THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V.

CONSORCIA
CABANGIS, ET AL
G.R. No. L-28379             March 27, 1929

DOCTRINE: Lots disappeared caused by natural erosion due to the bb and

flow of the tide, and as they remained in that condition until reclaimed for
the sea by the filling in done by the Government, they belong to the public
domain for public use.

FACTS
Lots 36, 39 and 40, which are subject to cadastral proceeding of the City of
Manila were formerly a part of a large parcel of land belonging to the
predecessor of the herein claimants and appellees.

From the year 1896 said land began to wear away, due to the action of the
waves of Manila Bay, until the year 1901 when the said lots became
completely submerged in water in ordinary tides, and remained in such a
state. On 1912,  the Government undertook the dredging of Vitas Estuary in
order to facilitate navigation, depositing all the sand and silt taken from the
bed of the estuary on the low lands which were completely covered with
water, surrounding that belonging to the Philippine Manufacturing
Company, thereby slowly and gradually forming the lots, the subject matter
of this proceeding.

Nobody had declared lot 39 for the purposes of taxation, and it was only in
the year 1926 that Dr. Pedro Gil, in behalf of the claimants and appellees,
declared lot No. 40 for such purpose.

The claimants-appellees contend that inasmuch as the said lots once formed
a part of a large parcel of land belonging to their predecessors, whom they
succeeded, and their immediate predecessor in interest having taken
possession thereof, said lots belong to them.

ISSUE

To which does the ownership of the reclaimed land belong to?

RULING

The Government owns the reclaimed land in the sense that it has become
property of public dominion, because in letting it remained submerged, the
claimants-appellees may be said to have abandoned the same. Having
become part of the sea or seashore, it became property for public use.
When the government took steps to make it land again, its status as public
dominion remained unchanged. As provided by Article 5 of the Law of
Waters,

ART. 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed

by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper
permission, shall become the property of the party constructing such works,
unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority.

Therefore, the claimants- appellees are not entitled to the land. Instead, the
Government

Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles

66 SCRA 431

FACTS:
A portion of land, sought to be registered, was declared, through law, an
abandoned road. The lot was awarded to the petitioner for being the
highest bidder.
The Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the
application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a
public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain
and therefore outside the commerce of man.

ISSUE:
WON the portion of land is susceptible to registration by a private individual.
-- YES

HELD:
Revised Charter of Cebu, under section 31, provides that, the City Council
shall have the power to close any city road, street or alley, etc, withdrawn
from public servitude, may be used or conveyed for any purpose.

It is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city

road or street. Such power is discretionary and will not ordinarily be
controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or
fraud or collusion. It follows that such withdrawn portion becomes
patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.

CEBU OXYGEN vs. Bercilles

FACTS
On September 23, 1968, the City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No.
2193, approved on October 3, 1968, declared the terminal portion of M.
Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same not
being included in the City Development Plan.

Subsequently, on December 19, 1968, the City Council of Cebu passed

Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land
through public bidding. Pursuant thereto, the lot was awarded to the herein
petitioner being the highest bidder and on March 3, 1969, the City of Cebu,
through the Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale to the
herein petitioner for a total consideration of P10,800.00.

By virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the petitioner filed an

application with the Court of First instance of Cebu to have its title to the
land registered.

ISSUE
WON the subject land is registrable.

HELD
YES.

Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State."

Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very clear and
unequivocal terms, states that: "Property thus withdrawn from public
servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real
property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed."

Therefore, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and
its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a
registerable title over the lot in question.
 Vda. De Tantoco v. Muncipal Council of Iloilo [G.R. No. 24950.
March 25, 1926.]

