EN BANC half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other

half.
[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]

CORNELIA MATABUENA , plaintiff-appellant, vs. PETRONILA DECISION

CERVANTES, defendant-appellee.

FERNANDO, J : p

Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Sañez for plaintiff-appellant.

A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We
Fernando Gerona, Jr. for defendant-appellee.
are called upon to decide whether the ban on a donation between the
spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1 The
SYLLABUS plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix
Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes,
WIFE; DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting
DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO that it was made at a time before defendant was married to the donor,
COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. — While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers sustained the latter's stand. Hence this appeal. The question, as noted, is
as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy novel in character, this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling
considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that
relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 year, is indicative of the appropriate response that should be given. The
O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks conclusion reached therein is that a donation between common-law spouses
unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the falls within the prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public policy."
then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the 3 Such a view merits fully the acceptance of this Court. The decision must be
other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper reversed.
pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating
ancient law; 'porque no se engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor that in plaintiff's complaint alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land
que han de consuno,' [according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV), in question, she specifically raised the question that the donation made by
reiterating the rationale 'Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur' of the Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under
Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every the aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand
reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as did assert ownership precisely because such a donation was made in 1956
husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that and her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that
assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater when the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965, there was
influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks stipulation of facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the defendant
to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by assisted by their respective counsels, jointly agree and stipulate: (1) That the
Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in question; (2) That said
donations should subsist lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of
turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on
family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached February 20, 1956, which same donation was accepted by defendant; (3)
to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage. That the donation of the land to the defendant which took effect immediately
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; was made during the common law relationship as husband and wife between
RULE WHERE A SISTER SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. — The lack of validity of the defendant-done and the now deceased donor and later said donor and
the donation made b~ the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does done were married on March 28, 1962; (4) That the deceased Felix
not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff
property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him claims the property by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral
and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962. She relative of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication
is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one- executed by her in 1962 and had the land declared in her name and paid the
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 estate and inheritance taxes thereon'" 5 used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. In the
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que
plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A donation under the terms of Article 133 of ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicación de sus disposiciones.'' 10
the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during the marriage. 3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to
When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having
on February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix
married. At that time they were not spouses. They became spouses only Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated
when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As
had been executed." 6 provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half. 11
considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage," WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965
policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of dismissing the complaint with costs is reversed. The questioned donation is
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs
relationship. We reverse. to the property in question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the above opinion.
Appeals decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 7 interpreting a similar provision Without pronouncement as to costs.
of the old Civil Code 8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because Teehankee, J, took no part.
of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a
prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; 'porque no se engañen
despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to] the Footnotes
Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale 'Ne mutuato amore
invicem spoliarentur' of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et 1. Art 133 of the Civil Code provides: "Every donation between the spouses
uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to during the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not apply when the
donation takes effect after the death of the donor. Neither does this
persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.
prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other
For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty
on the occasion of any family rejoicing."
years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the
danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, 2. 50 O.G. 3679 (1954).
as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), 'it would
3. Ibid., p. 3686.
not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of those
who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.' So long as marriage remains 4. Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 17-19.
the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the
5. Ibid, pp. 19-20.
disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage." 9
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the 6. Ibid, p. 21.
above pronouncement, any other conclusion cannot stand the test of 7. 50 O.G. 3679.
scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to
apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be 8. Art. 1334 of the former Civil Code was similarly worded: "All donations
between the spouses made during the marriage shall be void."
distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the
law which embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right 9. Buenaventura v. Bautista, 50 O.G. 3679, 3686 (1954).
would be nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with
disabilities would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should 10. The excerpt from Yellow Taxi and Pasay Trans. Workers Union v. Manila
Yellow Taxicab Co., 80 Phil. 833, 838 (1948) reads in full: "Esta interpretación
not be susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where
de la ley es insostenible. El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha
the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicación de sus dispociones. No deben
is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic atenerse a la letra de la ley cuando la interpretación literal se separa de la
purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. Whatever intención de la legislatura especialmente cuando lleva a conclusiones
omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language incompatibles con objeto manifesto de la ley. Cuando hay conflicto entre la
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