Plaintiff-Appellee Accused-Appellant: People of The Philippines, Aubrey Enriquez Soria
Plaintiff-Appellee Accused-Appellant: People of The Philippines, Aubrey Enriquez Soria
Plaintiff-Appellee Accused-Appellant: People of The Philippines, Aubrey Enriquez Soria
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, C.J : p
Lastly, witness Sorote of TV5 Cebu and The Freeman News testified
that he had covered the fire incident at the Parcons, and that he was able to
interview appellant in person after the police arrested her. He testified that
during the course of the interview, the appellant admitted to the crime. 12
The appellant denied the offense charged. She narrated that in the
morning of February 21, 2012, she wanted to go home because her children
were sick. She sought permission from Parcon, but the latter refused. As a
result, she escaped at about 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. of the same date through
the assistance of Cornelia. As agreed with Cornelia, they told Parcon that
they were going out for a snack, but that Cornelia would later return to the
house, fetch appellant's things and send her a text message. At 11:00 p.m.,
appellant did not receive any text message from Cornelia, so she proceeded
to Talisay City by riding a taxi. 13
On November 16, 2015, the RTC promulgated its Decision convicting
appellant of Qualified Arson. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, AUBREY ENRIQUEZ SORIA,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Arson as defined and
penalized under Section 1, in relation to Section 5, of Presidential
Decree No. 1613, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, including all the accessory penalties attached
thereto, and to pay Marciano P. Parcon, Jr. a temperate damage of
P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of P50,000.00, as well as the
heirs of Cornelia Tagalog P50,000.00 as compensation for the latter's
death and exemplary damages of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 14
The CA affirmed the findings of the trial court that the conviction of the
appellant is justified upon circumstantial evidence. The appellate court held
that the circumstances point to appellant as the author of the crime. As to
appellant's contention that her admission of guilt made before news reporter
Sorote should not be considered as it was not done intelligently and was
made with coercion, the CA observed that appellant voluntarily agreed to
take part in the interview and even provided details on how the arson was
committed. 17
Hence, this appeal wherein appellant raises the issue of whether the
prosecution was able to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
OUR RULING
The Court affirms the conviction of appellant.
Section 3 of P.D. No. 1613, otherwise known as the New Arson Law,
provides that the penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall
be imposed if the property burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Section
5 of the same law states that if by reason of or on the occasion of the arson
death results, the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua to death shall be imposed."
As such, the elements of the crime are: (a) there is intentional burning; and
(b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
I n People v. Gil , 18 appellant therein was convicted of the crime of
arson with homicide for willfully setting fire to a residential house by pouring
kerosene on a mattress and igniting it with a lighter, directly and
immediately causing the death of the person occupying the same. Here, we
emphasize the death similarly caused by appellant in deliberately burning
the inhabited house of Parcon. Thus, she should likewise be convicted of
arson with homicide. According to the trial court, the prosecution positively
proved that appellant deliberately set fire on the house owned and occupied
by the Parcon family when she burned her employment papers at the home
office thereof resulting in the death of the family's house helper. The records
reveal that the chain of events before, during, and after the fire established
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the acts alleged in
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the information.
But contrary to the findings of the trial court, the appellant argues that
the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to
convict her for the crime charged. Appellant further posits that Sorote's
testimony, surrounding the interview wherein appellant admitted committing
the offense, cannot be given credence because the purported admission was
not done intelligently and knowingly, and not without improper pressure and
coercion, as they were made while already detained at the Cebu City Police
Office. Lastly, she contends that the testimony of Umandak that he caught
appellant escaping the village should not be given weight because the same
was not corroborated by the testimonies of the other witnesses.
On the other hand, the People counters that the prosecution witnesses
sufficiently presented an unbroken chain of events that leads to the fair
conclusion that appellant intentionally burned the house of the Parcons and,
on the occasion of the fire, Cornelia died. As to appellant's contention that
her admission to the news reporter should be inadmissible as it was not
done intelligently, the People argues that the interview was not done in the
course of an investigation and that it was voluntarily given by appellant.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
identify appellant as the perpetrator of
the arson
In the case at bar, there is no direct evidence to link appellant to the
commission of the offense, there being no eyewitness as to how the fire
commenced. However, the lack or absence of direct evidence does not
necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused cannot be proved by evidence
other than direct evidence. Direct evidence is not the sole means of
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt because circumstantial evidence,
if sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evidence. 19
Resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Rule 133, Section 5
of the Revised Rules on Evidence. 20 To sustain a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, three requisites must be established: first, there is
more than one circumstance; second, the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and third, the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 21
In several instances, this Court had appreciated circumstantial
evidence to sustain convictions for the crime of arson. In People v. Abayon ,
22 none of the prosecution witnesses actually saw the accused start the fire,
but this Court held that the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution, taken in its entirety, all pointed to the accused's guilt.