FACTS

The widow of Tan Toco sued the municipal council of Iloilo for the
two strips of land, consisting of 592 sq.m and 59 sq.m with the amount of
P42,966.40, which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for widening
said street. CFI Ilo-ilo ordered the said municipality to pay Mrs. Tantoco the
said amount, plus its interest. Said judgment was appealed, and was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. On account of lack of funds the municipality
of Iloilo was unable to pay the said judgment, wherefore plaintiff had a writ
of execution issue against the property of the said municipality, by virtue of
which the sheriff attached two auto trucks, one police patrol automobile,
the police stations on Mabini street, and in Molo and Mandurriao and the
concrete structures, with the corresponding lots.
After notice of the sale of said property had been made the
provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion with the CFI praying that the
attachment on the said property be dissolved, that the said attachment be
declared null and void as being illegal and violate the rights of the
municipality. To which the Court agree, declaring the attachment levied
upon the aforementioned property of the municipality null and void. Mrs.
Tantoco appealed the decision of CFI Ilo-ilo.

ISSUE

Whether the Municipal properties can be executed in lieu of the unsatisfied

obligation?

HELD

The Supreme Court denied appeal and affirmed the decision of CFI
Ilo-ilo on the ground that the principle governing property of the public
domain of the State is applicable to property for public use of the
municipalities as said municipal property is similar in character. The principle
is that the property for public use of the State is not within the commerce of
man and, consequently, is unalienable and not subject to prescription.
Likewise, property for public use of the municipality is not within the
commerce of man so long as it is used by the public and, consequently, said
property is also inalienable. The rule is that property held for public uses,
such as public buildings, streets, squares, parks, promenades, wharves
landing places, fire engines, hose and hose carriages, engine houses, public
markets, hospitals, cemeteries, and generally everything held for
governmental purposes, is not subject to levy and sale under execution
against such corporation.

Salas v. Jarencio
46 SCRA 734 / G.R. No. L-29788. August 30, 1972

Facts:
City of Manila was owner in fee simple a parcel of land known as Lot 1,
Block 557 of Cadastral Survey of City of Manila, with an area of
9,689 square meters. On September 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila
adopted a resolution requesting the President to consider the feasibility of
declaring a land as patrimonial property of Manila for the purpose of selling
these lots to its actual occupants. The resolution was then transmitted to
the Congress, approved by the President  Republic Act 4118 which
converted the land from communal property to disposable and alienable
land of State.

The City of Manila delivered the TCT to  Land Authority which it canceled
the TCT 22547 and issuing TCT 80876 in the name of Land Authority, with
the knowledge and consent of the Mayor.
However, for some reason, the City of Manila brought an action to restrain,
prohibit, and enjoin Land Authority and Register of Deeds from
implementing RA 4118, and praying for the declaration of RA 4118 as
unconstitutional. Trial court declared RA 4118 to be unconstitutional and
invalid on the ground that it deprived City of its property without due
process of law and payment of just compensation.

Land Authority and Register of Deeds argued that the land is a communal
land, or a portion of public domain owned by State; that the land has not
been used by City of Manila for any public purpose; that it was originally a
communal land not because it was needed in connection with its
organisation as a municipality but rather for the common use of its
inhabitants; that the City mayor merely enjoys the usufruct over said land
and its exercise of acts of ownership by selling parts thereof did not
necessarily convert the land into a patrimonial property of City of Manila nor
divert the State of its paramount title.

Issue:
Whether or not the land is a private or patrimonial property of the City of
Manila.

Held:
The land is public property.

As a general rule, regardless of the source or classification of land in the

possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in
its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State
for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or
proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subject to the paramount power of
the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes its creation to it
as an agent for the performance of a part of its public work, the
municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes
of local administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as if the
State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use.

When it comes to property of municipality which it did not acquire in its

private or corporate capacity with its own funds (the land was originally
given to City by Spain), the legislature can transfer its administration and
disposition to an agency of the National Government to be disposed of
according to its discretion. Here it did so in obedience to the constitutional
mandate of promoting social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of the people.

The alleged patrimonial character of the land under the ownership of the
City of Manila is totally belied by the City’s own official act, which is fatal to
its claim since the Congress did not do as bidden. If it were its patrimonial
property why should the City of Manila be requesting the President to make
representation to the legislature to declare it as such so it can be disposed
of in favor of the actual occupants? There could be no more blatant
recognition of the fact that said land belongs to the State and was simply
granted in usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal purposes.

