon is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, as follows:
1. The sale of the subject land by defendant Alfredo Gozon to plaintiff-appellant Siochi is
declared null and void for the following reasons:
a) The conveyance was done without the consent of defendant-appellee Elvira Gozon;
b) Defendant Alfredo Gozon’s one-half (½) undivided share has been forfeited in favor
of his daughter, defendant Winifred Gozon, by virtue of the decision in the legal
separation case rendered by the RTC, Branch 16, Cavite;
2. Defendant Alfredo Gozon shall return/deliver to plaintiff-appellant Siochi the amount of ₱5

Million which the latter paid as earnest money in consideration for the sale of the subject land;
3. Defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon and Gil Tabije are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-
appellant Siochi jointly and severally, the following:
a) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages;
b) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
d) ₱20,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
e) The awards of actual and compensatory damages are hereby ordered deleted for
lack of basis.
4. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay defendant-
appellant IDRI jointly and severally the following:
a) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages;
b) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
c) ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Defendant Winifred Gozon, whom the undivided one-half share of defendant Alfredo Gozon was
awarded, is hereby given the option whether or not to dispose of her undivided share in the subject
land.
The rest of the decision not inconsistent with this ruling stands.
SO ORDERED.15
Only Mario and IDRI appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals. In his petition, Mario alleges that
the Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of the
other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since Elvira’s conduct signified her acquiescence to the
sale, Mario prays for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
property upon his payment of ₱9 million to Elvira.
On the other hand, IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value. Thus, IDRI prays that the
Court should uphold the validity of IDRI’s TCT No. M-10976 over the property.
We find the petitions without merit.
This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the property
occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code. Article 124 of
the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to the recourse to
the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either
or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was
separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property. However, as
sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of
Elvira or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. 16 The absence of
the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal
property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.17 Even if the other spouse actively
participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouse’s written consent to the sale is
still required by law for its validity. 18 The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the
written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards Mario’s contention that the
Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is
withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to
IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
However, we disagree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the one-half undivided share of
Alfredo in the property was already forfeited in favor of his daughter Winifred, based on the ruling of the
Cavite RTC in the legal separation case. The Court of Appeals misconstrued the ruling of the Cavite
RTC that Alfredo, being the offending spouse, is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is
awarded to Winifred.
The Cavite RTC ruling finds support in the following provisions of the Family Code:
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds
shall not be severed;
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated
but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance
with the provisions of Article 43(2);
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the
provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and
The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate
succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent
spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce
the following effects:
xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of
the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of
the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in
default of children, the innocent spouse; (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved
and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by
the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredo’s share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred.
Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that "[f]or purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in
value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution." Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not
Alfredo’s share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal
partnership property.
With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that IDRI is not a buyer in good faith.
As found by the RTC Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI had actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious person to make further inquiries about the
vendor’s title to the property. The representative of IDRI testified that he knew about the existence of
the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 5357 and the legal separation case filed before the Cavite RTC.
Thus, IDRI could not feign ignorance of the Cavite RTC decision declaring the property as conjugal.
Furthermore, if IDRI made further inquiries, it would have known that the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens was highly irregular. Under Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, 19 the notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled (a) upon order of the court, or (b) by the Register of Deeds upon verified
petition of the party who caused the registration of the lis pendens. In this case, the lis pendens was
cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon the request of Alfredo. There was no court order for the
cancellation of the lis pendens. Neither did Elvira, the party who caused the registration of the lis
pendens, file a verified petition for its cancellation.
Besides, had IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it would have discovered that
Alfredo’s donation of the property to Winifred was without the consent of Elvira. Under Article 125 20 of
the Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent of the other
spouse. Clearly, IDRI was not a buyer in good faith. 1avvphi1
Nevertheless, we find it proper to reinstate the order of the Malabon RTC for the reimbursement of the
₱18 million paid by IDRI for the property, which was inadvertently omitted in the dispositive portion of
the Court of Appeals’ decision.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. We AFFIRM the 7 July 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 74447 with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) We DELETE the portions regarding the forfeiture of Alfredo Gozon’s one-half undivided
share in favor of Winifred Gozon and the grant of option to Winifred Gozon whether or not to
dispose of her undivided share in the property; and
(2) We ORDER Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon to pay Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. jointly
and severally the Eighteen Million Pesos (₱18,000,000) which was the amount paid by Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc. for the property, with legal interest computed from the finality of this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
G.R. No 176556 July 4, 2012
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner,
vs.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by their
mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The family is the basic and the most important institution of society. It is in the family where children are
born and molded either to become useful citizens of the country or troublemakers in the community.
Thus, we are saddened when parents have to separate and fight over properties, without regard to the
message they send to their children. Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk from our obligation to rule
on this case involving legal separation escalating to questions on dissolution and partition of properties.
The Case
This case comes before us via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
1
The petitioner seeks that we vacate and set aside the Order dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional
2
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In lieu of the said order, we are asked to issue a Resolution
defining the net profits subject of the forfeiture as a result of the decree of legal separation in
accordance with the provision of Article 102(4) of the Family Code, or alternatively, in accordance with
the provisions of Article 176 of the Civil Code.
Antecedent Facts
On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation
against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). Subsequently, the RTC rendered a Decision dated
3 4
October 10, 2005, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendant-respondent Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to Article
55.
As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bond
shall not be severed.
Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and
Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent spouse.
Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining
properties, namely:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan
City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;
shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the respective
legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of [₱]45,740.00.
[Petitioner’s] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of
the common children.
He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of [₱]19,000.00 as attorney's fees and
litigation expenses of [₱]5,000.00[.]
SO ORDERED. 5
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period provided for under Section
17(a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal Separation. 6
On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for execution which the trial court granted in its
7
Order dated December 16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is hereby granted. Let a writ of execution be
issued for the immediate enforcement of the Judgment.
SO ORDERED." 8
Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution which reads as follows:
9
NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the [petitioner] BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you cause to
be made the sums stated in the afore-quoted DECISION [sic], together with your lawful fees in the
service of this Writ, all in the Philippine Currency.
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this execution and your lawful fees,
then we command you that of the lands and buildings of the said [petitioner], you make the said sums in
the manner required by law. You are enjoined to strictly observed Section 9, Rule 39, Rule [sic] of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings immediately after the judgment has
been satisfied in part or in full in consonance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. 10
On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner paying the respondents the amount
of ₱46,870.00, representing the following payments:
(a) ₱22,870.00 – as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal share;