Moreover, in People v. Acosta , 23 although there was no direct evidence
linking the accused to the burning of the house, we sustained the conviction
of the accused and ruled that the circumstantial evidence was substantial
enough to convict the accused. The accused had motive, and he was present
at the scene of the crime before and after the incident. 24
However, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a
conviction, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
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consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same
time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. 25 Thus, the circumstances
proven should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of others,
as the guilty person. 26 Moreover, it must be remembered that the probative
value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than nor superior to
circumstantial evidence. The Rules of Court do not distinguish between
"direct evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances from which the
existence of a fact may be inferred." The same quantum of evidence is still
required, that is guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 27
Both the trial and appellate courts held that the following
circumstances point to the logical conclusion that appellant commenced and
caused the fire:
1. February 22, 2012, at about 2 a.m., Parcon, Jr. and his family
were sleeping in their house at Holy Family Village I, Banilad,
Cebu City;
2. After having been roused from his sleep by [the] smell of smoke,
Parcon, Jr. leaped from his bed and slightly opened the door of
his room to check outside;
3. Parcon, Jr. saw a thick cloud of smoke on the second floor and
fire spreading on their stairs;
4. Parcon, Jr. opened the fire exit by the window of their bedroom
and his family passed [through] it to jump onto the roof of their
garage, away from the fire;
5. The firemen recovered the burned remains of Cornelia Tagalog
and noted that accused-appellant was missing;
6. At early dawn on even date, Parcon, Jr.'s neighbor, the witness
Umandak spoke with accused-appellant who had with her a bag
which later turned out to be owned by the deceased Cornelia
Tagalog, and that appellant had fled the village by climbing over
a fence and jumping over to the adjacent Holy [F]amily Village II;
7. At about 6:00 a.m., another resident of Holy Family Village I,
witness Umandak, told Parcon, Jr. that he saw and spoke with a
woman, later identified as the appellant;
8. After the appellant was arrested following a hot pursuit
operation, police investigators recovered from the appellant two
cellular phones that belonged to Parcon, Jr. as well as a handbag,
cash and personal effects belonging to the deceased Cornelia
Tagalog as identified by Parcon, Jr. and Cornelia (sic)[.]
9. Appellant admitted to a news reporter that she burned
employment documents inside Parcon, Jr.'s house and that she
was willing to face the consequences of her actions. 28
We find that the CA did not err in finding that the prosecution
witnesses realistically described a chain of circumstances which leaves no
doubt that appellant perpetrated the arson. The appellate court aptly
observed:
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What the evidence on record tells us is this — accused-
appellant, who had just been hired the day before the incident, had
stolen the cellular phones of her employer Parcon, Jr., as well as the
belongings of her co-worker, the deceased Cornelia Tagalog. To cover
her tracks, she burned her employment papers at Parcon, Jr.'s home
office, which fire turned into a conflagration that burned the entire
Parcon house down and resulted in the death of Cornelia Tagalog.
That accused-appellant had in her possession the two cellular phones
of Parcon, Jr. and the personal effects of Cornelia Tagalog places her
at the scene of the crime.
Even if the trial court disregarded the accused-appellant's
confession made before [the] police beat reporters, the testimonies of
Parcon, Jr., Umandak and Octe are sufficient to convict as they are
"consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt." 29
Indeed, the circumstances constitute an unbroken chain of events
which points to the appellant as the one who started the fire which gutted
the house of the Parcons, and eventually killed Cornelia. This Court notes
that the evidence was adequate to prove that appellant was present at the
scene of the crime before the incident and was the one who started the fire.
This is clear when she narrated during her interview with Sorote that she
burned her employment papers at the home office of Parcon, and that the
fire turned into a conflagration that burned the entire Parcon house.
Moreover, sufficient evidence was also presented to prove that appellant
was in close proximity to the gutted Parcon house after the incident.
Umandak, a neighbor of the Parcons, positively identified appellant as the
one he spoke with two hours after the incident.
Necessarily, the issue narrows down to credibility of the witnesses.