The property was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its
private or proprietary capacity. It has in its name a registered title is not
questioned, but this title should be deemed to be held in trust for the State
as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila
granted by the sovereign upon its creation.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL, BULACAN, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, in his capacity as the
Presiding Judge, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, The PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF of Bulacan, MARGARITA D. VDA. DE IMPERIO,
ADORACION IMPERIO, RODOLFO IMPERIO, CONRADO IMPERIO,
ERNESTO IMPERIO, ALFREDO IMPERIO, CARLOS IMPERIO, JR.,
JUAN IMPERIO and SPOUSES MARCELO PINEDA and LUCILA
PONGCO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-61744
June 25, 1984

FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 604-B, the then CFI of Bulacan rendered judgment holding
herein petitioner municipality liable to respondents Imperio, et al. When the
judgment became final, respondent judge issued a writ of execution to
satisfy the same. Petitioner municipality filed a motion to quash the writ on
the ground that the municipality‘s property or funds are public exempt from
execution. The motion was denied. The respondent judge issued another
order requiring both the municipal and provincial treasurer to comply with
the money judgment. When the treasurers failed to do so, respondent judge
issued an order for their arrest and that they will be released upon
compliance, hence the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the funds of the municipality in the hands of the Provincial and
Municipal Treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel, respectively are public
funds which are exempt from execution?

HELD:
YES.

Municipal funds in possession of municipal and provincial treasurers are

public funds exempt from execution. The reason for those was explained in
the case of Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois ‗that are held in trust for the
people intended and used for the accomplices of the purposes for which
municipal corporations are created and that to subject said properties and
public funds to execution would materially impede, even defeat and in some
instance destroy said purpose. Thus it is clear that all the funds of petitioner
municipality in the possession of the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel as
well as those in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan are
also public funds and as such they are exempt from execution. Besides PD
447, known as the Decree on Local Fiscal Administration, provides in section
3 (a) that ―no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance
of a lawful appropriation or other specific statutory authority. Otherwise
stated, there must be a corresponding appropriation in the form of an
ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan before any money of the
municipality may be paid out. In the case at bar, it has not been shown that
the Sangguniang Bayan has passed any ordinance to this effect.

Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga

G.R. No. L-24440

DOCTRINE: Under the law of Municipal Corporations, properties which are

devoted to public service are deemed public and the rest remain
patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the
property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local
administration, public education, public health, etc.

FACTS:
On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the
Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. It further provided that
buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer
of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of
Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General.

The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some

buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and
covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in the name of
Zamboanga Province. Pursuant to CA 39, the Auditor General fixed the
value of the properties and buildings in question left by Zamboanga
Province in Zamboanga City at P1,294,244.00.

When RA 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into

Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur, assets and obligations of the
previous Zamboanga province were divided as follows: 54.39% for
Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. Zamboanga del
Norte therefore became entitled to 54.39% of P1,294,244.00, the total
value of the lots and buildings in question, or P704,220.05 payable by
Zamboanga City.

The Executive Secretary issued a ruling holding that Zamboanga del Norte
had a vested right as owner of the properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of CA
39, and is entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This
ruling revoked the previous Cabinet Resolution conveying all the said 50 lots
and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City when the provincial capital of the
then Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog.

The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of Internal

Revenue to deduct an amount equal to 25% of the regular internal revenue
allotment for the City of Zamboanga. The deductions, all aggregating
P57,373.46, was credited to the province of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial
payment of the P704,220.05 due it.

On June 17, 1961, RA 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of CA 39 by

providing that buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former
province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are
transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga.

Consequently, the Secretary of Finance ordered the CIR to stop from

effecting further payments to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to
Zamboanga City the sum taken from it out of the internal revenue allotment
of Zamboanga del Norte.

Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint for relief with Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction against Zamboanga City, the Secretary of Finance and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. They prayed that 1) RA 3039 be
declared unconstitutional, 2) plaintiff's rights and obligations under said law
be declared, 3) they be reimbursed the sum paid to defendant City, and 4)
the latter be ordered to continue paying the balance of its internal revenue
allotments.

The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.

ISSUE:
WON RA 3039 is valid – PARTLY VALID

HELD:
Applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of
Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are
devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial.
Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property be
held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local administration,
public education, public health, etc.

Following this classification, RA 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots

used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium
sites and the high school playground sites — a total of 24 lots — since these
were held by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity
and therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress.

Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots above-mentioned, the

records do not disclose whether they were constructed at the expense of
the former Province of Zamboanga. Considering however the fact that said
buildings must have been erected even before 1936 when CA 39 was
enacted and the further fact that provinces then had no power to authorize
construction of buildings at their own expense, it can be assumed that said
buildings were erected by the National Government, using national funds.
Even assuming that provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute
mere accessories to the lands, which are public in nature , and so, they
follow the nature of said lands, i.e., public.

But RA 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share
in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial
properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly, governmental
purposes. Moreover, the fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens
the proposition that they are truly private in nature. However, the fact that
the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also registered is of no
significance since registration cannot convert public property to private.

It results then that Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to collect from the
City of Zamboanga the former's 54.39% share in the 26 properties which
are patrimonial in nature.

Villanueva v. Castañeda
154 SCRA 142

DOCTRINE: Article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public use in
provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the
squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public
works of general service supported by said towns or provinces.” Such is
outside the commerce of man and cannot be the object of a valid contract.
(Article 1271)

FACTS:
The subject of the herein petition is a “talipapa” that the petitioners claim
they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of
a previous authorization granted to them by the municipal government. The
respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal
constructions on public property.

This dispute goes back to when the municipal council of San Fernando
adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24 members of the
Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct
permanent stags and sell in the above-mentioned place. 2 The action was
protested where the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch 2, issued
a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the defendants from
constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the controversy. 3 On
January 18, 1964, while this case was pending, the municipal council of San
Fernando adopted Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area
as "the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality. Four years
later, the judge decided that the land occupied by the petitioners, being
public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not
be the subject of private occupancy. 5 The writ of preliminary injunction was
made permanent. 6
The decision was apparently not enforced, for the petitioners were not
evicted from the place; in fact, according to then they and the 128 other
persons were in 1971 assigned specific areas or space allotments therein for
which they paid daily fees to the municipal government. Then, on January
12, 1982, the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San
Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Resolution
No. 29, to restore the subject property "to its original and customary use as
a public plaza thereby the respondent was tasked to demolish the stalls in
the subject place which was favored by the trial court.

The basic contention of the petitioners is that the disputed area is under
lease to them by virtue of contracts they had entered into with the
municipal government.

ISSUE:
WON the lease agreement whereby the municipality of Cavite leased to the
petitioner valid given the fact the said area is dedicated for public use? --
NO

HELD:
Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that the petitioners had no right
in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in
remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. The
lease agreement is null and void.

According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public use in
provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the
squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public
works of general service supported by said towns or provinces.
The said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use, the municipal
council of Cavite could not in 1907 withdraw or exclude from public use a
portion thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit of the defendant
Hilaria Rojas.

Furthermore, the Civil Code, article 1271, prescribes that everything which
is not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract, and
plazas and streets are outside of this commerce.

Maneclang v. IAC
144 SCRA 553

DOCTRINE: Finding that subject body of water is a creek belonging to the

public domain,not susceptible to private appropriation, a factual
determination binding on the Supreme Court.

FACTS:
● Maneclang filed a complaint for quieting of title over a
certain fishpond located within the four parcels of land belonging to
them.
● The trial court dismissed the complaint upon finding that
the body of water traversing the titled properties of petitioners is a
creek constituting a tributary of a river; therefore public in nature and
not subject to private appropriation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a creek can be registered under the Torrens System -- NO

HELD:
A creek is a recess/arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb
and flow of the sea. It is a property belonging to the public domain, It is a
property belonging to the public domain. it is not susceptible to
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. As a public water, it cannot be
registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual.