(b) ₱19,000.00 – as attorney's fees; and
(c) ₱5,000.00 – as litigation expenses. 11
On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner
filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term "Net Profits Earned."
12
To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an Order dated August 31, 2006,
13
which held that the phrase "NET PROFIT EARNED" denotes "the remainder of the properties of the
parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts." The Order
14
further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits
earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. The dispositive portion of
15
the Order states:
WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff intends to forfeit all the remaining
properties after deducting the payments of the debts for only separate properties of the defendant-
respondent shall be delivered to him which he has none.
The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of the Decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 16
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on September
17
8, 2006. Consequently, the RTC issued another Order dated November 8, 2006, holding that although
18
the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it may still consider the Motion
for Clarification because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning of "net profit
earned." Furthermore, the same Order held:
19
ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered set aside. NET PROFIT
EARNED, which is subject of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common children, is ordered to be
computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code. 20
On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying for the correction
21
and reversal of the Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007, the trial court had
22
changed its ruling again and granted the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration whereby the Order
dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order dated August 31, 2006.
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on February 27, 2007 this instant Petition for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following:
Issues
IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE COMMON PROPERTIES

OF THE HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION GOVERNED
BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE?
II
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
FOR PURPOSES OF EFFECTING THE FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF THE
FAMILY CODE?
III
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HUSBAND AND WIFE WHO
GOT MARRIED IN 1977? CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE
EFFECT FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE AS
A RESULT OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION WITHOUT IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS
ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER THE CIVIL CODE?
IV
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE OF THE GUILTY
SPOUSE IN THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A RESULT OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE
DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION? 23
Our Ruling
While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the applicability of certain laws, we are well-
aware that the respondents have called our attention to the fact that the Decision dated October 10,
2005 has attained finality when the Motion for Clarification was filed. Thus, we are constrained to
24
resolve first the issue of the finality of the Decision dated October 10, 2005 and subsequently discuss
the matters that we can clarify.
The Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory at the time the Motion for
Clarification was filed on July 7, 2006.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file
a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final
order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, we clarified that to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules
25
and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that "it would be practical to allow a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration." 26
In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from
the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of
Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. We also said, "The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion
for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution." In other words, a party
27
litigant may file his notice of appeal within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the trial court's
decision or final order denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Failure to avail of
the fresh 15-day period from the denial of the motion for reconsideration makes the decision or final
order in question final and executory.
In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The petitioner neither filed
a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On December 16, 2005, or after 67 days had
lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the respondent's motion for execution; and on February
10, 2006, or after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a writ of execution. Finally, when the writ
had already been partially executed, the petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days had lapsed, filed
his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the "net profits earned." From the foregoing, the petitioner
had clearly slept on his right to question the RTC’s Decision dated October 10, 2005. For 270 days, the
petitioner never raised a single issue until the decision had already been partially executed. Thus at the
time the petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial court’s decision has become final and
executory. A judgment becomes final and executory when the reglementary period to appeal lapses
and no appeal is perfected within such period. Consequently, no court, not even this Court, can
arrogate unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a judgment that became final. 28
The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void judgment. Being such, the petitioner's
thesis is that it can still be disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed from the issuance of the decision
to the filing of the motion for clarification. He said that "a void judgment is no judgment at all. It never
attains finality and cannot be a source of any right nor any obligation." But what precisely is a void
29
judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a judgment becomes void?
"A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no power to grant the relief or no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both." In other words, a court, which does not
30
have the power to decide a case or that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, will
issue a void judgment or a coram non judice. 31
The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void judgment. For sure, the trial court
has jurisdiction over a case involving legal separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers upon an
RTC, designated as the Family Court of a city, the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide,
among others, complaints or petitions relating to marital status and property relations of the husband
and wife or those living together. The Rule on Legal Separation provides that "the petition [for legal
32 33
separation] shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing or in the case of a non-
resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner." In the
34
instant case, herein respondent Rita is found to reside in Tungao, Butuan City for more than six months
prior to the date of filing of the petition; thus, the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over the respondent's
