Similar Acts As Evidence
Similar Acts As Evidence
Similar Acts As Evidence
DOCTRINE:
Collateral facts may be admitted in evidence when a rational
similarity exists between the conditions giving rise to the fact
offered and the circumstances surrounding the issue or fact to be
proved.
FACTS:
Adoracion Cruz and her children executed a notarized deed
of partial partition (DPP) by virtue of which each one of them was
given a share of several parcels of registered lands all situated in
Taytay, Rizal. The following day, they executed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) which caused the consolidation of the
properties/lands. Titles were issued in their names, some of
which are registered in the name of Nerissa Tamayo. Meanwhile
Spouses Malolos filed an action for the collection for a sum of
money. The trial court in the said case condemned the spouses
Tamayo which, as a result, the sheriff of the court levied upon the
subject land and were subsequently sold to the highest bidders,
the spouses Malolos. Nerissa Tamayo failed to exercise her right
of redemption within the statutory period and so the final deed of
sale was executed by the sheriff in favor of the spouses Malolos.
Due to Tamayo’s failure to heed the court’s order to surrender
the subject titles, Malolos asked the court to declare said titles as
null and void. At this point, petitioners Adoracion Cruz, et al.,
intervened contending that they are co-owners of the subject
lands. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses Malolos and
subsequently affirmed by the CA. It was contended by the
petitioners that the MOA revoked and supersede the DPP and
thus they are co-owners of the subject lands and further invoke
the res inter alios act rule against the agreement of Tamayo and
the Spouses Malolos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not collateral facts may be received as evidence
in the case at bar
RULING:
Yes, collateral facts may be received as evidence in the case
at bar.
Res inter alios acta, as a general rule, prohibits the
admission of evidence that tends to show that what a person has
done at one time is probative of the contention that he has done
a similar as act at another time. Evidence of similar acts or
occurrences compels the defendant to meet allegations that are
not mentioned in the complaint, confuses him in his defense,
raises a variety of irrelevant issues, and diverts the attention of
the court from the issues immediately before it. Hence, this
evidentiary rule guards against the practical inconvenience of
trying collateral issues and protracting the trial and prevents
surprise or other mischief prejudicial to litigants.
The rule, however, is not without exception. While
inadmissible in general, collateral facts may be received as
evidence under exceptional circumstances, as when there is a
rational similarity or resemblance between the conditions giving
rise to the fact offered and the circumstances surrounding the
issue or fact to be proved. Evidence of similar acts may
frequently become relevant, especially in actions based on fraud
and deceit, because it sheds light on the state of mind or
knowledge of a persons; it provides insight into such persons
motive or intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan; or it
reveals a mistake.
In this case, petitioners argue that transactions relating to
the other parcels of land they entered into, in the concept of
absolute owners, are inadmissible as evidence to show that the
parcels in issue are not co-owned. The court is not persuaded.
Evidence of such transactions falls under the exception to the rule
on the res inter alios acta. Such evidence is admissible because it
is relevant to an issue in the case and corroborative of evidence
already received. The relevancy of such transactions is readily
apparent. The nature of ownership of said property should be the
same as that of the lots on question since they are all subject to
the MOA. If the parcels of land were held and disposed by
petitioners in fee simple, in the concept of absolute owners, then
the lots in question should similarly be treated as absolutely
owned in fee simple by the Tamayo spouses. Unmistakably, the
evidence in dispute manifests petitioners common purpose and
design to treat all the parcels of land covered by the DPP as
absolutely owned and not subject to co-ownership.