Its nature as property of the public domain cannot be modified by the

construction of irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation Authority, or by its
conversion into a fishpond. Hence, a compromise agreement adjudicating
the ownership of such property in favor of an individual is null and void. The
compromise agreement has no legal effect since it is contrary to law and
public policy.
Maneclang v. Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts:

Adriano Maneclang in this case filed a complaint for quieting of title over a
certain
fishpond located within the 4 parcels of land belonging to them situated in
Pangasinan but the trial court dismissed it by saying that the body of water
is a creek constituting a tributary to Agno River therefore public in nature
and not subject to private appropriation. They appealed it to the IAC, which
affirmed the aforementioned decision. Hence, this is a review on certiorari.
However, after having been asked to comment to the case thereon, they
manifested their lack of interest and the parties to the case (the
complainant and the awardee in the public bidding Maza) decided to
amicably settle the case saying that judgment be rendered and that the
court recognize the ownership of the petitioners over the land the body of
water found within their titled properties. They say that there would be no
benefit since the NIA already constructed a dike and no water now gets in
and out of the land.

Issue: Whether or not the fishpond is public in nature.

Held: Yes. A creek is defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. It is a property belonging to the
public domain and is not susceptible to private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. The mere construction of the dikes by NIA nor its
conversion to a fishpond altered or changed the nature of the creek as
property of the public domain. The compromise agreement is null and void
and of no legal effect because it is contrary to law and public policy.

Director of Lands v. MERALCO

153 SCRA 686

DOCTRINE: Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public

land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the
land ceases to be public land and becomes private property.

FACTS:
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed an amended application for
registration of a parcel of land located in Taguig, Metro Manila. Applicant
acquired the land applied for registration by purchase from Ricardo
Natividad who in turn acquired the same from his father Gregorio Natividad
as evidenced by a Deed of Original Absolute Sale. Applicant's predecessors-
in-interest have possessed the property under the concept of an owner for
more than 30 years. The property was declared for taxation purposes under
the name of the applicant and the taxes due thereon have been paid.

The respondent Judge rendered a decision ordering the registration of the

property in the name of the private respondent. The petitioner Director of
Lands interposed this petition raising the issue of whether or not a
corporation may apply for registration of title to land. Petitioner contends
that a corporation is not among those that may apply for confirmation of
title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the Public Land Act.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a corporation may apply for registration of titles to
public land.
2. Whether or not open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the
legal fiction whereby the land ceases to be public land and
becomes private property.

HELD:
1. Yes.
 The legal issue raised by the petitioner Director of Lands has been
squarely dealt with in two recent cases (The Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.,
etc., No. L-73002 (December 29, 1986), 146 SCRA 509. The Director of
Lands v. Hon. Bengzon and Dynamarine Corporation, etc., No. 54045
(July 28, 1987)], and resolved in the affirmative. There can be no
different answer in the case at bar.

Coming to the case at bar, if the land was already private at the time
Meralco bought it from Natividad, then the prohibition in the 1973
Constitution against corporations holding alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease (1973 Const., Art. XIV, See. 11) does not
apply.

The fact that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by a

corporation is simply another accidental circumstance, "productive of a
defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the
substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed
in said proceedings." Considering that it is not disputed that the
Natividads could have had their title confirmed, only a rigid
subservience to the letter of the law would deny private respondent the
right to register its property which was validly acquired.

2. Yes.
In the Acme decision, Supreme Court upheld the doctrine that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the
period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land,
upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need
of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes
private property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the

respondent Judge is AFFIRMED.

Laurel v. Garcia
187 SCRA 797

DOCTRINE: An abandonment of the intention to use the property for

public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the
Civil Code must be definite Abandonment and it cannot be inferred from the
non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the
government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial
support to repair and improve the property Abandonment must be a certain
and positive act based on correct legal premises.