petition below. Furthermore, the RTC also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both parties,
considering that summons and a copy of the complaint with its annexes were served upon the herein
petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the herein petitioner filed his Answer to the Complaint on
January 9, 2001. Thus, without doubt, the RTC, which has rendered the questioned judgment, has
35
jurisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the parties.
From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005 judgment of the trial court is clearly not
void ab initio, since it was rendered within the ambit of the court's jurisdiction. Being such, the same
cannot anymore be disturbed, even if the modification is meant to correct what may be considered an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law. In fact, we have ruled that for "[as] long as the public respondent
36
acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing
more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal." Granting without
37
admitting that the RTC's judgment dated October 10, 2005 was erroneous, the petitioner's remedy
should be an appeal filed within the reglementary period. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to do this.
He has already lost the chance to question the trial court's decision, which has become immutable and
unalterable. What we can only do is to clarify the very question raised below and nothing more.
For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be disturbed since the October 10, 2005
judgment has already become immutable and unalterable, to wit:
(a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he cohabited with a woman who
is not his wife; 38
(b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of respondent Rita; 39
(c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership; 40
(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership; 41
(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's custody; 42
(f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from the innocent spouse by
intestate succession; 43
(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent
spouse; 44
(h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal partnership of gains and
pursuant to Article 116 of the Family Code, all properties acquired during the marriage, whether
acquired by one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved; 45
(i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal properties while they were
living together; 46
(j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) foreclosed; 47
(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must be dissolved and liquidated and
the fact that respondent Rita was the one who took charge of the administration of these
properties; 48
(l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to matters included under Article 121
of the Family Code and the conjugal liabilities totaling ₱503,862.10 shall be charged to the
income generated by these properties; 49
(m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the petitioner had separate
properties which can satisfy his share for the support of the family; 50
(n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7); 51
(o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any encumbrance shall therefore be
divided equally between the petitioner and the respondent without prejudice to the children's
legitime;52
(p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is
forfeited in favor of the common children; and 53
(q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the sum of ₱19,000.00 as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses of ₱5,000.00.
54
After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated October 10, 2005, we will discuss the
following issues for the enlightenment of the parties and the public at large.
Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the parties' property relation is
governed by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code,
instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other
provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of
legal separation.
Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005 held that Article 129(7) of the Family Code
applies in this case. We agree with the trial court's holding.
First, let us determine what governs the couple's property relation. From the record, we can deduce that
the petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the
exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and
since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains. Article 119 of the Civil
55
Code provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.
Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the property relations of the
petitioner and of the respondent is conjugal partnership of gains. And under this property relation, "the
husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from
their work or industry." The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal
56
partnership of gains. 57
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the
operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in
so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of
the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable
because according to Article 256 of the Family Code "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as
it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
law."58
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common properties of the conjugal
partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63(2)
and 129 of the Family Code?
We respond in the negative.
Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired, arguing: "As earlier adverted to,
the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the conjugal properties, the same being owned in
common by the spouses. If the provisions of the Family Code are to be given retroactive application to
the point of authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the net remainder of the conjugal
partnership properties, the same impairs his rights acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code." In other words, the petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is
59
governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired
vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of
the Civil Code, which provides: "All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common
by the husband and wife." Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties covered by the
60
conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the said properties, even after the
promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under the Family Code may deprive
him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which prohibits retroactive application
of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's vested right.
However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is written on stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, we define and explained "vested right" in the following manner:
61
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the
will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in
itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term "vested right" expresses the concept of present
fixed interest which, in right reason and natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State
action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and
irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a title—legal or equitable—to the present or future enjoyment
of property. (Citations omitted)
62
In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S.
Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, we also explained:
63
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that

expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary
state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested. Rights are considered
vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed
and irrefutable. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
64
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his "vested right," he may lose the
same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that
the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in
65
his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner
and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the
community properties of the parties. Second, when the Decision dated October 10, 2005 was
66
promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed
as "net profits," pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being
67
deprived of his right to due process.
Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's "vested right" is one founded,
not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This provision is like
Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the conjugal
partnership profits. The said provision says:
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share of the conjugal
partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse
had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or entirely from the
work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the separate property of the guilty
spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net profits.
From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under
Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the
guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the chance to
present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be set aside under the Civil Code
since the trial court found him the guilty party.
More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr., we reiterated our long-standing ruling that:
68
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is
inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not
ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and
settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber
ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the
right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined
that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the
spouses or their respective heirs. (Citations omitted)
69
Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its Decision dated October 10, 2005
that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7) of the Family Code. The petitioner did not file a
70
motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus, the petitioner is now precluded from
questioning the trial court's decision since it has become final and executory. The doctrine of
immutability and unalterability of a final judgment prevents us from disturbing the Decision dated
October 10, 2005 because final and executory decisions can no longer be reviewed nor reversed by
this Court.
71
From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly applies to the present case since
the parties' property relation is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains and since the trial court's Decision has attained finality and immutability.
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the separate properties of
the spouses and the products of their labor and industry.
The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of "net profits" earned by the conjugal partnership for
purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that since
there is no other provision under the Family Code, which defines "net profits" earned subject of
forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then Article 102 of the Family Code applies.
What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation of "net profits" earned in the conjugal
partnership of gains the same with the computation of "net profits" earned in the absolute community?
Now, we clarify.
First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the property relations between
the parties and the applicable law as to the definition of "net profits." As earlier discussed, Article 129 of
the Family Code applies as to the property relations of the parties. In other words, the computation and
the succession of events will follow the provisions under Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to
the definition of "net profits," we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly
provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and
Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits "shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
the market value at the time of its dissolution." Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to
72
both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code. Where lies the
difference? As earlier shown, the difference lies in the processes used under the dissolution of the
absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes used under the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.
Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the absolute community regime and the
conjugal partnership regime.
On Absolute Community Regime:
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes joint
owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage,
and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code)
form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or community is
dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned. 73
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an inventory is prepared, listing
separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each; then the
debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute community's assets and if
the community's properties are insufficient, the separate properties of each of the couple will be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered to
each of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net assets, which shall be divided
between the husband and the wife; and for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture,
said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. 74
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the "net profits" requires that we first find the market value of
the properties at the time of the community's dissolution. From the totality of the market value of all the
properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute community and this result to the net
assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute community, from which we deduct the market
value of the properties at the time of marriage, which then results to the net profits.75
Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant case, let us see what will happen if we
apply Article 102:
(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and wife have no separate
properties, thus, the remaining properties in the list above are all part of the absolute
community. And its market value at the time of the dissolution of the absolute community
constitutes the "market value at dissolution."
(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally separated, all the
properties which remained will be liable for the debts and obligations of the community. Such
debts and obligations will be subtracted from the "market value at dissolution."
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from the total assets of the
absolute community constitutes the net remainder or net asset. And from such net
asset/remainder of the petitioner and respondent's remaining properties, the market value at the
time of marriage will be subtracted and the resulting totality constitutes the "net profits."
(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and nothing would be
returned to each of them, what will be divided equally between them is simply the "net profits."
However, in the Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited the half-share of the
petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we use Article 102 in the instant case (which should
not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner since both parties entered into their marriage
without bringing with them any property.
On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we make it clear that Article
102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant case for purposes only of defining "net profit." As
earlier explained, the definition of "net profits" in Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies to both the
absolute community regime and conjugal partnership regime as provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of
the Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal Separation.
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of the
Civil Code, "the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage." From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts.
76
The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses.
Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals. 77
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family Code, Article 129 of the
same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's properties in the event that the conjugal partnership
of gains is dissolved, to wit:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal
partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations
of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition
of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been
vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal
assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
(2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to
each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of
movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous
event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which
shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was
agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or
forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition in
accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated
shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the
majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are
deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no
such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of the properties of the
spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing the couple's
conjugal properties and their separate properties. In the instant case, the trial court found
78
that the couple has no separate properties when they married. Rather, the trial court
79
identified the following conjugal properties, to wit:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de Bugabos,

Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City. 80
(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership during the
marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal partnership; and if the
81
community is enriched at the expense of the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution
of the value of such properties to their respective owners shall be made. 82
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the conjugal
partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses shall be paid from their
respective separate properties. But if the conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts
and obligations, the spouses with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable. 83
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and of the wife
shall be returned to each of them. In the instant case, since it was already established by the
84
trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any
85
of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus,
ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the
spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the
86
guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like
in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal
partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in
the guilty party's favor.
In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner is not entitled to any
property at all. Thus, we cannot but uphold the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the trial court.
However, we must clarify, as we already did above, the Order dated January 8, 2007.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Butuan
City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional Trial Court,
the Order dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in accordance with
the above discussions.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE
and JANE DOE, respondents. Mesm
G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss? The
answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by
the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful
1
custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. Slx 2
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the
body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his capture and
detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider
in that behalf."
3
It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object of which is the liberation of
those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause. It is issued when one is deprived of liberty or is
4
wrongfully prevented from exercising legal custody over another person. 5
The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio is to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and its
6 7
resolution dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband, lawyer
8
Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce consortium as the wife.

On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio is to annul that portion of the decision of the Court
9
of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and the Court
of Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.
The undisputed facts are as follows: Scslx
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of
pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio
Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a
period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons.
Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and at
Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived
in Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda
Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for
about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this
time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant
drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence, Potenciano’s health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a petition for
10
guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latter’s advanced age, frail
health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return
to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. Slxsc
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the
custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents refused petitioner’s demands to
11
see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.
After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered decision the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, judgment is hereby rendered:
"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon petitioner’s manifestation, respondents Erlinda
K. Ilusorio Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap, the administrator of Cleveland Condominium or anywhere in
its place, his guards and Potenciano Ilusorio’s staff especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor to allow
visitation rights to Potenciano Ilusorio’s wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her children, notwithstanding any
list limiting visitors thereof, under penalty of contempt in case of violation of refusal thereof; xxx
"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued be recalled and the herein petition for
habeas corpus be DENIED DUE COURSE, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of unlawful restraint or
detention of the subject of the petition.
"SO ORDERED." 12
Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein jointly decided.
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or
13
by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a
person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is
denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where
a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and
14
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. Jksmä â Ó
15
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. 16
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or
17
moral.18
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the
individual to discern his actions.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his liberty.
The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio did not request the administrator of
the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. He
made it clear that he did not object to seeing them.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s mental state, the Court of Appeals observed that he was of sound
and alert mind, having answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial
choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may
not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to
Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from leaving his
house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no
reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject
of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy.
Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. Esä m
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas
corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of
subject’s sanity.
When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same shall be enforced
under penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power
is unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor
child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private
reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture
cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free
choice.
WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No costs.
In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision of the Court of Appeals
insofar as it gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. 5/31/00 10:02 AM

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G.R. No.

103047 September 2, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

the solemnization of their marriage.

The controlling facts are undisputed:

February 20, 1987

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.

(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.

We affirm the impugned Decision.

Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by an officer having

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

4 Articles 53 (4) and 58, New Civil Code.

5 Article 80 (3), New Civil Code.

6 Article 70, New Civil Code.

The trial court made the following findings:

This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.

He raises the following issues for Resolution.

We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

San Juan, Metro Manila

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

San Juan, Metro Manila

September 20, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

San Juan, Metro Manila

July 25, 2000

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

As testified to by Perlita Mercader:

A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.

A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .

Q Did you bring that with you?

A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.

A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19

In one case, it was held:

Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.

Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with Associate Justices Marina L.

Buzon and Aurora Santiago-Lagman concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-33.

The petition shall be supported with the following documents:

of the child are that of the opposite sex.