TITLE: G.R. No.

180043
July 14, 2009

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Respondent.

FACTS:

For the period January to December 2001, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT) collected from respondent the 10% Overseas Communication Tax (OCT) on
the amount paid by the latter for overseas telephone calls it had made through the former.
Respondent filed with the BIR an administrative claim for refund of the OCT it alleged to have
erroneously paid in 2001. Petitioner failed to act on the request for refund of the respondent,
which prompted to file with the CTA in Division, a petition for Review. The CTA granted the
petition. After a petitioner filed an appeal with the CTA en banc which denied petitioner appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the “lieu of all other taxes” phrase in Sec. 13 and 14 of PD 1590 applies
to grant the exemption

RULING:

Yes. According to Section 120 of the NIRC, the person paying for the services rendered
(respondent, in this case) shall pay the OCT to the person rendering the service (PLDT); the
latter, in turn, shall remit the amount to the BIR. If this Court deems the final tax on interest
income – which also an income tax, but distinct from basic corporate income tax – is included
among “all other taxes” from which respondent is exempt, then with all the more reason should
the Court consider OCT, which is altogether a different type of tax, as also covered by the said
exemption.

Petitioner further avers the respondent cannot avail itself of the benefit of the “in lieu of
all other taxes’ proviso in Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 1590 when it made no actual
payment of either the basic corporate income tax or the franchise tax.
 Petitioner made the same averment in the PAL case, which the Court rejected for the
following reasons: “A careful reading of Section 13 rebuts the argument of the CIR that the "in
lieu of all other taxes" proviso is a mere incentive that applies only when PAL actually pays
something. It is clear that PD 1590 intended to give respondent the option to avail itself of
Subsection (a) or (b) as consideration for its franchise. Either option excludes the payment of
other taxes and dues imposed or collected by the national or the local government. PAL has the
option to choose the alternative that results in lower taxes. It is not the fact of tax payment that
exempts it, but the exercise of its option.”

It must do well for petitioner to remember that a statute’s clauses and phrases should not
be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. A strict interpretation of the word "pay" in
Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 1590 would effectively render nugatory the other rights
categorically conferred upon the respondent by its franchise.
TITLE: G.R. No. L-36153 November 28, 1975

ALFONSO V. LEGASPI vs. THE HONORABLE, EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY, THE HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUDGET,
THE HONORABLE THE SECRETARY, THE AUDITOR and THE
CASHIER, all of the Department of Agrarian Reforms

FACTS:

On October 7, 1971, Petitioner, an employee of the Department of Agrarian Reforms,

sent a letter to the respondent Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, Honorable
Conrado F. Estrella, expressing his desire to be laid-off under the provisions of Republic Act No.
3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, on condition that he would also be paid the
gratuity benefits to which he might be entitled under Republic Act No. 1616.

On May 8, 1972, the General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System
approved petitioner’s retirement (Retirement Gratuity No. 27511) under Section 12 (c) of
Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by Republic Act No. 1616, but denied his claim for
gratuity under RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to both gratuity benefits under C.A No. 186, as
amended by RA 1616, and RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389.

RULING:

No. There is nothing in Section 169, Republic Act 3844, as amended, that would as much
suggest that an employee who is laid-off or prefers to be laid-off can receive two pension
benefits, one under its provisions and another pursuant to Commonwealth Act 186.

This interpretation is more in line with the policy of the law embodied in Section 28 (b)
of Commonwealth Act 186 13 prohibiting an employer from paying double retirement benefits
to an employee. Being the law governing the retirement of government employees, all other laws
extending retirement benefits to government employees should, in case of ambiguity, be
construed in relation thereto and in the light of its provisions. It is a rule of statutory construction
that when the legislature enacts a provision, it is understood that it is aware of previous statutes
relating to the same subject matter, and that in the absence of any express repeal or amendment
therein, the new provision should be deemed enacted pursuant to the legislative policy embodied
in the prior statutes, which should all be construed together.
TITLE: GR 187420 August 09, 2017

Power Generation Employees Association-NPC v. National Power Corporation

FACTS:

On June 8, 2001, Republic Act No. 9136 or EPIRA was signed into law. Among its
reforms was the privatization of NAPOCOR assets. Pursuant to this objective, PSALM was
created "to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of [NAPOCOR]'s generation
assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and [Independent Power Producer] contracts with
the objective of liquidating all [NAPOCOR] financial obligations and stranded contract costs in
an optimal manner.”

Sometime in 2008, Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management (PSALM) drafted
the Operation and Maintenance Agreement for NAPOCOR's acceptance. The contract provided
that NAPOCOR would perform "all functions and services necessary to successfully and
efficiently operate, maintain, and manage" power plants, generation assets, or facilities until its
transfer or turnover to PSALM. It further provided that NAPOCOR must submit its proposed
budget to PSALM for review and approval. All revenues related to the maintenance and
operation of power plants, generation assets, or facilities would be considered as PSALM's
properties.

On August 06, 2008, NAPOCOR President Cyril C. Del Callar (Del Callar) wrote a letter
to Representative Arnulfo P. Fuentebella (Rep. Fuentebella), one (1) of the authors of EPIRA.
He inquired whether PSALM had the authority to take control over NAPOCOR's assets and
revenues considering that its authority was limited only to the conservation and administration of
these assets. Then, Rep. Fuentebella opined that PSALM "should not be meddling with how
[NAPOCOR] operates and sells electricity from the undisposed generating assets and
[Independent Power Producer] contracts. He further stated that PSALM was designed to act as a
Special Purpose Vehicle for the purpose of bridging the financial requirement of NAPOCOR and
thereby, provide additional value to its assets before disposal.
 On March 9, 2009, the Operation and Management Agreement was signed by PSALM,
represented by Jose F. Ibazeta, and NAPOCOR, represented by Tampinco. This Agreement was
confirmed and ratified by NAPOCOR's Board of Directors on the same day.