FACTS:
These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their
representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of
the 3,179 square meters of land at Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21,
1990.

The subject property in this case is 1 of the 4 properties in Japan acquired

by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered
into with Japan on May 9, 1956. The properties and the capital goods and
services procured from the Japanese government for national development
projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses
in life and property and their suffering during World War II.

A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former

Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the
subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm. No change of ownership
or title shall occur. The Philippine government retains the title all throughout
the lease period and thereafter. However, the government has not acted
favorably.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling
non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and
services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in
Japan including the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first
"Whereas" clause.

Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the

government has been pushing its decision to sell the reparations properties
starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding
at a minimum floor price of $225 million.

ISSUE:
W/N the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the
Philippine Government. -- NO

HELD:
NO, the subject property cannot be alienated by the government, even if
the property has not been in use for a long time.

Vice President Laurel asserts that the lands were acquired as part of the
reparations for diplomatic and consular use by the Philippine government.
Laurel states that the Roppongi property is classified as one of public
dominion, and not of private ownership under Article 420 of the Civil Code.

The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under "property
intended for public service" in paragraph 2 of the above provision. He states
that being one of public dominion, no ownership by anyone can attach to it,
not even by the State. The Roppongi and related properties were acquired
for "sites for chancery, diplomatic, and consular quarters, buildings and
other improvements. The petitioner states that they continue to be intended
for a necessary service. They are held by the State in anticipation of an
opportune use. (Citing 3 Manresa 65-66). Hence, it cannot be appropriated,
is outside the commerce of man, or to put it in more simple terms, it cannot
be alienated nor be the subject matter of contracts (Citing Municipality of
Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 20 [1915]). Noting the non-use of the Roppongi
property at the moment, the petitioner avers that the same remains
property of public dominion so long as the government has not used it for
other purposes nor adopted any measure constituting a removal of its
original purpose or use.

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of

man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership
for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of
collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve
the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the
common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropration

The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:

ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private
ownership.
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks shores
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national
wealth.
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of
the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial
property.

The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article

420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for
some public service.

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual
Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property.
Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public
use. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the
part of the government to withdraw it from being such.

An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public

service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil
Code must be definite Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use
alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's own
deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and
improve the property Abandonment must be a certain and positive act
based on correct legal premises.

A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not

relinquishment of the Roppongi property's original purpose.

Moreover, President Aquino’s approval of the recommendation by the

investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at
the very least, conditioned on a valid change in the public character of the
Roppongi property. It does not have the force and effect of law since the
President already lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already
convened for more than a year. Assuming that the Roppongi property is no
longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the
respondents. There is no law authorizing its conveyance, and thus, the
Court sees no compelling reason to tackle the constitutional issue raised by
petitioner Ojeda.

Macasiano v. Diokno, Municipality of Paranaque

G.R. No. 97764

DOCTRINE: "Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not

absolute. They are subject to limitations laid down by the Constitution and
the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of such powers
should be subservient to paramount considerations of health and well-being
of the members of the community."

FACTS:
On June 13, 1990, the respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86,
Series of 1990 which authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz,
Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran,
Paranaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon.
July 20, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No.
86, s. 1990 of the municipal council of respondent municipality subject to
the following conditions:
1. That the aforenamed streets are not used for vehicular traffic, and
that the majority of the residents do not oppose the establishment
of the flea market/vending areas thereon;
2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea market/vending
area shall be marked distinctly, and that the 2 meters on both
sides of the road shall be used by pedestrians;
3. That the time during which the vending area is to be used shall be
clearly designated;
4. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary and shall be
closed once the reclaimed areas are developed and donated by the
Public Estate Authority.