Worthy of reiteration is the doctrine that on matters involving the credibility
of witnesses, the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of
witnesses since it has observed firsthand their demeanor, conduct and
attitude under grilling examination. Absent any showing of a fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have been
overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the
factual findings and assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the
trial court remain binding on an appellate tribunal. 30
Admissions made by appellant to news
reporter Sorote are admissible in
evidence against her
We likewise reject appellant's contention that her admission to news
reporter Sorote should be struck down for being inadmissible. Appellant
posits that the admission was given under intimidating and coercive
circumstances since the same was made when she was already detained at
the Cebu City Police Office. In this wise, our ruling in People v. Dacanay 31 is
instructive:
The fact that the extrajudicial confession was made by Antonio
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while inside a detention cell does not by itself render such confession
inadmissible, contrary to what Antonio would like this Court to
believe. In People v. Domantay , where the accused was also
interviewed while inside a jail cell, this Court held that such
circumstance alone does not taint the extrajudicial confession of the
accused, especially since the same was given freely and
spontaneously[.]
xxx xxx xxx
Following this Court's ruling in People v. Jerez , the details
surrounding the commission of the crime, which could be supplied
only by the accused, and the spontaneity and coherence exhibited by
him during his interviews, belie any insinuation of duress that would
render his confession inadmissible. 32
Here, Sorote interviewed appellant in person after she was arrested by
the police investigators. As correctly observed by the CA, appellant had not
only agreed to be interviewed; she also provided details on why and how she
perpetrated the offense, thus the admission of guilt made before Sorote is
admissible in evidence against her. Sorote testified that:
Q: Now Mr. Witness, can you recall the interview with Soria?
A: During the interview, she said she needed money, and that her
live-in partner was already asking for money and asked her to
stop being a nanny and go home so that they could be together.
So, as far as I could remember, the nanny said, "wala nako toyoa
ang pagsunod, nanguha ko ug mga butang sa familya Parcon,
and on my way out of the house, I thought of burning the
employment documents which were in the office of Mr. Parcon,
Jr."
However, when she torched the documents, the fire spread
throughout the room and to the entire house.
Q: And was there any other statements coming from the accused,
Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, she said that she did not intend to do the incident, and she
would like to ask forgiveness from the family, as well as from the
family of her dead co-worker in the house, and because the
incident was already done, she is willing to accept the penalty
and imprisonment of what she did. 33
Clearly, appellant's confession to the news reporter was given free
from any undue influence from the police authorities. Sorote acted as a
member of the media when he interviewed appellant, and there was
evidence presented that would show that Sorote was acting under the
direction and control of the police. 34 More importantly, appellant voluntarily
supplied the details surrounding the commission of the offense.
Penalty and the awarded indemnities
P.D. No. 1613 imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death if by
reason or on the occasion of the arson, death results. The lower courts
correctly sentenced appellant with reclusion perpetua only considering that
there was no aggravating circumstance alleged in the information. 35
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Anent the award of damages, the CA included an award of moral
damages in favor of the heirs of Cornelia in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00). In view of our ruling in People v. Jugueta , 36 we increase
this award to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00). We are also
modifying the award by the trial court of civil indemnity, as compensation for
death, and exemplary damages to Cornelia's heirs, by increasing them to
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00). Also, the award of exemplary
damages in favor of Parcon must also be increased to Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00). 37 Finally, these amounts shall earn six
percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully
paid. 38
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated April 30, 2019, in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 02503, finding
appellant Aubrey Enriquez Soria GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Arson with Homicide, with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) The awarded civil indemnity to the heirs of Cornelia Tagalog is
INCREASED to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00);
(2) The award of moral damages in favor of the heirs of Cornelia
Tagalog is INCREASED to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00);
(3) The award of exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of
Cornelia Tagalog is INCREASED to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00);
(4) The award of exemplary damages in favor of Mariano Parcon, Jr.
is INCREASED to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00); and
(5) Appellant is also ordered to pay interest on these amounts at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of
this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Caguioa, J.C. Reyes, Jr., Lazaro-Javier and Lopez, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo , pp. 5-18; penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles, and concurred in
by Associate Justice Edward B. Contreras and Associate Justice Dorothy
Montejo-Gonzaga.
2. CA rollo, pp. 30-42; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Macaundas M. Hadjirasul.
3. Id. at 30.
4. Id. at 30-32.
5. Id. at 32-33.
6. Id. at 33.
7. Id.
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8. Id. at 33-34.
9. Id. at 34.
10. Id. at 34-35.
11. Id. at 36.
21. People v. Ariel Manabat Cadenas, et al., G.R. No. 233199, November 5, 2018.
22. 795 Phil. 291 (2016).
23. 382 Phil. 810, 820 (2000).
24. Bacerra v. People, 812 Phil. 25, 37 (2017).
25. People v. John Sanota y Sarmiento, et al., G.R. No. 233659, December 10,
2019.
26. People v. Ariel Manabat Cadenas, et al., G.R. No. 233199, November 5, 2018.
27. Antonio Planteras, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 238889, October 3, 2018.
28. Rollo , p. 14.
29. Id. at 14-15; citations omitted.
30. People v. Murcia , 628 Phil. 648, 659 (2010); citation omitted.
31. 798 Phil. 132 (2016).