On April 28, 2009, petitioners filed this present Petition for Injunction with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction seeking to restrain the implementation of
the Operation and Management Agreement for contravening the provisions of EPIRA. In
particular, they argue that PSALM's ownership extends only to net profits, and not to all
revenues, of NAPOCOR under Section 55(e) of EPIRA. Hence, NAPOCOR's revenues should
not be billed for PSALM's account.

Petitioners argue that while EPIRA authorizes PSALM to take ownership of

NAPOCOR's generation assets, liabilities, Independent Power Producer (IPP) contracts, real
estate, and disposable assets, its ownership should be based on its mandate to privatize
NAPOCOR's assets and to liquidate its liabilities. They submit that EPIRA did not authorize
PSALM to enter into the Operation and Maintenance Agreement with NAPOCOR.

Petitioners further hold that the remittance of NAPOCOR's revenues to PSALM violates
EPIRA since Section 55 of EPIRA and Section ll(a)(i) of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations mandate that only the net profits shall be owned by PSALM.

Petitioners likewise assert that EPIRA did not grant PSALM the power to control and
supervise the internal operations of NAPOCOR. Thus, they argue that the provision in the
Operation and Maintenance Agreement requiring NAPOCOR to submit its proposed budget to
PSALM violates EPIRA since NAPOCOR's Charter grants the NAPOCOR Board of Directors
the authority to adopt a budget without prior approval from PSALM.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that the Operation and
Maintenance Agreement merely recognized PSALM's ownership of NAPOCOR's generation
assets and facilities, consistent with the mandate of EPIRA. It argues that under Sections 49 and
55 of EPIRA, PSALM became the owner of NAPOCOR's generation assets, real estate, IPP
contracts, other disposable assets, residual assets, and its net profits. It avers that generation
assets include all proceeds from the operation or disposition of the assets.
 The Office of the Solicitor General further contends that there is nothing in EPIRA that
qualifies or limits PSALM's ownership of these assets. Thus, PSALM may operate generation
assets directly or indirectly through NAPOCOR under Rule 21, Section 5(q) of EPIRA's
Implementing Rules and Regulations.[42] It argues that the opinion of Rep. Fuentebella should not
be controlling since it is the judiciary, and not the legislative branch, that interprets the law.

The Office of the Solicitor General likewise maintains that petitioners are not entitled to
injunctive relief since they are neither the real parties in interest nor have they shown that they
will suffer a grave and irreparable injury with the implementation of the Operation and
Management Agreement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners may file a Petition for Injunction under Section 78 of
EPIRA to question the validity of the Operation and Maintenance Agreement between
respondents PSALM and NAPOCOR?

Whether or not the petitioners may question the validity of the Operation and
Maintenance Agreement despite not being one (1) of the contracting parties?

Whether or not the Operation and Maintenance Agreement violated the provisions of
EPIRA when it mandated the remittance of NAPOCOR's revenues to PSALM and when it
required NAPOCOR to submit its proposed budget to PSALM for approval?

RULING:

NO. The Operation and Maintenance Agreement is a contract that preserves the
implementation of EPIRA. Thus, it is covered by Section 78. Under this provision, no restraint or
injunction whether permanent or temporary, could be issued by any court except by this Court.

However, in Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, this Court invalidated the second

paragraph of Republic Act No. 6770, Section 14 for being unconstitutional. The assailed
provision prohibited any court, except this Court, to enjoin investigations of the Ombudsman.
This Court explained in Carpio-Morales that provisional remedies found in the Rules of Court
are within this Court's constitutional prerogative to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and
procedure

Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, all courts have the inherent power to issue
temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction. When Congress passes a law that
prohibits other courts from exercising this power, it encroaches upon this Court's power to
promulgate rules of procedure, in violation of the separation of powers.

However, Carpio-Morales  dealt only with temporary restraining orders, not permanent

injunctions. The injunction contemplated in EPIRA is not a mere interlocutory action by a court
but a permanent remedy. Thus, Section 78 of EPIRA can still apply to this case.

B. NO. Petitioners, not being privy to the Operation and Maintenance Agreement, have no cause
of action against respondents. They are not the real parties in interest to question its validity.
Provisional reliefs, such as a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, are
ancillary writs issued by the court to protect the rights of a party during the pendency of the
principal action. Rule 58, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.

To issue an injunctive writ, the applicant must establish his or her right sought to be
protected. Petitioners allege that while they were not privy to the Operation and Maintenance
Agreement, they will be affected by its implementation as NAPOCOR employees since they are
"the ones engaged in the operations and maintenance of the unsold generation plants. The
Petition, however, fails to show how NAPOCOR employees will be affected by the Operation
and Maintenance Agreement's implementation.

Actions must be instituted by the real parties in interest. Otherwise, the action may be
dismissed for lack of cause of action. (Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court).

C. NO. The assailed provisions of the Operation and Maintenance Agreement do not contravene
the provisions of EPIRA. PSALM was created as a government-owned and -controlled
corporation to take ownership over all of NAPOCOR's assets and liabilities for the sole purpose
of managing its sale, disposition, and privatization. PSALM would have a corporate life of 25
years, after which all assets and remaining liabilities would revert back to the national
government. (Sections 49 and 50 of EPIRA)