June 20, 1990, Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any
service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and
management of flea markets and/or vending areas. On August 8, 1990,
respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative,
entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and
manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to
remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Paranaque.
Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the
said streets. On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP
Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the
destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in
Baclaran. These stalls were later returned to respondent Palanyag. October
16, 1990, petitioner Brig. General Macasiano wrote a letter to respondent
Palanyag giving the latter ten (10) days to discontinue the flea market;
otherwise, the market stalls shall be dismantled. Hence, on October 23,
1990, respondents municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint
petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for
preliminary injunction, to which the petitioner filed his
memorandum/opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction. October 24, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary restraining
order to enjoin petitioner from enforcing his letter-order of October 16,
1990 pending the hearing on the motion for writ of preliminary injunction.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court issued an order upholding the validity
of Ordinance No. 86 s. 1990 of the Municipality of Paranaque and enjoining
petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order against
respondent Palanyag.

ISSUE:
W/N an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of
Paranaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares
as sites for flea markets is valid. -- NO

HELD:
The Executive Order issued by acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of
Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who were granted
licenses by the city government contravenes the general law that reserves
city streets and roads for public use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may not
infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the
purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles
and pedestrians. The Solicitor General furthers the matter with his
observation, "Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not absolute.
They are subject to limitations laid down by the Constitution and the laws
such as our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of such powers should be
subservient to paramount considerations of health and well-being of the
members of the community. Every local government unit has the sworn
obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety and
convenience, maintain peace and order, and promote the general prosperity
of the inhabitants of the local units. Based on this objective, the local
government should refrain from acting towards that which might prejudice
or adversely affect the general welfare." Moreover, the municipality did not
even comply with the guidelines set forth by the Metropolitan Manila
Authority. Even if we were to argue for purposes of debate, the city of
Paranaque's claim would still be bereft and lacking in reason.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent

Regional Trial Court dated December 17, 1990 which granted the writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner as PNP Superintendent,
Metropolitan Traffic Command from enforcing the demolition of market
stalls along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and
Opena streets is hereby RESERVED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

Chavez v. Public Estates Authority

384 SCRA 152

DOCTRINE: Until now, the only way the government can sell to private
parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public
domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. However,
there exists a constitutional ban wherein private corporations are prohibited
from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. These corporations may
only lease the lands from a period granted by the law.

FACTS:
The government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a
contract with CDCP (Construction and Development Corp of the Phils.) to
reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay under the
MCCRRP (Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project). Later on
President Marcos signed PD No. 1084 and 1085 creating PEA (Public Estates
Authority) and transferring to PEA the reclaimed lands in the foreshore and
offshore of the Manila Bay. In addition, a Memorandum of Agreement was
executed between PEA and CDCP wherein the latter acceded and
transferred its rights and interest in favor of the former as regards CDCP’s
reclaimed lands under MCCRRP. During Aquino’s administration, special
patents as well as 3 TCTs (the lands were known as Freedom Islands) were
issued in favor of PEA.

PEA and AMARI, a private corporation, through negotiation but without

conducting any public bidding entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA
for brevity) for the development of the Freedom Islands. A year later,
Senate President Maceda described such JVA during his privileged speech as
the “grandmother of all scams”. Consequently, a joint investigation was
conducted and the report concluded that the JVA is illegal because what
PEA seeks to do is to transfer ownership of the reclaimed lands which are
public lands hence inalienable to AMARI. However, the Legal Task formed
by Pres. Ramos upheld the legality of the JVA.

Phillipine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that Pres. Ramos
ordered that renegotiations regarding the JVA be again made. Such JVA
(now called Amended JVA) was later on approved by Pres. Estrada.
Petitioner Chavez prays that the Amended JVA be declared null and void for
it violating the Constitutional and statutory provisions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not AMARI, a private corporation may acquire the reclaimed
lands? NO

HELD:
In this case, the SC traced back the laws governing reclaimed lands as
regards its alienability. The previous Constitutions including the 1987
Constitution has adopted the Regalian Doctrine wherein it states that all
public lands and waters are owned by the State. The court discussed and
emphasized also CA No. 141 which states that the only way the government
can sell to private parties’ government reclaimed and marshy disposable
lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing
such sale. In addition, the Constitution has established that private
corporations (such as AMARI) cannot acquire the reclaimed lands however;
these corporations are allowed to lease them. This rule is absolute.

Applying these provisions to the case, the reclaimed lands are classified as
public property and in order for PEA to sell these lands; there must be a
legislative act granting such right to sell. In addition, even if there exist an
express provision in favor of PEA, such would still subject of the
constitutional ban as regards private corporation acquiring reclaimed
alienable lands.

As mentioned and established already, these reclaimed lands are considered

inalienable public property. PD No. 1085 granting PEA the power to oversee
the Freedom Islands did not in any way convert the lands into alienable or
disposable lands. The issuance of special patents by Pres. Aquino as well as
the TCTs also did not convert it into private lands. It must be noted that the
registration of public lands under Torrens system cannot convert it into
private property.

MIAA v. Court of Appeals

 G.R. No. 155650

DOCTRINE: The term “ports” includes seaports and airports. The MIAA
Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port” constructed by the State.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings
are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the
Republic of the Philippines.

FACTS:
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Complex in Parañaque City. As operator of the
international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and
equipment within the NAIA Complex.
The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land
including the runways and buildings (“Airport Lands and Buildings”) then
under the Bureau of Air Transportation. The MIAA Charter further provides
that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through
sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the
Philippines.

OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) issued Opinion No.

061, in which it said that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the
exemption for real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA
charter.

Therefore, MIAA was held to be delinquent in paying its taxes. The City of
Parañaque Levied upon the properties of MIAA, and posted invitations for
public biddings of MIAA’s properties. MIAA filed with CA an action for
prohibition / injunction. The City of Parañaque averred that Section 193 of
the Local Government code expressly withdrew tax exemptions from
government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs).

CA dismissed the petition for filing beyond the 60 day reglementary period

ISSUE:
Whether properties of the MIAA are subject to real estate taxes. -- NO

HELD:
In the first place, MIAA is not a GOCC, it is an instrumentality of the
government. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate
powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any
other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested
with corporate powers. As operator of the international airport, MIAA
administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA
Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600
hectares of land, including the runways and buildings (“Airport Lands and
Buildings”) then under the Bureau of Air Transportation. The MIAA Charter
further provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be
disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by
the President of the Philippines.

Furthermore, Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public

dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines. Article 419 of the Civil Code provides, The Airport Lands and
Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by
the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

The Civil Code provides:

ARTICLE 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private
ownership.

ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of public

dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
 State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis
supplied)

ARTICLE 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the
character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.

ARTICLE 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer

intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State.

No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article

420 of the Civil Code, like “roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State,” are owned by the State. The term “ports”
includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings
constitute a “port” constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil
Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public
dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are
used by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation.
The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the
public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as
properties for public use. The operation by the government of a tollway
does not change the character of the road as one for public use. Someone
must pay for the maintenance of the road, either the public indirectly
through the taxes they pay the government, or only those among the public
who actually use the road through the toll fees they pay upon using the
road. The tollway system is even a more efficient and equitable manner of
taxing the public for the maintenance of public roads.

The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the
property whether it is of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code
defines property of public dominion as one “intended for public use.” Even if
the government collects toll fees, the road is still “intended for public use” if
anyone can use the road under the same terms and conditions as the rest
of the public. The charging of fees, the limitation on the kind of vehicles
that can use the road, the speed restrictions and other conditions for the
use of the road do not affect the public character of the road.

The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees
MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the bulk of the income that maintains
the operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees does not change the
character of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees are often termed
user’s tax. This means taxing those among the public who actually use a
public facility instead of taxing all the public including those who never use
the particular public facility. A user’s tax is more equitable — a principle of
taxation mandated in the 1987 Constitution.

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, which its Charter calls the
“principal airport of the Philippines for both international and domestic air
traffic,” are properties of public dominion because they are intended for
public use. As properties of public dominion, they indisputably belong to the
State or the Republic of the Philippines.
Being a property of public dominion, the properties of MIAA are beyond the
commerce of man.